The Operations of the Navy in the Dutch East Indies and the Bay of Bengal by Remmelink, Willem
Compiled by 
The War History Office of the 
National Defense College of Japan
The Operations of the Navy 
in the Dutch East Indies 
and the Bay of Bengal
Edited and translated by Willem Remmelink
The Operations of the Navy in the Dutch East Indies
and the Bay of Bengal

War History Series, Volume 26
The Operations of the Navy in the
Dutch East Indies and the 
Bay of Bengal
Compiled by
The War History Office of the National Defense College of Japan




Prof. Dr. Ken’ichi Gotō (Professor Emeritus, Waseda University)
Prof. Dr. Hisashi Takahashi (Professor Emeritus, Sophia University)
Prof. Dr. Ryōichi Tobe (Teikyo University)
Prof. Dr. Jirō Mizushima (Chiba University)
Dr. Petra Groen (Netherlands Institute for Military History)
Dr. Anita van Dissel (Leiden University)
Lt. Gen. (ret.) Ad Herweijer (Royal Netherlands Army) (†)
Lt. Gen. (ret.) Jan Folmer (Royal Netherlands Army)
V. Adm. (ret.) Egmond van Rijn (Royal Netherlands Navy) (†)
V. Adm. (ret.) Matthieu Borsboom (Royal Netherlands Navy)
This publication is part of a project of the Corts Foundation (www.cortsfoundation.org) that
aims to translate into English several volumes of the Senshi Sōsho series concerning the former
Dutch East Indies.
The publication of this volume was made possible by grants from the Isaac Alfred Ailion
Foundation, the Suntory Foundation, the Samenwerkende Maritieme Fondsen (i.e. Vader-
landsch Fonds ter Aanmoediging van ‘s-Lands Zeedienst, Directie der Oostersche Handel
en Reederijen, Vereeniging de Prins Hendrik Stichting), M.A.O.C.  Gravin van Bylandt Sticht-
ing, and the Netherlands Institute of Military History (NIMH). Their logos may be found at
the back of this volume.
Original title: 蘭印・ベンガル湾方面海軍進攻作戦 [Ran-In Bengaru-wan Hōmen Kaigun Shinkō
Sakusen], published by Asagumo Shimbunsha [Asagumo Newspaper Inc.], Tokyo 1969
© National Defense College of Japan [National Institute for Defense Studies], Japan 1969
English translation title: The Operations of the Navy in the Dutch East Indies and the Bay of Bengal
© The Corts Foundation/Leiden University Press, 2018
Cover design: Geert de Koning
ISBN 978 90 8728 280 6
e-ISBN 978 94 0060 293 9 (e-pdf)
NUR 686
All rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of this book may
be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any
means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise) without the written permission of
the publisher and the Corts Foundation, Secretariat, Mozartweg 3, 1323 AV Almere, The Netherlands.
This book is distributed in North America by the University of Chicago Press (www.press.uchicago.edu).
Contents
Editor’s Note xvii
About the Senshi Sōsho (War History Series) xxiii
Foreword xxxi
Preface, Explanatory Notes xxxiii
Chapter I The Circumstances Leading to Japan’s Invasion of the
Dutch East Indies 1
1. The Prewar Operational Policy of the Navy and the Supply and Demand of Oil 1
2. Changes in the International Situation and the Import of Essential Materials 2
3. The International Situation and the Changes in the Policy for Coping with
the Current Situation 4
4. The Supply and Demand of Essential Materials and the Appropriate Moment
to Open Hostilities 7
5. Changes in the Measures to Cope with the Fuel [Problem] 10
6. The Breakdown in the Japan-U.S. Negotiations 13
Chapter II The Military Topography of the Southwestern Region 15






The East Indian Islands 16
2. Summary of Meteorological Conditions 18




The East Indian Islands 19
4. Summary of Major Ports, Waterways, etc. 19
The Waters of the Philippines 19
South China Sea 20
The Malaya Waters 20
The Waters of the Dutch East Indies 20
5. The Military Situation in the Southwestern Region 22
Distribution of Forces 22
Strategic Assessment Based on the Location of the Air Bases 24
Chapter III The Drafting of a Plan of Operations for the
Southern Advance 26
1. Fixing the Outline of the Plan of Operations 26
2. IGHQ’s [Navy Department’s] Mission Directives and the Army-Navy Central 
Agreement 34
3. The Plan of Operations of the Combined Fleet 42
4. Conclusion of the Tokyo Agreement 62
Agreement Between the Commanders in Chief of the Combined Fleet and 
the Southern Army 62
Agreement Between the Commander in Chief of the Southern Army and
the Commander of the Navy Southern Task Force 62
5. Conclusion of the Iwakuni Agreement and the Saigon Agreement 69
6. Issue of Orders by Each Navy Unit 70
The Southern Task Force 70
The Philippines Unit 75
The Malaya Unit 75
7. The Southern Army Issues the Order to Launch the Invasion 75
8. Remaining Problems in the Southern Operation 76
Chapter IV Progress in the Preparations for the Invasion of the
Dutch East Indies 79
1. Smooth Progress in the Stage-One, Phase-One Operations 79
Success in the Leadoff Operations on the First Day of the Opening of Hostilities 79
Satisfactory Progress Seen also in the Operations in Malaya and Northern Borneo 81
Gaining Command of the Air in the Philippines Area and the Rapid Advance
of the Ground Units 82
2. The Bulk of the [Navy] Philippines Unit is Shifted to the Dutch East Indies 
Unit 83
The Shift to the Phase-Two Disposition of Forces 83
The Situation of the Navy Southern Task Force 84
The Situation of the Army Units 87
3. Assessment of the Enemy Situation in the Dutch East Indies Area at the Launch 
of Phase-Two Operations 87
4. Conclusion of the Army-Navy Agreement for the Java Invasion [Operation] 89
The First [Scheduled] Army-Navy Meeting is Moved up 89
vi
Conclusion of the Cam Ranh Agreement and the Shortening of the Invasion Schedule 90
5. Issuing the Phase-Two Plan of Operations, etc. 94
The Southern Task Force 94
The [Navy] Dutch East Indies [Operation] Unit 94
The Air Unit 100
The Submarine Unit 101
The Army Units 103
6. The Preparations of All Units Move Ahead 104
The Operational Directives of the Southern Task Force Commander and the Situation 
of the Main Body of the Southern Task Force 104
The Operational Directives of the Dutch East Indies Unit Commander and the Movements 
of the Units of the Dutch East Indies Unit 105
The Operational Directives of the [Southern Task Force] Air Unit Commander and 
the Actions of Each Component of the Air Unit 113
The Situation of the Carrier-Based Air Units 116
The Situation of the Army Units 116
Chapter V The Forward Push of the Air Bases 118
1. Outline of the Progress of the Operation 118
The Launch of the Dutch East Indies Operation 118
The Invasion of Malaya Makes Progress 119
Capture of Ledo and Southern Malaya 120
The Engagements of the Submarine Units 121
The Manila Conference 122
Completion of the Forward Push of the Bases in the Direction of Eastern Java 123
Completion of the Forward Push of the [Air] Bases in the Malaya Area 124
Capture of Southern Sumatra; the Preparations to Invade Western Java More or Less 
Completed 125
2. The Capture of Tarakan 126
Plan of Operations, etc. 127
The Arrangements Between the 1st Escort Unit and the [Army] Sakaguchi 
Detachment 127
The Plan of Operations of the 1st Escort Unit 127
The Plan of Operations of the Sakaguchi Detachment 129
The Plan of Operations of the Air Unit of the Southern Task Force 130
The Plan of Operations of the 2d Base Unit 131
The Plan of Operations of the 1st Air Unit 131
Assessment of the Enemy Situation Centering on Tarakan 133
The Launch of the Invasion Operation 133
Preliminary Neutralization of the Enemy Air Power Completed 133
The Sailing of the Convoy 135
The Landings and the Land Combat 135
The Engagement of Minesweepers No. 13 and No. 14 137
The Sinking of an Enemy Minelayer 143
The Guarding Against [Enemy] Submarines and Aircraft, and the Search for 
the Enemy 143
The Launch of Preparations for the Coming Operations 145
Taking over the Guarding from the Army 145
vii
The Minesweeping of the Inner Port Delayed 145
Little Progress in Conditioning the Airfield 146
The Swift Restoration of the Oil Fields 147
The Air Operations 149
3. The Capture of Menado 149
The Plan of Operations 150
The 2d Escort Unit 150
The Sasebo Combined Special Landing Force 152
The 1st Base Unit 153
The 2d Air Unit 153
The 1st Air Raid Unit 154
The 1st Yokosuka Special Landing Force 154
The Launch of the Invasion Operation 158
Prior Neutralization of the Enemy Air Power 158
The Sailing of the Convoy 158
The Engagements of the Sasebo Combined Special Landing Force and the Paratroop 
Unit 159
The Engagements of the Seaplane Unit 161
The Land-Based Air Units Scarcely Spotted the Enemy 164
The Operations from the 12th till the 20th [of January] 165
Lessons from the Operation and Observations 170
The Operations of the Main Body and the Base Unit 171
Sweeping the Molucca Sea of Whales 172
The Operations of the Support Unit and the Dutch East Indies Unit 172
The State of the Allies Forces 174
4. The Capture of Balikpapan 177
Postponement of the Invasion Schedule 177
Plan of Operations, etc. 177
The Arrangements Between the 1st Escort Unit and the Sakaguchi Detachment 178
The Plan of Operations of the [Army] Sakaguchi Detachment 178
The Covert Operation of the Sakaguchi Detachment 179
The Plan of Operations of the Detached Force of the Sakaguchi Detachment 179
The Plan of Operations of the 1st Escort Unit 179
The Plan of Operations of the 2d Base Unit 181
The Plan of Operations of the 1st Air Unit 181
The Plan of Operations of the Air Unit of the Southern Task Force 182
Assessment of the Enemy Movements in the Balikpapan Area 183
The Launch of the Invasion Operation 184
Prior Neutralization of [Enemy] Air Power Completed 184
The Sailing of the Convoy 184
Surprise Attack of an Enemy Surface Unit on the Japanese Anchorage 188
The Situation of the Allied Navy 192
The Situation After the Landing 194
The Situation from the 25th Onwards 195
The Air Campaigns After the Departure of the Convoy 198
5. The Seizure of Kendari 200
6. The Manila Agreement and the Operational Policy for Phase-Three 205
Request for a Two-Week Postponement of the Operation Schedule 205
The Difficult Conclusion of the Manila Agreement 208
viii
Issue of the Order to Commit the Main Force of the Carrier Task Force to 
the Southern Theater 211
The Operational Policy of Phase-Three Operations of the Southern Task Force 212
7. The Capture of Ambon 213
Plan of Operations, etc. 213
The Arrangement Between the 2d Escort Unit and the Itō Detachment 214
The Plan of Operations of the 2d Escort Unit 215
The Plan of Operations of the Itō Detachment 216
The Plan of Operations of the 1st Kure Special Landing Force 217
The Plan of Operations of the 2d Air Unit 218
The Plan of Operations of the Air Unit of the Southern Task Force 218
The Launch of the Operation 218
Signs of the Enemy Hardly Seen 218
The Enemy Movements in the Ambon Area at the Time of the Launch of
the Invasion Operation 220
The Sailing of the Invasion Convoy 221
The Launch of the Landing Operation and the General Completion of
the Capture 223
Minesweeping Delayed 227
The Operations of the 2d Air Unit 229
The Engagements of the Land-Based Air Units 231
The Formation of the 24th Special Base Force and the Preparations for
the Subsequent Operations 232
8. Operation Z of the Air Units and a Sea Engagement off Java 233
The Launch of the Operations 233
Operation Orders 233
Reconnaissance 234
Bombing the Airfields in the Surabaya Area 235
Destroying the Enemy Fighter Plane Units 235
Destroying an Enemy Fleet off Java 237
The Second Attack of [Operation] Z 241
Letting the Remnant of the Enemy Fleet Slip by 242
A Review of the Course of the Engagement 243
Related Operations 244
A Change in Deployment 245
9. The Capture of Makassar 246
Preparations for the Operation 246
Plan of Operations, etc. 248
Assessment of the Enemy Movements Centering on Makassar 248
The Plan of Operations of the 1st Base Unit 248
The Plan of Operations of the Sasebo Combined Special Landing Force 249
The Plan of Operations of the 2d Air Unit 249
The Plan of Operations of the Land-Based Air Units 250
The Launch of the Operation 250
Neutralization of the Enemy Air Power and the Sailing of the Convoy 250
The Natsushio Torpedoed; the Landing 251
The Redeployment of the [Makassar] Invasion Units 253
The Operations of the Air Units 256
10. The Seizure of Banjarmasin 256
ix
11. The Invasion of Southern Sumatra 258
Arrangement on the Air [Operations] in Operation L 258
Arrangement on Operation L 260
The Plans of Operation, etc. 261
The Plan of Operations of the [Navy] Malaya Unit 261
Outline of the Plan of Operations of the Army Units
(Excluding the [Army] Air Units) 265
Detailed Arrangements Between the 38th Division Commander and 
the 9th Base Force Commander 266
The Plan of Operations of the Escort Unit 267
The Plan of Operations of the Base Units 270
The Plan of Operations of the 1st Air Unit 270
The Plan of Operations of the 2d Air Unit 271
The Plan of Operations of the 3d Air Unit 272
The Plan of Operations of the Submarine Unit 272
The Plan of Operations of the Army Air Units 273
The Launch of the Operation 274
Postponement of the Operation Schedule 274
Little Progress in the Prior Neutralization of the [Enemy] Air Power 279
The Sailing of the Convoy 282
Missing an Opportunity to Destroy the Enemy Fleet 287
The Lack of Military Gains Produced by the Air Units 290
Success of the Upriver Sail to Palembang 295
The Operations of the Surface Units from the 16th Onwards 296
The Operations of the Air Units from the 16th Onwards 299
The Operations of the Submarine Units 299
The Engagements of the Army Air Units 300
The Operations of the Army Units 302
The Failed Counterattacks by the Allied Forces 304
12. The Capture by Surprise of Bali 305
The Air Unit’s Insistence on the Capture of Bali 305
The Plan of Operations 308
The 1st Base Unit 308
The Army Units 310
The [Navy] Air Units 310
Assessment of the Enemy Movements Centered on Bali 310
The Launch of the Operation 311
The Prior Neutralization of the [Enemy] Air Power Made Little Progress 311
The Sailing of the Convoy 311
The First Phase of the Sea Engagement off Bali
(From 2353 on 19 February till 0110 on 20 February) 314
The Second Phase of the Sea Engagement off Bali
(From 0310 till 0323) 317
The Third Phase of the Sea Engagement off Bali
(From 0341 till 0346) 317
The Fourth Phase of the Sea Engagement off Bali
(From 0347 till 0354) 317
The Withdrawal of the 1st [Phase Operation] Raiding Unit 319
The Communiqué by IGHQ 320
The Operations of the Air Unit 321
x
The Engagements of the Army Units 322
The Second [Phase]: The Bali Transport Operation 322 
A Review of the Sea Engagement off Bali 324
The First Phase 324
The Second, Third, and Fourth Phases 326
13. The Surprise Attack Operation Against Port Darwin 330
The Plan of Operations for a Surprise Attack on Port Darwin 330
The Launch of the Operation 334
Reconnaissance and Sailing 334
The Destruction of Port Darwin 337
14. The Capture of Timor 342
The State of Affairs up to the Capture [Operation] 342
The Invasion Schedule and the Units Involved 342
The Issue of Invading Portuguese Timor 342
The Issue of Which Forces to Assign to the Invasion of Timor 345
The Plan of Operations 346
Plan of Operations of the Eastern Attack Unit 346
The Arrangements Between the 2d Escort Unit and the [Army] Itō Detachment 347
The Plan of Operations of the Other Units 348
The Launch of the Operation 349
Prior Neutralization of the [Enemy] Air Power 349
The Sailing of the Invasion Units 351
The Landing in Kupang and the Uphill Battle of the Airborne Unit 351
The Landing at Dili 355
Chapter VI The Drafting of the Java Invasion Operation Plan 358
1. The Circumstances Until the Launch of the Operation 358
[The Circumstances] up to the Manila Conference 358
[The Circumstances] After the Manila Conference Until the Launch of the Operation 360
The Situation of the Units to Be Involved [in the Operation] 360
The Outline of the Arrangements Between the Commanders of the Army and 
the Navy 361
The Operational Policy of the Southern Task Force Commander 362
The Operational Policy of the Dutch East Indies Unit Commander 362
The Problems in the Java Invasion [Operation] in Terms of Strength 363
The Preparations of Each Unit 364
Partial Changes in the Disposition of Forces of the Dutch East Indies Unit 365
The Postponement of the Landing Date [on Java] Until 26 February 366
The Assembling of the Invasion Convoys Completed 366
Insufficient Results of the Air Campaign to Destroy the Enemy Air Power 367
The Malaya Unit’s Cooperation in the Western Java Operation 368
The Participation of the Sakaguchi Detachment in the Eastern Java Invasion 
Operation 370
The Situation Right Before the Invasion [Operation] 371
2. The Army-Navy Arrangement and the Plan of Operations of Each Unit 374
The Army-Navy Arrangement for the Java Invasion Operation ([at] Manila) 374
The Plan of Operations of the Dutch East Indies Unit 379
The Units Involved in the Western Java Invasion [Operation] 383
xi
The Army-Navy Arrangements Between the Sixteenth Army and
the 5th Destroyer Squadron 383
The Plan of Operations of the 3d Escort Unit 384
The Plan of Operations of the 1st Air Unit 387
The Units Involved in the Eastern Java Invasion [Operation] 391
The Arrangements Between the 4th Destroyer Squadron and the [Army] 48th 
Division 391
The Plan of Operations of the 1st Escort Unit 392
The Plan of Operations of the 2d Base Unit 393
The Plan of Operations of the 2d Air Unit and Its Circumstances 395
The Plan of Operations of the Land-Based Air Unit 395
The Plan of Operations of the Army Units 397
Chapter VII The Implementation of the Java Invasion Operation 400
1. Outline of the Progress of the Operation 400
2. From the Launch of the Operation Until the Landings 402
Further Postponement of the Landing Dates 402
The Conduct of the Operation by the Commanders of the Southern Task Force and
the Dutch East Indies Unit 404
The Unsatisfactory Prior Neutralization of the Enemy Air Power Both in Eastern and 
Western [Java] 408
The Operations of the Surface Unit in the Western Java Area 410
The Sailing of the Convoy 410
The Appearance of a Powerful Enemy Surface Unit 412
The 7th Cruiser Division’s Avoidance of a Decisive Battle 414
Heading for the Landing Points 418
The Engagements of the 1st Air Unit 420
The Operations of the 3d Air Raid Unit Fell Short of Expectations 421
The Mihoro Air Group of the Malaya Unit Failed to Provide Effective Support 423
The Belated Advance of the 4th Carrier Division 423
The Engagements of the Army Air Units 424
The Sailing of the Convoy for the Eastern Java Invasion [Operation] 424
The Operations of the 2d Air Unit 427
The 2d Air Raid Unit Largely Neutralized Eastern Java 429
3. The Sea Engagement off Surabaya 431
The Appearance of a Powerful Enemy Surface Unit (27 February) 431
The First Phase of the Daytime Engagement (from 1725 until 1850) 435
The Second Phase of the Daytime Engagement (from 1850 until 1950) 437
The First Phase of the Night Engagement (from 2050 until 2110) 439
The Second Phase of the Night Engagement (from 0030 until 0100) 440
The Main Unit of the Dutch East Indies Unit Came to Assist But Too Late to Participate 
in the Engagement 442
The Transport Convoy’s Entry into [the Anchorage off] Kragan 443
Destroying the Remnants of the Enemy Fleet 444
Lessons Learned and Reviews After the Sea Engagements 446
The Engagements of the 2d Air Unit 458
The Engagements of the 2d Air Unit 458
The Land-Based Air Unit Sinks the Tender USS Langley 459
xii
The Engagements of the 4th Carrier Division 461
The Situation of the Allied Forces 461
4. The Sea Engagement off Batavia (28 February - 1 March) 465
The First Phase of the Engagement (from 0009 until 0100) 465
The Second Phase of the Engagement (from 0100 until 0116) 467
The Third Phase of the Engagement (from 0116 until 0132) 468
The Fourth Phase of the Engagement (from 0138 until 0206) 469
The Damage Sustained by the Army Transport Ships and Minesweeper No. 2 472
Lessons of War and Observations After this Sea Engagement 472
5. The Main Body of the Southern Task Force Advances to the South of Java 475
6. The Operations of the Carrier Task Force (Until 1 March) 476
7. The Operations of the Submarine Units 481
Submarine Unit A, Guarding Java and [the Area] to the East 482
Submarine Unit C, Guarding [the Area] South of Java 485
8. The Army Units Sweep Across Java 488
9. The [Naval] Operations Around Java After the Landing of the Army Units 491
The Devastation of Cilacap by the Carrier Task Force 491
The Main Body of the Southern Task Force Destroys Enemy Vessels [on the Waters] 
South of Java 493
The Actions of the [Land-Based] Air Unit 495
The Engagements of the Army Air Units 500
The Eastern Java Units Clear [the Sea of] the Enemy 501
The Western Java Units Clear [the Sea of] the Enemy 508
The Formation of Special Base Forces 510
Revision of the Disposition of Forces of the Dutch East Indies Unit 512
10. The Lessons of War in the Air Campaign in the Dutch East Indies [Operation] 513
Lessons of War; General [Issues] 513
The Lessons of War [Drawn] by the Commander of the Genzan Air Group 518
11. The Conclusion of the Java Invasion Operaton 524
Military Gains and Losses 524
An Assessment of the Enemy Movements in the Southwestern Theater 534
Evaluation of the World Situation and the Fundamental Principles in Conducting
the War 536
Evaluation of the Achievements of the Initial Operations 538
A Critical Review [of the Operation] 541
Chapter VIII The State of the Allied Forces Before the 
Java Operation 554
1. The State of the Allied Forces Before the Outbreak of the Second European 
War 554
The United States 554
Britain 556
The Netherlands 559
2. The Situation of the Allied Forces Right Before the Opening of Hostilities 560
Britain 560
The United States 562
The Netherlands 562
xiii
3. The Situation of the Allied Forces at the Time of [Japan’s] Launch of the 




Chapter IX The Neutralization of the Indian Ocean 565
1. Outline of the Course of the Operation 565
The Circumstances Leading to the Capture of Burma and Neighboring Strategic Areas 565
Burma 565
Northern Sumatra 566
The Andaman Islands 567
Christmas Island 567
The Arrangements Between the Army and the Navy, etc. 568
The Course Leading to the Implementation of a Carrier Operation in the Indian Ocean 569
The Surprise Attack Operation on Ceylon 569
The Striking Operation in the Bay of Bengal 569
[The Operation to] Capture Burma and Key Areas Nearby Is Put in Motion 570
The Carrier Operation in the Indian Ocean Is Put in Motion 571
2. Clearing the Waterways in the Malacca Strait 571
Plan of Operations and Preparations 571
Clearing of the Waterways Completed 573
3. The Northern Sumatra Invasion Operation 576
The Plan of Operations 576
The Malaya Unit 576
The 1st Escort Unit 577
The 2d Escort Unit 578
Preparation for the Operations 579
Landings Made Without Bloodshed 579
4. The Capture of the Andaman Islands 581
The Plan of Operations 582
The Malaya Unit 582
The Air Unit of the Southern Task Force 583
The Shift of the Air Units 584
The Enemy Garrison Unconditionally Surrenders 585
5. The Burma Transport Operation 588
The Position of the Units Right Before the Launch of the Operation 588
The Transport of More Than Two [Army] Divisions 590
6. The Capture of Christmas Island 592
The Plan of Operations 593
The Naka Torpedoed 594
7. The Carrier Operations in the Indian Ocean 601
Return of the 5th Carrier Division Delayed 601
The Enemy Movements in the Indian Ocean 603
The Plan of Operations 604
The Southern Task Force 604
The Carrier Task Force of the Southern Task Force 605
The Air Unit of the Southern Task Force 612
xiv
The Malaya Unit 613
The Submarine Unit 616
The Launch of the Operation 617
The Movements of the Air Unit of the Southern Task Force 617
The Movements of Units Other Than the Carrier Task Force as of 31 March 618
The Advance of the Carrier Task Force of the Southern Task Force 619
The Air Raid on Colombo; the Sinking of Two [Enemy] Heavy Cruisers 621
The Air Strike on Trincomalee; the Sinking of One Small Aircraft Carrier 627
The Lessons of War Drawn from the [Operation of the] Carrier Task Force 
in Operation C 633
The Cooperation of the Air Unit of the Southern Task Force 638
The Malaya Unit Striking Force Neutralizes the Bay of Bengal 640
The Reconnaissance of Key [Enemy] Places by the Submarines Proved Difficult 646
The Distress of Britain 649
8. The Shift to Stage-Two Operations 653
The Grand Plan of Operations of IGHQ [Navy Department] 653
The Revision of the Wartime Formation 655
The Main Points of the Outline of the Stage-Two Operations of the Combined Fleet 656
Plan for the Stage-Two, Phase-One Operations of the Southwest Area Fleet 658
Conclusion 660




Index of Personal Names 687
Index of Ship Names 695
Index of Place Names 705
Supplement: Attached Tables and Illustrations 723
Attached Table No. 1: List of the Main [Naval] Personnel Involved in the 
Southern Operation 723
Attached Table No. 2: Characteristics of the Vessels and Aircraft of the 
Southern Task Force 734
Attached Illustration No. 5: The Sea Engagement off Surabaya [Battle of 
the Java Sea], Part I 744
xv
Attached Illustration No. 6: The Sea Engagement off Surabaya [Battle of 
the Java Sea], Part II 746
Attached Illustration No. 7: The Sea Engagement off Batavia [Battle of 
Sunda Strait] 748
List of Organizations That Supported this Publication 750
xvi
Editor’s Note
The history of Japan’s involvement in the Second World War is still a matter of greatcontroversy, not least in Japan itself. There, scholars, the public and politicians cannoteven agree on what to call the war, the Pacific War, the Greater East Asia War, the Fif-
teen Years War, the Asia-Pacific War, to name just a few examples, each with its dedicated
partisan following. Successive Japanese governments have avoided the use of any of these
names out of context, and the war is usually referred to as “The Late War” (Saki/Konji no
Sensō/Taisen). Even though the Imperial Household Agency denies any specific intent, in
practice the late Emperor, too, only referred to the war as “the late war,” or used expressions
such as “that unfortunate war” and “that unfortunate period,” unless he was speaking in an
international context about the “Second World War.”1
Not surprisingly, the same controversy affected the 102-volume War History Series (Senshi
Sōsho), of which The Operations of the Navy in the Dutch East Indies and the Bay of Bengal consti-
tutes Volume 26, and the previously published The Invasion of the Dutch East Indies Volume 3.
Here, a compromise was finally found by allowing the use of the term “Greater East Asia
War” in the main text, but avoiding it in titles, forewords and explanatory notes, although
this did not prevent the publisher, Asagumo Newspaper Inc., from prominently putting the
term on its flyers.2 The foreign reader, who is mostly unaware of the enormous controversy
still surrounding Japan’s involvement in the Second World War and the vigorous, if not ac-
rimonious, debate within Japan, is often left nonplussed by the vague official expressions
used in Japan to refer to the war to paper over fundamental differences that all sides seem
unable or unwilling to resolve. Moreover, to foreign readers, used to official war histories, as
for example in the case of Britain and Australia, that are commissioned and endorsed by the
government, or at least commissioned, even if the contents are left to the responsibility of
the author, as in the case of the Netherlands, the Japanese example of a war history that is
neither commissioned nor endorsed, but nevertheless compiled by a government agency,
seems an anomaly and raises the question of whose view it represents. 
The foreword to the present book is clear about it: the contents are the sole responsibility
of the author and the head of the War History Office. But, as Professor Tobe shows in his in-
troduction, it is not that simple. The text went through a great many study sessions and nu-
merous revisions, and although great care was taken to present the facts and the oral
testimonies as objectively as possible, the resulting text does to a large extent represent a
view shared by Imperial Army and Navy veterans. But even here we should be careful. In
the flyer supplied by the publisher for Volume 3, Major Okamura, a former staff officer of
Imperial General Headquarters sent out to Singapore to join the invasion of the Dutch East
1 Shōji Jun’ichiro, ‘What Should the ‘Pacific War’ be Named? A Study of the Debate in Japan,’ NIDS Security
Studies, Vol. 13, No. 3, Mar. 2011, pp. 70-72.
2 Idem, pp. 75-76.
Indies, explicitly denies the claim made in both volumes that the war was all about oil. For
such a vulgar materialistic matter, the Imperial Army did not go to war. It went to war with
the idealistic idea of establishing a new order in Asia and freeing the Western colonies of the
Western colonizers. This, incidentally, is an argument often heard in Japan to justify Japan’s
entry into the war. In its most minimal form, it asserts that something good came out of some-
thing bad, after all.
When even the name of your subject is a matter of controversy, it becomes very hard to
write an authoritative, let alone academically sound, historical narrative. Not being academ-
ically trained historians, the authors of the Senshi Sōsho may not be expected to handle their
material with all the conventions of the historian’s craft regarding primary sources, secondary
sources, the literature, references, etc. But in these respects, the Senshi Sōsho do not differ
much from most of the older Western military histories. In the official histories compiled by
the Allied powers after the war almost simultaneously with the compilation of the Senshi
Sōsho, the role of the home side is typically emphasized, and they serve to give an account
of, if not to account for, the actions of their own forces. A certain bias and one-sidedness is
inherent; the Senshi Sōsho are no exception.3 The professionalization of the field of military
history is a comparatively recent phenomenon. Also the Dutch counterpart, Nederlands-Indië
contra Japan,4 compiled by the War History Section of the Royal Netherlands Indies Army
(KNIL) and completed by the Military History Section of the Royal Netherlands Army, is a
case in point. However, there is a difference. The Dutch narrative spends no less than two of
its seven volumes on the events leading up to the war. The authors of The Invasion of the Dutch
East Indies and The Operations of the Navy in the Dutch East Indies and the Bay of Bengal only
need a few pages to hop, step and jump to the opening of hostilities. This seems to be a de-
liberate choice. Other volumes in the series — eventually no less than seven — would be
dedicated to the circumstances that led to the opening of hostilities. Moreover, the authors’
primary task was to provide educational and research material for the Japanese Self-Defense
Forces, so not surprisingly they opted for the simplest explanation of the war, the quest for
oil, and jumped as quickly as possible into the nitty-gritty details of the planning and execu-
tion of the operations. 
It has been remarked that the Senshi Sōsho “… provide a great treasure of data and fact.
Yet they often omit discussion of questions of primary interest to the Western historian.”5
That the Senshi Sōsho and many other Japanese sources are often “maddeningly silent”6 on
such matters, however, does not take away their immense value as a treasure trove of data
and fact. As Professor Tobe remarks in his introduction: “It is virtually impossible to examine
how Japanese forces fought in the Pacific War without referring to the Senshi Sōsho series.”
For the student of the Japanese invasion of the Dutch East Indies, the present translations
will fill a large gap in his knowledge, even though he may not find answers to some of his
most fundamental questions. There is another limitation. Despite its title, The Invasion of the
Dutch East Indies deals mainly with the operations of the Japanese Sixteenth Army until the
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3 See also: P. J. Dennis, ‘Military History in Australia,’ Mededelingen Sectie Militaire Geschiedenis (Vol. 14, 1991)
9-18, pp. 9-10; A. R. Millett, ‘The Study of Military History in the United States Since World War II’, Idem, 109-
129, pp. 122-123.
4 Sectie Krijgsgeschiedenis, Nederlands-Indië contra Japan, 7 Vols., ‘s-Gravenhage, Staatsdrukkerij, 1949-1961.
5 David C. Evans, Mark R. Peattie, Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-
1941, Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 1997, p. xxiii.
6 Idem, p. xxiv.
beginning of March 1942 when the Royal Netherlands Indies Army surrendered. This means
that the events in central and northern Sumatra are not dealt with at all, for they mainly took
place after that date and, moreover, fell under the responsibility of the Japanese Twenty-fifth
Army; and events in other areas that fell under the responsibility of the Japanese Navy, e.g.
Celebes, are dealt with only very summarily. In Volume 26, the latter limitation has been
largely lifted, because it describes in reasonable detail the events in Menado, Makassar and
even the Navy’s involvement in the northern Sumatra campaign. A fuller treatment of the
latter will have to wait for the planned publication of a third volume dealing with northern
Sumatra and a more detailed treatment of the Japanese Army air force in the Dutch East In-
dies campaign, both extracted from Volume 5 and 34 of the Senshi Sōsho series. Despite all
limitations, Volume 3 and Volume 26 provide an unparalleled insight into the Japanese mil-
itary campaign and the men who executed it. Moreover, we hope it will answer some of the
questions of those who still wonder how it all could have happened, and who often still bear
the scars of defeat and the subsequent years in prison or internment camps. A look over the
hill, or the horizon, to see what was done and thought on the side of the former enemy, may
not excuse anything, but it may explain many things.
The translation of military terms: Although the organization of the Imperial Japanese Army
(IJA) and the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) was similar to those of Western armies and navies,
there is often no one-to-one correspondence in the names and functions of their constituent
parts. Some translators have chosen to emphasize the differences by not translating specific
military terms, while others prefer literal translations in some form or another. For example,
we might find hikō sentai (飛行戦隊) simply as “sentai” or translated more literally as “air
regiment.” Others again try to find designations in Western armies and navies that most
closely resemble their Japanese counterpart in function, resulting in translations such as
“group,” “air group,” “air combat group,” or even “wing.” In this book, we have generally
followed the third option without being too dogmatic. “Gun” (軍) as in “daijūroku gun” (第
十六軍 [Sixteenth Army]) remains “army,” even though “army corps” would be more correct
in terms of size and function. At the same time, we have tried to avoid British or Common-
wealth terminology and generally followed American usage common in the U.S. Army and
Navy during World War II. This limitation precludes the use of terms such as “wing” in the
example above because a comparable “wing” did not come into existence in the U.S. (Army)
Air Force until after the war. The same applies to the terms “sentai” (戦隊) and “kōkū sentai”
(航空戦隊) in the IJN. Since American World War II usage reserves “squadron” for destroyer
and submarine squadrons, we turned the other fleet “sentai”/“kōkū sentai” into “divisions,”
and the IJN land-based air “sentai” into air “flotillas.” However, we did not try to reinvent
the wheel and based our translations mainly on the 1944 U.S. Army manual “A Handbook
on Japanese Military Forces” [https://archive.org/details/TME30-480] for the IJA, and
Japanese Monograph No. 116 for the IJN [http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Japan/
Monos/JM-116/index.html]. As not everyone may agree with our choices, we have made
them explicit in the glossary at the end of the book.
Japanese names: The characters used in Japanese names can often be read in more than one
way. In the text we have used the readings from the name lists of the IJA and IJN, if given
and unless pointed out otherwise by later research. If no reading is given in these lists, we
xix
have used readings found in bibliographical dictionaries and other sources. In all other cases,
we have adopted the most common reading. In the Index of Personal Names, we have added
a question mark behind the family and/or personal name whenever the reading remains
open to interpretation. In the translated text, Japanese names are given in Japanese order, i.e.
the family name first, followed by the personal name without a comma in between.
Place names: In the Japanese text, foreign place names are either written in characters, as in
the case of Chinese place names, or in the Japanese phonetic katakana script. Especially in the
latter case, this has led to a great number of hard to identify place names. We think that we
managed to identify most of them. With the exception of Hong Kong and Saigon, all place
names are given in their modern, local readings, e.g. Guangdong instead of Canton, and
Gaoxiong instead of Takao. An exception has been made for the names of Japanese naval air
groups that take their name from their home bases outside Japan proper. These are given
with their Japanese names, for example, Takao Air Group from Gaoxiong (Taiwan), Genzan
Air Group from Wǒnsan (North Korea), and Tōkō Air Group from Donggang (Taiwan). In
the case of the Dutch East Indies, colonial era names such as Batavia and Buitenzorg have
been preserved, but their modern names, Jakarta and Bogor, have been added in the Index
of Place Names. The spelling of Indonesian place names is rather inconsistent and differs
from atlas to atlas. We have followed what seems to be the most commonly accepted spelling. 
The Tohoku University Gaihozu Digital Archive (http://chiri.es.tohoku.ac.jp/~gaihozu/
index.php) provided by the Tohoku University Library, Institute of Geography, Graduate
School of Science, was a great source for hard to find maps and charts.
Ship names: We have checked most of the requisitioned ship names against the List of Japan-
ese Ship Names (日本汽船名簿 [Nihon Kisen Meibo]), the Imperial Maritime Association Reg-
ister (帝国海事協会レジスター [Teikoku Kaiji Kyōkai Rejisutā]), and especially for smaller
vessels, such as fishing boats, the Japanese Ship Names’ Record (日本船名録 [Nihon Senmei-
roku]). Unfortunately, the latter source does not give the readings of the names. In such cases,
we have adopted the most common reading.
Maps: We have reproduced all the maps inside the book and provided them with English
legends. A list of the symbols and abbreviations used in the maps may be found on page 664.
The ten separately attached maps of the original Japanese edition, however, proved too large
for the confines of the English edition. Moreover, they did not add much to the understand-
ing. We have made an exception for attached maps 5, 6, and 7. Fortunately, these maps could
be scaled down to a still readable size. They depict a Japanese reconstruction of the course
of the Battle of the Java Sea and the Battle of Sunda Strait, and are of intrinsic interest to the
naval historian.
Names of engagements: In the translation, we have kept to the Japanese names. This means
that, for example, the “Strike in Badung Strait” becomes the “Sea Engagement off Bali,” the
“Battle of the Java Sea” the “Sea Engagement off Surabaya,” and the “Battle of Sunda Strait”
the “Sea Engagement off Batavia.” 
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Editorial notes and emendations: Respecting the wishes of the copyright holder, the National
Institute for Defense Studies of Japan (NIDS), the translation is full and unabridged.7 Although
the text invites comparison with foreign sources, we have generally refrained from adding
external material. The editorial emendations and notes within brackets or in the form of foot-
notes are only meant to make the text more readable, to indicate misprints, contradictory de-
scriptions within the text itself, or occasionally differences with the descriptions in other
volumes of the Senshi Sōsho series. Obvious misprints and errata pointed out in the list of er-
rata compiled by NIDS in 2005 have been silently corrected. Parentheses are as used in the
Japanese text.
The translation: The present translation is the joint effort of Willem Remmelink and Yumi
Miyazaki. The latter also conducted almost all the background research in Japanese sources.
We wish that more time could have been given to the solution of remaining problems. How-
ever, in the interest of making this translation quickly available to the public, we had to limit
ourselves to the most obvious problems. We hope that other researchers will pick up the
threads where we left off.
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About the Senshi Sōsho (War History Series)
TOBE Ryōichi
The Senshi Sōsho is a series of 102 volumes (to which two supplementary volumes werelater added) on the military history of the Pacific War (including the Sino-JapaneseWar). These volumes contain the results of research conducted at the then War History
Office (renamed the Military History Department, and later reorganized into the Center for
Military History) of the National Defense College (later renamed the National Institute for
Defense Studies) of the Defense Agency, or the Ministry of Defense as we know it today. The
series was published by Asagumo Shimbunsha [Asagumo Newspaper Inc.] between 1966
and 1980. Although the series is usually called an “official” war history, the fact that it was
published by a private publisher and not the government shows the official stance of the
government that, although the series contains the results of research conducted by a branch
of a governmental institution (i.e. the War History Office of the National Defense College), it
does not express the official view of the Japanese government on the Pacific War. As men-
tioned in the foreword, “the main purpose of the publication of this series is to serve as ed-
ucational and research material for the Self-Defense Forces,” but that “its public use has been
taken into consideration as well.”
A study of the history of the Pacific War and a compilation of the results by a Japanese
governmental institution had been planned since the days of the occupation right after the
defeat. However, it was not until 1955, after the end of the occupation, when the War History
Office was established within the Defense Agency, that the plan was put into effect in earnest.
At the War History Office, dozens of veterans were appointed to compile the materials. They
held meeting after meeting to write materials for educational and research purposes, revised
these materials based on the discussions in these study meetings, and prepared manuscripts.
For the research, the War History Office gathered about 70,000 documents, which were scat-
tered and lost after the defeat, interviewed about 15,000 veterans, and collected about 10,000
documents transferred from the Ministry of Health and Welfare, which had taken over the
demobilization of the Army and the Navy, and about 30,000 documents that had been col-
lected by the occupation forces and were subsequently returned from the United States.
In 1965, the Defense Agency set forth a plan to publish the research results of the War
History Office as the Senshi Sōsho series. Publication was started the next year; the study
meetings at the War History Office, as many as 3,500 in ten years, and the results of some
240,000 pages of prepared manuscripts provided the basis for the series. The number of au-
thors and researchers who participated in the compilation was 134. The entire 102-volume
series can be subdivided in various ways. In one way, they can be divided into seven volumes
on the circumstances which led to the opening of hostilities, ten volumes on the Army De-
partment of IGHQ, seven volumes on the Navy Department of IGHQ and the Combined
Fleet, ten volumes on the military preparations, nine volumes on the invasion operations,
ten volumes on the operations in the Solomon Islands and New Guinea, five volumes on the
operations in the central Pacific theater, three volumes on the defensive operations in the
southwestern theater, four volumes on the operations in Burma, three volumes on the oper-
ations in the northeastern theater, three volumes on the operations in Manchuria, fifteen vol-
umes on the operations in China, five volumes on the decisive battles in the Philippines,
three volumes on the decisive battles on Okinawa, four volumes on the operations in the
homeland, three volumes on the history of special operations (vessel escorting, submarine
warfare, etc.) and one volume with a chronological table and a glossary of technical terms.
The series can also be subdivided in a different way, e.g. twenty-four volumes on the general
conduct of the war, ten volumes on military preparations, sixty-seven volumes on the oper-
ations themselves, and one volume on other matters. Finally, the series could be divided into
sixty-nine volumes on the Army and thirty-two volumes on the Navy, and one volume com-
mon to both (the chronological table). The present book, Volume 26: The Operations of the Navy
in the Dutch East Indies and the Bay of Bengal, would then fall into the category of invasion op-
erations conducted by the Navy, whereas the previously published Volume 3, The Invasion of
the Dutch East Indies, would belong to the category of invasion operations conducted by the
Army.
The published Senshi Sōsho series was on the whole favorably received by historians of
modern and contemporary Japan. It was because the series filled a gap at a time when objec-
tive data on the history of the Pacific War were scarce. Also, the attitude of the authors who
strove to be objective and ideologically unbiased was well thought of.
Needless to say, there was harsh criticism as well. For example, from a historiographical
point of view, the series was criticized that its academic level was not necessarily high, which
was only natural, for it was written not by academically trained researchers but by veterans.
However, I doubt whether there were more suitable persons at that point to write the war
history series than these veterans. Even if it had been possible to commission university-level
professional researchers to do the writing, without sufficient military knowledge they would
not have had the competence to do the work. I should also add that even though there were
more than 120,000 historical documents available at the time of publication, their number
was limited compared to the current number of available documents.
The authors of the Senshi Sōsho series were consistent in their attitude that they should
just convey as faithfully as possible the facts based on the documents and the oral evidence
from the interviews, and leave analyses and interpretation to the reader or the specialist,
rather than on the basis of their research results publish their own analyses or interpretations.
This is even reflected in the title of the series. By choosing the title “War History Series,” they
consciously tried to steer clear of the political and ideological controversies that surrounded
such titles as “History of the Greater East Asia War,” or “History of the Pacific War.” As a re-
sult, many researchers regarded the series as a kind of primary historical source and tried to
utilize the information extracted from the series in their own research. In that sense, even if
indices and notes were insufficient, it can be said that the authors successfully achieved in
their own way their intention to just convey the facts and the evidence. Moreover, not all of
the 102 volumes did necessarily fall short of the required academic level. Of the 102 volumes,
quite a few did attain a considerably high research level.
xxiv
Another criticism was that the authors, as veterans, might be biased towards the organi-
zation to which they once belonged and in their evaluation of the record might have become
lenient with it or its members. As I mentioned above, the texts of each author were discussed
at study meetings, attended by the whole group, and revised. We cannot tell whether in the
reviews at the study meetings, any criticism of their fellow soldiers was toned down or ac-
tually reinforced. But at least it is clear that the reviews at the study meetings must have put
as much restraint as possible on prejudices or feelings of favor or disapproval. In that sense,
we may say that objectivity and impartiality were to a large extent guaranteed in the series.
The criticism that the series was written by a group of insiders was also leveled at the fact
that the inter-service rivalry between the Army and the Navy sometimes resurfaced in this
series. A typical example is the fact that different Army and Navy versions were written,
with considerable differences in interpretation, about the circumstances that led to the open-
ing of hostilities. The Senshi Sōsho series can be divided into those volumes of which the Army
was in charge and those of which the Navy was in charge. In other words, the parallel tracks
that the Army and the Navy had pursued from the time of their foundation in the early Meiji
period onwards extended to the issue of who would take charge of certain volumes. How-
ever, the difference in interpretation and views between the Army and the Navy mainly oc-
curred in the descriptions of the general conduct of the war; only a few cases show traces of
this rivalry in the description of operations. Whereas Volume 3, of which the Army was in
charge, mainly deals with the history of operations and engagements with a focus on land
engagements, Volume 26, of which the Navy was in charge, describes the history of opera-
tions and engagements with a focus on naval and aerial engagements. We may say that in
both volumes the influence of a Army-Navy rivalry is hardly seen. 
Another criticism of the Senshi Sōsho series was that it focused on operations, and that the
analysis and description of subjects such as the line of communication (logistics), intelligence,
and medical matters were extremely few. Other criticism was that the descriptions were too
flat and often offered nothing but a list of facts. Many parts of Volume 3 and 26 may fall
under the latter criticism in particular. However, as I mentioned, this could be the result of
the efforts of the authors to just convey the facts or the oral evidence, obtained in the process
of their research and writing, while leaving out their subjective judgments as much as pos-
sible.
After publication, a considerable number of misprints and factual mistakes were found.
Apart from the misprints, factual misunderstandings have been clarified by newly found
material and through progress in research. The Military History Department (or the Center
for Military History) is said to be working on an updated list of errata. However, at this stage
much work still needs to be done.
Despite the above criticisms and shortcomings, there is no doubt that the Senshi Sōsho se-
ries is the first basic reference work to turn to when studying the history of the Pacific War;
it is a rich and indispensible source for all future research. It is virtually impossible to examine
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Foreword
More than a decade after the establishment of the War History Office, we are finallyready to publish some of the results of our research one after another, and as thetwenty-sixth volume [of the series], we now publish The Operation of the Navy in
the Dutch East Indies and the Bay of Bengal. Although the main purpose of the publication [of
this series] is to serve as educational and research material for the Self-Defense Forces, its
public use has been taken into consideration as well.
As enormous quantities of documents were destroyed, scattered or lost at the end of the
war and, moreover, there was a gap of ten years before the establishment of the War History
Office, the difficulties of compiling a history of the war were, compared to past war history
compilations in Japan as well as overseas, beyond description. Yet fortunately, the under-
standing of all concerned and the enthusiastic support by a great many veterans helped re-
alize the publication of this work. Here, once again, we would like to express our deep
gratitude.
Due to space limitations, not a few parts have been omitted in the account. It is also ex-
pected that some parts will need further revision in the future because of newly added col-
lections of historical materials. We earnestly solicit the cooperation and comments of all of
you, in or outside the War History Office.
The research on the materials for this volume was firstly shared among the war histori-
ographers Tanaka Ken’ichi, Iki Haruki and Nambu Nobukiyo of our office, and on the basis
of their results, further research was conducted by war historiographer Sasaki Masao to write
this volume.
Further, we would especially like to add that the head of the War History Office and the
author are solely responsible for the contents of this volume.
May 1969
National Defense College




Being poor in natural resources, Japan depended on foreign countries for most of thematerials it needed. Particularly, oil products, which may be called the root of militarystrength, were for a large part imported from the United States.
However, due to the escalation of the China Incident and the rising tensions in the political
situation in Europe, the United States gave notice in July 1939 that it would abrogate the U.S.-
Japan Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, as it tried to constrain Japan’s movements in the
Far East by controlling the export of essential materials to Japan. At this point, Japan had no
choice but to aim at quickly becoming self-supporting by adding the areas to its south to [the
bloc of] Japan, Manchuria and China, and end its dependence on the United States and
Britain for essential materials. In the southern areas, the focus of interest was particularly
upon getting hold of the oil in the Dutch East Indies.
Although the Dutch East Indies produced an amount of oil that surpassed the amount
needed by Japan, most of the petroleum companies there were operated by U.S. and British
capital, and hence the amount that Japan had requested to buy was never permitted by the
Dutch East Indies government. Therefore, availing itself of the golden opportunity of Ger-
many’s sweep across Europe in the summer of 1940, Japan arrived at the idea to aggressively
solve the southern question. In the fall of that year, the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Ger-
many and Italy was concluded, and troops were advanced and stationed in the northern part
of French Indochina, against which, the United States and Britain further intensified their
economic and military encirclement policy against Japan. Although Japan had started nego-
tiations with the United States from the spring of 1941 onwards, it resolutely decided to sta-
tion troops in southern French Indochina in July of that year from the standpoint of stepping
up its preparations for self-sufficiency and self-defense, and also partly due to the deadlock
in the negotiations with the Dutch East Indies. Against this move, the United States, Britain
and the Netherlands took strong retaliatory measures such as freezing Japanese overseas as-
sets and putting a total embargo on oil exports to Japan, which completely stopped the im-
port of oil. At that time, the amount of oil Japan had stored was not sufficient to prosecute a
war; Japan had no other choice than either make great concessions to its claims in the Japan-
U.S. negotiations in order to settle the negotiations, or use armed force in the southern regions
in order to get hold of the main areas with resources, fully aware of [the possibility of] a war
against the United States. Thus, while making every possible effort to bring about a break-
through in the Japanese-U.S. negotiations on the one hand, Japan started full-scale war prepa-
rations in case the worst came to the worst. However, despite Japan’s efforts, Japanese-U.S.
relations came to the worst, and on 8 December, Japan opened hostilities.
The operation to invade the main areas of the south was conducted with the aim to ad-
vance as far as to the line of Java, quickly get hold of the resources necessary to nurture and
maintain Japan’s national power, while creating political stability in the Far East by estab-
lishing a Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. Although Burma was listed as a key point
of military, political and economic importance in establishing the Greater East Asia Co-pros-
perity Sphere, due to the military strength necessary for the [whole southern] operation, a
full-scale invasion of the country was not considered at the time of the opening of hostilities.
However, after the more-than-expected progress in the southern operation, it was decided
to conduct a full-scale invasion [of Burma], and in order to support it, the Navy carried out
an operation in the Indian Ocean. This operation concluded the offensive operations of the
Navy [in the theater] to the southwest [of Japan]; the major operations of the Navy thereafter
came to be directed to the east and southeast of Japan.
This volume deals with the Navy invasion operations in the Dutch East Indies as well as
its operations in the Indian Ocean, which followed the operations in the Philippines and
Malaya areas. It was an undeniable fact that in these operations, some engagements were
[rather] passively conducted, which was not the Navy’s preferred way in view of its annihi-
late-the-enemy-on-sight tradition. It seems that this was caused by the fact that the Japanese
Navy regarded itself inferior to its principal enemy, the U.S. Navy, and had to be very careful
not to lose vessels, particularly cruisers and larger vessels, and by the fact that due to the re-
markable results achieved by our aircraft after the opening of hostilities, the Navy became
unconsciously too impressed by the power of air forces. 
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Chapter I The Circumstances Leading to Japan’s 
Invasion of the Dutch East Indies
1. The Prewar Operational Policy of the Navy and the Supply and
Demand of Oil
Since Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War, the interests of Japan and those of theUnited States gradually started to clash over policies in the Far East, and they came toconsider each other as potential enemies. Consequently, Japan established an Imperial
Defense Policy for the first time in 1907, and singled out the United States, Russia and France
as its hypothetical enemies. However, in view of the difference in national power between
Japan and these countries, the policy was adopted that a war against two or more countries
at the same time should be avoided; that by political means Japan should be steered to a war
against one country [only]; and that if war should be waged, it should be conducted quickly
and decisively. In this plan, the strategy against the United States, where the Navy would
play the leading role, was, in view of [the differences in] national power and military strength,
to take advantage of the different strategic positions of both countries and intercept the U.S.
Fleet at sea close to Japan. The reason [for this strategy] was that, gathering from the opera-
tional thinking of the U.S. Navy and American Far Eastern policy, it was considered inevitable
that the U.S. Fleet would attack at an early stage after the opening of hostilities. Later on,
due to changes in the international situation, France was removed from [the list of] hypo-
thetical enemies and China and Britain were added instead. Further in 1918, the plan to cap-
ture the Philippines at the opening of hostilities was added to the operational outline against
the United States. Although Britain was added to [the list of] hypothetical enemies in 1936,
hardly any concrete operation plans were studied. It goes without saying that no operation
plans at all were considered against the Dutch East Indies.
As is generally known, Japan was lacking in natural resources and its industrial technol-
ogy lagged far behind the United States and Britain, which rendered it dependent on other
countries for most resources as well as technology. On top of that, for a large proportion [of
its needs] it depended on its hypothetical enemies, the United States and Britain, as well as
on other countries that were under their strong influence. Japan’s domestic production of
oil, for which demand had sharply increased among others because of the switch of the Navy
to heavy oil as fuel, the growing industrialization of Japan, and the rapid increase in the num-
ber of cars and aircraft, covered merely about 10 percent of the demand. For the rest, it had
to rely on imports. Ironically, 70 percent of the total imports came from the United States, its
hypothetical enemy. Moreover, it relied on the United States for its entire oil refinery tech-
nology (according to the statistics of 1936). In those years, as the largest consumer of oil, the
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Navy took the lead in improving the oil policy and although it tried hard to solve the prob-
lems, it still could not come up with proper solutions.
The annual production of oil in the southern region from 1936 to 1939 was about 7.95 mil-
lion tons in the Dutch East Indies, about 0.93 million tons in British Borneo, and about 1.27
million tons in Burma, while the annual demand in Japan in this period was between about
4.40 million and about 5.70 million tons.(1) The oil production in the southern region well sur-
passed the demand in Japan, while the oil fields in these areas were not yet much developed.
Therefore, Japan planned to shift from its hypothetical enemy, the United States, to the south-
ern region for its import source of oil. However, the plan was not successful, and it remained
dependent on [oil imported from] the United States.
2. Changes in the International Situation and the Import of 
Essential Materials
In 1933 in the wake of the Manchurian Incident (1931), Japan walked out of the League of
Nations (due to the latter’s adoption of a resolution that Manchuria should be made a de-
militarized zone under international control). Following that, Japan concluded in November
1936 the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany, which Italy also joined. After that, relations be-
tween Japan and the United States briefly relaxed, but in 1937 the China Incident occurred,
and despite the policy of the [Japanese] government to contain it, the incident continued to
expand. The United States, leading the countries concerned, resumed and continued its
protest against Japan. Moreover, the United States took the proclamation of the “Establish-
ment of a New Order in East Asia,” which Japan had announced in November 1938, as an
open challenge to the principles of its foreign policy. Meanwhile in Europe, the radical poli-
cies of the Nazi government increased tensions in the international situation surrounding
Germany, and the political situation worldwide, in the West as well as in the East, turned
turbulent.
In May 1939, the Soviet Union carried out a large operation in Nomonhan, and Japan was
exposed to a serious threat from the north, too (the Nomonhan Incident). Meanwhile, the
United States took the opportunity of Japan’s blockade of the British concession in Tianjin to
give on 28 July 1939 Japan notice of the abrogation of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Commerce
and Navigation (with an advance notice of six months). The aim [of the United States] was
to contain Japan’s actions in the Far East by [showing] its readiness to control at any time
the export of materials that were essential to Japan. This measure caused much concern in
Japan, which was hurriedly building up its military preparedness against interference by
third countries, while prosecuting the China Incident at the same time. Particularly from the
perspective of the situation in those days, it was considered highly likely that should Japan
be involved in another war it would likely be a protracted war. In order to endure such a
protracted war, it was absolutely essential for Japan to obtain the raw materials indispensable
for maintaining and nurturing its national power. Consequently, Japan had no other choice
but to urgently obtain them in areas closer at hand, i.e. the Far East.
In Europe, the Second European War [the Second World War] began with the German in-
vasion of Poland in September 1939. At the end of the year, the United States condemned the
Soviet Union’s indiscriminate bombing of Finnish citizens and banned the export of refinery
technology and equipment to produce high-grade gasoline [to the Soviet Union]. As this
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measure was also applied to Japan, which was prosecuting the China Incident, Japan was
no longer able to import the technology and was seriously affected by it.
Although the abrogation of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Commerce and Navigation came into
effect in January 1940, the U.S. government did not immediately start imposing restrictions
on exports to Japan. However, the strain on the Japanese economy was not eased at all, and
Japan desperately tried every means to meet the situation.
As mentioned previously, Germany had all of a sudden invaded Poland on 1 September
1939, and partitioned the country with the Soviet Union, but it showed little noteworthy ac-
tivity after that. However, from April 1940 onwards the German Army became active [again],
occupied Denmark and Norway at a stroke, drove the allied forces from the European Con-
tinent (the so-called “Dunkirk Tragedy”) and finally occupied Paris on 14 June. Belgium, the
Netherlands and France were overwhelmed in the German blitzkrieg, and a German landing
on the British mainland seemed highly likely. This meant that the British, Dutch and French
colonies in the Far East had lost or were about to lose their mother countries. [Meanwhile,]
still maintaining its neutrality, the United States stayed focused on supporting the allied
countries in Europe, while in the Far East urgently containing the offensive actions of Japan,
which was taking advantage of the situation. For that purpose, the United States took the
following measures against Japan:
[1940]
May: Announced the permanent stationing of its Pacific Fleet in Hawaii in order to contain
Japan’s southward advance.
June: Imposed an embargo on the export of machine tools.
July: Enacted the “Act to Expedite the Strengthening of National Defense,” [i.e. Export Control
Act of 1940] with which the United States applied a license system to the export of ma-
terials essential to its defense, and granted the President the authority [to decide the li-
censing]. However, petroleum products and scrap iron were excluded from the items
subject to an export license.
[July]: Enacted the “Two-Ocean Navy Act,” (an armaments expansion plan to expand the num-
ber of warships by 70 percent as well as the number of aircraft to 15,000). 
End [of July]: Added particular petroleum products and scrap iron to the items subject to
export licensing.
Note:
1. Japan was rapidly expanding its industrial power and was very much short of machine
tools. Moreover, due to its [poor level of] technology, most precision machines were im-
ported.
2. Scrap iron was essential as a material for steelmaking, and most of it was imported from the
United States at that time.
However, as the U.S. government permitted the export of petroleum products and scrap iron
to Japan even after the enactment of the “Act to Expedite the Strengthening of National De-
fense,” Japan made every possible effort to import and store them.
3. The International Situation and the Changes in the Policy for
Coping with the Current Situation
When Japan was in such a predicament, the war situation in Europe was rapidly developing
to the advantage of Japan. It led Japan to decide in July 1940 on an ambitious national policy
to set its course to “Establishing a Greater East Asia New Order,” which, with Japan, Man -
churia and China as the basis, would include the southern region. In line with this, Japan
decided on the Outline of the Main Principles for Coping with the Changing World Situation, in
order to solve existing problems at a stroke. The main points of the outline are as follows:(2)
1. Efforts shall be made to promptly settle the China Incident.
2. Political ties with Germany and Italy shall be promptly strengthened.
3. Military forces of one element strong shall be advanced into French Indochina to work out
[and take] measures to stop the support for the Chiang Kai-shek [Jiang Jieshi] regime from
northern French Indochina as well as to obtain resources.
4. As for the Dutch East Indies, [Japan] shall seek to obtain resources for the time being by
diplomatic means. If the situation permits, the aim shall be accomplished even by resorting
to force of arms. Even in such a case, friction with the United States shall be avoided as much
as possible, though preparations for a war against the United States shall be duly made.
In accordance with this outline, Japan advanced [its forces] into northern French Indochina
and also concluded the Tripartite Pact in September of the same year [1940]. [Previously] on
1 August, the United States had already banned the export of aircraft fuel to areas outside
the western hemisphere, and it further added scrap iron and steel to the export embargo ex-
cept for the western hemisphere and Britain. Also, Britain notified the re-opening of the sup-
ply route [to the Chiang regime] via Burma. Around this time, the [Japanese] Army and Navy
started their study of the Dutch East Indies invasion operation for the first time as a contin-
gency plan. Although the Navy had been making war preparations so as to be ready for an
intervention by a third power in the wake of the China Incident, it could simply not catch
up with the developments in the current situation. The Navy even considered to issue the
order to put a preparatory fleet mobilization into motion, which was supposed to be passed
down only when an opening of hostilities was expected (a preparatory action required to
shift the Naval forces and institutions to their wartime footing). In the meantime in Septem-
ber 1940, the [Japanese] government dispatched Minister of Commerce and Industry
Kobayashi Ichizō to the Dutch East Indies as special envoy to start negotiations for an increase
in the imports of oil and other resources. At that time in the United States, President Roosevelt
was expected to be reelected for a third term, which, in Japan’s view, would result in a much
more uncompromising policy toward Japan.
On 12 September 1940, while Japan worried about a U.S. oil embargo after the expected
third-term reelection of Roosevelt, Special Envoy Kobayashi arrived in Java. Special Envoy
Kobayashi negotiated to the best of his ability with the aim of importing 3.15 million tons, or
if possible, 3.80 million tons of oil. However, on 17 October, before achieving his aim, he re-
ceived the order recalling him home. At that time, the Dutch East Indies was heavily depend-
ent on the United States and Britain, and the relations [between them] were so close that a
meeting between the United States, Britain and the Netherlands on the defense of the region
was held in Singapore in October 1940. Replacing Special Envoy Kobayashi, Ambassador
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Yoshizawa Kenkichi arrived in Java on 28 December, and resumed the negotiations. But the
negotiations were not substantially different from those with the Americans and the British.
On 14 June 1941, with almost no progress made, he was instructed to discontinue the nego-
tiations and received an order recalling him home.
Prior to this, the Army and the Navy had differed in their judgment of the international
situation. The difference was whether the United States would immediately stand up for
Britain and wage war against Japan should Japan strike Britain (which meant that they
should be regarded as inseparable), or not (which meant they could be considered as sepa-
rable). The Outline of the Main Principles for Coping with the Changing World Situation of July
1940 had been decided upon the assumption that the United States and Britain were separa-
ble, in view of the world situation at that time (i.e. [the battle of] Dunkirk in May, Italy’s
opening of hostilities against Britain and France in June, and the surrender of France of the
same month). However, in the course of a study conform to the Outline of the Main Principles
for Coping with the Changing World Situation, the Navy became skeptical about the judgment
that the United States and Britain were separable, and returned to its former judgment that
they should be considered inseparable. In the meantime, as the likelihood of a German land-
ing on the mainland of Britain and the latter’s collapse, which Japan had expected, dimin-
ished, the Army was also becoming cautious about the use of force in the southern region.
As a result, in April 1941, the Outline of Policy toward the South was agreed upon between the
Army and the Navy Departments of IGHQ. This outline took a step back from the active ad-
vance into the south policy of the previous year and contained the following major points:(3, 4)
1. The objective of the present policy toward the south is to promptly expand the overall national
defense strength for the sake of the Empire’s self-preservation and self-defense. To this end:
(1) The military, political and economic ties between the Empire, French Indochina, and Thai-
land shall be made closer.
(2) Close economic relations shall be established between the Empire and the Dutch East In-
dies.
(3) Normal commercial relations shall be maintained between the Empire and the other south-
ern nations.
2. The above shall be achieved through diplomatic means. In particular, military ties shall be ur-
gently established with French Indochina and Thailand.
3. In case the following situations should occur and no solutions should be found, force of arms
shall be employed for the sake of self-preservation and self-defense:
(1) In case where the self-preservation of the Empire should be threatened by the embargoes
imposed by Britain, the United States and the Netherlands.
(2) In case the encirclement by the United States, Britain, the Netherlands, China, etc. were
stepped up to the degree that it is no longer tolerable from the standpoint of national de-
fense.
4. If the collapse of Britain may be taken for certain, the purpose of this policy shall be achieved,
particularly by intensifying diplomatic actions toward the Dutch East Indies.
In the meantime, Japan succeeded in mediating the border dispute between Thailand and
French Indochina in November 1940, and in March 1941, it also concluded agreements [with
French Indochina and Thailand] that neither of them should have political or military coop-
erative relations with third countries.
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In those days, the United States government increased the economic pressure with the
following measures:
December 1940: Added aviation lubricant manufacturing equipment to the items subject to an
export license.
February 1941: Added well-drilling rigs, oil tanks, oil drums and others to the items subject
to an export license.
April 1941: (1) The decision as to the additional inclusion of derivatives and materials
transformed from the items subject to an export license into items to be con-
trolled by an export license was entirely entrusted to the Office for Export
Control.
(2) The leaking of information to other countries on the production and pro-
cessing of items currently subject to an export license should be controlled.
Furthermore, on 21 June 1941, right after the discontinuation of the negotiations between
Japan and the Netherlands, the United States included all petroleum products in the items
subject to export licensing.
The next day, 22 June 1941, the German army all of a sudden invaded the Soviet Union,
and the German-Soviet War started. After that, the support for Chongqing [government] by
the United States and Britain was strengthened more than ever. [Also], the so-called ABCD
encirclement ([by] America, Britain, China, and the Dutch) was formed, and machinations
in French Indochina and Thailand to alienate them from Japan were intensified, which made
it difficult for Japan to obtain rice, rubber, and tin. The Dutch East Indies was also getting
tougher in its attitude. On 25 June 1941, the Measures for Advancing the Southern Policy, which
included [the idea to] advance into southern French Indochina, was decided upon; it was
aimed to cut off the connections between the United States, Britain and the Chongqing gov-
ernment, to confront the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands, which had placed po-
litical, economic and military pressure [on Japan] in the southern region, and also to contain
the machinations [of these countries] in French Indochina and Thailand to alienate them from
Japan. Furthermore, on 2 July, the Outline of National Policies in View of the Changing Situation
was decided upon, in which three policies were laid down: that [Japan] should firmly hold
the course to establish the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, that it should accelerate
the preparations for a southward advance, and that it should solve the northern problems
depending on the situation.(2)
Note: In order to solve the northern problems [mentioned] here, the Army mobilized an un-
precedented number of troops and reinforced the Kwangtung Army and the Korean Army
(the Special Grand Maneuvers of the Kwantung Army, a.k.a. “KANTOKUEN”). However,
due to subsequent changes in the situation, the lull in tension at the border between
Manchuria and the Soviet Union lasted until right before the end of the war.
On 28 July 1941, in accordance with these policies, the Japanese Army advanced into southern
French Indochina in a peaceful way. Prior to this, on 25 July, the [Japanese] government had
Nomura Kichisaburō, Japanese ambassador to the United States, directly explain to President
Roosevelt the intentions and the reasons of the advance [of the Army] into southern French
Indochina. In the wake of this, on 26 July, the U.S. government announced a freeze on Japan-
ese assets, which was followed by Britain and the Netherlands. Then on 1 August 1941, the
United States put a total embargo on the export of oil [to Japan]. Until that time the U.S. gov-
6 Chapter I     /     The Circumstances Leading to Japan’s Invasion of the
Dutch East Indies
ernment had not put an embargo on oil because it judged that Japan would certainly start its
southward advance to seek oil by force of arms if the oil supply [to Japan] was stopped.
Therefore, Roosevelt’s intention to totally stop the oil supply to Japan was of extremely great
significance.
4. The Supply and Demand of Essential Materials and the
Appropriate Moment to Open Hostilities
It was obvious that Japan, having been prohibited from importing oil, would not be able to
survive an anticipated, protracted war against two or more countries with its current stock
and [small] domestic production [of oil]. Cornered into such a situation, [Japan] had no other
way but to make large concessions in an attempt to break the deadlock in the Japan-U.S. ne-
gotiations, or to swiftly obtain oil in the Dutch East Indies even by force of arms.
As of 1 August 1941, an investigation by the Naval Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry
of the supply and demand of oil in case of war yielded the following results. In this study, it
was assumed that the key areas in the south including the Dutch East Indies were captured
and the oil produced in those areas could be sent back [to Japan].(5)
1. Estimated Supply and Demand (kilo tons)
War 1st year 2d year 3d year
A. Amount of Stock at the Beginning of the Year 9,400 4,800 2,740
B. Acquirable Amount per year
Domestic Production 200 200 400
Synthetic Oil 300 700 1,500
Oil Sent from the South 300 2,440 4,770
C. Total (A+B) 10,200 8,140 9,410
D. Annual Consumption 5,400 5,400 5,400
E. Amount of Stock at the End of the Year (C-D) 4,800 2,740 4,010
F. Minimum Reserve
Fixed reserve in tanks 800
Reserve mainland Japan 1,000
Reserve for decisive battles 500
Total 2,300
Amount usable by the End of the Year (E-F) 2,500 440 1,710
2. Presuppositions of this study
(1) All oil facilities [in the areas to be occupied] are destroyed by the time of occupation.
(2) Drilling rigs
The current number of rigs: 200. Under construction: 40 rigs ([ordered by] the Navy; to be
completed in December 1941), and 40 rigs ([ordered by] civilians, to be completed in March
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1942); the number of rigs [under control of or ordered by] the Army is unknown. Estimated
annual turnout of rigs: 100 (amount of steel necessary [for constructing] one unit: 200 tons).
(3) Workers
Current [oil] workers at home: 7,800. On-site workers required: 3,200 in Borneo, 1,500 in
Sumatra, totaling 4,700.
(4) Steel pipes stored or in production at home shall be used when they are ready. (The domestic
annual production capacity: 250,000 tons, which allows the construction of 2,000 wells of
700 meters deep).
(5) The drillings shall be primarily wartime makeshift drillings.
(6) The rate of loss of crude oil by enemy attacks shall be set at 10%.
(7) Transport capacity
The current number of tankers is 47 with a [total] capacity of 440,000 tons, and the amount
[of oil] to be transported from the Dutch East Indies to the mainland is about 5 million tons.
The number of tankers to be built in the next three years (as of 1 August [1941]) is 10 tankers
of the 10,000-ton class and about 20 of the 5,000-ton class, with [a capacity of] 200,000 tons
in total. (This plan works [only] when the rate of wartime transport loss is calculated at 10%.
The shipbuilding costs have to be increased if necessary in the light of actual performance.)
3. Negative factors in this study 
(1) Loss of domestic oil reserve by possible enemy air strikes is not included in the calculation.
(2) Although loss [of oil] on site by possible enemy air strikes is, combined with transport loss,
calculated at 10% of the production, the loss rate may be larger.
(3) No drilling mishaps were taken into consideration.
(4) [In the light of] considerable difficulties to transport the oil produced in Seria and Sumatra
[to ports], six months was allotted for fixing the pipelines from Seria and seven months for
those from Palembang. However, it may take many more days to fix them depending on the
degree of damage.
4. Positive factors in this study 
(1) The production from the northern Sakhalin oil field is not included in the calculation. (The
amount could be 50,000, 200,000, and 1,200,000 tons respectively for the first, the second and
the third year, if all of its production will be available.)
(2) [The production from] the oil field in western New Guinea is not taken into consideration.
According to fairly reliable information, the quantity of oil in that area is no less than that in
Borneo. After the test drillings, deadlight-lids were reportedly put over the wellheads. If
this is true, it will be quite easy to obtain the oil after occupation.
(3) [The production of] the domestic oil fields for the first and the second year is calculated at
half the amount produced in peacetime. If production work is concentrated on the main oil
fields as a stopgap measure, it is possible to obtain the same production amount as in peace-
time from the first year on ([which means] an increase in the domestic oil production for
both the first and the second year by 200,000 tons.)
(4) As for the [average] monthly production of oil per well, Engineer Ōmura of Nippon Oil es-
timates that the current average production can be [increased] by [at least] three times for
sure by drilling new wells as a wartime stopgap measure, while abandoning the wells,
whose production has sharply dropped. However, to make this study more reliable, [the av-
erage monthly production per well] was calculated at two times or less [the current average
production]. If the estimate by Engineer Ōmura is correct, the production can be further in-
creased by fifty percent. 
(5) The oil fields in central and northern Sumatra are not included in [this] calculation. It is pos-
sible to double the amount of oil production in southern Sumatra if drilling rigs are ordered
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simultaneously with the opening of hostilities (oil drilling rigs ordered by the Army are ex-
cluded from the calculation).
(6) [The situation will be] all the more favorable if fires of gushing oil wells are extinguished or
current facilities [assumed to be destroyed] are fixed and used, and extremely favorable,
particularly if the fires are successfully extinguished because such wells will be available as
they are.
(7) Some further increase in the production of synthetic oil is likely.
5. Conclusions of this study
(1) Due to the oil embargo imposed by the United States, Britain and the Netherlands, the stock
of oil [in Japan] will decrease from August onwards by 400,000 tons every month. Unless
war is waged by the end of October [1941], fuel [shortage] is feared at the end of the second
year of the war.
(2) It is necessary to make as much effort as possible to increase the production of synthetic oil,
but not much can be expected unless drastic measures would be taken.
(3) When conducting the Dutch East Indies invasion, it is necessary to come up with good ideas
when planning and carrying out the operation in order to minimize damage to the oil fields.
(4) It is necessary to give oil field workers to be dispatched to the occupied areas a training to
extinguish fires set at [naturally] flowing oil wells. (Note: For this purpose, a system of de-
fense details was employed later, and two defense details were formed.)
As seen in this study, it was feared that the war potential [of Japan] would sharply drop and
finally be lost if the embargo on the import of oil should continue and the moment to wage
war should be delayed. Meanwhile, the Cabinet Planning Board made the following esti-
mates at the end of October [1941].(2)
War 1st year 2d year 3d year
A. Amount of Stock at the Beginning of the Year 8,400 4,660 1,560
B. Annual Production
Domestic Production 360 400 440
Synthetic Oil 300 500 700
C. Total (A+B) 9,060 5,560 2,700
D. Annual Consumption 4,400 4,000 3,950
E. Amount of Stock at the End of the Year (C-D) 4,660 1,560 -1,250
F. Minimum Reserve 1,500 1,500 1,500
Amount usable by the End of the Year (E-F) 3,160 60 -2,750
[kilo tons]
Therefore, if Japan had no choice but to wage war, it needed to decide as soon as possible in
view of the oil [stocks].
Furthermore, apart from oil, Japan’s stockpiles of other materials for which it depended
on imports were also extremely small. The stockpiles of materials kept by the Navy as of Au-
gust 1940 were as follows. The stockpiles were at such a [low] level that they would barely
last for about one year if imports of the materials should stop.(6)




Chapter I     /     The Circumstances Leading to Japan’s Invasion of the 9
Dutch East Indies
Aluminum 9.5













According to the study of the Cabinet Planning Board as of the end of October 1941, the pro-
curement of tungsten ore, tin ore, crude rubber, rice, corn, rock phosphate, pine resin, raw
lacquer, cowhide, vegetable fats and oils and the like had [already] become difficult, while
in the southern region, large amounts of crude rubber, sugar, timber, Manila hemp, cinchona,
iron, copper, chromium, tin, zinc, nickel, bauxite, and coal for iron-manufacturing were pro-
duced. Consequently, from the standpoint of Japan it was desirable to try to get hold of the
region as soon as possible.
Also from a military point of view, it was preferable that if worst came to worst and there
was no choice but to wage war, it should be done the sooner the better in view of the fact
that with the passage of time the ratio in military strength between Japan and the United
States would worsen [for Japan] and the encirclement by the ABCD countries could be ex-
pected to become stronger; furthermore, that it was necessary to finish the southern operation
before a northern operation became feasible because of a thaw in the weather in the north in
order to avoid simultaneous operations in both the north and the south, and that it was also
necessary to launch the operation before the northeastern monsoon started in the South China
Sea which would make the landing operations on the east coast of the Malay Peninsula dif-
ficult.
So, the Army and the Navy pressed the government to not lose the right moment in de-
ciding to wage war should the emergency arise. At the same time, the Navy started full-scale
war preparations as a precaution and, on 1 September 1941, announced the all-out wartime
formation. At that time, the Japan-U.S. negotiations were hardly making any progress. On 6
September, the Main Points for the Implementation of Imperial National Policy was decided at
the request of the Army and the Navy.(2) The gist was that [Japan] should complete the prepa-
rations for war by the end of October, while taking all possible diplomatic steps to break the
deadlock in the Japan-U.S. negotiations and try to attain its minimum demands, but that it
would nevertheless decide to wage war in the beginning of October if it had no prospect of
attaining its demands.
5. Changes in the Measures to Cope with the Fuel [Problem]
As seen above, Japan was heavily dependent on its hypothetical enemy, the United States,
for the supply of oil as the energy source of all of Japan’s activities, so the [U.S.] export con-
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trols against Japan posed a great threat to the latter. To put it forcibly, it may even be said
that [the controls] forced the latter into war. In view of the importance of oil, let us try to
summarize the changes in the policy adopted by the Navy, which had a leading role in
[Japanese] oil policy, as well as the changes in the national oil policy.
1. The Navy’s countermeasures [against oil shortage]
At the end of the Meiji Period when heavy oil came into use as fuel for naval vessels, it was ex-
pected that [the demand] could be covered by domestic production. However, heavy oil became
the only fuel for the engines of naval vessels; then it was also adopted as fuel for civilian factories
and the like, and the relation between supply and demand became, contrary to expectations,
rather precarious. The Navy, considering it urgent to quickly stockpile oil, purchased 3,700 tons
by the end of 1909. Afterwards, the Navy aggressively purchased and stored oil, and by the end
of 1926, the [oil storage] tank capacity reached 1.59 million tons, and the heavy oil storage 1.54
million tons.(7)
In 1920, the Imperial Diet approved the “Eight-Eight Fleet Plan” ([aiming to build] a large
fleet of eight battleships and eight [armored] battle cruisers as the core), which were within the
first period of a warship’s life, i.e. eight years from the start of construction, which made the
current level of stored oil totally inadequate. On the completion of this plan, the annual amount
of heavy oil required in the first year of a war would jump to about 3.6 million tons, and that in
the second year and onwards to about 2.6 million tons.(7) Accordingly, the Navy had to urgently
push forward comprehensive countermeasures against a fuel [shortage]. The principal measures
taken were the following:(7, 8, 9)
(1) Promotion of import of overseas oil: The first contract was made in 1917, and imports from
Borneo, the United States and others got on track.
(2) Development Assistance to the north Sakhalin oil fields: Owing to this measure, the annual
production [of the oil fields] reached about 200,000 tons around 1932 and 1933.
(3) Development Promotion of oil field(s) in Taiwan: Although the field(s) did not yield satis-
factory amount(s), this measure greatly raised awareness regarding oil [shortage] issues in
Taiwan, and had a great effect [on promoting alternative fuel plans such as] the use of natural
gas.
(4) Research on low-temperature carbonization: Although it did not reach [the level of] practical
use, the research formed a basis for the coal liquefaction industry. 
(5) Stimulation of the shale oil industry: Shale oil, when blended with oil from Tarakan at a ratio
of three or less to seven, was fit for use by the Navy as heavy oil. It was said that shale oil
from the Fushun Mines in Manchuria would reach 5 billion tons, and that that amount was
located above the coal bed alone. Shale oil had much potential as alternative liquid fuel and
the annual production of unrefined oil reached 370,000 tons from 1939 to 1940.
(6) Promotion of the coal liquefaction industry: Although coal liquefaction was by and large
successful as an experiment in 1935, due to the high temperature and the high pressure re-
quired, there were technical difficulties in its industrial production. [As the industrialization]
was also hampered by the difficulty in obtaining materials from 1937 and onwards, the actual
production only reached about 10% of the plan.
(7) [Increase in] oil storage: Although the target amount of the crude oil storage of the year 1936
was 10 million tons, [only] half of the target was actually stored.
(8) Subsidizing the building of tankers.
(9) Promotion of countermeasures against [shortage of] aviation fuel: Research on a practical
application of tetraethyl lead (an antiknock substance to prevent early ignition and improve
power output) as well as research on a method to produce high-octane cracked gasoline by
hydrogenation was conducted.
(10) Introduction of [foreign] technologies to produce isooctane and aviation lubricant.
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(11) Promotion of an industry to synthesize isooctane.
(12) Development of the domestic production of high-grade aviation lubricant: The production
succeeded at last in 1943 and 1944.
(13) Construction of oil storage tanks: The [total] capacity reached 6,914,000 tons in 1942.
(14) Facilitating the supply and demand of fuel by streamlining the departments managing it.
2. The transition of the national oil policy
Until about 1930 – 1931, fuel policy was [mainly a subject of] research and discussion. However,
in the wake of the Manchurian Incident in 1931, [the Japanese government] shifted to the im-
plementation of a fuel policy, and with the Petroleum Industry Law, which became effective in
July 1934, oil came under strict control of the government. The main measures of the national
oil policy were as follows.(10) First of all, with the Petroleum Industry Law: 
(1) A license system was introduced to control the oil business.
(2) The duty of storing oil was imposed on oil companies: Each company was required to store
at all times half the amount of its total imports of crude oil, heavy oil and gasoline of the
previous year.
(3) According to the policy [to promote] domestic refining, protection was given to domestic
companies by giving an advantage to domestic products over the imported products in the
allotment of sales.
Soon after that, due to the outbreak of the China Incident in July 1937, oil consumption had to
be brought under control.
(1) The First [Oil] Consumption Controls (November 1937)
{1} Ban on cruising taxis.
{2} Ten percent reduction in gasoline consumption of buses and gasoline-fueled cars in both
public and private use.
{3} Saving gasoline consumption of trucks by improving efficiency of business operations.
{4} Voluntary restrictions on the use of gasoline for private cars.
{5} Creating substitute fuel for official cars by blending 5% alcohol with the gasoline.
{6} Propagating equipment for gasoline-substitute fuel such as charcoal and firewood, and
promptly employ wood gas generators for buses, trucks and gasoline-fueled cars in gov-
ernmental use.
{7} Ten percent reduction in the consumption of heavy oil in the mining and manufacturing
industries by increasing the efficiency of its use and by improving facilities.
(2) The Second [Oil] Consumption Controls (May 1938)
About the same time as the enactment of the National Mobilization Law, the regulations for
the control of gasoline and heavy oil sales were promulgated, and a coupon sales system
was adopted. 
(3) The Third [Oil] Consumption Controls (September 1941)
All private vehicles were completely prohibited from using gasoline, and made to run on
substitute fuel (wood gas).
Apart from the above, such measures as the implementation of an overall fuel administration
by a newly established Fuel Agency, the stockpiling of fuel and the promotion of the substitute
fuel industry were taken, but the outlook for the supply and demand of fuel remained bleak.
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In conformity with the consumption controls imposed on civilians, the Navy, too, placed a
rigid limit on the fuel used in fleet training, the bulk consumer. From 1935 onwards, the Navy
earnestly made efforts to conserve oil by only [allowing its fleet training] an annual allotment
[of fuel] that would merely cover thirty to forty-five around the clock sailings at cruising
speed (about twelve knots), with a separate amount set aside for eight around the clock tac-
tical exercises. As for naval vessels not included in the fleet, it further reduced the allotment
of fuel, limiting the allotment to an amount that would cover twenty-five around the clock
sailings.
6. The Breakdown in the Japan-U.S. Negotiations
As mentioned previously, Japan decided on the Main Points for the Implementation of Imperial
National Policy on 6 September 1941, and in the negotiations with the United States tried to
attain its minimum demands, but even in mid-October nothing concrete had materialized.
The Konoe Cabinet, however, could not make up its mind about war or peace, and finally
resigned en bloc. On 18 October the Tōjō Cabinet was formed and, in accordance with the
personal instruction of the Emperor, started all over again with the decision of 6 September,
and reexamined the whole situation from scratch. Nonetheless, on 5 November, as a result
of the reexamination, it was decided “to suspend the initiation of military action should the
negotiations with the United States prove successful by 0000 on 1 December.” Pending that,
it was decided “to remain resolved to wage war against the United States, Britain and the
Netherlands, to set the time for the launch of military action at the beginning of December
and to have the Army and the Navy complete their operational preparations, while at the
same time making efforts to come to an agreement in the negotiations with the United
States.”(2) Following this, the high command set the tentative date for the opening of hostilities
on 8 December. Judging from the situation of that time, the outlook for an agreement in the
Japan-U.S. negotiations was bleak.
Prior to this, the Navy launched a full-scale war preparation from August 1941 onwards,
and on 15 August, the Combined Fleet issued an order to complete the war preparations by
the beginning of October (anticipating the opening of hostilities in mid-November). However,
partly due to the massive personnel shifts, which followed the announcement of the all-out
wartime formation, the war potential [of the Navy] sharply dropped and it had to postpone
the tentative date for the opening of hostilities previously fixed on the middle of November.
The Army could not complete its preparations in time either, and consequently the [new ten-
tative] date for the opening of hostilities was fixed on 8 December. In the meantime, the work
to draw up an operation plan went on, and the plan was for the most part completed by the
end of October. Although there were complicated developments in the course of the planning,
the surprise attack on Hawaii right at the outset of the war with a unit consisting of the full
strength of the main carriers (six carriers) as its core, was adopted in the operational policy
of the Navy Department of IGHQ at the strong request of Commander in Chief of the Com-
bined Fleet Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku.
The Navy Department of IGHQ put forth the “Operational policy to be carried out by the
Combined Fleet” as of 5 November, and the latter issued its operation orders in conformity
to this policy. The Combined Fleet shifted its forces to the dispositions at the time of the open-
ing of hostilities ([by] disposing its forces so as to suit the planned operations), and each unit
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started its deployment to the standby positions before the opening of hostilities. Then on 21
November, the Navy Department of IGHQ told the Combined Fleet to advance its units to
the operational waters, and all units started to advance to their respective stations for the
time of launching operations.
Meanwhile, concerning the rough going Japan-U.S. negotiations, the government further-
more urgently dispatched Ambassador Kurusu Saburō [to the United States] to present a
new proposal and to seek progress in the negotiations. However, the reply from the U.S. Gov-
ernment, the so-called “Hull Note,” was unbending. It plainly demanded the following
points:
1. Withdrawal of all military, naval, air and police forces from China and from Indochina.
2. Repudiation of any government or regime in China other than the regime [of Chiang Kai-shek]
with its capital at Chongqing.
3. Renunciation of special close relations between Japan and China.
4. Declaring the Tripartite Pact a dead letter.
On 28 November 1941, having received the full text of the “Hull Note,” the [Japanese] gov-
ernment and the high command examined the contents in a liaison conference and came to
the unanimous conclusion that this could not be regarded as anything but an ultimatum [to
Japan], and that no way was left now for Japan other than to wage war for its self-preserva-
tion and self-defense. As a consequence, at 1610, 1st December, 1941, the following decision
was given by the Emperor:
The negotiations with the United States in accordance with the Main Points for the Implementation
of Imperial National Policy decided on 5 November were unsuccessful. The Empire [of Japan]
shall wage war against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands.
On the next day, the 2d, both chiefs of the Army and the Navy General Staffs reported to the
Emperor side by side and asked for the approval of the Emperor to exercise military force
against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands from 0000, 8 December, 1941 onwards.
As a result, at 1730 on that day, the Combined Fleet transmitted the secret code telegram “Ni-
itaka-yama Nobore 1208” [Climb Mount Niitaka on 1208] (Fix 8 December as Day X), and
plunged headlong into the Greater East Asia War.
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Chapter II The Military Topography of the South-
western Region
(See Attached Illustrations No. 1, No. 2 and No. 3) [Omitted]
Before the opening of hostilities, both the Army and the Navy tried hard to gather mil-itary information about the southwestern region [southeast Asia], but except for thePhilippines the information collected was utterly insufficient. As a result, the reality
was that except for the Philippines [both] knew almost nothing about the details of the mil-
itary topography [of the region] required for actual operations, and that they pushed forward
with the operations while proceeding with the research.(11)
It is said that volumes one and two of [a compiled set of] military data kept at the Navy
General Staff Office before the opening of hostilities partly contained rather detailed data.
However, as they are no longer extant and other materials referred to at that time,(12, 13) such
as, “Aviation handbook of the southern countries,” “Military sketches,” “Airport chart(s) of
the Dutch East Indies,” “Air base plans of the southern countries,” “Meteorological charts of
the southern countries,” and “Wind volumes and directions chart,” are virtually no longer
extant either, the details [of what was known or not] are unclear.
The following is an outline of the military topography of the southwestern region ob-
tained by the Navy by the end of 1941.
1. General Topography
The Philippines(14)
The Philippines is a U.S.-ruled territory south of Taiwan. It consists of about 7,100 large and
small islands that stretch for about 1,700 kilometers from south to north between latitude 5º
to 21º north and for about 1,100 kilometers from east to west, of which Luzon is located in
the north, the Visayan Islands in the center, Mindanao in the south, and Palawan Island and
the Sulu Archipelago to the west of Mindanao. It was a strategic area that [Japan] had to se-
cure at any cost for the advance on Java.
Air transportation in the Philippines is relatively developed. As for ground transportation,
railroads are only available on Luzon, Panay, and Cebu, but they are in poor condition. How-
ever, on the flat country of the main islands motorways are well developed, and there are
also many cars. Major ports are those of Manila and Cebu, and other ports such as those of
Iloilo, Davao, and Legaspi serve for exporting local specialties.
Thailand(15)
Thailand lies in the middle of the Indochina Peninsula; it shares its eastern border with
French Indochina and its western border with Burma. In the south it faces the Gulf of Thai-
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land. With its capital in Bangkok, it is the only independent nation in the Indochina Penin-
sula. Southern Thailand is also called Thai Malaya and borders on British Malaya. At that
time, it was totally under the influence of Britain.
Burma(15)
In Burma, the Arakan mountain range lies in the northwest, where the country borders on
India, and in the east the Shan Plateau extends to where it shares borders with Yunnan and
Thailand. The Irrawaddy River flows more or less southward through the central lowlands
into the Bay of Bengal. Along with the seaport of Rangoon, this country came to attract the
attention of the world as the so-called supply route to the Chiang Kai-shek regime.
British Malaya(15)
British Malaya is a peninsula that further juts out from the Indochina Peninsula and faces
the South China Sea in the east and the Bay of Bengal in the west. At the tip of the peninsula
lies the island of Singapore, which serves as Britain’s political, economic and military center
in Asia. In British Malaya, rubber is commercially produced on an extensive scale, and min-
eral products are also abundant. The export hub [of these products] is Singapore. British
Malaya produced respectively 40% and 30% of the total world production of rubber and tin
respectively (in 1938).
British Borneo(15)
British Borneo consists of the Principality of Sarawak and British Northern Borneo and bor-
ders on Dutch Borneo in the south. It faces the South China Sea in the north and also borders
on the Philippines across the Balabac Strait. Oil is produced near Miri. Kuching, the capital
of the Principality of Sarawak, has an airfield, which is located about 420 nautical miles from
Singapore, about 420 nautical miles from Palembang, and about 510 nautical miles from
Batavia; it is very important as an air base for the air campaign in the Java invasion opera-
tion.
The East Indian Islands(16, 17, 18)
The Dutch East Indies consist of numerous islands situated close to each other in an area
stretching from latitude 6º north to 11º south and from longitude 95º to 141º east with the
equator more or less in the middle. The area can roughly be divided into the Sunda Islands,
Borneo, Celebes, the Moluccas and New Guinea. The total area is 1.90 million square kilo-
meters and the total population is over 60 million.
The Sunda Islands consist of the Greater Sunda Islands (with Sumatra and Java as the
main components) and the Lesser Sunda Islands (with Bali, Lombok, Sumbawa, Sumba, Flo-
res and Timor as the main components). The Moluccas consist of Halmahera, Buru, Ceram,
and other islands, and are also known as the Spice Islands. The major waters between these
archipelagos are the Celebes Sea, the Molucca Sea, the Banda Sea, the Flores Sea and the Java
Sea, etc.; the Indian Ocean, the Timor Sea and the Arafura Sea are on the periphery of the
southern region.
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The Dutch East Indies is situated in a location that more or less forms a bridge connecting
the Asian continent and Australia; furthermore its southern part faces the Indian Ocean. It
forms the outermost part of the area [Japan] plans to occupy. Of this area, Sumatra and Java
are the most important.
Sumatra and Java: Sumatra, from where the Malay Peninsula can be seen across the Malacca
Strait, has oil fields near Palembang, Medan, etc. Those in the sector of Palembang and vicin-
ity (with an annual oil production of three million tons) and those of northern Aceh (one mil-
lion tons) were eagerly coveted by Japan.
Java is the most developed island in the East Indies. Batavia in the west, the seat of the
government-general of the Dutch East Indies, has a population of about 600,000, and
Surabaya in the east about 400,000. In Java, the mountain areas are [also] well developed,
and so is the transportation system. Along with Cilacap on the south coast, Batavia and
Surabaya constitute important ports not only as commercial but also as military (strategic)
ports.
Celebes: Celebes is located midway between New Guinea and Borneo. Makassar at the
southern tip of the island, located at a distance of about 430 nautical miles from Surabaya
and about 400 nautical miles from Kupang, was very important as a base for the air campaign
during the attack on eastern Java. With an area of about 190,000 km², Celebes has many
mountain ranges and gorges. The island produces nickel, which was also exported to Japan,
and it is further said to have large iron ore reserves.
Borneo: Borneo is the third largest island in the world with an area of 750,000 km², of which
about 540,000 km² is Dutch-ruled; however, the population is remarkably sparse. Balikpapan
and Banjarmasin on the southern coast, respectively located at a distance of about 450 nautical
miles and 260 nautical miles from Surabaya, were important as air bases for the campaign to
destroy the enemy air power in eastern Java. The annual oil production of the Sanga Sanga
sector in Borneo (with a refinery [in Balikpapan]) was one million tons, and that of the
Tarakan sector 700,000 tons. The Japanese Navy had been importing heavy oil from Tarakan
for many years.
New Guinea: New Guinea is the world second largest island with an area of a little over
800,000 km², of which the Dutch-ruled territory stretches westward from longitude 141º east,
occupying an area of a little over 390,000 km². As situated in between the United States and
Australia, this island holds an extremely important position for Japan to conduct operations
to cut off communications between the United States and the Australia. A central mountain
range like a spinal column links a series of mountains of 4,000 meters or higher and is covered
with snow through all seasons. The island has many areas untrodden by man, and as situated
in the tropics, it consists of many vast wetlands and dense jungles.
Timor Island: Situated between Java and Australia, the island of Timor serves as a key loca-
tion for supporting Java from Australia. While the western part of the island is Dutch-ruled,
the eastern part is ruled by Portugal, a neutral country. Dutch Timor is about the same size
as Kyūshū, while Portuguese Timor is about the same size as Shikoku.* The latter has a colo-
nial government and is administered by a civilian governor general. The city of Dili is ad-
ministered separately. Although no demographic statistics are available, the population on
the basis of tax collection is 477,000. Since the end of October 1941, a permission of the gov-
ernor general is required to go outside the Dili city district.
2. Summary of Meteorological Conditions(19)
The seasonal and trade winds together form a unique wind system over the whole south-
western region. As the wind direction reverses about every half year, it is generally called
the monsoon wind.
As the northeastern wind is dominant around January from the Philippines to northern
Borneo, French Indochina, Thailand and the Malay Peninsula, it causes [much] rainfall on
the eastern side of the [southwestern] region, while resulting in very little rainfall on the
western side of the region.
In the south from the Sunda Islands to the Moluccas, the dry northwestern wind creates
a dry season in January, while the wet southeastern wind creates a rainy season in July. Al-
though the seasonal wind [generally] dictates the climate in this area, different [local] winds
blow along the coastal and mountain areas, which bring about some variation in the climate.
Typhoons often cross the Philippines, its northern part in particular, the east coast of
French Indochina, the South China Sea, the waters east of the Philippines, the northeastern
and northwestern coasts of Australia, etc., and sometimes cause serious damage. Typhoons
are mostly formed in the area between latitude 3º to 12º north and longitude 130º to 135º east;
two thirds of the typhoons appear between July and October.
3. Summary of Air Bases
The Philippines
For inter-island transportation, the Philippines is very much dependent on air transport. Al-
though it has as many as one hundred or more airports, they are generally small and many
of them are quite inadequate as air bases for operations. The main bases in the southern
Philippines used by its air force as operational bases are as follows:(20)
Mindanao:            Davao, Zamboanga, Delmonte, Cagayan, Cotabato, etc.
Other [islands]:    Jolo, Iloilo, Cebu, etc.
Malaya Area
Air transportation in Malaya is relatively well developed. There are more airfields on the
west coast, and military air bases are located in the Kota Bharu sector, Kwantan, Singapore
(Seletar, Sembawang, Tengah, Kallang are for civilian use and also available for seaplanes),
Alor Setar, Sungai Petani, Penang, etc.
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* Actually, the whole of Timor island is slightly smaller than Kyūshū.
British Borneo
British Borneo has only two airfields, Kuching and Miri. It is presumed that in case of a Japan-
ese attack, Miri will be destroyed and that Kuching and Jesselton (the latter is located on the
west coast close to the northern tip of the island; its airfield of 600 meters by 800 meters with
a diagonally running 1,500 meter [runway] is still under construction by converting and ex-
panding a racetrack) will be made ready for use.
The Kuching airfield is situated about 13 kilometers from [the city of] Kuching. It is an L-
shaped airfield with runways of 800 meters by 300 meters and of 600 meters by 300 meters.
The ground is solid, and it is [even] accessible in the rainy season. [Moreover,] as no hangars
stand nearby, it is extensible. The Miri airfield is about 7 kilometers north of the city. It has a
runway of 900 meters by 300 meters, and is extensible to the size of 1,200 meters by 300 me-
ters.
The East Indian Islands
Regular air services are provided between Java, Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes, Timor and others.
Particularly Java has many airfields. However, there are no aircraft building facilities in the
Dutch East Indies, only aircraft repair facilities located in Bandung and Surabaya.(12, 13)
The major airfields are as follows:
Sumatra: Sabang (700 [meters] by 200 [meters]), Medan (1,000 by 1000), Belawan (Seaplane Base),
Pekanbaru (800 by 800), Jambi (700 by 200), Palembang (1,000 by 1,000), and Mentok (1,000
by 200)
Java: Batavia (west: 1,000 by 1,000; south: 1,200 by 1,200), Buitenzorg (for bombers), Bandung
(1,200 by 1,000), and Surabaya (1,000 by 820)
Menado: Kakas (presumably 1,000 by 1,000), and Kakas (Seaplane Base)
Ambon: Army Base (1,200 by 400), Naval Base (unknown)
Borneo: Tarakan (900 by 800), Balikpapan (800 by 800), Bengkayang (700 by 150), and Pontianak
(Seaplane Base)
Others: Bali (800 by 800), Kupang (800 by 800), Dili (800 by 500), Kendari (1,000 by 600), and
Makassar (800 by 700)
4. Summary of Major Ports, Waterways, etc.
The Waters of the Philippines(22)
Numerous large and small islands lie scattered around and the waters enclosed by these is-
lands make up many good harbors that give shelter against the northeastern monsoon. How-
ever, few ports meet both conditions of port facilities and anchorage, except for Manila.
Davao Gulf is the largest bay in the southern Philippines; however, it is unsuitable for an-
choring because its mouth is wide open to the south and it is too deep. However, the port of
Davao, located furthest in the bay, is equipped with some port facilities, and good areas very
much suitable for anchoring are located in its neighborhood and in Malalag Bay, which will
make the port a possible operational base next to Manila Bay.
In the Sulu Archipelago (which consists of more than 300 islands between Mindanao and
Borneo), there are good anchorages near Tawi-Tawi and Jolo.
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South China Sea(23)
The South China Sea is a vast oblong sea enclosed by Taiwan and continental China in the
north, the Philippines in the east, Indochina and the Malay Peninsula in the west, and Borneo
in the south; it stretches for about 1,800 nautical miles from north to south with a width of
about 500 nautical miles from east to west. The islets and cays of the Paracel Islands, the
Spratly Islands and others stud the waters; the islands belonging to the Natuna Islands, the
Anambas Islands and others are located in the southern part. There are no good ports or bays
on the western side of this sea (i.e. Malaya and Indochina), except for Cam Ranh Bay in
French Indochina; repair and replenishment facilities are available only at [the ports of]
Saigon and Bangkok, and [not] in Malaya or Borneo where there are no suitable ports.
In northern Borneo, only Brunei Bay is suitable for anchoring and replenishing. Kuching,
the center of the Sarawak district, and Miri, the port [to ship] the oil produced [nearby], have
port facilities built on the banks at the mouth of the rivers.
On [the side of] the Malay Peninsula [which faces the South China Sea], only the port of
Singora in southern Thailand is [considered available], but the port is small and its facilities
are poor.
The Malaya Waters(24, 25)
The Malaya waters are the ocean area [enclosed by] Malaya and northern and central Sumatra
with the Malacca Strait in the center. The major ports [in these waters] include Singapore,
Malacca, Penang, and Sabang. Singapore is a small island situated at the south end of the
Malay Peninsula and a strategic location for maritime traffic connecting the Pacific Ocean
and the Indian Ocean, which made the city Britain’s largest military foothold in the East.
Malacca is another key location for [maritime] traffic on the west coast of the Malay Peninsula
in the southern part of the Malacca Strait. Although it has port facilities built on both banks
of the mouth of the river, it cannot be used for large naval vessels. Penang is an island adja-
cent to the west coast of the Malay Peninsula in the northern part of Malacca Strait. It has
port facilities on the side facing the west coast of the peninsula as well as an anchorage, which
not only provides shelter against the northern wind but also enables repair works.
The Malacca Strait is the only strait which connects the Indian Ocean to the South China
Sea and Java. On the whole it is deep and easy to sail; even at the narrowest part it has a
depth of eighteen meters or more and a width of three nautical miles.
On the west coast of Sumatra, high mountains come close down to the coast. Flat lands
are scarce and neither are there good ports along the coast. One of them is the port of Padang,
but the port can only be used for some replenishing and loading and unloading. Sabang is
an island adjacent to the north end of Sumatra with a good bay. The port is relatively well
equipped with facilities, including those for replenishing and repair. It is a strategic point on
the [sea] route from Singapore to the Indian Ocean.
The Waters of the Dutch East Indies(26)
The ocean areas [meant here] are the waters of the Dutch East Indies (including Portuguese
Timor) except for northern Sumatra. These areas border on the Indian Ocean and the Arafura
Sea in the south with Sumatra and the [other] Sunda Islands in between, and face the Philip-
pines in the north and New Guinea in the east. Numerous large and small islands, including
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Borneo, Celebes and Java, lie scattered in the vast waters of an area of about 2,000 nautical
miles from east to west and about 600 nautical miles from south to north, which includes the
Java Sea, the Banda Sea, the Molucca Sea, the Makassar Strait and others.
Although the seasonal wind blows from the northwest in winter and from the southeast
in summer in these waters, the impact of the wind is weaker than in the South China Sea. It
is warm but rainy all through the year; particularly the rainfall is heavier in spring and au-
tumn when the seasonal wind changes [direction]. Although in these waters many locations
constitute good harbors, most of them are still undeveloped.
The Java Sea is enclosed by southern Sumatra, southern Borneo, southern Celebes, Java
and the Lesser Sunda Islands; submerged rocks and islets lie scattered around while the sea
is shallow with a depth of no more than seventy meters at the deepest, which allows ordinary
ships to drop anchor anywhere. [The port of] Surabaya is the best port in the area; as the base
of the Dutch East Indies Navy it is fully equipped with an arsenal and replenishing facilities,
and it also has a dock with a capacity of accommodating heavy-cruiser-class ships.
Batavia (i.e. its outer port Tanjung Priok), which is enclosed by breakwaters, is fully
equipped with replenishing and repair facilities. The port has a dock with a capacity of ac-
commodating light-cruiser-class ships, too.
Cilacap is the only port on the southern coast of Java and is equipped with facilities to
supply coal and oil. 
Makassar is located at the southwestern tip of Celebes and dominates the entrance of the
Makassar Strait. It has a small bay open to the high seas and is equipped with facilities for
replenishing and minor repairs.
Palembang, the center of the oil production region on the east coast of southern Sumatra,
is situated on the banks of a river about fifty nautical miles upriver from the sea; ships with
a draft of less than six or seven meters can easily sail the river. [The port of] Palembang is
fully equipped with replenishing facilities. The Celebes Sea faces the east coast of Borneo
and the northwestern coast of Celebes. The Makassar Strait, the strait between Borneo and
Celebes, is an important route to reach Java from the Philippines. The strait is shallow in the
western half and many islets lie scattered around its southern exit. The strait has much rain-
fall in winter. The wind there is weaker than in the Java Sea, and the tide and ocean currents
are also weak on the whole. Whereas the terrain is gently sloped and [several] ports and an-
chorages are found on the coast of Borneo, on the Celebes side, mountains come right down
to the coast and no suitable ports or anchorages are found.
Tarakan is a small island adjacent to the east coast of northern Borneo, which produces
oil. As for its port facilities, it has all the facilities necessary for replenishing oil, but its ca-
pacity to replenish other materials is poor.
Samarinda is located about twenty kilometers upstream of the Kutei River [from] the east
coast of central Borneo, which faces the Makassar Strait; it has a copious production of oil
and coal. It has substantial port facilities with replenishing facilities. 
Balikpapan is situated south of Samarinda; it has port facilities and an oil refinery at the
mouth of its river.
Menado and the Bangka anchorage are located at the northeastern tip of Celebes. As the
port of Menado is exposed to the high sea and is only equipped with a few mooring facilities,
it cannot be called a good port. The Bangka anchorage to the east of this port is suitable for
anchoring fleets and convoys.
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The area of the Banda Sea, with the Banda Sea as the center and [adjacent to] the Flores
Sea, the Ceram Sea, etc, faces the Banda Islands, the eastern side of Celebes, and the eastern
part of the [Lesser] Sunda Islands. This area in general has much rainfall and is hot and
humid throughout the year.
Ambon is situated at the center of this ocean area and is a traffic hub. The harbor in an in-
ward curving bay is deep and few locations are suitable for anchoring. With poor port facil-
ities, it has little capacity for replenishing.
5. The Military Situation in the Southwestern Region(13, 27)
From the “Notes of Lt. Cdr. Matsumoto Makoto” and the “Documents kept by Lt. Cdr. Yone-
hara Tsunaki,” the military information and the assessment of the military situation regarding
the southwestern region which the Japanese Navy had obtained until right before the war
can by and large be summarized as follows:(13, 27)
Oil Production of 1940(13)
Place Annual Production






Sanga Sanga (Balikpapan) 1,000,000t
Greater East Ceram 80,000t
Miri (British [Borneo]) 900,000t
Yenangyaung (Burma) 1,000,000t
Total 9,180,000t
Note: Production varies from year to year.(13)
Distribution of Forces
1. The Philippines
Navy Army Air Force
Heavy Cruisers 1 U.S. Garrison 18,500 Bombers 15
Light Cruisers 3 (Caucasians 6,500) Recon. Planes 15
Destroyers 14 The Philippines Army 4,500 Fighter Planes 100
Submarines 17 Other than the above Flying Boats 36
Flying Boat Tenders 4 Reserve 125,000
Torpedo Boats 8
Total 47 Total 148,000 Total 166
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1. The strength of the Army Air Force
Most of [the army air force, consisting of] five squadrons of attack planes, one squadron
each of bombers and reconnaissance planes, seven squadrons in total, are stationed in Luzon
and are mainly deployed at Nichols Field, Clark Field, and Camp Murphy. 
2. Navy
Two squadrons of flying boats are conducting training patrols from the bases Cavite, Olon-
gapo and Tawi-Tawi, etc. They patrol areas [with a radius] of about 300–400 nautical miles
with their bases as the center and usually start patrolling around 0900, but sometimes they
conduct dawn and night patrols.
2. British Malaya
Navy Army Air Force
Light Cruisers 4-5 Regular Army Bombers 90
around Singapore 12,000
Destroyers 6-8 NE Malaya 18,000 Torpedo Bombers 32
Submarines 1 E Coast of Malaya 8,000 LB Recon. planes 120
River Gunboats 8 NW Malaya 20,000 Fighter planes 64
Torpedo Boats 50 W Coast of Malaya 10,000 Flying boats 11
Spec. Dispatched 1-2 Volunteer Army 20,000 Total 317
(6,000)
Total 70-74 Police Force 15,000 About 550 planes in
(1,500) total incl. reserve and
training planes
In order to secure the shipping lanes, Britain’s policy is to defend Malaya, the Dutch East Indies
and Australia mainly with its air force and army.
1. Distribution of the air force
Singapore: Torpedo bombers, fighter planes, reconnaissance planes [to keep guard over] the
east coast, and flying boats
Calcutta, Ceylon, and Penang: Land-based reconnaissance planes
Andaman: Flying boats
British Borneo: Bombers and reconnaissance planes
Although it boasts that it shall increase the number of aircraft to 800–1,000, the number of
aircraft as of the end of 1941 is 338. Reinforcement will be sent from Australia, the United
States (fighter planes and flying boats), the Near East, India and the [British] mainland. Al-
though the number of air bases, which used to be seventeen, was increased to twenty-two,
only four bases are equipped with direction finders. Crew members are also brought from
New Zealand and Australia. Although trainings are usually conducted in a formation of two
or three aircraft, a formation consisting of twelve aircraft has been observed once. Aircraft
are gathering in Kota Bharu.
2. Outline of the patrols in British Malaya 
(1) Interdiction of vessels entering or leaving territorial waters at night.
(2) Patrolling of the east coast by cruisers or auxiliary vessels.
(3) Conducting air patrols over the east and the south.
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3. British Borneo
(1) Army: About 10,000 regular army men; further reinforcement is expected.
(2) Police Force: About 24,000 men.
4. Burma
(1) Navy: Two patrol boats and fifteen other small vessels
(2) Army: About 35,000 men (of which about 13,000 men are stationed in the Tennasserim area.)
(3) Air Force: Twenty bombers, ten reconnaissance planes, some fighter planes, and twenty am-
phibians, about sixty planes in total.
5. Dutch East Indies
(1) Navy
Five cruisers (including one assumed), eight destroyers, nineteen submarines (including
four assumed), one coastal defense ship, two gunboats, six minelayers, eight minesweepers,
ten high-speed torpedo boats, and thirty-two torpedo boats, aggregating to ninety-one.
(2) Army
{1} Regular Army (80% consisting of indigenous people): 54,500 men in Java, 9,000 men in
Sumatra, 6,500 men in Borneo and 6,200 men in the Greater East, aggregating to 76,200
men.
{2} Volunteer Army: 15,000 men (mostly Caucasians), the indigenous units: 3,000 men, (95%
consisting of indigenous people), the field police units: 7,000 men (90% consisting of in-
digenous people), aggregating to 25,000 men.
{3} The total number to be mobilized: about 120,000 men.
(3) Air Force
{1} Navy Air Force
Forty flying boats, thirty-five seaplanes (including carrier-based planes), and twenty-
five reconnaissance planes: one hundred planes in total.
{2} Army Air Force
One hundred bombers, one hundred fighter planes, twenty-five reconnaissance bombers,
eighty reconnaissance planes: 305 planes in total.
(4) Outline of security precautions
{1} They are patrolling with flying boats and patrol boats all over the Dutch East Indies wa-
ters. Particularly, they are on high alert at the Bali, Lombok, Alas and Sape straits, and
the strait between Timor and Flores.
{2} They are watching the Moluccas Strait with (a) destroyer(s) and (a) guard ship(s).
{3} They are on high alert at the Makassar Strait employing ships as well as aircraft.
Strategic Assessment of Deployment Based on the Location of the Air Bases(27)
1. Although there is no great difference in total strength between the enemy and us, [the strength
of] the enemy is roughly divided into three, that is, the southern central part of Luzon for the
Philippines, the British Strait Settlements for Malaya, and mainly Java for the Dutch East Indies.
The distances between them are more than one thousand and several hundred nautical miles,
which makes it relatively difficult for them to support each other.
2. The southern central part of Luzon is roughly within a range of 550 nautical miles from southern
Taiwan, and the southern Philippines are roughly within a range of 600 nautical miles from
Palau, which means they are within attacking range by Type–0 fighter planes and land-based
attack planes.
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British Malaya lies roughly within a range of 600 nautical miles from the bases in southern
Indochina, which means northern Malaya is within attacking range by Type–0 fighter planes
and southern Malaya by land-based attack planes.
It will be most advantageous for Japan to concentrate its strength against them and destroy
them one by one.
3. As the enemy has many bases and is likely to disperse when escaping, it is necessary to conduct
air raids on their permanent bases with as much strength as possible in the first strike, and catch
and destroy them.
4. When the enemy aircraft disperses in escaping, it is necessary to advance Type–0 fighter planes
to the bases in northern and southern Luzon and northern Malaya (such as Aparri, Vigan, Laoag,
Legaspi, and Kota Bharu) and have the planes wipe out [the enemy aircraft].
5. It is necessary to seize as quickly as possible relay air bases (such as Legaspi, Davao, Jolo, Miri,
Kuching, Kota Bharu), so that the enemy will not escape [across the seas] between the Philip-
pines, Malaya, and the Dutch East Indies.
6. As enemy air strikes on [Japanese] convoys are expected, it is necessary to be on strict alert [for
such strikes]. It is [also] necessary for the convoys to timely conduct evasive maneuvers and
take measures to control damage.
7. Finally, it is necessary to prepare a plan to destroy the enemy air power gathering into Java with
a combined force of fighter planes and bombers, by conducting concentrated attacks [on them,
departing] from the [already] occupied bases both in the east and the west (such as Kendari,
Makassar, Balikpapan, Banjarmasin, Kuching and Palembang).
8. In order to check reinforcements from Australia, it is necessary to conduct offensive air opera-
tions towards northern Australia (such as Port Darwin and Broome) from bases on the island of
Timor (Kupang and Dili) to destroy [the enemy] air power.
9. The enemy’s capacity to repair aircraft (repair depot and personnel) is quite poor.
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Chapter III The Drafting of a Plan of Operations for
the Southern Advance
1. Fixing the Outline of the Plan of Operations
Although the plan of operations for the [administrative] year 1941 of the Navy GeneralStaff was completed in March of that year, the plan [only] covered operations againstone single country [at a time] of each of the hypothetical enemies. Since the summer
of 1940, a joint study of the Army and the Navy General Staff Offices had been conducted on
simultaneous operations against all four hypothetical enemies (the United States, Britain, the
Netherlands and China), but it did not reach the stage of examining concrete details due to
a lack of material for [planning] operations at that time. It was in April 1941 and onwards
that the Navy General Staff seriously set about studying a plan of simultaneously executing
operations against all four countries, assuming that the United States and Britain were in-
separable.(28)
By June, the working plan for the operations showed considerable progress, and by the
beginning of July the outline was informally and tentatively agreed upon between the per-
sons in charge at the General Staff Offices of both the Army and the Navy; by mid-August
they also won an unofficial agreement from [both] the Chief of the Navy General Staff, Ad-
miral Nagano Osami, and the Chief of the Army General Staff, General Sugiyama Gen.(28)
In the meantime, Germany’s opening of hostilities against the Soviet Union at the end of
June, Japan’s advance into southern French Indochina, the [subsequent] break-off of eco-
nomic relations with Japan by the United States and Britain at the end of July, and [Japan’s]
informal decision in the beginning of August to not take the offensive against the Soviet
Union before the end of the year, had rapidly altered the situation. The outline of the plan to
simultaneously execute operations against four countries, agreed upon by the Army and the
Navy around mid-August, when the Navy General Staff showed a firm determination to
“complete war preparations by the end of October,” was in summary as follows:(28)
1. Tentatively setting the opening of hostilities at the beginning of November, [the Navy] shall,
concurrently with the opening of hostilities, launch simultaneous operations against both the
Philippines and Malaya in conjunction with the Army and complete the invasion of the neces-
sary key areas in the south in roughly five months. 
2. The naval strength to be employed for the southern operation shall consist of the bulk of the
surface units of the Combined Fleet and the land-based air units, while the carrier-based air
units shall be employed in the air campaign at the beginning of the opening of hostilities.
3. The Army strength to be employed for the southern operation shall consist of about seven di-
visions of ground [units] and two numbered air forces.
4. In the operation against the United States, the submarine unit shall keep watch on [the U.S. fleet
in] Hawaii, and the Fourth and the Fifth Fleets shall be on alert [for the U.S. fleet] in the area
east of Japanese territory, while the battleship unit shall stay in the homeland [waters], ready to
intercept [the U.S. fleet]. In case the U.S. fleet comes to the attack in the western Pacific, the main
force of the southern operation task force shall be extracted, be combined with the battleship
unit and together with strength rallied from everywhere, they are expected to destroy the U.S.
fleet.
As seen in the above outline of the plan of operations, the Navy General Staff Office at that
time still set the U.S. Navy as the main enemy even in the [simultaneous] operations against
multiple countries. It drew up a [new] operational policy on the basis of the former plan of
operations against the United States by [only and newly] adding to this plan an operation to
capture key areas in the south right at the opening of hostilities.
The Navy General Staff Office, which unofficially had decided on a plan to speedily com-
plete war preparations, gave instructions to the Combined Fleet around the middle of August
to break off its ongoing trainings and operations by the end of August and complete a rapid
war preparation roughly in one month starting from the beginning of September. Following
this instruction and keeping only a part of the strength in reserve, almost the full strength of
the Combined Fleet began to take positions in the homeland [waters] in the beginning of
September to speed up the war preparations. Also, on 15 August, a part of the second stage
of the preparatory fleet mobilization order was put into motion.(29) (The first stage of the
preparatory fleet mobilization order had [already] been put into motion in November 1940.
The first stage preparation was supposed to require about half a year and be completed by
the issuing of the order of the war formation. The second stage was to be executed following
it.)
Meanwhile, the Combined Fleet headquarters pressed the Navy General Staff Office to
adopt [the idea of an] operation to conduct a surprise attack on Hawaii by aircraft carriers
right at the outset of the war. In mid September, after getting the approval of the Navy Gen-
eral Staff Office, the Combined Fleet headquarters conducted a map exercise at the Naval
College in Meguro, Tokyo, and examined [the feasibility of] this plan, taking the previous
roughly fixed outline as a start and further based it on a concrete draft plan of operations
that included the surprise attack on Hawaii, on which the headquarters had firmly insisted.
This is the so-called “Map Exercise at the Naval College,” although the exercises of the op-
eration to control the western Pacific and the operation of a surprise attack on Hawaii were
conducted separately.(28)
The general outline of the map exercise at the Naval College was as follows (parts con-
cerning the Philippines and Malaya have been omitted by the author):
1. Assuming the hostilities to be opened on 16 November, the operations against the Philippines
and Malaya shall be launched almost simultaneously, and the strategic areas of the Philippines,
Malaya and the Dutch East Indies shall be captured in roughly 150 days.(30)
2. The strength to be employed in the southern operation(11, 31, 32, 33)
(1) Navy
One element of the First Fleet (one destroyer squadron and carrier division each)
The bulk of the Second Fleet
The full strength of the Third Fleet, the Eleventh Air Fleet, and the Southern Expeditionary
Fleet
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One element of the First Air Fleet (small aircraft carrier(s))
The bulk of the force attached to the Combined Fleet (a seaplane tender division, submarine
squadrons, landing force(s), supply vessels, etc.)
(2) Army
About 300,000 troops consisting of about 10 divisions as the core
An air unit of about 600 aircraft in about two numbered air forces
3. Assessment of the enemy situation in the southern region at the time of the map exercise(34)
(1) The Philippines area (the U.S.-Filipino Army)
Naval vessels: About 60 ships, consisting of 2 cruisers, 14 destroyers, 17 submarines, 4 sea-
plane tenders as the core
Air force: About 160 aircraft (of the Army and the Navy in total)
Ground troops: About 40,000 regular troops ([and possible] mobilization of about 160,000
troops of the Filipino Army)
(2) Malaya area (British armed forces, including [those from] Hong Kong)
Naval vessels: About 90 ships, consisting of 5 cruisers and 10 destroyers as the core (A pow-
erful unit including battleships and aircraft carriers is deployed in the Indian Ocean)
Air force: About 200 aircraft (A reinforcement of 300 aircraft or more is anticipated by the
end of year)
Ground troops: About 60,000 – 70,000 regular troops (Apart from these, a voluntary army
of about 20,000 men)
(3) The Dutch East Indies area (the Dutch East Indies armed forces)
Naval vessels: About 90 ships, consisting of 5 cruisers, 8 destroyers, 19 submarines as the core
Air force: About 300 aircraft ([of] front line aircraft; apart from these, about 200 reserve air-
craft)
Ground troops: About 70,000 troops
4. General Plan of Operations(11, 34, 35)
(1) An air force of about two to three times as strong as that of the enemy directly in front shall
be employed.
(2) In the Malaya area, an army unit shall be disembarked in the southern Thai area and sent
southward along the Malay Peninsula, to capture Singapore. This operation is supposed to
be accomplished in about 100 days from the opening of hostilities.
(3) The operation against the Philippines shall be launched from Taiwan, and pushed ahead
first to Luzon, then to the central and southern Philippines. The capture of Manila is sup-
posed to be accomplished in about 45 days from the opening of hostilities. 
(4) In the Dutch East Indies, the lines of operation shall be pushed forward to Celebes and Bor-
neo in the east with the southern Philippines as the basis, and to Sumatra in the west, setting
the capture of Java as the final target. This operation is supposed to be accomplished in about
150 days from the opening of hostilities. 
(5) The area to be captured is roughly set as the Philippines, British Malaya, British Borneo and
the Dutch East Indies. [An attack on] Burma shall be conducted for the purpose of eliminat-
ing interference with the Malaya operation, and [only] to the degree of capturing a part of
southern Burma and conducting air campaigns. 
5. The disposition of forces of the Navy(12, 33, 36, 37, 38)
(1) The Philippines and the Dutch East Indies
Commander: Commander in Chief of the Second Fleet
Forces: The bulk of the Second Fleet
The full strength of the Third Fleet
The bulk of the Eleventh Air Fleet
The bulk of the units attached to the Combined Fleet
Three small aircraft carriers of the First Fleet and the First Air Fleet
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Outline of the Disposition:
Capture of strategic areas: a force [consisting of] the Third Fleet as the core
Air campaign: a force [consisting of] the Eleventh Air Fleet as the core
Destruction of the enemy surface forces: a force [consisting of] the Second Fleet as the core
Submarine operation: submarine squadrons
(2) Malaya area
Commander: Commander in Chief of the Southern Expeditionary Fleet
Forces: The full strength of the Southern Expeditionary Fleet
One element of the Eleventh Air Fleet (About one air unit each of land-based
attack planes and fighter planes)
One cruiser division and destroyer squadron each from [both] the First and
the Second Fleets
One small aircraft carrier of the First Fleet
One element of the 6th Submarine Squadron
Outline of the Disposition:
Surface escort: a force [consisting of] cruiser divisions, destroyer squadrons and a small air-
craft carrier as the core
Destruction of the enemy surface forces: a force [consisting of] cruiser divisions, destroyer
divisions and the Eleventh Air Fleet
6. Outline of the Philippines operation(12, 33, 34, 39)
(1) Right at the outset of the war, about 200 Navy aircraft and about 450 Army aircraft shall
launch an air campaign from southern Taiwan to destroy the enemy air power on its air
bases on Luzon. Prior to this, Type–0 fighter planes of the land-based air unit shall be ad-
vanced on the waters at a short distance from Manila on three small aircraft carriers on the
first day of hostilities to support the strikes of the land-based attack units from Taiwan.
(2) On the day of the opening of hostilities, the advance unit shall make surprise landings at
Aparri and Vigan, swiftly seize the air bases and make them ready for use, and let the fighter
plane unit(s) advance from Taiwan, so as to thoroughly carry out the operation to destroy
the enemy air power from that time on.
(3) Making use of the results of the campaign to destroy the enemy air power right at the open-
ing of hostilities, the main force of the Army unit to capture Luzon shall be disembarked at
Luzon in about ten to fifteen days after the opening of hostilities and seize the capital Manila
at a stroke. The strength of the Army ground forces is supposed to be about two divisions.
(4) When the air campaign against Luzon is for the greater part completed, the frontline of the
operation shall gradually be extended southward towards the central and southern Philip-
pines, so as to seize Davao and Jolo roughly in twenty to thirty days after the opening of
hostilities, and secure footholds for the Dutch East Indies invasion operation.
7. Outline of the Malaya operation(30, 33, 34, 35, 39, 40)
(1) Right at the outset of the war, the air units of both the Army and the Navy (about 450 aircraft)
shall conduct preemptive air strikes against northern Malaya and Singapore from southern
French Indochina. Simultaneously, small advance units of the Army shall conduct surprise
landings (under the escort of a small number of Navy war vessels) at the strategic locations
north of and including Singora, or north of and including Nakhon in southern Thailand,
swiftly seize the airfields and make them ready for use, so as to advance the Army air units
one by one.
(2) After that, when the [air] campaign of the Army air unit as the main strength to destroy the
enemy air power has achieved results, the main force of the Army Malaya invasion unit shall
go ashore, advance overland through the Malay Peninsula southward to capture Singapore.
The Army ground forces to be employed in this area are supposed to be about five divisions.
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(3) In the early period after the opening of hostilities (roughly between Day X and about Day X
+ 5), a Navy unit shall make a surprise landing at Miri and Kuching in northern Borneo, se-
cure the oil fields in Miri and quickly ready the airfield in Kuching, so as to advance the
Navy air unit [there] and put them in charge of air campaigns against Singapore and the
Java Sea.
8. Outline of the Dutch East Indies operation (summary)
(1) After the air unit has been advanced to Davao and Jolo in the southern Philippines, invasion
operations against Borneo and Celebes shall be launched from about Day X + 50 onwards.
(2) In the eastern part [of the Dutch East Indies], operations shall proceed along two lines of
operation, that is, the line Tarakan – Balikpapan - Banjarmasin and the line Menado –
Kendari - Makassar. The capture [of those areas] and the advance of the air units [there] shall
be conducted [simultaneously] in parallel. [Then, the air units] shall conduct the air cam-
paign to destroy the enemy air power in Java from Makassar and Banjarmasin in concert
with [the campaigns conducted] from the direction of Malaya and Sumatra.
(3) When the air campaign to destroy the enemy air power has achieved results, the Army units
shall be disembarked on Java and capture the entire island. This operation is supposed to
be completed in about five months from the opening of hostilities.
(4) The forces to be employed for the Dutch East Indies [Operation]
{1} Navy: the force of the Second and Third Fleets, and the Eleventh Air Fleet, after partici-
pating in the Philippines operation.
{2} Army: The ground forces of three divisions, and one numbered air force to be transferred
from the Malaya Invasion Operation.
Note by the author: No specific materials are extant concerning the advance of the lines
of operation in the western part.
According to the above plan, the map exercise was carried out; the findings concerning the
Dutch East Indies Operation were in outline as follows:(11, 12, 33, 36)
1. It should be expected that while advancing the air bases [of the air units] from the Philippines
one after another, as many as ten bases have to be made ready in three months before reaching
eastern Borneo. As it is also quite difficult to carry out operations in which air units would shift
their positions one after another, it may be a [better] idea to focus all the strength on the Malaya
area and advance southward toward Java from the west, avoiding the southern advance in the
east. (Eleventh Air Fleet)
2. Concerning the above opinion, [the Combined Fleet] cannot agree to the idea to put priority on
the advance from the west because on an operational level it is an essential condition that the
Combined Fleet first copes with the Philippines. (Combined Fleet)
3. Concerning the above, it is necessary to study a case in which the share of responsibility is clearly
defined in such a way that the Army air unit shall take charge of the operation in Malaya and
the Navy air unit of that in the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies.
4. The Navy has no units specialized in the speedy preparation of airfields after seizing them, and
no such trainings were ever conducted. [The Navy] should swiftly form [such] construction
units, conduct trainings, and draw up concrete plans of how to condition bases.
5. In this map exercise, the loss of Type–0 fighter planes and the land-based attack planes respec-
tively reached 160% and 40%. We have to be prepared for the possibility that no aircrew leaving
from Taiwan will make it to Java. It is necessary to give due consideration to the training and
the replenishment of personnel and draw up an adequate plan, let alone [a plan for] the replen-
ishment of aircraft. (Eleventh Air Fleet)
6. The Philippines invasion plan of operations of the Second Fleet is too careful. As the research
by the Navy General Staff Office judges that the defense of the Philippines is not so much to be
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worried about, it should be captured in a shorter period. (And [the invasion unit] shall [more]
quickly advance to the line of Davao and Jolo) to swiftly set about the Dutch East Indies [oper-
ation]. (Navy General Staff Office [Note by the author:] it seems that along with the interception
of the U.S. fleet, the biggest matter of concern of the Navy in those days was to swiftly seize the
oil fields in eastern Borneo.) 
7. It is necessary to attach [more] importance to Miri and Kuching. Agreements between the Army
and the Navy have to be arranged concerning the preparation of these air bases. (Navy General
Staff Office)
8. During this operation, the [enemy sea] transport around Burma and in the Indian Ocean has to
be destroyed with land-based attack planes from the airfields in Thailand or Malaya, so as to
cut off the enemy from its rear. (Eleventh Air Fleet)
9. It is necessary to employ more careful measures in the campaign to destroy the enemy air power
in Java. (Eleventh Air Fleet [Note by the author:] this meant that such campaigns should be
launched after the lines [of operation] to southern Sumatra, Banjarmasin and Makassar had
been duly established.)
10. As the military information on the southern region is inadequate, a further study should be
made especially on the air bases to be seized and used, so that the plan of operations will not
be frustrated. [Particularly,] further photoreconnaissance of Menado, Kendari, Miri, Kuching,
Ambon, etc. needs to be conducted immediately. Also, it is necessary to obtain as much as possible
metereological information on this region because it is seriously lacking. (Eleventh Air Fleet)
11. The Third Fleet, which shall execute the invasion operations, has a severe lack of small craft. It
is necessary to quickly increase the number [of such craft]. (Third Fleet)
12. As operations are carried out at sea, it is impossible to specify the invasion schedule in the form
of detailed operation timetables. The plan must be given elasticity by dividing the schedule into
rough periods and allotting areas of operations to the participating units. 
These problems were solved one by one, except for a few (such as those of the invasion sched-
ule, the units to condition air bases, and the measures to be taken against attrition in the air
campaigns, which shall be explained later). That is, measures were taken to split the respon-
sibility for the air operation in such a way that the responsibility for Malaya would fall on
the Army and that for the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies on the Navy, that base con-
struction units would be promptly formed, and that in the early period after the opening of
hostilities sudden landings would also be conducted on the central and the southern Philip-
pines simultaneously with those on the northern Philippines.
The map exercise at the Naval College marked a major advance in the process of formu-
lating the Navy plan of operations. Meanwhile, the Army had also started studying the details
of the [draft] southern plan of operations and was hurriedly completing a concrete version.
After going through [further] study on the Army side and passing through the “Kanoya
Map Exercise” on the Navy side in the beginning of October 1941 (a map exercise conducted
by the Eleventh Air Fleet headquarters at the Kanoya Air Group’s [base] in Kagoshima), the
[draft] plan of operations of the General Staff Offices [of the Army and the Navy] was for
the most part completed and had reached a stage where the views of the Army and the Navy
on the whole could find mutual agreement. In mid-October, the Combined Fleet headquarters
conducted a map exercise based on the roughly completed final draft of the plan of opera-
tions on its flagship Nagato and saw to it that the plan was fully understood by the com-
manders at every level as well as their staff officers. This is the so-called “Nagato Map
Exercise.” From the viewpoint of swiftly obtaining oil resources to build up a self-supporting
position and doing it before U.S. and British forces in the Far East were reinforced, it would
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be better to wage war as soon as possible. However, the massive personnel shifts due to the
Combined Fleet’s shift to a wartime formation caused the readiness level to drop and prepa-
rations could not be managed in time. The supposed date [of the opening of hostilities] in
the Kanoya map exercise was [delayed until] 7 December 1941, and in the Nagato map exer-
cise, it was [further] put off until 8 December. Also, the number of the regular aircraft carriers
to be employed in the air strike on Hawaii, which might have quite a large impact on the
southern operation, underwent the following changes. In the map exercise at the Naval Col-
lege, the number of carriers allotted to the southern operation and the operation against
Hawaii were nil and four respectively. After the completion of the large aircraft carrier
Zuikaku on 25 September 1941 and due to the postponement of the assumed date of the open-
ing of hostilities, the number of carriers allotted to the southern operation and Hawaii were
changed to two and four respectively.(28) Then in the Kanoya map exercise in the beginning
of October, a [new] idea of employing three carriers (with shorter cruising ranges, the Akagi,
the Sōryū, and the Hiryū) for the southern operation and the other three (with longer cruising
ranges, the Kaga, the Shōkaku, and the Zuikaku) for Hawaii was adopted.(35) After all these
changes, a strong request by Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet Yamamoto Isoroku
and his confidence [in his proposal] finally won the agreement of the Navy General Staff Of-
fice, so on 19 October the number of carriers to be allotted to the southern operation and
Hawaii was decided upon as nil and six respectively (so as to ensure the success of the
[Hawaii] operation and have sweeping military gains).
In this way, the final decision was made to execute the air strike on Hawaii with the full
strength of the main aircraft carriers. With the other problems mostly solved, [the draft of]
the central agreement between the Army and the Navy concerning the southern operation
was for the most part informally decided by 26 October. The main persons of the Army and
the Navy in charge added necessary modifications to this draft and obtained the approval
of the chief of the Navy General Staff by 29 October.(40) Although some pending issues re-
mained at that time, most of them were solved one after another by the time of the conclusion
of the agreement between the Army and the Navy on 10 November 1941.
During this period, the [Japanese] government was trying hard to reach an agreement in
the U.S.-Japanese negotiations, but the negotiations made no progress. Finally, at the Imperial
Conference on 5 November 1941, the Main Points for the Implementation of Imperial National
Policy was decided upon with the following contents (excerpted by the author):(41)
1. In order to resolve the present crisis, to assure its self-preservation and self-defense, and to es-
tablish a New Order in Greater East Asia, the Empire [of Japan] is now determined to wage war
against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands. The following measures are to be taken:
(1) The time to initiate military action shall be set at the beginning of December, and both the
Army and the Navy shall complete operational preparations accordingly.
(2) The main points of the negotiations with the United States (omitted by the author).
(3) Cooperation with Germany and Italy shall be strengthened.
(4) Close military relations with Thailand shall be established (omitted by the author).
2. If the negotiations with the United States are successful by 0000 on 1 December, the initiation of
military action shall be suspended.
By IGHQ Navy Department Order No. 1(42) and IGHQ Navy Department Instruction No. 1(43)
of the same date [5 November 1941], the Navy issued to the Commander in Chief of the Com-
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bined Fleet the Imperial command “to complete operational preparations by early December,
expecting to wage war against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands,” and also an-
nounced the “Operational Policy of the Imperial Japanese Navy” and the “the Army-Navy
Central Agreement,” based upon which this operation should be executed. The chiefs of the
Navy and the Army General Staffs [also] informed the Combined Fleet that the tentative date
to wage war was set on 8 December 1941.
In the meantime, on 6 November, the Army issued the order of battle(44) of the forces to
be involved in the southern operation, and gave new assignments [to its personnel] accord-
ingly. And while conveying to the commander in chief of the Southern Army the Imperial
command “to prepare for the invasion of the strategic areas in the south,” it also announced
the “General Plan of Operations of the Imperial Japanese Army” as well as the “Army-Navy
Central Agreement.”
The southern operation, the Dutch East Indies invasion operation in particular, had the
following characteristics: 
1. It is required to complete the operation in as short a period as possible.
(1) It is required to secure the strategic materials, which are absolutely indispensable for Japan
to fight a protracted war, oil in particular, as soon as possible before the enemy destroys
them.
(2) As the preparations for a joint defense between the United States, Britain and the Nether-
lands are rapidly progressing, it is required to invade [the area] before the preparations of
the enemy are [further] strengthened.
(3) It is desirable to carry out the invasion of the area before the U.S. Fleet is fully prepared to
come for an attack, so as to establish a strategically unbeatable position.
(4) Considering a worst-case scenario where [Japan] would have to conduct operations in both
the northern and southern theaters, the Dutch East Indies operation shall be completed by
spring when it becomes feasible to conduct operations against the north. 
2. Characteristics of the execution of the operation 
(1) The operation is [characterized by] a repeated process of gaining control of the air, invading,
capturing and preparing bases, and advancing [the Army and Navy] air forces over a wide
area. For this reason,
(i) It is required to draw up a detailed plan for the operation of transport ships and their
escort vessels.
(ii) A close cooperation between ground, sea and air forces is particularly required.
(2) Due to the shallowness of the waters, large-scale mine warfare is expected.
(3) It is necessary to prepare for the employment of paratroopers to occupy the oil fields in sud-
den attacks, and also for their quick reopening and resumption of production, etc.
3. [The operation] will be greatly affected by other operations.
(1) The operation depends on the success or failure of the Carrier Task Force’s surprise attack
on Hawaii. That is, whereas the Malaya invasion operation and the Philippines invasion op-
eration shall be pushed through regardless of the success or failure of the surprise attack on
Hawaii, the execution of the Dutch East Indies operation shall be affected by the success or
failure of the surprise attack on Hawaii.
(2) As the operation is carried out by advancing air bases while using the Philippines, Malaya
and British Borneo as stepping-stones, it is affected by the progress of these [local] opera-
tions. As the main strength of the enemy in the southern [region] is situated in the Philip-
pines and Malaya areas, the operation will turn into a pursuit battle once the main strength
of the enemy has been overcome. 
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2. IGHQ’s [Navy Department’s] Mission Directives and the
Army-Navy Central Agreement
On 5 November, IGHQ [Navy Department] issued the following order and instructions to
the Combined Fleet:(42, 43)
IGHQ Navy Department Order No. 1
5 November 1941
By Imperial Order, Chief of Navy General Staff Nagano Osami directs Commander in Chief of
the Combined Fleet Yamamoto as follows:
1. The Empire [of Japan], for the sake of its self-preservation and self-defense, expects to wage war
against the United States, Britain and then the Netherlands in early December and has decided
to complete all operational preparations.
2. The commander in chief of the Combined Fleet shall implement the necessary operational prepa-
rations.
3. Regarding details, the chief of the Navy General Staff shall give instructions.
IGHQ Navy Department Instruction No. 1
5 November 1941
Chief of Navy General Staff Nagano Osami directs Commander in Chief of the Combined
Fleet Yamamoto in conformity with IGHQ Navy Department Order No.1 as follows:
1. In anticipation of waging war against the United States, Britain and later the Netherlands in
early December, the commander in chief of the Combined Fleet shall timely advance the neces-
sary units to their standby points before the launch of operations.
2. The commander in chief of the Combined Fleet shall be on strict alert against unforeseen attacks
delivered by the United States, Britain and the Dutch [East Indies] forces.
3. The commander in chief of the Combined Fleet may secretly conduct reconnaissance when it is
specifically required for executing operations.
4. The commander in chief of the Combined Fleet shall have the Fourth Fleet timely lay mines in
the [waters] of the equatorial Pacific Islands in conformity with its defense plan.
5. The mission directives and the Army-Navy Central Agreement, in conformity with which the
operations are to be conducted, are given in the supplement.
6. The commander in chief of the Combined Fleet shall make agreements with the commanders
concerned of the Army on joint operations between the Army and the Navy.
7. The bases of operations right at the launch of the operations are generally determined as follows:
Yokosuka: The Fourth, the Fifth and the Sixth Fleets
Kure: The First and the Second Fleets, the First Air Fleet and the units under direct con-
trol of the Combined Fleet
Sasebo: The Third Fleet, the Southern Expeditionary Fleet and the Eleventh Air Fleet
IGHQ Navy Department Instruction No.1, Supplement
Mission of the Imperial [Japanese] Navy for War against the United States, Britain and the
Netherlands (Excerpted by the author)
Part 1. 
Mission in Case War against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands Breaks Out
During the Operation Against China
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Chapter 1. Summary
1. The outline of the mission of the Imperial [Japanese] Navy is, while continuing [operations] to
take control of the Chinese coast and the lower reaches of the Yangzi basin, to promptly destroy
the enemy fleet and air power in the East, to occupy and secure key areas in the south, to build
up a sustainable and unbeatable position, and [eventually] to destroy [more of] the enemy’s
fleet and in the end deprive the enemy of his will to fight.
Chapter 2. Mission of the Combined Fleet
Section 1. Stage-One Operations
2. The unit, consisting of the Second Fleet, the Third Fleet, the Southern Expeditionary Fleet, and
the Eleventh Air Fleet as its core, shall clear [the sea] in the Philippines, British Malaya, and the
Dutch East Indies of the enemy fleet, destroy them, and in conjunction with the Army, carry out
the following operations:
(1) [The unit] shall launch operations against British Malaya and the Philippines simultaneously,
conduct preemptive air strikes on the air power and on the naval forces of the enemy in
these areas and [at the same time] put ashore the Army’s advance corps in the key locations
in Malaya and the Philippines as quickly as possible in order to push ahead the air units
and intensify the air operations.
(2) After the above operations [in 2.(1)] produce results, the main force of the invasion corps of
the Army shall be put ashore in the Philippines and then in Malaya to promptly capture the
Philippines and British Malaya.
(3) In the early stages of the operations, strategic places in British Borneo shall be occupied, fol-
lowed by those in Dutch Borneo, Celebes, and southern Sumatra at the earliest opportunity.
Key places in the Moluccas and Timor shall [also] be occupied at favorable opportunities
and the necessary air bases [at each place] shall be made ready for use.
(4) As soon as the air bases mentioned in the above [2.(3)] are made ready for use, air units shall
be advanced one after another to suppress the air power of the enemy in the Java area. After
[the operation] produces results, the main force of the invasion corps of the Army shall be
put ashore on Java to capture it.
(5) After capturing Singapore, strategic areas in northern Sumatra shall be occupied, and the
operations against Burma shall timely be conducted in order to block the enemy’s supply
route to China.
3. –5. (Omitted by the author – [concerning] the operations in the equatorial Pacific Islands as well
as the sea to the east of Japan, and the operation by submarines against Hawaii.)
6. The unit consisting of the First Air Fleet as its core shall conduct a surprise attack on the enemy
fleet in Hawaii right at the outset of the war and strive to degrade its power. After that, it shall
mainly be assigned to support the operations of the Fourth Fleet and the southern invasion op-
eration.
7. The main force of the Combined Fleet shall be assigned to support operations as a whole and
take action at the right moment according to the movements of the enemy fleet.
8. An element of the Combined Fleet shall be assigned to disrupt the shipping lanes of the enemy
in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas at the right moment.
9. As for Thailand and French Indochina, while doing our best not to provoke their hostility, efforts
shall be made to make [both countries] follow our operations. However, if any hostile behavior
is observed, armed force shall be employed without hesitation so as not to let it hinder our op-
erations.
Section 2. Stage-Two Operations
10. While continuing the task of reconnoitering, observing and conducting surprise attacks against
the main force of enemy fleets, the unit consisting of the Sixth Fleet as its core, shall, along with
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an element of the Combined Fleet, intensify [operations to] disrupt the shipping lanes of the
enemy, and when required, destroy enemy advance bases in surprise attacks.
11. The unit consisting of the First Air Fleet and the Eleventh Air Fleet as its core shall take charge
of searching for and attacking enemy forces. Also, it shall at an opportune moment attack and
destroy enemy advance bases.
12. The Third Fleet, the Southern Expeditionary Fleet and [other] necessary units shall take charge
of defending and patrolling the occupied [sea] areas in the south as well as protecting the ship-
ping lanes in these areas. They shall [also] strive to search for enemy naval vessels appearing in
these areas as well as to attack and destroy enemy advance bases in the outer areas [of the south].
13. The unit consisting of the Fourth Fleet as its core shall take charge of seizing the equatorial Pa-
cific Islands as well as the Bismarck Islands, defending and patrolling strategic locations, pro-
tecting the shipping lanes in these areas, and searching for and attacking enemy naval vessels
[there]. At the same time, it shall strive to surprise the enemy advance bases in the outer areas.
14. The unit consisting of the Fifth Fleet as its core shall take charge of defending the Ogasawara
[Bonin] Islands, and patrolling and protecting the shipping lanes in the waters north of and in-
cluding the islands and to the east of Japan. At the same time, the unit shall search for and attack
enemy fleets appearing in the waters and, at a favorable opportunity, strive to surprise the
enemy advance bases in the Aleutians. 
15. One element of the Combined Fleet shall timely be sent to the Pacific Ocean and the Indian
Ocean, where it shall make utmost efforts to disrupt enemy shipping lanes. 
16. The main force of the Combined Fleet shall take charge of timely acting in response to move-
ments of the enemy fleets and supporting the entire operation.
17. In case the U.S. main fleet comes [for an attack], the unit consisting of the Sixth Fleet as its core
shall take charge of reconnoitering the enemy at close range, so that while the air units and the
submarine units strive to weaken the enemy power, the major part of the Combined Fleet, which
shall timely be concentrated, shall intercept them and destroy them. 
18. In case a powerful British fleet comes [for an attack], the Third Fleet, the Fourth Fleet, the South-
ern Expeditionary Fleet, air units and submarine units, etc. shall timely be moved and concen-
trated, and try to scout, reconnoiter at close range, and weaken the power of the enemy. In the
meantime, while responding to the movements of the U.S. fleet, the main force of the Combined
Fleet shall search for the British Fleet and destroy it.
19. Among the areas to be occupied, defense shall be provided for the following strategic locations:
Manila, Hong Kong, Davao, Singapore, Batavia, Surabaya, Tarakan, Balikpapan, Menado,
Makassar, Ambon, Penang and Rabaul.
20. Advance bases [to be set up] in the occupied areas shall be as follows:
Manila, Singapore and Surabaya.
Chapter 3. Mission of the China Area Fleet (Omitted by the author)
IGHQ Navy Department Instruction No. 1 Supplement
The Army – Navy Central Agreement for the Southern Operation (Summary)
1. The areas to be occupied in the south are as follows:
The Philippines, British Malaya, Burma, Java, Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes, Timor, etc.
2. Forces to be employed for the operation
(1) The Army (as in the following table)
36 Chapter III     /     The Drafting of a Plan of Operations for the Southern 
Advance
Chapter III     /     The Drafting of a Plan of Operations for the Southern 37
Advance
Army Forces Deployment Area
Southern Army
14th Army
16th Div, 48th Div, 2
tank rgts, 44 antiair-
craft guns, 6 artillery
bns under direct con-
trol of the army (Note:
65th Bde shall not be
employed in the inva-
sion operation.)
The Philippines
15th Army 33d Div, 55th Div(minus one element) Thailand, Burma
16th Army
2d Div, 38th Div (to be
transferred after com-
pleting the Hong Kong
operation), 3 tank rgts,
48th Div (to be trans-
ferred after completing
the Philippines opera-
tion), 56th Mixed Inf
Gp (Sakaguchi Det), 5
artillery bns under di-
rect control of the
army, 88 antiaircraft
guns
The Dutch East Indies
25th Army
Imperial Guard Div,
5th Div, 18th Div, 56th
Div (to be afterwards
transferred to Burma),
4 tank rgts, 11 artillery
bns under direct con-
trol of the army, 60 an-
tiaircraft guns
Malaya
Units under direct con-
trol of the Southern
Army
21st Div, 21st Inde-
pendent Mixed Bde, 48
antiaircraft guns, 3d
Air Force, 5th Air
Force, 21st Independ-
ent Air Unit
23d Army 38th Div, 1 light bomber air gp Hong Kong
South Seas Detachment 55th Mixed Inf Gp Pacific [Islands]
(2) The Navy
Notes:
(1) Part of the strength shall be increased or reduced depending on the situation.
(2) * Indicates forces whose strength may be partly employed depending on the situation.
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Fleet Forces Areas of operation
Combined Fleet
Flagship of the Combined
Fleet, 4th and 5th Submarine
Sqdns, 11th Seaplane Tender
Div
11th Seaplane Tender Div: The
Philippines, The Dutch East In-
dies
Submarine Sqdns: entire South
Pacific area
1st Fleet
One element of 3d Battleship
Div, 3d Destroyer Sqdn, one el-
ement of 3d Carrier Div, *6th
Cruiser Div, one element of 1st
Destroyer Sqdn
3d Destroyer Sqdn: Malaya area 
Others: in areas where necessary
2d Fleet
4th, *5th, and 7th Cruiser Divs,
2d and 4th Destroyer Sqdns,
*8th Cruiser Div
At the outset, main force: the
Philippines area, one element:
Malaya
Later: Malaya and the Dutch East
Indies
3d Fleet
16th Cruiser Div, 17th
Minelayer Div, 5th Destroyer
Sqdn, 6th Submarine Sqdn,
12th Seaplane Tender Div, 1st
Base Force, 2d Base Force
At the outset, main force: the
Philippines, one element: Malaya
Later: the Dutch East Indies area
4th Fleet
One element of 18th Cruiser
Div, one element of 6th De-
stroyer Sqdn, one element of
5th Base Force, 24th Air
Flotilla, 1 seaplane tender
Areas of [equatorial] Pacific Is-




1st, 2d, 4th and 5th Carrier
Divs Where required
11th Air





The Kashii, the Shimushu, 9th
Base Force (at the outset of the
operation, 1 cruiser, 1 de-
stroyer sqdn, 1 carrier, 2 sea-
plane tenders shall [also] be
assigned)







Bulk of the 2d China Expedi-
tionary Fleet, one element of
the China Area Fleet, one ele-
ment of the Combined Fleet
Hong Kong
3. Outline of the launch of the operation (Omitted by the author)
4. Outline of the Philippines operation
(1) Right at the outset of the war, while preemptive air strikes shall be carried out on the enemy
air power, naval vessels, etc. in the Philippines, the Navy unit shall simultaneously make a
sudden attack on Batan Island to quickly prepare an emergency landing field.
(2) Advance units shall, with the cooperation of the Army and the Navy, land in Aparri, Vigan
(followed by Laoag), Legaspi and Davao and their vicinities, first seize air bases and make
them ready for use. Then, they shall capture Jolo Island and make the air base ready for use
as quickly as possible. After that, air units of both the Army and the Navy shall advance
their air bases to continue their air operations.
(3) Making most of the results of the above air campaigns, by the fifteenth day of the operation
at the latest, the main force of the Fourteenth Army shall be put ashore at Lingayen Gulf,
and one element at Lamon Bay, to promptly capture Manila, and subsequently occupy
[other] key locations in the Philippines.
(4) When the [Philippines] invasion operation is for the most part completed, the 48th Division
shall be assembled near Manila to be transferred to the Dutch East Indies invasion corps.
5. Outline of the British Malaya operation
(1) The unit consisting of the Twenty-fifth Army, the Third Air Force and the Southern Expedi-
tionary Fleet as its core shall launch the operation in the following manner:
{1} Plan A (in case execution of a sudden landing is likely in view of the situation in Britain
and in Thailand)
The advance corps shall enter into the anchorage at 0000 on Day X and onwards, conduct
a sudden landing at Ban Don, Nahkon, Singora and Pattani and their vicinities, to swiftly
seize air bases and make them ready for use. Air units of both the Army and the Navy
shall launch air strikes at 0000 on Day X and onwards from southern Indochina, and
mainly carry out preemptive air strikes on the enemy air power and naval vessels in
British Malaya.
{2} – {4} (Plan B and others; omitted by the author)
(2) Outline of the invasion of Singapore (Omitted by the author)
6. Outline of the British Borneo operation
(1) Right at the opening of hostilities, one element of the force under the direct control of the
Southern Army shall seize Miri in a sudden attack, and secure the important resource areas
and the air base.
(2) After the seizure of Miri, it shall proceed to capture Kuching, seize the air base, make it ready
for use, and advance the Navy air unit.
7. Outline of the Dutch East Indies operation
(1) During the Philippines operation, the Army and the Navy in conjunction shall, with one el-
ement of the Sixteenth Army, capture Tarakan as swiftly as possible, then Balikpapan and
Banjarmasin one after another, depending on the situation of the Philippines and the Malaya
operations. During or after this operation, Ambon and Kupang shall be seized at an oppor-
tune moment, where necessary air bases shall be seized and made ready for use, and key
resource areas shall be secured.
(2) Roughly at the same time with the capture of Tarakan, the Navy shall seize Menado, then
Kendari and Makassar without assistance [of the Army] during the latter’s operations in the
previous item.
(3) Apart [from the above], when the operation against British Malaya has made progress, one
element of the Sixteenth Army shall at an opportune moment seize the key locations on
Bangka Island as well as Palembang, ready the air base and secure the important resource
areas.
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(4) After the necessary air bases [seized] in the above (1), (2), (3) [operations] have been readied
and the enemy air power in Java has been brought under control, the main force of the Six-
teenth Army shall land in western Java and one corps diverted [from the Philippines] in
eastern Java, and promptly capture Batavia, Bandung and Surabaya. After that, they shall
mop up the key areas in Java.
(5) When the Malacca Strait has been brought under control after the capture of Singapore, one
element of the Twenty-fifth Army shall timely be disembarked in the vicinity of Medan from
the west coast of the Malay Peninsula to seize the key areas in Aceh and, at an opportune
moment, Sabang Island. 
8. Command
The operations shall be carried out by the Army and the Navy in conjunction. However, when
the Army unit and the Navy special landing force shall conduct operations in the same area in
a local landing operation, a unified command may be instated depending on the situation. 
9. Transport and escort
(1) The Navy shall provide escort to the landing units in all operational areas. However, escort
to be provided for transport units after the landing of the main force [in charge] of the area
shall be provided within the limit of the strength available under the circumstances of that
time.
(2) Generally, no particular direct escort shall be provided to empty return ships and to general
shipping north of Taiwan. [However,] depending on the circumstances, escort for general
shipping north of Taiwan may be provided by one element of the forces of the China Area
Fleet.
(3) Necessary escorts shall be provided to ships replenishing and transporting the Army or
evacuating its casualties. These transports, which should be carried out in groups as much
as possible, shall be determined in view of the timing of the transport and the situation of
the operations, taking the availability of escort forces into consideration.
10. Assembly points of the invasion units (Omitted by the author)
11. Agreements and arrangements to be made between the commanders of the Army and the Navy
If the opening of hostilities should be decided on, [agreements and arrangements] shall be con-
cluded at an earliest opportunity between the commanders of the following units:
(1) The Southern Army, the Combined Fleet, and the Second Fleet (Note: concerning southern
operations in general)
(2) The Southern Army and the Southern Expeditionary Fleet (Note: concerning the British Bor-
neo operation)
(3) The Fourteenth Army, the Sixteenth Army and the Third Fleet (Note: concerning the Philip-
pines and the Dutch East Indies operations)
(4) The Fifteenth Army, the Twenty-fifth Army and the Southern Expeditionary Fleet (Note:
concerning the Malaya operation)
(5) The Third Air Force, the Fifth Air Force and the Eleventh Air Fleet (Note: concerning the
southern air operation)
(6) The Third Air Force and the Southern Expeditionary Fleet and the 22d Air Flotilla (Note:
concerning the Malaya air operation)
12. Code names
The Philippines operation: Operation M; The British Borneo operation: Operation B; The Malaya
operation: Operation E; the entire southern operation: Operation “A-GŌ”; The Dutch East Indies
operation: Operation H
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Attachment to the Army-Navy Central Agreement for the Southern Operation
The Army-Navy Central Agreement on the Air [Operation] for the Southern Operation (Summary)
1. The forces to be employed (as in the following table)
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Most of the forces assigned to the
Philippines and Malaya operations
shall be diverted, and one element of
the 1st Air Fleet shall be added, de-
pending on the situation.
As much force as possible shall be di-
verted from Malaya areas after the
Malaya operation is for the most part
completed or the fate of Singapore is
sealed, though depending on the situa-
tion.
* The text mistakenly has 177.
2. Outline of the Philippines operation 
(1– 4) (Omitted by the author)
(5) When the air campaign to destroy the enemy air power in the Philippines is completed, the
Navy air units shall be diverted to the Dutch East Indies operation.
3. Outline of Malaya, Burma, and British Borneo operations
(1– 4) (Omitted by the author)
(5) While the Army shall be in charge of the preparation of the air bases in Malaya, Thailand
and Burma, the Navy shall be in charge of those in British Borneo and of the seaplane bases.
(6) When the air bases on the east coast of the Malay Peninsula are made ready for use, the
Army shall successively advance [its forces], while the Navy shall appropriately use these
bases with one element to intensify its air campaigns.
4. Outline of the Dutch East Indies operation
(1) Although the Navy shall take the major part in this operation, the operation in northern
Sumatra shall be mainly conducted by the Army, whereas those in southern Sumatra and
western Java shall be carried out by the Army and the Navy in conjunction.
(2) The Navy shall allocate the air units to be diverted from the Philippines to the main force
and, according to the war situation, also divert necessary strength from the units conducting
the Malaya and British Borneo operations.
(3) The Army shall cooperate in this operation with the units to be diverted from the Malaya
area. The air campaign against northern Sumatra shall be carried out at appropriate moments
even while the Malaya operation is in progress.
3. The Plan of Operations of the Combined Fleet
In conformity with the mission directives and the central agreement given by central com-
mand, the Combined Fleet disclosed its plan of operations against the United States, Britain
and the Netherlands to all its units by Combined Fleet Operation Order Classified No. 1 of
5 November, an excerpt of which is as follows (some parts are summarized):(45)
Supplement to Combined Fleet Operation Order Classified No. 1
Operations of the Combined Fleet in a War against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands
(Excerpted by the author)
Part 1.
Mission of the Combined Fleet in Case War against the United States, Britain and
the Netherlands Breaks Out During the Operation Against China
Chapter 1.
Summary of the operation
1. In the east, the U.S. fleet shall be destroyed and the lines of operation and the supply lines of
the United States to [their forces and allies in] the east shall be disrupted.
2. In the west, the British Malaya area shall be captured, and the lines of operation and the supply
lines of Britain to [its forces and allies in] the east, as well as the supply route in Burma [to China]
shall be cut off.
3. The enemy power in the east shall be destroyed, their operational bases seized and resource
areas captured.
4. By seizing key locations, expanding [the seized areas], and strengthening defenses a position
shall be secured from where a protracted war can be conducted.
5. The enemy power shall be intercepted and destroyed.
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6. By expanding the military gains, the morale of the enemy shall be undermined.
Chapter 2
Preparations for the opening of hostilities and the [actual] opening of hostilities
Section 1
Preparations for the opening of hostilities
1. In case the Empire [of Japan] anticipates a war against the United States, Britain and the Nether-
lands and determines to complete various operational preparations, the “first [phase] of prepa-
rations for the opening of hostilities” order shall be passed down, along with a tentative date
for the opening of hostilities (Day Y). Each unit shall act as follows:
(a) Each fleet and unit shall, without particular separate orders, shift its formation according to
the phase-one operational disposition of the stage-one operations, complete war prepara-
tions and timely advance to the standby point before the launch of the operation designated
by the commander of each unit, and stand by.
(b) Each unit shall stay on strict alert against unexpected attacks delivered by U.S., British, and
Dutch forces.
(c) Each commander may secretly conduct reconnaissance when it is specifically required for
executing operations.
(d) (The laying of mines in the [Japanese administered] equatorial Pacific Islands: omitted by
the author.)
2. When advance units required for executing the operation are sent to the operational waters, the
“second [phase] of preparations for the opening of hostilities” order shall be issued.
Each unit shall act as follows:
(a) The advance units, the Carrier Task Force, the units to disrupt [the enemy] shipping lanes,
the submarine units belonging to the Southern Task Force and the South Seas Unit shall
timely start for their respective operational waters designated by the commander of each
unit.
(b) The remaining units shall act as designated by the commander of each unit in conformity to
their dispositions right at the opening of hostilities.
3. Depending on circumstances, [it is possible that] some units shall be designated to make [spe-
cific] necessary preparations for the opening of hostilities. It is [also] possible that the “second
[phase] of preparations for the opening of hostilities” shall be reversed to the “first [phase] of
preparations for the opening of hostilities,” if huge changes should occur in the circumstances.
Section 2
The opening of hostilities and the use of arms before the opening of hostilities





1. The advance units, the Carrier Task Force, the South Seas Unit, the Northern Task Force and the
main unit [the Combined Fleet] shall conduct operations against the U.S. Fleet.
Right at the outset of the war, the advance unit and the Carrier Task Force shall destroy [the
U.S. Fleet] in a surprise attack and block its offensive operations. The units shall strive to capture
and destroy the U.S. Fleet if the latter should go into action (the rest omitted by the author).
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2. While holding the upper hand in the area, the Southern Task Force shall clear and destroy the
enemy fleets in the waters of the Philippines, British Malaya, and Dutch East Indies; at the same
time it shall conduct the following operations in conjunction with the Army:
(a) [The unit] shall launch operations against British Malaya and the Philippines simultaneously,
conduct preemptive air strikes on the air power and on the naval forces of the enemy in
these areas and repeatedly attack them. [At the same time] it shall put ashore the Army’s
advance corps in the key locations in Malaya, the Philippines and then British Borneo as
quickly as possible in order to push ahead the air units and intensify their air operations.
(b) After the above operations [2(a)] produce results, the main force of the invasion corps of the
Army shall be put ashore in the Philippines and then in Malaya to promptly capture the
Philippines and British Malaya.
(c) In the early stages of the operation, strategic places in Celebes shall be occupied, followed
by those in Dutch Borneo and southern Sumatra. Key places in the Moluccas and Timor shall
[also] be occupied at favorable opportunities and the necessary air bases [at each place] shall
be made ready for use.
(d) As soon as the air bases mentioned in the above [2(c)] are made ready for use, air units shall
be advanced one after another to suppress the air power of the enemy in the Java area. After
[the operation] produces results, the main force of the invasion corps of the Army shall be
put ashore in Java to capture it.
(e) After capturing Singapore, strategic areas in northern Sumatra shall be occupied, and the
operations against Burma shall timely be conducted in order to block the enemy’s supply
route to China.
3. In case the U.S. Fleet should come for an attack, the Third Fleet, the Southern Expeditionary
Fleet, and others shall carry out the southern operation for the time being, while the bulk of the
decisive force shall take charge of implementing the operation to intercept the U.S. Fleet.
4. – 5. (The operation to disrupt the [enemy] shipping lanes, and the items concerning Thailand
and French Indochina [operations]: Omitted by the author.)
Section 2
Outline of the operation against the U.S. Fleet
(Omitted by the author)
Section 3
Outline of the southern operation
The southern operation shall be conducted by the commander of the Southern Task Force, except
for mission directives and orders particularly given in conformity with the agreements between
the commanders in chief of the Combined Fleet and the Southern Army.
Section 4
Periodization of the operation
Stage-one operations shall be divided into the following phases, and particular orders shall be
given for shifts [from one phase to another].
1. Phase-one operations: The operations [cover the period] from the opening of hostilities roughly
until the completion of the landing of the main force of the Army Philippines invasion [unit]
2. Phase-two operations: The operations [cover the period] after phase-one operations roughly
until the completion of the landing of the main force of the Army British Malaya invasion [unit]
3. Phase-three operations: The operations [cover the period] after phase-two operations until the
Dutch East Indies operation is for the most part completed.




The disposition of forces during stage-one operations shall be designated as follows:
1. Phase-one disposition: Separate Table No. 1
2. Phase-two disposition: Separate Table No. 2
3. Phase-three disposition: Separate Table No. 3





1. The advance units shall continuously watch and surprise the U.S and British fleets and, at fa-
vorable opportunities, land-based air units and carrier-based air units shall [also] carry out raids. 
2. The lines of operation and the supply lines of the United States and Britain to [their units and
the allies in] the East shall be securely cut off, and the defense of key locations shall be strength-
ened.
3. Enemy forces in the waters under [Japanese] control as well as enemy remnants in the seized
key locations shall be cleared and destroyed, resources shall be secured, and the shipping lanes
shall be protected.
4. By taking advantage of [our] inner [defense] lines, the U.S. and British fleets coming for an attack
shall be destroyed one by one.
5. The operation to disrupt the U.S. and Britain’s shipping lanes shall be intensified.
Section 2
Strategic locations and advance bases in the occupied areas to be defended
1. In the occupied areas, the strategic locations to be defended shall be planned as follows:
Manila, Davao, Singapore, Batavia, Surabaya, Tarakan, Balikpapan, Menado, Makassar, Ambon,
Penang, and Rabaul
2 In the occupied areas, the advance bases shall be planned as follows:
Manila, Singapore, and Surabaya
Section 3
The areas planned to be occupied or destroyed
The areas to be occupied or destroyed as swiftly as the operational situation permits are as fol-
lows: 
1. Eastern New Guinea, New Britain, Fiji, and Samoa area
2. Aleutians, and Midway area
3. Andaman Islands
4. Key locations in Australia
Section 4
Disposition of forces
(Omitted by the author)
Chapter 5
Protection of shipping lanes and disruption of those of the enemy
and mining operations
Chapter III     /     The Drafting of a Plan of Operations for the Southern 45
Advance
Section 1
Protection of shipping lanes
In addition to the following table, the protection of the shipping lanes shall be implemented as
designated by the commander of each unit in accordance with the Wartime Commerce Protec-
tion Plan of [administrative] year 1941.
Section 2
The operation to disrupt the [enemy] shipping lanes
1. Mission
The operation to disrupt the [enemy] shipping lanes shall swiftly be conducted against the most
important areas for the shipping of the United States, Britain and the Netherlands, while at the
same time containing the enemy forces in order to support the main operations.
Later, the operations shall be increasingly intensified and carried out for a longer period, so as
to undermine the morale of the enemy.
2. Outline of the implementation
(a) – (c) ([Areas] other than the southwestern region: Omitted by the author.)
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West of 136.2º E (excluding the wa-
ters guarded by the 3d Base Force)
South of 20º N
East of the 315º line with the north
end of British Borneo as the center
(excluding the areas of the 2d
China Expeditionary Fleet)
– Controlling the movements of ships in
the assigned areas
– Matters concerning the escort of
[friendly] ships in the assigned areas
– Collecting information and its communi-
cation
– Controlling ship signals in the assigned
areas
– Issuing warnings and all-clear signals in
the assigned area
Malaya Unit
South of the 315º line with the
north end of British Borneo as the
center
South Seas Unit
East of 136.2º E (also includes the
waters guarded by the 3d Base
Force)




Waters north of 24º N
Waters south of 29º N 
Other operational
units Each operational area
Shall cooperate in the following way:
1. Destroying the enemy power in each op-
erational area
2. Cooperation in the escort (by mainly
providing indirect escort; direct escort
depending on the circumstances)
3. Support of signal communications
(d) After stage-one, phase-one operations, the 4th, the 5th, and the 6th Submarine Squadrons
shall take charge of disrupting the [enemy] shipping lanes partly at the south coast of Java
or near the west exit of the Malacca Strait, as designated by the commander of the Southern
Task Force. When the southern operation is for the most part completed, they shall further
actively engage in the disruption of [enemy] shipping lanes in the Indian Ocean and [the
waters near] Australia.
(e) When stage-one operations are for the most part completed or when favorable opportunities
are found during the operations, the force engaging in the disruption of [enemy] shipping
lanes shall further be strengthened, and [the operation] shall be vigorously carried out with
naval vessels and aircraft.
Section 3
Mining operations
Apart from the below, the mining operations of the Combined Fleet shall be [carried out] as des-
ignated by the commander of each unit.
1. The southern operation area
(a) The standard implementation of offensive mining operations: As in Attached Table No. 1
(b) The table of the bases to be defended with mines and antisubmarine nets (standard): As in
Attached Table No. 2
(Followed by “A table of mines and antisubmarine nets to be replenished” and “Mining op-
erations in the equatorial Pacific Islands,” etc., which are omitted by the author.)
Attached Table No. 1
The standard implementation of offensive mining operations in the southern operation area
(1) Stage-one, phase-one operations (The Philippines and Malaya areas: Omitted by the author)
(2) Stage-one, phase-two operations (Note by the author: As in the following table)
(3) Stage-one, phase-three operations and thereafter
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Attached Table No. 2
The table of the bases to be defended with mines and antisubmarine nets
(1) The Philippines area (Omitted by the author)
(2) The French Indochina area (Omitted by the author)
(3) The Dutch East Indies area:
Tarakan, Balikpapan, Makassar, Surabaya, Ambon or Kupang, Batavia, and the Sunda Strait.
(4) The Malaya area:
Outer area of the port of Singapore, and the Malacca Strait.
Chapter 6 
Signal Communications 
(Omitted by the author)
Chapter 7 
Replenishment 
(Omitted by the author)
Chapter 8 
Operations [to be conducted] by others than the Combined Fleet 
(Omitted by the author)
Part 2 
Operations of the Combined Fleet in Case War against Russia Breaks Out While the War
Against the United States, Britain, the Netherlands and China Is Underway 
(Omitted by the author)
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* The text mistakenly has submarine.
Part 3 
Miscellaneous Rules 
(Omitted by the author)
Separate table No. 1
Stage-One, Phase-One Disposition of Forces (Note by the author: As in the following table*)
(From the first [phase] of preparation for the opening of hostilities until about Day X + 20, when
the landing of the main force of the Army Philippines invasion unit is completed.)





































1st Fleet (minus 3d
Battleship Div, 6th





Sqdn), and 1 de-




1. The unit stays on alert
at anchor in the west-
ern part of the Inland
Sea and makes a sor-
tie for support when
necessary.
2. Based on Operation
Tactics 1 against the
U.S. Fleet, it shall
cover the return of
the Carrier Task Force
after the attack by de-


























1st Air Fleet (minus









































1. Operation Tactics 1
against the U.S.
[Fleet].
(a) On Day X, it shall
destroy the enemy
warships in Hawaii
in a surprise attack
with all its air
strength.
(b) It shall attack the
Midway Islands
with one element to
destroy the [enemy]
base facilities there.
(c) After the air strikes,




2. Operation Tactics 2
and 3 against the U.S.
Fleet.





Fleet, it shall cooper-
Hitokappu
Bay
* Separate tables No. 1-3 contain a number of small mistakes. We have revised these tables on the basis of the
original archival document cited in note 45.

















































ate in the South Seas
Unit’s operation to
seize key locations if
required.
(b) One element shall












































1. It shall observe and
attack the U.S. Fleet
in the area of Hawaii.
It  shall intercept [the
enemy] at the water-
way of Pearl Harbor
and strive to block the
waterway. If the
enemy makes a sortie,
follow him and attack
him.
2. In the Operation Tac-
tics 1 against the U.S.
Fleet, it shall operate
roughly as follows:
(a) The key locations in
the Aleutians as well
as those in the areas
of Samoa, Fiji and
Tutuila shall be re-
connoitered by Day
X – 3 with one sub-





to the Carrier Task
Force, be found, they
shall be watched and
reported.
(b) An element shall sail
and sweep in front




cling Hawaii at a


























































Hawaii with one ele-
ment.
(c) When the operation
of the Carrier Task
Force is successfully
[over], one submarine
division or less shall
timely be dispatched
to [the area] between
north America and
Hawaii to disrupt the
[enemy] shipping
lanes.
3. In Operation Tactics 2
against the U.S. Fleet,
one element shall
timely make an attack
on enemy air bases be-
tween Hawaii and
Samoa. Also [the unit]
shall timely cooperate
with the South Seas



























4th Fleet (minus 6th
Destroyer Sqdn
(minus 1 destroyer

























1. In addition to captur-
ing Wake and Guam
as swiftly as possible,




for actions of the U.S.
and British fleets.
2. In Operation Tactics 1
against the U.S. Fleet,
the 6th Cruiser Div
shall join the main
force at a designated
point to provide cover
for the Carrier Task
Force to return. 
Flying boats shall ad-
vance to Wake Island
as soon as possible to
conduct the required
patrol.
3. In Operation Tactics 2
against the U.S. Fleet,
depending on the situ-
ation, Rabaul and
other key locations
shall be invaded with






















div), 2 patrol boats




































































4th Cruiser Div, 3d
Battleship Div 2d
Section, 4th Carrier
Div (minus 2d Sec-
tion), 1 destroyer
div of 1st Destroyer
Sqdn, 1 destroyer
div of 4th Destroyer
Sqdn, the Akashi,
the Asahi-maru, 5













































the enemy air power
and naval vessels in
the Philippines and
Malay areas, and the
enemy submarines




cretly be sent to the
necessary areas before
the opening of hostili-
ties, where they [take
charge of] observing,
laying mines and re-
plenishing seaplanes.
3. [It] shall seize Batan,
Aparri, Vigan (Laoag),
Davao, Legaspi, and
Jolo, quickly ready the
air bases there and ad-
vance one element of
the Air Unit.
4. [It] shall escort at sea
the main force of the
[Army] Philippines in-
vasion unit, and cover
its landing.
5. [It] shall escort at sea
the advance corps of
the [Army] Malaya in-
vasion unit, as well as
the units to advance
into Thailand, and




one element of the air
force to the seized air-
fields.
6. In the early stages of
the operation, 2 de-
stroyers shall be put
under the command of
the commander in
















































































3d Fleet (minus one
element), 5th




Sqdn (minus 1 de-
stroyer div), 11th
Seaplane Tender





























Separate table No. 2
Stage-One, Phase-Two Disposition of Forces
(Until about Day X + 40, when the landing of the main force of the Army Malaya invasion unit
is completed.)



















































1. To patrol and
defend the as-
signed areas.


























































































dr 1st Combined Sig-
























Omitted by the author
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1st Battleship Div, 1st
Fleet (minus 3d Battle-
ship Div, 6th Cruiser
Div, 1st Destroyer Sqdn
(minus 3 destroyer divs)
and minus 3d Destroyer
Sqdn), and 1 destroyer
of 7th Destroyer Div
























1st Air Fleet (minus 4th
Carrier Div and de-
stroyer div), 1st De-
stroyer Sqdn (minus 3
destroyer divs), 3d Bat-
tleship Div (minus 2d
Section), 8th Cruiser
Div, 1 destroyer div of
the 2d Destroyer Sqdn,





















































































4th Cruiser Div, 3d Bat-
tleship Div 2d Section,
4th Carrier Div (minus
2d Section), 1 destroyer
div of 1st Destroyer
Sqdn, 1 destroyer div of
4th Destroyer Sqdn, the
Akashi, the Asahi-maru, 5
bns of special landing
forces, some fishing
boats





2. To escort at sea




3. To capture key
places of the
Dutch East Indies.
1. The forces em-
ployed in the
Philippines opera-
tion shall be re-
structured to be
ready for the inva-






































































11th Air Fleet (minus
22d Air Flotilla and 36
fighter planes), 2 bns of
special landing forces






2. One element of sub-
marines and
minelayers shall ad-
vance to the waters
south of the Dutch
East Indies, and
[also] that south of






3. The key locations in
the Dutch East In-
dies shall be seized
[making use of the
results of] the ad-
vanced air forces












4. The air force shall
advance to the
Kuching area by the
time of the landing

























3d Fleet (minus one ele-
ment), 5th Cruiser Div,
2d Destroyer Sqdn
(minus 1 destroyer div),
4th Destroyer Sqdn
(minus 1 destroyer div),
11th Seaplane Tender



















Cruiser Div, 3d De-
stroyer Sqdn, 12th Sea-
plane Tender Div, the
Tatsumiya-maru, 5th De-
stroyer Sqdn, 4th Sub-
marine Sqdn, 1
submarine div of 6th
Submarine Sqdn, 22d
Air Flotilla, 36 fighter







t 35 transport ships
Separate table No. 3
Stage-One, Phase-Three Disposition of Forces
(Until the southern operation is for the most part completed.)











































et 5th Fleet, (Kisarazu Air
Gp), Chichijima Signal
Unit










































































Same as phase-one operations
























1st Battleship Div, 1st
Fleet (minus 3d Battle-
ship Div, 6th Cruiser
Div, 1st Destroyer
Sqdn (minus 2 de-
stroyer divs), and 3d
























1st Air Fleet (minus
4th Carrier Div), 3d
Battleship Div (minus
2d Section), 8th
Cruiser Div, and 1st
Destroyer Sqdn













































































































4th Cruiser Div, 2 de-
stroyer divs of 4th
Destroyer Sqdn, 4th
Carrier Div (minus
2d Section), 3d Battle-
ship Div 2d Section,
the Akashi, 5 bns of
special landing
forces, the Asahi-
maru, and some fish-
ing boats





2. To escort at sea


















11th Air Fleet (minus
22d Air Flotilla and
36 fighter planes),

























Sqdn (minus 2 de-
stroyer divs), 11th
Seaplane Tender Div,
and 8 patrol boats































































Cruiser Div, 3d De-
stroyer Sqdn, 22d Air
Flotilla, 36 fighter





















































































































Same as phase-one operations
By means of the above [plan of operations], the commander in chief of the Combined Fleet
gave detailed instructions concerning the operational outline of the stage-one operations to
all units under his control and also disclosed the plan for the stage-two operations. Following
this, on 7 November, he gave the order of the first [phase] of preparations for the opening of
hostilities and indicated the scheduled date to open the hostilities.(46)
The Combined Fleet Operation Order Classified No. 2
7 November 1941
[Start] the first [phase] of preparations for the opening of hostilities; Day Y [is] 8 December.
By this order, each unit shifted to the phase-one disposition of forces and started its advance
toward the standby point before the launch of operations.
In the wartime organization of the Imperial [Japanese] Navy, the composition of the main
force of the Combined Fleet was as follows:
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2d Battleship Div Ise, Hyūga, Fusō, Yamashiro 4 battleships
3d Battleship Div Kongō, Haruna, Kirishima, Hiei 4 battleships
6th Cruiser Div Aoba, Kinugasa, Kako, Furutaka 4 heavy cruisers
9th Cruiser Div Kitakami, Ōi 2 light cruisers
1st Destroyer Sqdn


















4th Cruiser Div Takao, Atago, Chōkai, Maya 4 heavy cruisers
5th Cruiser Div Nachi, Haguro, Myōkō 3 heavy cruisers
7th Cruiser Div Mogami, Mikuma, Suzuya, Kumano 4 heavy cruisers
8th Cruiser Div Toné, Chikuma 2 heavy cruisers
































16th Cruiser Div Ashigara, Nagara, Kuma 1 heavy cruiser2 light cruisers
17th Minelayer Div Itsukushima, Yaeyama, Tatsumiya-maru 3 minelayers
5th Destroyer Sqdn Natori 5th Destroyer Div22d Destroyer Div
1 light cruiser
8 destroyers











Kashima [Flagship of the 4th Fleet]* 1 light cruiser*
18th Cruiser Div Tenryū, Tatsuta 2 light cruisers
19th Minelayer Div Okinoshima, Tokiwa, Tsugaru, Ten’yō-maru 3 minelayers1 auxiliary minelayer















21st Cruiser Div Tama, Kiso, Kimikawa-maru 2 light cruisers1 seaplane tender




























* Table rearranged by the editor.
















1st Carrier Div Akagi, Kaga, 7th Destroyer Div 2 aircraft carriers3 destroyers
2d Carrier Div Sōryū, Hiryū, 23d Destroyer Div 2 aircraft carriers3 destroyers
4th Carrier Div Ryūjō, Kasuga-maru, 3d Destroyer Div 2 aircraft carriers2 destroyers

































Kashii, Shimushu 1 light cruiser1 coastal defense ship
24th Aux Cruiser Div Hōkoku-maru, Aikoku-maru, Kiyosumi-maru 3 auxiliary cruisers
11th Seaplane Tender
Div Mizuho, Chitose 2 seaplane tenders
4th Submarine Sqdn






















4. Conclusion of the Tokyo Agreement 
In conformity with the Army-Navy Central Agreement that was issued on 5 November, [a
conference to conclude] operational agreements between the top commanders of the Army
and the Navy of the southern operation (i.e. the commanders in chief of the Combined fleet
and the Second Fleet and the commander in chief of the Southern Army) was held at the War
College from 8 to 10 November, and on the 10th of the same month [the agreements] were
sealed. 
The persons concerned at the high command of the Army and the Navy were present as
well, and also the staff officers of each army and fleet involved in the southern operation
participated in the meeting. This is the so-called “Tokyo Agreement,” which consisted of the
following two agreements. 
Agreement Between the Commanders in Chief of the Combined Fleet and the Southern
Army 
This agreement was signed on 10 November, 1941 between Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, com-
mander in chief of the Combined Fleet, and General Terauchi Hisaichi, commander in chief
of the Southern Army. It was in summary as follows:(34)
1. The operation shall be launched in the following manner: 
(1) At the moment of the launch of Operation A-GO (Note: a code name for the southern oper-
ation) [i.e.] ([on] Day X), the Combined Fleet shall conduct preemptive air strikes against
the enemy fleet in another area. (Note: another area means Hawaii.) 
(2) If after the Emperor’s order to launch operations is given, we come under a serious preemp-
tive attack from the enemy prior to Day X, the Navy shall immediately go into the state of
war and launch its operations. 
2. The agreements concerning plans for Operation A-GO other than this (except for the operations
against Guam, Hong Kong, and the Bismarck Islands), and those during the implementation of
the operation shall be made between the commanders in chief of the Southern Army and the
Second Fleet. However, if the commander in chief of the Second Fleet is engaged in an operation
to intercept the U.S. Fleet, the commander in chief of the Third Fleet shall take charge of con-
cluding agreements concerning implementation of the operation instead. 
Agreement Between the Commander in Chief of the Southern Army and the Commander
of the Navy Southern Task Force 
This agreement was concluded between Commander in Chief of the Southern Army, General
Terauchi Hisaichi and Commander in Chief of the Second Fleet V. Adm. Kondō Nobutake.
It was in outline as follows:(34)
I. Policy of the joint operations 
In conformity with the “Army-Navy Central Agreement for the Southern Operation” of 6
November 1941 (hereinafter referred to as the “Central Agreement”), the Navy Southern
Task Force and the Southern Army shall accomplish the objective of the southern operation
within a short period of time in an atmosphere of close and proper cooperation. 
II. [Editor’s note: omitted by the author.]
III. Standard dates [to implement] the invasion [operations]
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The key areas where the Army and the Navy shall in cooperation with each other launch inva-
sions as well as the starting dates of the landings (along with assembly points and the key areas
which the Navy shall capture unassisted as well as the starting dates of the landings) 





Key areas to capture 
(*stands for the areas which the Navy will capture unassisted) Assembly points
Operation M Operation E Operation B Operation H

















By Day X + 4 Vicinity ofLegaspi Palau




gora and Pattani Cam Ranh Bay
Around Day






X + 13 Jolo Davao
By around**





[for the unit] for
Lingayen Gulf;
Amami Ōshima







Day X + 25
Southern Thai-
land or east coast
of Malaya (for
the first [landing]










* The text has 5.2.1. We have followed the numbering in Vol. 3.
** The text has no around. We have followed Vol. 3.
IV. Disposition of Forces 
1. Southern Army


















land or east coast
of Malaya (for
the second [land-





Day X + 60
Ambon and Ku-

















[Particulars for] other [targets] shall be decided on in arrangements between the highest commanders of the













































































Areas Corps Commander(Chief of Staff)
Forces (assem-














































* Following Vol. 3, we have added around.
** Following Vol. 34, we have added Islands.



















































































































i) 55th Div (French
Indochina) and
33d Div (north-
ern China) as the
core;


































































3d, 7th, 10th and





























































Div (Op C at
first), 48th Div




(Ops G and R at


















































ity in French In-
dochina
* We have followed the term used in Vol. 34.
Remarks: 
1 The outline of the distribution of the first transport for the landing operations and the landing schedule is
as shown in Attached Table No. 1 (omitted by the author). 
2 The units other than those in the above table, which are standing by for embarkation at the time of the
opening of hostilities, and the ships they shall embark are in outline as shown in Attached Table No. 2
(omitted by the author).
2. Navy Southern Task Force
























































































































































































































































































































Bulk of 3d Fleet, 5th
Cruiser Div, bulk of
2d Destroyer Sqdn,







the middle of the
operation) and 4
bns of special land-
ing forces as the


















2) Seizure of air-























































































































































































[unit] in the middle
of the operation),
22d Air Flotilla, as







































































































The bulk of  11th
Air Fleet as the core
















2) Searching for the
enemy at sea and
attacking it


























































of the 6th Subma-
rine Sqdn (the
Philippines)

































V. Outline of the operation
1. Measures to be taken against the enemy [if it comes for an attack] before the opening of hos-
tilities (omitted) 
2. The general operational outline 
(1) The operation to capture key areas shall be carried out in conformity with [item] III. Stan-
dard dates [to implement] the invasion [operations] (omitted). 
(2) Escort at sea 
{1} When required, restrictions may be placed on the sea routes and the movements of
empty homeward-bound ships and of ships transporting army supplies, sick and
wounded being sent back, or transporting diverted forces, etc. by the commander of
the Navy (commander in chief of the Navy in the Southern Area, or the commander
of the Philippines (the Dutch East Indies) Unit). However, when it is recognized that
such restrictions may seriously affect subsequent operations, [further] agreements or
arrangements shall be made between the commander in chief of the Navy in the
Southern Area and the commander of the Southern Army, or the commanders of the
Army and the Navy on site. 
{2} An escort for the transfer of Army forces shall be provided according to item (3)
[below]. 
{3} Other particulars shall be arranged between the commanders of each landing corps
and the escort fleet. 
(3) Transfer of Army forces and replacement of Army forces by Naval forces 
{1} The replacement of the forces guarding Jolo shall be arranged between commanders
of the Navy Philippines unit and the Sixteenth Army. 
{2} The replacement of the forces guarding Tarakan and Ambon 
The replacement of the forces defending these areas after they are seized and secured
shall be arranged between the commanders of the Navy Dutch East Indies Unit and
the Sixteenth Army. 
{3} The transfer of the 48th Division (the Dutch East Indies invasion corps) 
The completion of the corps’ assembly near Manila shall be scheduled roughly on
Day X + 55, and its departure from the assembly point on around Day X + 70. The
Navy Philippines (Dutch East Indies) Unit commander shall provide escort for the
above transfer with the necessary forces.
{4} The escort for the transfer of the corps that is to capture Bangka and southern Suma-
tra (one element of the Sixteenth Army) shall be provided by the Navy Malaya Unit
commander with the necessary forces. 
{5} The transfer of one element of the 38th Division (a unit to invade the Dutch East In-
dies) 
The escort for the transfer of this corps (from Hong Kong to western Java), along with
[the escort of] the main force of the Sixteenth Army (from Taiwan to southern French
Indochina and further to western Java), shall be provided by the Navy Dutch East
Indies Unit commander with the necessary forces. 
{6} The transfer and redeployment of the units to capture Ambon and Kupang (one ele-
ment of the Sixteenth Army)
The escort for the transfer and redeployment (between Palau and Hong Kong, and
the departure from Palau or Hong Kong) of the units shall be arranged between the
commanders of the Navy Dutch East Indies Unit and the Sixteenth Army.
{7} The escort to be provided for the transfer and redeployment of other smaller units
shall be arranged between the commanders of the Army and the Navy concerned.
3. Outline of the air operation (Omitted)
VI. Signal communications (Omitted)
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VII. Setting up of supply bases (Omitted)
VIII. Exchanges of information (Omitted)
IX. Exchanges of agreements and arrangements
1. Further detailed communication of the Central Agreement shall be made as follows:
[Between] the commander in chief of the Southern Expeditionary Fleet and Major General
Kawaguchi ([at] Saigon)
The commanders in chief of the Third Fleet and the Eleventh Air Fleet, and the commanders
of the Fourteenth Army and the Fifth Air Force shall conclude joint arrangements ([at]
Iwakuni).
The commander in chief of the Southern Expeditionary Fleet, the commanders of the Fif-
teenth Army, the Twenty-fifth Army, the Third Air Force and the [Navy] 22d Air Flotilla shall
conclude  joint arrangements ([at] Saigon).
2. Conferences to be held between the commanders concerned of the Army and the Navy shall
be scheduled as follows:
(1) Around the 40th day of the operation
(2) Around the 120th day of the operation
(3) Conferences shall be added if necessary.
3. For the duration of this operation and in order to communicate all particulars resulting from
the Central Agreement as well as this agreement, the Navy shall dispatch one staff officer to
each army headquarters [concerned] and the Third Air Force [headquarters]. Other than the
above, if the situation permits, the Army and the Navy shall dispatch staff officers to each
other at every important moment, promote their mutual understandings and communicate
information so as to attain a smooth and swift implementation of the joint operations. 
4. The responsibility [to provide] support and provisions for the dispatched staff officers, as
mentioned in the previous item, which may be necessary to accomplish their tasks, shall fall
on each receiving unit. 
5. Conclusion of the Iwakuni Agreement and the Saigon 
Agreement
After concluding the Tokyo Agreement on 10 November, the main persons in charge of the
Army and the Navy units involved in the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies operations
gathered at [the base of] the Navy Iwakuni Air Group in Yamaguchi Prefecture from 14 to 16
November and made the necessary arrangements stipulated in the Tokyo Agreement. This
is the “Iwakuni Agreement.” In the Iwakuni Agreement, the arrangements concerning the
Philippines and those concerning the Dutch East Indies were separately dealt with. In the
following outline, only the points that differed from those in the Tokyo Agreement are
given:(34)
1. [Operations in] the Philippines ([arranged] between the Third Fleet and the Eleventh Air Fleet
of the Navy, and the Fourteenth Army and the Fifth Air Force of the Army)
[The scheduled dates for] the sudden attacks on the key locations in northern Luzon and the
disembarkation of the main force of the Army Luzon invasion unit shall be postponed for two
days.
2. [Operations in] the Dutch East Indies ([arranged] between the Navy Third Fleet and the Six-
teenth Army)
Other than deciding on the postponement of the landing on Tarakan for five days and that of
the seizure of Banjarmasin for six days, the capture of Bali, which was not included in the Tokyo
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Agreement, was scheduled for Day X + 70. A proposal of adding the Sakaguchi Detachment of
the Sixteenth Army to [the forces to] capture Davao was made, but it was left pending (On 24
November [the proposal] was adopted as it was).
In the meantime, the Army and the Navy units involved in [the operations in] the Malaya
area held a meeting in Saigon on 18 November, and made arrangements between the com-
manders on site. This was the “Saigon Agreement,” which was in summary as follows:
1. [Operations in] British Malaya and Thailand ([arranged] between the Southern Expeditionary
Fleet and the 22d Air Flotilla of the Navy, and the Twenty-fifth Army, the Fifteenth Army and
the Third Air Force of the Army)
The details of the action of the advance corps, a simultaneous landing [also] to be conducted on
Kota Bharu in British [Malaya], the share of responsibility concerning the air campaign and oth-
ers were decided on.
2. [Operations in] British Borneo ([arranged] between the Navy Southern Expeditionary Fleet and
the Army Kawaguchi Detachment)
Arrangements for the capture of Miri and Kuching, etc. were made. 
6. Issue of Orders by Each Navy Unit
The Southern Task Force
On 15 November, when the Iwakuni Agreement was essentially ready, Southern Task Force
Commander Vice Admiral Kondō issued Southern Task Force Order Classified No. 1, which
read in summary as follows:(47)
I. The Southern Task Force shall, in conjunction with the Army, completely destroy the U.S., British
and Dutch naval vessels and air power in the Far East, demolish all bases in the Philippines,
British Malaya, Burma and the Dutch East Indies, and capture key areas in these territories,
while making preparations to intercept attacks by the U.S. mainland fleets and others.
II. Mission
1. In conjunction with the Southern Army, it shall first destroy the enemy power in the Philip-
pines, British Malaya and British Borneo, invade the Dutch East Indies from both the south-
ern Philippines and Malaya, and mop up [the enemy] there.
2. The execution of the operations shall roughly be divided in the following three periods.
(Omitted)
3. The launch of the southern operation (Omitted by the author)
III. Outline of the operation
1. The Philippines operation (Omitted by the author)
2. The British Malaya and British Borneo operations
(1) – (4) (Omitted by the author)
(5) At the earliest opportunity after the opening of hostilities, the British Borneo invasion
unit shall be escorted to capture first Miri, and then Kuching, and quickly make air bases
[there] ready for use, so as to advance one element of the Navy air units and intensify
the air campaigns against Malaya and the Dutch East Indies.
3. The Dutch East Indies operation
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(1) When the air bases in Davao and Jolo are ready, forces of the Eleventh Air Fleet shall suc-
cessively be advanced [there] to completely destroy the remnants of the enemy in the
Philippines, as well as to launch the air campaign to destroy the enemy air power in the
Dutch East Indies.
(2) Once operations at sea around Malaya are for the most part completed, the Navy air
units in the area shall also be diverted to the bases in Miri, Kuching and others to partic-
ipate in the air campaign against the Dutch East Indies.
(3) After the Philippines invasion operation has made progress, submarines shall gradually
be advanced to the waterways south of the Celebes Sea. The surface units shall [also] be
advanced and act in concert with the air campaign, and Menado shall be seized with a
Naval landing force. After that, they shall advance to Kendari and Makassar one after
another. Apart from [the above], in conjunction with the Army, invasion operations shall
be carried forward largely in parallel with the above against Tarakan, Balikpapan and
Banjarmasin, while at an opportune moment Ambon and Kupang shall be captured.
(4) Necessary bases in the above captured areas shall be quickly prepared, and the air forces
shall be advanced one after another, in order to secure footholds (Kupang, etc.) for op-
erations against Australia, as well as to further intensify air campaigns against Java from
the east and to destroy the enemy air power and naval vessels. Also, one element of the
submarine [units] shall be advanced to the Indian Ocean to disrupt the supply lanes to
British Malaya through the Malacca Strait and those to the Dutch East Indies from the
south.
(5) When the operation in the Malaya area has made progress, strategic locations on Bangka
Island (Note: [near] Sumatra) and Palembang shall be seized at an opportune moment,
and air bases [there] shall be made ready for use, so that [the Japanese forces can] close
in on western Java. Concerted air campaigns from the east and the west shall be intensi-
fied, so as to suppress the enemy air power, and gradually tighten the encirclement.
[Meanwhile,] the main force of the Sixteenth Army shall be disembarked near Batavia,
and another corps near Surabaya. They shall swiftly seize Batavia, Bandung and
Surabaya and then mop up the enemy in the key areas on Java.
(6) When the Malacca Strait is brought under control after the capture of Singapore, one el-
ement of the Twenty-fifth Army shall timely be put ashore near Medan from the west
coast of the Malay Peninsula to capture the strategic areas in northern Sumatra and then
at an opportune moment the island of Sabang.
(7) In this operation, depending on the nature of the terrain, etc., the 1001 Unit (Note: para-
trooper unit) and maneuvers and supply by fishing boats and other small vessels shall
be employed.
4. [Later] when the situation permits, submarine cables from Java to Malaya, Australia and the
Cocos Island (Note: [in] the Indian Ocean) shall be severed with submarines. [However,]
those between the islands of the Dutch East Indies shall not be cut with the aim of using
them after the Dutch East Indies has been occupied.
5. The areas to be invaded in the final stage of the southern operation and the operations af-
terwards
[The areas to be invaded] shall be the U.S., British and Dutch territories, enveloped by
western New Guinea and the eastern islands of the Dutch East Indies in the east, and Burma,
the Andaman Islands, the Nicobar Islands and the line [streching to] the western peripheral
islands of the Dutch East Indies in the west. Advance bases shall be set up along the lines
connecting the outer border islands, and mine barriers shall be set up in the waters adjacent
to Australia such as the Arafura Sea, the areas around the Malacca Strait, and a part of wa-
terways south of the Dutch East Indies. At the same time, one element of the submarine
units shall reconnoiter the movements of the enemy forces in Australia and India, attack
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them and disrupt the [enemy] shipping lanes. Also, an air raid shall timely be carried out
on Port Darwin for the purpose of defending the occupied areas. 
IV. Deployment of forces
Main body of the Southern Task Force: departure from the Inland Sea on Day X – 9
arrival in Magong on Day X – 6
Submarine Unit/ 6th Submarine Sqdn: departure from the Inland Sea on Day X – 17
arrival in Sanya on Day X – 9
5th Submarine Sqdn: departure from the Inland Sea on Day X – 13
arrival in Palau on Day X – 7
V. Disposition of forces
1. Phase-one (as in the following table)
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4th Cruiser Div (minus 2d Section), 3d Battleship
Div 4th Ship (the Kongō), 4th Destroyer Div, 6th
Destroyer Div 2d Section; Support for entire opera-
tion ([also] cooperation in the Hong Kong invasion
operation)
Eastern Sup-
port Unit Senior Captain
3d Battleship Div 3d ship (the Haruna), 4th Cruiser
Div 3d ship (the Maya), 6th Destroyer Div (minus
2d section); Support for the operation in the area
east of the Philippines
The Philippines Unit Cdr in Chief, 3d Fleet
3d Fleet (minus one element), 5th Cruiser Div, 4th
Carrier Div (minus 2d Section), 2d Destroyer Sqdn
(minus 1 destroyer div), 4th Destroyer Sqdn
(minus 1 destroyer div), 11th Seaplane Tender Div,





Southern Expeditionary Fleet, 4th Cruiser Div 4th
Ship (the Chōkai), 7th Cruiser Div, 3d Destroyer
Sqdn, 4th Submarine Sqdn, 1 submarine div of 6th
Submarine Sqdn, 17th Minelayer Div 2d Section,
12th Seaplane Tender Div, 22d Air Flotilla, one ele-
ment of 23d Air Flotilla (36 fighter planes and 6
land-based reconnaissance planes), 1 bn of special
landing forces, etc.
Air Unit Cdr in Chief, 11th Air Fleet
11th Air Fleet (minus 22d Air Flotilla and one ele-
ment of 23d Air Flotilla), 1001 Unit
Submarine Unit Cdr, 5th Subma-rine Sqdn
5th Submarine Sqdn, 6th Submarine Sqdn (minus
one submarine div)
Note: The 1st Secton of the 4th Carrier Division consisted of the aircraft carrier Ryūjō and the destroyer
Shiokaze.
2. Phase-two (as in the following table)
3. Phase-three
Then, the commander of the Southern Task Force dealt with [the units] to cooperate in the Hong
Kong operation, along with the necessary measures for the ground units, such as special landing
forces, construction squads and defense details, as follows: 














Same as phase-one 
The Philippines Unit
Cdr in Chief, 
3d Fleet
One element of 3d Fleet
The Dutch East Indies Unit
Bulk of 3d Fleet, 5th Cruiser Div, 2d Destroyer
Sqdn (minus 1 destroyer div), 4th Destroyer Sqdn
(minus 1 destroyer div), 11th Seaplane Tender Div,





5th Destroyer Sqdn and 4th Carrier Div (minus 2d
Section) shall be added to the force deployed for
phase-one.
Air Unit Cdr in Chief, 11th Air Fleet Same as phase-one













4th Cruiser Div (minus the Chōkai), 3d Battleship
Div 2d Section, 4th Carrier Div (minus 2d Section),
4th and 24th Destroyer Divs
The Philippines Unit
Cdr in Chief, 
3d Fleet
One element of 3d Fleet
The Dutch East Indies Unit
Bulk of 3d Fleet, 5th Cruiser Div, 2d Destroyer
Sqdn, 4th Destroyer Sqdn (minus 2 destroyer divs),
11th Seaplane Tender Div, 8 patrol boats, 4 bns of





Southern Expeditionary Fleet, 4th Cruiser div 4th
Ship (the Chōkai), 7th Cruiser Div, 3d Destroyer
Sqdn, 22d Air Flotilla, one element of the 23d Air
Flotilla, 1 bn of special landing forces
Air Unit Cdr in Chief, 11th Air Fleet Same as phase-one
Submarine Unit Cdr, 4th Subma-rine Sqdn 4th, 5th and 6th Submarine Sqdns
1. In order to cooperate in the Hong Kong operation, the 2d Section of the 6th Destroyer Division
(assigned to the main body of the Southern Task Force) was temporarily put under the command
of the Second China Expeditionary Fleet.
2. Distribution of the special landing forces and others
As the units in the following table were incorporated into the Southern Task Force as of 20 No-
vember, the commander ordered the distribution of each unit [as follows].
Note: The defense details are units for preventing fire and destruction, and providing emergency repairs of
oil fields and other important facilities. 
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1st Yokosuka SLF Air Unit Paratrooper unit
2d Yokosuka SLF Malaya Unit Order was given to advance to Sanya by Day X – 6; tobe employed for the British Borneo operations
3d Yokosuka SLF Air Unit Paratrooper unit
1st Kure SLF The PhilippinesUnit
Planned to be employed for the Legaspi and Jolo op-
erations
2d Kure SLF Ditto Planned to be employed for [the operation in] theDutch Borneo area











1st Construction Squad Ditto Planned to be employed for [the operation in]Legaspi; attached to the 1st Kure SLF
2d Construction Squad Ditto Planned to be employed for [the operation in] Davao
3d Construction Squad Ditto Planned to be employed for [the operation in]Celebes; attached to the Sasebo Combined SLF
4th Construction Squad Malaya Unit Planned to be employed for [the operation in] BritishBorneo; attached to the 2d Yokosuka SLF
5th Construction Squad The PhilippinesUnit
Planned to be employed for [the operation in] Dutch
Borneo; attached to the 2d Kure SLF









1st Defense Detail Ditto Planned to be employed for [the operation in] DutchBorneo; attached to the 2d Kure SLF
2d Defense Detail Ditto Ditto
The Philippines Unit
The order of the Philippines Unit was issued on 20 November 1941 [actually 23 November].
It started with an assessment of the enemy situation in the Philippines area, gave an outline
of the situation of friendly forces (the operations of the Air Unit and the Submarine Unit as
well as the Malaya and Hong Kong operations), and explained in detail the operational di-
rectives, the disposition of forces, and actions of each unit in the Philippines area; furthermore
it gave the general idea of the Dutch East Indies operation.(47)
The Malaya Unit
The order of the Malaya Unit was issued on 20 November 1941. It roughly explained the
enemy situation in the Malaya area, the mission [of the unit], the employment of force before
and after the opening of hostilities, the disposition of forces, and the outline of the operational
directives.(47)
7. The Southern Army Issues the Order to Launch the Invasion
Dated 6 November, the Army Department of IGHQ disclosed its concept of the operation.
On the same day, General Terauchi Hisaichi was personally appointed commander in chief
of the Southern Army by the Emperor. He was given by [the Army Department of] IGHQ
the Order to Prepare for the Seizure of Strategic Areas in the South, along with the Summary
of the Operations of the Southern Army, and the Army-Navy Central Agreement for the
Southern Operation.” On 10 November, Commander in Chief Terauchi, along with his staff
officers, concluded agreements for the southern operation with the commanders in chief of
the Combined Fleet and the Second Fleet, and simultaneously issued to his subordinate units
the orders concerning the operational preparations. On 15 November, based on the order of
battle of the Southern Army his high command came into effect, and the Southern Army is-
sued the Plan of Operations for the South.(34)
Then on 16 November, the armies [under] the Southern Army concluded the necessary
arrangements with the Navy units concerned (the Iwakuni Agreement), after which on 20
November he [Terauchi] issued the order to invade the southern key areas, the excerpt and
summary of which are as follows:(34)
1. – 10. (Concerning the Philippines, Malaya, Thailand, and Burma: Omitted by the author.)
11. The commander of the Sixteenth Army shall swiftly occupy Davao, Jolo, Tarakan and then
Balikpapan, Banjarmasin with an element of his force and secure the necessary air bases as
well as vital resource areas. (The rest omitted by the author)
12. Commander Kawaguchi of the Kawaguchi Detachment shall depart from the assembly point
after the opening of hostilities, occupy Miri and Seria first in a sudden attack, secure vital
resource areas as well as air bases and, immediately after that, occupy the air base near Kuch-
ing as quickly as possible.
13. – 14. (Omitted by the author)
15. In order to restore order, obtain resources crucial to national defense and secure the means
for the armies to maintain themselves on their own account in the occupied territories, each
army commander and Commander Kawaguchi shall take charge of establishing a military
administration in each area. Separate orders shall be issued concerning the details of the es-
tablishment of a military administration (summarized by the author).
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With this, [the Southern Army] had issued the orders to control the operations of the armies
under its command for the next forty to fifty days.
8. Remaining Problems in the Southern Operation
Among the problems concerning the southern operation that became clear after the map ex-
ercise at the Naval College, the following three major problems remained unsolved until the
last minute: 
1. The problem of the invasion schedule(11)
The Army was eager to shorten the [invasion] schedule from the strategic point of view that it
wanted to be ready for a [possible] northern operation sooner, that it wanted to seize the oil be-
fore it was destroyed by the enemy, and that it wanted to quickly [complete the invasion] before
the enemy strengthened its defenses. However, this was difficult to realize due to the problems
in the shipping operation, etc. Meanwhile, the Navy shared the same view about the shortening
of the schedule from the point of view that it wanted to be ready for the operation against the
United States, and that it wanted to quickly seize oil. However, it had to be cautious by all means
due to the required thorough air campaigns to safely transport the convoy carrying the invasion
[corps], the preparation of bases, the operation of its vessels for escort, and others. That is to
say, both the Army and the Navy had a strong ambition to shorten the schedule but it was dif-
ficult to form a clear view of the schedule. Moreover, both had concerns about whether they
[even] could conduct the operations as scheduled.
2. The problem of the construction units to set up air bases
The operational outline against the United States that the Japanese Navy had adopted for years
was based on the idea to intercept the main force of the enemy by making use of the [Japanese
administered equatorial] Pacific Islands and destroy the enemy at a stroke in a decisive battle.
Therefore, it had almost never considered an operation [to be conducted while] advancing its
bases.
However, the main part of the present southern operation was an operation [conducted
while] advancing bases. As a quick preparation of advance bases was required, operational units
assigned to [setting up] facilities became necessary. (In peacetime, the Navy Facility Department
was in charge of the construction of naval air bases.)
Therefore, on 12 September 1941, the formation of construction squads was stipulated in an
amendment to Navy order No. 105, the Auxiliary War Vessels Unit Order. At that time, the reg-
ular personnel of a construction squad consisted of engineers, assistant engineers and civil of-
ficers totaling 10 officers, about 20 clerks, employees, etc., and up to 3,000 military laborers as
needed. However, they were not equipped with modern construction machines. For this reason,
the construction capacity of the squads was too low to meet the needs of the operational units.
3. Measures against attrition in the air campaigns
(1) Shortage of aircraft
The map exercise at the Naval College had shown that 160% of the fighter planes and 40%
of the land-based attack planes of the land-based air units would be lost in fighting before
advancing to the line of Java, so the replenishment [of the loss] became an issue. After further
examination, it was found that whereas the 40% loss of land-based attack planes could some-
how be replenished, it was totally impossible to replenish the 160% loss of fighter planes.
Although [a total of] 150 Type–0 fighter planes were built by April of 1941, the production
capacity around October of the same year was merely about 50 aircraft per month.(49) For
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reference, the following table shows the actual numbers of aircraft built in April 1941
(monthly production) and the planned numbers of aircraft to be built in April 1942 estimated
as of July 1941.(50)
At the study meeting of the map exercise at the Naval College, Commander in Chief of the
Combined Fleet Admiral Yamamoto strongly demanded that 150 more Type–0 fighter planes
should be built by January 1942 on top of the current production plan. However, it was to-
tally impossible to meet his demand.(49) As a countermeasure, the [Navy] Aeronautical De-
partment drew up a plan to increase the production of Type–0 fighter planes and land-based
attack planes by decreasing the production of land-based transport planes and observation
planes until March 1942, while increasing the production of 20-mm machine guns to be
mounted on aircraft by also making use of the production capacity of 25-mm machine guns
at the Toyokawa Naval Arsenal, which was under control of the Navy Technical Department.
But these measures were only able to slightly increase production.(51)
(2) Shortage of flight crew
The Navy, which had envisioned the scenario of an intercepting operation, had planned for
a short decisive battle. Therefore, in training its flight crew, it had set the target of [just] filling
the full regular number of personnel for its units. The regular number of personnel was one
and a half times the number of flight crew for the regular number of aircraft. Even the report
of the Aviation System Study Committee of the [administrative] year 1939 stated that the
targeted [full regular number of] flight crew in peacetime should be set at three times as
many as the number of flight crew for the regular aircraft.(52) ([Note by the author:] As the
military capacity [the number of aircraft] is to be doubled in wartime, the number of flight
crew, [three times as many as the number of flight crew for the regular aircraft at peacetime,]
will make half as many again as the [increased] military capacity.)









Carrier-based fighter planes 32 58
Medium-sized land-based attack planes 15 23
Large-sized land-based attack planes 1 5*
Carrier-based attack planes 28 0
Carrier-based bombers 13 17
Three-seater reconnaissance seaplanes 6 23
Observation planes 9 15
Large-sized flying boats 4 9
Medium-sized flying boats 0 3
Transport planes 7 12
Training planes 47 31
In total 162 196
* The text mistakenly has 15.
In the meantime, every time a [new] naval armaments supplement program was ap-
proved, the plans to increase the power of air units had been significantly stepped up. As a
result, despite the desperate efforts of the persons concerned, the number of trained flight
crew could not even reach [the targeted number] as in the above, which was half as many
again [as the number of flight crew for the regular aircraft]. For that reason, the naval arma-
ments supplement program (five-year plan) of the [administrative] year 1939 went so far as
to stipulate the increase of air training units by as many as forty units all at once.
Due to the [difficulty of] the tasks, flight crew were given piloting (reconnaissance) train-
ing for about one year on top of a [just] sufficient fundamental training, after which they
were further given in-service training for about one year before somehow becoming full-
fledged crew members. [Moreover,] in order to become a cadre flight crew member of aircraft
carriers or of the front line base units, a further training of one to two years was required,
which meant that the training of flight crew had to be started at least three years prior to an
increase in the armaments supplement programs. It was impossible to increase [flight crew
numbers] just like that.
Although adequate documents about the actual situation of the training of flight crew
are not extant, the rates of filled vacancy of flight crew as of the end of March 1941 were re-
spectively 80% and 70% for pilots and reconnaissance staff. These numbers included a large
number of fledgling crew, who had just finished [flying training].(51) The rate of filled vacancy
of specially-trained mechanics was 74% until the end of March 1941.(51)
Although the rates of filled vacancy were improved in the autumn of 1941, there was a
great shortage in personnel skilled enough to be assigned to the immediate operations, es-
pecially to aircraft carriers, due to the [particular] increase in the number of younger crew
[on one hand] and the rapid increase in the number of aircraft carriers [on the other].
Such being the case, the meeting of the Navy General Staff and the Combined Fleet de-
cided the following:(35)
1. Skilled members among the flight crew of the 3d and the 4th Carrier Divisions shall [be re-
moved to] replenish the 1st and the 2d Carrier Divisions (main aircraft carrier unit), so as to
prevent a deterioration in skills which may be caused by the increase in the regular number
[of crew] due to the wartime shift.
2. [The flight crew of] each ship of the 5th Carrier Division ([consisting of] newly built vessels)
shall be replenished with teachers, instructors and the cadre crew of air training units and
homeland units. For that purpose,
(1) The number of students and trainees assigned to a teacher or an instructor shall be in-
creased.
(2) Training of unskilled flight crew shall be conducted in the units engaged in battles out-
side [Japan].
3. It cannot be helped to reduce the rate of [flight] crew assigned to the fleets. ([In such a case,]
the reserve flight crew shall [first] be reduced.)
4. No replenishment may be required for the 3d and the 4th Carrier Divisions (small aircraft
carriers).
5. No reinforcement shall be made to the Eleventh Air Fleet. Consequently, a large number of
unskilled flight crew was assigned to the Eleventh Air Fleet, [consisting of] land-based air
units, which also incurred the responsibility for their training.
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Chapter IV Progress in the Preparations for the
Invasion of the Dutch East Indies
(See Attached Illustration No.1) [Omitted]
1. Smooth Progress in the Stage-One, Phase-One Operations
Success in the Leadoff Operations on the First Day of the Opening of
Hostilities
The first action in the Greater East Asia War was initiated in Kota Bharu in the Malayaarea. Right before 0000 on 8 December, the main force of the 1st Escort Unit of theMalaya Unit ([consisting of] one light cruiser and four destroyers of the 3d Destroyer
Squadron as the core) escorted three transport ships of the Army Takumi Detachment and
entered the roadstead off Kota Bharu at the northern end of the British part of the Malay
Peninsula, from where the Army unit started landing from 0215 onwards. From the land
fierce counterattacks were immediately made against these landings. These were the first
hostilities in the Greater East Asia War. The Kota Bharu unit, while continuing its landing
operation, [also] came under repeated attacks of several enemy aircraft from around 0330
onwards.
Meanwhile, the Navy’s Carrier Task Force ([consisting of] six aircraft carriers as the core)
reached the waters about 200 nautical miles north of Hawaii at 0100 on that day and launched
the first attack unit consisting of 180 carrier-based aircraft. These rushed into the skies over
Pearl Harbor at 0320, carrying out strikes on the main force of the U.S. Pacific Fleet anchored
there. It was a perfectly successful surprise attack.
At 0600 on the same day, IGHQ announced: “Today, the 8th, before dawn, the Imperial
[Japanese] Army and Navy entered a state of war with U.S. and British forces in the western
Pacific.”
The other engagements on 8 December are in outline as follows:
1. The 5th Division that was to land in the Singora and Pattani areas in Malaya entered the an-
chorage at 0035 and successfully landed in Singora and Pattani respectively at 0410 and 0430.
2. At 0515 the Navy dispatched a bearer of a flag of truce to the U.S. and British gunboats in Shang-
hai to demand their surrender. Whereas USS Wake surrendered, HMS Peterel opened fire at 0530.
The Navy unit sank the latter at 0605.
3. Thirty-two land-based attack planes of the Navy Mihoro Air Group of the 22d Air Flotilla de-
parted from Thủ Dầu Một in French Indochina at 0015 and carried out air strikes on airfields
and military facilities in Singapore from 0530 to 0545.
4. The special landing force of the 2d Base Force came ashore on Batan Island in the Philippines at
0730 and seized the airfield.
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5. A combined force of about 160 fighter planes and bombers of the Army Third Air Force departed
from air bases in southern French Indochina around 0630 and carried out air strikes on the Kota
Bharu sector in full force (and the Kedah sector with one element) around 0800.
6. Twenty-two carrier aircraft of the 4th Carrier Division departed at 0545 and carried out air strikes
on the airfield in Davao and the auxiliary seaplane tender USS William B. Preston between 0746
and 0843.
7. Five reconnaissance seaplanes of the 18th Air Group of the Fourth Fleet departed from Saipan
at 0645 and carried out air strikes on Guam.
8. The 2d Escort Unit, which escorted the Uno Detachment of the Fifteenth Army, put the latter
ashore north of Nakhon (included) on the Malay Peninsula at 1000.
9. Thirty-four land-based attack planes of the Chitose Air Group of the Fourth Fleet departed from
Roi (note: [in the] northern part of the Marshall Islands) at 0510, and bombed Wake Island at
1010. 
10. Eighteen heavy bombers and twenty-five light bombers of the Army Fifth Air Force departed
from southern Taiwan between 0620 and 0730, and conducted a bombing raid on Tuguegarao
and Baguio in the northern Philippines around 0930.
11. The Navy Special Landing Force at Shanghai started the seizure of the International Settlement
([particularly] the U.S. and British [concessions]) at 1100. 
12. 106 Land-based attack planes and 85 fighter planes of the Eleventh Air Fleet departed from
southern Taiwan between 0920 and 1030, and conducted an attack on the Clarke and Iba [air-
fields] on the Philippines respectively at 1332 and 1345.
All of these leadoff strikes were a big success. Particularly, the air strikes on Hawaii, on which
the Navy had staked the success or failure of the first engagements, achieved a tremendous
success. In two [waves of] strikes, [the Navy] dealt a devastating blow to the main force of
the U.S. Pacific Fleet only at the cost of twenty-nine aircraft. However, as none of the U.S.
carriers were in port in Pearl Harbor [at that time], the Navy missed the opportunity of de-
stroying them. Also, in the Malaya area, Japanese forces were able to secure a beachhead in
Kota Bharu, which had been regarded as extremely difficult, and completed the landing op-
erations in the Pattani and the Singora sectors in southern Thailand, meeting almost no re-
sistance. In the Philippines area, naval air groups reported military gains of bringing down
or destroying ninety or more [enemy] aircraft with the attack on the Clarke and Iba airfields.
Also, Army air units reported military gains of bringing down or destroying about fifty
enemy aircraft in the attack on British air force bases in the Kota Bharu sector (and partly in
the Kedah sector) in the Malaya area.
In the Thailand area, the Imperial Guard Division, which had been standing by at the bor-
der between Thailand and French Indochina, departed from the border at 0700 on the 8th to
launch its advance into Thailand. The Yoshida Detachment of the Fifteenth Army, which had
been standing by on Phú Quốc Island, also reached [the waters] south of Bangkok before
dawn of the 8th, and started landing. The negotiations concerning the stationing of Japanese
forces in Thailand had been delayed due to the absence of Prime Minister [Luang] Pibul-
songgram, and the advance was made before the negotiations had reached an agreement,
which led to conflicts with the Royal Thai Army at a few places. However, Thailand soon
took steps to stop the resistance, and after the negotiations reached an agreement at 1200,
the advance was implemented without problems.
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Satisfactory Progress Seen also in the Operations in Malaya and Northern
Borneo
The surprise landings on Malaya on the first day of the opening of hostilities had been suc-
cessful, and it was [also] judged that the air campaign of the Army air units against the enemy
air power in northern Malaya had destroyed on the whole the greater part of the British air
forces in the space of two days, the 8th and the 9th. During this period, other than a few at-
tacks by [enemy] aircraft and several counterattacks by [enemy] submarines, there was no
noteworthy resistance, and the operations progressed satisfactorily.
On the afternoon of 9 December, submarine(s) deployed at sea on the east coast of the
Malay Peninsula noticed two [enemy] battleships and some destroyers sailing north, but due
to bad weather, it was impossible to attack them on that day. On the afternoon of the next
day, the 10th, about eighty Navy land-based attack planes attacked them, and sank the bat-
tleships HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse, the main force of the British Fleet in the East
(the sea battle off Malaya).
On 10 December, the head unit of the 5th Division, which had landed in the vicinity of
Singora, destroyed the British army [there], broke through the border between Thailand and
Malaya, continued its bold charge, and as early as on 26 December, seized Ipoh, a strategic
location in central Malaya. Meanwhile, after breaking through Terengganu on the 23d, the
Takumi Detachment in the Kota Bharu sector closed in on Kwantan. In the meantime, on 26
December, the 1st Escort Unit of the Malaya Unit escorted the army units of the second [wave
of] landings and put them ashore at Singora and other areas. The units of the second wave,
following after the units of the first wave, advanced southward.
While carrying out air campaigns and providing support for the ground operations in
northern and central Malaya, the Army Third Air Force advanced its main force to Sungai
Petani in northern Malaya around the 20th.
Meanwhile in the Burma region, one element of the Army Third Air Force advanced to
Bangkok on the 10th, and launched air strikes against southern Burma, such as Victoria Point
[Kawthaung], etc. In the meantime, the Uno Detachment, which had landed in southern Thai-
land, captured Victoria Point on the 14th, while the air units carried out air raids on Rangoon
with a massive strength both on 23 and 25 December. 
In the northern Borneo region, in parallel with the second landings in the Malaya area,
the Kawaguchi Detachment of the Army, a naval special landing force and a construction
squad landed in Miri on the 16th and in Kuching on the 24th of December under the escort
of the 2d Escort Unit of the Malaya Unit. In this operation, three destroyers were sunk and
several transport ships were damaged by air raids of the enemy and torpedo attacks by
enemy submarines. The landing units captured Kuching on the 25th, and started preparations
to advance the main force of the naval land-based air units, while one element of the air units,
which had advanced to Miri on the 22d, carried out an air strike on Tarakan on the 26th for
the first time.
Gaining Command of the Air in the Philippines Area and the Rapid 
Advance of the Ground Units
The air campaign to destroy the enemy air power in Luzon [conducted by] the naval land-
based air units as the main force had been continued since 8 December, employing a massive
strength, and as early as on the 13th, they had already destroyed the greater part of the U.S.
air units. 
In parallel with this air campaign, the Army advance units and the naval special landing
forces seized key locations such as Batan Island on the 8th, and Aparri and Vigan on the 10th
under the escort of the surface vessels of the Navy Philippines Unit and with the support of
the air units of the Army and the Navy, which [enabled] the advance of the Army Fifth Air
Force [to the area]. On the 12th, Legaspi at the southeastern tip of Luzon was seized in a sud-
den attack, which enabled an element of the Navy land-based air units to advance and launch
their air campaign against the enemy air power in central Luzon. On the 20th, the [Navy]
Philippines Unit captured Davao, a strategic location in the southern Philippines. (Although
the landing in Davao was at first scheduled for 14 December, it was postponed until the 22d,
due to the appearance of the British state-of-the-art battleships, which led the Southern Task
Force on 28 November to concentrate its air and naval forces on that sector. However, because
of the sinking of [both battleships] in the sea battle off Malaya, as well as the military gains
in the air campaign to destroy the enemy air power in the Philippines right at the outset of
the war, and the less-than-expected resistance of the enemy, it was judged advantageous to
move up the date of the landing. On 15 December, in an arrangement between the Army and
the Navy on site, it was moved up by two days to 20 December.)
Following [the above], the main force of the Fourteenth Army was put ashore at Lingayen
Gulf and at Lamon Bay respectively on the 22d and the 24th. On the 25th, the [Navy] Philip-
pines Unit captured Jolo, (which was [originally] scheduled for the 21st but postponed in
line with the postponement of the capture of Davao). With the capture of Davao and Jolo,
the footholds were secured, from where the subsequent Dutch East Indies operation should
be launched. The main force of the Fourteenth Army, which had landed at Lingayen Gulf
and Lamon Bay, made a pincer attack on the U.S.-Filipino Army from the north and the east,
and charged toward Manila (which was seized on 2 January).
Against these multiple landing operations, no surface war vessels of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet
showed up, apart from some active counterattacks conducted by submarines. The fleet was
considered to have escaped to the Dutch East Indies and northern Australia.
In the meantime, the Navy land-based air units with their bases in Taiwan, which had
continued air raids on the Manila Bay areas as well as on the central Philippines, started ad-
vancing their forces to Davao and Jolo respectively on 22 and 26 December to launch recon-
naissance and air strikes on Tarakan and Menado.
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2. The Bulk of the [Navy] Philippines Unit is Shifted to the
Dutch East Indies Unit
The Shift to the Phase-Two Disposition of Forces
Combined Fleet Commander in Chief Admiral Yamamoto, who judged that the landings of
the main force of the Army unit for capturing the Philippines were completed, issued an
order to shift to phase-two operations at 1200 on 26 December.(53) The [new] distribution of
forces of the Southern Task Force in this order was roughly as in the following table. Except
for an element of the Third Fleet, the bulk of the [Navy] Philippines Unit was shifted to the
Dutch East Indies Unit.(47)
The main force of the Southern Task Force was further divided into the following units:
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Name of Unit Commander Forces
Main Body of the 
Southern Task Force
4th Cruiser Div (minus the Chōkai), 3d Battleship Div 2d
Section, 4th Carrier Div (minus 2d Section), 4th De-














One element of the 3d Fleet
The Dutch East Indies Unit
Bulk of 3d Fleet, 5th Cruiser Div, 2d Destroyer Sqdn
(minus 8th and 18th Destroyer Divs), 4th Destroyer Sqdn
(minus 4th Destroyer Div), 11th Seaplane Tender Div, 1st







Southern Expeditionary Fleet, the Chōkai, 7th Cruiser
Div, 3d and 5th Destroyer Sqdns, 8th Destroyer Div, 4th
Submarine Sqdn, 17th Minelayer Div 2d Section, 22d Air
Flotilla, main body of Kanoya Air Gp, Yamada Unit, 12th
Seaplane Tender Div (minus the San’yō-maru), 2d Yoko-
suka SLF, 4th Construction Squad, 11th* Submarine Base
Unit
Air Unit Cdr in chief,11th Air Fleet
11th Air Fleet (minus 22d Air Flotilla, main body of
Kanoya Air Gp, 36 carrier-based fighter planes and 6
land-based reconnaissance planes), 2 SLFs
Submarine Unit Cdr, 5th Sub-marine Sqdn 5th and 6th Submarine Sqdns
Name of Unit Commander Forces
Main Unit Under direct command of cdr inchief, 2d Fleet
4th Cruiser Div 1st Section, the Kongō, 4th
Destroyer Div
Eastern Support Unit Capt of the Haruna The Haruna, the Maya, 6th Destroyer Div 1stSection
* The text mistakenly has 111th.
Notes:
1. The 4th Carrier Division was temporarily put under the command [of the main body of the Southern
Task Force] to be [further] transferred to the Malaya Unit, and therefore not included in this distribution
of forces.
2. [Concerns abbreviations in Japanese, irrelevant to the translation: Omitted by the editor.]
The Situation of the Navy Southern Task Force
The movements of each unit around 26 December were as follows:
1. The Dutch East Indies Unit (as in the following table)
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Name of Unit Whereabouts Movements
3d Fleet HQ; 16th Cruiser Div Magong
Returned to Magong on 23d December after support-
ing the Luzon invasion operations; is preparing for the
next operations
17th Minelayer Div 1st Section Palau
Returned to Palau on 11 December after implementing
offensive mining operations in the waterways east of
the Philippines; is protecting maritime transport routes
between Davao, Legaspi and Palau
San’yō-maru Gaoxiong Aircraft unit returned to Donggang on 25 Decemberafter participating in the Lingayen landing operations




Are guarding Jolo after engaging in the operation to
capture Jolo
16th Destroyer
Div 2d Section Davao







Left Lamon Bay on 26 December for Palau after com-












Left Lamon Bay on 26 December for Palau after com-







Due to arrive in Davao on 27 December, leaving Jolo
on 26th, after providing guard for the landing [opera-





Left Lamon Bay on 26 December for Palau after com-
pleting the operation in Lamon Bay
2. The Air Unit







Is guarding the anchorage in Lamon Bay with the main
force, while setting up defense facilities at Davao with
one element
2d Base Force
Main Force Lingayen Gulf Is guarding the anchorage in Lingayen Gulf
Sanuki-maru Gaoxiong Aircraft units returned to Donggang from Vigan on the25th
1st Patrol Boat Div Palau, etc.
Is guarding anchorage(s) or [returned] to Palau, after
engaging in operations in Lamon Bay, Legaspi and
Jolo; one element is guarding the Chitose and the
Mizuho





The main force is standing by in Palau; one element is









Landed in Davao on 20 December; is setting up air
field(s)
3d Construction












Due to arrive in Palau on 28 December
Name of Unit Whereabouts Movements
11th Air Fleet HQ Gaoxiong Is directing the operations
21st Air Flotilla
HQ Palau ([shift-ing] to Davao)
[Shifted] from Tainan to Palau on 19 December, and






25* Type–1 land-based attack planes [flew] from
Taizhong to Peleliu on 18 December, 10 [of which] will
[shift] to Davao on 28 December
1st Air Gp Tainan
Cancelled its advance of 39 Type–96 land-based attack
planes to Jolo; leaves it with no immediate advance
scheduled
1001 Unit Jiayi 28 Type–96 transport planes
* The number given in Illustration No. 1, p. 102, is 27.
3. The Philippines Unit
4. The Submarine Unit









Left Gaoxiong for Davao on 26 December
3d Yokosuka






18 flying boats [shifted] from Palau to Davao between
22-25 December
23d Air Flotilla
HQ Gaoxiong Is directing operations
Takao Air Gp Gaoxiong 61 Type–1 land-based attack planes
Tainan Air Gp Tainan
Of 25 Type–0 fighter planes, 2 land-based reconnais-
sance planes and a few Type–96 fighter planes about
half were advanced to Legaspi on 14 December, [the
other] half were advanced to Jolo on 25 December
3d Air Gp Gaoxiong
Of 31 Type–0 fighter planes, 4 land-based reconnais-
sance planes and a few Type–96 fighter planes about
two-thirds were [advanced] to Davao between 23-25
December
32d Special Base Force Davao Landed in Davao on 20 December; is guarding theplace




1st Gunboat Div left Lamon Bay for Palau on 26 De-
cember; the rest is guarding Lamon Bay












3 submarines are assembling in Davao; 1 submarine
off Manila
Submarine Unit B
Yura Heading forCam Ranh Bay







4 submarines are assembling in Cam Ranh Bay; 2 sub-
marines are under repair in Kobe
5. The Main Body of the Southern Task Force
The Situation of the Army Units
3. Assessment of the Enemy Situation in the Dutch East Indies
Area at the Launch of Phase-Two Operations
On 26 December, the shift to phase-two dispositions was put into effect. V. Adm. Takahashi
Ibō, commander of the [Navy] Philippines Unit until that time, became the Dutch East Indies
Unit commander, while the bulk of the Philippines Unit was shifted to the Dutch East Indies
Unit. In the meantime, the Air Unit had also advanced its forces to the Davao – Jolo line in
the southern Philippines and was making preparations to launch the Dutch East Indies op-
eration, while clearing remnants of the enemy in the Philippines. On 29 December, Southern
Task Force Commander V. Adm. Kondō Nobutake held a meeting with Commander in Chief
of the Southern Army General Terauchi Hisaichi at Cam Ranh Bay and agreed upon a major
moving-up of the schedule of the coming operations (which will be explained later in detail),
while dated on the same day, the Dutch East Indies Unit issued Operation Order No. 1* con-
cerning the invasion of the Dutch East Indies. In this period, Dutch East Indies Commander
Vice Admiral Takahashi’s assessment of the enemy situation was in outline as follows:(47)
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Main Unit Cam Ranh Bay Arrived in Cam Ranh Bay on 24 December, after sup-porting the Lingayen Gulf landing operation
Eastern Support Unit Magong Arrived in Magong on 23 December, after supportingthe Lingayen Gulf landing operation
4th Carrier Div Palau Arrived in Palau on 26 December, after supporting theoperation in Jolo
8th Destroyer Div Magong Temporarily transferred to the Malaya Unit
16th Army HQ Tokyo
Is engaged in gathering information, studying the op-
eration plan and taking command of its [subordinate]
units






Landed in Davao with its main force on 20 December;
[the unit] is mopping up the enemy in the vicinity
38th Div Hong Kong Is engaged in the Hong Kong operation; it captured thecity on 25 December
48th Div Luzon Landed at Lingayen Gulf on 22 December; is advanc-ing to Manila
* Apparently a mistake for Dutch East Indies (Philippines) Unit Order Classified No. 3. See p. 94.
Air power
1. It seems that although most of the U.S. air power in the Philippines was destroyed, an element
escaped to the Dutch East Indies and is planning a counterattack along with British and Dutch
air forces.
2. The Dutch East Indies air force is estimated roughly as follows. The force seems to conduct air
campaigns using Ambon, Kendari, Balikpapan and Sorong as first line concentration bases, and
Menado, Gorontalo, Ternate and Tarakan as the relay bases.
(1) Army aircraft
Bombers: Glenn L. Martin, Lockheed, etc. 90 – 100 aircraft
Fighter planes: Curtiss Hawk, etc. 90 – 100 aircraft
Patrol bombers: Douglas, etc. 20 – 25 aircraft
Training aircraft 70 – 80 aircraft
In total: 270 – 305 aircraft 
(2) Navy aircraft
Flying boats: PBY, Dornier, etc. 40 – 60 aircraft
Reconnaissance seaplanes and attack planes: Dornier, Fokker 25 – 50 aircraft
Training aircraft 20 – 25 aircraft
In total: 85 – 135 aircraft
Grand total: 355 – 440 aircraft
First line aircraft in the above: 265 – 335 aircraft
3. It seems that about 100 aircraft of the Australian air force have advanced to Ambon and Ku-
pang.
Naval forces
1. Almost all of the U.S. Pacific Fleet was destroyed in the strike against Hawaii at the beginning
of the hostilities, and it is for the time being unlikely that the fleet will carry out a transoceanic
attack with its main force.
2. Although the situation of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet from the time of the opening of hostilities is un-
clear, it is more or less certain that it has already escaped to Celebes and further south.
3. Although the situation of the British fleet in the East after the complete destruction of its main
force is also unclear, it is highly likely that in the days ahead the U.S. and British fleets in the
East will put up defensive battles mainly in the waters of the Dutch East Indies and Australia,
in league with the Dutch East Indies fleet.
4. The strength of the Dutch East Indies fleet is estimated as follows: 2 light cruisers, 8 destroyers,
15-19 submarines, 3 gunboats or coastal defense ships, 6 minelayers, 8 minesweepers, 7 torpedo
boats and 32 other ships
5. Surface war vessels of the enemy sometimes appear at Tarakan, Menado, Sorong and other
places.
6. Although some of the U.S., British and Dutch submarines have already been lost, a major part
of the strength still infests all areas. It is anticipated that in the days ahead more and more will
go into action particularly in the Dutch East Indies waters. It seems that the enemy submarines
are concentrated outside Davao Gulf and in the southern part of the Celebes Sea, which led to
frequent alarms given against them.
7. In view of the geographical features and the armaments of the Dutch East Indies, it is required
to be on the alert against enemy mines [particularly] in the Java Sea as well as in the southern
part of the South China Sea.
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Ground forces
1. The Dutch East Indies Army is [estimated at] about 100,000 men in total, consisting of about
75,000 men of the regular army and 25,000 men of the voluntary army and the police force; the
total mobilizable force is assumed to be 120,000 men.
2. It appears that of the ground forces the main force (about 60,000 men) is stationed in Java, while
the forces, which we face at each of the key locations in the eastern part of the Dutch East Indies,
are deployed in the following way:
Tarakan 3,000 Menado 2,500
Ternate 200 Balikpapan 1,500
Kendari 150 Makassar 1,500
Banjarmasin 1,000 Ambon 1,200
Kupang 350
3. There are about 900 Australian troops in Ambon.
4. Conclusion of the Army-Navy Agreement for the Java 
Invasion [Operation]
The First [Scheduled] Army-Navy Meeting is Moved up
None of the documents regarding the Central Agreement of 5 November that specified the
details of the operation schedule are extant. However, according to documents related to the
agreement,(54) it seems that IGHQ planned to aim at landing on the island of Java roughly
around Day X + 100 (18 March) and completing the southern operation by Day X + 120, that
is, in about four months from the launch of operations. As a matter of fact, it would have
suited both the Army and the Navy if [the operation] were completed sooner. However, in
view of the [available] shipping tonnage of the transport ships carrying the invasion units,
the shipping operations, the tempo of advancing the air bases, and the distribution of vessels
for escorting, etc., [both the Army and the Navy] for the moment set the target [date] at four
months [from the launch of the operations].
However, Southern Army headquarters, which was most keen on shortening the schedule
of the southern operation, strongly insisted at the Tokyo Agreement [conference] on an agree-
ment to complete the operations in about three months, shortening the period in the plan
drawn up by IGHQ by about one month.(34) The Navy, being in charge of implementing the
air operations as well as the escort operations, was of the opinion that that plan was not fea-
sible, and that an allowance of at least one month should absolutely be taken into account.(11)
Also, the Army Department of IGHQ did not entirely agree to the [Southern Army’s] plan
[to complete the operation] in three months, mainly in terms of the [available] shipping ton-
nage of transport ships. However, in the end, owing to the strong insistence of the Southern
Army headquarters, it was agreed to set [the scheduled date of] the landing on Java on “by
and large around Day X + 80” (26 February) in the Tokyo Agreement, and to strive to realize
this as the target date. That line was taken in the Iwakuni Agreement as well and agreed to
in the same way.(34)
However, as the progress in the initial stages of the war was better than expected, the
Southern Army headquarters judged it advantageous to make use of the war momentum
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and direct the operations on the concept of a strategic pursuit. Accordingly, at its staff meeting
on 20 December, it decided on a plan to advance [the starting date of] the Java landing [op-
eration] by ten days to Day X + 70 (16 February; and set the [date of] completion of the op-
eration on Day X + 90). It wired this proposal to [the Army Department of] IGHQ and also
informed the Navy side of its intentions.(30)
Just then on the next day, 21 December, Hattori Takushirō, chief of the Operations Section
of the Office of Army General Staff [who also belonged to the Army Department of IGHQ],
and his party arrived on site [Saigon]. The Southern Army headquarters explained the plan
to shorten the schedule with the proviso that in order to execute it a further increase in the
allotment of ships to the Southern Army by about 150,000 tons was required. Agreeing to
the plan, Section Chief Hattori personally sent a telegram to [the Army Department of] IGHQ.
Based on the proposal of the Southern Army, [the Army Department of] IGHQ held meetings
with the Navy and also examined [the possibility of] increasing the shipping tonnage. How-
ever in the end, on 27 December, it replied to the Southern Army that an increase in tonnage
was simply impossible.(40) Having no other choice, the Southern Army headquarters studied
the means to shorten the [invasion] schedule by using [just] the ships it had under its control
at that time (though loss would be replenished). After changing parts of the plan in such a
way that the forces taking part in the Sixteenth Army be reduced to some extent and that the
shift and transfer of [other] forces be avoided as much as possible, [the Southern Army] ten-
tatively drew up a final draft.(30)
In the meantime, problems that needed to be discussed by the Army and Navy command-
ers were piling up also on the Navy side, including the situation of recent enemy reinforce-
ments brought up from Australia (mainly by way of Port Darwin), [which led the Navy to
think that] it was urgently necessary to swiftly seize the Ambon – Kupang line. Consequently,
without waiting until the scheduled date of the first [Army-Navy] meeting which was set
on Day X + 40 (17 January) in the Tokyo Agreement, the Southern Army and the Navy South-
ern Task Force summoned the staff officers of the relevant units under their command to
Cam Ranh Bay on 29 December, to discuss matters on the flagship of the Second Fleet Atago,
which had anchored in the bay. This was the Cam Ranh Agreement [conference].
Conclusion of the Cam Ranh Agreement and the Shortening of the Invasion
Schedule
The Cam Ranh Agreement [conference] was held on the Atago on 29 December, and on 1 Jan-
uary 1942, the agreement was signed. Firstly, prior to the conclusion of the agreement, the
operational directives for the southern operation from that time onwards were discussed and
decided upon as follows:(30, 33, 34, 40, 62)
1. [The schedule of] the Dutch East Indies operation shall further be advanced from that in the
former plan, and [the operation] shall be completed in three months from the opening of hos-
tilities. That is, the Java landing [operation] shall be launched on Day X + 70 (16 February).
2. [The schedule of] the capture of Singapore shall [also] be moved up by about one month from
the anticipated date in the former plan, which was about the 100th day from the opening of hos-
tilities. [In the new plan], the fall [of the city] is expected in the beginning of February.
3. Prior to the landing on Java, Bangka and Palembang shall be seized after bypassing Singapore
as swiftly as possible.
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4. The time to capture Ambon and Kupang shall be fixed and moved up; it shall be carried out in
parallel with the capture of Celebes. 
5. Taking advantage of the current war situation, the Burma operation shall be pushed forward
and intensified; the northern Sumatra invasion operation shall be implemented after the fall of
Singapore.
6. The starting point of the operations to seize Tarakan, Menado and Ambon shall be changed
from Palau to Davao.
7. The Army’s plan for operating its units
(1) Although at first the plan was to allot four divisions to the Malay Peninsula and Singapore
operations, three divisions are sufficient [to do the job]. So, the diversion of the 56th Division
to the Burma theater must be considered. 
(2) The capture of Ambon and Kupang shall be assigned to Detachment B ([consisting of] three
battalions of the 38th Division), which shall be extracted from [the unit in] Hong Kong. The
South Seas Detachment (which was scheduled to join the Dutch East Indies operation after
capturing Guam and Rabaul) shall henceforth not be employed for the southwestern theater.
(3) At the request of the Navy, the Kawaguchi Detachment shall carry out the [operation to]
capture Ledo (which shall be explained later).
(4) Due to the [shortage of] shipping tonnage, the force of the Sixteenth Army for the Java in-
vasion [operation] shall be slightly reduced.
8. The Navy’s plan for operating its units concerned
(1) The 2d Carrier Division ([consisting of] two aircraft carriers as the core) shall be employed
from the time of the Ambon operation; the redeployment of the main force of the Carrier
Task Force to the southern theater shall be considered at the time of invasion of Java.
(2) As the Ledo airfield, which was lately spotted, is essential for the operation against the Dutch
East Indies, it is hoped that an Army unit shall swiftly seize it.
(3) A submarine base shall be set up at Penang ([off] the northwestern coast of Malaya) for op-
erations in the Indian Ocean.
(4) In order to bring the Malacca Strait under control, one element of the land-based air units
shall be advanced to the Malay Peninsula.
(5) After the capture of southern Sumatra, naval air units shall advance there in order to conduct
the air campaign against Java and to cut off Malaya from its rear.
In accordance with the above general operational directives, the agreement was concluded
in outline as follows:(34, 62)
1. Standard dates [to implement] the invasion [operations]
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Date of the start of
the landings
Key areas to capture
(*stands for the areas
which the Navy will cap-
ture unassisted)
Assembly Point Commanders to conclude the arrange-ments
Day X + 33 (10 Jan) *Menado and Tarakan,and vicinities Davao or Jolo
Cdr in chief 3d Fleet and 16th Army CdrDay X + 43 (20 Jan) *Kendari and Balikpapan,and vicinities
Menado and
Tarakan
Day X + 48 (25 Jan) Ambon Davao
2. The Army convoys to be directly escorted by the Navy
Sakaguchi Det (about 10 ships) Davao–Tarakan–Balikpapan–Banjarmasin
Det B (about 7 ships) Hong Kong–Davao–Ambon–Kupang
Main force of the 38th Div (about 18 ships) Hong Kong–Cam Ranh Bay–Bangka
Main force of the 16th Army (about 50 ships) Gaoxiong–Cam Ranh Bay–western Java
48th Div (about 50 ships) Manila–Menado–eastern Java
The characteristics of this agreement were as follows:
1. Comparison of the dates [to implement] the invasion [operations] (as in the following
table):
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Day X + 53 (30 Jan) *Makassar and Banjar-masin, and vicinities
Kendari and 
Balikpapan
Roughly Day X + 60
(6 Feb)
Bangka and Palembang
[and vicinities] Cam Ranh
Cdr in chief Southern Expeditionary Fleet
and 16th Army Cdr
Roughly Day X + 65
(11 Feb) Kupang Ambon Cdr in chief 3d Fleet and 16th Army Cdr







Roughly Day X + 80
(26 Feb) Northern Sumatra Penang
Cdr in chief Southern Expeditionary Fleet
and 25th Army Cdr
[Particulars for] other [targets] shall be decided on in arrangements [between] the highest commanders of the
















Day X + 33
1. As Davao and Jolo were captured behind schedule,
the launch of the Tarakan and the Menado opera-
tions were put off for some days so as to be
launched on the same day. After that, the operations
in eastern Borneo and eastern Celebes shall be car-
ried out in parallel, and the simultaneous advance
on the line connecting Banjarmasin and Makassar
shall be made 17 days before the landing on Java.
2. The Army was not so willing to advance [the date
of] the Ambon invasion [operation], and had in
mind that it should be launched around Day X + 60,
as in the Iwakuni Agreement. However, [the Army]
was persuaded by the Navy, [which insisted on]
Tarakan [By] aroundDay X + 25 Day X + 30 Day X + 33
Kendari AroundDay X + 35 Day X + 43
2. Employment of the units
(1) It seems that the employment of the Navy 1001 Unit (a paratrooper unit) was not yet de-
cided.(47)
(2) The plan was that the capture of Ambon and Kupang should be carried out with Detachment
B for the Army, while [the Navy] would redeploy the 1st Kure Special Landing Force, which
was then in Legaspi (in the Philippines). Although the strength of the Detachment B was
decided on as two battalions as the core in the Iwakuni Agreement, it was further increased
by one battalion in view of the latest enemy movements.(30, 34)
(3) Although the employment of the aircraft carrier unit was not yet decided except for the 2d
Carrier Division’s participation in [the operation to] capture Ambon, it seems to have been
under consideration to employ [the aircraft carrier unit] at the time of the Java invasion op-
eration.(30, 40)
3. Changes in the assembly points
Although the assembly points of the units to capture Tarakan, Menado and Ambon were all
designated as Palau in the Tokyo Agreement and the Iwakuni Agreement, they were changed
to Davao in this agreement. It was because Davao was more advantageous in terms of geogra-
phy and the capacity of its base.(11, 34)
Chapter IV     /     Progress in the Preparations for the Invasion of the 93
Dutch East Indies
Balikpapan AroundDay X + 35 Day X + 35 Day X + 43
moving up [the schedule], and the date was set on
Day X + 48.(30)
3. Because of the advance of [the operation to] capture
Java, [the need of] the operation to capture Bali
[first] automatically disappeared.
4. The Army insisted that the capture of Bangka and
Palembang [should be scheduled] 20 days before
the Java operation (i.e. Day X + 50), as an important
stepping stone before the landing [operation] in
western* Java, without waiting for the capture of
Singapore. However, due to the availability of es-
cort forces and the preparation of air bases of the
Navy, it was set on Day X + 60.






Day X + 54 Day X + 53
Ambon By aroundDay X + 60 Day X + 60 Day X + 48
Kupang By aroundDay X + 60
Roughly
Day X+ 65


















* The text mistakenly has eastern Java.
5. Issuing the Phase-Two Plan of Operations, etc.
The Southern Task Force
On the verge of phase-two operations, Southern Task Force Commander Vice Admiral Kondō
transmitted by telegram the mission of the Dutch East Indies operation and the immediate
operational directives, which were in summary as follows:(62)
1. The order to [shift to] the phase-two disposition of forces and the operational directives
At 1200 on 26 December, the Southern Task Force issued the order to put in motion [the shift to]
the phase-two disposition of forces by Telegraphic Order No. 35. It gave official notice of the
[new] disposition of forces and disclosed the tasks of each unit.
2. The orders for the mission of the submarine operations and the setting-up of a submarine base
The order was issued to incorporate the 11th Submarine Base Unit, which had been transferred
to the Southern Task Force on 27 December, into the Malaya Unit, to set up a submarine base at
Penang ([by] Telegraphic Order No. 39), and to designate the subsequent operational areas of
the three submarine units belonging to the Southern Task Force ([also by] Telegraphic Order
No. 39).
3. Present operational directives for the main body of the Southern Task Force
On 28 December, the Southern Task Force commander issued the order by Telegraphic Order
No. 40, which was in summary as follows:(63)
(1) The Malaya Unit shall leave Magong on 31 December and take charge of escorting the trans-
port of the main force of the Twenty-fifth Army and others scheduled to land in the Singora
and Saigon areas in the beginning of January. The Dutch East Indies Unit shall launch the
scheduled invasion [operations] of the Tarakan and Menado areas around 10 January.
(2– 4) Support for the Malaya operations (Omitted by the author)
(5) The Eastern Support Unit shall leave Magong [at a time] designated by its commander, ad-
vance to [the waters] in between Palau and Mindanao around dawn of 10 January and, after
supporting the operations of Unit H (the unit to conduct the Dutch East Indies operation),
drop anchor at Palau.
(6) The main unit is scheduled to leave Cam Ranh Bay on 9 January and, after replenishing at
Magong, depart on the 14th to advance to Palau.
[With these orders] Vice Admiral Kondō, commander of the Southern Task Force, judging
that the end of the operation in the Malaya area, which he had primarily supported so far,
was now in sight, showed that he meant to shift his position to the support of [the operation
in] the area of the main force of the Dutch East Indies Unit, which was finally about to be
launched. 
The [Navy] Dutch East Indies [Operation] Unit
On 28 December, Dutch East Indies Unit Commander Vice Admiral Takahashi issued the im-
mediate outline of the disposition of forces and the schedule. Following the 29 December
agreement with the Army at Cam Ranh Bay, he issued the operation plan by way of Dutch
East Indies (Philippines) Unit Order Classified No. 3 of the same date. According to the “Mat-
sudaira documents,”(47) the main points were as follows:
Note:
1. It seems that some elements in the last part of this plan are missing [in this document].
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2. It would seem that this document was taken down from a copy of the operation plan of 29 De-
cember that included revisions that had been made by 5 or 6 January. (This is assumed from the
scheduled date to capture Kupang, which was advanced to 5 February from 11 February, as well
as from the allotment of tasks to the 2d Destroyer Squadron and the 1st Base Force.)
1. The situation of enemy and friendly forces
(1) Almost all of the U.S. Pacific Fleet was destroyed in the strike at the beginning of the hostil-
ities, and it is for the time being unlikely that the fleet will carry out a transoceanic attack
with its main force.
(2) It is very likely that in the days ahead the remnants of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet and the British
fleet in the East will put up defensive battles mainly in the waters of the Dutch East Indies
and Australia, in league with the Dutch East Indies fleet.
(3) Although some of the U.S., British and Dutch submarines have already been lost, a major
part [of the strength] still infests all areas. It is anticipated that in the days ahead more and
more will go into action particularly in the Dutch East Indies waters.
(4) It seems that although most of the U.S. air units in the Philippines were destroyed, an ele-
ment escaped to the Dutch East Indies and is planning a counterattack along with British
and Dutch air forces.
(5) In view of the geographical features and the armaments of the Dutch East Indies, it is re-
quired to be on the alert against enemy mines [particularly] in the Java Sea as well as in the
southern part of the South China Sea.
(6) The Air Unit of the Southern Task Force has already advanced a part of its force to Davao
and Jolo, and is conducting operations against Area H (the Dutch East Indies). The deploy-
ment is expected to be completed by around 5 January.
(7) The 2d Carrier Division (consisting of the Sōryū and the Hiryū as its core) is scheduled to be
incorporated into the Air Unit of the Southern Task Force around 16 January.
(8) The 6th Submarine Squadron is conducting operations in Area H, as shown in Separate Il-
lustration No. 2. (No separate illustrations are attached.) 
(9) Our army units invading the Philippines and Malaya are steadily enlarging their military
gains and charging toward Manila and Singapore respectively.
2. Mission
In accordance with the mission [stated] in Philippines Unit Operation Order Classified No.
1, the Dutch East Indies Unit shall, on the one hand, in conjunction with the Air Unit of the
Southern Task Force as well as the Sixteenth Army, first seize Tarakan and Menado, and then
strategic locations on the Makassar Strait, the Moluccas Sea, and the Banda Sea one after an-
other, and push forward its attack, while on the other hand, in cooperation and in concert
with the Southern Expeditionary Fleet and the Malaya Invasion Army, advance the prepa-
rations to encircle Java to swiftly attack Java at the core.
3. Outline of the operation
(1) Especially by maintaining close cooperation and coordination with the friendly air units,
the attack shall be pushed forward after having as far as possible established command of
the air.
(2) Powerful direct escort forces shall be deployed against the enemy’s submarine warfare and
mine warfare, and through a close cooperation of these [escort forces], base units and air
units, it shall be made doubly sure that the surface escort and landing cover will be flawless. 
(3) [Sufficient] escort forces shall be deployed so that those on site will be able to defeat the
enemy surface forces. [They] shall make efforts to catch and destroy the latter in concert with
powerful support units and friendly air units, which will [also] search for the enemy and
attack them.
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(4) The main purpose of the capture of strategic locations in the Dutch East Indies is to neutralize
and seize important enemy air bases with the aim to advance in parallel in the east and the
west roughly according to the following order and schedule:
{1} Eastern side of Celebes and the Banda Sea
[Conducted] by the Navy [unassisted]: Menado (around 10 January) ⟶ Kendari
(around 20 January) ⟶ Makassar (shall be seized at a favorable opportunity between
25 January and 14 February)
[Conducted] independently by the Army: Ambon (around 25 January) ⟶ Kupang
(around 5 February)
{2} The Makassar Strait area and eastern Java 
In conjunction with the Army: Tarakan (around 10 January) ⟶ Balikpapan (around 20
January) ⟶ Banjarmasin (around 30 January) ⟶ Surabaya (around 16 February)
Depending on the situation, Makassar shall be seized around 5 February, and Bali shall
be captured almost simultaneously with the capture of Surabaya in conjunction with the
Army.
{3} Western Java
In conjunction with the Army: Batavia area (around 16 February)
4. The distribution of forces (as shown in the following table)






























4th Destroyer Sqdn (minus 4th Destroyer Div), one element of
2d Base Force, 2d Kure SLF (minus 1 plt), Patrol Boats Nos.
36*, 37, and 38
2d Base
Unit 2d Base Force Cdr Major part of 2d Base Force and the Itsukushima
1st Air Unit Capt of the San’yō-maru
The San’yō-maru, the Sanuki-maru, Patrol Boat No. 39, 1 plt of





5th Destroyer Sqdn, one element of 1st Base Force, one ele-
ment of 2d Base Force (after the 5th Destroyer Sqdn is re-

















2d Destroyer Sqdn (minus 4th** and 18th Destroyer Divs), 1st
Kure SLF (minus one element), Sasebo Combined SLF (minus
2 plts), Patrol Boats Nos. 1, 2, and 34
1st Base
Unit 1st Base Force Cdr One element of 1st Base Force and the Nagara
2d Air Unit 11th Seaplane TenderDiv Cdr
11th Seaplane Tender Div, the Kiku-maru, Patrol Boat, No. 35, 2





32d Special Base Force, 1st Gunboat Div, 51st Subchaser Div, 6





17th Minelayer Div (minus the Itsukushima, and the Tatsumiya-
maru), 3d Gunboat Div, 53d Subchaser Div, the Kuma
Attached Units 1st, 2d, 3d, 5th and 6th Construction Squads, and others
* The text mistakenly has 3, 16.
** Probably a mistake, since a 4th Destroyer Div is also mentioned in the second row, third column.
5. Tasks of each unit 
(1) Main Unit 
Staying on alert in Malalag Bay, it shall make a sortie, depending on the enemy situation, to
Celebes and the Makassar Strait area to mainly cover the Western Attack Unit.
(2) Western Attack Unit 
{1} 1st Escort Unit 
Escorting the Sakaguchi Detachment, it shall leave Davao around 7 January, cast anchor
[off] Tarakan at the waters east of Cape Batu, put ashore the detachment and capture
[the place] in conjunction, secure the air base and advance the air force of the Eleventh
Air Fleet.
[Then] it shall have the 2d Kure Special Landing Force replace the Army Sakaguchi De-
tachment and leave Tarakan around 18 January, escorting the detachment. Having sup-
pressed the [enemy] air power, it shall put the detachment ashore in the Balikpapan area
before dawn around 20 January and in conjunction seize the air base and resource loca-
tions, and then advance the air force of the Eleventh Air Fleet. 
After that, having gained command of the air, it shall leave Balikpapan around 28 Janu-
ary, escorting one element of the Sakaguchi Detachment, enter into Banjarmasin before
dawn around 30 January and seize the enemy air base. During this period, it shall keep
close communication with the 1st Air Unit (seaplane tender unit), clear enemy sub-
marines and prepare against enemy surface forces.
Separate orders shall be given when the cooperation of the 1001 Unit (a paratrooper unit)
is available.
{2} 2d Base Unit
After making arrangements with the 1st Escort Unit commander, it shall incorporate pri-
marily its minesweeper divisions and subchaser* divisions into the 1st Escort Unit for
the period required. The remaining unit shall defend the key locations of Tarakan, Ba-
likpapan and others, while protecting the shipping lanes, as well as escorting and cov-
ering empty Army ships.
{3} 1st Air Unit (a seaplane tender unit)
It shall advance its bases to places where necessary, and cooperate with the 1st Escort
Unit by guarding against [enemy] submarines as well as by supporting the landing at-
tacks.
{4} 3d Escort Unit
After returning to the Dutch East Indies Unit, it shall sail to Gaoxiong, from where it
shall escort the main force of the Sixteenth Army, leaving Gaoxiong (Magong for one el-
ement) on 30 January to head for Cam Ranh Bay. It shall leave the bay on 11 February
and put [the Army unit] ashore in Batavia and vicinity on 16 February. Cooperation by
the force of the Southern Expeditionary Fleet shall be provided for one part [of the op-
eration]. 
(It may [also] escort with one element the ship(s) carrying the 101st Fuel Depot.)
(3) Eastern Attack Unit
{1} Support Unit
While covering and supporting the [operation to] seize Menado, Kendari, Ambon,
Makassar, Kupang, etc. conducted by the Eastern Attack Unit, it shall prepare against
the maneuvers of enemy surface forces from the direction of Australia.
{2} 2d Escort Unit
Leaving Davao on 8 January, it shall seize Menado in a sudden attack before dawn on 10
January, secure and ready the air base to advance the forces of the Eleventh Air Fleet.
Next, it shall have one element participate in a sudden attack on Kendari to be conducted
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* The text mistakenly has destroyer.
before dawn around 20 January under the command of the 1st Base Force commander,
while covering [the operation] with the bulk of its force. After that, the unit shall escort
Army Detachment B to Ambon from Menado (it is supposed to have escorted [the de-
tachment] from Davao to Menado with one element of the 2d Escort Unit [beforehand]
after the seizure of Menado), seize Ambon around 25 January and secure the airfield
[there]. Then, [the unit] shall further escort Detachment B (one element of which shall
be left in Ambon, depending on the situation) and make preparations to seize Kupang
roughly on 5 February in conjunction with the detachment.
While keeping in contact with the 2d Air Unit (seaplane tender unit), the unit shall clear
enemy submarines and prepare against enemy surface forces.
Separate order(s) shall be given when the 1001 Unit is to be employed [in the relevant
operations].
{3} 1st Base Unit
After making arrangements with the 2d Escort Unit commander, it shall incorporate one
element of its minesweeper divisions and subchaser divisions into the 2d Escort Unit for
the period required, while guarding the Bangka anchorage after the capture of Menado.
Then, with the major part of the unit, and also taking command of one element of the 2d
Escort Unit, it shall make a sudden attack on Kendari before dawn on around 20 January
under the cover of the 2d Escort Unit, secure the air base [there] to advance the air forces
of the Eleventh Air Fleet.
After that, it shall take charge of defending key locations and protecting the shipping
lanes, mainly those to Menado.
Depending on the circumstances, it shall seize Makassar.
The incorporation of the minesweeper divisions and subchaser divisions into the 3d Es-
cort Unit at the time of the landing of the main force of the Sixteenth Army shall be
arranged with the 5th Destroyer Squadron commander.
{4} 2d Air Unit (a seaplane tender unit)
It shall advance its bases to the points required and cooperate with the 2d Escort Unit
by guarding against [enemy] submarines and supporting the landing operations.
(4) Eastern Philippines Unit
It shall take charge of guarding key locations such as Davao, Legaspi, Jolo and Malalag, etc.,
protecting the shipping lanes in the east of the Philippines, and replenishing the naval units
operating in the vicinity.
(5) Western Philippines Unit
While guarding Lingayen Gulf to secure the line of communications of the main force of the
Fourteenth Army to its rear, the unit shall, depending on the situation, advance to Manila
Bay to take charge of clearing and defending the bay as well as protecting the shipping lanes
to the west of the Philippines.
This order differed from the outline of the disposition of forces on 28 December and from
the Cam Ranh Agreement on the following points:(47, 53, 62)
1. The differences from the outline of the disposition of forces
Because at the end of December there was advance information that a Third Southern Expedi-
tionary Fleet would be formed in the beginning of January to take charge of the Philippines
area, the disposition of forces was altered in the following way:
(1) The 17th Minelayer Division commander shall be appointed commander of the Western
Philippines Unit. The 17th Minelayer Division (minus the Itsukushima and the Tatsumiya-
maru) shall be added to the unit, and 2d Base Force and one element of the 2d Signal Unit
shall be removed.
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(2) The Itsukushima shall be added to the 2d Base Force, from which the mine-laying unit shall
be removed.
(3) The Kuma shall be removed from the 2d Base Force, and added to the Western Philippines
Unit.
[The change] that the Third Southern Expeditionary Fleet would take over the operations in the
Philippines areas from the Third Fleet was meant to have the latter concentrate on its operations
in the Dutch East Indies. The formation [of the new fleet] was planned as follows: The Kuma
(planned as the flagship), the Yaeyama, the 31st Special Base Force, the 32d Special Base Force,
the 3d Gunboat Division, the 2d Survey Unit, the Kyōdō-maru No. 36.*
For this purpose, the 17th Minelayer Division was disbanded; the commander R. Adm.
Kobayashi Tetsuri and the staff of the division were transferred to the newly formed 31st Special
Base Force and advanced to the Manila area. The Itsukushima and the Tatsumiya-maru of the 17th
Minelayer Division were attached to the Third Fleet, while the Yaeyama was to be incorporated
into the Third Southern Expeditionary Fleet. 
2. The differences from the Cam Ranh Agreement
(1) Whereas in the [Cam Ranh] Agreement, the seizure of Makassar was scheduled for around
30 January with no provisos attached, in this order it was mentioned in one part that
“[Makassar] shall be seized at a favorable opportunity between 25 January and 14 February
by the Navy [unassisted],” and in other parts that “Depending on the situation, Makassar
shall be seized around 5 February, … in conjunction with the Army,” “Depending on the cir-
cumstances, the 1st Base Force shall seize Makassar.” [Consequently, the schedule of] the
seizure [of Makassar] was not clearly designated as 30 January. 
This was because the operations of the Eastern Attack Unit had become very tight due to
the increase of lines of operations from the two that were in the initial plan of the Dutch East
Indies Unit (Tarakan – Balikapan – Banjarmasin, and Menado – Kendari – Makassar) to three
(the Ambon – Kupang line was added). That is to say, the destroyers of the 2d Destroyer
Squadron had to be transferred back and forth between the Squadron and the 1st Base Force
every five days, so as to realize the two lines of attack in the east (Menado on the 10th of
January, Kendari on the 20th, Ambon on the 25th, Makassar on the 30th, and Kupang on the
5th of February), which made it totally impossible to schedule [the operation to seize] Makas-
sar on the 30th.(11)
On top of that, there were two other problems about [the operation to] seize Makassar:
{1} It was quite dangerous to advance from Kendari to Makassar by sailing around the south
of Celebes, because it meant that on their way [the ships] would expose their flank to
Kupang, one of the leading air bases of the enemy at a distance of merely 300 nautical
miles.
{2} Because Makassar was a strategic outpost of Java, it was assumed that the enemy had
also deployed considerably powerful ground forces there. Although it had been decided
to seize this place only with the naval landing forces, there was some concern about the
strength of these landing units, if part of this force was also employed in the Ambon the-
ater.
For these reasons the Dutch East Indies Unit seemed more strongly inclined to seize Kupang
first, rather than Makassar, so that it could go to Makassar after having eliminated the concern
[of being attacked] on its flank. This [feeling] was reflected in the phrase “…at a favorable op-
portunity between 25 January and 14 February…;” while the concern about the shortage of
ground forces was expressed in the part “Depending on the situation, … in conjunction with
the Army.”
In any case, the Dutch East Indies Unit was not sure that it would be able to implement [the
operation to] seize Makassar precisely on 30 January. This was probably why the unit, because
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of the great many uncertain elements, used rather evasive expressions, even though the schedule
of the seizure was decided on in the agreements.
(2) Whereas [the operation to] capture Bali had automatically disappeared in the Cam Ranh
Agreement, this order stated that “Depending on the situation, … Bali shall be captured al-
most simultaneously with the capture of Surabaya” ([the capture of Bali had been scheduled]
ten days prior to the capture of Java in the Iwakuni Agreement).
This reflected the demand of the Eleventh Air Fleet, which wanted to cut off Java from its
rear in a most effective way by capturing Bali with a small unit (of course, solely by the
Navy) simultaneously with [the capture of] Surabaya. Needless to say, since it was a landing
simultaneous with the landing in the Surabaya area, it did not mean that [the Eleventh Air
Fleet] intended to conduct an air campaign to destroy the enemy air power on the main is-
land of Java from Bali.(20, 64)
Although the Dutch East Indies Unit showed little enthusiasm for making a landing just
like that right under the nose of Surabaya, it seems that due to the strong demand of the
Eleventh Air Fleet, it tentatively expressed in the order the possibility of capturing [Bali].(11)
(3) Whereas the capture of Kupang was scheduled for Day X + 65 (11 February) in the Cam
Ranh Agreement, it was [moved up to] 5 February in this order. The reason may be attributed
to the strong desire of the Navy to capture Kupang as soon as possible in order to [safely]
advance to Makassar as well as to neutralize [the threat from] Australia. It seems that because
the Eleventh Air Fleet was particularly adamant about capturing the Ambon – Kupang line,
the Third Fleet as well moved up the date, following the demand [of the Eleventh Air
Fleet].(20) (The change [of schedule] was made around 5-6 January.)
The Air Unit (See Illustration No. 1)
When [the order to shift to] phase-two dispositions was put into effect on 26 December, the
Air Unit of the Southern Task Force, with some elements advancing to Davao and Jolo, were
shifting to their positions for the launch of the Dutch East Indies operation. However, the
condition of the airfields in Davao and Jolo was unexpectedly bad (the ground of [the airfield
in] Davao was soft, and frequent squalls hindered the progress of the rolling of the apron,
while [the airfield in] Jolo had a large inclination and the field undulated),(54) which meant
that the immediate deployment of all forces was impossible. On the other hand, the air op-
erations in the Malaya area had progressed smoothly, and it became unnecessary to conduct
operations from Miri and Kuching ([in] British Borneo) to Malaya. Therefore, on the grounds
that the operation plan needed to be reexamined and the like, the unit obtained the prior ap-
proval of the Combined Fleet and the Second Fleet headquarters and postponed putting in
motion its shift to phase-two dispositions until 2 January.(12)
In the meantime, V. Adm. Tsukahara Nishizō, commander of the Air Unit, had not only
launched the Dutch East Indies operation with the part of the forces that had been advanced
to the southern Philippines, but also accelerated the construction work at the Davao and Jolo
bases and the deployment of his forces, while at the same time striving to clear the remnants
of the enemy forces in the Philippines with his main force. Meanwhile, the deployment of
forces for the operations in the Malaya area from British Borneo had become unnecessary,
and no reinforcements needed to be brought to Kuching and Miri from the east. Therefore,
he made changes in the operational plan and offered his opinion to step up [the operation
to] seize Ambon, which he had put on hold due to a lack of strength; it was decided to seize
the place in late January.(58)
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On 2 January, Air Unit Commander Vice Admiral Tsukahara transmitted [the order to]
put in motion the shift to phase-two dispositions by way of Telegraphic Operation Order
No. 19. The outline of the Air Unit’s operation plan at that moment was as follows:(54)
1. Each air raid unit commander shall engage in the assigned operations in conformity with the
phase-two disposition of forces, unless otherwise ordered by separate orders.
2. Support for the invasion operation in the Dutch East Indies areas shall be implemented accord-
ing to [the directives of] the operational area of each air raid unit as shown separately.
3. The operational border of the 1st and the 2d Air Raid Units has been tentatively decided on as
the line of 122º E.
4. Phase-two disposition of forces (inferred) (as shown in the following table)
Note: The 2d Carrier Division was supposed to advance to Davao on 17 January
5. The invasion [operation] shall be scheduled as follows:
Menado on 10 January, Kendari on 20 January, Ambon on 25 January, Makassar on 30 January
(on the 28th, depending on the situation), Kupang on 5 February, Bali on 11 February, Tarakan
on 10 January (on the 11th, depending on the situation), Balikpapan on 20 January, Banjarmasin
on 30 January, Palembang during 1 to 6 February, Surabaya and Batavia on 16 February.
6. When the operations in the Malaya area are largely completed and the Dutch East Indies oper-
ation is about to be launched, the forces under the command of the 22d Air Flotilla (which had
been transferred to the Malaya Unit) shall return to the Air Unit except for one element, and
participate in the air campaign against the Dutch East Indies from Ledo and Palembang as the
3d Air Raid Unit.
The situation of the Air Unit’s shift of its bases is as shown in Illustration No. 1.
The Submarine Unit
At the time of the shift to phase-two disposition of forces put into effect on 26 December,
Southern Task Force Commander Vice Admiral Kondō removed the 5th Submarine Squadron
from the Malaya Unit to form Submarine Unit B as the submarine unit under the direct com-
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Cdr, 21st Air Flotilla 
(in Davao as of 27 Dec)
Kanoya Air Gp Det,
Tōkō Air Gp, 1st and
3d Air Gps, 1st Yoko-
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Support for the East-





2d Air Raid Unit Cdr, 23d Air Flotilla (in Jolo as of 3 Jan)
Takao Air Gp, Tainan
Air Gp, 3d Yokosuka
SLF
Support for the West-





Cdr, 2d Carrier Div
The Sōryū, the Hiryū,
7th Destroyer Div, 27th
Destroyer Div 2d Sec-
tion
Support for [the opera-
tion to] capture
Ambon
mand of the Southern Task Force, and also formed Submarine Unit A with the 6th Submarine
Squadron.(65)
On the same day, Southern Task Force Commander Vice Admiral Kondō transmitted the
tasks of phase-two operations to each unit by Telegraphic Order No. 35. Although the con-
tents of the telegraphic order are unclear, they are roughly assumed to have been as follows:(60)
Submarine Unit A (6th Submarine Squadron)
1. To search for and attack enemy war vessels and disrupt [enemy] shipping lanes in the Banda
Sea, the Flores Sea and the waters north of Australia, in concert with the operations of the Dutch
East Indies Unit
2. To observe the strategic locations of the enemy and lay mines
Submarine Unit B (5th Submarine Squadron)
1. To advance into the Indian Ocean and disrupt [enemy] shipping lanes 
2. To sever the [enemy] submarine cables between the Dutch East Indies and Australia
Following this, on 28 December, the operational areas and the immediate operational direc-
tives of each submarine unit were transmitted by Telegraphic Order No. 39, a summary of
which was as follows:(63)
1. The operational areas of the submarine units shall roughly be divided as follows:





:  The 11th Air Fleet Headquarters 
shifted on 21 October 
from Kanoya to Gaoxiong
:  66 Type-1 land-based attack 
planes of the Kanoya Air Group 
shifted on 22 November 
from Kanoya to Taizhong
KAN = Kanoya Air Group
TAI = Tainan Air Group
TAK = Takao Air Group
TOK = Tōkō Air Group
MB = Main Body
Det = Detachment
























































































































Illustration No. 1 — The Shift of the Bases of the Air Units
(1) Submarine Unit A (6th Submarine Squadron)
The waters of the Dutch East Indies, Australia and the Indian Ocean east of 117ºE
(2) Submarine Unit of the Malaya Unit (4th Submarine Squadron)
The South China Sea, the Java Sea and the Indian Ocean west of 117ºE and east of 106ºE
(3) Submarine Unit B (5th Submarine Squadron)
The Indian Ocean west of 106ºE
2. The submarines of the Submarine Unit B shall advance into the Indian Ocean as soon as replen-
ishment and repair at Cam Ranh Bay is completed and engage in the tasks assigned in Southern
Task Force Telegraphic Operation Order No. 30 when the submarine base at Penang is ready.
3. The submarines of the Submarine Unit A shall advance to the assigned waters as soon as re-
plenishment at Davao is completed and engage in the tasks assigned in Telegraphic Operation
Order No. 30. However, they shall be careful to carry out mine warfare [only] in the waters of
Australia.
The Army Units
After concluding the Iwakuni Agreement, the Sixteenth Army worked out its plan of opera-
tions in Tokyo. The initial employment plan of its forces was roughly as follows:(66)
1. The Sakaguchi Detachment ([consisting of] three battalions as the core)
For Tarakan, [and later] Balikpapan and Samarinda
One battalion for Banjarmasin and half a battalion for Bali
2. The 38th Division
Main force for Southern Sumatra; one element for western Java
Detachment B ([consisting of] two battalions as the core) for Ambon and Kupang
3. The 2d Division and a major part of the units under the direct control of the army
For western Java
4. The 48th Division
For eastern Java
5. The South Seas Detachment
For western Java; depending on the situation, for Ambon and Kupang instead of Detachment
B
After intercommunication with the Southern Army in late December and the [conclusion of
the] Cam Ranh Agreement, the [above] plan was modified in the following way:
1. The South Seas Detachment shall not be employed in the operations in the southwestern the-
ater.
2. The force to be employed in the capture of Ambon and Kupang shall be increased.
3. The force to be employed in the capture of Java shall be slightly reduced.
This modification changed the operational concept of the Sixteenth Army as of the end of
December in the following way:
1. The Sakaguchi Detachment shall capture Tarakan, Balikpapan and Samarinda as [previously]
planned, and [also] capture Banjarmasin with the strength of one battalion as its core.
2. The 38th Division shall be divided into the following three units:
(1) Main force ([consisting of] four battalions as the core) for the occupation of the oil [produc-
ing] areas in Palembang and the preparation of the air base(s).
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(2) Detachment B ([consisting of] three battalions as the core) for capturing Ambon and Ku-
pang.
(3) One element ([consisting of] two battalions as the core) for the landing in western Java along
with the main force of the army.
3. The main force of the army that is to land in western Java ([i.e.] the 2d Division, one element of
the 38th Division and a major part of the units under the direct control of the army) shall as-
semble in Gaoxiong, while the 48th Division that is to land in eastern Java shall assemble in
Manila after capturing the place.
4. In [the operation to] capture Java, landings in eastern and western [Java] shall generally be car-
ried out in concert. Batavia and Surabaya shall swiftly be seized, after which Bandung, the base
of operations of the Dutch East Indies Army, shall be seized.
On 25 December, the Sixteenth Army commander decided to advance the command post of
the army to Saigon, leaving Tokyo on the 29th of the month. Then on the 27th, he instructed
the 2d Division and the units under the direct control of the army to assemble in Gaoxiong
and prepare for the coming operations.
6. The Preparations of All Units Move Ahead
The situation of each unit from the time of the shift to phase-two dispositions of 26 December
to the launch of the Dutch East Indies operation developed as follows:(53, 57, 62, 63)
The Operational Directives of the Southern Task Force Commander and the
Situation of the Main Body of the Southern Task Force 
26 December: [The Southern Task Force commander] issued the order to shift to phase-two dis-
positions and assigned the tasks of phase-two operations to each unit (Telegraphic Order
No. 35)
27 December: Based on reports from the air units that had been searching for the enemy for
days in succession, the Southern Task Force commander made the personal judgment that
a large scale escape of U.S.-Filipino units was imminent. He disposed the forces so as to
catch and destroy them. (Telegraphic order No. 37; there was actually no evacuation of large
units.)
[He also] issued an order to the Malaya Unit to set up a submarine base in Penang and in-
corporated the 11th Submarine Base Unit into the Malaya Unit as of the 28th. (Telegraphic
Order No. 38)
28 December: [The Southern Task Force commander] decided on the operational areas of the
4th, the 5th and the 6th Submarine Squadrons, and gave immediate operational directives
to the 5th and the 6th Submarine Squadrons, which were under his direct command. (Tele-
graphic Order No. 39)
[He also] informed the Malaya Unit and the Dutch East Indies Unit of the outline of their
phase-two operations and gave directions to the main body of the Southern Task Force as to
the schedule of its advance to Palau. (Telegraphic Order No. 40)
29 December: The Cam Ranh Agreement [conference] was held.
30 December: [The Southern Task Force commander] gave directions to remove the 8th De-
stroyer Division (minus the 2d Section) from the Malaya Unit and incorporate it into the
Dutch East Indies Unit as of 3 January, and to have it escort the seven ships carrying the
Ambon invasion unit of the 38th Division due to leave Hong Kong on 8 January for Davao.
[He also] issued an order to remove the 2d Section of the 8th Destroyer Division from the
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Malaya Unit as of 6 January to return to the main body [of the Southern Task Force]. (Tele-
graphic order No. 41)
31 December: Upon the request of the 2d Destroyer Squadron commander (in Davao), [the
Southern Task Force commander] ordered the repair vessel Akashi, which had advanced to
Palau from the time of the opening of hostilities to primarily take charge of repairing vessels
of the Philippines Unit, to [further] advance to Davao. (Telegraphic order No. 43)
1 January 1942: The Cam Ranh Agreement was officially concluded.
Upon the request of the Malaya Unit commander, [the Southern Task Force commander]
removed the 4th Carrier Division (minus the 2d Section) from the main body [of the Southern
Task Force] and attached it to the Malaya Unit as of 3 January.
[He] also decided to remove the auxiliary torpedo boat tender Kamikaze-maru from the
main body as of the same day, 3 January, to incorporate it into the Dutch East Indies Unit
and assign it a supply mission between homeland Japan and Davao.
4 January: Along with the formation of the Third Southern Expeditionary Fleet, [the Southern
Task Force commander] issued the change(s) in the disposition of forces as of 3 January.
(Telegraphic order No. 48)
[He] decided on the areas where the Dutch East Indies Unit and the Philippines Unit were
respectively responsible for protecting the shipping lanes. (Telegraphic order No. 49; contents
omitted [by the author].)
[He also] issued an order to Submarine Unit A to lay mines around Port Darwin (the op-
erational base of the United States and Australia for sending reinforcements to the Dutch
East Indies theater). (Telegraphic order No. 50)
[He also] disclosed the schedule of the movements of the main unit of the main body of
the Southern Task Force (to leave Cam Ranh Bay on 8 January to sail to Magong, and leave
Magong on the 14th to advance to Palau). Along with the above, [he] also issued an order to
add the 2d Section of the 8th Destroyer Division to the escort [forces] of the Ambon invasion
unit of the 38th Division, and to remove the 5th Destroyer Squadron from the Malaya Unit
between 9 and 12 January, so as to incorporate it into the Dutch East Indies unit. (Telegraphic
order No. 51)
8 January: [The Southern Task Force commander] issued an order to form a carrier-based air
unit with the 2d Carrier Division (minus the 23d Destroyer Division), the 7th Destroyer Di-
vision and the 2d Section of the 27th Destroyer Division. As its main task, he assigned it the
destruction of the enemy air power and naval vessels in the eastern part of the Dutch East
Indies and the support of the Ambon invasion operation; their operational directives he as-
signed to the air unit commander. (Telegraphic order No. 55) 
The Operational Directives of the Dutch East Indies Unit Commander and
the Movements of the Units of the Dutch East Indies Unit
Prior to this, on 19 December, the Philippines (Dutch East Indies) Unit Commander Vice Ad-
miral Takahashi had directed all units to advance to Davao, the assembly point for launching
the Dutch East Indies operation. As Davao was captured behind schedule, the Dutch East
Indies operation was expected to be launched roughly around 10 January. Accordingly, as
the [Army] invasion units were scheduled to leave Davao on 7 to 8 January, the units [of the
Dutch East Indies Unit] were scheduled to assemble in Davao by 4 to 5 January. The Dutch
East Indies Unit commander was also scheduled to advance to Davao on 2 January on the
Ashigara.(53, 62)
Chapter IV     /     Progress in the Preparations for the Invasion of the 105
Dutch East Indies
27 – 28 December: Although he was in the middle of [working out] an agreement with the
Southern Army at that moment, Dutch East Indies Unit Commander Vice Admiral Takahashi
issued the outline of the disposition of forces to the units under his command so as to get
across the concept of the immediate operations. He also informed them that the Dutch East
Indies operation would be launched around 10 January, that he would leave Gaoxiong on 2
January and advance to Davao on the 6th. (Although the advance to Davao had been sched-
uled for the 2d, it was delayed due to the huge backlog of matters to be discussed with the
Sixteenth Army headquarters.)
29 December – 2 January: [The unit] provided escort at sea centering on Davao, the main tasks
of which were as follows.
1. Escort for transport ships carrying invasion units and others, advancing from Palau to
Davao.
2. Escort for transport ships returning from Davao to Taiwan.
3. Escort for transport ships sailing from Taiwan to Davao.
27 December – 7 January: As the senior commander on site in Davao, 2d Destroyer Squadron
Commander R. Adm. Tanaka Raizō was in charge of designating the anchorages for the ad-
vancing units as well as guarding Davao Gulf until 30 December. On the 27th, he offered
his opinion to the chief of staff of the Third Fleet that the anchorages were limited in area
and in many ways difficult to defend against air raids, and that [the location] had to be re-
considered because of the recently frequent air raids.
Note: Davao Gulf was impossible [to guard] by setting antisubmarine nets or laying mines due to its
depth. [Moreover,] as the anchorage did not have the capacity for large units and the wide mouth
of the bay allowed [enemy] submarines to easily enter the bay, it was not particularly suitable for
a base. Malalag Bay had a narrow entrance and was safer against [enemy] submarines, but raised
concerns in terms of antiaircraft [defense]. Other than these bays, there were places with a suitable
depth for anchorage in the waters west of Samal Island and in Magnaga Bay, but because they
were exposed to the open sea, they raised concerns in terms of antisubmarine [defense].
On 30 December, the 5th Cruiser Division arrived in Davao, and Division
Commander R. Adm. Takagi Takeo became the senior commander on site.
On 31 December, the commander gave instructions on the main points of
guarding the bay to the units there, the contents of which were roughly
as follows:
1. Two destroyers of the 2d Destroyer Squadron shall patrol the entrance
of Davao Gulf at night. When the 4th Destroyer Squadron arrives on
2 January, the former and two destroyers of the latter shall take turns
to continuously patrol the entrance of the bay. 
2. One each of the reconnaissance seaplanes of the [cruisers of] the 5th
Cruiser Division and of the Jintsū and the Naka shall take turns to con-
tinuously carry out antisubmarine patrols at the entrance of the bay
during daytime. (The reconnaissance seaplane unit of the 32d Special
Base Force shall cooperate in the [patrols].)
3. The 11th Seaplane Tender Division shall keep guard in the air above the anchorage dur-
ing daytime with its observation seaplanes, as designated by the 11th Seaplane Tender
Division commander. (The fighter planes of the Eleventh Air Fleet, which have already
advanced to Davao, shall cooperate in this [guarding].)
4. When the strength of the 1st Base Force arrives in Davao on 2 January, it shall patrol the
waters south of Samal Island with a minesweeper or a submarine chaser around the
clock and provide guard for the anchorages of Davao and Samal Island.
The outline of these protective measures is as shown in Illustration No. 2.





30 December – 8 January: The employment plan of the special landing forces of the Dutch East
Indies Unit was as follows:(47, 53, 67, 68)
[For] Tarakan and Balikpapan: the 2d Kure Special Landing Force
[For] the Menado, Kendari and Makassar areas: the Combined Special Landing Force of the
Sasebo Naval Station (consisting of the 1st and the 2d Sasebo Special Landing Force)
[For] the Ambon and Kupang areas: the main force of the 1st Kure Special Landing Force
(one element of it was to be left in the Philippines) and one element of the Sasebo Combined
Special Landing Force
When phase-two operations were put in motion, the Sasebo Combined Special Landing
Force and the 2d Kure Special Landing Force had already advanced as far as to Palau and
they only needed to advance to Davao, which was no problem. However, the main force of
the 1st Kure Special Landing Force was still in Legaspi, engaging in the operation to clear
[the enemy] in the vicinity, while one element of its strength was clearing [the enemy] in
Jolo. Dutch East Indies Commander Vice Admiral Takahashi gave instructions to the 1st

























Illustration No. 2 — Outline of the Guarding of the Anchorages in Davao Gulf
Kure Special Landing Force regarding its operational schedule in order to arrange its de-
ployment so that it would be able to advance to Davao for the Ambon invasion [operation].
The advance of the 1st Kure Special Landing Force was [further] delayed due to the alloca-
tion of ships [for the transfer of the force], and the Dutch East Indies Unit commander ex-
erted pressure to allocate ships. In the end, the force left Legaspi on 14 January and advanced
to Menado, while the other special landing forces left Palau on 1 January and advanced to
Davao on the 4th.
30 December – 6 January: The employment plan of the construction squads of the Dutch East
Indies Unit was as follows.(53)
1st Construction Squad: Legaspi ⟶ Kendari
2d Construction Squad: Davao ⟶ Balikpapan
3d Construction Squad: Jolo ⟶ Makassar
5th Construction Squad: Tarakan
6th Construction Squad: Menado
Although [squads to be employed for the invasion of] Ambon and Kupang were not yet de-
cided, it seems that the plan was to employ the 5th and/or the 6th Construction Squads.
However, because it was decided in the Cam Ranh Agreement that the Ambon – Kupang
line should also be captured in tandem, the employment plan was changed so as to make
full use of the construction squads on hand, by moving them at an interval of about twenty
to thirty days.
1st Construction Squad: Legaspi at that time ⟶ Ambon [from] 25 January 
2d Construction Squad: Davao at that time ⟶ Balikpapan [from] 20 January
3d Construction Squad: Jolo at that time ⟶ Makassar [from] 30 January
5th Construction Squad: Palau at that time ⟶ Tarakan [from] 10 January ⟶ Kupang [from]
30 January
108 Chapter IV     /     Progress in the Preparations for the Invasion of the
Dutch East Indies
Name of base and date of capture
Planned date of capture
Construction squad number
The plan after the Cam Ranh Agreement














































Illustration No. 3 — The Employment Plan of the Construction Squads After the Cam Ranh Agreement
6th Construction Squad: Palau at that time ⟶ Menado [from] 10 January for the 1st group
and Kendari [from] 20 January for the 2d group
While the preparations for the Dutch East Indies operation progressed, it became clear that
the conditions at the Legaspi, Davao and Jolo bases, which had been seized and were being
prepared, were worse than expected, and that the preparation would require more days than
planned. Moreover, the vessels for redeploying the construction squad(s) were delayed in
reaching their actual locations. Therefore, on 6 January, the Dutch East Indies Unit com-
mander once again changed the employment plan of the construction squads as follows,
and requested central command to form another construction squad and assign it to him.
1st Construction Squad: [deployment to] Ambon cancelled; to Kendari [instead]
2d Construction Squad: [to be deployed to] Balikpapan as in the former plan
3d Construction Squad: [to be deployed] as in the former plan for the main force; one element
[to be deployed] to Menado
5th Construction Squad: [deployment to] Kupang cancelled
6th Construction Squad 1st group: [to be deployed to] Menado as in the former plan
6th Construction Squad 2d group: [deployment] changed from Kendari to Ambon
New Construction Squad: [to be deployed] to Kupang
These changes can be illustrated as in the diagram above. [Illustration No. 3]
On 9 January, a reply with the following gist came from the chief of the Naval Affairs Bu-
reau; the result was that the request to form a new construction squad and assign it to the
unit was realized.
1. For the present, the Kupang base shall be quickly made ready for use with the aim to ac-
commodate 27 fighter planes.
(1) The 9th Construction Squad ([consisting of] about 1,000 men including engineers)
shall be formed in the homeland [Japan] as of 15 January and attached to the Third
Fleet.
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Illustration No. 4 — Outline of the [Enemy] Air Strikes [on the Anchorage] at Malalag Bay
(at 1200, 4 January 1942)
(2) It shall advance to Davao by 20 January carrying a minimum load of matériel with
it.
2. Then the base shall be made ready step by step so that it can accommodate large units
of land-based attack planes.
(1) The personnel shall be successively increased from other squads on site.
The required amount of matériel is in preparation.
25 December – 6 January: Phase-one of the Philippines operation ended with the capture of
Jolo on 25 December, and the bulk of the Philippines Unit was shifted to the Dutch East In-
dies Unit. From the next day, the 26th, onwards, the unit shifted its position so as to advance
to Davao. On 6 January, the Ashigara, with the Dutch East Indies Unit commander on board,
also advanced to Davao, completing the advance of almost all of its forces to Davao.
4 January: At 1155, the warships and other vessels at anchor in Malalag Bay came under attack
of eight B–17s of the enemy. A bomb hit the port side of the front deck of the Myōkō (the flag-
ship of the 5th Cruiser Division) with the senior commander on site on board. The ship sus-
tained the loss of twenty men and more than forty men injured, as well as considerable
damage on her hull. Rear Admiral Takagi, commander of the 5th Cruiser Division, was also
knocked down on the front deck by the bomb blast and suffered minor injuries.(57, 69) (See Il-
lustration No. 4)
At that time, the Davao airfield was swamped by heavy rain day after day, and no patrols
by fighter planes around the bay were carried out. Moreover, because concern about [enemy]
air raids conducted from the Philippines had almost gone, which had lessened the attention
to antiaircraft [precautions], the enemy aircraft was spotted too late. On the Myōkō, the bomb
hit the front deck packed with gunners of the main gun, who were trying to get into the
turret in order to take up their positions, and caused many casualties. The fact that the ship
with the senior commander on site on board was damaged and had to leave the line of battle
when the Dutch East Indies operation was about to be launched, and that it had even failed
to mount an effective counterattack, was a great shock to the Dutch East Indies Unit.
Commander Takagi of the 5th Cruiser Division changed his flagship to the Nachi and sent
the Myōkō to Magong (later it was changed to Sasebo) for repair, while requesting a tighten-
ing of the guard by the fighter planes of the 21st Air Flotilla. Also, it was decided that from
the 5th onwards, each unit should move around in the bay by day, and break up [in small
groups] and ride at anchor at different anchorages by night.
5 January: A strategy meeting of the Dutch East Indies Unit was held in Davao, and the follow-
ing was decided upon:(53, 70)
1. The schedule of the Dutch East Indies invasion operation shall be postponed by one day,
and [in line with the postponement] arrangements shall be made with the Sixteenth
Army. The reasons for the postponement were as follows:
(1) The delay in the preparation of air bases hindered the progress in gaining command
of the air.
(2) The allotted transport ships for redeploying the special landing forces and the con-
struction squads (the 6th Construction Squad in particular) had been operating be-
hind schedule.
(3) The advance of one element of the 2d Base Force to Davao, which would be employed
for the capture of Tarakan, had been delayed.
2. The 1st Yokosuka Special Landing Force (a paratrooper unit) shall be employed in the
capture of Menado. Particulars need to be arranged concerning its drop at the airfield in
concert with the Sasebo Combined Special Landing Force of the 2d Escort Unit.
3. The employment plan of the construction squads shall be finalized, and an opinion shall
be offered to central command that the newly formed construction squad be allotted to
Kupang (as described previously).
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4. In view of the two lines of attack in the east, it was decided that the responsibility of cap-
turing [the following locations] should fall on the following [units]:
Menado: the 2d Destroyer Squadron, one element of the 1st Base Force, the Sasebo
Combined Special Landing Force, and the 1st Yokosuka Special Landing
Force
Kendari: the 1st Base Force, one element of the 2d Destroyer Squadron, the major part
of the Sasebo Combined Special Landing Force
Ambon: the 2d Destroyer Squadron, one element of the 1st Base Force, the major part
of the 1st Kure Special Landing Force
The 1st Base Force and the 2d Destroyer Squadron shall respectively take charge of the
capture of Makassar and Kupang.
29 December – 6 January: In conformity with the Cam Ranh Agreement [draft] of 29 December,
the Third Fleet and the Sixteenth Army had made a preliminary arrangement at Gaoxiong,
and the arrangement was officially concluded on 6 January. It was called the 1st Takao [Gaox-
iong] Arrangement, the main points of which were as follows.(53)
1. Army Detachment B ([i.e.] the Itō Detachment in four transport ships; note: [in] seven
[transport ships] in the Cam Ranh Agreement) shall leave Hong Kong on 12 January
under the escort of the 1st Section of the 8th Destroyer Division and reach Davao on 18
January. From there, escorted by a force [consisting of] the 2d Destroyer Squadron as the
core, it shall capture Ambon and Kupang respectively on 25 January and 5 February.
2. The Sakaguchi Detachment shall be escorted by a force [consisting of] the 4th Destroyer
Squadron as the core and seize Tarakan, Balikpapan and Banjarmasin, which are respec-
tively scheduled for 11, 21 and 31 January.
3. The main force of the Sixteenth Army shall assemble in Gaoxiong between 29 January
and 5 February, and land in Batavia and vicinity around 16 February, escorted by a force
[consisting of] the 5th Destroyer Squadron as the core. The detailed arrangements con-
cerning the landings shall be made between the 5th Destroyer Squadron commander
and the Sixteenth Army commander on 26 January at Gaoxiong.
4. The 48th Division shall be escorted by a force [consisting of] the 4th Destroyer Squadron
as the core. It shall leave Manila on 7 February and land in Surabaya and vicinity around
16 February. The detailed arrangements shall be made between the 4th Destroyer
Squadron commander and the 48th Division commander in Manila on 4 February.
If the above arrangements as well as the results of the strategy meeting are put together, the
outline of the operation plan of the Dutch East Indies Unit commander before the Dutch
East Indies operation was [actually] put in motion (on 7 January 1942) was as shown in Il-
lustration No. 5.
6 – 7 January: The Dutch East Indies Unit commander assigned the following tasks to the units
concerned:(53)
1. He ordered the 2d Gunboat Division to guard Jolo and the Itsukushima to lay a mine bar-
rier at the eastern entrance of the Bangka anchorage (north of Menado) after capturing
Menado.
2. He ordered the 8th Destroyer Division (with its 2d Section added) to escort the Army Itō
Detachment’s transfer from Hong Kong to Davao.
3. He arranged the deployment for a rescue operation at the time of the attack on Ambon
from the 6th to the 7th by large flying boat units and land-based attack plane units. 
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Illustration No. 5 — Plan of the Dutch East Indies Operation Right Before the Launch of the Operation 
([As of] 7 January, 1942)
The Operational Directives of the [Southern Task Force] Air Unit Com-
mander and the Actions of Each Component of the Air Unit
By 20 December it was concluded that the enemy air power in the Philippines area was
mostly destroyed and that the [enemy] surface forces in the Malaya and the Philippines areas
had already pulled back to the Java area as well. The Army air campaign to destroy the enemy
air power in the Malay Peninsula also progressed for the most part smoothly. Vice Admiral
Tsukahara, commander of the Air Unit, launched the Dutch East Indies operation with the
forces that had been advanced to the southern Philippines and was gradually intensifying
the operation by accelerating the construction of bases as well as the shift of his air forces to
the southern regions. Yet, he conducted the operation in such a way that the units in Taiwan
and those deployed in Legaspi, Davao and Jolo should according to the circumstances con-
tinue the Philippines operation and wipe out the remnants of the [enemy] forces there. The
total military gains and losses of the Eleventh Air Fleet up until 31 December were reported
as follows:(54)
The total military gains up until 31 December
1. [Enemy aircraft] that were brought down or caught fire with certainty (those brought down
are shown in parentheses)
(68) Fighter planes, 28 (0) middle-sized planes, 39 (5) large-sized planes, 24 (6) flying boats,
17 (0) training aircraft, totaling 251 (79) aircraft
2. [Enemy aircraft] that were wrecked on the ground by strafing or bombing or which may
have been brought down but not with certainty
72 Small planes, 4 middle-sized planes, 15 large-sized planes, 3 flying boats, 15 training
planes, totaling 109 aircraft
3. [Enemy] war vessels sunk or badly damaged
4 Destroyers, 4 submarines, 24 merchantmen of 1,000 tons or more, 2 vessels of less than
1,000 tons
4. [Enemy war vessels] considerably damaged by direct or near hits of bombs
1 Light cruiser, 1 destroyer, 1 submarine, and 21 merchantmen
Losses up until 31 December (Except for losses incurred in other situations than aerial com-
bats)
1. Flight crew: 4 land-based attack plane teams, 1 transport plane team, 14 Type–0 fighter plane
crew, and 2 flying boat teams
2. Equipment: 10 land-based attack planes (4 Type–1s, 6 Type–96s), 24 Type–0 fighter planes,
1 transport plane and 2 flying boats 
The condition of the seized air bases
1. Legaspi: A runway of 50 meters wide and 1,000 meters long is to be ready by 5 January. It
can accommodate 18 fighter planes, 2 land-based reconnaissance planes, and about 3 land-
based attack planes.
2. Jolo: Although a runway of 140 meters wide and 1,100 meters long is to be ready by 5 Janu-
ary, it is not available until 8 January because it has not only a large inclination but also un-
dulates. (The rest is unclear because the next part in the original document is missing.) 
3. Davao land base: A runway of 1,200 meters long is to be ready [at] 1030 on 6 January. How-
ever, due to the soft ground and frequent squalls, the rolling of the apron has not made much
progress, and the accommodation available as of 8 January is [limited to] 54 fighter planes,
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8 land-based reconnaissance planes and 40 land-based attack planes. The Eleventh Air Fleet
headquarters is due to advance [there] on 7 January.
The scheduled deployment of forces as of 8 January and the current deployment as of 31 De-
cember (Note: the latter is shown in parentheses)
1. Tainan: the 1st Air Group (about one half of the Tainan Air Group and the 1st Air Group)
2. Gaoxiong: About one half of the Takao Air Group (the Eleventh Air Fleet headquarters, the
23d Air Flotilla headquarters, and the Takao Air Group)
3. Davao: the Eleventh Air Fleet headquarters, the 21st Air Flotilla headquarters, about one
half of the Kanoya Air Group, the Tōkō Air Group, the transport plane unit of the 1st Air
Group (the 21st Air Flotilla headquarters, the 3d Air Group, the Tōkō Air Group, and one
element of the Kanoya Air Group)
4. Jolo: About one half of the 23d Air Flotilla, the Tainan Air Group (one element of the Tainan
Air Group)
5. Legaspi: (One element of the Tainan Air Group)
On 2 January, the Air Unit commander ordered [the shift to] the phase-two disposition of
forces, generally set the operational border of the 1st and the 2d Air Raid Units at the line of
122º E, and entrusted each air raid unit commander with [the arrangement of] the particulars
for implementing the operation. He also put the 1st and the 3d Yokosuka Special Landing
Forces (both paratrooper units) respectively under the command of the 1st Air Raid Unit and
of the 2d Air Raid Unit from 2 January onwards, to have them prepare for the operations re-
spectively against Menado and Balikpapan. Along with that, he temporarily put the transport
plane unit of the 1001 Unit under the command of the 1st Air Raid Unit, so as to have it par-
ticipate in the 1st Yokosuka Special Landing Force’s operation to capture Menado.
Following this [order], the 1st Air Raid Unit, which had [already] launched the operation
in the Dutch East Indies area with as preliminary actions the search for the enemy in the
Celebes Sea on the 23d of December and the reconnaissance attack on Menado on the 24th,
advanced its headquarters to Davao on 27 December. Following the above [order], it mainly
carried out attacks on the northern part of the island of Celebes. Moreover, on 7 January,
prior to [the operation to] capture Menado, flying boats of the Tōkō Air Group and land-
based attack planes of the Kanoya Air Group carried out a night raid on Ambon. Meanwhile,
the 1st Yokosuka Special Landing Force left the port of Gaoxiong on the 26th of December,
entered the port of Davao on the 31st, and set about preparing for the paradrop operation
on Menado scheduled for the 11th and the 12th of January.
In the meantime on 30 December, the 2d Air Raid Unit launched the Dutch East Indies
operation with, as the first attack, the attack on Tarakan by the Tainan Air Group from the
Jolo base.(71) The 23d Air Flotilla headquarters also advanced to Jolo on 3 January.
Note: The air raid on Tarakan was also carried out from the Miri base by Type–0 fighter planes
and land-based attack planes of the Mihoro Air Group of the Malaya Unit on 26 and 28 De-
cember, as well as by Type–0 fighter planes and land-based reconnaissance planes of the 3d
Air Group of the 1st Raid Unit also on the 28th ([the latter] will be described later).
From that time on, the 2d Air Raid Unit carried out patrols over the northern half of the
Makassar Strait and reconnaissance attacks over the Tarakan and Balikpapan areas, while
continuing the Philippines operation. Meanwhile, the 3d Yokosuka Special Landing Force
left Gaoxiong on the 5th of January and arrived in Davao on the 12th (due to the operation
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of the available ship, it called at Jolo on the way) and set about preparing for the paradrop
operation in Balikpapan.(71)
The major engagements of the Air Unit during the preparation for the Dutch East Indies
operation are as follows:(71)
28 December: The 3d Air Group ([of] the 1st Air Raid Unit) conducted an attack on Tarakan
with seven Type–0 fighter planes and one land-based reconnaissance plane from Davao and
fought against nine enemy fighter planes. It pursued the enemy who lacked fighting spirit
and escaped into the clouds; all aircraft [of the group] safely returned, reporting that [the
group] brought down four [enemy] Buffalo’s for sure, more or less certainly brought down
two old-model Boeing’s, and was not sure about the results of the other two to three planes.
Only one aircraft [of the group] was hit. At that time, due to the [thick] clouds, it was im-
possible to reconnoiter Tarakan and the air raid [on the aircraft] on the ground was called
off. As this attack was conducted outside the operational area of the 1st Air Raid Unit (the
area was the responsibility of the 2d Air Raid Unit) and moreover, it was a long-distance at-
tack almost reaching the limit of the cruising range of the Type–0 fighter planes, the unit
was severely admonished by the Eleventh Air Fleet headquarters.(12)
31 December: Six flying boats of the Tōkō Air Group ([consisting of] three equipped with bombs
and three with torpedoes) and five land-based attack planes of the Kanoya Air Group carried
out a bomb and torpedo attack from 1655 to 1730 against a Canopus-class cruiser (Note: it
was the Dutch seaplane tender Heron; [editor’s note: in fact it was the USS Heron]), which
was sailing southward on the waters west of the island of Kasiruta (southwest of Halma-
hera). However, due to the high-speed evasive movements of the enemy ship, only two 60-
kilogram conventional bombs of the land-based attack plane unit (led by Lt. Cdr. Irisa
Toshiié) hit the ship, which caused fires but failed to sink the ship. The defensive fire of the
enemy ship in this attack was fierce and precise. It [hit] the flying boat of the torpedo unit
commander (Lt. Ōta Jusō) and made him to ditch it. Four other aircraft were also hit, and
the second and the third flying boats of the torpedo unit were beached when they returned.
5-6 January: After the [enemy] air strikes over Malalag Bay, the search for and the attacks on
the enemy in the Philippines from the air were intensified and so was the direct air defense
above Davao and Jolo, but almost no enemy aircraft were spotted. The enemy aircraft that
had conducted the air strike over Malalag Bay were eight B–17s of the U.S. 5th Bomber Com-
mand. Having departed from Malang on Java, they had carried out the attack using
Samarinda on Borneo as a staging base and already returned to Malang on the 5th.
6-7 January: Six flying boats of the Tōkō Air Group ([consisting of] two torpedo bombers, one
illumination aircraft, and three bombers, led by Cdr. Aizawa Tatsuo) and twenty-one land-
based attack planes of the Kanoya Air Group Detachment (led by Lt. Cdr. Irisa Toshiié) were
going to conduct a night attack on Ambon (a torpedo attack [with flying boats that would
release their torpedoes] after landing [and while running on the water]). However, due to
engine trouble right after taking off from the water, the flying boat with Commander Aizawa
on board hit the foremast of the transport ship Kirishima-maru at anchor in Davao Gulf; it
crashed killing all the crew (eight personnel including Commander Aizawa). Due to this ac-
cident, the attack by the torpedo unit ([consisting of] two torpedo-equipped flying boats and
one with illumination flares) was called off. Meanwhile, seven of the land-based attack
planes also returned [to base] due to trouble of the plane that had the commander on board.
Eventually, three flying boats and fourteen land-based attack planes attacked the Ambon
airfield from 0348 till 0447, and all aircraft returned safely. It was concluded that this attack
had sealed the enemy’s use [of the Ambon airfield] during the operation against Menado.
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The Situation of the Carrier-Based Air Units
The main force of the First Air Fleet had completed the Hawaii operation and returned to
the Inland Sea of Japan on 23 December. As a result of a meeting on the 24th, it was decided
that the 1st and the 5th Carrier Divisions should cooperate in the Rabaul invasion operation,
after which they should get ready for [an attack from] the east, and that the 2d Carrier Divi-
sion should be incorporated in the Southern Task Force.(46) The 2d Carrier Division ([consist-
ing of] the Sōryū and the Hiryū as the core) participated in the operation to capture Wake
Island between 21 and 23 December on their way back from the attack on Hawaii and entered
the port of Kure on 29 December. After entering the port of Kure, the division replenished
its personnel along with conducting repair and maintenance of the ships and armaments,
while striving to complete the preparations for the coming operations.(72)
The Situation of the Army Units
The situation of the Army units during the preparatory period of the Dutch East Indies op-
eration was as follows:
Sixteenth Army headquarters: The army headquarters was [still] situated in the premises of
the War College in Tokyo, but was scheduled to advance to the field in January 1942. How-
ever, as the Dutch East Indies operation was substantially moved up and, in line with this,
considerable changes had to be made in the deployment plan of units, Army Commander
Lt. Gen. Imamura Hitoshi decided to quickly advance the headquarters to the field on 25
December, moving up the original schedule by half a month. On 27 December, he also issued
an order to the 2d Division and the units under the direct control of the army to assemble in
Gaoxiong.
The army commander left Tokyo on 30 December, advanced to Saigon on the 3d of January,
and received the order to capture Bangka, Palembang, Ambon and Kupang from Com-
mander in Chief of the Southern Army General Terauchi on the 4th. From that time on, the
commander directed the operations at the command post in Saigon.
2d Division: [Having received] the army order on 27 December to assemble in Gaoxiong, the
2d Division, which had conducted training at maneuvering grounds in central Japan, left
the maneuvering grounds one after another, and was assembling at Ujina to embark from
there. The advance unit was expected to leave Ujina around 15 January. 
48th Division: Having landed along Lingayen Gulf on 22 December, the division had charged
southward with unstoppable force, captured Manila on 2 January, and moved its main force
toward the Bataan Peninsula in pursuit of the defeated enemy. On 5 January, the division
had received an unofficial order to redeploy its force to the Dutch East Indies theater. Thus,
relieved on the front line by the 65th Brigade on 8 January, it was gradually assembling in
the Manila area. The division was incorporated in the order of battle of the Sixteenth Army
on 14 January.
38th Division: The 38th Division had captured Hong Kong on 25 December. Shortly after that,
on 30 December, it received an order from the Twenty-third Army to form a detachment
suitable for operations against different islands with [a unit consisting of] one infantry reg-
iment and one artillery battalion led by the infantry group commander as the core, and have
the detachment prepared so that it would be able to embark on the 6th of January at Hong
Kong to leave port on the 9th. This was the Itō Detachment, led by Maj. Gen. Itō Takeo, which
was the Detachment B (scheduled for the capture of Ambon) that had been decided on in
the Cam Ranh Agreement. The Itō Detachment, whose preparation for the departure had
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slightly fallen behind schedule, left Hong Kong for Davao on 12 January in five transport
ships (note: seven ships in the Cam Ranh Agreement and four in the 1st Takao Agreement).
In the meantime, the 38th Division was incorporated in the order of battle of the Sixteenth
Army on 4 January, received an unofficial order to capture Bangka and Palembang, and
started its operational preparations.
Sakaguchi Detachment: The Sakaguchi Detachment had roughly completed the mopping-up
[operation] around Davao by the end of December, handed over the task of maintaining se-
curity of the area to the Miura Detachment ([of] the 16th Division of the Fourteenth Army)
and assembled its units in the Talomo and Daliao sectors to make operational preparations
for the coming Tarakan operation. On 4 January, its rear units advanced from Palau. The de-
tachment embarked its entire force on nine ships that then assembled in the anchorages of
Davao and Daliao, thereby completing its operational preparations on 6 January.
Fifth Air Force: The Fifth Air Force had deployed its main force in various areas of the northern
Philippines and primarily supported the ground operations of the main force of the Four-
teenth Army, while assigning one element to the air campaign to destroy the enemy air
power as well as to the cover of the anchorages. On 5 January, the force was given an unof-
ficial notification of redeployment to the Burma area; it set about the preparation from that
day onwards and gradually began its redeployment to central Thailand by air and sea trans-
port from the 14th onwards. Thereafter, the [Army] air operations in the Philippines were
carried out by a small force of air units attached to the army.
Third Air Force: The Third Air Force had been stationed in French Indochina, Thailand and the
Malay Peninsula at the time of opening of hostilities and supported the Army ground oper-
ations in the Malaya area. The force advanced to the Malay Peninsula one after another by
around the end of December and was in charge of the support for the ground operations as
well as of the air campaign to destroy the enemy air power in the Malaya and Burma areas.
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Chapter V The Forward Push of the Air Bases 
(See Attached Illustrations No. 1, No. 2 and No. 3) [Omitted]
1. Outline of the Progress of the Operation
The Launch of the Dutch East Indies Operation
Having concluded that with the successful landing of the main force of the Army inthe Philippines and the capture of key locations in the southern Philippines thestage-one, phase-one operations were more or less completed, Combined Fleet Com-
mander in Chief Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku issued an order to shift to the phase-two dis-
position of forces at 1200 on 26 December.
The land-based air unit advanced its force to Davao and Jolo from late December till early
January and launched its air campaign against eastern Borneo and Celebes. However, con-
trary to expectations, the condition of the Davao and Jolo airfields was bad, and since only
a part of the force could be advanced, [the operation to] gain command of the air did not
progress as scheduled. In the meantime, the surface unit had assembled in Davao from the
end of December till early January and was making preparations for the operation. Because
of his concern about gaining command of the air, Dutch East Indies Unit Commander V.
Adm. Takahashi Ibō decided on 7 January, after consulting all sections, to conduct the attack
on Menado and Tarakan on 11 January, one day later than the date stipulated in the Cam
Ranh Agreement. Meanwhile, as described previously, the Myōkō, the flagship of the 5th
Cruiser Division, having sustained damage in the air raid by enemy heavy bombers on 4
January, had left the line of battle.
On 7 January the Dutch East Indies Unit launched the operation against the Dutch East
Indies with the sailing of the Tarakan invasion unit from Davao. On 11 January, the landings
on both Menado and Tarakan were launched, and after quite fierce fighting, the airfields [in
both places] were seized. In the attack on Menado, the 1st Yokosuka Special Landing Force
carried out a paradrop operation for the first time in Japanese [military history] and achieved
great success. However, in Tarakan, two minesweepers were sunk, and this, as well as the
fact that the sweeping of the sea for mines required an enormous amount of time, pointed to
the many difficulties in the way of the invasion operations.
Although the advance of the Air Unit was behind schedule due to the delay in the
minesweeping and the inadequate condition of the seized airfields, by 15 and 16 January it
had pushed forward its bases to Menado and Tarakan and expanded its air campaign to
Samarinda, Balikpapan, Kendari, Makassar and Ambon. Furthermore, on 23 January, in par-
allel with the Kendari and the Balikpapan invasion operations, the carrier-based air unit
([consisting of] two aircraft carriers, one heavy cruiser and six destroyers) with the 2d Carrier
Division as its core, which had been incorporated to the Southern Task Force on 8 January,
attacked Ambon, a place of strategic importance north of Australia, scarcely meeting with
any counterattacks worth mentioning.
Although the launch of the operations to seize Kendari and Balikpapan was slightly de-
layed, the respective invasion units, which had started from Menado and Tarakan, seized
Kendari and Balikpapan on 24 January. While the resistance on land at these [locations] was
not very serious, at Balikpapan, the unit came under quite a fierce counterattack that included
raids by enemy aircraft, a night raid on the anchorage by enemy destroyers and torpedo at-
tacks by [enemy] submarines, and it sustained the loss of some transport ships that were
sunk or caught fire and of one patrol boat that was badly damaged. Nonetheless, the coun-
terattack did not greatly affect the progress of the operation. Whereas the airfields that had
been seized until then were poor, the Kendari [airfield] was a remarkably excellent and large
airfield that could be used without hardly any improvements and that was suitable for use
by large units.
As of early January, the main body of the Southern Task Force wound up its support for
the operations in the Malaya area, left Cam Ranh Bay and advanced via Magong to Palau on
18 January, shifting to a position of support for the operation of the main force of the Dutch
East Indies Unit.
The Invasion of Malaya Makes Progress
From the very opening of hostilities, the Southern Army had nurtured a plan to swiftly dis-
embark one unit on the east coast of Malaya to accelerate the operation to neutralize Singa-
pore. So, in concert with the rapid advance of the units [charging southward] along the west
coast of Malaya, the army decided to put this plan into action in late December as Operation
Q (Kuantan landing [operation]) and discussed arrangements with the [Navy] Malaya Unit.
The Malaya Unit at first did not agree to the plan, saying that the plan was a dangerous op-
eration [because it meant] rushing into an area where the enemy had command of the air,
but in the end, [it agreed on the condition that] the implementation would be somewhat de-
layed, and it was decided that an operation unit, which would standby in Singora, should
land in Kuantan at a favorable opportunity after 31 December. However, because in late De-
cember the Takumi Detachment, which was heading south from Kota Bharu, got close to a
point north and within a short distance of Kuantan, operation [Q] was called off. The Oper-
ation Q unit, which had advanced to Singora on the 27th under the escort of one half of the
3d Destroyer Squadron, was put ashore in Kota Bharu, and the escort unit returned to Cam
Ranh Bay on 31 December. [Meanwhile,] on 26 December, about one half of the air unit of
the Malaya Unit had advanced to Kota Bharu.
Then the Malaya Unit had a unit, consisting of the 5th Destroyer Squadron and one half
of the 3d Destroyer Squadron as the core, escort the convoy of more than fifty ships in total
of the main force of the Twenty-fifth Army and one element of the Fifteenth Army. They left
Magong on 31 December; on 8 January the major part was put ashore in Singora and one el-
ement in Bangkok. On completing this operation, the 5th Destroyer Squadron was immedi-
ately transferred to the Dutch East Indies Unit. In the meantime, the other half of the 3d
Destroyer Squadron, which had returned from [the cancelled] Operation Q, sailed to Guang-
dong, from where it escorted the main force of the 18th Division, which was to participate in
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the Malaya operation; it arrived in Cam Ranh Bay on 10 January. The next operations of the
Malaya Unit were those to disembark the 18th Division on the east coast of the Malaya and
to capture the Anambas Islands. That is to say, the Southern Army had a plan, called Oper-
ation S, which was to disembark the main force of the 18th Division in Endau and vicinity
on the east coast of Malaya to envelop and destroy the enemy forces in the Malay Peninsula,
while swiftly advancing air bases to southern Malaya in preparation for the coming Sumatra
operation. The [Navy] Malaya Unit currently used Cam Ranh Bay as its [main] supply base
and Cap Saint Jacques and Puolo Condore as advance supply bases for its rapid units, but
as the war situation developed smoothly, it was decided to move forward the advance supply
base to the Anambas Islands in order take an even more active part in the operations. Al-
though Operation S was clearly defined in the Cam Ranh Agreement and particulars had
been arranged between the [Navy] Malaya Unit and the [Army] 18th Division on 11 January,
the operation became unnecessary because on 18 January the Army Koba Detachment had
already closed in on Endau while the 5th Division was charging [southwards] through Gemas
west [of Endau], so in the end it was cancelled. Accordingly, [the plan] was changed in such
a way that the 18th Division should be disembarked at Singora. The 3d Destroyer Squadron
escorted the division, leaving Cam Ranh Bay on the 20th of January, and arrived in Singora
on the 22d. However, a prompt disembarkation of aviation fuel and ammunition at Endau
[became] necessary for the conduct of the subsequent air operations, and it was decided to
send two transport ships there. The 3d Destroyer Squadron, escorting these ships, left Sin-
gora, entered the anchorage [at Endau] on the afternoon of the 26th and began the disem-
barkation. During this period, they came under attack of as many as several dozen enemy
aircraft, but the counterattacks by army fighter plane units drove back every wave of attack,
and the [disembarkation] work was continued without incurring much damage. Around
0430 on the 27th, two enemy destroyers raided the anchorage, one of which was sunk in the
counterattack of the 3d Destroyer Squadron and another sustained damage and escaped. In
the meantime, [the operation to] seize the Anambas [islands] was carried out by the 9th Base
Force; it seized the islands on the morning of 26 January, meeting no resistance at all.
Capture of Ledo and Southern Malaya
Earlier, the preparation of the Kuching airfield in northern Borneo, which was seized on 25
December, had contrary to the huge expectations of the Navy made no progress [at all] be-
cause of such unfavorable conditions as the wet ground of the airfield and the rainy season
[which made it worse]; the plans for conducting the air campaign after advancing to the
Kuching airfield seemed to become thoroughly upset. Therefore, the Navy greatly placed its
hopes on the newly spotted large airfield in Ledo about fifty nautical miles southwest of
Kuching and changed its plans so as to make to the fullest extent use of this airfield.
Since the Navy had expressed at the Cam Ranh Agreement [conference] its hope that Ledo
be seized, General Terauchi Hisaichi, commander in chief of the Southern Army, issued an
order to the Kawaguchi Detachment on 6 January to seize the Bengkayang area in western
Borneo. The detachment was somewhat tardy in its preparations, but it launched the action
from Kuching in late January, and seized Ledo and Pontianak respectively on 27 and 29 Jan-
uary.
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As for the overland [advance] in the Malaya area, the leading unit of the 5th Division,
which had reached Ipoh on 26 December, continued its southward advance, completely de-
stroyed a large enemy unit near Slim on 7 January, and captured Kuala Lumpur, a place of
strategic importance, on 11 January. By around that time, the Imperial Guard Division, which
had entered into Thailand from French Indochina at the time of the opening of hostilities,
was catching up [with the units ahead] by land, started charging [southward] along the west
coast of Malaya in parallel with the 5th Division, and partly by maneuvering in small craft
along the shore. This shifted the battlefront to southern Malaya; Malacca was seized on the
14th of January, Gemas and Batu Pahat on the 16th, and Kluang on the 25th. On 31 January,
the leading units of both divisions charged into Johor Bahru, [from where] Singapore was
visible within hailing distance.
The Koba Detachment, which was heading southward along the east coast of the Malay
Peninsula, broke through Endau and Mersing respectively on the 20th and the 26th of Janu-
ary, and rendezvoused with one unit of the 5th Division, which was heading eastward from
Kluang on the 28th. [With this], communication between [the units heading southward along
the] east and west [coasts] was [finally] established. 
The Engagements of the Submarine Units
During phase-one operations, the submarine units [in the southwestern region] were mostly
concentrated in the Malaya area to attend to the British Fleet in the East. However, in phase-
two operations, only the 4th Submarine Squadron remained in the Malaya area to participate
in the operations around Java, whereas the 5th Submarine Squadron and the 6th Submarine
Squadron respectively took charge of [the operations in] the Indian Ocean, and [those in] the
Celebes area and the area north of Australia, as the submarine unit of the Southern Task
Force.
The 4th Submarine Squadron, which remained in the Malaya area, engaged with Cam
Ranh Bay as its base in the attack on enemy naval vessels as well as in the disruption of
[enemy] shipping lanes in the waters south of Singapore, the east coast of Sumatra and
around Java from late December through mid and late January, and sank five or six [enemy]
merchantmen.
Having returned to Cam Ranh Bay after completing its support of the northern Borneo
operation in late December, the 5th Submarine Squadron carried out the operations in the
Indian Ocean by shifting its base to Penang after the seizure of the location in late December
and after the 11th Submarine Base Unit had been assigned [to the base]. The submarines of
the squadron departed from Cam Ranh Bay in early and mid January (one element joined
from the mainland of Japan via Davao), and engaged in the disruption of [enemy] shipping
lanes around Java. After carrying out operations as far as around the island of Ceylon with
one element, it advanced [its base] to Penang from late January to early February. During
these operations, the squadron sank more than a dozen enemy ships, but it [also] lost one of
its submarines (the I-60). The 6th Submarine Squadron, which had laid mines in the Philip-
pines area at the opening of hostilities and returned to Cam Ranh Bay, [again] left the bay in
the middle of December for surveilling and patrolling [around] the Philippines and with one
element the strategic area of Surabaya; it returned to Davao at the end of December. [Then]
in early January, all submarines [of the 6th Submarine Squadron] left Davao for northern
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Australia to take on a mission of laying mines in [the waters of] Port Darwin and the Torres
Strait and keeping a watch on the enemy fleet in the Arafura Sea; it returned to Davao in late
January. During these operations, the squadron spotted the U.S. heavy cruiser USS. Houston
in the Banda Sea on 14 January and chased her, but they let her slip away. The squadron lost
one submarine (the I-24 [I-124]) outside the port of Port Darwin.
The Manila Conference
Although at the Cam Ranh Agreement [conference] on 29 December it was decided, as de-
scribed previously, to drastically move up the operation schedule, not a few in the Navy
units on site from that moment onwards commented that on the operational level the [new]
schedule was impossible. After the launch of the Dutch East Indies operation, unfavorable
conditions had developed one after another just as had been feared, and the opinion that the
operation schedule should be postponed grew stronger. The grounds [for the opinion] in-
cluded the poor condition of the seized airfields, the counterattacks by enemy aircraft, the
delay in the minesweeping operations, the fatigue of the crews of the escort ships, and the
issue of the maintenance of the ships. Because the Army stubbornly opposed the Navy’s
opinion to postpone [the operation], the staff personnel concerned gathered in Manila on 21
January and discussed the matter, which resulted in the following changes in the contents of
the Cam Ranh Agreement.
1. Invasion schedule: To be postponed for four to nine days.
2. The air operation to destroy the enemy air power on Java shall be carried out from Balikpapan
and Makassar, and Banjarmasin will not be used. Instead, if possible, Bali should be seized right
before the landing on Java, and air units should be advanced [there], so as to have a hold upon
Java.
3. One requirement for the operations against southern Sumatra and western Java was the avail-
ability of the airfields in Western Borneo for the Navy, such as those in Kuching or Ledo. How-
ever, if they could not be readied in time, the Navy should use the airfields on the Malay
Peninsula.
Having concluded that the disembarkation of the main force of the Army units for the Malaya
region had been completed, Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet Admiral Yamamoto
issued on 24 January the order to shift to the phase-three disposition of forces. The aim of
the Southern Task Force in phase-three [operations] was the invasion of Java, for which the
forces of the Southern Task Force were roughly disposed as follows:
1. The Dutch East Indies Unit shall continue [its operation] to seize key areas in the eastern part
of the Dutch East Indies, such as Makassar, Ambon, and Timor.
2. As a preparatory operation for the invasion of Java, air operations to destroy the enemy air
power in eastern Java shall be carried out by land-based air units from Balikpapan and Kendari.
3. The Malaya Unit shall seize key areas in southern Sumatra, [from where] land-based air units
shall conduct air operations to destroy the enemy air power in western Java.
4. Before the landing on Java, Bali shall be seized, and air units shall be advanced [there].
5. The Dutch East Indies Unit shall put ashore the main force of the Sixteenth Army simultaneously
in eastern and western Java.
6. The Submarine Unit shall be deployed around Java to support the operations.
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7. Almost simultaneously with the landing [operation] on Java, mobile operations shall be con-
ducted on the waters south of Java with the main body of the Southern Task Force as well as
the newly added 2d Carrier Division and 2d Submarine Squadron, in order to attack Java from
all sides as well as to cut off the escape routes of the enemy.
8. The [newly] attached 2d Carrier Division shall in the first place make an attack on Port Darwin,
a strategic location in northern Australia, in concert with [the operation to] seize Timor.
9. The Malay Unit shall prepare for the operations in northern Sumatra, the Andaman Islands, the
Nicobar Islands, and the Burma area, so that it will be able to start [those operations] after the
seizure of Singapore. 
Completion of the Forward Push of the Bases in the Direction of Eastern Java
In the eastern part of the Dutch East Indies, conform to the [above] plan, the Ambon invasion
unit, which had left Davao on 27 January and had been joined on the way by naval escort
vessels from Menado and Kendari, started the landing [operation] on Ambon on 31 January.
The unit captured the place on 3 February, which led to the advance of Navy fighter planes
to the Ambon airfield as early as on the 5th. Then, [another] unit, which had left Kendari on
6 February, seized Makassar on 9 February. In this operation [against Makassar], one de-
stroyer was sunk by an enemy torpedo attack.
In the meantime, on 31 January, the Sakaguchi Detachment of the Army in Balikpapan
launched the Banjarmasin operation, starting its advance toward Banjarmasin by land (and
for one element by maneuvering small craft along the shore) and seized it on 10 February.
The main force of the land-based air unit advanced to Kendari and Balikpapan in late
January and carried out an air operation from 3 to 5 February to destroy the enemy air power
in eastern Java. On the 4th, it spotted a powerful enemy fleet on the sea east of Java and at-
tacked it with its full force. The result was seen as having utterly destroyed the main force of
the enemy. When it was further reported that more than one hundred enemy aircraft had
been destroyed, it was judged that the major part of the enemy air force in the area had been
destroyed. It was followed by the first air raid on Kupang from Kendari on 6 February.
On 8 February, the main force of the Carrier Task Force (minus the 5th Carrier Division
and the 2d Section of the 18th Destroyer Division) was newly incorporated into the Southern
Task Force and advanced from the mainland of Japan [on p. 212: from the Marshall Islands]
to Palau. After joining there the 2d Carrier Division, which had completed the attack on
Ambon, they left Palau on the 15th of February and attacked Port Darwin on the 19th. In
concert with this [operation], the land-based air unit also made a sortie from Ambon and
Kendari, attacked Port Darwin and caused serious damage to enemy aircraft, numerous
naval vessels and facilities on land.
The unit to capture Bali left Makassar on 18 February, landed on Bali on 19 February, and
seized the airfield [there]. However, that night a powerful enemy fleet attacked the anchor-
age. The 8th Destroyer Division (four destroyers) on site engaged it in a fierce night engage-
ment, and reported the military gain of sinking several enemy warships, while sustaining
some damage to two destroyers.
Earlier, at the Manila Conference on 21 January, the invasion of [Dutch] Timor had been
fixed on 20 February. Almost concurrently, an invasion against Portuguese Timor (Portugal
being a neutral state) was discussed at IGHQ, and it was decided to invade [the territory] on
the grounds that allied forces had after all been deployed in Portuguese territory and because
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of the importance of an air base in Dili. The invasion unit left Ambon on 17 and 18 February,
conducted a simultaneous landing in Kupang and Dili on 20 February, drove back the enemy
there and seized the airfield on the 21st. The 3d Yokosuka Special Landing Force carried out
a paradrop operation on Kupang. The land-based air unit advanced to Bali on the 20th of
February and Kupang on the 24th, from where it immediately launched a search and attack
[operation] for the enemy in eastern Java and northern Australia from the air; the prepara-
tions for the invasion of eastern Java were [now] for the most part completed.
Completion of the Forward Push of the [Air] Bases in the Malaya Area
With the operation at Endau in late January, the Malaya Unit finished for the time being its
task of putting Army units ashore in Malaya and was subsequently supposed to engage upon
the southern Sumatra operation.
The plan for the southern Sumatra invasion operation was to advance land-based air units
to western Borneo, conduct an air campaign against southern Sumatra and western Java that
also served to cut off the escape routes from Singapore and to neutralize the enemy [there],
and after extending the search range for the enemy as far as the Java Sea, capture those areas
in conjunction with the Army. In order to realize that, the Navy put all its energy into accel-
erating the preparation of the Kuching airfield, while at the same time trying to rapidly trans-
port air base matériel to the seized Ledo airfield. However, the Ledo airfield was situated far
inland, and moreover, the roads and bridges [to the airfield] had been thoroughly destroyed,
which made it difficult to transport the fuel and ammunition. On top of that, it was learned
that airfield itself was not very good, which meant that it could not be ready in time for the
southern Sumatra operation.
Having no other choice, Malaya Unit Commander V. Adm. Ozawa Jisaburō decided to
advance one half of the force of the land-based air unit to Kuantan and the other half to Kuch-
ing, and proposed to the Southern Army a two-day postponement of the operation, which
was supposed to be implemented on 4 February.
On 5 February, [part of] the air force was advanced to the Kuching base at last, which en-
abled [the unit] to launch the air operation against Bangka [Island] and western Java. How-
ever, due to the poor condition of the airfield, aircraft were allowed to load only half of the
loading capacity of ammunition and fuel, and [the operation] to gain command of the air
did not make as much progress as one had wished. Meanwhile, when an advance unit went
to the Kuantan airfield, to where it had been hastily decided to advance [part of the unit], it
found that [the airfield] was not suitable for immediate use by land-based attack plane units,
because giant trees obstructed the extension of the runway. It was estimated that felling these
trees would take several days. The Navy had not made a survey of the Kuantan [airfield]
until that time. On 6 February, Malaya Unit Commander Vice Admiral Ozawa proposed to
the Southern Army a further four-day postponement of [the launch of] the operation. As the
Southern Army headquarters was in favor of invading [area after area] in one go on the con-
cept of a strategic pursuit, they were extremely displeased with the postponement of the op-
erations and the Navy’s lack of preparation. However, as long as the Navy did not put the
operations in motion, the Army could not launch them [on its own], and the Army impa-
tiently passed the days. In the end, on 9 February, the prospect became clear that the [Kuan-
tan] airfield would be ready for use (though [limiting] the fuel and ammunition [for the
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aircraft] to half), and the southern Sumatra invasion unit left Cam Ranh Bay on the evening
of the 9th, in order to definitely carry out [the operation] on 15 February (five days later than
planned in the Manila Agreement).*
The Navy land-based air unit advanced to the Kuantan airfield on 11 February and
launched the attack on the Bangka [island] area, while the Army Third Air Force launched
air raids on the Palembang area on consecutive days from 6 February onwards. In the mean-
time, the main force of the Twenty-fifth Army, which had reached the southern tip of the
Malay Peninsula on 31 January, launched the operation to land in the face of the enemy on
the island of Singapore on 9 February. 
Capture of Southern Sumatra; the Preparations to Invade Western Java More
or Less Completed 
Before dawn on 15 February, [one of] the advance units of the southern Sumatra invasion
unit landed in Mentok on Bangka Island, while the other units started sailing upriver toward
Palembang by operating [landing] craft. That morning, reconnaissance seaplane(s) searching
for the enemy spotted a large enemy unit sailing northward through the Gasper Strait. [At
that time] Malaya Unit Commander Vice Admiral Ozawa was on the waters north of Bangka
Island, leading the main force of the surface unit in order to cover the main convoy of the
[southern Sumatra] invasion unit (with the 38th Division on board). He judged that the
enemy force was a powerful unit including one battleship, and decided to destroy [the
enemy] with the surface unit, after first attacking them with the air unit. Although the air at-
tack was carried out for as much as six hours by the force of the land-based unit, which flew
from Saigon, Kuching and Kuantan, etc., as well as by aircraft of the carrier (Ryūjō) of the
surface unit, the enemy reversed course and [the unit] let the latter escape before dealing it
a major blow.
On 14 February, the Army paratrooper unit was dropped on the airfield and the oil re-
fineries of Palembang and seized them, while the unit that had sailed upstream the Musi
River in [landing] craft also reached Palembang on the evening of the 15th. After the river
was cleared of mines, the main force of the Army southern Sumatra invasion corps also sailed
upstream the Musi River and reached Palembang on the 17th. 
Two days earlier, on 15 February, Singapore surrendered. The surface unit of the Malaya
Unit caught up with the naval vessels escaping from Singapore, and caught or sank more
than a dozen small ones.
Malaya Unit Commander Ozawa concluded that the southern Sumatra invasion opera-
tion was more or less completed as of 18 February, pulled the major part of the surface unit
back to the Anambas Islands in order to shift to the preparations for the coming operations
([that is] the clearing [of mines in] the waterways of Singapore and the Malacca Strait).
As the operations in the Malaya area were largely completed, Southern Task Force Com-
mander V. Adm. Kondō Nobutake as of 21 February removed one element of the 3d De-
stroyer Squadron and some other forces from the Malaya Unit and incorporated them into
the Dutch East Indies Unit for the operation against western Java. The main force of the 22d
Air Flotilla was also removed from the Malaya Unit and incorporated into the land-based
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* According to Vol. 3, pp. 302, 310, only the amount of fuel was halved and the planes made a stopover at Kahang
to top up their fuel tanks.
air unit of the Southern Task Force to conduct operations under the command of Eleventh
Air Fleet Commander V. Adm. Tsukahara Nishizō. With these [redeployments], the prepa-
rations for the invasion of western Java were also by and large completed.
2. The Capture of Tarakan (See Illustration No. 7)
The capture of Tarakan was carried out by the Western Attack Unit with the support of the
Air Unit of the Southern Task Force. The disposition of forces of the Western Attack Unit was
as shown in the following table.(47)
Notes:
1. Although the commander in chief of the Third Fleet commanded the Western Attack Unit, the
invasion operation was virtually directed by 1st Escort Unit Commander and 4th Destroyer
Squadron Commander R. Adm. Nishimura Shōji. 
2. 24th Destroyer Division: the Umikaze, the Kawakaze, the Yamakaze, and the Suzukaze
2d Destroyer Division: the Yūdachi, the Samidare, the Harusame, and the Murasame
9th Destroyer Division: the Asagumo, the Minegumo, the Natsugumo and the Yamagumo
31st Subchaser Division: three submarine chasers
11th Minesweeper Division: four minesweepers
30th Minesweeper Division: two minesweepers
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The Naka, 24th Destroyer Div,
9th Destroyer Div (minus the
Yamagumo), 2d Destroyer Div
(minus the Murasame), 11th
and 30th Minesweeper Divs,
31st Subchaser Div, Patrol
Boats Nos. 36, 37, and 38, 2d
Kure SLF (minus 1 plt), 5th
Construction Squad, and 2d
Defense Detail
1. To provide direct escort for
the convoy of the Army
Saka guchi Det and the 2d
Kure SLF
2. In conjunction with the
Army, to seize Tarakan and
















dr 2d Base Force (minus 11th and
30th Minesweeper Divs, 31st
Subchaser Div, Minesweeper
No. 20, and the Sanuki-maru),
and the  Itsukushima
1. To cooperate with the 1st Es-
cort Unit (by providing
forces)
2. To defend key locations and



















The San’yō-maru, the Sanuki-
maru, Patrol Boat No. 39,
Kureha-maru No. 3, 2d Kure
SLF 1st Plt, and fishing boats
To provide the 1st Escort Unit
with guard against sub-
marines, as well as to support
the landings
Plan of Operations, etc.
The Arrangements Between the 1st Escort Unit and the [Army] 
Sakaguchi Detachment
On 5 January, 1st Escort Unit Commander R. Adm. Nishimura Shōji and
Maj. Gen. Sakaguchi Shizuo concluded the arrangements concerning
capture of Tarakan, which were in outline as follows:
1. Disposition of Forces for the Landing Operation
Note: It had been specified in the Iwakuni Agreement that the 2d Kure Special Landing Force
should come under the command of Detachment Commander Sakaguchi from the time of
landing on Tarakan till the conclusion of operations in the most important areas.
2. Landing Actions and Disembarkation Operations
(1) It is principally intended to conduct surprise landings.
(2) Gunfire by Naval vessels to cover the landings shall be provided at the request of Detach-
ment Commander Sakaguchi.
(3) Transport ships shall change anchorage to the Lingkas anchorage one after another when
ordered. At that time, depending on the circumstances, naval vessels shall guide them along
the waterway.
(4) The preparations for the subsequent operations shall be made at the Lingkas anchorage.
The Plan of Operations of the 1st Escort Unit
On 4 January, 1st Escort Unit Commander Rear Admiral Nishimura issued 1st Escort Unit
Order No. 1 in Malalag Bay, and disclosed the outline of the operation to capture Tarakan,
the main points of which were as follows:(56)
1. Distribution of transport ships
1st Section: 1) the Tsuruga-maru, 2) the Liverpool-maru, 3) the Hiteru-maru, 4) the Hankow-maru,
5) the Ehime-maru, 6) the Kunikawa-maru, and 7) the Kano-maru (with the right wing unit of
the Sakaguchi Detachment and the 2d Kure Special Landing Force on board)




Force Coast to land on Tasks
Main force of the Sakaguchi Det 
(1½ bns) Central part, east coast of Tarakan To seize the oil fields and Lingkas
One element of the Sakaguchi Det
(1 bn) Southeastern end of Tarakan To seize the Mengacu Battery
2d Kure SLF (1 bn) Central part, east coast of Tarakan To seize the airfield
2d Section: 1) the Havana-maru, 2) the Teiryū-maru, 3) the Kuretake-maru, 4) the Nichiai-maru,
5) the Kagu-maru, 6) the Kunitsu-maru, and 7) the Rakutō-maru (with the left wing unit of the
Sakaguchi Detachment, the [Navy] 5th Construction Squad and the 2d Defense Detail on
board)
2. Outline of the sortie from Davao
(1) The 24th Destroyer Division and the 9th Destroyer Division (minus the Yamagumo) shall
leave Malalag Bay at 0800 on 7 January as the clearing unit, and clear enemy submarines
ahead of the sailing route of the transport fleet, after which they shall join the transport fleet
on the evening of that day.
(2) The 2d Destroyer Division (minus the Murasame), Patrol Boats Nos. 36, 37 and 38 shall sail
to the sea off Davao, leaving Malalag Bay on the morning of 7 January. [Then] they shall de-
part from [Davao] at 1100, guiding and escorting the transport fleet.
3. Escort during sail
(1) Planned sailing route: as shown in the Separate Illustration No. 11 (Omitted by the author)
(2) Sailing speed: 8 knots at normal speed, 6 knots at slow speed
(3) Protective sailing formation: as shown in the Separate Illustration No. 10 (Illustration No. 6)




























Illustration No. 6 — The Sailing Formation of the 1st Escort Unit on First Alert
4. Entering into the anchorage areas
At 0700 on 10 January, the 9th Destroyer Division, 31st Subchaser Division and the 11th and
the 30th Minesweeper Divisions shall leave the line without [separate] orders to form a se-
curity unit (commander: 9th Destroyer Division commander), sail to the anchorage areas
ahead [of the fleet] and sweep for mines at the 1st anchorage as shown in the Separate Illus-
tration No. 12 (Illustration No. 7). After sunset, the unit shall search [for mines] and clear
them at the 2d anchorage, while trying to detect enemy submarines in the waters nearby.
Also, [the unit] shall have two submarine chasers take up the positions shown in the Separate
Illustration No. 12 (Illustration No. 7) to act as markers.
The times for anchoring the transport ships and launching the landing [operations] shall be
set as follows:
1st anchorage: anchoring at 1930 on the 10th; launch of the landing [operation] at 2130.
2d anchorage: anchoring at 0000 on the 11th; launch of the landing [operation] at 0200.
5. Guarding of the anchorages (one light cruiser, ten destroyers, one submarine chaser, three patrol
boats, and six minesweepers)
The 24th Destroyer Division and the 31st Subchaser Division (minus the marker vessels):
Direct guarding around the 1st anchorage
The 2d Destroyer Division (minus the Murasame) and Patrol Boat No. 36:
Direct guarding around the 2d anchorage
The Naka, the 9th Destroyer Division (minus the Yamagumo and the Natsugumo), the 11th
and the 30th Minesweeper Divisions and Patrol Boats Nos. 37 and 38:
Guarding of outer [areas] of the anchorages
The Natsugumo (leaving the line at 0700 on the 11th):
Guarding of the waterway north of Tarakan
6. Sweeping the Lingkas anchorage for mines
The 11th and the 30th Minesweeper Divisions (led by the 11th Minesweeper Division com-
mander) shall sweep the areas A and B in the Separate Illustration No. 12 (Illustration No. 7)
for mines by separate orders.
7. Special Landing Forces and others
The 2d Kure Special Landing Force, the 5th Construction Squad and the 2d Defense Detail
shall, in cooperation with the Sakaguchi Detachment, land on the island of Tarakan, seize,
ready and secure the air base and [also] secure important resource areas.
The Plan of Operations of the Sakaguchi Detachment(56)
1. Mission
[The detachment] shall land on the east coast of Tarakan Island, cut through the jungle area
and seize the Tarakan oil fields in one go, while attacking the enemy strongholds from their
rear and destroying them. Following that, it shall seize the airfield and the oil fields in the
north. Once the operations on the island are concluded, it shall hand over the guarding [du-
ties] to the Naval unit, assemble the main force around the town [of Tarakan], embark on
the ship(s) in succession and make preparation for the subsequent operations.
2. Disposition of forces
Right Wing Unit 
Commander: 146th Infantry Regiment Commander Col. Yamamoto Kyōhei
(1) Forces: the 146th Infantry Regiment (minus 2 battalions), one battery, one engineer company,
and one battalion of the 2d Kure Special Landing Force
(2) Action: As the main force, the Yamamoto Regiment shall make a forced landing at the mouth
of the Amal River, and after clearing the enemy around the place, swiftly cut through the
jungle, seize the Pamusian oil field area north of the town of Tarakan, and advance to Lingkas
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before sunrise. The 2d Kure Special Landing Force shall go ashore about
thirty minutes after [the landing of] the main force, charging at the rear
of the latter. While the main force is seizing the town of Tarakan], it shall
overtake the main force and seize the airfield.
Left Wing Unit
Commander: 146th Infantry Regiment 2d Battalion Commander Maj.
Kanauji Ken’ichi
(1) Forces: the 2d Battalion of the 146th Infantry Regiment and one engineer
platoon
(2) Action: The unit shall go ashore in a southeastern part of Tarakan Island
almost simultaneously with [the landing of] the right wing unit, charge
through the jungle, attack and seize the batteries of Mengacu and Karun-
gan from the rear. [After that,] by way of Lingkas, and also passing by
the 2d Kure Special Landing Force at the airfield, it shall attack and seize
the Gunung Cangkol and Juwata oil fields and the Juwata battery.
The unit under the direct control of the detachment
(1) Forces: the 3d Battalion of the 146th Infantry Regiment, armored vehicle
unit, one artillery battalion, antiaircraft artillery battalion, independent
engineer company, etc.
(2) Action: Following the landing of the right wing unit, the unit shall ad-
vance in the rear of the former, and reach the town of Tarakan.
The Plan of Operations of the Air Unit of the Southern Task Force
As of 7 January, the Air Unit of the Southern Task Force was deployed
in the following way:
Davao base: Eleventh Air Fleet headquarters, 21st Air Flotilla headquarters, 27 Type–1 land-
based attack planes of the Kanoya Air Group Detachment, 28 transport planes of the 1st Air
Group, 54 Type–0 fighter planes of the 3d Air Group, 7 land-based reconnaissance planes,
20 Type–97 flying boats of the Tōkō Air Group
Jolo base: 23d Air Flotilla headquarters, 12 Type–1 land-based attack planes of the Takao Air
Group, 41 Type–0 fighter planes of the Tainan Air Group, 5 land-based reconnaissance planes
On 2 January, Air Unit Commander Vice Admiral Tsukahara disclosed the outline of the sup-
port [the unit was to provide] for the invasion operation by Telegraphic Operation Order
No. 19, the main contents of which were as follows:(54)
1. Antiaircraft guarding
(1) [Guarding against enemy aircraft] shall be provided for all invasion units continuously dur-
ing daylight hours, except for the period from the entering of the units into the anchorages
at Menado, Kendari and Ambon until the advance of fighter planes to the seized bases
[there].
(2) The 1st Air Raid Unit shall be in charge of guarding for the Tarakan invasion unit against
enemy aircraft in [the zone] east of 123º30‘E.
2. As for the reconnaissance of the landing points, photoreconnaissance of each landing point shall
be conducted as quickly as possible and sent to the units concerned.
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23d Air Flotilla 
Commander R. Adm.
Takenaka Ryōzō
2d Base Force 
Commander R. Adm.
Hirose Suéto
On 7 January, in conformity with the above Telegraphic Operation Order
No. 19, 2d Air Raid Unit Commander R. Adm. Takenaka Ryōzō decided
on the following outline of support for the 1st Escort Unit:(62)
1. Antiaircraft guarding: 3 Type–0 fighter planes and 1 land-based reconnais-




2. Search for enemy surface vessels and guarding against them
Shall be carried out, leaving the base at 0800 on 9 and 10 January, [in an
area] within a radius of 300 nautical miles of the range between 135º and
220º with the Jolo airfield as its center, ([to be conducted with] 6 land-
based attack planes).
As mentioned previously, since gaining command of the air [in the areas to capture] was de-
layed, Dutch East Indies Unit Commander Vice Admiral Takahashi on the 7th changed the
date to launch [the operation to] seize Tarakan and Menado from the 10th to the 11th. Ac-
cordingly, the operation schedule of all units was postponed by one day.(62)
The Plan of Operations of the 2d Base Unit(68, 72)
1. The commander, on board of the Wakataka, shall leave Davao on 9 January, leading the main force
of the 2d Base Force, follow in the rear of the 1st Escort Unit and reach Tarakan on 11 January.
2. After the main force reaches Tarakan, the 11th and the 30th Minesweeper Divisions and the Ku-
magawa-maru shall be returned to the command [of the 2d Base Unit] and charged with sweeping
for mines inside the port of Tarakan.
3. After sweeping for mines in the port of Tarakan and seizing [areas] around the port, the unit
shall take charge of preparing, operating and administering the facilities of the port, while [also]
carrying out the guarding and defense of the anchorages, relieving the 1st Escort Unit.
The Plan of Operations of the 1st Air Unit
R. Adm. Imamura Osamu, commander of the 1st Air Unit (a seaplane unit), by order No. 1
of the unit, assigned [his unit] to support the 1st Escort Unit and escort the Sakaguchi De-
tachment under sail. He [also] disclosed the outline of the support [the unit was to provide]
during the landing operations on Tarakan. The outline of the actions of the ships and the al-
lotment of the air operation were as follows:(76)
The outline of the actions of each ship











[The unit shall] conduct flying missions around the anchorages.
At 1700, it shall depart from Davao.
Around 0800, [it shall be] [on the waters] southwest of Tawi-tawi (or the
waters near the convoy when required), and carry out its duties.
[It shall] join the Sanuki-maru at the point 119ºE and 4ºN at 0700; after that
[it shall] act appropriately on the waters north of the convoy; and ad-
vance toward Tarakan while carrying out the air operation.
[It is] scheduled to enter the port of Tarakan in the afternoon.
The allotment for the air campaign





[The unit shall] conduct flying missions around the anchorages.
At 1830 it shall depart from Davao.
[It shall] act appropriately in Sarangani Bay or in the near waters and
carry out air operations. 
After that, by 0700, [it shall] join the San’yō-maru at the point 119ºE* and
4ºN; afterwards [it shall] act appropriately near the San’yō-maru; ad-
vance toward Tarakan while conducting air operations.
Patrol Boat
No. 35**
7 January [The unit shall] replenish and prepare for a sortie in the morning; leave
Davao at 1700, after which [it shall] advance toward Tarakan, while










Direct defense of the trans-
port convoy against
[enemy] aircraft





2 Type–0 observation sea-
planes/Sanuki-maru
3 Type–0 observation sea-
planes/San’yō-maru
As designated by the
captain of the ship.
1st shift 1100 (1300)
2d shift 1300 (1500)
8 January
Direct defense of the trans-
port convoy against
[enemy] submarines
0630 (1830) 2 Type–0 observation sea-
planes/Sanuki-maru
As designated by the
captain of the ship.
9 January
Ditto 0650 (1900) 2 Type–0 observation sea-
planes/San’yō-maru
1st shift 0650 (0900)
2d shift 0845 (1100)
3d shift 1045 (1300)
4th shift 1245 (1500)
5th shift 1445 (1700)
6th shift 1645 (1900)













2 Type–0 observation sea-
planes/San’yō-maru
2 Type–0 observation sea-
planes/Sanuki-maru
2 Type–0 observation sea-
planes/San’yō-maru
2 Type–0 observation sea-
planes/Sanuki-maru
2 Type–0 observation sea-
planes/San’yō-maru
Each ship can increase
the number of aircraft,
depending on the sit-
uation.






* The text mistakenly has 111º
** In the tables on pp. 96 and 126: Patrol Boat No. 39. She was in January replaced by Patrol Boat No. 35.
Note by the editor: According to note 76, the above table is based on the records of the Sanuki-
maru. These records could not be traced in the archives. The records of the Sanyō-maru could
be traced, but they differ in several places from the table above.
Assessment of the Enemy Situation Centering on Tarakan
First Escort Unit Commander Rear Admiral Nishimura’s judgment about the enemy situation
in the Tarakan area right before the sortie from Davao was in outline as follows:(56)
1. No enemy aircraft were spotted on the Tarakan airfield.
2. It seems that one or two submarines are staying in the port of Tarakan; it is also reported that a
naval vessel that looked like a submarine tender was [also] there. 
3. Enemy naval surface vessels are not likely to appear on the waters between Davao and Tarakan.
4. It seems that there are a few enemy naval surface vessels in the Balikpapan area.
5. Although [Japanese] air operations are to be carried out with Jolo as the base, the tardiness in
the improvement of the base caused a delay in the advance of land-based attack planes. [Because
of this], attacks on Tarakan were conducted only about two times by fighter planes, and these
have not yet produced adequate results. 
6. As we are advancing toward the Borneo area from now on, the appearance of many enemy air-
craft is expected. 
7. Enemy submarines are gradually assembling at the mouth of Davao Gulf and in the Celebes
Sea; this situation requires the highest state of alert.
The Launch of the Invasion Operation
Preliminary Neutralization of the Enemy Air Power Completed
The air attack on Tarakan was launched first of all by the Mihoro Air Group of the Malaya
Unit. That is to say, in view of enemy aircraft coming toward Miri and Kuching, the Malaya
Unit was keenly aware of the necessity to neutralize Tarakan, and attacked Tarakan on the
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11 January
Support for the ground op-
eration







2 Type–0 observation sea-
planes/San’yō-maru
2 Type–0 observation sea-
planes/Sanuki-maru
2 Type–0 observation sea-
planes/San’yō-maru
2 Type–0 observation sea-
planes/San’yō-maru
2 Type–0 observation sea-
planes/Sanuki-maru
2 Type–0 observation sea-
planes/San’yō-maru
1. Support for the
ground operations














(4) Enemy forces in
the outer areas of
Tarakan Island
The execution of subsequent air operations shall be ordered depending on the war situation by separate orders.
26th of December with seven land-based attack planes, and again on the 28th with seven
land-based attack planes and four fighter planes of the Mihoro Air Group.(71) However, each
time only one aircraft was spotted on the ground in these attacks, and they were destroyed.
As described previously, on the same day, the 28th, the 3d Air Group of the 1st Air Raid Unit
attacked Tarakan with seven Type–0 fighter planes and one land-based reconnaissance plane,
and reported that the unit had caught up with nine enemy fighter planes and had brought
down four planes for sure, almost certainly brought down two, but was not sure about the
results of the other two or three.(71)
It was not until 30 December when the 2d Air Raid Unit, which was [supposed to be]
mainly in charge of the attack [on the areas including Tarakan], made its first attack on
Tarakan.(71) From that time on, the unit conducted reconnaissance attacks over the area of
Tarakan with fighter planes and land-based reconnaissance planes on 31 [December] and 3,
4, and 5 January, but no enemy was spotted other than one auxiliary aircraft carrier, which
was seen at Balikpapan on the 31st by a land-based reconnaissance plane.(7) Meanwhile, by
the 7th [of January] the long-awaited advance of twelve land-based attack planes of the Takao
Air Group from Gaoxiong to the Jolo base was [finally] effected.(62)
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Type–0 Fighter Plane
Type–98 Land-based Reconnaissance Plane
The Sailing of the Convoy
At 0800 on 7 January, the convoy of about forty ships left Davao as scheduled. Receiving a
report that a reconnaissance seaplane of the San’yō-maru had spotted two objects at about
4º55‘N 124ºE, which looked like enemy submarines, but that it had lost sight of them in a
short while, the convoy [once] altered course to avoid [enemy submarines]. However, other
than that, the convoy calmly approached the anchorage.(56) During the sailing, reconnaissance
seaplanes of the 1st Air Unit and fighter planes of the 1st and the 2d Air Raid Units provided
direct defense above the convoy, while the land-based attack planes of the units made a re-
connaissance attack on Tarakan as well as searched for the enemy in the Makassar Strait. The
outline of the results of the air reconnaissance reported by the 2d Air Raid Unit as of the af-
ternoon of the 9th was as follows:(71)
1. On the 9th, [the unit] attacked one merchantman and one gunboat ([of] 200 tons), which were
moored alongside the pier at the port of Lingkas. Two bombs directly hit them, and [the ships]
are expected to catch flames and sink.
2. It seems that the enemy does not expect that they will come under attack of the Japanese forces
soon.
3. Although there is considerably fierce antiaircraft fire, no enemy aircraft were spotted.
The destroyer division and the minesweeper divisions, which had sailed ahead as planned
from 0000 on the 10th onward, reached the lightship outside the port of Tarakan around 1000
of the same day, seized a 1,000t-class Dutch merchantman loaded with one aircraft, which
had set out from the port just then, led it to the area near the 1st anchorage and had it drop
anchor. In the meantime, around 1130, the Natsugumo reached the lightship and seized it.
Around that time, the Sanuki-maru, ([which sailed] in the rear out of sight of the transport
fleet) was bombed by large enemy planes, but sustained no damage. By 1500 the convoy was
approached for about thirty minutes by two large enemy aircraft, and it was considered that
the full picture of the Tarakan invasion unit was more or less known [to the enemy].
Around 1600, the security unit, which had sailed ahead, completed the clearing [of mines]
of the 1st anchorage and reported no mines [left]. At 1750 when the convoy reached right in
front of the anchorage, three twin-engine bombers, and two fighter planes of the enemy came
for an attack, dropped bombs near the convoy and immediately escaped. Again at 1818 two
twin-engine planes came for an attack and dropped bombs, but fortunately the Japanese
forces sustained no damage. At 1900, separating into the 1st and the 2d Sections, the convoy
dropped anchor at the 1st anchorage thirty minutes earlier than scheduled. Earlier at 1805, a
reconnaissance seaplane of the San’yō-maru had spotted an enemy submarine afloat one nau-
tical mile off Tarakan, but let her slip away. The security unit cleared the sea of mines at the
2d anchorage between 1935 and 2115, and reported that no mines were snagged.(56)
The Landings and the Land Combat (See Illustration No. 7)
The 1st Section, i.e. the right wing unit of the Sakaguchi Detachment and the 2d Kure Special
Landing Force ([the latter] under the command of Cdr. Makiuchi Tadao), dropped anchor at
the 1st anchorage at 1900 and immediately started their preparations for the landings. At
2130, the first landing unit of the right wing unit of the Sakaguchi Detachment left the an-
chorage, which was followed by the 2d Kure Special Landing Force, leaving the anchorage
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thirty minutes later at 2200. Around 2100, flames from fires that had apparently been set were
observed from the sea rising up at two locations on Tarakan. At 2215, the 2d Section set sail
and headed for the 2d anchorage. At 2325, the Yamakaze, which was patrolling the southern
side of the 1st anchorage, spotted an enemy submarine that had surfaced, but lost sight of
her because she had dived immediately. Four ships of the 2d Section dropped anchor at the
2d anchorage between 0100 and 0120 on the 11th, and the first landing unit of the left wing
unit of the Sakaguchi Detachment left the 2d anchorage at 0220. From 0330 onwards, the
[ships of the] 1st Section also moved to the 2d anchorage one after another. Around 0700, 1st
Escort Unit Commander Rear Admiral Nishimura received a report from Detachment Com-
mander Sakaguchi that “the first landing unit had successfully landed at 0000 on the 11th
and the second landing unit at 0400.” [Meanwhile] on the island of Tarakan, where fires had
been burning from the previous night onwards, [further] explosions occurred at the oil fields
and large fires broke out in the area of Lingkas around 0300, creating a ghastly sight in the
dim light of dawn with black smoke covering the entire sky.(56)
Around 0940, the 1st Escort Unit commander received from the Sakaguchi Detachment
the first report on the land combat, which was in summary as follows: “(1) The right wing
unit mistook [the location of] the Amal [river] and landed on the northeastern end of Tarakan
Island; at present it is preparing to transfer to the mouth of the Amal river. (2) The left wing
unit is advancing as scheduled. [Reported at] 0900.” Although the seizure of Lingkas and
the Mengacu battery was a matter of the utmost urgency, [enemy] machinegun fire from the
ground at friendly aircraft flying over these areas indicated that the left wing unit had not
yet seized them. [The Navy] had not the slightest idea what had happened to this unit.
[Meanwhile,] two enemy four-engine bombers raided the anchorage twice between 1300 and
1340; they dropped bombs around the anchorage, but no damage was sustained. At 1400,
the 2d Base Unit, which followed [the 1st Escort Unit], [also] arrived at the anchorage, and
the 1st Escort Unit commander returned the minesweeping force to the 2d Base Unit. Finally
at 1700, he received from the Sakaguchi Detachment the second report on the land combat,
which was in outline as follows: 
1. The right wing unit and the [naval] special landing force have advanced to the highlands east
of [the town of] Tarakan, but blocked by a powerful enemy artillery position, their advance has
been delayed. They plan to break through the position tonight by means of a night attack.
2. The situation of the left wing unit is unknown.
3. [We] request bombing of the battery position to the east of the foreign residential area in the
town of Tarakan, the Juwata Battery at the northern end of Tarakan, and the antiaircraft battery
position on the islet of Sadau west [of Tarakan].
Thus, on 11 January, with sunset at 1916, the second night [on Tarakan] came around while
the situation of the land combat failed to work out as expected. About one day had passed
since the launch of the Tarakan operation, but the advance of the right wing unit had got
stuck whereas the situation of the left wing unit was totally unknown. Moreover, the enemy
at the Mengacu Battery was [still] very active, while right in front essential resource materials
were being consumed by fire. [The Japanese forces] impatiently greeted sunrise on the 12th.
In the meantime, in the middle of night of the 11th, having heard nothing at all from the left
wing unit since its landing, Detachment Commander Sakaguchi deployed one infantry com-
pany, which was under the direct control of the detachment and led by Lt. Col. Namekata
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Shōichi, to land at Cape Batu and advance along the coast to seize the Mengacu Battery. The
Namekata Detachment landed on the coast southeast of the battery at 0430 on the 12th, and
advanced in front of the battery around dawn. Detachment Commander Sakaguchi was ad-
vancing at the rear of the right wing unit after its landing. [According to Vol. 3, The Invasion
of the Dutch East Indies, p. 179, Detachment Commander Sakaguchi landed at Amal sometime
during the day on the 12th, after it had become clear that his landing at the Lingkas pier was
impossible.]
The right wing unit, i.e. the Yamamoto Regiment, which had planned to break through
the strong enemy position in a night attack, handed over the task of securing the highlands
northeast of the town of Tarakan to the [naval] special landing force and carried out the night
attack on the enemy position at 2300. However, meeting with extremely fierce resistance of
the enemy, the Yamamoto Regiment, which at one time managed to seize part of the enemy
barracks, failed to succeed in seizing the entire position and had no choice but to go back to
its original position by dawn. At 0820, when the regiment was making preparations to resume
the attack, the bearer of a flag of truce of the enemy sent by the enemy garrison commander
came to offer a general surrender. Receiving the offer, Regimental Commander Yamamoto
wired Detachment Commander Sakaguchi his request that [the detachment commander]
swiftly land at the Lingkas pier. Also, while starting disarming the enemy, he strictly in-
structed them to forbid any resistance by the batteries at the mouth of the port. The special
landing force seized the airfield at 1500, but the left wing unit lost its bearings in the dense
forest and only reached the rear of the Karungan Battery around noon on the 12th. However,
unable to find the battery and due to communication troubles, the unit was not able to seize
the said battery on that day. Detachment Commander Sakaguchi learned of the surrender of
the enemy at 0900, and advanced into the town of Tarakan [according to Vol. 3, p. 179, at
1930].(56)
The Engagement of Minesweepers No. 13 and No. 14
Having received the report of the surrender of the enemy at 0930, 1st Escort Unit Commander
Rear Admiral Nishimura, leading the Naka, shifted to [the area] near the 2d anchorage from
the outer area of the anchorages, so as to take general command of the clearing of the water-
ways to the mouth of the port of Tarakan as well as the disembarkation of units and matériel
at the port of Tarakan. He took a position from where he could observe the mouth of the port
of Tarakan and issued an order to start clearing the waters [of mines] at 1100. According to
the “Action Report of the 4th Destroyer Squadron, No. 3,” the details of the engagement of
the minesweeper divisions were as follows.
The Engagement of the Minesweeper Divisions at the Mengacu Waterway on 12 January
1. The situation before the engagement
(a) The general situation
(1) Although the situation of the land combat was not clear, its progress seemed quite dif-
ferent from what had been expected. The enemy battery at Mengacu was still intact; two
large-sized motorized [landing] craft, which operated near the mouth of the port on the
afternoon of the 11th, came under fierce fire from the enemy battery. Although [the craft]
managed to return safely, the power [of the battery] should not be underestimated.
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Illustration No. 7 — The Outline of the Capture of Tarakan (10-20 January, 1942)
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(2) The fires at the oil wells and tanks were burning so furiously that a thick black smoke
completely covered the sky in the west, consuming the heavy oil resources, about which
we could do nothing but watch them [burn] in front of us.
(3) Because the friendly fighter planes were based on Jolo, which is far away, it was impos-
sible for them to ensure a flawless cover against enemy air raids, due to the time [required
to get here] and for meteorological reasons. On the contrary, enemy planes frequently
came in for a raid; they sometimes came around sunset after the friendly fighter planes
had returned [to their bases].
(4) In view of the coming operations, the rapid preparation of the airfield [on Tarakan] was
one of our greatest concerns.
In these circumstances, wishing to clear the waterway [of mines] as soon as possible follow-
ing a rapid progress in the land combat, in order to disembark the required personnel and
matériel, to ready the airfield (so that friendly aircraft could be deployed), and to secure the
heavy oil resources, all of [the units] had been making preparations while awaiting the report
of victory in the land combat.
(b) The launch of the minesweeper divisions
Around 0930 on the 12th, a report came from the army that the enemy garrison commander
and his men had offered to surrender. Then, as soon as the order to clear the waters [of
mines] was issued at 1100, the minesweeper divisions got ready to go into action. It was
with such swiftness that it struck one by a “are they going already?” feeling of surprise.
The commander of the 11th Minesweeper Division went into action leading the 11th and
the 30th Minesweeper Divisions and already reached the mouth of the port around 1200.
The 11th and the 30th Minesweeper Divisions got into formation ready for minesweeping
and were followed by several large-sized motorized [landing] craft belonging to the Special
Minesweeping Service Unit of the Kumagawa-maru. They grandly entered the waterway of
Mengacu.
2. The Progress of the Action [Illustration No. 8]
(Although the action report of the minesweeper divisions
should [ideally] be referred to for the details, [here] the
course of events based on the progress of the action as
witnessed from the bridge of the Naka is described be-
cause it was difficult to learn the details [from the
minesweeper division report] due to the loss of those di-
rectly involved in the action, i.e. the 11th Minesweeper
Division commander, Minesweepers Nos. 13 and 14, and
the majority of the crew. However, from the Naka, the ac-
tion was almost throughout observed from distance of
twelve to thirteen kilometers.)
The Minesweeper divisions got into formation ready
for minesweeping, keeping a strict alert against the Men-
gacu battery as well as against mines. With all the crew
having taken up their positions and geared up, they
headed for the port with Minesweeper No. 13 at the head.
Around 1200, as soon as [Minesweeper No. 13] changed
course north of Menulun Island and headed toward the
port, a hidden battery at Karungan (situated at the foot
of a mountain and so well camouflaged that it was not
easy to spot [even] when after the seizure [of Tarakan]
viewed from the pier) and located at a distance of about
two kilometers [from the ships], abruptly opened fire, at
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Mengacu
First shot





Illustration No. 8 — The Engagement of
the Minesweeper Divisions
first at Minesweeper No. 13. Minesweeper No. 13 immediately fired back, but the enemy fire
became suddenly accurate from about the third salvo. [Minesweeper No. 13] first of all received
a direct hit midships near the waterline. Following Minesweeper No. 13, Minesweeper No. 14
[also] began firing back.
The enemy markedly stepped up its rate of fire, and the artillery duel became extremely
fierce. Although hit by enemy shells, Minesweepers Nos. 13 and 14 still continued firing and
kept their course toward the port (seemingly gaining speed). [Meanwhile,] Minesweepers Nos.
15 and 16 and other ships, which had followed [them], slowed down and changed course, steer-
ing clear of the enemy’s firing range.
Following [the first hit], Minesweeper No. 13 received a second hit near the bridge. Despite
the blaze and the black smoke furiously rising from the violent explosion, all guns [of the ship]
(the gun on the fore in particular) still kept on firing furiously. After a while, [the ship] gradually
turned to port. Although hit by some more enemy shells near the stern, catching fires at places,
and with steam violently shooting out, she [once] seemed to have successfully taken an evasive
course. However, her speed suddenly slowed down, and she stopped for a moment. Then she
[tried to] start an evasive action by moving backward, but she seemed unable to control [her
movements]. After a while, as she started moving forward again, she [also] started turning to
port. That time, for a moment, it looked as if she succeeded in taking evasive action, which made
us feel a little relieved. However, the ship kept turning to port and again turned her bow toward
the port [of Tarakan]; her rudder seemed out of order. Earlier, Minesweeper No. 14 had followed
in the wake of Minesweeper No. 13. But when the latter slowed down and gradually turned
port due to a hit [by the enemy], Minesweeper No. 14 came a little ahead of the latter. From
around the time when Minesweeper No. 13 [tried to] start evasive action, enemy fire, which
until then had been concentrated on Minesweeper No. 13, was [now] directed at Minesweeper
No. 14. Almost all enemy shells scored direct hits causing fires at parts of the bridge, midships
and stern, and steam shot from the ship. Particularly, the shell that hit her at the stern seemed
to have caused an explosion of antisubmarine depth charges; black smoke from the explosions
billowed high up into the sky, and the ship looked as if torn near the mizzenmast. Another shell,
which hit near the first gun in the fore part, seemed to have blown off the gun, which was ab-
solutely horrifying. Nevertheless, the ship suddenly changed course in such a way that she was
heading toward the enemy battery. Also, she must have been set to full speed; suddenly she
seemed to gain speed, wildly shooting steam from her side. With the first gun still firing, she
was rushing toward the enemy battery. When the ship was finally about to go behind Cape
Mengacu [and out of sight] from the bridge of the Naka, another large column of water was
thrown up from around the waterline. The ship slowed down as if she had struck a mine, and
was sinking from the bow, [still] closing in to the shore. After a while and about the time the
first gun stopped firing, the ship sank behind Cape Mengacu. It was precisely at 1205.
During this period, Minesweeper No. 13 acted as previously described, temporarily evading
enemy fire. However, the moment Minesweeper No. 14 sank, Minesweeper No. 13, which had
been trying to retreat by slightly moving backward, [began] moving forward, as if already re-
solved, ([still] turning to port) and with the rudder out of order, she turned her bow again to-
ward the port [of Tarakan], which caused enemy fire to be again concentrated on her. While the
ship gradually slowed down, the enemy fire on the contrary became more and more accurate,
and almost all shells scored direct hits and caused fires. Particularly, a hit near the bridge was
terribly disastrous. A hit near the gun on the fore part looked as if it had totally destroyed the
first gun, but the gun reopened fire after a while. And thus, due to a hit near the waterline, the
ship, almost standing still, listed to port, and started gradually sinking from the bow. In a short
while, raising her stern, the ship bravely met her end. It was 1215. In the meantime, the other
four minesweepers were soon after ordered to retreat. The desperate and courageous fight of
Minesweepers Nos. 13 and 14 was so truly heroic that it would have made even a demon weep.
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It was an unexpected engagement that happened in only five or ten minutes, and [believing]
that the enemy had surrendered, the Naka and the 2d Destroyer Division, which witnessed
the engagement from beginning till end, were off guard. Moreover, mines had been laid in
the very narrow waters of the engagement, which made it impossible for them to rush to the
rescue, leaving them helpless while the two minesweepers were lost. In this engagement, the
11th Minesweeper Division sustained a great loss of 156 men killed, including the com-
mander of the division, Cdr. Yamakuma Wakito (graduate of the 48th class of the Imperial
Japanese Naval Academy); (there were [only] 53 survivors).(56)
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Minesweeper No. 13, Which Engaged with the Enemy Battery and Sank
A Yamakaze-class Destroyer
The Sinking of an Enemy Minelayer
On the night of the 12th, after the tragic engagement of the minesweeper divisions, the De-
stroyer Yamakaze (Capt.: Cdr. Hamanaka Shūichi; graduate of the 51st class), which had been
deployed at the northern waterway, spotted an enemy naval vessel trying to escape [from
Tarakan] and sank the latter. According to the “Action report No. 3 of the 4th Destroyer
Squadron,” the course of the engagement was as follows:
At 2157, the Yamakaze, keeping guard on the waterway between the islands of Tarakan and
Bunyu, spotted the silhouette of a ship, which looked like an enemy naval vessel. She gradually
and secretly followed the latter up to the wider waters near the eastern exit of the waterway
and maintained surveillance, while deliberately making such preparations as previously an-
nouncing all the [relevant] units the scheduled time of turning on the searchlights. At 2318, in-
creasing her speed to 26 knots, she closed in on the [enemy] ship. At 2322, both ships almost
simultaneously started firing, turning searchlights on each other at a distance of about 2 kilo-
meters; the Yamakaze, along with Patrol Boat No. 38, which followed the former, sank the
[enemy] ship at 2332.
Every salvo of the main gun of the Yamakaze scored a direct hit on the ship from the begin-
ning, whereas many of the enemy shells flew over, mostly passing above our heads. And the
power of their searchlight was very small; [the enemy] was not a match for us at all. The en-
gagement was one-sided to the end, and the enemy [ship], which tried to escape, sank in the
end. The average firing distance was about 1,800 meters. At 2355, we lowered two cutters on
the waters near the location of the sinking and rescued five men (including one engineer lieu-
tenant junior grade), after which we immediately continued our patrol. The enemy ship was
the HNLMS Prins van Oranje.
The enemy ship, which [the Yamakaze] sank, was a Dutch minelayer (1,291 ton, with two 3-
inch guns and two 40-millimeter machineguns, 15 knots at top speed; built in 1931). This
military gain by the Yamakaze was enough to lift the morale of all the personnel at the an-
chorage, who had felt somewhat frustrated because of the sinking of the minesweepers in
the afternoon.(56) This was the first engagement between naval surface vessels in the Philip-
pines and the Dutch East Indies areas.
The Guarding Against [Enemy] Submarines and Aircraft, and the Search for the Enemy
[Illustration No. 9]
The 1st Air Unit and the Air Unit of the Southern Task Force had day after day carried out
the guarding of the invasion units against [enemy] submarines and aircraft, while searching
for the enemy in the Makassar Strait and conducting attacks on Tarakan. By the 12th, they
reported that they had sank or destroyed several [enemy] merchantmen, caused some dam-
age to a submarine that had surfaced and a gunboat; [further] they had brought down one
heavy bomber and destroyed another. During these operations, the only loss sustained [by
Japanese forces] was one land-based attack plane, which had crashed itself, and one Type–0
fighter plane, which had made an emergency landing (with no loss of crew).
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The Launch of Preparations for the Coming Operations
Taking over the Guarding from the Army
After the garrison commander had offered surrender at 0820 on the 12th, the Army units dis-
armed the garrison one by one, seized the Karungan battery at 1710 on the 13th, and more
or less completed the capture of the entire island with the disarmament of the Juwata battery
on the morning of the 14th. At 1500 on the 14th, the [Naval] Special Landing Force relieved
the Army from the guarding and took charge of the guarding of the entire island. The re-
spective numbers of abandoned enemy bodies as well as those interned with injury and those
taken prisoners, known by the 19th, were about 300, about 40, and 871. The major weapons
that the 2d Kure Special Landing Force had seized were 40 heavy machineguns, 322 rifles,
24 pistols, 38 500-kg bombs and 48 1000-kg bombs (note by the author: the judgment of the
size of the bombs was wrong; they are considered to have been far smaller.) The loss sus-
tained by the Japanese forces in the land combat were 7 killed and about 35 injured of the
Sakaguchi Detachment and 3 injured of the 2d Kure Special Landing Force.(56)
The inhabitants generally disliked the Dutch, but were quite obedient to the Japanese
Army, warmly welcoming them.(56)
The Minesweeping of the Inner Port Delayed
Although minesweeping the port was a matter of the utmost urgency for the subsequent op-
erations, it was not an easy matter at all. The Dutch minelayer HNLMS Prins van Oranje,
which had earlier been sunk by the destroyer Yamakaze, had laid all the mines she carried
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A Battle Site on Tarakan
(110 mines) all over the port before her escape. Arial reconnaissance by a reconnaissance sea-
plane of the Naka with a staff officer of the 2d Base Force and the commander of the Special
Minesweeping Service Unit on board revealed that the port was almost totally covered with
mines. After the Army had dealt with the Karungan battery at 1710 on the 13th, the Special
Minesweeping Service Unit got to work on minesweeping [the port] with large-sized mo-
torized [landing] craft and boats from 0700 on the 14th onwards, and finally by 1330 managed
to clear a waterway wide enough (700 meters) for large-sized motorized [landing] craft to
reach the Naval wharf. After that and until the 17th, the unit continued sweeping with large-
sized motorized [landing] craft and boats, disposed of 77 mines, and cleared a waterway of
1,500 meters wide. It was not until the 18th that the unit for the first time started minesweep-
ing with the minesweepers ([of] the 11th and the 30th Minesweeper Divisions, four ships in
total). The unit disposed of 173 mines in total by the 24th. Nevertheless, no transport ships
were able to reach the anchorage inside the port before the launch of the operation to seize
Balikpapan.(56)
Little Progress in Conditioning the Airfield
The minesweeping of the anchorage became such a serious hindrance that it was impossible
to promptly send in the construction force to condition the airfield. Therefore, 1st Escort Unit
Commander Rear Admiral Nishimura decided to put ashore on the 13th in the afternoon for
the time being a small number of staff officers of the construction [squad] at the mouth of
Amal River, dispatch them to the airfield, and ready the airfield as much as possible with
the force of the 2d Kure Special Landing Force. However, at 1620 on the same day, three twin-
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A Member of the Special Landing Force Guarding the Island of Tarakan
engine enemy bombers raided [the airfield] and caused a major loss of fifteen men killed and
twenty-seven injured of the special landing force, who were preparing it. This [further] held
up the preparation of the airfield.(62) At 1100 on the 14th, a report came from the 23d Air
Flotilla headquarters, which was in outline as follows:(62) “Today at 0830 we had a land-based
reconnaissance plane conduct a low-altitude reconnaissance [of the airfield]. [According to
its report], the airfield is dotted with obstacles, and even a runway [as narrow and short as]
20 meters wide and 700 meters long has not yet been cleared, [which means] it is impossible
for Type–0 fighter planes to take off or land. Moreover, no personnel were spotted working
on the airfield at all. If the situation remains as it is, it is impossible [for us] to provide guard
[against enemy planes] at dawn and dusk, when they are most likely to come for a raid.
Therefore, we would like you to attend to the situation as quickly as possible and clear and
ready [a runway] of [more than] 100 meters wide and more than 1,000 meters long (which
should be able to support a weight of about three tons).” Meanwhile, as soon as a waterway
[wide enough for] large-sized motorized [landing] craft was cleared on the afternoon on the
14th, the 1st Escort Unit commander put ashore the members of the construction squad in
quick succession to make together with locals pressed into service a start with the expansion
of the runway for fighter planes; on the 16th, a minimum runway for fighter planes to land
on was mostly completed. Because of this, nine fighter planes and two land-based reconnais-
sance planes of the Tainan Air Group of the 23d Air Flotilla advanced to the Tarakan [airfield]
on the same day.(62) However, the airfield at Tarakan was unexpectedly small, and a hill to
the east ([of] the runway that stretched from east to west) allowed planes to take off and land
only from the west. Moreover, the soil was bad and without improvement, [the airfield] was
unsuitable for use by land-based attack planes. Because of this, it was expected that another
considerable number of days would be required before [the airfield] would allow the landing
of land-based attack plane units. Although at that time bulldozers had also been captured,
[the Japanese forces] were not able to handle them.(20)
The Swift Restoration of the Oil Fields
According to the report of the head of the 2d Defense Detail, the condition of the oil fields
after the occupation was as follows:(56)
2d Defense Detail Classified Telegram No. 26 (2210 on the 15th)
A considerable amount of heavy oil is stored, which can be transported in drums. Since it is im-
possible to examine [the situation] at night, the [amount of] storage and the capacity of trans-
porting it in drums shall be reported as soon as [the results of] the examination become clear
tomorrow.
A plan [to install] temporary [oil-] bunkering equipment by using pipelines is under consider-
ation.
2d Defense Detail Classified Telegram No. 9 (1900 on the 16th)
Results of the examination concerning the capacity to supply the remaining oil as well as those
concerning the facilities were as follows:
1. The remaining heavy oil in tanks: 12,300 tons (gravity 35 degrees Baumé; the other qualities of
the oil are yet unknown) for the tanks in Lingkas only.
2. [There are] 120 drums of heavy oil.
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3. [There are] 1,900 empty drums, which are expected to be filled from the heavy oil tanks and
transported by naval vessels.
4. Although one of the three oil pipelines between the Lingkas tanks and the new pier was burned
and damaged, the other two are usable. All the pipelines at the pier end are not usable for 500
meters. Due to a lack of machine tools and motor power at present, it is considered extremely
difficult to temporarily repair [the pipelines], however, we are planning to make temporary re-
pairs using the equipment left. 
5. We have removed all seven explosive devices left set at the heavy oil tanks in the Juwata oilfield
area.
2d Defense Detail Classified Telegram No. 13 (1446 on the 17th)
The condition of the oil fields is as follows:
1. The heavy oil storage tanks in the Pamusian area with a capacity of 100 to 1,000 tons are all de-
stroyed with no oil remaining. One of the eight [tanks] in the Juwata area with the capacity of
about 1,000 tons was blown up but our detail removed the explosive devices left set on the re-
maining seven tanks. The amount of heavy oil remaining intact is about 3,000 tons, which can
be transported in drums.
2. All power-driven pumps of the oil wells ([in] the Pamusian and Juwata areas) were destroyed,
and most of the nodding donkey-type pumps were made unusable by dropping the sucker rods
into the wells, [only] very few of them were blown up. All rigs were intact. No [naturally] flow-
ing wells were seen.
3. Oil conveying pumps are all destroyed, and most parts of the oil pipelines are unusable; pipes
for bunkering are badly damaged and unusable.
4. All generators are destroyed and impossible to repair.
5. Most of the oil fields are supplied with water.
6. Most of the important plans and part of the important documents have been seized and put in
safekeeping.
2d Defense Detail Classified Telegram No. 14 (1620 on the 17th)
Observations and matters investigated about the heavy oil of Tarakan:
1. It is judged that the remaining oil may be used in diesel engines as “L 1 [grade oil].”
2. Compared to “L 0” [boiler fuel], this heavy oil is judged to be lower in specific gravity and vis-
cosity, and its flash point is lower [as well]. Therefore, one needs to particularly keep this in
mind in handling the oil when using it as boiler fuel. As it is also considered that the [optimal]
angle to spray [this oil] must be different from that when using “L 0”, it is appropriate to first
test the oil before putting it to use. 
3. Although ships such as small heavy oil supply ships were not found, one lighter was spotted
near the new pier. As our detail was not allotted boats for transportation, the equipment on the
ship is unknown. We request to have an appropriate naval vessel examine the ship.
4. As the oil tanks in Lingkas are located upland at a height of about fifty meters and it is difficult
to fill drums near the tanks, we are constructing another oil pipeline so that the drums can be
filled near the coastal road. The construction will be completed by tonight.
At 1930 on the 18th, 1st Escort Unit Commander Rear Admiral Nishimura reported to his
superiors about the condition of the oil fields after the capture of Tarakan as follows:(56)
Although there are about 430 oil wells (about 380 in the Pamusian area and about 50 in the
Juwata area), most of the sucker rods were dropped. Also, all power engines are completely de-
148 Chapter V     /     The Forward Push of the Air Bases
stroyed and impossible to repair, but it seems that the oil fields themselves are not destroyed. It
is judged that it should not be difficult to restore [them]. The condition of the heavy oil tanks is
as already reported.
When finished checking on the damage, the defense detail repaired the wells with incredible
speed and started operations from June 1942 onwards, along with the oil fields in Sanga
Sanga (located about seventy kilometers northeast of Balikpapan) and the Balikpapan oil re-
fineries. The oil production continued without a hitch until mid-August 1943, when the first
air raids started.(77)
The Air Operations
Also from the 13th onwards, the Air Unit continued guarding Tarakan against [enemy] air-
craft and submarines as well as searching for the enemy day after day. On the 13th, Type–0
fighter planes brought down in the air above the friendly units two out of three enemy air-
craft that had come for a raid, lifting the morale of the entire force [there].(62) On the 18th, [the
air unit] conducted air strikes on Balikpapan, the next target to capture, with Type–0 fighter
planes and land-based reconnaissance planes from the Tarakan base, but no enemy was spot-
ted on the ground as well as in the air. On the 20th, [the unit] conducted an attack on Banjar-
masin from the same base with four Type–0 fighter planes and one land-based reconnaissance
plane, they spotted one PBY–4 flying boat on the river to the west [of Banjarmasin] and
strafed it, setting it ablaze and sinking it. The unit additionally conducted a photoreconnais-
sance of Balikpapan, Banjarmasin and Makassar by land-based reconnaissance planes.(71)
Thus, the operation to capture Tarakan was completed, and all units went on to prepare
for the operation to seize Balikpapan. On the 17th, 1st Escort Unit Commander Rear Admiral
Nishimura gave the following report on the enemy forces and defense of Tarakan.(56)
1. Army: 400 artillery men, 800 infantry men, 70 engineers, and about 100 others, in total 1,400
men.
Weapons (known so far): 3 12-cm guns, 12 field guns, many 12-mm to 20-mm machineguns,
and a few armored cars, etc.
The defense facing the sea was really strong, for example the Lingkas front, which almost looked
like a [true] fortress. (Note by the author: Staff Officer Yano Tsuneo of the Sakaguchi Detachment
reported that the [Japanese] landing forces would have been totally destroyed if they had landed
from that direction as arranged [between the Sixteenth Army and the Navy Dutch East Indies
Unit]).
2. Navy: Apart from the HNLMS Prins van Oranje, there seems to have been one submarine, but it
is thought to have escaped before [we] entered the anchorages. 
3. The Capture of Menado (See Illustration No. 11)
The capture of Menado was conducted by the Eastern Attack Unit with the support of the
1st Air Raid Unit. The disposition of forces of the Eastern Attack Unit [participating in the
Menado operation] was as shown in the following table.(78)
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Notes:
1. The 2d Section of the 6th Destroyer Division: the Ikazuchi, the Inazuma
The 15th Destroyer Division: the Kuroshio, the Oyashio, the Hayashio, the Natsushio
The 16th Destroyer Division: the Hatsukaze, the Yukikaze, the Amatsukaze, the Tokitsukaze
The 21st Minesweeper Division: five minesweepers
The 1st Subchaser Division: three submarine chasers
2. The commander of the Eastern Attack Unit was the commander of the 5th
Cruiser Division, Rear Admiral Takagi, but he left the details of the capture
operation almost completely to the 2d Escort Unit commander, R. Adm.
Tanaka Raizō.
The Plan of Operations
The 2d Escort Unit
On 5 January, 2d Escort Unit Commander Rear Admiral Tanaka issued
2d Escort Unit Order No. 1 at Magnaga Bay and disclosed the outline of
the operation to capture Menado, while at the same time issuing orders
to make preparations for the capture of Ambon. The outline was as fol-
lows:(54)
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5th Cruiser Div (minus
the Myōkō), and 2d Sec-
tion of 6th Destroyer
Div
Support for all opera-
tions
2d Escort Unit 2d Destroyer Sqdn Cdr
The Jintsū (flagship),
15th and 16th Destroyer
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Sasebo Combined SLF
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1. To provide direct es-
cort for the convoy
[of the units to] cap-
ture Menado and to
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ready for use
1st Base Unit 1st Base Force Cdr
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(1) The enemy garrison is expected to have deployed its main force in the area of the town of
Menado. Therefore, [the unit shall] contain the enemy there, rapidly cut off the communica-
tion routes between the town and the airfield from the rear, and mutually act in concert with
the paradrop operation of the 1st Yokosuka Special Landing Force. The main force of the
Sasebo Combined Special Landing Force shall go ashore near Menado city and put one ele-
ment ashore in the Kema area on the east coast, so as to make a pincer attack on the enemy.
(2) The convoy shall be divided into two echelons of faster ships and slower ships, which shall
leave Davao at different times so as to enter into the anchorage at the same time.
(3) The landing shall be made following a two-stage anchoring system; the first landing [unit]
shall be launched as far as possible off the coast. 
(4) On completion of unloading, the ships shall evacuate to the defended area of the Bangka
anchorage (north end of Celebes) one after another.
2. The distribution of the transport ships, the landing points, the escort and the leading naval ships
(1) Distribution according to echelons
(2) Distribution according to landing points
(3) Actions of each unit
{1} The 1st Echelon Unit and the 2d Echelon Unit shall respectively leave Davao at 0100 and
at 1000 on 9 January, sail at standard speeds of respectively 9 knots and 12 knots along
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Echelon Escort vessels Leading vessel Transport ships
1st echelon 1st Section of 15th DestroyerDiv and 1st Subchaser Div Hayashio
The Shōka-maru, the Kōshin-
maru, the Chōwa-maru (all
carrying the 6th Construc-
tion Squad)  
2d echelon 21st Minesweeper Div, PatrolBoats Nos. 1 and 2 Oyashio
The Nankai-maru (Sasebo
Combined SLF), the Kinai-
maru (1st Sasebo SLF), the
Hokuriku-maru (2d Sasebo
SLF), the Amagisan-maru, and
the Katsuragi-maru (11th Air
Fleet)
Outside the line of sailing
The Oha-maru, and the
Shinkō-maru [B] (both carry-
ing the 6th Construction
Squad)
Landing Area Escort vessels Transport ships
Menado
15th Destroyer Div, 3 minesweepers
of 21st Minesweeper Div, 1st Sub-
chaser Div
The Nankai-maru, the Kinai-maru,
the Shōka-maru, the Kōshin-maru, the
Chōwa-maru, and the Amagisan-
maru
Kema
1st Section of 16th Destroyer Div, 2
minesweepers of 21st Minesweeper
Div, Patrol Boats Nos. 1 and 2
The Hokuriku-maru, and the Kat-
suragi-maru (disembarkation at
Girian)
the planned sailing route shown on Separate Map No. 14 (omitted), so as to reach the
5th turning point at 1400 on 10 January.* 
{2} From the 5th turning point onwards, the echelons shall be divided up and sail on [in
echelons] distributed according to the landing points. From that time on, the standard
speed shall be set at 9 knots.
{3} The Jintsū and the 16th Destroyer Division shall leave Davao at 0600 on 9 January as the
main body, catch up with the 1st Echelon while clearing the sailing route ahead of the
2d Echelon, and directly support them.
(4) Entering into the anchorage(s) and the launch of the landing operations
{1} The following schedule shall apply to both Menado and Kema:
Entering into anchorage: 0200 11 January
Launch of [landing] craft: 0300 ditto
Reaching coast 0400 ditto
{2} The transport ships with the special landing forces on board (the Nankai-maru, the Kinai-
maru, and the Hokuriku-maru) shall launch the first landing unit at the first launching
point, after which they shall move on to the second launching point, launch the second
landing unit, and then move on to the third launching point.
{3} The transport ships other than the above (i.e. [those of] the 6th Construction Squad and
the 11th Air Fleet) shall advance [to the anchorages] little by little after sunrise of 11 Jan-
uary and moor to buoys or cast anchor after Menado is captured.
{4} The landing points at Menado and Kema shall be the coasts south and north of the town
of Menado and the front of Kema. 
{5} The clearing [of mines in] the routes ahead at the time of entering into the Kema anchor-
age shall be designated by the 16th Destroyer Division commander.
(5) The guarding and defense of the anchorages
The deployment of the naval vessels to guard around the anchorage of Menado shall be des-
ignated by the 15th Destroyer Division commander, and that of Kema by the 16th Destroyer
Division commander. The minesweeper division shall sweep the Bangka anchorage from
around 1000 on 11 January onwards, and engage in the task of the 1st Base Force to defend
[the anchorage].
The Sasebo Combined Special Landing Force
The plan of the landing operation of the Sasebo Combined Special Landing Force was in out-
line as follows:(68)
1. The Sasebo Combined Special Landing Force headquarters, the units under the direct command
of the headquarters and the 1st Sasebo Special Landing Force shall go ashore at both coasts
north and south of the town of Menado, envelop the enemy in the town of Menado and destroy
them, after which they shall leave Menado and charge toward the Kakas airfield via Tomohon.
2. The 2d Sasebo Special Landing Force shall land at Kema and charge toward the Tondano lake
and the Kakas airfield via Airmadidi.
3. In concert with the 1st Yokosuka Special Landing Force, which shall drop on the airfield, they
shall make a pincer attack on the enemy in the area of the airfield from the east and the west.
4. After destroying the enemy in these areas, they shall assemble in Menado city, and prepare for
the coming operation to seize Kendari.
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* In this plan of 5 January, the departure date from Davao should have been cited as 8 January, because only on
6 January the operation was postponed by one day to 9 January (See p. 158).
The 1st Base Unit
The outline of the plan of operation of the 1st Base Unit was as follows:(68)
1. The main unit (the Nagara and the Chikushi) shall leave Davao on the morning of 9 January, and
reach the Bangka anchorage after taking charge of the direct support of the 2d Echelon of the
2d Escort Unit.
2. The 1st Defense Unit (the Shirataka, the Aotaka, the Kimishima-maru, one half of the 1st Base Force
and the 1st Survey Unit) shall leave Davao at 0800 on 10 January and reach the Bangka anchor-
age early morning on 12 January to take charge of the defense and guarding of the anchorage.
3. The 2d Defense Unit shall remain in Davao Gulf, in charge of the defense of the gulf, while the
units attached to it shall take charge of the supply as well as the guarding of the anchorage.
The 2d Air Unit
The plan of operation of the 2d Air Unit was in outline as follows:(79) the 2d Air Unit shall, in
support of the 2d Escort Unit, temporarily anchor at a point west of the Sangihe Islands (is-
lands about 120 nautical miles north of Menado) and provide cover for the 2d Escort Unit
with its aircraft. Then, on the 11th, the tender ships shall enter the Bangka anchorage, guard
Menado, Kema and the Bangka anchorage against enemy aircraft as well as submarines, and
also support the land combat with their aircraft.
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The 1st Air Raid Unit
The disposition of forces and the actions of each unit of the 1st Air Raid Unit in the operation
to capture Menado are on the basis of various documents assumed to have been as follows:(12,
71, 75)
1. The disposition of forces (as shown in the table below)
2. The Actions of each unit
(1) The Kanoya Air Group Detachment shall, in cooperation with the Tōkō Air Group, carry
out a night attack on Ambon beforehand, so that actions of enemy naval vessels and air
power shall be contained during the [Menado] operation, while at the same time preparing
against attacks by enemy naval vessels and air power.
(2) The Tōkō Air Group shall take charge of patrol and reconnaissance (attack) over the Celebes
Sea, the Gulf of Tomini, the Molucca Sea, the Makassar Strait and the Sulu Sea. It shall also
destroy enemy naval vessels and air power by a night attack on Ambon in cooperation with
the Kanoya Air Group Detachment.
(3) The 3d Air Group shall conduct a local reconnaissance on Menado with its land-based re-
connaissance plane(s) beforehand and send the report and the reconnaissance data to the
units concerned. Also, it shall totally destroy the enemy air power with Type–0 fighter
planes, while guarding the air above bases, anchorages and the convoys.
(4) The 1001 Unit shall transport the paradrop units of the 1st Yokosuka Special Landing Force
with transport planes from Davao to the Menado land air base (Langoan), where the
paradrop units shall swiftly secure the air base and facilitate the operation of the Sasebo
Combined Special Landing Force by cutting off the escape routes of the enemy from Menado
(a sometimes very rugged road) and Kema. 
(5) Once the capture of Menado is completed and both the seaplane and land air bases are se-
cured, the Tōkō Air Group, the 3d Air Group, the Kanoya Air Group Detachment and others
shall successively be pushed forward in preparation of the coming operations.
The 1st Yokosuka Special Landing Force
The plan of operation of the 1st Yokosuka Special Landing Force, which for the first time in
Japanese [military history] was to conduct a paradrop operation, was in outline as follows:(80)
1. The Special Landing Force shall take charge of part of the operation to capture Menado by car-
rying out a paradrop operation on the enemy airfield at 0930 on 11 January with the support of
the fighter plane unit of the 1st Air Raid Unit. They shall attack and drive off the enemy around
there and secure the airfield as well as the Kakas seaplane base, so as to facilitate the subsequent
air operations.
2. The distribution of tasks and actions of each unit (as shown in the table below) 
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[The unit] shall carry out a paradrop on the enemy air-
field in Langoan on 11 January, attack the enemy it faces
and drive them off. Then, the unit shall act in the follow-
ing way:
1. 1st Company shall seize Langoan.
2. The remaining force shall seize the Kakas seaplane base
under the direct command of the commander.
3. The paradrop plan of the First Drop Unit
(1) The formation of the plane units and the paradrop formation 
1st Squadron ⎧f t × 5⎨⎩f t × 5
2d Squadron ⎧f t × 5⎨⎩f t × 5
3d Squadron ⎧f t × 4⎨⎩f t × 4
The intervals between the squadrons: 1,500 meters
Note by the author: f t indicates transport planes.
(2) The number of personnel and weapon packages to be dropped
Number of personnel to be dropped per plane: 12 men
Number of packages hanging from [each] dropping plane: 5
Number of packages loaded on [each] plane: 2 (of which, one is a package of provisions)
(3) The outline of the drop
In one flyover weapons and personnel shall be dropped in that order. 
The speed of the plane at the time of drop: 100 knots
The altitude at the time of drop: 150 meters
(4) The dispersion plan of the drop (for each group)
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Second Drop Unit 3d Co: 173*
[The unit] shall carry out a paradrop on the enemy airfield
in Langoan on 12 January; the subsequent actions shall be
separately ordered.








[The unit] shall leave Davao on the Katsuragi-maru on 6
January, land in Kema and take charge of transporting
war supplies. Then, it shall join the main body.




Antitank Gun Unit: 10
Total 22
[The unit] shall leave Davao on 11 January in flying boats.
On landing on the water of Lake Tondano, [the unit] shall
quickly join the main body and receive orders.










[The unit] shall leave Davao as separately designated,
and transport war supplies. Then, [the unit] shall join the
main body and receive orders.




A three-second interval shall be set between the drop of personnel and the weapon [pack-
ages] so as to avoid tangles in the air.
4. Communication, etc. (omitted by the author)
5. Weapons and ammunition
(1) Weapons to be carried along right after the drop
Warrant officers and officers of higher rank
Military sword, pistol, binoculars, steel helmet, canteen, provisions, sword belt, flashlight,
map case, semaphore flags, small shovel, national flag, mosquito mask, mosquito gloves,
first aid package No. 2
Non-commissioned officers and privates (regular infantry)
Rifle (regular infantry), pistol, bayonet, steel helmet, hand grenade, canteen, provision case,
semaphore flags, small shovel, national flag, mosquito mask, mosquito gloves, first aid pack-
age No. 2
Heavy machine gun, light machine gun, grenade launcher, Type97 portable wireless phone
set (for those assigned)
(2) Number of packages 







Type of packages Bn HQ 1st Com 2d Com Signal Unit
No. 1 packages (Rifles) 4 41 38 7
No. 2 packages (Light machine guns) 1 13 13 0
Ditto (Generator fuel) 0 0 0 2
No. 3 packages (Heavy machine guns) 0 2 2* 0
Ditto (Communication Equipment) 0 0 0 6
No. 4 packages (Ammunition for heavy machine guns) 0 6 6 0
Special package (Generators) 0 0 0 1
Miscellaneous packages (Provisions) 4 12 11 1
* The text mistakenly has 0.
(3) Number of main weapons and ammunition of the paradrop unit
Note: The antitank guns and the weapons and ammunition for them containing high explosives in this table
shall be airlifted to Lake Tondano by flying boats.
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Item Unit Bn HQ 1st Com 2d Com Signal Unit
Browning Pistols 36 109 114 3
Type38 Carbines 36 109 114 3
Ammunition for the above 4,320 11,690 17,690 480
Type96 Light Machineguns 1 13 13 0
Ammunition for the above 2,100 25,235 15,720 0
Type89 Grenade Discharger 0 7 6 0
Grenades for the above 0 194 123 0
Type92 Heavy Machineguns 0 2 2 0
Ammunition for the above 0 5,640 5,400 0
37mm Antitank Guns 0 0 1 0
High explosive shells for the above 0 0 60 0
Fuses for the above shells 0 0 60 0
Armor-piercing shells for the above guns 10 0 40 0
Type89 Hand Grenades 150 278 274 25
Model TM Handy Radio Set 0 0 0 2
Model TM Handy Radio Set with accessories 0 0 0 1
“Kū” Mark 2 Radio Set 0 0 0 1
“Kū” Mark 2 Radio Set with accessories 0 0 0 1
Spare parts for “Kū” Mark 2 Radio Set 0 0 0 1
Type97 Portable Telephone Set 20 0 2 0
Batteries 0 0 0 (12V)   4
Generators 0 0 0 1
The Launch of the Invasion Operation
Prior Neutralization of the Enemy Air Power 
The preliminary reconnaissance attack on the Menado area started with a photoreconnais-
sance by a land-based reconnaissance plane of the 3d Air Group conducted over the area on
24 December. After that, combinations of land-based reconnaissance planes and several Type–
0 fighter planes carried out reconnaissance [missions] over the Menado and Gorontalo areas
(west of Menado) day after day. But apart from reporting that they had spotted five flying
boats at the Menado seaplane base on 26 December, which they had attacked, strafed and
set ablaze, they did not sight the enemy.(71)
In the meantime, the Tōkō Air Group carried out reconnaissance (attacks) with flying
boats over the Celebes Sea, the Molucca Sea, the Gulf of Tomini, the Makassar Strait, and the
Sulu Sea from the 23d onwards, but the group spotted no enemy aircraft or naval vessels,
other than one enemy cruiser, one destroyer and one merchantman. On the 5th [of January],
[another] seventeen land-based attack planes of the Kanoya Air Group advanced to Davao
and, along with the flying boats of the Tōkō Air Group, carried out a night raid on Ambon
([with] fourteen land-based attack planes and three flying boats). The raid caused heavy
damage to the enemy, and hindered the latter from using [the airfield] during the [Japanese]
operation against Menado (as described previously [p. 117]).(71, 81) In the wake of the [enemy]
air raid on Malalag Bay on the 4th, the patrol in the sky over Davao with Type–0 fighter
planes had been intensified, but almost no enemy had been spotted since then, which by the
time of the sailing of the invasion convoy led [the Navy on site] to conclude that the neutral-
ization of the enemy air power was on the whole more or less completed.
The Sailing of the Convoy
On the morning of 6 January, the 2d Escort Unit and the convoy of the invasion units com-
pleted assembling in Magnaga Bay. On the afternoon of the same day, the Ashigara (with the
Dutch East Indies Unit commander on board) entered port, and the commanders of the units
of the Dutch East Indies Unit assembled on the ship for a last strategy meeting. As the result,
the launch of the Dutch East Indies operation was postponed by one day, which changed the
sortie of the 2d Escort Unit to the 9th.(54) [See editor’s note p. 152.]
On 9 January, all units left Magnaga Bay as scheduled. On that day, the weather was fine,
and the sea was very calm. Around 0730, the Nagara, (the flagship of the 1st Base Force) in
Malalag Bay reported that three enemy planes had come for a raid and dropped bombs. Fol-
lowing that, the Murasame, which was heading for Jolo escorting the Asama-maru reported:
“0730: One enemy plane closely [flying by] and reconnoitering [us].” The location was about
100 nautical miles west of the Sarangani islands (about 250 nautical miles from Menado). It
was fine and quiet that whole day with no enemy air raid until the evening. Around 1830,
when the Kema landing unit reached the area north of Bangka Island, three [enemy] PBY-
type flying boats came for an attack and dropped bombs, but no damage was sustained.(54)
At 0110 on 11 January, the Menado landing unit reached the first launching point and
lowered the [landing] craft. At 0315, the first landing unit left and successfully landed at 0400.
On learning the landing of the Japanese forces, the enemy immediately set fire to the heavy
oil tanks with the flames and smoke rising high into the sky. In the meantime, the Kema land-
ing unit also reached its first launching point at 0130, departed from the point at 0345, and
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successfully landed on the coast of Kema at 0420. Also at Kema the
enemy seemed to have set fire to important facilities, and at several
places flames were observed rising into the sky. At 0500, the Menado
landing unit of the 1st Sasebo Special Landing Force reported that it had
[finished] clearing the enemy near the landing point and seized the
neighborhood, and that it was going to take up positions to envelop
Menado.
On the 11th, the sun rose at 0640. From around that time onward,
enemy aircraft came for raids by turns as described below, which kept
the anchorage busy dealing with them.(54)
0620 Four enemy twin-engine bombers came for a raid and dropped bombs
on the Kema anchorage; no loss sustained.
0635 Six enemy heavy bombers came for a raid on the Menado [anchorage]; two of them bombed
the Oha-maru sailing at the rear; no loss sustained.
0650 Six enemy twin-engine Lockheed bombers bombed the Jintsū off Menado for one hour. Al-
though the Jintsū sustained no damage, taking every time evasive actions, the bombardment
caused the ship to evacuate as far as 100 nautical miles to the north of Menado.
0700 Three enemy PBY-type flying boats raided Kema, strafing and bombing for one hour and
a half; no loss sustained.
1430 Five enemy Lockheed bombers raided Kema, strafing and bombing for about forty-five
minutes; no loss sustained.
1540 Three enemy bombers raided the Menado [anchorage]; the Amagisan-maru sustained dam-
age to the hull by a near hit.
1628 Four enemy Lockheed bombers raided Kema; no loss sustained.
On that day, the 21st Minesweeper Division started clearing the Bangka anchorage [of mines]
and completed clearing of anchorage A (location unknown) by evening, but no mines were
snagged.
Meanwhile, 1st Base Unit Commander R. Adm. Kubo Kyūji headed for Menado leading
the Nagara, leaving Malalag Bay on the 9th. The Nagara spotted what seemed to be an enemy
periscope at the mouth of Malalag Bay and had the 2d Subchaser Division search [for the
enemy], but it could not locate the enemy. Afterwards, the Nagara headed southward, mostly
sailing along with the 2d Echelon of the 2d Escort Unit. On the 10th, the Shirataka, the Aotaka
and the Kimishima-maru, which were to take charge of the defense and guarding of the Bangka
anchorage, left Malalag Bay for the anchorage. Also on that day, the Itsukushima of the 2d
Base Unit* left Davao as well for the Bangka anchorage to build a mine barrier at the east en-
trance of the anchorage. At 2115 on the 10th, the Nagara spotted an enemy submarine afloat at
a point about forty nautical miles northwest of Menado and attacked her, but with unknown
results. The Nagara arrived off Menado on 11 January and took the lead of the base unit.(72)
The Engagements of the Sasebo Combined Special Landing Force and the Paratroop Unit
(See Illustration No. 10)
The main force of the Sasebo Combined Special Landing Force (i.e. the Sasebo Combined
SLF headquarters, the units under its direct command and the 1st Sasebo Special Landing
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1st Base Force 
Commander, 
R. Adm. Kubo Kyūji
* The text mistakenly has 1st Base Unit (See p. 99).
Force) landed on the coast north and south of Menado at 0400 on 11 Jan-
uary; their strength consisted of about 1,800 men (led by Capt. Mori Ku-
nizō). After engaging with about 400 enemy troops right after the
landing, the unit seized Menado City at 0830. At 0945, the main force
headed for Tomohon, leaving one element in Menado City, and ad-
vanced southward, while on the way eliminating resistance put up by
the enemy, who made use of natural defensive positions as well as [man-
made] obstructions. [The main force] seized Tomohon at 1930 and halted
there [for the night] on full alert.
In the meantime, about 1,400 men of the 2d Sasebo Special Landing
Force (led by Cdr. Hashimoto Uroku) successfully landed at Kema at
0420, engaged with about 70 enemy troops, drove them off, and started
to advance toward the mountains in the direction of Airmadidi. At 1300,
the unit drove off about 300 enemy troops near Airmadidi and seized
the location at 1400. One element of the leading party reached the Ton-
dano front at 2200, and halted there [for the night].(53, 54)
At 0630 on 11 January, 324 men of the first drop of the 1st Yokosuka
Special Landing Force (commander: Cdr. Horiuchi Toyoaki) took off
from the Davao airfield in 27 transport planes and flew toward the Lan-
goan airfield south of Menado, escorted by the fighter plane unit of the
1st Air Raid Unit.* En route, at the north tip of Celebes, the 5th plane of
the 4th team (with 12 paratroopers and 5 crew on board) crashed, having
been mistakenly shot down by friendly fire from a reconnaissance sea-
plane. At 0952, the teams flew into [the airfield area] from the north (the
airfield had a runway from north to south). With the support of friendly
fighter planes, [the paratroopers] started their drop at the planned drop
point and completed the drop at 1020. Simultaneously with the start of the drop, the para-
troopers came under fierce machinegun fire from enemy positions on the western side of the
airfield, which caused the paratroopers to suffer casualties one after another. On landing, the
paratroopers quickly armed themselves and engaged the enemy in a fierce fight, directing
their focus of attack to the left wing position of the enemy ([on] the northern side of the air-
field) while gradually enveloping the position at 1050. However, at 1055, an enemy armored
car rushed in from the northeastern part of the airfield and machine-gunned the [Japanese]
right wing company (the 1st Company) from the rear. Undaunted by this, the company first
charged into the enemy left wing position and seized it, opening the way for victory. Follow-
ing this, [the paratroopers also] charged into the [enemy] positions from the front, seized all
of them, and captured the entire area of the airfield at 1125. The unit started on clearing [the
enemy] from the airfield and vicinity, while sending (one squad of) a reconnaissance team
led by an officer to the Kakas area at 1300 to reconnoiter the movements of the enemy. At
1300, the reconnaissance team encountered one [enemy] armored car at the western end of
Kakas and seized it. They further [continued] their advance, engaged with another enemy
light-armored car in the town of Kakas and put it to flight. The main force, which had com-
pleted clearing [the enemy from] around the airfield at 1300, headed toward Kakas, leaving








* The difference between these numbers and those in the table on p. 157 is seemingly caused by the return of one
plane to Davao because of engine trouble; those on board seem to have joined the drop on the next day.
two squads and the signal unit for the defense of the airfield; they engaged with 150 enemy
troops with one light-armored car [on the way]. At 1450, [the main force] completely seized
the town, after which they launched an attack on the seaplane base there from 1550 onwards
and completely seized the base at 1800. After that, the main force returned to the Langoan
airfield, leaving the 2d Company to secure Kakas. [The main force] halted [for the night] at
the airfield, while making preparations for the attack on the town of Langoan and taking
precautions against a counterattack by the enemy.(54, 71, 80)
The Engagements of the Seaplane Unit
On the morning of the 9th, the Chitose and the Mizuho of the 2d Air Unit (led by R. Adm.
Fujita Ruitarō) respectively left Malalag Bay and Pakiputan Strait for the operation to capture
Menado. On that day, [the unit] provided guard on the sailing route ahead of the convoy and
conducted searches for the enemy and reconnaissance over the waters south of Mindanao
with a total of five Type–94 reconnaissance seaplanes; furthermore, it directly guarded the
convoy against [enemy] submarines with a total of sixteen Type–0 observation seaplanes,
but no enemy was spotted. At 0900 on the 10th, [the tender ships of] the 2d Air Unit tem-
porarily anchored at a point west off the Sangihe Islands and carried out the following air
operations: With one Type–94 reconnaissance seaplane and a total of twenty-six Type–0 ob-
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Illustration No. 10 — The Engagement at the Langoan Airfield
servation seaplanes it provided direct escort for the convoy against
[enemy] submarines, guarded its own unit against [enemy] submarines,
reconnoitered the Sangihe Islands and bombed the [enemy] radiotele-
graph station. With three Type–94 reconnaissance seaplanes it provided
guard on the sailing route ahead of the convoy and conducted recon-
naissance of the area north of Celebes. After the sunset on that day, the
11th Seaplane Tender Division left the anchorage west of the Sangihe Is-
lands and sailed southward toward Menado. At 0540 on the 11th, the di-
vision entered the Bangka anchorage and carried out the following air
operations from 0630 till 1900: With a total of forty-nine Type–0 obser-
vation seaplanes it provided direct escort and guard for the convoy and
the Bangka anchorage against [enemy] submarines and aircraft, and sup-
ported the land combat, while with a total of four Type–94 reconnais-
sance seaplanes it searched for the enemy in the vicinity. During this period, [the division]
engaged nine large enemy flying boats and four bombers, and reported that it brought down
two flying boats. The Japanese losses were one Type–0 observation seaplane, which crashed
(but the pilot bailed out unhurt), two Type–0 observation seaplanes, which made emergency
landings (one of them sank but its crew was rescued), and several seaplanes, which got hit.
The aircraft that shot down one of the transport planes of the 1001 Unit was [part of] the
2d shift of the Type–0 observation seaplanes of the Mizuho, which was in the course of directly
guarding the Bangka anchorage.(82) Concerning this friendly fire incident, the 11th Seaplane
Tender Division insisted that the action of the 1001 Unit had not been known and that the
latter had not performed a friendly identification maneuver [either],(83) while the 1st Air
Group retorted that their action had been [shared] at the strategy meeting on 5 January on
the flagship of the Third Fleet and [therefore] should have been known; moreover, that right
in front of the enemy it is impossible to perform friendly identification maneuvers such as
putting down landing gear and lowering altitude.(84) Concerning this incident, the chief of
staff of the Dutch East Indies Unit wired on the 13th the following to [all units of] the Dutch
East Indies Unit:(53)
On 11 January during the operation to seize Menado, an incident has occurred, in which our re-
connaissance seaplane(s) shot down one of the transport planes ([of] the 1001 Unit) of the
Eleventh Air Fleet. When aircraft units are executing their mission in a combat zone, it may
often be difficult for units to apply the currently designated friendly identification methods.
Therefore, since it is risky [to identify friends] only by relying on the above friendly identification
method, it is requested to strictly keep the following points in mind and be determined to never
cause such accidents anymore: 
1. To closely communicate with friendly forces and make due arrangements with them prior
to the launch of operations, and also to make subordinates thoroughly understand the
friendly missions.
2. To communicate well in advance with the units concerned [about the circumstances], par-
ticularly those where it is expected that it will be difficult to perform the designated [friendly
identification] signals due to the execution of special missions or other reasons.
3. To teach crews in advance how to make proper judgments of situations where a risk of [mis-
takenly] shooting friendly forces is feared. 
4. To make [crews] thoroughly familiar with the models and types of friendly aircraft, and have
them [first] identify the model marks as much as possible when carrying out attacks.





5. To pay special attention when giving instructions to crews who easily get agitated in en-
gagements.
6. Converted Type–96 land-based attack planes are used for the transportation of the 1001 Unit,
and the standard altitude at the time of the drop is 150 meters above the ground.
The Land-Based Air Units Scarcely Spotted the Enemy
On 9 January, the 1st Air Raid Unit had four flying boats of the Tōkō Air Group search for
the enemy; [further] it had the land-based attack plane unit stand by for attacks, twelve trans-
port planes in total of the 1st Air Group patrol the sailing route ahead of the convoy, and two
transport planes of the group reconnoiter the Menado airfield (the Langoan airfield) and
vicinity, while having eighteen Type–0 fighter planes and two land-based reconnaissance
planes of the 3d Air Group provide direct escort in the air above the 2d Escort Unit. However,
no enemy was spotted other than two submerged submarines, of which it was unclear
whether they were friend or foe, spotted by the flying boats of the Tōkō Air Group. [Mean-
while, the unit] spotted numerous cheveaux-de-frise (obstructions to prevent aircraft from
landing) on the Menado airfield. On the 10th, four flying boats of the Tōkō Air Group
searched for the enemy over the Celebes Sea, the Gulf of Tomini and the Molucca Sea, but
spotted no enemy other than two [enemy] merchantmen [on the waters] north of Tarakan
and three British[-made?] twin-engine two-seater monoplanes to the east of Menado. The 3d
Air Group, which provided direct guard over the Davao base as well as direct escort in the
air above the convoy, spotted no enemy either, and neither did the Kanoya Air Group De-
tachment, which carried out patrol over the sailing routes ahead of the convoy with its sixteen
land-based attack planes in total. On the 11th, the plan for the day was that the flying boats
of the Tōkō Air Group were to search for the enemy, that the land-based attack planes of the
Kanoya Air Group Detachment were to stand by for attacks on [enemy] naval vessels, that
the transport planes of the 1st Air Group were to transport the paratrooper unit, and that the
fighter planes of the 3d Air Group were to advance to Menado, guided by land-based recon-
naissance planes or by land-based attack planes, to provide direct guard in the air from 0700
through 1630. However, due to the bad weather around the base, the fighter planes were
only able to directly guard it from 0900 through 1415, so they could not catch enemy aircraft
that might come in for a raid in the early morning or evening. No other enemy vessels or air-
craft were spotted, and no attacks were carried out. The twenty-seven transport planes of
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the 1st Air Group successfully transported the paratrooper unit, but one of them was, as pre-
viously told, shot down en route by friendly reconnaissance seaplane(s). Meanwhile, two
flying boats (one of which was a transport aircraft) carried the paymaster unit, the medical
unit and the antitank gun unit of the paratrooper unit to Lake Tondano and landed on the
lake at 1450. At 1750, they successfully established contact with the 1st Yokosuka Special
Landing Force, which had seized Kakas, and stayed at anchor on the lake that night.(12, 81)
The Operations from the 12th till the 20th [of January]
The second airdrop unit of the 1st Yokosuka Special Landing Force took off from Davao in
eighteen transport planes at 0630 on the 12th, parachuted down on the Langoan airfield and
joined the unit of the first airdrop. The 1st Yokosuka Special Landing Force immediately
launched an attack with its main force on Langoan City and the whole neighborhood of Tom-
paso. With no real will to fight, the enemy retreated, abandoning a large amount of weapons
and ammunition. The 1st Yokosuka Special Landing Force seized the urban area of Langoan
at 1125 and Tompaso at 1230, while one element advanced to Paso and completely seized the
place at 1035.(71, 81)
In the meantime, the Sasebo Combined Special Landing Force, which [had halted for the
night] around Tomohon and Tondano, went into action from the early morning onwards; it
rushed into Tondano at 0810, after which the 1st and the 2d Sasebo Special Landing Forces
charged toward the airfield area, the former along the road from Tomohon to Kawangkoan,
and the latter via the roads along [both] the east and west shores of Tondano Lake. First of
all, at 1100 the 2d Sasebo Special Landing Force established contact with the paratrooper unit
of the 1st Yokosuka Special Landing Force near Paso and then the 1st Sasebo Special Landing
Force established contact near Tompaso at 1230. Both [the 1st and the 2d Sasebo SLFs] arrived
at the Langoan and Kakas sector by 1400. The enemy, which seemed to have escaped toward
the direction of Amurang in the west, retreated while blowing up bridges and warehouses
and made no real attempt to counterattack. The general populace cheered and warmly wel-
comed the Japanese forces. After the engagements on the 11th and the 12th, 140 abandoned
enemy bodies and 48 prisoners were counted; seized weapons amounted to ten 8-mm field
guns and a great number of machineguns, rifles, and war supplies. Japanese losses consisted
of 12 men killed and 154 men injured of the Sasebo Combined Special Landing Force, and 32
men killed (of whom, 12 killed in the plane crash) and 32 men injured of the 1st Yokosuka
Special landing Force.(80) From the 13th onwards, the Sasebo Combined Special Landing Force
switched to a mopping-up operation of the vicinity, completed the operation by the 16th,
and assembled in Menado to start preparations for the coming Kendari operation. On 20 Jan-
uary, it again embarked on the transport ships and assembled at the Bangka anchorage.(54, 57)
Day after day the 2d Air Unit (the Chitose and the Mizuho of the 11th Seaplane Tender Di-
vision) guarded Menado, Kema and the Bangka anchorage against enemy aircraft and sub-
marines; it [also] conducted searches for the enemy as well as reconnaissance [missions] over
the Celebes Sea and the Molucca Sea, but it spotted almost no enemies other than the two
aircraft coming for a raid on the 12th, which it reported as having brought down. Moreover,
since the resistance of the enemy ground forces was not fierce, no support for the land combat
was provided. Meanwhile on the 14th, based on a report of a land-based reconnaissance
plane of the 3d Air Group of having spotted thirty enemy submarines (which will be ex-
plained later), the unit carried out an operation to clear the enemy submarines from the
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Illustration No. 11 — The Invasion of Menado and the Defense of the Bangka Anchorage
Celebes Sea from the 15th through the 19th in support of the 2d Escort Unit, but no enemy
was spotted.(71)
The 1st Air Raid Unit also provided day after day direct guard in the air over Menado
and carried out reconnaissance attacks on Ambon and Kendari, while reconnoitering enemy
air bases on the west coast of New Guinea, Halmahera and Celebes, searching for the enemy
in the Molucca Strait and the Ceram Sea, as well as searching for and attacking the enemy in
the Philippines area. During this period, the following military gains were reported: On the
12th, [the unit] brought down three out of four [enemy] Lockheed Hudson-type bombers
that raided Menado, and again one out of two on the 20th. On the 17th, [the unit] attacked
three B–24 bombers and two B–17D bombers [of the enemy] that had come for a raid, and
caused damage to one of the B–17Ds and two of the B-24s; the former spilling gasoline, and
three of the engines of one of the B–24s stalling (it later made an emergency landing), and
one engine of another [B–24] stalling, but none of the attacks was effectual enough to bring
them down. In the attack on Ambon on the 15th, [the unit] brought down two [enemy] fighter
planes right after their takeoff, set ablaze one Douglas bomber on the ground and one twin-
engine flying boat about to take off and caused serious damage to one twin-engine flying
boat as well as to one four-engine flying boat. Also [in the attack] on Ambon on the 16th, [the
unit] strafed and sank one twin-engine flying boat, which had just returned [there]. On the
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Boeing B–17
17th, Type–0 fighter planes attacked Kendari and caused serious damage
to one [enemy] heavy bomber, which had taken off to escape, but they
were not able to bring it down.(81)
According to the Summary Report of the Actions of the 1st Air Raid
Unit, the state of affairs [on the 17th] in the attacks on the large [enemy]
planes had been as follows:
1. Around 0730, two B–17Ds and three B–24s flew into the skies of the airfield
([at] an altitude of 5,000 meters) from the direction of Tondano. Three B–24s
dropped about ten bombs at the southern part of the airfield, [but] we sus-
tained no damage.
(1) Two Type–0 fighter planes patrolling the sky pursued the B–17s in for-
mation, engaged them in air combat for about twenty minutes and fired
all their bullets, many of which hit [the enemy aircraft]. [The hits] caused the second enemy
plane to spill [gasoline] from its tank, but it was not [effective enough to] bring it down, let-
ting [both] escape on an 180º course.
(2) Two Type–0 fighter planes, which, on spotting the enemy, immediately took off, caught up
with the B–24s in formation and carried out repeated attacks, firing all their bullets. [The
hits] caused one of the engines of the second enemy plane to stall while leaking gasoline.
They [also] caused the third plane to descend from an altitude of 4,000 meters to 800 meters
while giving off black smoke from three of its engines, forcing an emergency landing (note
by the author: [at] Kendari), but the other two planes escaped on a 210º course. 
2. (Omitted by the author)
3. At 0920, one land-based reconnaissance plane and three Type–0 fighter planes made a sortie to
attack “LK” (note by the author: Kendari), where the [enemy] plane coming for a raid [earlier]
this morning had most likely made an emergency landing. At 1415, all [planes] returned.
(1) The first and the second planes strafed a twin-engine bomber on the airfield and totally de-
stroyed it.
(2) The third plane pursued one B–17D, which had just taken off, and blew off its gun turret
after about eight attacks. [The enemy plane] was seen giving off white smoke from a wing,
but it was not [so damaged that it was] brought down. [The third plane] returned after using
up all its bullets.
4. (Omitted by the author)
5. Damage: four Type–0 fighter planes holed by bullets.
Concerning the large enemy planes, 1st Air Raid Unit Commander R. Adm. Tada Takeo gave
his views, which were in summary as follows:(12, 81)
1. The B–24 and B–17 models that have newly appeared are both very strong in their armored pro-
tection. Each Type–0 fighter plane fired all the bullets it had at close range, but failed to bring
them down. It is necessary to increase as quickly as possible the power of our fighter planes’
armor-piercing ammunition and also to increase the amount of 20-mm bullets loaded [on each
aircraft] (60 bullets per gun at that time).
2. It is conceivable that from now on the enemy will fly these models to Australia to reinforce their
strength. It is necessary to intensify our operations to cut off [the route].
3 The Type–0 fighter planes pursued for 200 nautical miles the large [enemy] planes that had
raided Menado; three B–24s escaped on a course of 240º (to the southwestern part of the Gulf of
Tomini) (note: [written as] “210º” in the Summary Report of the Actions), and two B–17Ds on a
course of 180º. Judging from the reconnoitered condition of the Makassar [airfield] (note: small
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with soft ground, and unfit for use by large planes) and the fact that one made an emergency
landing in Kendari, it is concluded that the enemy must have used bases near Kupang and on
Java.
4 In order to avoid “out-[of]-range” (the situation that one side is able to attack, but the other side
is not, due to the attacking distance), it is necessary for us to have large attack planes ready.
The 3d Air Group completed its advance to Menado by advancing ten fighter planes on the
12th (along with one land-based reconnaissance plane; at that time the Langoan airfield was
half completed, and the western half remained unavailable), advancing a total of twenty-
seven planes on the 14th (along with four land-based reconnaissance planes), and a total of
fifty-one planes on the 19th (of which forty-one planes could be put to use in combat). As for
the Tōkō Air Group, about half of its flying boats had advanced to Menado on the 17th and
all of them on the 18th. The 21st Air Flotilla headquarters [also] advanced to Menado on the
16th.(71, 75) In the meantime, twenty of the Type–96 transport planes of the 1st Air Group, which
had been engaged in the Menado paradrop operation, had been pulled back to Gaoxiong on
the 13th. On the 14th, through a reconnaissance over Ambon conducted by a land-based re-
connaissance plane of the 3d Air Group, twenty-five enemy planes (six large planes and
eighteen small ones [on the ground] and one fighter plane in the air) were spotted. [Also]
spotted were one ship, which looked like a mid-sized cruiser (note: from the photo recon-
naissance on the 15th, it was judged to be more like a minelayer), and two merchantmen, all
anchored in the port. Judging that the enemy was gearing up for an all-out counterattack,
1st Air Raid Unit Commander Rear Admiral Tada concentrated all his forces on the attack
on Ambon on the 15th and the 16th, and destroyed the enemy.(81) (The reported military gain
was six [enemy] planes, which were brought down or set ablaze, and the destruction of the
airfield facilities.) In the meantime, at 1620 on the 14th when returning from the reconnais-
sance of Ambon, the land-based reconnaissance plane of the 3d Air Group spotted one
[enemy] submarine at a point about 120 nautical miles, 200º [SW] from Ternate (in the western
part of Halmahera) and [also], at 1650, spotted about thirty enemy submarines cruising sub-
merged in loose formation (sometimes showing then hiding their periscopes) along the line
connecting the Sula Islands and Labuha (on Halmahera). The 1st Air Raid commander
doubted the report, but taking the report as well as the Ambon reconnaissance report into
consideration, he had to deal with it just to make sure, and he sent a telegraph, which was in
summary as follows:(81)
According to a reconnaissance by our land-based reconnaissance plane today, the 14th, about
thirty enemy submarines were cruising submerged in loose formation between Labuha and the
western tip of the Sula islands around 1650 and may reach the vicinity of Menado tomorrow
morning. Since on Ambon about twenty-five enemy planes were concentrated and also an
[enemy] mid-sized cruiser was spotted [in the harbor], our unit shall attack Ambon tomorrow,
the 15th, with its full force of land-based mid-sized attack planes as well as fighter planes and
[also] carry out attacks on the enemy submarines with its full force of flying boats (of which not
more than ten are available).
On the 16th, 1st Air Raid Commander Rear Admiral Tada wired the following about the
[enemy] submarines spotted by the land-based reconnaissance plane:(57)
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The state of affairs at the time when the enemy submarines were spotted by the land-based re-
connaissance plane on the 14th and my views on it are as follows:
1. From 1620 through 1650, [in an area] about 50 nautical miles 250º [WSW] from the town of
Labuha [and stretching] for about 30 to 50 nautical miles along the 250º line, 15 pairs of some-
thing that looked like submarines (each pair keeping a distance of 2 to 3 nautical miles from
one another, and each member of the pair a distance of about 500 to 1,000 meters between
one another), 30 in total, were spotted cruising submerged. The course of the enemy was
more or less 160º [SSE].
2. The first one spotted looked very much like a submarine by its periscope and underwater
appearance, whereas the others were oval, black and (illegible characters), which made us
have some doubts. However, it was [also] said that the one spotted first looked the same
after [the plane] circled to take a [closer] look, and that even then (two characters illegible)
high, that it raised its periscope at times, and that it submerged, discharging oil and bubbles,
when the plane approached. However, what it really was, was not determined. The reconnais-
sance was made from an altitude of 300 meters, and the skills of crew were excellent.
3. In the state of affairs of the reconnaissance described above, there are several points that
leave much room for doubt, such as the fact that many submarines were cruising submerged
in an area of merely 40 nautical miles wide, that they looked oval and black, and that they
took a southward course. However, a case where they may have dived at the sight of [our]
plane when they were about to turn back is imaginable.
4. As stated in the above, there are still some doubts and it is difficult to conclude that there
really were about thirty submarines. However, taking into consideration the steps the enemy
might take in the current war situation, along with the information [collected] from the wire-
less, we concluded that it was necessary [to conduct an operation] to thoroughly neutralize
[enemy] traffic in the area for another several days.
From the 15th onwards, the Navy conducted a sweeping [operation] of the Molucca Sea
against this pack of [enemy] submarines with a total of forty-one flying boats as well as de-
stroyer divisions and minesweeper divisions (which will be described later), but they found
no clues at all. From a case on the 18th, when a large flying boat of the Tōkō Air Group had
mistaken whales for [enemy] submarines and other such situations, [the Navy] concluded
that the major part of the [enemy] submarines spotted by the land-based reconnaissance
plane were whales and called off the search on the 19th.(12)
Lessons from the Operation and Observations
According to the Action Report of the 2d Destroyer Squadron, the lessons and observations
drawn from the Menado operation were as follows:
1. It is necessary to execute the invasion operations [only] after the air operations to destroy the
enemy air power have been almost completed. Since this [Menado] operation was carried out
when our air operations to destroy the enemy air power had not yet produced sufficient results,
we suffered fierce counterattacks by enemy aircraft. It was fortunate that [the enemy] caused
no [major] damage to us because their attacks were carried out by single planes, and, moreover,
their skill was not very great. We observe that our losses must have been disastrous should we
have been attacked by a considerable number of [enemy planes] in formation.
2. The enemy aircraft attacked, choosing an appropriate moment when our fighter planes were
not in the air. Moreover, they easily carried out their bombings because the speed of our obser-
vation planes was slow and inferior.
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We observe that it is difficult to stop and destroy the [enemy] high-speed bombers during
an antiaircraft guard with observation planes [alone], unless the latter were to be deployed in
considerably large numbers.
3. Air defense communications with the land-based air units went not smoothly, and generally
took two hours [to be transmitted]. The reason is that these communications depend on the gen-
eral fleet radio wave, even though insufficient [numbers of] personnel are assigned to this radio
wave at advance bases, and this wave gets congested. Quick communications by using this radio
wave cannot be expected. The need for a [separate] air defense communications system was
keenly felt.
4. The formation of base construction squads is essential in operations to seize [enemy] air bases,
therefore their formation and equipment as well as the embarkation and disembarkation
[process] on and from transport ships needs to be studied and prepared well ahead. We observe
that it is quite inconvenient to send forward temporarily formed [squads of] noncombatants
along with front line units and, on top of that, as usual to load equipment and personnel in such
a way that it takes as much as one week to unload them.
5. It is also vital to have ready small naval vessels with great mobility, like the ones the U.S. Navy
possesses, for the purpose of supplying flying boats, reconnaissance seaplanes and others as
well as for use in the construction of bases.
6. From an escort point of view, the requisitioned ships need to be arranged and allotted in ad-
vance, so that convoys heading to a same area should be formed with the ships of a similar type
with similar speeds. The ships allotted as transport ships for the Sasebo Combined Special Land-
ing Forces for the last Menado operation were ideal indeed.
7. If diesel-powered ships and only coal-burning ships (the next part is partly unclear) are used in
the same convoy, it may be difficult to set the speed of the convoy due to the critical speed of
the diesel-powered ships.
The Operations of the Main Body and the Base Unit
On 12 January, the main body of the 2d Escort Unit was sailing about 100 nautical miles
northwest of Menado. Rear Admiral Tanaka, commander of the 2d Escort Unit, concluded
that the operation to capture Menado was for the most part completed by that day and issued
one order after another about replenishment, preparations for the next operations, the outline
of the subsequent actions and about the guarding of the anchorage. The main orders con-
cerned the preparations for the Kendari and the Ambon operations. Concerning the prepa-
rations for the Kendari operation, he designated the forces participating in the operation and
those covering the former. He [also] announced that the Jintsū (the flagship of the 2d Escort
Unit) would head for Davao (the assembly place for the Ambon invasion units), leaving
Menado on the 15th, and that the guarding of the sea in the Menado area would be conducted
under the command of the 15th Destroyer Division commander until the unit to seize
Kendari was formed.(54) Concerning the preparations for the seizure of Ambon, he announced
that the Jintsū would arrive in Davao on the 18th, that the Itō Detachment (the Army unit for
seizing Ambon) would arrive in Davao on the 19th, that the 1st Kure Special Landing Force
and the 6th Construction Squad would arrive at the Bangka anchorage by the 12th, and that
the units in Menado should join the main body later en route (time and place to be ordered
later), etc. In the meantime, 1st Base Unit Commander Rear Admiral Kubo on board the Na-
gara was operating off Menado, commanding the base unit. The base unit, which had started
working on the defense of the Bangka anchorage from the early morning of the 12th, closed
the east entrance with mines laid by the Itsukushima, set antisubmarine nets at the north en-
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trance with the Shirataka and the Aotaka, while closing the north entrance on the western side
with mines as well (See Illustration No. 11). The defense work at the Bangka anchorage was
completed by the evening of the 12th, and the ships that had completed disembarkation,
supply ships, the units for the next operations, and others assembled in succession at the
Bangka anchorage. On the 13th, 1st Base Force Commander Rear Admiral Kubo notified the
units that were to participate in the seizure of Kendari to assemble in the Bangka anchorage
by the 17th and leave the anchorage on the 18th.
Sweeping the Molucca Sea of Whales (See Illustration No. 12)
On 15 January, 2d Escort Unit Commander Rear Admiral Tanaka was on his way back to
Davao from Menado in order to make preparations for the coming Ambon operation. How-
ever, because the land-based reconnaissance plane of the 3d Air Group, as previously told,
had spotted thirty submerged [enemy] submarines in the Molucca Sea the day before, he
ended up taking care of sweeping the sea by order of the Dutch East Indies Unit commander.
In this sweeping operation, the 21st Minesweeper Division of the 1st Base Force also partic-
ipated. The outline of the sweeping operation is as shown in Illustration No. 12.(54) The sweep-
ing operation was led by the commander of the 15th Destroyer Division. [First of all], on the
15th from 2200 onwards, the 15th and the 16th Destroyer Divisions in a row and keeping a
distance of nine nautical miles between each ship, sailed southward from the north at a speed
of thirteen knots. Then, on the 16th from 0300 onwards, [following the former] the 21st
Minesweeper Division repeated the sweeping operation from the north. On the 16th at 0600,
the 15th and the 16th Destroyer Divisions reversed course to sail northwards. At 1030, joined
by the 21st Minesweeper Division, they [changed course and] swept the sea northeastward
in a row while keeping a distance of five nautical miles between each ship. In the meantime,
from 0215 to 0220 on the same day, the Takao Signal Unit had detected two [enemy] sub-
marines with their radio direction finding system as shown in the illustration. The 15th and
the 16th Destroyer Divisions and the 21st Minesweeper Division headed to the waters where
the enemy submarines were supposed to be hiding. However, apart from two enemy heavy
bombers, which passed flying over the sweeping unit at 1150, no enemy movements were
detected even by 1800 on the 16th, and the operation was called off by the previously given
orders. The 15th Destroyer Division headed for the Menado anchorage, while the 16th De-
stroyer Division and the 21st Minesweeper Division sailed to the Bangka anchorage. Also
the Jintsū, which had been supporting the operation as shown in the illustration, broke off
the operation and headed for Davao. And also the Nagara, which was on the waters east of
Menado to support the operation, broke off the operation and entered into the Bangka an-
chorage on the evening of the 16th.(54)
Most of the [enemy] submarines in this operation, which had been spotted by the land-
based reconnaissance plane of the 3d Air Group, were judged to have been whales.
The Operations of the Support Unit and the Dutch East Indies Unit
The Support Unit, i.e. the 5th Cruiser Division left Davao at 1500 on 9 January, and supported
the invasion operation by timely deploying in an area about 150 nautical miles northwest of
Menado. At 1100 on the 13th, Support Unit Commander Rear Admiral Takagi concluded that
the Menado operation was largely completed and left the site at 0000 on the 14th to enter the
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Illustration No. 12 – The Sweeping Operation for Enemy Submarines in the Molucca Sea
(15-16 January, 1942)
anchorage north of Pakiputan Strait in Davao Gulf at 1630.(78) In the meantime, Dutch East
Indies Unit Commander Vice Admiral Takahashi was still in charge of directing the entire
operation on board the Ashigara in Davao Gulf. After the operations against Tarakan and
Menado were largely completed, the commander issued orders on the 15th to postpone the
schedule of the [operation] to seize Kendari from the 21st of January to the 24th, and that of
capturing Ambon from the 25th of January to the 29th, due to the delay in the advance of the
construction squad as well as due to the operation to clear the Molucca Sea of enemy sub-
marines. On the 16th, he further issued orders to postpone [the operation against] Balikpapan
from the 21st of January to the 24th.(56)
The State of the Allied Forces
1. Air forces
At the time of Japanese invasion of Menado, the allied air forces were deployed in the
following way, but no effectual counterattacks were carried out.(85, 86)
Ambon
Bombers (Martin; Australian Air Force and Dutch Army) 25-30 aircraft
Fighter planes (Curtis; Dutch Army) about 5 aircraft
Flying Boats (Catalina and Dornier; U.S. and Dutch Navy) about 15 aircraft
Kendari
Flying Boats (Catalina and Dornier; U.S. and Dutch Navy) 7-10 aircraft
Malang (Eastern Java)
Bombers (B–17; U.S. Army) 10 aircraft, increased by 6 on the 15th
Bombers (LB–30; U.S. Army) unknown, increased by 4 on the 15th
Note: The aircraft, which raided Menado on 17 January and which the Japanese Navy took
for B–24s, were in reality LB–30.* 
2. Surface Forces
Admiral Hart, commander in chief of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet in Surabaya, decided to im-
mediately attack the Japanese convoy in Kema and issued an order that the unit at Port
Darwin (the heavy cruiser USS Houston, the destroyers USS Alden, USS Edsall, and USS
Whipple, the light cruisers USS Boise and USS Marblehead, the destroyers USS Stewart, USS
Bulmer, USS Pope, USS Parrott, and USS Barker, of which the USS Boise and the rest had
been escorting a transport ship [the Bloemfontein] to Surabaya from Darwin) should make
a sortie in full force. On 12 January, the USS Houston and the unit in Darwin left the port
and sailed northward so as to join the unit escorting the transport ship in the Banda Sea.
However, it became known from the intelligence provided by the submarines USS Pike
and USS Permit, which had been stationed off Kema on the 17th, that the Japanese forces
were not in Kema, and the operation was cancelled.(87)
3. Ground Forces
Although 1,500 men of a Dutch [East Indies] garrison unit were stationed in Menado, the
first-ever paratroop operation of Japanese forces caused confusion among the unit, of
which the coastal defense unit was contained. As a result, the garrison abandoned
Menado by the evening of the 12th.(85)
174 Chapter V     /     The Forward Push of the Air Bases
* These are actually the same planes. B–24 being the U.S. Army Air Force designation; LB–30 being the factory
designation.
According to the Action Report of the 1st Yokosuka Special Landing Force, the state of the
enemy, which the 1st Yokosuka Special Landing Force had learned through the interrogation
of prisoners, etc. was as follows: 
(1) The enemy in the entire Minahasa province had stationed its headquarters in Tomohon and
built strong pillbox positions along the strategic roads that led to the direction of the airfield
from the landing points of Menado, Belang, Amurang, and Kema, and drastically increased
its strength at the Langoan airfield.
Due to our drop on the Langoan airfield, the enemy, being attacked from the rear, had its
plans completely shattered and fled into the mountains. The paradrop had an enormous ef-
fect on the Menado invasion operation.
(2) Deployment [of the enemy] at the Langoan [airfield] and surrounding areas
(3) On the 11th, as if the enemy already knew the Japanese plans, they had strengthened their
defenses by placing cheveaux-de-frise and constructing trenches at strategic places in every
town.
Moreover, the enemy had handed out leaflets against [Japanese] paratrooper units and
[also] posted them, so as to give an even stronger warning to watch out for them.
In particular, very tight defenses had been put up at the dropping area, the Langoan air-
field, where more than three hundred cheveaux-de-frise (of 5 meters long and 1.5 meters wide)
had been put all over the place, countless bamboo stakes had been planted and eight pillbox
positions and trenches had been constructed in three directions, adjacent to which eight ma-
chineguns and two armed cars had been placed at both sides, to make an extremely strong
defense system.
Simultaneously with the start of the drop and along with the fire from the armored cars
at the rear, the enemy started to rake [our troops] with a fierce fire and tenaciously resisted.
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Date Position Number of troops Main armaments Notes
11 January Langoan Airfield 400 2 Armored cars8 Machineguns












12 January Urban area of Langoan 120 Machinegun(s)
Looks like they were





and arsenals of vari-
ous weapons
Ditto Paso 23 Ditto
Ditto Tompaso 41 Ditto
However, at [our] brave charge at their left wing position, the enemy gradually retreated to-
ward Langoan City. In Kakas, with about fifteen men [150 according to the table above] and
one antitank gun and one converted armored car deployed, [the enemy] defended [the city]
by putting up cheveaux-de-frise and constructing trenches at strategic locations in the urban
areas. As the main [Japanese] force advanced, the enemy fought back against our advance
guard, but gradually retreated. After that, although the enemy tried to put up some resist-
ance at strategic locations in the urban area as well as in the neighborhood, they fled into
mountains, abandoning quite a lot of weapons and ammunition.
(4) On the 12th, the enemy who was deployed in the urban area of Langoan as well as all around
Paso and Tompaso, had already lost their will to fight. While putting up some resistance
against our attacks by using strategic locations, the enemy fled into mountains, abandoning
various facilities, weapons and ammunition. 
(5) Sketch of the enemy positions in Langoan and the whole surrounding area
(Separate Illustration No. 1 – Note by the author: Illustration No. 13)
Map of the defensive positions at the Langoan airfield (dropping point)
(Separate Illustration No. 2 – Omitted by the author)
























Illustration No. 13 – Enemy Positions in Langoan and the Whole Surrounding Area
(The numbers in parentheses indicate the number of troops)
4. The Capture of Balikpapan (See Illustrations No. 14 and No. 17)
Postponement of the Invasion Schedule
The date of [the operation to] seize Balikpapan had been set for Day X + 43 (20 January) in
the Cam Ranh Agreement. However, because the Air Unit’s shift to the operation against the
Dutch East Indies was delayed due to the delay in the capture of Davao and Jolo and the bad
condition of the airfields, it was decided at the meeting on 6 January to postpone the seizure
[of Balikpapan] by one day until 21 January. But the sweeping of the Lingkas anchorage after
the capture of Tarakan was held up, and the debarkation of matériel and personnel for the
construction of the airfield made little progress, delaying the preparation of the Tarakan air-
field. On top of that, the condition of the airfield was worse than expected, which lead to a
further delay in the advance of air forces.(56) That is, there was only a dim prospect for the
advance of nine fighter planes and two land-based reconnaissance planes of the Tainan Air
Group on the 16th, but the advance of the land-based attack planes was expected to require
a considerable further number of days.(62) Moreover, because it was difficult for land-based
attack planes to take off fully loaded from the rear base of Jolo, things came to such a pass
that both the air campaign against [enemy bases] south of Balikpapan by land-based attack
planes as well as the surprise attack on Balikpapan by the paratrooper unit could no longer
be counted on.(12)
In the meantime, in view of the example of Tarakan, there were great hopes for taking the
oil facilities intact. For that purpose, it was decided to carry out a surprise attack and occupy
[Balikpapan] not by means of a frontal attack but by catching the Dutch East Indies garrison
off guard through a covert operation by the Army and prevent them from destroying and
burning the facilities. On 15 January, 1st Escort Unit Commander Rear Admiral Nishimura
conferred with Detachment Commander Sakaguchi and they came to the conclusion that the
landing in Balikpapan should be [further] postponed from the 21st until the 24th, and re-
ported the matter to the Dutch East Indies Unit Commander Vice Admiral Takahashi, who
approved it on the next day, the 16th.(56)
On the same day, the 16th, the Asama-maru with the Navy 1001 Unit (the 3d Yokosuka
Special Landing Force, i.e. [another] paratrooper unit) on board entered the port of Tarakan.
However, the postponement of only three days was not enough to get the Tarakan base ready
for the required transport unit (twenty-eight to thirty-nine aircraft) to land on and take off
from [the airfield], and the employment of the paratrooper unit for the Balikpapan [opera-
tion] was cancelled. It was decided to employ the unit [instead] in the subsequent operation
to seize Banjarmasin, and [for that purpose] the unit was kept on standby in Tarakan.(12)
Plan of Operations, etc.
On the 17th, the units concerned made detailed arrangements in line with the postponed
schedule, and the departure from Tarakan of the units to seize Balikpapan was changed to
1700 on 21 January. The outline of the arrangements, plans of operations, etc. were as fol-
lows.(56)
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The Arrangements Between the 1st Escort Unit and the Sakaguchi Detachment
On 17 January, in line with the [new] postponed schedule, the detailed arrangements between
the Army and the Navy concerning the operation to seize Balikpapan were changed as fol-
lows:(56)
1. Landing points
Main force: Near the Balikpapan airfield
Detached force: Near the reservoir 10 nautical miles north of Balikpapan, by sailing up the Wain
River
2. Landing strength
Main force: two infantry battalions and [a] field artillery battalion as the core
Detached force: one infantry battalion as the core
3. Distribution, movements and sailing routes of the transport ships
Same as those in the plan of the 1st Escort Unit
4. Others
[The arrangements] at the time of the Tarakan invasion operation shall apply.
The Plan of Operations of the [Army] Sakaguchi Detachment
The main force, consisting of the 146th Infantry Regiment (minus the 2d Battalion), an ar-
mored car unit, a field artillery battalion, and an engineer company (minus one platoon),
shall land near the airfield. After seizing the airfield, one element shall immediately be dis-
patched to the Samboja oilfields to the north and occupy them, while [at the same time] being
assigned the task of covering the rear of the main force. [Meanwhile,] the main force shall
advance westward along the coastal road and storm the Balikpapan stronghold. When car-
rying out the assault, the main force shall act in concert with the detached force, make use of
the military gains [of the latter] and not rush into the assault.
The detached force, consisting of one infantry battalion, one engineer platoon, one inde-
pendent engineer platoon and one radio section, shall sail up the Wain River, land near the
reservoir, and dispatch one element to the water-pumping station, so as to prevent various
facilities from being destroyed. The main force [of the detached force] shall swiftly advance
to the hamlet of Batu Ampar. While cutting off the escape routes of the enemy, [the force]
shall charge into the urban area as unexpectedly as possible and throw the enemy’s organized
resistance into disorder, so as to facilitate the assault of the main force of the Detachment on
the stronghold.
The Resources Salvage Unit under the direct control [of the Detachment], consisting of
two infantry companies, [one] antiaircraft artillery battalion, one independent engineer com-
pany (minus one platoon), one transport company, two radio platoons, [one] medical unit,
and one platoon of the 1st Kure Special Landing Force, shall go ashore in the wake of the
main force and enter Balikpapan City along with the main force. The Resources Salvage Unit
shall split in two groups, each of which shall respectively accompany the main force and the
detached force, and [be in charge of] preventing facilities from being destroyed and resources
from being dispersed and lost. 
After the occupation of the Balikpapan sector, one detachment consisting of one infantry
battalion as the core shall be formed as swiftly as possible to take charge of seizing and se-
curing the Sanga Sanga oilfields in conjunction with the naval special landing force.
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By one unit after another, [the detachment] shall make preparations for the next [opera-
tion] to seize Banjarmasin.(88)
The Covert Operation of the Sakaguchi Detachment
[The detachment] shall dispatch Captain Colijn, currently adjutant of the Tarakan garrison,
who is the [eldest] son of a former governor-general of the Dutch East Indies [actually: former
Dutch prime minister] and who is a manager of BPM (Bataafse Petroleum Maatschappij) and
on friendly terms with the Balikpapan garrison commander, to the headquarters of the Ba-
likpapan garrison, having Captain Reinderhoff, a staff officer of Tarakan garrison accompany
him, to convey that the garrison “not put up useless resistance or destroy resources and ma-
terials.” For this purpose, [the detachment] shall put them on board of a seized steam launch
and send them ahead to Balikpapan along the coast, flying the Dutch flag.(89)
The Plan of Operations of the Detached Force of the Sakaguchi Detachment
From among the prisoners, [the detached force] shall have one native, who worked as a patrol
officer in Balikpapan until about ten days ago, [also] board the launch of the unit for the
covert operation and have him infiltrate into Balikpapan to light a leading light on the wa-
terway to the Wain River (which flows into the bay of Balikpapan) and to guide the detached
force (two companies led by a battalion commander). The detached force shall sail upriver
in [landing] craft and land near the reservoir about ten nautical miles north of Balikpapan.
In concert with the landing operation of the main force, the [detached] force shall envelop
from the rear of Balikpapan the shelters of Dutch noncombatants, thereby advising them to
surrender and prevent the resource facilities from being destroyed. Depending on the situa-
tion, [the detached force] shall attack the enemy lines at a stroke and occupy Balikpapan. The
detached force shall separate from the main force the day before the landing, shift to [landing]
craft at the 2d anchorage [near] the south coast of Balikpapan Bay, camouflage the craft with
mangrove branches and sail upriver along the west coast of the bay.(89)
The Plan of Operations of the 1st Escort Unit
On 18 January, the 1st Escort Unit announced its plan of operations for the capture of Balik-
papan; it was in outline as follows:(56)
1. Distribution of the Transport Convoy
(1) 1st Section
The Tsuruga-maru, the Liverpool-maru, the Hiteru-maru, and the Ehime-maru (carrying the Sak-
aguchi Detachment), the Asahisan-maru and the Nittei-maru (carrying the 2d Construction
Squad), the Kumagawa-maru (the auxiliary personnel transport ship of the 1st Base Force)
and the Sumanoura-maru (the auxiliary net-layer of the 1st Base Force)
(2) 2d Section
The Havana-maru, the Hankow-maru, the Teiryū-maru, and the Kuretake-maru (carrying the
Sakaguchi Detachment), the Kanayama[san]-maru [Kayamasan-maru] (carrying the 2d Con-
struction Squad), the Tōei-maru [B] (carrying the 1st Defense Detail), the Nan’a-maru (the
transport ship of the 11th Air Fleet)
(3) The detached force
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The 1st and the 2d ships of the 2d Section shall leave the line by separate order and form the
detached force.
2. Departure from Tarakan
(1) First of all, at 1700 on 21 January, the 1st Section of the 24th Destroyer Division, the 2d De-
stroyer Division and the 31st Subchaser Division shall leave [Tarakan] and form a clearing
unit; sailing at slow speed ahead of the route of the convoy, they shall [search for the enemy]
by using sound and signal detection until ordered otherwise by separate orders.
(2) After that, the Naka, the transport convoy (led or escorted by the 9th Destroyer Division, the
11th and the 30th Minesweeper Divisions, and Patrol Boats Nos. 36, 37 and 38) shall leave
[Tarakan] in that order and form a protective sailing formation.
3. Escort during the sailing
(1) Scheduled route: As shown in the Separate Illustration No. 25 (omitted)
(2) Sailing speed: 9 knots at normal speed; 6 knots at slow speed
(3) The protective sailing formation
By day, the 31st Subchaser Division ([with] three submarine chasers) shall sweep the waters
by using sound detection, sailing in a row seven kilometers ahead of the convoy. The 1st
Section of the 24th Destroyer Division and the 2d Destroyer Division [shall clear the sailing
route] by using signal detection, sailing in a row three kilometers ahead of the convoy. The
Asagumo shall lead the 1st Section of the convoy and Patrol Boat No. 36 the 2d Section, while
the 9th Destroyer Division (minus the Yamagumo), the 30th and the 11th Minesweeper Divi-
sions, three patrol boats and the Naka shall provide direct escort. By night, the formation
shall be contracted: the rows to clear the waters ahead shall be removed, and the destroyers
shall be deployed at the front [of the convoy] to form a protective screen.
4. Entering into the anchorage
(1) Around 1800 on 22 January, by separate order, the 1st Section of the 24th Destroyer Division,
the Havana-maru and the Hankow-maru (note: the ships with the detached force on board)
shall leave the line and sail ahead.
(2) On the afternoon of 23 January, by separate order, the Natsugumo shall leave the line and
sail ahead to take charge of guarding the waters around the 1st anchorage as the marker
vessel east of the anchorage.
(3) At 1800 on the 23d, the main body shall start shifting to the preparatory formation to enter
into the anchorage.
(4) The detached force shall sail ahead [of the main body] along the sailing route shown in the
Separate Illustration No. 25 (omitted), and cast anchor at the 2d anchorage at 2100 on the
23d. After launching the landing units, the ships shall return to the 1st anchorage.
(5) The main body shall shift to the formation to enter into the anchorage by separate order and
enter into the anchorage following the route cleared in a two-tier clearing system, consisting
of [a first] clearing [of the waters] along the route ahead by the 31st Subchaser Division and
[a second] sweeping of waters by the 30th and the 11th Minesweeper Divisions and the 2d
Destroyer Division. The main body shall cast anchor at the 1st anchorage around 0100 on
the 24th. The 1st and the 2d anchorages are as shown in Separate Illustration No. 29 (Illus-
tration No. 14).
(6) The 30th and the 11th Minesweeper Divisions and the Special [Minesweeping] Service Unit
(on board the Kumagawa-maru) of the 2d Base Force shall by separate order sweep the shal-
low waterways leading to the inside of the port of Balikpapan from the 1st anchorage.
5. Guarding the anchorage
After [the convoys] have entered into the anchorage, the areas around the anchorage of the con-
voy shall be guarded by the minesweepers, submarine chasers, and patrol boats. The 9th De-
stroyer Division shall guard the whole area southeast [of the anchorage], and 24th Destroyer
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Division the area northeast [of the anchorage]. The Naka and the 2d Destroyer Division shall
further guard the area outside that under the guard of the 9th Destroyer Division.
6. Communications, etc. (omitted)
The Plan of Operations of the 2d Base Unit
The commander on board of the Itsukushima shall leave Tarakan on 24 January, leading the
Wakataka, the Imizu-maru, and the 21st Subchaser Division, to advance to Balikpapan on the
26th. He shall have the 30th and the 11th Minesweeper Divisions, the 31st Subchaser Division,
the Kumagawa-maru and the Sumanoura-maru incorporated into the 1st Escort Unit and let
them sail ahead. After his advance to Balikpapan, the commander shall have the forces, which
had been incorporated into the 1st Escort Unit, rejoin his unit, putting them under his com-
mand and take charge of the minesweeping at the anchorage as well as along the waterways
inside the port. He shall also take charge of the defense of the anchorage and the management
of the port, while supporting the operation of the 1st Escort Unit. The rest of his unit shall
remain mostly in Tarakan and take charge of escorting reinforcements and other units.(68)
The Plan of Operations of the 1st Air Unit
The 1st Air Unit was scheduled to escort the Sakaguchi Detachment from Tarakan to Balik-
papan, supporting the 1st Escort Unit and, depending on the situation, to support the landing
operation in Balikpapan. The aircraft units were supposed to mainly conduct operations from
the Tarakan base and the Sangkulirang base (note: about halfway between Tarakan and Ba-
likpapan).
The main scheduled operations were as follows:(90)
1. Division of the operations
(1) San’yō-maru
She shall dismantle her base at Tarakan on the 23d, collect the base supporting personnel
and matériel, and sail at 1600 on the 23d along with the 2d Base Force vessels to set up a
base [at] the coast south of the Balikpapan airfield on the 26th. After that, she shall at an ap-
propriate moment enter the port of Balikpapan.
(2) Sanuki-maru
She shall leave Tarakan on the evening of the 24th, arrive at Sangkulirang Bay on the early
morning of the 26th, dismantle the base, collect the base supporting personnel and assist in
embarking the large-sized motorized [landing] craft used as patrol boats. She shall enter
[the port of] Balikpapan around the 27th and support [the setting up of] a base [there].
2. Aircraft employment division
(1) [On] the 21st
Between 0645 – 0900: sweeping the waters of [enemy] submarines [to be conducted as shown
in] Separate Illustration No. 1 (omitted by the author). Between 1000 – 1300: patrol against
[enemy] submarines and direct guarding against [enemy] submarines [to be conducted with]
one Type–0 observation seaplane of each ship. Between 1245 – 1900: direct escort of the trans-
port convoy against [enemy] submarines [to be conducted by] two shifts of two observation
seaplanes for each shift.
(2) [From] the 22d through the 23d
Direct escort of the convoy against [enemy] submarines shall be conducted almost in the
same manner [as the day before].
(3) From the 24th Onwards
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From early morning until about sunset, observation seaplanes shall guard the periphery of
the anchorage against [enemy] submarines and reconnoiter the waters where mines were
laid, while three-seater reconnaissance seaplanes shall search for the enemy in the area be-
tween 205º [SSW] and 180º [S] within a radius of 240 nautical miles from the base.
The Plan of Operations of the Air Unit of the Southern Task Force
The land-based air unit to support [the operation to] seize Balikpapan was the 2d Air Raid
Unit. The deployment of the unit as of 20 January was as follows:
Tarakan: the 23d Air Flotilla headquarters, 20 Type–0 fighter planes of the Tainan Air Group, 4
land-based reconnaissance planes, and the 3d Yokosuka Special Landing Force
Jolo: 45 Type-1 land-based attack planes of the Takao Air Group and 10 Type–0 fighter planes of
the Tainan Air Group
Gaoxiong: 20 Type–1 land-based attack planes of the Takao Air Group and 27 transport planes
of the 1001 Unit
Although no documents are extant concerning the plan of operations of the 2d Air Raid Unit,
the operation schedule of each unit is assumed to have been as in the following table.(71, 75)




1. To direct the operation of the 2d Air Raid Unit at the Jolo base.
2. To advance to the Tarakan base when the base is ready.
Takao Air Group
1. To push forward its forces to the Jolo base from Gaoxiong one after another when the Jolo
base is ready.
2. To patrol the northern half of the Makassar Strait from the Jolo base and attack enemy
naval vessels.
3. To conduct reconnaissance attacks and provide cover for [friendly] convoys as well as
combat support for the landing units upon their request in the area of Balikpapan in Bor-
neo from the Jolo base.
4. [The group] may advance one element of its force from the Jolo base to the Tarakan base
when the latter is ready.
Tainan Air
Group
1. To conduct a photoreconnaissance of the landing points of Balikpapan and [also] recon-
noiter Banjarmasin and Makassar with land-based reconnaissance planes from the Jolo
base.
To provide direct guard in the air above Jolo and Tarakan and mop up the enemy air
power in the Borneo area with the Type–0 fighter planes (land-based reconnaissance
planes).
2. To advance from the Jolo base to the Tarakan base when the latter is ready, and mop up
the enemy air power in the areas of Balikpapan and Banjarmasin with land-based recon-
naissance planes from the [Tarakan] base.
To provide direct guard in the air above Tarakan with Type–0 fighter planes.
3. To provide direct escort in the air above the 1st Escort Unit and the transport convoys
with Type–0 fighter planes (land-based reconnaissance planes).
Remarks
1. The participation of the 1001 Unit in the operation to seize Balikpapan was cancelled (as al-
ready described).
2. Since the Tarakan [airfield] was not anytime soon ready for use by land-based attack planes,
and it was also impossible for the planes to take off from the Jolo airfield fully loaded, the
search for the enemy and the patrol over the Makassar Strait south of Balikpapan was as-
signed to the 1st Air Raid Unit until the advance of the land-based attack planes of the 2d
Air Raid Unit to Balikpapan. Rear Admiral Tada, commander of the 1st Air Raid Unit, carried
out the search for the enemy and the patrols over the southern part of the Makassar Strait
from Menado with flying boats.(71, 75)
3. When the Balikpapan airfield was ready for use, the Tainan Air Group and the 2d Air Raid
Unit headquarters were supposed to advance to the base from Tarakan to prepare for the
subsequent operations. 
Assessment of the Enemy Movements in the Balikpapan Area(68)
1. As the [Japanese] operations progressed, the allied surface forces moved southward
outside the reach of our air forces. They are in the Java Sea area and show little enthu-
siasm to make a sortie, while a part of the defending forces seems to be operating in
the Makassar Strait area.
2. It is necessary to be on alert against [enemy] submarines, because not only do they
regularly appear off Tarakan, but also two or three of them have been detected with
direction finders in the strait leading toward Balikpapan.
3. According to intelligence and air reconnaissance reports, [the enemy] has deployed to
Balikpapan some destroyers, patrol vessels, mine-laying vessels and torpedo boats;
they seem to busy themselves putting up a defense.
4. Dutch aircraft have been carrying out considerably aggressive counterattacks using
airfields at various places, in particular hidden airfields, unknown to us. We need to
be very much on our guard against their four-engine heavy bombers because they
carry a large load and are very accurate in their bombing, and also because it is difficult
for friendly fighter planes to bring them down.
5. In view of the experience in [the invasion of] Tarakan, it is certain that mines have
been laid in the port of Balikpapan. Moreover, due to the shallowness of the waters,
we need to be on our guard against mines at the whole planned anchorage.
6. According to air reconnaissance [reports], fires and explosions were spotted in the
urban area of Balikpapan and at many places in the oilfields of Samarinda ([as of] 20
January); it appears that the enemy is adopting drastic scorched-earth tactics.
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1001 Unit
1. The 3d Yokosuka Special Landing Force shall leave Gaoxiong on the Asama-maru on the
5th of January, arrive in Davao on the 12th via Jolo, leave Davao for Tarakan when the
Tarakan base is seized, and provide guard for the latter.
2. To join the operation to seize Balikpapan from the Tarakan base.
3. The transport unit of the 1001 Unit shall advance to the Tarakan base from Gaoxong, and
cooperate in the paradrop operation of the 3d Yokosuka Special Landing Force participat-
ing in the operation to seize Balikpapan.
The Launch of the Invasion Operation
Prior Neutralization of [Enemy] Air Power Completed
From 30 December [1941] onwards, the Tainan Air Group of the 2d Air Raid Unit had
launched reconnaissance [missions] over the Tarakan, Samarinda and Balikpapan areas by
its land-based reconnaissance planes with the Jolo airfield as its base. After the capture of
Tarakan, the air group advanced nine fighter planes and two land-based reconnaissance
planes on the 16th [of January], and launched attacks on Balikpapan with these fighter planes
from the 18th onwards. Along with this, it carried out reconnaissance [missions] over Ban-
jarmasin with its land-based reconnaissance planes, but almost no planes or surface vessels
of the enemy were spotted. [In the meantime,] the Tōkō Air Group had carried out searches
for the enemy in the Makassar Strait almost every day since 7 January with its large flying
boats using Davao as its base, but it did not spot the enemy, either. Also, the Takao Air Group,
which had launched search (reconnaissance) attacks on the enemy in the Makassar Strait as
well as on the Balikpapan airfield from 11 January onwards with its land-based attack planes
using Jolo as its base, barely spotted the enemy, other than four enemy fighter planes, which
they encountered (one shot down, unconfirmed) and several [enemy] merchantmen which
they attacked (no direct hits).(71) In the meantime, the 1st Air Unit (the seaplane unit) started
to carry out reconnaissance [missions] over the east coast of Borneo on 17 January and started
the construction of the Sangkulirang base on the 20th.(76, 90)
The Sailing of the Convoy
At 1535 on 18 January, the steam launch with those assigned to the covert operation on board
left [Tarakan] port, heading for Samboja; the Samidare observed and escorted the launch until
she was out of the harbor. Then, on the 19th from around 2000, an experiment was conducted
on the waters east of Cape Batu [to test whether it was possible to] make out a large-sized
motorized [landing] craft of the detached force camouflaged with mangrove branches in the
search lights of a destroyer. The experiment confirmed the belief that [landing] craft could
successfully sail upstream in disguise even when illuminated by search lights from Balikpa-
pan.(89) At 1200 on the 21st, 1st Escort Unit Commander Rear Admiral Nishimura moved up
the time of the main body’s anchoring at the 1st anchorage by two hours to 2300 on the 23d.
The reason for this [change] is unknown.
At 1700 on the 21st of January, the 1st Escort Unit and the transport ships left [Tarakan]
as scheduled. The total strength consisted of one light cruiser, nine destroyers, four
minesweepers, three submarine chasers, three patrol boats and sixteen transport ships, ag-
gregating to thirty-six ships. With frequent squalls the weather was so bad that almost no
air operations could be carried out, but [the sea] was relatively calm.(56)
On the 22d, the bad weather from the previous day continued and was such that it was
impossible to determine the position of the ships by celestial observation. 
Friendly aircraft, which were supposed to directly escort the convoy from the air, did not
appear at all, except for two land-based attack planes, which provided guard on the sailing
route ahead of the convoy for about one hour in the morning only. Around 1200, when sailing
southward at a point northeast of Cape Mangkalihat, [the convoy] spotted the steam launch,
which had left [earlier] for the covert operation, coming back. The Kawakaze approached to
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investigate, only to find that the covert operation had failed. [The Kawakaze] took the inter-
preters on board and let the launch return to Tarakan.(56)
The above-mentioned party for the covert operation had encountered a Dutch flying boat
off Samarinda at 0700 on the 20th; it had landed on the water and taken the two* Dutchmen
away. The steam launch had arrived at Samboja around 1600 on the 20th, and temporarily
anchored there to wait for the reply from the [garrison] commander of Balikpapan. Around
1800, a military messenger bearing of a flag of truce and carrying the enemy commander’s
letter had come to the launch. The letter contained a reply to the effect that “the main facilities
had been burned before the reception of the message from the Japanese Army;” the [covert]
operation to prevent [the facilities] from being destroyed prior [to the invasion] was consid-
ered to have come too late and have met with failure. After putting ashore the personnel [as-
signed] to the marking of the landing point at 0200 on the 21st, the steam launch had left
Samboja at 0300 to head back [toward Tarakan] and come across the convoy around noon
on the 22d. After communicating the situation, the steam launch safely returned to Tarakan
on the evening of the 23d.(89)
In the meantime on the 22d, the convoy continued sailing on as scheduled. It entered the
Makassar Strait around 1600 and sent the detached force ahead at 1800. At night, a message
came from the 23d Air Flotilla headquarters in Tarakan, which read, “It rained all day long.
Because the airfield was unfit for use, the tasks of the fighter planes were not carried out. It
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Destroyed Refinery at Balikpapan
* The text mistakenly has three. See also Vol. 3, p. 355.
is expected that [the airfield] will remain unusable tomorrow.”(56) Meanwhile on the 22d, the
Tōkō Air Group carried out a search for the enemy in the southeastern part of the Makassar
Strait from the Menado base with seven flying boats, but spotted no enemy in that area.
At 0005 on the 23d, the Umikaze, [escorting] the detached force, suddenly came under tor-
pedo attacks of enemy submarine(s) at close range. Noticing three torpedoes passing by the
bottom of the ship and another ahead of the ship, she immediately moved to detect and
attack the enemy. At 0040, she detected an enemy submarine, [closed in] while keeping track-
ing the latter until the distance between them became 600 meters, and released six [antisub-
marine] depth charges, but the results were unconfirmed.(56)
Around sunrise on the 23d, the detached force reached a point about eighty nautical miles
east of Balikpapan, while the ships of the main force were following about thirty nautical
miles behind. At 1050, three enemy twin-engine bombers appeared in the sky above the ships
of the main force, but they passed over in the direction of Samarinda without dropping
bombs. Around 1130, the ships of the main force changed their course to 270º [W], and headed
toward the anchorage of Balikpapan. From 1220 through 1305, one enemy twin-engine flying
boat reconnoitered the ships of the main force from the south from a great distance. Again
on that day, due to the bad weather in Tarakan, no friendly fighter planes showed up. The
land-based attack planes just conducted search and attack [missions] against the enemy in
the northern part of the Makassar Strait from the Jolo base, while the Tōkō Air Group also
conducted no search and attack [missions] against the enemy in the southern part of the
Makassar Strait. On top of that, due to the bad condition of the Sangkulirang base, the sea-
plane unit was unable to provide close support for the escort unit, either. What was more,
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Restored Oilfields of Balikpapan


















































































Illustration No. 14 — Summary of the Actions of the Units to Seize Balikpapan (21–24 January, 1942)
the weather at sea around the convoy was steadily improving, making the conditions more
advantageous for enemy aircraft to attack.(56)
Sure enough, at 1625 first of all nine twin-engine bombers and four light bombers [dive
bombers] of the enemy raided the ships of the main force. In this attack, a small bomb hit the
Tatsugami-maru (note: a Navy transport ship accompanying the convoy) sailing at the rear of
[the convoy]. Although [the bomb] caused injuries, she fortunately did not sustain major
damage.(91) Meanwhile at 1602 on the part of the detached force, the Kawakaze, which had de-
tected enemy submarine(s) and was attacking them with antisubmarine depth charges, was
persistently strafed and bombed for about one hour by the enemy aircraft that had completed
the attack on the [convoy of the] main force and who were later joined by two light bombers
[dive bombers]. However, [the Kawakaze] narrowly avoided damage. Then at 1930 [1730?],
when the minesweeping unit of the ships of the main unit started leaving [the line] to sail
ahead, one enemy twin-engine bomber unexpectedly attacked from the scattered clouds the
Nan’a-maru (note: a transport ship of the Eleventh Air Fleet), which was sailing at the rear of
the [ships of the] main force. The [enemy] bomb hit near the mizzenmast of the ship, causing
a huge fire and finally the inevitable abandonment of the ship.(56)
At 2230, the detached force launched the landing unit and immediately raised anchor to
head for the 1st anchorage, reporting that it would join [the main force] around 0900 on the
next day. In the meantime, from around 1830 onwards, the main force began sweeping the
sailing route ahead, and at 2100 set course towards the port [of Balikpapan]. During this pe-
riod, at 2030, Patrol Boat No. 36, which was guiding the 2d Section, reported “two trails of
[enemy] torpedoes on the starboard side of the ship heading in the opposite direction of the
ship,” and it was judged that enemy submarine(s) were still continuing their pursuit. How-
ever, there were no mines in the vicinity of the anchorage as had been dreaded, and the ships
completed their anchoring between 2310 and 2330.(56)
Surprise Attack of an Enemy Surface Unit on the Japanese Anchorage 
(See Illustration No. 15)
As the [transport] ships had finished anchoring, all ships of the 1st Escort Unit were about
to shift to [the task of] guarding the anchorage. However, the 2d Destroyer Division, which
had been in charge of sweeping the anchorage of mines, was still retrieving its minesweeping
cables at a point several nautical miles to the south of the anchorage. Just about that time, a
submarine chaser, which was positioned to the southwest of the convoy, spotted a suspicious
small vessel, but soon lost sight of it. At 0030, the Naka, which had temporarily anchored at
a point about one kilometer to the southwest of the Tsuruga-maru, the 1st ship of the 1st Sec-
tion, spotted a vessel, which looked like an [enemy] torpedo boat, at a distance of about three
kilometers, 280º [W], and immediately started raising anchor, while giving an order to Sub-
marine chaser No. 12 nearby to look into the matter. Following that, at 0040, [the Naka] spot-
ted the trail of a torpedo heading for her port bow, evaded it, and gave order(s) to submarine
chaser(s) to attack [the enemy], while evacuating to the east. The [spotted] ship was consid-
ered to be a torpedo boat or a surfaced submarine. Soon around 0045, torpedo(es) hit the Tsu-
ruga-maru, and she sent out a signal that all hands were evacuating. First Escort Unit
Commander Rear Admiral Nishimura ordered the 30th Minesweeper Division (Minesweep-
ers Nos. 17 and 18) to go to the rescue. He also decided to newly divide the guarding tasks
of the anchorage: he ordered the 9th Destroyer Division to guard an area about three kilo-
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meters east of the convoy, the 31st Subchaser Division the area west of the convoy, the patrol
boats the area south of the convoy, and the 11th Minesweeper Division the area north of the
convoy.(56)
The Naka continued sailing eastward and directed the subsequent operations while oper-
ating in an area five kilometers east of the anchorage. At 0140, the 1st Escort Unit commander
ordered the 9th Destroyer Division to continue [its current task]. Around that time, the 2d
Destroyer Division was patrolling the periphery [of the area covered by the 9th Destroyer
Division].
At 0140, the first landing unit departed, and the second landing unit was preparing for
departure. Around 0400, the Naka shifted its position from the patrol area of the 9th Destroyer
Division to the peripheral area covered by the 2d Destroyer Division but reversed course
around 0430. Just about that time, Minesweeper No. 15, sailing at slow speed on a southeast-
ern course while patrolling the area to the northeast of the convoy, suddenly spotted a sus-
picious silhouette on her starboard bow. The silhouette approached in no time. Visibly
confirming four funnels, the minesweeper at first thought that it could be the Naka, but after
spotting more than one vessel, she judged that they were enemy [vessels]. But it was too late.
At 0425, the enemy passed her at high speed and disappeared astern. Three minutes later,
she spotted the trails of torpedoes on her port quarter and evaded them. At 0432, the
minesweeper spotted a huge explosion in the northern part of the convoy; from the circum-
stances of the explosion, it was judged that the Sumanoura-maru, which carried antisubmarine
depth charges as well as mines, had been instantly sunk. When Minesweeper No. 16, which
was positioned to the north of the convoy, was changing course to rush to the rescue of the
Sumanoura-maru, she spotted to her north one enemy vessel heading southwestward at high
speed, but promptly lost sight of her. At 0437 the minesweeper reached the site where the
Sumanoura-maru had sunk, but not an object was spotted on the waters around.*(56)
The Kumagawa-maru (an auxiliary personnel transport ship), which was anchored next to
the Sumanoura-maru, had raised anchor at the report of the enemy’s appearance and headed
for shallow waters near the coast. After a while, when changing course southwestward, she
spotted an enemy vessel closing in on her at high speed on starboard quarter. The enemy
vessel fired at her at close range, and about ten shells hit her. [Then the enemy] crossed her
bow 200 meters ahead, switched to her port side and was gone in an instant. The Kumagawa-
maru also made a counterattack and one of her shells hit the stern of the enemy vessel. The
enemy vessel threaded between [the ships of] the convoy at high speed, fired at the
Asahi[san?]-maru and the Tōei-maru [B], cut through the line to the eastern side of the convoy
and lastly launched a torpedo at the Kuretake-maru (which hit at 0445); after strafing her stern,
she disappeared southwestward.(56)
In the meantime, the two [enemy] vessels, which had sunk the Sumanoura-maru, disap-
peared southward, after launching torpedoes at the Tatsugami-maru at the rear of the 2d Sec-
tion [of the convoy] at 0435. At 0440, Patrol Boat No. 38, which was patrolling the area south
of the convoy at slow speed, spotted two enemy destroyers to her north. The enemy shortly
launched torpedoes at her, but she evaded them, and [the enemy vessels] passed westward
at high speed. Then, Patrol Boat No. 37, which was to the west of Patrol Boat No. 36, spotted
the same enemy vessels. Patrol Boat No. 37 [also] thought it was the Naka, but when she iden-
tified them as enemy [vessels] after having closed in, it was too late. One of three enemy tor-
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* Actually, she headed for the Sumanoura-maru at 0437 and arrived at 0500.
pedoes hit her at the stern. Despite the immediate order to fire, her guns did not move due
to a power supply failure. Before she could turn a searchlight [on the enemy], the latter
crossed her bow and switched to her port side again launching torpedoes, one of which hit
her at her port bow and another at her stern at 0445.(56)
At 0450, Patrol Boat No. 36, which was to the south of Patrol Boats Nos. 37 and 38, spotted
a silhouette, which bore a close resemblance to the Naka, at about two kilometers northwest
of her. In the time that she identified the silhouette as an enemy [vessel], the enemy sailed
past her southeastward launching an illumination flare, and disappeared from sight. The pa-
trol boat mistook both the enemy vessels and the friendly patrol boats behind them for enemy
cruisers, and reported that she had spotted four enemy cruisers to the south of the convoy at
0500. The [whole] engagement lasted only thirty minutes, between 0420 when Minesweeper
No. 15 first spotted the enemy and 0450 when Patrol Boat No. 36 lost sight of them.(56)
The first report that the enemy had been spotted that reached 1st Escort Unit Commander
Rear Admiral Nishimura was the report from Minesweeper No. 15 at 0440, which meant that
Rear Admiral Nishimura should have seen the explosion of the Sumanoura-maru ([at] 0432)
by that time. However, he was on board of the Naka, which was in the patrol area of the 2d
Destroyer Division about thirteen kilometers away from the anchorage, and he did not con-
firm the detailed situation. Moreover, when the report that the enemy had been spotted
reached him, he was in the course of moving from the patrol area of the 2d Destroyer Division
to that of the 9th Destroyer Division, and was still as much as ten kilometers away from the
convoy. Even after receiving the report of Minesweeper No. 15,* the commander did not be-
lieve that a number of enemy destroyers were raiding the anchorage. At 0458, he issued an
order to “Heighten the alert against enemy submarines and torpedo boats.”(56)
[Even] at the report from Patrol Boat No. 36 at 0500 in the patrol area south of the anchor-
age that she had spotted four enemy cruisers, 1st Escort Unit Commander Rear Admiral
Nishimura was still skeptical about a raid by enemy surface vessels. At 0508, the commander
inquired of the patrol boat: “Is it not possible that the [enemy] cruisers in the earlier [report]
could [actually] have been the 2d Destroyer Division?” At 0512, he received a reply from the
patrol boat: “The [enemy] cruisers in the earlier report were a mistake for destroyers with
four funnels.”** Around 0520, while still operating in an area six to seven kilometers east of
the convoy, he issued an order to the 9th Destroyer Division to attack the enemy to the north
of the convoy, and he himself headed northward leading the Naka, but without knowledge
about the enemy movements. However, because the 9th Destroyer Division, too, had no
inkling about the enemy movements and was getting disorganized, the 1st Escort Unit com-
mander ordered it at 0548 to resume [its previous task]. The commander [then] sailed toward
the anchorage to ascertain the state of the convoy, but [in doing so] he got separated from
the 9th Destroyer Division.(56)
In the meantime at 0515, 1st Escort Unit Commander Rear Admiral Nishimura had wired
the Teiryū-maru (note: with Detachment Commander Sakaguchi on board) to have the trans-
port ships timely evacuate eastward. At 0553, he also wired the detached force, which was
coming to join [the main force], to suspend the action until dawn. Around dawn at 0652, Sub-
marine chaser No. 12 patrolling the area west of the convoy spotted [enemy] torpedoes pass-
ing under the ship. She immediately caught up with the enemy, sailed over the periscope,
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* The text mistakenly has Patrol Boat No. 15.
** The allied destroyers involved in the raid were American four stackers; the Japanese destroyers of the 2d De-
stroyer Division were Shiratsuyu-class two stackers; the light cruiser Naka was a four stacker.
launched depth charge(s), and witnessed the enemy submarine sinking with its bow standing
upright out of the water.(56)
Around 0700, finally it became light at the anchorage. The situation at the anchorage was
devastating, and it became clear that the following loss was sustained:(56)
Army transport ships: The Tsuruga-maru and the Kuretake-maru, sunk by torpedoes (causing a
loss of about thirty men in total)
Naval vessels: Patrol Boat No. 37, hit by three torpedoes at the bow and the stern, and too seri-
ously damaged to sail (causing about thirty-five casualties); the Sumanoura-maru, hit by tor-
pedoes and instantly sunk, leaving nine survivors; the Tatsugami-maru, hit by torpedoes and
sunk thirty minutes later; the Kumagawa-maru, hit by about ten enemy shells (causing six ca-
sualties and minor damage to the hull); the Asahisan-maru, hit at the stern by several enemy
shells (causing about fifty casualties)
Among the sunken Army transport ships, the Tsuruga-maru was hit by a torpedo around 0045
when the first landing unit was just about to depart and part of the unit had already shifted
to the [landing] craft. Also, when the Kuretake-maru was hit by a torpedo around 0445, the
first landing unit had already departed. It was fortunate that both ships sustained [only] a
small loss of personnel. It was very much after the fact that 1st Escort Unit Commander Rear

















































































































destroyer to the north of convoy
W16
W15
Illustration No. 15 — The Sea Engagement at Balikpapan (24 January, 0420 – 0515)
Admiral Nishimura confirmed that it had been a night raid by three or four enemy destroy-
ers.(56)
The circumstances on that night were as shown in Illustration No. 15.
The Situation of the Allied Navy(87, 92) (See Illustration No. 16)
Anticipating that Japan’s next target after the landing on Tarakan would be Balikpapan, the
allied headquarters deployed six U.S. and two Dutch submarines in the sea off Tarakan
through the southern part of the Makassar Strait. On 20 January, judging that a sortie of the
Japanese forces was drawing close, the ABDA naval forces commander issued an order to
the main force of Task Force 5 led by U.S. Navy Rear Admiral Glassford, which had been re-
plenishing at Kupang, Timor, to make a sortie. Although the force originally consisted of a
strength of two light cruisers and four destroyers, the flagship USS Boise ran aground on an
uncharted shoal while sailing through the Sape Strait on the evening of 21 January and sus-
tained damage, which made the light cruiser USS Marblehead the flagship. However, due to
engine trouble, she [also] became unable to participate in the attack, which left only four de-
stroyers to take part [in the attack] in the end. The four destroyers, USS John D. Ford, USS
Pope, USS Parrott and USS Paul Jones, led by Commander Talbot, commander of the [U.S.]
59th Destroyer Division, rushed into the anchorage at a high speed of 27 knots, dealt a blow
against the Japanese convoy, which was highly visible as if silhouetted against the backdrop
of Balikpapan in flames, and were gone like the wind. At that time, the United States exten-
sively advertised this engagement as the “Battle of Makassar Strait.”
Further, it was the Dutch submarine K–XVIII that tried to torpedo the Naka and sank the
Tsuruga-maru right after the unit to seize [Balikpapan] had entered into the anchorage. The
submarine sustained serious damage by Japanese [antisubmarine] depth charge(s), and
barely managed to return to Surabaya, escorted by three B–17s. The Dutch submarine K–XIV
returned also with damage sustained in air raids, but no [allied] vessels were [reportedly]
sunk.
The movements of both forces in this sea engagement off Balikpapan may be recon-
structed as in Illustration No. 16, based on the “Action Report of the 4th Destroyer Squadron,”
The Rising Sun in the Pacific [(History of the United States Naval Operation in WWII)] by [Samuel]
Morison, and Australia in the War of 1939-1945 Series [2] Navy Vol. 1 Royal Australian Navy
[1939-1942] [by G. Hermon Gill], etc..
Concerning the engagement of that night, 4th Destroyer Squadron Commander Rear Ad-
miral Nishimura stated his views in the “Action Report” as follows: 
In that engagement, when the enemy destroyers entered into the anchorage of the convoy, they
used illumination flares and flash-suppressing gunpowder, deftly threaded their way through
the transport ships, thus hiding their whereabouts and actions, accomplished their goals of at-
tack and fled away. 
Although their illumination flares were seen, the ignition flashes were not seen. (They might
have been seen at a closer distance, but they were at least not seen at [a distance of] 2,000 meters
or more.) In the end, it was impossible to catch up with them and we let them escape.
I believe that the performance of the enemy’s flash-suppressing gunpowder is well worth
studying.
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Course according to Morison
Illustration No. 16 — The Engagement with the U.S. Destroyers in the Sea Battle off Balikpapan
(0416 – 0450, 24 January)
The Situation After the Landing [Illustration No. 17]
Despite the major loss sustained by the transport convoy, the front line units of the Sakaguchi
Detachment successfully landed by and large as scheduled, with the first landing unit at 0240
and the second landing unit at 0640. Around sunrise, [the convoy of] the detached force was
seen joining the 1st anchorage. [Prior to that] at 0545 while [sailing to] join the main force,
the detached force had spotted an enemy surfaced submarine at a point about thirty nautical
miles south of the anchorage. It attacked the submarine, which then submerged, the result
of the attack remaining unknown. Meanwhile, the Nan’a-maru continued drifting, with the
fires far from dying down.(56)
On the 24th, as the weather improved, the Japanese fighter plane units, land-based attack
plane units, flying boat units, and seaplane units resumed direct guarding and escorting,
while attacking and searching for the enemy as scheduled. However, the anchorage contin-
uously came under fierce raids by the enemy from morning onward.(56)
At 0812, one enemy four-engine heavy bomber came for a raid, which was followed by
one twin-engine flying boat, which came for reconnaissance at 0925. [Then,] five twin-engine
bombers with five dive bombers, and seven four-engine heavy bombers came for a raid re-
spectively at 0950 and at 1040. All of them bombed the convoy while threading through the
desperate antiaircraft fire from the escort vessels as well as eluding interception by Japanese
fighter planes. Fortunately, there was no damage, and [Japanese] fighter planes shot down
some of the enemy aircraft. However, as observed from the naval vessels, the [enemy] four-
engine heavy bombers, no matter how persistently attacked by Japanese fighter planes, were
not brought down.(91) At 1205, one [enemy] flying boat was seen reconnoitering from a dis-
tance, and an [enemy] raid in the afternoon was anticipated. In the meantime, the Sakaguchi
Detachment reported that it had secured the airfield and the entire area around the bridge.
Also around 0930, the 1st Escort Unit commander received a telegram from the [Navy] Dutch
East Indies Unit commander saying: “the main unit is hurrying toward Balikpapan and is
due to arrive on the evening of the 24th.”
From around 1240 onwards, the 30th Minesweeper Division started clearing the waterway
between the anchorage and the mouth of the river [near] the airfield for large-sized motorized
[landing] craft. Meanwhile from 1230 through 1420, a total of more than thirty land-based
attack planes of the 2d Air Raid Unit carried out bombings on batteries and positions to the
east of Balikpapan.(71) At 1710, eight enemy twin-engine bombers and three dive bombers
raided [the anchorage] and dropped bombs, but no loss was sustained. The raiding enemy
aircraft on that day aggregated to thirty-one aircraft.
Taking a lesson from the experience that morning, 1st Escort Unit Commander Rear Ad-
miral Nishimura decided to have the ships leave the anchorage at night. At 1900, the Naka,
the 9th and the 2d Destroyer Divisions, the 1st Section of the 24th Destroyer Division, the
30th and the 11th Minesweeper Divisions left the 1st anchorage, escorting eleven transport
ships and appropriately moved around the waters to the east. Only the 31st Subchaser Divi-
sion and three patrol boats remained in the anchorage to guard the area. At 2030 while es-
corting the ships, the Umikaze spotted probable torpedo trails, and almost simultaneously,
also the Samidare and the Asagumo spotted trails of torpedoes; they attacked [the enemy] with
[antisubmarine] depth charges, but with unknown results. Around 2100, during these actions,
the Nan’a-maru was seen sinking after a huge explosion.(56)
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The Situation from the 25th Onwards
At 0113 on the 25th, the Yūdachi detected and attacked a submarine; the attack was believed
to have been largely effective. Early in the morning, the Sakaguchi Detachment stormed into
the city of Balikpapan. Although the attack did not meet any enemy resistance, it was delayed
because the bridges were completely destroyed. At 0740, the transport ships returned to the
anchorage and dropped anchor. At 1000, ten [enemy] twin-engine bombers came for a raid.
However, no damage was sustained, and friendly fighter planes shot down one of them.(56,
71) [Meanwhile] at 1045, the San’yō-maru and the Sanuki-maru entered the port of Sangkulirang
and dismantled the seaplane base.(76) Although seven [enemy] four-engine heavy bombers
came for an attack [on the Balikpapan anchorage] at 1305, no damage was sustained. When
the detached force, which had left the water-pumping station on that day early in the morn-
ing, was about to advance southward from Batu Ampar at 1440, it encountered the Dutch
East Indies garrison commander and his party in about 100 vehicles including armored cars
and defeated them.(89)
At 1930, the convoy shifted to a new anchorage closer to the coast and dropped anchor.
After nightfall, the detached force advanced into the urban area of Balikpapan and estab-
lished contact with the main force. By the end of the day, the city was completely cleared [of
the enemy]. [In the meantime,] the main unit of the [Navy] Dutch East Indies Unit had ad-
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Illustration No. 17 – The Capture of Balikpapan (24-30 January, 1942)
vanced to about 200 nautical miles northeast of Balikpapan so as to support the units to cap-
ture the city, but judging that the operation [to] capture [Balikpapan] was for the most part
completed, it began to reverse course toward Davao.(56)
At 0800 on the 26th, the San’yō-maru and Sanuki-maru entered the port of Balikpapan and
launched their support [operations].(76) At 1030, the 2d Base Unit [also] entered the port and
took over the task of directing the minesweeping [operations] from the 1st Escort Unit. The
2d Base Unit from then on until 5 February disposed of 57 mines [in total] and finished clear-
ing the waters inside the port.(56) On that day [the 26th], no enemy air raid was conducted.
With the completion of mopping up [the enemy] in the Samarinda and the Sanga Sanga areas,
the Sakaguchi Detachment started to prepare for the seizure of Banjarmasin, the next tar-
get.(89)
On the 27th, at 1300, five [enemy] four-engine heavy bombers again came for a raid. The
Sanuki-maru sustained some damage from near hits, which also caused some damage to one
of the Type–0 observation seaplanes that was in the process of being taken on board and
slightly damaged another.(76) At 1940, the 2d Destroyer Division (minus the Harusame) made
a sortie to clear out five enemy submarines, which, according to signal information of the
Takao Signal Unit, [had been detected] in the central area of the Makassar Strait. However,
unable to locate the enemy, the division returned [to Balikpapan] early in the morning on
the 28th. On that day, nine carrier-based bombers of the 2d Carrier Division advanced to Ba-
likpapan. They were brought under the command of 2d Air Raid Unit Commander Rear Ad-
miral Takenaka and assigned to guard the area against submarines. Meanwhile, it was
decided that the Sanuki-maru, which had sustained damage from the [enemy] bombing,
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The Enemy’s Bombing of [the Anchorage off] Balikpapan
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Illustration No. 18 — The Sanuki-maru’s Engagement with [Enemy] Aircraft 
would be brought under the command of the 2d Base Unit Commander R. Adm. Hirose Suéto,
to be assigned to attacking and neutralizing enemy submarines in the Makassar Strait, and
that she was due to be transferred to the 1st Base Unit from 7 February onwards.(76) (See Illus-
tration No. 18)
On the afternoon of the 28th, nine Type–0 fighter planes advanced to Balikpapan. At 1630,
1st Escort Unit Commander Rear Admiral Nishimura was notified by the [Navy] Dutch East
Indies Unit that Banjarmasin would be seized overland, and that the escort by the 1st Escort
Unit was cancelled.(76) The 2d Base Unit started to prepare for the seizure of Banjarmasin. On
the 29th, twelve Type–0 fighter planes and two land-based reconnaissance planes advanced
to Balikpapan.(71) On the next day, the 30th, 1st Escort Unit Commander Rear Admiral
Nishimura headed for Lingayen Gulf, leading the main force, in order to make preparations
for the next operation (the Java invasion operation); thereafter the defense of Balikpapan and
the guarding of the anchorage was left to 2d Base Unit Commander Rear Admiral Hirose.
On the same day, after dismantling its base, the San’yō-maru, too, left for Cam Ranh Bay in
order to be engaged in the operations in the Malaya area.(90) Meanwhile, the 23d Air Flotilla
headquarters and the entire fighter plane unit completed their advance to Balikpapan.(75)
The Air Campaigns After the Departure of the Convoy
As previously told, from 11 January onwards, the 2d Air Raid Unit day after day carried out
search (reconnaissance) attacks on the enemy in Balikpapan and Banjarmasin ([the latter
only] from the 18 January onwards) as well as in the Makassar Strait. As a result, by the 20th,
enemy aircraft and naval vessels came hardly to be seen [any longer] in those areas. However,
from the time of the departure of the convoy to seize [Balikpapan] [from Tarakan] on the 21st
through the 23d, the weather north of Balikpapan including Tarakan was bad, while south
[of Balikpapan] it was fine, which created circumstances extremely disadvantageous to the
[Japanese] air campaign. On top of this, also the seaplane unit was prevented from executing
its [scheduled] flights on the 23d because of the bad condition of the Sangkulirang [sea] base,
which the Navy had set up midway between Tarakan and Balikpapan ([that is,] shoals
stretching to a good distance from the pebble-covered shore, marshy land, and trees growing
even in the sea, which made the base unusable unless [the seaplanes] were moored to
buoys).(76, 90) Because of the above, both the land-based unit and the seaplane unit were not
able to provide effective support for the convoy at the most critical moment, leaving the latter
to experience the enemy air raid head-on.
From the 24th onwards, as the weather conditions improved, the air units resumed their
search and attack missions against the enemy and also repeatedly attacked the [enemy] secret
base in Melak (west of Samarinda), which had newly been spotted; by around the 28th they
had on the whole suppressed the enemy movements in that area.(71)
However, the preparation of the airfield was delayed again this time (the [Balikpapan]
airfield was 900 meters long from north to south: although runway was not paved, its ground
condition was better than at Tarakan, and it was extendable).(56) Finally, nine carrier-based
bombers of the 2d Carrier Division advanced [there] on the 27th,(75) and nine Type–0 fighter
planes of the Tainan Air Group on the 28th.(75) They were followed by the 23d Air Flotilla
headquarters, which also advanced [there] on the 30th (as previously told), but it was quite
late and not until 3 February that (one element of) the land-based attack planes were ad-
vanced [there].(75) This was because the sinking of the Nan’a-maru and the Tatsugami-maru
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had led to a shortage in the number of large-sized motorized [landing] craft, and the disem-
barkation of airfield construction matériel did not make the expected progress even after the
arrival of the Kamogawa-maru and the Okitsu-maru. 
In the meantime, from around that time, air raids by four-engine enemy B–17 heavy
bombers had increased, and they were difficult to deal with. The circumstances were as fol-
lows:(71)
24th [of January 1942]: Seven [enemy] aircraft came for a raid; it was reported that three of them
were shot down and another shot down but unconfirmed. Due to hits sustained in the air
engagement, two Type–0 fighter planes were seriously damaged at the time of landing.
25th: Seven [enemy] aircraft came for a raid; the result [of the counterattack] unclear. Shot by
[the enemy], one Type–0 fighter plane fell apart in midair. Another went missing.
27th: Five [enemy] aircraft came for a raid; none of them was brought down.
29th: Four [enemy] aircraft came for a raid; none of them was brought down. One Type–0 fighter
plane crashed itself, while another was hit, leaving its crew seriously injured.
31st: Five [enemy] aircraft came for a raid; none of them was brought down.
Thus, the Balikpapan operation was completed. The loss sustained by the Japanese forces
was the heaviest thus far in the landing operations in the Dutch East Indies area: The
Sumanoura-maru, the Tatsugami-maru and the Kuretake-maru were sunk, Patrol Boat No. 37
and the Asahisan-maru badly damaged, the seaplane tender Sanuki-maru half damaged, and
the Kumagawa-maru slightly damaged. However, despite these losses, the number of casual-
ties was small. Also, the resistance put up by the enemy ground forces was extremely limited
in this operation, [which led to a result that] only eight men of the Sakaguchi Detachment
were killed on the ground. The Navy requisitioned the Sanga Sanga oil fields as well as the
BPM oil refineries situated in Balikpapan and operated them. Although the enemy had thor-
oughly destroyed these facilities before retreating, the Japanese defense detail [1st Defense
Detail] repaired the oil wells at an amazing speed and smoothly kept them in operation dur-
ing the period from June 1942 until August 1943 (as mentioned previously). The crude oil
from the Sanga Sanga oil fields was light in quality and could for 34% turned into petroleum.
With a high octane rating, [the oil] refined at Balikpapan was of great use in the [Japanese]
operations in the southwestern Pacific.(77)
Just for reference, the loss of munitions sustained in the sinking of the transport ships is
as shown in the following [tables] (the tables partly include losses in [later] naval engage-
ments):(75)
The Depletion of Ammunition Stocks (from 2 January 1942 until 9 April 1942, [of] the Air Unit of the
Southern Task Force)
1. Ordnance 
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Torpedoes 6
No. 80 bombs
Regular bombs 18 (160)
Land bombs 28 (332)
No. 25 bombs
Regular bombs 475 (750)
Land bombs 2,635 (700)
2. Aviation fuels
5. The Seizure of Kendari (See Illustration No. 19)
On 24 January, the same day as the capture of Balikpapan, the [operation to] seize Kendari
was carried out single-handedly by the Navy. The seizure [operation] was executed by the
Eastern Attack Unit (commander: 5th Cruiser Division Commander R. Adm. Takagi Takeo)
with almost the same forces as employed in the [operation to] seize Menado (except for the
paratrooper unit). However, the unit to seize Kendari was supposed to be directly com-
manded by 1st Base Unit Commander Rear Admiral Kubo, and 2d Escort Unit Commander
Rear Admiral Tanaka was supposed to support it while making preparations for the [oper-
ation] to capture Ambon. In conducting the [Kendari] operation, the 15th and the 16th De-
stroyer Divisions and others of the 2d Escort Unit were incorporated into the 1st Base Unit,
and the 21st Minesweeper Division and the 1st Subchaser Division were also returned to the
1st Base Force.(78)
The [operation to] seize Kendari had been scheduled for 21 January at the time of the
launch of the Dutch East Indies operation. However, [having found that] the transfer of the
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No. 6 bombs
Regular bombs 2,908 (2,500)
Land bombs 2,043 (2,450)




Tubular clips [???] 190,654 (137,900)
Drop tanks
For Type–0 fighter planes 626
For Type–96 fighter planes 124
Remarks
1. [The numbers] in parentheses were the loss incurred by the sinking of
the Tatsugami-maru and the Yūbari-maru [Editor’s note: the Yūbari-maru
was sunk in Kupang on 27 March 1942.]
2. No. 80: 800-kg; No. 25: 250-kg; No. 7: 70-kg; No. 6: 60-kg
3. [Omitted: remarks on Japanese abbreviations]
Aviation Fuel
Special 92 Octane Gasoline 412.1
92 Octane Gasoline 7,062.7 (4,040)
91 Octane Gasoline 4452.1
87 Octane Gasoline 5430.3 (1,139)
Aviation Mineral Oil (kiloliter) 675.7 (280)
Remarks
1 [The numbers] in parentheses were the loss incurred by the sinking of
the Nan’a-maru, the Kamogawa-maru and the Yūbari-maru
2 [Omitted: remarks on Japanese abbreviations]
1st Construction Squad could not be made in time, the staff of the 1st Base Force wired on
the 14th [of January] that the next operation was expected be postponed for several days.(54)
Further, after [receiving] on the night on 14 January the telegram reporting that the land-
based reconnaissance plane of the 3d Air Group had “spotted thirty [enemy] submarines”
(as previously told), Dutch East Indies Commander V. Adm. Takahashi Ibō decided, on 15
January, that [the operation to] seize Kendari should be postponed for three days till 24 Jan-
uary.(54) Without having detected after all [particular] enemy movements in the operation to
clear the Molucca Sea of enemy submarines, the Nagara, the 15th and the 16th Destroyer Di-
visions and the 21st Minesweeper Division returned to the Bangka anchorage on the morning
of the 17th. Earlier, the Air Unit had with Davao as its base launched its air campaign to de-
stroy the enemy air power, as described previously. That is, starting with the night raid on
Ambon on the 7th, the unit carried out search missions for the enemy in the Gulf of Tomini,
the Molucca Sea, and the Ceram Sea as well as reconnaissance attack missions on Menado,
Kendari and Ambon almost every day. Other than the twenty-five large and small aircraft,
which [the unit] had spotted on the Ambon [airfield] on the 14th and destroyed in the raid
on the 15th and the 16th, as previously told, it spotted no enemy worth attacking during the
campaign. Signs of the enemy were no longer seen at Kendari around the 15th, and on the
18th, no enemy aircraft was spotted even in Ambon, either. Also, no enemy naval vessels
were spotted even in the first reconnaissance of Makassar on the 17th, and it was concluded
that [the campaign to] neutralize the enemy from the air was more or less completed by the
time of departure of the unit to seize [Kendari]. On 24 January, the day when [the operation
to] seize Kendari was conducted, carrier-based air units ([consisting of] the Sōryū and the
Hiryū of the 2d Carrier Division as the core) carried out an air strike on Ambon (which shall
be described later), but no enemy vessels or aircraft were spotted.(71, 75, 81)
The unit to seize [Kendari] left the Bangka anchorage on 21 January. While the 2d Air Unit
([consisting of] the Chitose and Mizuho) provided direct escort against enemy aircraft and
submarines and patrolled the sailing route ahead, it reached Kendari on the morning of the
24th and successfully landed at 0428.(54) Although several times during that period objects
that seemed to be submarines had been detected, there was no counterattack from the allied
forces, so the support unit, after merely cruising in the area to the north of Celebes, simply
returned to Davao on the 26th. During this operation, the surface unit and the air unit pur-
sued one enemy light cruiser, the only allied naval vessel that had come in the area (land-
based reconnaissance planes had spotted the cruiser at a point south of Kendari on the 24th;
according to The Rising Sun in the Pacific [History of the United States Naval Operations by
Samuel] Morison, it was the U.S. seaplane tender USS Childs). However, due to the delay in
the start of the pursuit and hindered by bad weather, they lost sight of the ship.(54, 93)
Meeting with little resistance on land, Capt. Mori Kunizō, commander of the Sasebo Com-
bined Special Landing Force, who had made the landing, reported at 0305 on the 25th that
[his force] had occupied the airfield at 1700 on the 24th. The condition of the airfield was
quite good, and the commander reported: “[the airfield is] right away available for 30 fighter
planes. [The condition of] the airfield is quite good and it can be used even by medium-sized
land-based attack planes without problem.”(53) The main force of the fighter plane unit of the
1st Air Raid Unit ([consisting of] twenty-five fighter planes and five land-based reconnais-
sance planes) advanced to the Kendari airfield as early as on the afternoon of the 25 January.
Apart from just one disadvantage that it was far from the coast, for the Japanese [forces] the
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airfield very fortunately met the conditions for a base in that it required almost no construc-
tion work and was immediately usable for land-based attack planes.(12) As early as the 27th,
the 21st Air Flotilla headquarters and twenty-seven land-based attack planes of the Kanoya
Air Group Detachment advanced to Kendari.(53)
It seemed that the Kendari operation would be successfully completed with only two men
of the special landing force injured, but an unexpected accident happened early in the morn-
ing on the 25th. It was the collision between the Hatsuharu of the 21st Destroyer Division,
which had been incorporated into the 1st Base Unit from the support unit for reinforcement
and was rushing toward Kendari, and the Nagara with the 1st Base Force commander on
board. At that time, it was raining and visibility was limited. The Hatsuharu collided into the
Nagara near starboard midship at a high speed of 21 knots. The collision crushed the former’s
bow up to the turret of the fore gun, and left the Nagara with some damage to its starboard
and to some of its upper structures.(94) It was fortunate that the only personnel damages were
serious injuries to two men on board of the Nagara. Due to this [collision], 1st Base Force
Commander Rear Admiral Kubo [had to] change ships from the Nagara to the Hatsushimo
(the fourth ship of the 21st Destroyer Division). The Nagara [had to] be brought to Davao on
its own [for repair], while the Hatsuharu [had to] be brought to Davao [as well], escorted by
the Nenohi (the third ship) and the Wakaba (the first ship); the reinforcement of the Kendari
operation unit [instead] ended up in a reduction of its strength.(87) Responding to this, the
Eastern Attack Unit commander adopted such measures as to delay for one day the return
of the 16th Destroyer Division, which had been due to leave [Kendari] on the 25th for the
Bangka anchorage to prepare for the subsequent Ambon operation.(78) However, this accident
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Illustration No. 19 — The Seizure of Kendari
struck a hard blow to the Eastern Attack Unit, which [already] suffered from a shortage of
smaller vessels.
Apart from the unexpected accident of the collision between the Nagara and the Hatsuharu,
the Kendari operation made smooth progress. The Chitose and the 16th Destroyer Division
left Kendari on the 26th, the Sasebo Combined Special Landing Force on the 27th, the 15th
Destroyer Division on the 27th and the 29th, the 21st Minesweeper Division on the 29th, and
the rest on the 30th, which completed the withdrawal of all [invasion] units from the town,
and they started preparations for the subsequent Makassar and Ambon operations. Mean-
while on the afternoon of the 26th, it was decided that the Mizuho should leave Kendari on
the 29th to participate in the Ambon operation straight [from there].(54, 59, 78)
The Japanese seized Kendari by catching the allied forces totally off guard. Until the in-
vasion units entered into the anchorage, the allied forces were totally unaware of them.(92)
This presumably had several causes: the allied air unit in Ambon had sustained loss after
loss caused by the Japanese air campaigns, which had day by day been getting increasingly
fierce from 7 January onwards, and its capacity to conduct patrols had markedly declined;
in preparation against the Japanese [operation to] capture Balikpapan, allied submarines
were concentrated in the Makassar Strait, which led to the deployment of fewer submarines
in the Molucca Sea and the Banda Sea; and during [the Japanese approach to Kendari], the
weather was calm but visibility was low.
After the landing of the [Japanese] invasion unit [at Kendari], too, half of the [U.S.] 19th
Bombardment Group at Malang in eastern Java was engaged in operations from Palembang
to Malaya, while the other half was attacking [Japanese forces] in Balikpapan and had no
strength to spare for Kendari.(86) Although an Australian bomber squadron was stationed in
Kupang, Kendari was beyond its range of action. And since no air unit was stationed in
Makassar, no counterattack [on Kendari] was conducted from the air.(95) As for the [allied]
surface units, though U.S. Task Force (TF) 5 was [covering the area], the unit with the USS
Houston was out to the Torres Strait to escort transport ships carrying reinforcements from
the United States, while the unit with the USS Boise was moving to attack [Japanese forces]
in Balikpapan, leaving no strength to spare for the [Kendari] area.(87)
On the day when the landing on Kendari was carried out, Commander in Chief of the
Combined Fleet Admiral Yamamoto issued an order to shift to the phase-three disposition
of forces. Having concluded that the landing of the main force of the Army Malaya invasion
unit was completed with the landing of the main force of the 18th Division at Singora on 22
January, the commander in chief of the Combined Fleet issued an order by Telegraphic Op-
eration Order No. 50 ([at] 1200 on 24 January), which read: “[The units shall] shift the dispo-
sition of forces to that of phase-three operations. However, the destroyer divisions
(destroyers) shall remain in the same disposition as of 1200 on the 24th.”(62) At that moment,
the Endau and the Anambas operations were about to be launched in the Malaya area, while
on the same day the units to capture Balikpapan and Kendari landed in these places in the
Dutch East Indies, which made it impossible for the Southern Task Force to immediately shift
the disposition of forces. Thus, [the commander in chief of the Combined Fleet] issued the
order in such a way that [these units could] shift to the phase-three operations with their cur-
rent disposition of forces.(62)
204 Chapter V     /     The Forward Push of the Air Bases
6. The Manila Agreement and the Operational Policy for
Phase-Three
Request for a Two-Week Postponement of the Operation Schedule
On 18 January, Southern Task Force Commander Vice Admiral Kondō advanced to Palau,
leading the main body of the Southern Task Force.(61) On the next day the 19th, he summoned
the senior staff officers of the Third Fleet and the Eleventh Air Fleet, Capt. Yamaki Akira and
Capt. Takahashi Chihaya, to discuss the subsequent Dutch East Indies operation. At this
meeting, Captain Yamaki of the Third Fleet strongly demanded a two-week postponement
of the operation schedule of the subsequent Dutch East Indies operation,(11) giving the fol-
lowing reasons: 
1. The seized airfields in Davao and Jolo in the southern Philippines, and Tarakan and Menado in
the Dutch East Indies are all in such an unexpectedly bad condition that [several] days will be
required to extend and make them ready for use, and that two weeks from the moment of
seizure would be required before land-based attack plane units could use them.
2. It is impossible to arrange the escort ships, if the invasion [were to be conducted] according to
the schedule specified in the Cam Ranh Agreement.
3. The current schedule has put us in a situation where the Air Unit’s [operations to] neutralize
the [enemy] air power are started almost simultaneously with the departure of the invasion
units from their bases. [Consequently,] the latter will [have to] rush headlong into the points to
be seized before [the air operations] have brought about sufficient results, which we greatly fear
may increase the damage to the invasion units.
4. In Tarakan, the mines laid by the enemy gave us a lot of trouble and much time was spent on
minesweeping, which, as a result, became a major cause of the delay in the operation schedule.
It may be expected that the farther we go southward from now on, the more minefields [will be
encountered], which means that it is necessary to allow more time for sweeping mines.
5. In the current schedule, escort ships cannot afford to take time off for maintenance; their engines
cannot be maintained because they have to be ready all the time for sailing at high speed, which
is causing steam leakage and other troubles one after another. [Moreover,] the officers and crew
are extremely exhausted due to patrol [duties], which do not allow them to rest even for a mo-
ment. It makes us worry about the prospect [for the coming operations] if the operations con-
tinue [in this way].
Remarks:
(1) For example, the operations of the destroyers(72) (as shown in the following table)
(2) The duty hours of the ships’ captains
While the crews were exhausted, the overwork of the captains was an even bigger problem.
That is, the captain was by far senior to his second-in-rank senior staff officer in terms of
graduation classes at the Naval Academy. To the captain it was out of the question to regard
his senior staff officer as his substitute. So, after leaving the port of Palau, the captain left
the bridge only when he had a call of nature and even seldom slept in bed, which made the
captain’s work the toughest among the crew. [Examples of the differences in] graduation
classes of the captain and the senior staff officer [of some destroyers] were as follows:
Natsushio (50th class – 65th class), Kuroshio (50th – 62d), Oyashio (50th – 63d), Hayashio (50th
– 61st), Yukikaze (50th – 61st), Tokitsukaze (48th – 64th), Amatsukaze (49th – 61st), Hatsukaze
(49th – 63d)
6. In the current circumstances, it is impossible to spare escort forces at the time of [the operation
to] seize Banjarmasin. Moreover, the operation is tactically unfavorable because the operation
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The Operations of the 15th and the 16th Destroyer Divisions 
(from 26 November 1941 through 18 January 1942)
Note: In the above table, Palau was the only safe port where it was not necessary to keep the engines on standby.
to seize [Banjarmasin] would be made by a sea route that exposed the flank [of the seizing unit]
to Java. So, we would like to omit the escort on sea in this operation.
Also, Eleventh Air Fleet [Senior] Staff Officer Captain Takahashi requested a postponement
on the following [grounds]:(34)
1. It has taken more days than expected to make airfields ready for use, which has resulted in suc-
cessive delays in the forward deployment of the Air Unit. I am of the same opinion as the Third
Fleet on the postponement of the schedule.
2. The air campaign against eastern Java prior to the invasion of Java shall be conducted from Ba-
likpapan and from Makassar. [That from] Banjarmasin shall be called off.
3. As a result of finding detailed documents on the airfield on Bali among the recently seized
enemy objects at Tarakan, it became clear that the airfield has better facilities than expected.
Therefore, we want our forces to capture this place, advance one element of the Air Unit there
prior to the invasion of Java and use the facility as an air base for the invasion operation.
Remarks:
The view that [the operation to seize] Banjarmasin should be cancelled and [that an operation
to seize] Bali should be added [instead] presumably came from the [following] judgment:
the condition of the Banjarmasin airfield was not yet known and it was expected to take con-
siderable time to ready the Banjarmasin airfield even if it were captured; [moreover,] sup-
plying the airfield would involve serious risks; however, the airfield on Bali was better than
expected; if [the Japanese forces] had to take risks in either case, occupying Bali and using
it for the air campaign to destroy the enemy air power would be far more effective, because
it would also enable [the Japanese forces] to cut off the enemy supply route from Australia.
It was a strong request from the 23d Air Flotilla headquarters.
Though sympathetic to the predicament of the units on site, the Second Fleet headquarters,
in response to these views, demanded [more] effort not to postpone the invasion schedule
for reasons that a postponement of the schedule would have quite an impact on the entire
conduct of the operation as well as on the [Navy’s] good faith with the Army. However, per-
suaded by the insistence of the units on site that they could not give what they did not have,
the Second Fleet decided to urgently confer with the Southern Army and propose as a com-
promise plan a postponement of ten days. For this purpose, it was decided to hold a confer-
ence at Manila from the 21st through the 23d of January. The telegram sent from the chief of
staff of the Second Fleet to the chief of staff of the Southern Army read as follows:(34)
The actual situation of the schedule for the invasion of the Dutch East Indies is that the advance
and deployment of the air forces is experiencing one delay after another because the condition
of the occupied bases in the eastern part of the Dutch East Indies is unexpectedly bad, despite
all efforts to expand and ready those bases. Meanwhile, the enemy is mounting counterattacks
using a great many bases. Moreover, from the situation at Tarakan, we may infer that mines
have been laid across many stretches of water. In order to advance the subsequent invasion op-
erations without major problems, it is inevitable to postpone the landing dates for Banjarmasin,
Makassar, Timor and Java by more or less ten days. Therefore, in order to discuss the details,
we will send the senior staff officer of our fleet to a conference to be held in Manila from 21 to
23 January in order to make arrangements between the Sixteenth Army, the Third Fleet and the
Eleventh Air Fleet. We would appreciate it if you would arrange the dispatch of staff officers
from your headquarters.
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Southern Army headquarters was dead against the request by the Second Fleet to postpone
the schedule. It insisted [in outline] that:(34)
1. A postponement of the schedule would, if anything, give the enemy [an opportunity to]
strengthen (in particular its naval and air) defense, which would all the more delay our invasion
[schedule]. At this juncture, [we maintain that the invasion schedule] should be carried out on
the basis of the schedule stipulated in the Cam Ranh Agreement at any cost.
2. The Army shall provide more than enough support for the Navy air units by such things as get-
ting hold of and preparing airfields and by supplying the necessary fuel.
Not only the central command of the Army but also the upper echelon of the Navy, namely,
the Navy General Staff and the Combined Fleet headquarters were against a postpone-
ment.(40) In particular, the Combined Fleet headquarters was extremely frustrated: it had or-
dered the Second Fleet headquarters to study the possibility of conducting [the operation to]
capture Ambon around the 10th of January in tandem with [the operation against] Menado,
but the latter had postponed it, replying that it was not feasible. Adding to the frustration
was the fact that the Combined Fleet headquarters had taken the extraordinary step of trans-
ferring the 2d Carrier Division, which had returned from Hawaii, to the Southern Task Force
in order to speed up the capture of Ambon, but nevertheless the Second Fleet headquarters
had postponed the schedule from the 25th till the 29th [See p. 177], and then again postponed
it till the 31st. Stating that the request for such a significant postponement for whatever reason
was extremely inimical to the entire conduct of the operation, the Combined Fleet headquar-
ters sent telegrams to the Second and the Third Fleets to demand explanations from them.
The Navy General Staff also sent to the Combined Fleet as well as the Second and the Third
Fleets a telegram demanding them to take appropriate steps, bearing in mind that a post-
ponement of the operation schedule would have a large impact on all quarters.(34)
In the meantime, the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet [too] had made a request to post-
pone Operation L (Bangka and Palembang) for two weeks on the grounds that the condition
of the Kuching airfield on Borneo was bad and that it had had no prospects of occupying
and preparing the Ledo airfield [yet]. This request was also added to the agenda at Manila.(34)
The Difficult Conclusion of the Manila Agreement
The Manila Conference, held from 21 January, had four objectives: the schedule of the entire
[southern] operation, Operation L, the operations in the eastern part of the Dutch East Indies,
and the operations in western Java.(34, 97) The meeting was held from the evening of the 21st
of January until deep into the night. To begin with, the Navy made the following proposals.(34)
1. The operation schedule after [the operations against] Makassar and Kupang until the landing
in Java shall be postponed for about ten days from those stipulated in the Cam Ranh Agreement.
That is, [the date of the operation against] Makassar shall be set on Day X + 69 (15 February),
that against Kupang on Day X + 74 (20 February), and that against eastern Java on Day X + 80
(26 February). As for the date of [the operation to capture] Ambon, the Third Fleet and the Six-
teenth Army have already agreed to postpone it till Day X + 54 (31 January).
2. The operation [to seize] Banjarmasin shall be cancelled and the air campaign to destroy the
enemy air power in Java shall be conducted from Makassar and Balikpapan.
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3. Instead of Banjarmasin, Bali shall be captured right before the invasion of Java so as to use it as
a support air base at the time of the [Java] landings.
4. If the 48th Division is to depart from Lingayen Gulf on 8 February ([the place of departure was]
changed because the delay in occupying Bataan Peninsula made it impossible for the division
to depart from Manila Bay) and sail at an average speed of eight knots, it cannot arrive in eastern
Java earlier than 19 February. It is impossible to conduct a landing [operation] on Java on Day
X + 70 (16 February).
As previously told, the Army side fiercely objected to this proposal, saying that, in view of
reports that the enemy’s air and naval forces were being reinforced, a postponement of a few
days at this moment would give the enemy time to reinforce its forces and eventually result
in a delay of ten to twenty days; that by omitting [the operation against] Banjarmasin, Japan
would also give up a perfect strategic point for the air operations against Java, which meant
that sufficient results could not be expected unless reinforcements were to be provided by
the aircraft carriers; that, for these reasons, the invasion operations had to be carried out as
stipulated in the Cam Ranh Agreement at any cost. With neither side giving in, the conference
continued well into the dead of the night and was then suspended for the time being.
The next day the 22d started early in the morning with the conference on Operation L be-
tween the staff of the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet and the staff of the Southern Army.
The Navy side proposed a two-week postponement, as previously mentioned.(34) The South-
ern Army fiercely objected to a postponement of the dates, arguing that:(38, 98)
1. If the Ledo airfield cannot be made ready in time, [the Navy] shall use the bases on the Malay
Peninsula, because [the Army] has previously said that [the Navy] could make use of them. The
airfields in the southern part of the Malay Peninsula will [soon] be seized by the ground units
and made available by the time of Operation L.
2. We will see to it that the Ledo airfield shall be seized as soon as possible and we will have the
Kawaguchi Detachment fully cooperate in the transportation of fuel and the preparation of the
base, so as to have the airfield as ready as possible for Operation L.
These differences between the Army and the Navy stemmed from a fundamental difference
in their way of thinking. That is to say, the Army thought it best to rush and seize strategic
points of the enemy with the idea of a pursuit battle and without giving the latter time to
put up a defense. The Navy on the other hand took the view that the invasion of strategic
points should throughout adopt a standard method of attack, in which, prior to the launch
of the invasion operation, preliminary air campaigns to destroy the enemy air power at air
bases in the rear as well as at the invasion points should be carried out and once the air power
of the enemy was neutralized, the invasion units should be pushed forward. If not, there
would only be a useless increase in losses.
The Southern Army considered that some concession to the Third Fleet’s request for a
postponement was unavoidable, but it was absolutely against a postponement of Operation
L by the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet. However, the Sixteenth Army, the Army unit
that was to carry out the invasion operation, expressed approval of the Navy, taking the view
that if there was no absolute certainty about the escort, the [invasion] date should be post-
poned.(34) Neither the Southern Army on the Army side nor the Third Fleet and the First
Southern Expeditionary Fleet on the Navy side would budge until finally Capt. Yanagisawa
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Kuranosuke, senior staff officer of the Second Fleet, proposed a compromise that at last man-
aged to bring them together. The contents of the proposal were [in outline] as follows:(34)
1. Operation L shall be postponed for four days from the date stipulated in the Cam Ranh Agree-
ment, till Day X + 64 (10 February).
2. [The operation against] Makassar shall be postponed for four days from the date stipulated in
the Cam Ranh Agreement till Day X + 63 (9 February), and [that against] Kupang for nine days
till Day X + 74 (20 February).
3. After the capture of Makassar in the east and Palembang in the west on 9 and 10 February, air
units shall be pushed forward there so as to substantially complete the air campaigns to destroy
the enemy air power by and large by 20 February. The landing on western Java shall be carried
out on Day X + 75 (21 February) and that on eastern Java on Day X + 77 (23 February).
4. While Banjarmasin shall be seized overland single-handedly by the Sakaguchi Detachment, the
Navy shall as far as is practical provide forces to help with the maneuvering of craft along the
coast and other operations.
5. Bali shall be captured around Day X + 75 (21 February), and the Navy air units shall be pushed
forward there so as to use it as an air operation base at the time of the landing [operation] on
eastern Java.
In accordance with the [principles of] the draft agreement above, a draft arrangement for the
Java invasion was concluded between the Third Fleet, the Eleventh Air Fleet, the Sixteenth
Army and the [Army] Third Air Force on the 23d. It was agreed to arrange it in such a way
that after this draft arrangement had been brought back to each headquarters by its staff of-
ficers, the Second Fleet would first send a consultative telegram to the Southern Army while
also informing the Combined Fleet and central command in order to make sure of their in-
tentions, and that the agreement would formally come into effect after the reception of a
telegram of approval from the Southern Army. On the next day, the 24th, all staff officers left
Manila for their respective headquarters.(34)
Then, on the 25th, in accordance with the arrangement of staff officers at Manila, Second
Fleet Commander in Chief Vice Admiral Kondō sent Southern Army Commander in Chief
General Terauchi the following consultative telegram:(62)
Second Fleet Classified Telegram No. 750, 2100, 25 January 
We would like to make the following additions and revisions to the agreement of 1 January,
1942, between the commander in chief of the Southern Army and the commander in chief of
the Navy in the South, and [would like to] discuss these [with you].
1. Standard dates [to implement operations] of capturing (areas to be seized, the dates to start
landing [operations])
(a) Makassar, around Day X + 63; (b) Bangka and Palembang, around Day X + 64; (c) Kupang,
around Day X + 74; (d) Western Java, around Day X + 75; (e) Eastern Java, around Day X + 77
2. The seizure of Banjarmasin shall be conducted overland from Balikpapan as quickly as possible.
However, depending upon the circumstances, the operation may be launched after consultations
between the commander of the Sixteenth Army and the commander in chief of the Third Fleet.
3. The air base on Bali shall be seized in conjunction by the Army and the Navy around Day X +
75, so that [it can be used] as an air base at the time of [the operations to] capture eastern Java.
The details of the implementation of the above operation shall be arranged between the com-
mander of the Sixteenth Army, [the commander in chief of the Third Fleet], the commander of
the Third Air Force and the commander in chief of the Eleventh Air Fleet.
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4. The commander of the Third Air Force and the commander in chief of the Eleventh Air Fleet
shall be included in the [number of] commanders with whom the arrangements for the opera-
tions to capture Java shall be made.
Looking at this consultative telegram and finding the word “around” before every invasion
date, the discussion became heated again at the Southern Army headquarters.(34) It was settled
by agreeing that regardless of the word “around,” [both sides] should do their very best and
commit themselves to execute [the invasion operation] in accordance with this invasion
schedule as the standard schedule. In the meantime, since the high command of the Army
had not yet been informed of the plan to capture Banjarmasin overland, a telegram had come
inquiring whether it was [still possible to capture the town] by means of [advancing] over-
land or by maneuvering craft along the coast, while advising that it would be better to seize
the town in order to make sure of [the success of] the subsequent operations even if it was
not in time for the capture of Java.(99) Then on the 28th, the high command of the Army, finally
coming to understand that the Southern Army had a plan to capture the town overland in
early February, approved the draft, and the draft arrangement made at Manila was formally
concluded on 28 January.* The arrangement was called the Manila Agreement.(65)
Issue of the Order to Commit the Main Force of the Carrier Task Force to the
Southern Theater
In late December, when the Carrier Task Force returned to mainland Japan from the air strike
on Hawaii, it was decided that for the subsequent operations the main force, that is, the 1st
and the 5th Carrier Divisions, should support the operation to capture Rabaul, and that the
2d Carrier Division should be committed to the southern operation. Due to a lack of [relevant]
materials, the detailed plans at that time of how these forces should subsequently be em-
ployed are unclear, but by putting all [available] documents together, various patterns of em-
ployment as shown below seem to have been considered by central command:
1. To commit one element of the Carrier Task Force to the [southern] theater at the time of the in-
vasion of Java by the Southern Task Force, and have it act in concert with the invasion opera-
tion.
2. To carry out offensive operations with the Carrier Task Force to cut off Australia from the United
States in tandem with the invasion of Java.
3. To have the 1st and the 5th Carrier Divisions advance [off] the east coast of Australia in early
February after the operation to capture Rabaul, and carry out attacks in that area, after which
they shall prepare against [an attack from] the east.
The 2d Carrier Division shall be engaged in the southern operation.(40)
In the end, the third plan was adopted as [operational] policy. However, on 24 January a de-
tailed report from Submarine I–8 on the sinking of the USS Lexington (on 12 January) came
in, and its instant sinking was regarded as certain.** This led the Combined Fleet to conclude
that it no longer needed to worry about [an attack from] the east, and that it would be more
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* A more extensive version of the proceedings at Manila may be found in Vol. 3, pp. 209-22.
** The torpedo attack and the report were in fact made by I–6 (Vol. 98, pp. 112, 118). The target was actually the
Lexington-class USS Saratoga, who was severely damaged and had to be withdrawn for repairs (https://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/USS Saratoga_(CV-3)).
effective to employ the main strength of the Carrier Task Force in the
south at the time of Java invasion operation. So, on 31 January, by means
of telegraphic order No. 54, it ordered the incorporation of the Carrier
Task Force into the Southern Task Force.(100)
However, on the next day, 1 February, a U.S. Task Force conducted a
raid on the Marshall Islands. The main force of the Carrier Task Force,
which just at that time had returned to Truk after completing the Rabaul
operation, headed for the Marshall Islands to attack them. At 1100 on 1
February, Combined Fleet Commander in Chief Admiral Yamamoto is-
sued an order that the time of incorporation of the Carrier Task Force
into the Southern Task Force in accordance with telegraphic operation
order No. 54 would be given later. However, with no [updated] infor-
mation about the movements of the enemy in the Marshall [Islands] after
that, he issued an order to the Carrier Task Force late at night on 2 February to cancel the ad-
vance to the Marshall Islands and prepare for joining the Southern Task Force. However, it
was decided that the 5th Carrier Division and three destroyers [of the Carrier Task Force]
should return to the mainland for training and guarding against [possible attacks by] U.S.
Task Forces. By this order, the main force of the Carrier Task Force ([consisting of] the 1st
Carrier Division as the core) sailed straight from the Marshall Islands to Palau. At 0000 on 8
February, the Combined Fleet formally issued an order to incorporate the Carrier Task Force
(minus the 5th Carrier Division and three destroyers) into the Southern Task Force.(100)
Prior to this, the 2d Carrier Division, which had been incorporated into the Southern Task
Force on 7 January, carried out an air raid on Ambon (which will be described later) in concert
with the Kendari operation on 24 January, and achieved considerable success. As a result of
this [raid], 2d Carrier Division Commander R. Adm. Yamaguchi Tamon proposed to the Sec-
ond Fleet and the Combined Fleet a plan to attack Port Darwin with the 2d Carrier Division,
stating that, rather than attacking the important invasion points prior to the invasions, the
best employment of the aircraft carrier unit in support of the southern operation would be
to attack Port Darwin, the point where the enemy concentrated its reinforcements, and that
this operation [to attack Port Darwin] would be highly promising, judging from the current
situation.(101)
Incorporating 2d Carrier Division Commander Rear Admiral Yamaguchi’s plan for an air
strike on Port Darwin as well, Southern Task Force Commander Vice Admiral Kondō issued
on 9 February by Telegraphic Order No. 92 orders for the Carrier Task Force’s mobile oper-
ation I (air strikes on Port Darwin) and mobile operation II (mobile operations to the south
of Java), as well as orders for the operations of the submarine units (the details of which will
be described later [p. 331]).(53)
The Operational Policy of Phase-Three Operations of the Southern Task Force
Around 30 January, when it was informally decided to commit the Carrier Task Force to the
southern theater, the Southern Task Force’s phase-three operations in the Dutch East Indies
theater were guided by the following operational policy:(53)
1. In late February, the Java invasion operation shall be carried out to completely destroy the last
bases of the allied forces in the southern theater.




2. In early February, the air campaign to destroy the enemy air power in eastern Java shall be
launched with the air units from Balikpapan and Kendari.
3. In the western [part] of the Dutch East Indies, Bangka and Palembang shall be captured by the
[Navy] Malaya Unit and the Sixteenth Army around 10 February; the Air Unit of the Malaya
Unit shall swiftly be deployed at the [earliest] possible opportunity in western Borneo, southern
Malaya and the Palembang area to launch its air campaign to destroy the enemy air power in
western Java in tandem with the Army air units.
4. Makassar shall be captured by the Dutch East Indies Unit around 9 February; air units shall be
advanced there in order to intensify the air operation against Java.
5. Ambon shall be captured on 31 January and Timor around 20 February by the Dutch East Indies
Unit and one element of the Sixteenth Army; air units shall be advanced there in order to cut
off the enemy route of supply and reinforcements from Australia to Java as well as to launch air
strikes on northern Australia.
6. Almost simultaneously with the capture of Timor by the Dutch East Indies Unit, a surprise
attack on Port Darwin shall be conducted with the newly to be deployed main force of the Car-
rier Task Force. The land-based air units shall also carry out simultaneous attacks.
7. Around 20 February, Bali shall be captured by the Dutch East Indies Unit in order to push for-
ward there one element of the Air Unit.
8. From 21 to 23 February, the main force of the Dutch East Indies Unit shall escort the main force
of the Sixteenth Army and put them ashore on both eastern and western Java.
9. In concert with the landing [operation] against Java, the main body of the Carrier Task Force,
the main body of the Southern Task Force and the [later] to be added Submarine Unit C (2d
Submarine Squadron) shall advance to the waters south of Java and carry out the operation to
cut off the escape routes of the enemy, etc. The Air Unit shall act in concert with this operation. 
10. Submarine Unit A (the 4th and the 6th Submarine Squadrons) shall act in concert with the Java
invasion operation, watch and patrol the southern coast of Java, Port Darwin, the Torres Strait,
etc.
7. The Capture of Ambon (See Illustrations No. 20 and No. 21)
Plan of Operations, etc.
[The operation to] capture Ambon was carried out by the Eastern Attack Unit with the sup-
port of the Air Unit of the Southern Task Force; this time, 2d Escort Unit Commander and 2d
Destroyer Squadron Commander Rear Admiral Tanaka directly took command of the capture
[operation]. The main force of the escorting force, i.e. the 15th and the 16th Destroyer Divi-
sions and the 21st Minesweeper Division, which had been put in the 1st Base Unit in [the
previous operation to] seize Kendari, were this time incorporated in the 2d Escort Unit. In
the meantime, the 1st Base Unit was assigned to the defense of the Bangka anchorage and
the protection of the sea lanes, while preparing for the coming operation against Makassar.(78)
The following units were supposed to cooperate with the Eastern Attack Unit:(78)
1. Army unit: the Itō Detachment (Commander: 38th Infantry Group Commander Maj. Gen. Itō
Takeo)
Strength: three infantry battalions, one mountain gun battalion, one antitank gun battery and
one field antiaircraft artillery battery, one engineer company, and one independent engineer
company as the core ([with] about 5,300 men, 110 automobiles, etc.) 
2. Land-based air unit: the 1st Air Raid Unit of the Southern Task Force’s Air Unit ([consisting of]
the 21st Air Flotilla and the 3d Air Group as the core)
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3. Carrier-based air unit: the unit consisting of the 2d Carrier Division, which had been incorpo-
rated into the Air Unit of the Southern Task Force, as the core ([i.e.] The 2d Carrier Division, the
Maya, the 7th Destroyer Division, the 2d Section of the 27th Destroyer Division)
The Arrangement Between the 2d Escort Unit and the Itō Detachment
On 18 January, escorted by the 8th Destroyer Division, the Itō Detachment had advanced
from Hong Kong to Davao, where it made a [draft] arrangement on [the operation to] capture
Ambon with 2d Escort Unit Commander Rear Admiral Tanaka on the 20th, and signed the
arrangement on the next day the 21st. The outline of the arrangement was as follows.(54) Due
to the delay in the shift from the Philippines operation to the Dutch East Indies operation,
the search for enemy submarines in the Molucca Sea and the diversion of forces from
Kendari, the schedule for [the operation to] capture Ambon had been changed again and
again (25th → 26th → 29th). On the 19th, the day of signing of the arrangement, it was set on
31 January.*
1. Disposition of forces at the time of landing (as shown in the table below)
(1) The Army Itō Detachment and the Navy 1st Kure Special Landing Force shall act in con-
junction with each other.
(2) One company led by 1st Lt. Wakabayashi Tōichi shall be dispatched from the Itō Detachment
to the 1st Kure Special Landing Force, and brought under the command of the latter.
2. Landing combat and cover for the landing [operation]
(1) Although [the unit] is primarily supposed to make a surprise landing, [it shall] determinedly
carry out an assault landing if the situation is unavoidable.
(2) Covering fire for the landing operations shall be provided at the request of Detachment
Commander Itō.
(3) If requested by the Army, the naval vessels near the anchorages of the [Army] transport
ships shall provide temporary repairs for [Army] craft, when the war situation permits.
3. The movement of the transport ships after the landing (omitted by the author)
4. Others (omitted by the author)
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Distribution of Units Main force of the Army Itō Det The Navy 1st Kure SLF and theArmy Wakabayashi Com
Time [to start] drifting near
the anchorage 0100, 31 January 0000, 31 January
Time to launch the landings 
(time to leave the [mother] ships) 0400, ditto 0300, ditto
Landing points Coast east of Rutung Coast west of Hitulama
Disembarkation operations
First of all, the matériel and personnel required to carry out the immedi-
ate combat shall be disembarked; the rest shall be disembarked at Ambon
Bay.
* There seems to be some confusion about when the agreement was signed and when the date of the Ambon in-
vasion was decided. See also Vol. 3, pp. 362 and 366.
The Plan of Operations of the 2d Escort Unit
On 25 January at Davao, 2d Escort Unit Commander Rear Admiral Tanaka issued an order
concerning the main points of [the operation to] capture Ambon by 2d Escort Unit Order No.
4.(54)
1. Distribution of the transport ships
1st Echelon: Yamaura-maru, Africa-maru, Zen’yō-maru, Miike-maru (all with the Army Itō Detach-
ment on board)
2d Echelon: Kirishima-maru (1st Kure SLF), Yamafuku-maru (3d Construction Squad), Yamagiri-
maru (3d Construction Squad), Lyons-maru, Hino-maru No. 5, Katsuragi-maru (the last three
belonging to the Eleventh Air Fleet)
Out of the line: Ryōyō-maru (will leave port along with the 1st Echelon)
2. Disposition of forces (as in the table below)
(1) This disposition of forces shall take effect from 0000 on 26 January onwards.
(2) Incorporation of units currently engaged in other operations in progress shall be ordered by
separate orders.
(3) The 1st Kure Special Landing Force (minus one element) shall be assigned to landing oper-
ation in conjunction with the Army units.
3. Tasks and operations of each unit
(1) The main body (the Jintsū and the 1st Section of the 16th Destroyer Division)
The Jintsū shall leave Davao at 1300 on 26 January, and sail to the Bangka anchorage. Then
she shall generally operate near the 2d Detachment. After the arrival of all units in Ambon,
she shall timely operate around the Ceram Sea and the Molucca Sea. The 1st Section of the
16th Destroyer Division shall operate along with the 2d Detachment until ordered otherwise
by separate orders.
(2) The covering unit (The 15th Destroyer Division)
On the morning of 30 January, it shall join the 1st Detachment on the waters northeast of
Buru ([by] sailing straight from Kendari), take charge of the direct cover of the detachment
until 1800 on that day. After that, it shall be assigned to watch the entrance of Ambon Bay
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Jintsū, 1st Section of the
16th Destroyer Div
[In charge of] the entire
[operation]
Covering Unit 15th Destroyer Div Cdr 15th Destroyer Div
To watch and guard the
entrance of the bay and to
cover both detachments
1st Detachment 8th Destroyer Div Cdr
8th Destroyer Div, 1st
Subchaser Div (minus 3
submarine chasers), 21st
Minesweeper Div (minus
Minesweepers Nos. 9 and
11)
To escort 1st Echelon and
cover its disembarkation
2d Detachment Capt of the Amatsukaze
2d Section of the 16th De-
stroyer Div, Minesweep-
ers Nos. 9 and 11
To escort 2d Echelon and
cover its disembarkation
while directly supporting the minesweeping inside the bay, as designated by the com-
mander.
(3) The 1st Detachment (The 8th Destroyer Division, the 1st Subchaser Division, and the main
force of the 21st Minesweeper Division)
Escorting the 1st Echelon, it shall leave Davao at 1600 on 27 January, and have the former
disembark at Ambon (on the coast east of Rutung). The scheduled time to enter into the an-
chorage ([staying] adrift) shall be at 0100 on 31 January. Submarine chaser No. 2 shall escort
the Ryōyō-maru and catch up with the detachment. The 21st Minesweeper Division (minus
Minesweepers Nos. 9 and 11) shall join the detachment on the morning of the 30th (by sailing
straight from Kendari).
(4) The 2d Detachment (the 2d Section of the 16th Destroyer Division, and Minesweepers [No.
9] and No. 11)
Escorting the 2d Echelon, it shall leave the Bangka anchorage at 0000 on 29 January, and
have the former disembark at Ambon (on the coast west of Hitulama). The scheduled time
to enter into the anchorage ([staying] adrift) shall be at 0000 on 31 January. Minesweepers
Nos. 9 and 11 shall join the detachment on 30 January (by sailing straight from Kendari).
4. Outline of the escort
(1) Sailing speed: 10 knots at normal speed; 11 knots at fast speed
(2) Sailing route and sailing formation (omitted by the author)
5. Outline of the entry into the anchorages (omitted by the author)
6. Outline of the guarding after shifting to the anchorage inside Ambon Bay (omitted by the au-
thor)
7. Main points of the plan
(1) The landing operation is meant to be carried out after the 1st Air Raid Unit has thoroughly
neutralized the enemy air power in Ambon and vicinity.
(2) Since the enemy’s defense of the front of Ambon Bay is extremely strong and the entire area
has practically been turned into a stronghold, the landing points are set at Rutung and Hitu-
lama in order to seize the area from the rear.
(3) In view of the situation at the time of the capture of Tarakan, minesweeping inside the bay
shall not be launched until the batteries at the entrance of the bay surrender. Disembarkation
shall proceed at the landing points as much as possible until it becomes feasible to [safely]
anchor inside the bay.
(4) When it is not necessary to worry about counterattacks by enemy surface vessels, the main
body shall hide its whereabouts as much as possible from enemy aircraft.
(5) Due to [the schedule of] the units diverting from the Menado and Kendari operations (i.e.
the 15th and the 16th Destroyer Divisions and the 21st Minesweeper Division), the opera-
tional preparations of the 1st Detachment (the Army unit) and the 2d Detachment (the Navy
unit) shall be made respectively at Davao and at the Bangka anchorage. 
(6) In the event of major counterattacks by enemy aircraft, the transport ships shall be evacuated
to the Bangka anchorage after having disembarked the minimum [amount of men and
matériel] required.
The Plan of Operations of the Itō Detachment(102)
1. Operational policy
[The unit] shall land in Rutung, swiftly cut through the mountains and charge into the urban
area of Ambon from the east. Then it shall seize the battery on the southwestern peninsula.
2. Disposition of forces
(1) Left Attack Unit (the main force of the 228th Infantry Regiment)
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After the landing in Rutung, [the unit shall] split into two units; the main force shall head
straight for Ambon through the mountains from Rutung, while the detached force shall head
for Ambon along the southern road through Hatalai.
(2) Right Attack Unit (the 2d Battalion of the 228th Infantry Regiment)
[The unit shall] advance eastward from Rutung along the coastal road to Paso and seize such
strategic points as Paso and Halong.
(3) The Wakabayashi Company
[The company shall] come under the command of the 1st Kure Special Landing Force and
land in Hitulama along with that force.
The Plan of Operations of the 1st Kure Special Landing Force
On 28 January at the Bangka anchorage, the 1st Kure Special Landing Force announced the
outline of the operation to capture Ambon by Operation Order No. 10.(103) Now, Cdr. Fujimura
Masasuke, the commander of the 1st Kure Special Landing Force, had fallen ill after the cap-
ture of Legaspi (the Philippines) and Cdr. Hayashi Shōjirō had been ordered to replace him
as of 21 January, but Commander Hayashi could not be in time to assume his new post, so
until that time it fell to senior officer Lt. Hatakeyama Kunito as acting commander to draw
up the plan.
1. Operational Policy
Before daybreak on 31 January, [the force shall] determinedly carry out the landing at the coast
of Hitulama and swiftly seize the Laha airfield as well as the Alang battery.
2. Disposition [of forces] at the time of landing
(1) First Landing Unit ([at] the coast of Hitulama)
First landing: Special Landing Force headquarters, 2d Company, one element of the artillery
unit and the main force of the attached units
Second landing: The [Army] Wakabayashi Company, the main force of the artillery unit, the
paymaster unit, ammunition and provisions
Third landing: ammunition, provisions, base construction matériel, and supplies for the Wak-
abayashi Company  
(2) Second Landing Unit ([at] the coast of Hitulama) and the Third Landing Unit ([at] the coast
of Laha)
Base construction personnel and matériel; depending on the situation, the landing of the second
landing unit shall be called off and immediately [combined] with the landing of the third
landing unit. 
3. Operations after landing (omitted by the author)
4. The forces under the command of the 1st Kure Special Landing Force (750 men in total; compo-
nents omitted by the author)
In order to make up for the understaffing at the 1st Kure Special Landing Force caused by
the absence of its commander, Dutch East Indies Unit Commander Vice Admiral Takahashi
ordered that R. Adm. Hatakeyama Kōichirō, prospective commander of the 24th Special Base
Unit, which was due to be set up at Ambon after the capture of the island, should take com-
mand of the 1st Kure Special Landing Force after its landing. Also, Cdr. Ieki Kōnosuke,
prospective senior staff officer, and two other officers were assigned for the staff work.(103)
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The Plan of Operations of the 2d Air Unit
Also accepting the opinion offered by 11th Seaplane Tender Division Commander R. Adm.
Fujita Ruitarō (that the Ambon operation should be carried out with the whole force), 5th
Cruiser Division Commander Rear Admiral Takagi decided on 26 January to have the full
strength of the 2d Air Unit participate in the operation to capture Ambon; he issued orders
that the Mizuho, and Patrol Boats Nos. 34 and 39 should leave Kendari on the 29th in order
to participate in the Ambon operation straight [from there].(53) The flagship Chitose, which
was scheduled to participate in the invasion of Ambon from the start [of the planning], left
Salabangka Channel on the 26th, arrived at the Bangka anchorage at 1500 on the 27th, where
2d Air Unit Commander Rear Admiral Fujita met with 2d Escort Unit Commander Rear Ad-
miral Tanaka to discuss the Ambon operation. As a result [of this meeting], it was decided
that in [the operation to] capture Ambon, the 2d Air Unit should carry out such tasks as pa-
trolling the route ahead of the convoy, providing direct escort against [enemy] aircraft and
submarines, providing direct protection around the anchorages as well as protecting the unit
itself against enemy aircraft and submarines, and searching for the enemy in the Banda Sea.(54) 
The Plan of Operations of the Air Unit of the Southern Task Force
1. 1st Air Raid Unit
It was decided that the 1st Air Raid Unit should provide guard for the invasion unit against
enemy aircraft and reconnoiter the landing points, as well as such tasks as destroying enemy
naval vessels and air power, searching for the enemy and patrolling [against them], and sup-
porting the ground combat.(53)
2. Carrier-based Air Unit
In order to destroy the enemy surface and air power in Ambon in concert with the [operation
to] seize Kendari on 24 January, the carrier-based air unit ([consisting of] the 2d Carrier Division
as the core) was scheduled to leave Palau on the 22d of January to carry out air strikes on Ambon
on the 23d.(71)
The Launch of the Operation
Signs of the Enemy Hardly Seen
As previously told [p. 117], 1st Air Raid Unit Commander Rear Admiral Tada carried out a
(night) attack on the Ambon [airfield] for the first time on 7 January with the forces of the
Kanoya Air Group Detachment and the Tōkō Air Group. After that, he gradually intensified
the attacks and reconnaissance in the following way:(71)
14 January: One land-based reconnaissance plane of the 3d Air Group conducted a reconnais-
sance on Ambon from Menado.
15 January: Twenty-six land-based attack planes of the Kanoya Air Group Detachment and
eighteen Type –0 fighter planes and one land-based reconnaissance plane of the 3d Air Group
carried out an attack on Ambon (the former from the Davao base and the latter from
Menado) and reported a military gain of destroying seven enemy aircraft.
16 January: Sixteen land-based attack planes of the Kanoya Air Group Detachment, four Type –
0 fighter planes and one reconnaissance plane of the 3d Air Group, and one large flying boat
of the Tōkō Air Group carried out an attack on Ambon.
18 January: One land-based reconnaissance plane of the 3d Air Group reconnoitered Ambon.
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19 January: Four large flying boats of the Tōkō Air Group reconnoitered the area of Ambon.
21 January: Three Type –0 fighter planes and two land-based reconnaissance planes of the 3d
Air Group attacked and reconnoitered Ambon, while conducting a photoreconnaissance of
the landing points.
On 22 January, 1st Air Raid Unit Commander Rear Admiral Tada sent Rear Admiral Yama -
guchi, commander of the 2d Carrier Division (carrier-based air unit) the following telegram
concerning the situation of Ambon.(53)
The situation of Ambon is as follows:
1. In January, our unit has carried out attacks and reconnaissance (at night) on the 7th as well as
(in the daytime) on the 14th, the 15th, the 16th, the 18th, and the 21st. After it destroyed seven
aircraft in total (all aircraft [spotted there]) on the 15th and the 16th, no enemy aircraft has been
seen since then. However, [this is to be expected because] the military airfield located at Laha
[on Ambon] seems to have been used only occasionally as a staging base.
2. Although several fast enemy naval ships and merchantmen were seen at anchor [at Ambon]
until around the 16th, no enemy vessels have been spotted recently.
Yesterday, the 21st, two mid-sized [enemy] merchantmen entered the port.
3. Apart from the military airfield and the flying boat base, another airfield is under construction
at the eastern point of Ambon Island, but it is not yet fit for use.
4. In view of [our] use [of the existing facilities] after the capture of Ambon, we consider it better
to choose the following attack targets in case no enemy naval vessels or aircraft are spotted:
(a) The batteries on both sides of the entrance of Ambon Bay in the west
(b) The battery southwest of the city of Ambon
5. For reference:
(a) The enemy air force has its main bases on Timor and Java, and uses Ambon, Kendari, and
Banjarmasin as advance bases, but it lacks fighting spirit.
(b) U.S. naval vessels sometimes appear in the Banda Sea; at present the USS Houston is in Dar-
win.
(c) There are oil fields as well as large-scale port facilities in Bula at the east point of Ceram; it
is better to seize and make use of them. There is no airfield on Groot-Banda (note by the au-
thor: an islet located about sixty nautical miles south of Ceram).
(d) [We have] roughly bombed and destroyed [enemy facilities in] Sorong and Babo (in western
New Guinea) and Ternate (note by the author: on Halmahera Island). [The enemy has] for-
merly made counterattacks in these areas, but we have met with no counterattacks these
days.
Today, the 22d, the search for the enemy in these areas was carried out by one large flying
boat.
On 23 January, under the command of Lt. Cdr. Kusumi Masashi, the Hiryū Air Unit com-
mander, the carrier-based air unit headed for Ambon for an attack with nine Type–0 fighter
planes, nine Type–99 carrier-based bombers and nine Type–97 carrier-based attack planes of
the Hiryū and nine Type–0 fighter planes, nine Type–99 carrier-based bombers and nine Type–
97 carrier-based attack planes of the Sōryū, fifty-four planes in total. However, due to bad
weather, the unit was unable to carry out the attack and changed its target to Ternate, where
it found no suitable targets. The unit ended up cancelling the attack and all aircraft returned
safely.(71) On the next day the 24th, the unit [again] reached the sky above Ambon with the
same strength. But having spotted no enemy naval vessels or aircraft, the unit bombed the
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barracks and the battery southwest of the city [instead], and all returned safely, [after which]
the carrier-based air unit headed back to Davao(71) (arriving in Davao on the 25th). Further-
more on 27 January, in accordance with the Air Unit’s Telegraphic Operation Order No. 36,
eighteen Type–0 fighter planes and nine carrier-based bombers of the carrier-based unit were
advanced to Kendari from Davao [in Vol. 3, the date and number of planes differs] and put
under the command of 1st Air Raid Unit Commander Rear Admiral Tada, in order to take
charge of destroying the enemy naval vessels and air power until the completion of the
Ambon operation.(81)
The Enemy Movements in the Ambon Area at the Time of the Launch of the Invasion
Operation
As of 28 and 29 January, the intelligence that the unit to capture Ambon had obtained on the
enemy movements was by and large as follows:
1. The situation of [enemy] air units(54)
(1) Because Kendari has fallen into Japanese hands, which brought Timor as well as Ambon
within the action range of Type–0 fighter planes, large-scale enemy counterattacks are not
expected, [although there may be] counterattacks by a small number of mid- and small-sized
aircraft using [airfields in] western New Guinea as their staging base, or from Port Darwin
by a few large aircraft or flying boats.
(2) However, there are still traces of use at the Ambon airfield even now; [the airfield] seems to
be still in use as a staging base from the Port Darwin area. Also, Namlea on Buru (west of
Ceram) is being used as an air base; we must be on alert against other hidden enemy bases
as well. 
2. The movements of [enemy] surface units(54)
(1) Although the enemy surface forces seem to have evacuated to the areas south of Timor and
west of Makassar, it is likely that they will make a surprise counterattack.
(2) While it seems that enemy submarines have [mainly] been deployed in the area south of the
Molucca Sea, some of them are also active near the Bangka anchorage.
(3) Although it seems that the U.S. and Dutch naval units are by and large stationed at Port
Darwin and Surabaya, one element of them appears in the Banda Sea at times.
3. The situation on Ambon and the surrounding waters(103)
(1) As the central military and economic base of the eastern part of the Dutch East Indies,
Ambon has recently been provided with strong defenses; it seems that almost the entire is-
land has been fortified.
(2) Although the strength of the Dutch East Indies garrison stationed in Ambon is said to have
consisted of about 1,000 men, it seems to have been reinforced with about 2,000 men of the
Australian army.
(3) Reconnaissance by our naval air units from the end of December [1941] onwards has deliv-
ered the following [picture]:
{1} From the end of December onwards, [enemy] naval vessels have frequently sailed in and
out of Ambon; they seem to have been assigned [the task] of troop reinforcements as
well as the transport of evacuees. 
{2} Mines seem to have been laid over strategic areas such as the entrance of Ambon Bay as
well as Baguala Bay; before 16 January, several minelayers as well as light and fast ships
were seen at anchor.
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{3} Antisurface vessel [coastal] batteries seem to be located both at the south and the north
entrance of Ambon Bay, and it is certain that the Halong seaplane base as well as the
Laha airfield have antiaircraft battery positions.
(4) Putting all the above together, it seems that for Ambon the Ambon Bay area serves as its
front defense and the Baguala Bay as its rear defense, while there are strong defensive posi-
tions around the city of Ambon as well on the western part of the Laha airfield.
The Sailing of the Invasion Convoy
At 1530 on 27 January, the 1st Echelon left Davao and started sailing southward toward
Ambon. At 0200 on 28 January, the Asashio and Submarine chaser No. 1 left the Bangka an-
chorage in order to join the 1st Echelon; they joined it around 1400. In the meantime, the 1st
Section of the 15th Destroyer Division and the 21st Minesweeper Division, which were at
Kendari, discontinued the Kendari operation and left Kendari at 0700 on the 28th for the
Ceram Sea to join the 2d Escort Unit.(54)
At 0000 on 29 January, the 16th Destroyer Division and the 2d Echelon left the Bangka
anchorage. They met up with the Jintsū around 0915, after which they sailed southward in
the Molucca Sea, following the 1st Echelon at a distance of about twenty-five nautical miles.
During the sailing, first at 1426 the Arashio, which escorted the 1st Echelon, then at 1623 the
Amatsukaze, which escorted the 2d Echelon, and then at 1703 the Hayashio, which guarded
the 1st Echelon, detected a little north of the equator enemy submarine(s). Each of them made
an attack with antisubmarine depth charges but with unconfirmed results.(54) Although a
little choppy, the weather was fine that day. With fighter planes of the 1st Air Raid Unit and
seaplanes of the 2d Air Unit flying over the convoys the whole day to guard against enemy
aircraft and submarines, no enemy aircraft came to attack.(94) In the meantime, the support
unit left Davao at 1700 as scheduled and headed for the Bangka anchorage to support the
invasion unit.(78) On that day, flying boat[s] of the Tōkō Air Group reconnoitered Ambon and
sent the following report:(81)
1. One flying boat was moored (in the north corner) inside the inner harbor.
Two reconnaissance seaplanes were taking off from the water, while two twin-engine aircraft
were spotted on the airfield. 
2. As for the ships at anchor, in addition to two 200t-class ships, there were many small boats.
Also, two fast ships were spotted near Cape Nusanive.
3. The defense gunfire near the seaplane base and near the airfield was fierce and relatively accu-
rate.
4. Reconnaissance altitude: 3,000m
In the early morning on 30 January, the convoy sailed into the Ceram Sea, passing between
the Sula Islands and the island of Obi Mayor. At 0715, the 1st Section of the 15th Destroyer
Division and the 21st Minesweeper Division, both of which had sailed straight from Kendari,
joined the convoy, and sailed southward at seven to ten nautical miles ahead of the latter by
way of precaution.
At 0745, one enemy Lockheed bomber was spotted reconnoitering [the convoy], but it
soon disappeared into the clouds. It was judged that with this reconnaissance the enemy
must have gotten the full picture of the Japanese invasion unit. At 1200, the main body (the
Jintsū and the 1st Section of the 16th Destroyer Division) separated from the 2d Detachment
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Illustration No. 20 — Outline of the Operations of the Ambon Invasion Units (27-31 January, 1942)
and sailed westward to be on guard to the west of Buru. At 1320, one Lockheed bomber once
again approached the main body and the 2d Echelon; three observation planes in the sky at-
tacked it, but it disappeared into the clouds. However, with friendly fighter planes, recon-
naissance seaplanes and observation planes providing also on that day guard in the sky
above, the escort unit basically did not need to worry about [enemy] air attacks.(70)
About sunset on the 30th, the 15th Destroyer Division, which sailed ahead, was approach-
ing a point about twenty nautical miles from the entrance of Ambon Bay, the 1st Echelon a
point about forty-five nautical miles from Rutung, and the 2d Echelon only thirty-five nau-
tical miles from the Hitulama anchorage. At 1950, the 15th Destroyer Division reached the
entrance of Ambon Bay and reported: “The heavy oil tanks near the urban area of Ambon as
well as near the Laha airfield are in flames.”(94) The weather conditions at that time showed
occasional sudden showers with the wind from a 0º direction and a velocity of 6 meters [per
second]. At 2216, the Hino-maru No. 5, the fifth ship of the 2d Echelon was torpedoed by [an]
enemy submarine (with three torpedoes that passed by her bow), but she sustained no dam-
age. The Amatsukaze and Minesweeper No. 11 immediately attacked to neutralize the enemy,
while Minesweeper No. 9 reversed course to pin down the enemy submarine astern. At 2218,
the Amatsukaze spotted a surfaced enemy submarine at a distance of about 6,000 meters and
approached it for an attack but lost the opportunity to attack it because it submerged. At
2300, the 2d Echelon entered the Hitulama anchorage about one hour earlier than planned,
while at 0020, the 1st Echelon entered the Rutung anchorage forty minutes earlier than
planned without encountering the enemy.(54) Meanwhile, 2d Escort Unit Commander Rear
Admiral Tanaka, leading the Jintsū and the 1st Section of the 16th Destroyer Division, directed
the operation while appropriately operating from a position about ten nautical miles west of
Buru. At 1420 on that day, the Support Unit (the 5th Cruiser division and the Ikazuchi) ad-
vanced to the Bangka anchorage.(78)
The Launch of the Landing Operation and the General Completion of the Capture 
Having entered the Hitulama anchorage at 2300 on the previous night, the 2d Echelon im-
mediately launched the landing operations, and at 0100 on 31 January, two hours earlier than
planned, its landing craft departed from the anchorage of the convoy. However, because the
enemy had placed wooden stakes, barbed wire entanglement and underwater obstacles along
the coast and put up stiff resistance from pillbox positions with trench mortars and machine-
guns, the landing operation got momentarily bogged down. The 2d Detachment commander
reported the situation in quick succession: “0120: Departed;” “0200: Having difficulty in land-
ing;” “0210: Meeting with resistance.” The 1st Kure Special Landing Force forced a landing,
eliminating stiff enemy resistance and finally succeeded in landing at 0320, occupying Hitu-
lama, the landing point.(54)
In the meantime, the 1st Echelon had entered the anchorage at Rutung, [and its landing
craft] departed from the anchorage of the convoy at 0220, about one hour earlier than
planned. After [the Army unit] had successfully landed at 0245 without meeting any resist-
ance, Second Escort Unit Commander Rear Admiral Tanaka reported the success of the land-
ings at both Rutung and Hitulama.(54) From about 0700 or 0800 on that day, the weather on
Ambon and its surroundings rapidly worsened; it rained torrentially with a west wind blow-
ing as strongly as twenty meters [per second]. The 2d Air Unit wired that it would suspend
its air campaign until the weather improved. The rainstorm weakened from around 1100 on-
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wards, and by around 1200 it completely cleared up; the 2d Air Unit reported that it would
resume its air campaign. Despite the return of the good weather, the enemy fortunately did
not carry out any air raids in the afternoon.(54)
During that period, whereas the ground operations of the Army went smoothly, the ad-
vance of the 1st Kure Special Landing Force seemed to experience extreme difficulties. That
is, from 1100 onwards, the headquarters of the 1st Kure Special Landing Force, which had
headed for the Laha airfield from Hitulama, lost contact with the force remaining at the Hitu -
lama landing point, leaving the Landing Force totally clueless as to the situation at its front.
In the evening, the 15th Destroyer Division in charge of watching the entrance of Ambon
Bay reported that the batteries to the southwest of [the city of] Ambon were volleying toward
the Laha and Lata areas, so it was assumed that the front of the 1st Kure Special Landing
Force had advanced more or less to that neighborhood.
Meanwhile, the Rutung anchorage was calm, with no enemy raids other than that the
Asashio, which was guarding the anchorage, detected at 1715 [an] enemy submarine and at-
tacked her, with unconfirmed results. The debarkation of personnel and matériel from the
Miike-maru and the other ships at the Rutung anchorage was largely completed by the
evening. After that, in order to avoid attacks by enemy submarines, excepting the Miike-maru,
the other three ships left the anchorage at 2000 escorted by the 8th Destroyer Division and
timely sailed to an area within thirty nautical miles southeast of the anchorage. During that
action, at 2035, the Asashio again detected [an] enemy submarine and attacked her almost at
the same point as she had done in the evening, [again] with unconfirmed results. At the Hitu -
lama anchorage [the ships] kept drifting there on the alert, but there were no enemy attacks. 
Whereas at 2400 the Army unit reported to have charged into Ambon city before sunset,
the 1st Kure Special Landing Force remained out of contact with its headquarters until the
morning of 1 February. In order to establish contact with the front as well as to supply am-
munition and provisions, the commander of the 16th Destroyer Division guarding the Hitu-
lama [anchorage] formed a landing party of one platoon with the approval of 2d Escort Unit
Commander Rear Admiral Tanaka and dispatched it to the coast of Hitulama at 0700 (it re-
turned to the ship(s) at 1900 on the same day). Right after the dispatch of the landing party,
contact with the headquarters of the 1st Kure Special Landing Force was restored, and their
situation from the afternoon of the 31st onwards became clear. According to the report, the
front line unit had reached Hunut at 1000 and [further] advanced westward along the coast.
While from that moment on fierce torrential downpours and bad roads had troubled them,
they continued marching on while on the alert. However, because of the rain they actually
avoided being spotted from the enemy positions on the opposite shore [of the bay]. The unit
passed through Waiame at 1430 without meeting with any resistance and reached Suakodo
by 1530. However, because of the heavy rain the wireless radio set[s] had broken down, and
it became impossible to establish contact. Also, the unit following [the front line unit] became
unable to move forward due to fierce shelling from the opposite shore [of the bay] at the
bridge near Waiame and [also] lost contact with the front line unit.(103) At 1600 on the 31st,
the front line unit reached the line of the Weti River and advanced to the attack, intending to
break through the enemy position at a stroke with the Wakabayashi Company on the right
and the 2d Company on the left front. However, fierce enemy counterattacks from positions
at the airfield as well as from the batteries near Ambon city on the opposite shore with
weapons such as trench mortars and machineguns made it difficult to break through. There-
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fore, at 1850 the unit suspended the attack and momentarily retreated as far as Suakodo to
halt there for the night while on the alert and make preparations for the next day.(103)
On the morning of 1 February, contact with the friendly units was restored, but as a result
of a thorough reconnaissance of the enemy positions, it was judged impossible to carry out
a daylight assault with the present strength. So, it was decided to request a bombardment
by friendly aircraft on the enemy positions during the day, and [then] break through the
enemy positions in a night attack on the 1st. While stationed between Suakodo and the Weti
River, the unit made efforts to reconnoiter and learn the movements of the enemy, while try-
ing to make contact with [its fellow units in] the Hitulama area. At 1430 the bulk of the rear
unit as well as a considerable amount of ammunition and provisions arrived. For the dispo-
sition of forces for the night attack it was decided that the Wakabayashi Company should
leave at 2100 and make a detour through the mountains to the north and charge into the
enemy [position] from behind from the highland to the north, while the 2d Company should
launch an attack on the enemy position at 2200. The Wakabayashi Company, which was dis-
patched to the north at 2100 in accordance with this disposition, was [also] ordered that if
the company did not reach the enemy position by midnight, it should make a further detour
in a northwestern direction, refrain from making an assault by daylight on the 2d, and charge
into the enemy position exactly at 0300 on the 3d of February.(103)
The 2d Company organized a suicide squad to destroy the barbed wire entanglements
[of the enemy positions] under the command of Lieutenant Hatakeyama [Kunito], advanced
to the attack at 2200 on the 1st, breached the enemy position north of Tawiri at 0400 on the
2d, and penetrated into a corner of the position. However, after that, fiercely concentrated
enemy fire made it difficult for the company to advance, and the sun rose. The company re-
mained pinned down there until the sunset on the 2d, unable to move either forward or back-
ward. The rear unit (accompanied by Rear Admiral Hatakeyama [Kōichirō]) also [tried] to
advance toward the breach before sunrise in order to cover the 2d Company, but fierce
[enemy] gunfire totally cut it off from the latter. In the meantime, Rear Admiral Hatakeyama
dispatched Commander Ieki and tried to have him inspect the front, but an enemy trench
mortar shell killed the commander around 0800. Rear Admiral Hatakeyama, after requesting
the air units as well as the 2d Escort Unit to bomb and shell the enemy positions to the north
of the airfield, decided to suspend the attack at 1200 to rearrange his force. On that day, from
around 0800 till around 1630, friendly attack planes and reconnaissance seaplanes continu-
ously bombed the enemy positions, and naval gunfire from the sea was added to it in the af-
ternoon. Although considerable confusion was seen at the enemy positions and white flags
were spotted at places on the Laha airfield, the main force of the enemy still had a strong
will to fight and kept fiercely firing at the Japanese forces. From the night of the 1st till the
morning of the 2d, the Wakabayashi Company did so far not show up at the rear of the enemy
position, and no contact was established with the company either.(103)
The rear unit, which had been prevented from advancing, retreated to the neighborhood
of Suakodo at 2200 on the night of the 2d, after sustaining a loss of about twenty men includ-
ing Commander Ieki killed and about forty men injured. In the meantime, the assault unit,
led by Lieutenant Hatakeyama [Kunito], which had penetrated a corner of the enemy posi-
tion, also succeeded in extricating themselves at 2300. Although having sustained a loss of
more than a dozen men killed and about twenty men injured, they managed to join the rear
unit, and tried to reorganize. Despite doubts about [the readiness for] an attack on the morn-
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ing of the 3d, the 1st Kure Special Landing Force decided to once again carry out a night at-
tack in concert with the Wakabayashi Company, because that company was supposed to
storm [the airfield] at 0300. It was [also] decided that the 1st Kure Special Landing Force
would leave one platoon to guard the injured and advance to the attack at 0115 on the 3d
under the command of Lieutenant Hatakeyama [Kunito] with all the rest of the force.(103)
At 0215 on the 3d, the point of the advance guard reached the enemy position in Tawiri,
and the engagement was reopened. At 0500, the enemy fire slackened off markedly, and [the
1st Kure Special Landing Force,] without missing an opportunity, carried out an all-out attack
and broke through the Tawiri position at a blow, and charged into the area around the Laha
pier by 0530. This brought about that the enemy troops soon raised white flags and offered
a general surrender. At 0615, the 1st Kure Special Landing Force raised a naval flag at a north-
ern part of the airfield and completely seized the airfield at 0630; Rear Admiral Hatakeyama
[Kōichirō] then also entered the airfield. Meanwhile, the Wakabayashi Company, whose ad-
vance had experienced immense difficulties because its detour had taken it through a large
and densely forested region that had consumed more time than expected, charged into the
airfield from the rear of the enemy at 0600 on the 3d. Another company of the Army that had
been dispatched overland from the Paso area for support reached Laha on the evening of the
3d.(54)
The operations of the Itō Detachment that had landed in Rutung had gone smoothly after
the landing. That is, at 2030 on the 31st, the detachment had forced 800 enemy troops in Paso
to surrender, had occupied Halong at 0500 on the 1st, and Detachment Commander Itō had
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entered into the urban area of Ambon at 1000 on the 1st. After that, the detachment had at-
tacked the enemy in the hilly areas southwest [of the city], seized Amahusu and Mt. Nona
by the early morning of the 2d, and had forced the surrender of the whole enemy army in
the area of Eri by 0630 on the next day, the 3d. The loss sustained by the Itō Detachment in
that area was 55 men killed and 135 men injured.(104) On the other hand, the loss sustained
by the 1st Kure Special Landing Force was 40 men killed (including Commander Ieki and
three platoon commanders) and 50 men seriously injured; the casualties with serious injuries
or more amounted to 12% of its total strength of 750 men.(103)
Having seized the airfield (about 1,300 meters long and 100 meters wide), the 1st Kure
Special Landing Force with one element of its force immediately started clearing the obstacles
and repairing the destroyed parts and together with the advance base personnel of the
Eleventh Air Fleet, which had advanced in its wake, worked hard to put it back into service.
As a result, it was expected that the airfield would be available for a few fighter planes from
the next day, the 4th, onwards (two planes advanced on the 4th). From the afternoon on the
3d onwards, the 1st Kure Special Landing Force started mopping up the enemy in the area
of Cape Alang with its main force, and completed the cleanup operation after having all the
remnants of the enemy surrender by around 7 February.(103)
Minesweeping Delayed
In the meantime at sea, Minesweepers Nos. 7, 8 and 12 from Rutung, and Minesweepers Nos.
9 and 11 from Hitulama had assembled at the entrance of Ambon Bay by 0700 on the 1st,
completing preparations for clearing [the bay] of mines. However, the Laha airfield and the
batteries on the southern coast had not yet been seized, which prevented the minesweepers
from entering into the bay and kept them there on standby. During that period, the Army
unit requested the rapid sweeping of Ambon Bay in order to speed up the disembarkation
of its matériel in the area of Paso (it was difficult to enter into Baguala Bay due to the risk of
mines). Furthermore, the special landing forces were in a situation that needed strong support
from sea. At 0800 on the 2d, 2d Escort Unit Commander Rear Admiral Tanaka ordered the
21st Minesweeper Division and the 15th Destroyer Division to launch the scheduled
minesweeping, while watching out for gunfire from land. The 21st Minesweeper Division
immediately entered the bay and started a single-ship minesweeping maneuver ([i.e.] sweep-
ing mines by extending sweeping wires from both sides of a ship) while the 15th Destroyer
Division followed in its wake and covered it with gunfire and machinegun fire against enemy
coastal positions. At 1030, the minesweeper division advanced as far as the line connecting
Amahusu and Laha, where it snagged a mine for the first time, after which the division cut
and disposed of fifteen mines by 1200. However, when the division was about to further ad-
vance into the area off Ambon [city], mines successively touched the paravanes of
Minesweepers No. 11 and No. 12 and exploded. The explosions caused a leak at the stern of
Minesweeper No. 12 and engine trouble to Minesweeper No. 11. Then at 1400, Minesweeper
No. 9 hit a mine and sank. When this was reported to 2d Escort Unit Commander Rear Ad-
miral Tanaka, he immediately called off the sweeping operation by the minesweepers and
switched to a small-scale minesweeping operation by large motorized [landing] craft (an op-
eration where small shallow-draft boats or small motorized vessels would tug compact and
simple minesweeping devices to snag mines and blow them up).
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Meanwhile, the 8th Destroyer Division had been discussing the disembarkation [of per-
sonnel and matériel] of the Army at Paso. In the end, a minesweeping operation was
launched by means of a small minesweeping unit consisting of a motor launch and four small
motorized [landing] craft from 1020 on the 2d onwards. It reached Paso at 1215 and success-
fully established a communication route for small boats. The unit swept the waters down to
five meters deep, but snagged no mines. On that day, there were no enemy attacks from the
air or appearances of [enemy] submarines, except for one enemy flying boat that was spotted
in the southern part of Ambon Bay around 1440. 
On 3 February, the 21st Minesweeper Division off Ambon city carried out a small-scale
minesweeping operation on the waters in front of the urban area using its motor launch with
the support of [a] large motorized [landing] craft and disposed of three mines. However, be-
cause they only performed a few sweeps, the sweeping was far from thorough. To make mat-
ters worse, the damage survey of Minesweepers Nos. 11 and 12 resulted in the conclusion
228 Chapter V     /     The Forward Push of the Air Bases
Convoy drifting point
small-scale mine sweeping by
21wg on 2.3~4 and 16dg on 2.4
16dg cdr’s plan of joint small-scale 
minesweeping area on 2.4
Area cleared by 2.7 
(main waterways)
Kaitetu












































Joint small-scale minesweeping 














































Illustration No. 21 — The Invasion of Ambon and the Minesweeping
that both were crippled beyond an emergency repair of the engines. Meanwhile, at 1500 on
the 3d, the 8th Destroyer Division reached the entrance of Ambon Bay, escorting the 1st Ech-
elon [of the transport convoy]. However, because the anchorage in front of the urban area of
Ambon was not yet completely swept, [the echelon] could not enter into the anchorage and
perforce started the disembarkation by shipping the freight in landing craft from the vicinity
of Portuguese Bay in the outer bay area to the urban area of Ambon.
From 1000 on 4 February onwards, the warships launched a small-scale minesweeping
operation with boats and completed clearing the anchorage south of Laha at 1500, with no
tethered mines found. It was concluded that no mines had been laid, so the Navy transport
ships entered the anchorage one after another and started disembarkation right in front of
the airfield. [However,] because the anchorage in front of the urban area of Ambon (hereafter
called Ambon port) had a wide waterway leading to it with many tethered mines, it would
take [the Navy] much time to clear it of mines, which kept the Army transport ships still
standing by near Portuguese Bay. 
From 5 February onwards, under the command of the captain of the destroyer Sazanami,
[the naval vessels] jointly formed a number of small-scale minesweeping units and went on
with the minesweeping of Ambon port. After snagging five mines on that day, fourteen mines
on the 6th, and nine mines on the 7th, they completed clearing Ambon port on the morning
of the 8th. After this operation, five Army transport ships and the Katsuragi-maru (with the
base matériel of Tōkō Air Group on board) were finally allowed to enter the port at 1430. Af-
terwards, the operation of the joint small-scale minesweeping units continued until 10 Feb-
ruary, and was finally completed after disposing of forty-two mines in total. During that
period, on the 9th, one requisitioned merchantman struck a mine and sank in the yet-to-be-
swept waters south of the swept waterways. 
The Operations of the 2d Air Unit (See Illustration No. 22) 
As previously told [p. 221], at 1130 on 26 January, the flagship Chitose departed from the Sala -
bangka Channel (north of Kendari). At 1500 on the next day the 27th, the ship arrived at the
Bangka anchorage,(68) where she provided direct escort in the air above the convoy and patrol
against submarines until 1900 on the 29th; thereafter she headed for Sula Mangoli Strait.(71,
72) Meanwhile, the Mizuho provided guard on the sailing route ahead of the 1st Section of the
15th Destroyer Division, the 21st Minesweeper Division and the 1st Subchaser Division,
which left Kendari at 0730 on the 29th, while [also] providing them with patrol against sub-
marines. Then at 0940, the ship departed from the Salabankga anchorage for Sula Mangoli
Strait along with Patrol Boats Nos. 34 and 39 and six fishing boats, and joined the Chitose
south of Sula Mangoli Island at 1000 on the 30th.(68)
On the 30th, the 2d Air Unit provided direct escort in the air above the convoy sailing
southward at a point southeast of Sula Mangoli [Island], while escorting it against enemy
submarines, guarding its sailing route ahead, and conducting a reconnaissance attack on
Namlea. During these operations, the unit strafed and seriously damaged one Lockheed
Hudson and one PBY flying boat at Namlea, and further drove away mid-sized enemy attack
plane[s], which came for reconnoitering the echelon at 1320.(68, 71)
On the evening of that day, the ships left Sula Mangoli for Kelang Bay (to the west of
Ceram) and arrived there at 0550 on the next day the 31st.(68)
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Illustration No. 22 — The Outline of the Operations of the 2d Air Unit in the Ambon Operation
On the 31st (the day of the landing operation [on Ambon]), the unit provided direct escort
against [enemy] submarines as well as direct escort in the air above the convoy, while search-
ing for the enemy in the Banda Sea ([the aircraft assigned to the latter] turned back due to
bad weather). During these operations, no enemy was spotted other than one plane, which
the aircraft assigned to the 1st shift of the direct escort in the air above [the convoy spotted,]
pursued without knowing whether it was friend or foe and lost sight of. On the morning of
that day, as previously told [p. 226], the weather was quite bad on Ambon and the surround-
ing waters, and it was not possible to carry out air operations. 
On the 1st and the 2d of February, the unit carried out a search for the enemy in the Banda
Sea, provided the convoy with guard against enemy submarines as well as in the air above,
while supporting the land combat with its full force. The unit dropped 137 60-kg bombs using
a total of about 70 aircraft on the 1st, and on the 2d 251 60-kg bombs, using a total of about
70 aircraft on the enemy positions near the Laha airfield as well as on the batteries [near the
city of] Ambon, and neutralized the enemy.(68, 71) Also from the 3d of February until the 6th,
the unit searched for the enemy on the Banda Sea, while providing guard against enemy sub-
marines as well as enemy aircraft day after day. During this period, no enemy was spotted
other than one PBY flying boat, which had come for a raid on the 5th, but was shot down by
friendly aircraft.(71) At 1500 on the 3d, the Mizuho, Patrol Boat No. 39 as well as three guard
ships left the Kelang anchorage, headed for Kendari to participate in the Makassar opera-
tion.(68) Meanwhile, the Chitose left the Kelang anchorage at 1900 on the 3d, headed for Piru
Bay (to the north of Ambon). After carrying out operations [while stationed] at Piru Bay, she
discontinued the Ambon operation at 1730 on the 6th, left the bay at 1845 along with Patrol
Boats Nos. 34 and 38 and headed for a point southeast of Selayar Island (to the south of
Celebes) in order to participate in the Makassar operation.
The Engagements of the Land-Based Air Units(68, 71, 81) 
From 24 January onwards, the land-based air units continued their operation to search for
the enemy in the Banda Sea and conduct reconnaissance attacks on the airfields on Ambon
and Namlea [Buru], while directly escorting the convoy from the air after its sortie, with large
flying boats of the Tōkō Air Group, land-based attack planes of the Kanoya Air Group De-
tachment and the 1st Air Group, Type–0 fighter planes and land-based reconnaissance planes
of the 3d Air Group, along with the carrier-based bombers and Type–0 fighter planes of the
force dispatched from the 2d Carrier Division. By the 30th, the unit had destroyed most of
the enemy military facilities in that area and also virtually driven off all existing enemy air-
craft. During that period, no enemy naval vessels appeared at all. Meanwhile on 27 January,
the 21st Air Flotilla headquarters and the Kanoya Air Group Detachment advanced from
Menado to the Kendari base.(71, 81)
On the 31st (the day of the landing operations), no air campaign was executed due to bad
weather. After the weather improved from the 1st onwards, [the unit] carried out a search
for the enemy operation in the Banda Sea and provided patrol in the air above Ambon. On
the 2d, [the unit] totally destroyed enemy positions in support of the ground combat with
its land-based attack planes. As early as the 4th, two fighter planes advanced to the Laha air-
field, which was followed by one reconnaissance plane and seven fighter planes on the 5th.
From the 7th onwards, the land-based air unit began its reconnaissance over the vicinity with
its land-based reconnaissance planes, while starting preparations for the subsequent opera-
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tions. Meanwhile, the Tōkō Air Group pushed forward three of its flying boats to Ambon. It
was followed by the 1st Air Group, which pushed forward its land-based attack planes to
the Laha airfield, attaining the expected goal of the Ambon operation.(71, 81)
The Formation of the 24th Special Base Force and the Preparations for the Subsequent
Operations
As mentioned previously, the prospective staff members of the 24th Special Base Force head-
quarters had landed along with the 1st Kure Special Landing Force and advanced to the Laha
airfield led by Rear Admiral Hatakeyama [Kōichirō]. On 5 February, the 24th Special Base
Force was [officially] formed and assigned to guard Ambon Island and the surrounding wa-
ters with a strength of about 490 men of the 1st Kure Special Landing Force, the 3d Military
Supplies Department and about 2,000 men of the 3d Construction Squad. From the 10th on-
wards, the force successively took over the guard from the Army Itō Detachment and com-
pleted the takeover on the 16th. It was [also] decided to assign the crippled Minesweepers
Nos. 11 and 12 to the guarding of Ambon and cooperate with the 24th Special Base Force
until ordered otherwise by special order.(107)
In the meantime, the Support Unit, which had stayed at the Bangka anchorage from the
30th onwards, left the anchorage and sailed northward at 1100 on 5 February to return to
Davao for the preparations of the Makassar operation (arriving there at 0800 on the 6th).(78)
Meanwhile, 2d Escort Unit Commander Rear Admiral Tanaka, who had been on the waters
southwest of Buru during the Ambon operation, arrived in the port of Ambon at 1030 on 10
February, leading the Jintsū. Thereafter, the 2d Escort Unit started on the preparations for the
operation against Kupang, while its escort forces, the 8th and the 15th Destroyer Divisions
and others began the preparations for the operations against Makassar.(54)
The Ambon operation was thus completed: During the operation, the 2d Escort Unit sus-
tained a loss of one minesweeper sunk and two half-damaged at sea, while forty men of the
1st Kure Special Landing Force were killed and fifty men seriously injured on land. As for
the 1st Kure Special Landing Force, it reported military gains of 150 enemy abandoned bod-
ies, 250 prisoners, 5 seized tanks, 12 firearms, etc.(54) According to the documents of the allied
forces,(95) the strength of the garrison at that time consisted of about 2,600 men of the Dutch
East Indies army and about 1,100 men of Australian army, about 3,700 men in total.
The action report of the 2d Destroyer Squadron describes its observations and lessons
learned in the operations as follows:
1. Since in this operation the friendly air units gave quite close and well-timed support and the
air campaign to destroy the air power of the enemy had produced sufficient results, the opera-
tion progressed without enemy counterattacks.
2. Although providing [friendly forces] with fire and bombing cover in their ground combat is dif-
ficult because of the risk of friendly fire [accidents], it inflicts an enormous mental blow to the
enemy. Therefore, against a tough enemy, it is necessary to do this vigorously while leaving
enough margin [to avoid mistakes] and specifying the [bombing] zones, thus eliminating the
possibility of friendly fire [accidents].
3. In conducting minesweeping operations in hostile territory, it is required to conduct them in
such a way as to first sweep the sea with special craft (of 0.5-meter draft or lighter), and then
clear the waters with minesweepers.
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For that purpose, it is urgently necessary to build powerful high-speed special minesweepers
as well as to develop [new] minesweeping equipment (both of the cutting mine cables type and
the pair-ship minesweeping type). 
4. In guarding against enemy aircraft, close cooperation between fighter planes assigned to the
direct escort and naval vessels is most required. Since the observation ability of fighter planes
in direct escort is generally quite poor, it is most essential to swiftly inform the aircraft in charge
of the direct escort about enemy planes spotted by the superior observation [ability] from the
vessels. And the best and most certain way [to provide the directly escorting aircraft with infor-
mation about the enemy aircraft] is gunfire from general naval ships. This was keenly felt both
in the Jolo operation as well as in the Ambon operation.
Therefore, when there is [support from] friendly fighter planes, it is necessary to show the
position and direction of the enemy aircraft by swiftly firing some salvos regardless of the firing
range.
8. Operation Z of the Air Units and a Sea Engagement off Java
The Launch of the Operations (See Illustrations No. 23 and No. 24) 
It was decided that the air units, which had deployed in Kendari and Balikpapan, should
immediately launch an air campaign to destroy the enemy air power in the Surabaya area.
The strength of the [Japanese] air units deployed in that area as of the end of January was as
follows:(75, 81)
Eleventh Air Fleet headquarters Davao 
1st Air Raid Unit (21st Air Flotilla) headquarters Kendari 
Kanoya Air Group Detachment 34 land-based attack planes Kendari
1st Air Group 27 land-based attack planes Kendari
Tōkō Air Group 4 large flying boats Kendari
17 large flying boats Menado
3d Air Group 41 Type–0 fighter planes Kendari
6 land-based recon. planes Kendari
Unit dispatched from the 2d Carrier Division 18 carrier-based fighter planes Kendari
8 carrier-based bombers Kendari
2d Air Raid Unit (23d Air Flotilla) headquarters Balikpapan
Tainan Air Group 30 Type–0 fighter planes Balikpapan
3 land-based recon. planes Balikpapan
Unit dispatched from the 2d Carrier Division 9 carrier-based bombers Balikpapan
At that time, the condition of the Kendari airfield was such that it could immediately be used
by a large number of aircraft. However, it took a considerable number of days to ready the
base in Balikpapan. Finally at the end of January, it was ready for a concentrated use by
fighter planes, but land-based attack planes could only use it in small numbers and lightly
loaded.
Operation Orders
At 1650 on 30 January, Southern Task Force Air Unit Commander Vice Admiral Tsukahara
issued his orders, which were in summary as follows:(75)
Chapter V     /     The Forward Push of the Air Bases 233
1. On the 3d and 4th (with the 5th as an alternative date) of February, the unit shall [conduct an
operation to] destroy the enemy air power in eastern Java with its whole force.
2. Deployment of forces
The bulk of the fighter planes shall assemble in Balikpapan and shall be led by the 2d Air Raid
Unit commander. The entire force of the land-based attack planes shall assemble in Kendari and
shall be led by the 1st Air Raid Unit commander.
3. Disposition of forces in the attack
1st Attack Unit Full force of the Takao Air Gp ⎫
⎬ Surabaya and 
1st Fighter Plane Unit Full force of the main unit of the 3d Air Gp ⎭ vicinity
2d Attack Unit Full force of the Kanoya Air Gp Det ⎫
⎬ Madiun (about 80 NM
2d Fighter Plane Unit Half of the Tainan Air Gp ⎭ west of Surabaya)
3d Attack Unit Full force of the 1st Air Gp ⎫
⎬ Malang
3d Fighter Plane Unit Half of the Tainan Air Gp ⎭
The 1st weather reconnaissance plane ([of] the 1st Air Raid Unit) shall reconnoiter the Sunda
Sea, the eastern part of the Java Sea, and at 0700 [the waters] north of Madura.
The 2d weather reconnaissance plane ([of] the 2d Air Raid Unit) shall reconnoiter the eastern
part of the Java Sea, and [the waters] north of Surabaya at the earliest possible hour.
The 1st reconnaissance plane ([of] the 1st Air Raid Unit) shall observe the military gains.
Rescue unit: 2 large flying boats of the Tōkō Air Gp; each aircraft shall take positions near Laut
Island and the Kangean Islands.
4. The time to launch the attack
Day 1: 1200
Day 2: 1100-1330
5. Shifting [of bases] and the command system
The Takao Air Gp (note: [currently] at Jolo) shall shift to Kendari by 2 February, to come under
the command of the 1st Air Raid Unit commander. Also, the main body of the 3d Air Group
shall shift to Balikpapan by 2 February, to come under the command of the 2d Air Raid Unit
commander.
6. Related operations
The 1st Air Raid Unit shall destroy the enemy air power in Timor, the Banda Sea and the Arafura
Sea area with the 2d Carrier Division Unit dispatched to Kendari and 3d Air Group Detachment,
and clear the area of the enemy.
7. This operation shall be called Operation Z only within our unit.
The outline of cooperation between the fighter planes and bombers in this operation was
discussed [and decided] in such a way that [both] should go into action at a fixed time with-
out assembling [beforehand].(12)
Note: The time of sunrise and sunset was at 0730 and around 2000 respectively.
Reconnaissance
On 1 February, the 2d Air Raid Unit Commander Rear Admiral Takenaka conducted a re-
connaissance over eastern Java (Surabaya, Malang, and Madiun) with three land-based re-
connaissance planes of the Tainan Air Group. Although the first reconnaissance plane, which
had headed for Surabaya, went missing without [prior] communication, the second recon-
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naissance plane successfully reconnoitered the Malang area, spotted three B–17s and two
small planes on the airfield as well as in the Madura Strait one vessel, which looked like a
tender ship, and returned. The third reconnaissance plane, which reconnoitered Madiun,
spotted nine large planes and three mid-sized planes on the airfield.(71) In the meantime, the
1st Air Raid Unit searched for the enemy in the Banda Sea and the Sunda Sea with three land-
based attack planes, but spotted no enemy except for five large enemy flying boats, which
were flying toward Surabaya. On the 2d, the unit spotted eighteen flying boats on the
Surabaya seaplane base.(71)
Bombing the Airfields in the Surabaya Area
At 0757 on 3 February, twenty-six land-based attack planes of the Takao Air Group of the 1st
Attack Unit under the command of Lt. Cdr. Nonaka Tarō took off from the Kendari base and
headed for the Surabaya airfield for an attack. At 1220, the unit carried out a bombing of the
airfield as well as the port facilities and reported that all bombs had hit their targets and that
one out of four moored flying boats had been sunk. Although the unit engaged with four
enemy fighter planes in the air from [the beginning of] the bombing till 1230, there were no
military gains or losses [in the air combat]. After the attack, the 1st and the 2d Squadrons re-
turned to Balikpapan (as had been specified in the plan of operations), and the 3d Squadron
to Kendari, all without damage. Twenty-seven land-based attack planes of the Kanoya Air
Group of the 2d Attack Unit under the command of Lt. Cdr. Irisa Toshiié took off from
Kendari at 0710 for Madiun. At 1225, the unit carried out a bombing of the airfield and the
area of the hangars and barracks, reporting a military gain of [damaging] two [buildings]
and one large plane, [both of] which had been set ablaze, and seriously damaging two mid-
sized planes (the unit spotted ten large planes and two mid-sized planes on the ground and
two small planes in the course of taking off). The unit also engaged with five enemy fighter
planes in the air, which came for an attack after the bombing, and reported shooting down
two of them (one of which was unconfirmed). All aircraft returned to the Kendari airfield
(five of them marked by bullets). Also, nineteen land-based attack planes of the 1st Air Group
of the 3d Attack Unit, led by Lt. Cdr. Ozaki Takeo, took off from Kendari at 0630. The unit
bombed Malang at 1210 and reported seriously damaging one large plane (out of six planes
it spotted on the ground) and scoring direct hits on two warehouses as well as an antiaircraft
artillery position, after which all aircraft returned to Kendari without damage. The unit fur-
ther reported around 1350 on its way back [to Kendari] having spotted at Madura two bat-
tleships, one Class–A cruiser and two Class–B cruisers and nine destroyers at anchor.
Destroying the Enemy Fighter Plane Units(71) 
At 0930, twenty-seven Type–0 fighter planes and two land-based reconnaissance planes of
the 3d Air Group of the 1st Fighter Plane Unit took off from Balikpapan led by Lt. Yokoyama
Tamotsu. [The unit] rushed into [the air over] Surabaya, and reported military gains of shoot-
ing down fifteen Curtis-Wright fighter planes, three P–36 fighter planes (one of which with
unconfirmed results), four P–40 fighter planes (one of which [also] with unconfirmed results),
four flying boats, nine Buffalo fighter planes, and four Hawker Hurricane fighter planes, to-
taling thirty-nine planes, as well as seriously damaging one B–17 and four flying boats, and
[also damaging] fourteen flying boats, which had caught fire. Although three Type–0 fighter
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Illustration No. 23 — The Shift of the Bases of the Air Units (11 January – 6 February, 1942)
planes and one land-based reconnaissance plane went missing, all other Japanese planes re-
turned to Balikpapan without problems (of the latter, three Type–0 fighter planes were
marked by bullets). [Also,] seventeen Type–0 fighter planes and one land-based reconnais-
sance plane of the Tainan Air Group of the 2d Fighter Plane Unit, led by Lt. Asai Masao, took
off from Balikpapan at 0900. [The unit] rushed into [the air over] Madiun at 1230. Reporting
military gains of shooting down two and destroying four [enemy planes], all planes returned
to Balikpapan without damage. [Meanwhile,] fourteen Type–0 fighter planes and one land-
based reconnaissance plane of the Tainan Air Group of the 3d Fighter Plane Unit, led by Lt.
Shingō Hideki, took off from Balikpapan at 0915, rushed into [the air over] Malang, and re-
ported military gains of damaging one B–17, one twin-engine flying boat, five four-engine
planes, one twin-engine plane and one small plane, which were destroyed or had been set
ablaze, by strafing [those on the ground] or in air combat. Other than one Type–0 fighter
plane, which crashed itself, the unit returned to Balikpapan (seven of which were marked
by bullets).
At 2350 on the 3d, Eleventh Air Fleet Commander in Chief Vice Admiral Tsukahara re-
ported the military gains of that day as sixty-two planes being confirmed results (shot down
or set ablaze), and twenty-three or twenty-four planes being unconfirmed results (heavily
damaged by strafing or shot down but unconfirmed), totaling eighty-five aircraft.(54) The loss
sustained on the Japanese side was one Type–0 fighter plane, which crashed itself, and three
Type–0 fighter planes and one land-based reconnaissance plane, which did not return, total-
ing five aircraft. This attack surprised the enemy to such a degree that, having no idea of
where the Japanese fighter planes had flown from, they [even] assumed that the Japanese
had conducted the raid from the south, using aircraft carriers.(108) Air Unit Commander Vice
Admiral Tsukahara [then] issued an order concerning the attacks on the following day, the
4th, ordering that the Kendari Unit should attack the enemy fleet (which had been spotted
by the attack [plane] unit of the 1st Air Group), while the Balikpapan Unit should continue
Operation Z.(75)
Destroying an Enemy Fleet off Java
As previously told, on 3 February on its way back from the attack on Malang the land-based
attack plane unit of the 1st Air Group had spotted two enemy battleships, one Class–A
cruiser, two Class–B cruisers and nine destroyers at anchor off Madura Island around 1350.
(As a result of a review after its return [to base], the “battleships” in that report were amended
to “Class–A cruisers.”) Air Unit Commander Vice Admiral Tsukahara decided to immediately
conduct a probe and an early morning search for the enemy, and to attack the enemy fleet
with the full force of the land-based attack planes on the following day, the 4th.(12) However,
with regard to the attacks by the land-based attack planes on the 4th, the Air Unit commander
issued an order at 2330 [on the 3d] that eighteen land-based attack planes of the Takao Air
Group at Balikpapan should continue Operation Z.(75)
At 1900 on the 3d, one land-based attack plane of the 1st Air Group took off to probe the
enemy, but [shortly] returned due to trouble with its telegraph. Then it was decided that two
large flying boats of the Tōkō Air Group at Kendari should take off, but this was delayed
due to bad weather; one took off at 2245 and the other at 2315. One of them spotted three
large enemy cruisers and two destroyers at 0410 (the report of the sighting did not reach [the
base] before 0530) and continued tailing them until 0600, returning [to base] at 0945. The
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other plane spotted one large enemy cruiser and four destroyers at 0537, tailed them until
0630 and returned [to base] at 1055.(71)
In line with the plan that the land-based attack planes should [start] searching for the
enemy if no report on the enemy movements from the flying boats had been received by
0530 on 4 February, four land-based attack planes of the Takao Air Group at Balikpapan and
one land-based attack plane of the Kanoya Air Group at Kendari were deployed to search
for the enemy and took off from their respective airfields at 0735 and 0600.(81) The plane of
the Kanoya Air Group returned to Kendari at 1345 without spotting the enemy, while three
out of four land-based attack planes of the Takao Air Group returned [to Balikpapan] due to
bad weather. However at 1005, the last aircraft spotted one cruiser, one destroyer and two
armed merchantmen at a point 80 nautical miles 93º [E] from Surabaya. After tailing them
and reporting on them until 1130, the aircraft further searched for the enemy and in the end
spotted another enemy fleet ([consisting of] five cruisers and five destroyers) at 1305. It tailed
them and reported on them until 1317 before returning to base at 1530.(71) Meanwhile, on the
basis of the report that the enemy had been spotted, twenty-seven land-based attack planes
of the Kanoya Air Group (led by Lieutenant Commander Irisa), nine land-based attack planes
of the Takao Air Group (led by Lt. Yokomizo Kōshirō) and twenty-four land-based attack
planes of the 1st Air Group (led by Lieutenant Commander Ozaki), which had already taken
off from the Kendari base around 0800 and were heading toward Surabaya, immediately
rushed toward the enemy fleet.
At 1115, the land-based attack plane unit of the Kanoya Air Group spotted an [enemy]
fleet consisting of two Java–class cruisers, one De Ruyter–class cruiser, one Marblehead–class
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cruiser, and five destroyers (two of the latter being Tromp–class) [sailing] (at a speed of
twenty-four knots on a southeastern course) at a point thirty nautical miles south of the
Kangean Islands and attacked it. [The unit] reported the following military gains: The 1st
Squadron ([led by] Lieutenant Commander Irisa) bombed the 1st ship at 1140, which was
half damaged by two near hits at the stern, while the 2d Squadron ([led by] Lt. Morita Rinji)
dropped bombs at the 2d ship at 1129, two of which hit the ship at the fore and at midship,
causing an explosion near the engine around 1132. [The second] bombing at the 1st ship had
no results, while the 2d ship sank at 1153. The 3d Squadron ([led by] Lt. Tanaka Takekatsu)
dropped bombs at the 3d ship at 1138, [one of] which fell at 100 meters from the side; the
ship was half damaged by two bombs which fell close to the stern. At 1157, the bombing of
the 1st ship scored one direct hit at the fore, another at the aft, and four nearby hits, [which
caused] damage to the rudder. [After] one explosion near the fore turret around 1200, the
flagship USS Houston sank at 1215. Then, all aircraft (of which thirteen planes were marked
by bullets) returned to Kendari between 1425 and 1500.(71, 81)
Nine land-based attack planes of the Takao Air Group spotted a combined fleet of U.S.
and Dutch naval forces at 1135, and carried out a bombing at 1141 for the first time and at
1149 for the second time. However, because the enemy took large evasive actions at high
speed, the unit scored no direct hits. During [the engagement], at 1152 the 3d plane of the 3d
Flight crashed itself after being hit by enemy antiaircraft fire; the others returned to Kendari
at 1416 without damage.(71)
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Type–1 Land-based Attack Plane 
Type–96 Land-based Attack Plane
Twenty-four land-based attack planes of the 1st Air Group spotted a 5,000t-class transport
ship escorted by two destroyers on the waters off Makassar and reported it at 1110 (they were
later attacked by carrier-based bombers of the 2d Carrier Division). Then at 1240, [the unit]
spotted two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers and seven destroyers sailing in a disorderly
formation about ten nautical miles south of Sepanjang Island. Launching an attack on the
fleet from 1330 onwards, the unit reported having sunk one De Ruyter–class cruiser and hav-
ing caused considerable damage to one Marblehead–class cruiser and one Java–class cruiser.
The unit returned to Kendari between 1630 and 1730. Three planes of the unit were marked
by bullets.(71)
First Air Raid Unit Commander Rear Admiral Tada reported the military gains in these
attacks in his preliminary operation report as follows:(81)
The results of the attacks on the enemy fleet today, the 4th, are as follows:
Of the enemy fleet consisting of two Java–class [cruisers], one De Ruyter–class [cruiser], one Mar-
blehead–class [cruiser], and seven destroyers (two of the latter were assumed to be Tromp–class),
one Java–class [cruiser] was instantly sunk ([by] two direct hits of regular No. 25 bombs), and
one De Ruyter–class [cruiser] was seriously damaged by two direct hits of regular No. 25 bombs
and a number of near hits. She caught fire, and stopped for a while. [However,] after [success-
fully] putting out the flames one hour later, she sailed without sinking, trailing a large amount
of spilt heavy oil.
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Kanoya Air Group (KAN)
1st Air Group (1AGp)
Takao Air Group (TAK)
Tainan Air Group (TAI)













































































































Illustration No. 24 — Operation Z and the Sea Engagement off Java
One Sumatra–class [destroyer] was directly hit by a No. 6 regular bomb and nearly hit by
two No. 25 bombs and for a while belched out black-brown smoke. Though the fire was put
out, she was heavily damaged. One (Marblehead–class) light cruiser was directly hit by a No. 25
bomb at [one of] its turrets and nearly hit by another No. 25 bomb, [both of] which caused con-
siderable damage.
Meanwhile, one transport ship ([of] about 5,000 tons) heading for Makassar escorted by two
gunboats was set ablaze and destroyed by carrier-based bombers of the 2d Carrier Division.
The 1st Air Raid Unit commander decided to have [some] large flying boats of the Tōkō Air
Group try as hard as possible to tail the enemy fleet on the night of the 4th, in order to resume
the attack on the next day, the 5th, and completely destroy the enemy.(81) Accordingly, one
large flying boat took off from Kendari at 1533 on the 4th, but did see no enemy fleet other
than spotting one merchantman in flames (accompanied by two destroyers; the one attacked
by the carrier-based bombers of the 2d Carrier Division) to the south of Makassar at 1730.
Another flying boat took off at 1820 and searched for the enemy around the Lombok Strait
at 2345, but returned due to bad weather without finding the enemy.(71) Thereafter, [all] sorties
were suspended due to bad weather, and the chance to tail the enemy fleet was completely
lost. Also, the attack of [Operation] Z by the Balikpapan Unit on the 4th was not carried out
due to bad weather and was postponed to the 5th.(75)
The Second Attack of [Operation] Z 
On 5 February, the unit at the Balikpapan [base] carried out the second attack of [Operation]
Z.(71) On that day, because it was expected that enemy fighter planes would be advanced to
Bali in connection with an evacuation of the enemy fleet, one element of the attack was di-
rected to the Bali airfield.
At 0820, twenty-seven Type–0 fighter planes ([led by] Lieutenant. Shingō) and one land-
based reconnaissance plane of the Tainan Air Group took off from Balikpapan, dashed [into
the air over] Surabaya at 1115; the reconnaissance plane immediately headed back. The Type–
0 fighter plane unit was engaged in air combat and strafing until 1150. After reporting mili-
tary gains of shooting down four [enemy] fighter planes and one flying boat, damaging one
flying boat that was set ablaze, destroying one reconnaissance seaplane, and damaging two
large four-engine planes that had belched out black smoke, all returned [to base] (four of
them marked by bullets).
Eleven Type–0 fighter planes ([led by] Sublt. Yamaguchi Sadao) and a land-based recon-
naissance plane of the 3d Air Group took off from Balikpapan at 0915, and entered [into the
air over] Surabaya at 1145. After reporting [military gains of] shooting down one flying boat
and two P–36s, and damaging two flying boats, which had been set ablaze, between 1200
and 1300, all returned [to base].
Eighteen land-based attack planes of the Takao Air Group ([led by] Lt. Adachi Jirō; after
the attack on the 3d the unit had moved to Balikpapan) attacked the Surabaya airfield, having
left Balikpapan at 0820. Having dropped their full load of bombs ([totaling] 108 60-kg bombs)
at 1120, hitting the facilities of the airfield, all [aircraft] returned to Balikpapan without dam-
age.
Ten Type–0 fighter planes ([led by] Lt. Hasuo Ryūichi) and one land-based reconnaissance
plane of the 3d Air Group left Balikpapan at 0835 and entered into the air over Denpasar
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([on] Bali Island) at 1125. After reporting having shot down in air combat until 1200 eleven
P–14s (two of them unconfirmed), all returned [to base]. Only one aircraft had bullet marks.
It was concluded that in the first and the second attacks of Operation Z, almost all of the
enemy aircraft stationed in the Surabaya area had been destroyed.(81)
Letting the Remnant of the Enemy Fleet Slip by
At 0700 on the 5th, three land-based attack planes took off from Kendari and searched for
the enemy on the waters south of Lombok Strait.(81) After spotting one surfaced [enemy] sub-
marine at 0950, the 1st search plane spotted one badly damaged Class–A cruiser, four de-
stroyers and one transport ship at a point 150 nautical miles 243º [WSW] from Bali. The plane
tailed them until 1300 and returned to base at 1650.(71) However, the transmission of this sight-
ing of the enemy did not reach the attack units of the Kanoya Air Group or the Takao Air
Group.(75) Meanwhile, at 1200, the 2d search plane had spotted one Marblehead–class cruiser
and one 5,000t-class transport ship sailing eastward at 10 nautical miles south of Sumbawa.
The plane tailed them until 1230 and returned to the base at 1410. However, the transmission
of this sighting of the enemy did not reach the attack units, either.(75)
Twenty-three land-based attack planes of the Kanoya Air Group ([led by] Lieutenant Com-
mander Irisa) took off from Kendari at 0815 along with the eight land-based attack planes of
the Takao Air Group ([led by] Lieutenant Yokomizo) and in concert with the search unit
headed for an attack on the enemy fleet. However, unable to detect enemy movements, [both]
units reversed course at 1200 and headed for the Jimbaran airfield on Bali. After bombing
the airfield from 1228 till 1249 (there were one large, seven mid-sized and ten small aircraft
on the ground) and reporting having damaged three mid-sized aircraft, which had been set
ablaze, and destroying three mid-sized and four small aircraft, all returned to the Kendari
airfield without damage.(71) Meanwhile, twenty-three land-based attack planes of the 1st Air
Group ([led by] Lieutenant Commander Ozaki) took off from Kendari at 0835 and spotted
one Marblehead–class [cruiser] and one transport ship sailing eastward at a point ten nautical
miles south of Sumbawa at 1220. From 1300 through 1350, the unit bombed the enemy at a
low altitude (900 – 1,500 meters) despite fierce enemy defensive fire, bad weather and treach-
erous air currents. However in the end, due to the treacherous air currents, the unit could
not score direct hits on the enemy. In this attack, the right engine of the plane of the com-
mander stalled due to enemy hits, and he had to fly back to base on only one engine. Al-
though seven other planes were [also] hit, all aircraft returned to Kendari by 1845.(71)
On the 6th, a search and attack mission was conducted with as many as fifty-three land-
based attack planes, but in the end they failed to spot the enemy fleet. On that day at 1600,
[the Navy Department of] IGHQ made the following announcement:(109)
During [the mission to] search for the enemy fleet on 4 February, following the air operation to
destroy the air forces of the Dutch East Indies on the previous day, the air unit of the Imperial
Japanese Navy spotted the main force of the enemy fleet accompanied by several destroyers on
the waters thirty nautical miles south of the Kangean Islands in the Java Sea. Without missing
an opportunity, the unit fiercely attacked [the enemy fleet], and during an engagement of several
hours, it instantly sank one enemy cruiser of the Dutch Java–class and seriously damaged the
Dutch cruiser De Ruyter, which sank before long; it [also] caused some damage to one Dutch
Java–class cruiser as well as one U.S. Marblehead–class cruiser, and sank one enemy 5,000t-class
ship. In this sea engagement, the enemy fleet, which had been operating in the western Pacific
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from the opening of hostilities, the main force of the Dutch East Indies fleet in particular, has in
effect been virtually destroyed. In this sea engagement, we lost one aircraft. 
(NB: This sea engagement shall be called the Sea Engagement off Java.)
A Review of the Course of the Engagement
By comparing the Japanese materials(71, 81) with The Rising Sun in the Pacific [(History of the
United States Naval Operation in WWII), pp. 298-303] by [Samuel] Morison, the course of events
in the engagement may be reconstructed as follows:*
On 3 February, the enemy fleet had assembled in the Banda** anchorage at Madura Island.
The forces consisted of the Dutch light cruiser HNLMS De Ruyter, the U.S. heavy cruiser USS
Houston, the U.S. light cruiser USS Marblehead, the Dutch light cruiser HNLMS Tromp, the
U.S. destroyer USS Stewart, the U.S. destroyer USS [John D.] Edwards, the U.S. destroyer USS
Barker, the U.S. destroyer USS Bulmer, the U.S. destroyer USS Paul Jones, the U.S. destroyer
USS Pillsbury, the U.S. destroyer USS Whipple, the U.S. Oiler USS Pecos, and a Dutch destroyer
unit. [Editor’s note: According to Dutch sources, the last four mentioned ships were not pres-
ent. The Dutch destroyers were HNLMS Banckert, HNLMS Piet Hein, and HNLMS Van Ghent.]
At 0130 on 4 February, the Dutch commander, Rear Admiral Doorman, left the Bundan
anchorage, leading a combined striking force in order to intercept the Japanese units that
were about to advance into the Makassar Strait to seize either Makassar or Banjarmasin (they
were then assembling at Kendari). The force headed for the Makassar Strait with the flagship
HNLMS De Ruyter in the lead, followed by the USS Houston, the USS Marblehead, the HNLMS
Tromp in that order, and guarded by four U.S. destroyers on the flanks, as well as by four
[three] Dutch destroyers at the rear.
Since Rear Admiral Doorman had sent out a warning at 1105 that thirty-seven [Japanese]
land-based attack planes were heading for Surabaya, the USS Marblehead dumped more than
4,000 gallons of aviation gasoline that was stacked on the deck into the sea. At 1115, the land-
based attack plane unit of the Kanoya Air Group and the Takao Air Group spotted the U.S.-
Dutch fleet at thirty nautical miles south of the Kangean Islands. At 1120, Lieutenant
Commander Irisa, commander of the attack unit gave the order to attack, and the attack
planes in formations of nine planes each and at an altitude of 4,000 meters and a speed of
150 knots entered upon a bombing course aimed at HNLMS De Ruyter and USS Houston. At
the first try, they lost the opportunity to drop bombs due to the high-speed evasive move-
ments [of the enemy ships] and they flew over the ships. On the second try they again flew
over. Then, on the third try, they attacked from 1129 till 1149, but [still] could not damage the
fleet. (Note: Although the Morita Squadron reported sinking USS Houston, and the Tanaka
Squadron half-damaging USS Marblehead, and the Irisa Squadron half-damaging HNLMS De
Ruyter, Morison’s The Rising Sun in the Pacific has no record of any bomb damage.) During
that attack, one of the land-based attack planes of the Takao Air Group was hit by antiaircraft
fire from the USS Marblehead and crashed itself.
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* The author does not make a clear distinction between the passages from Morison which he summarizes and
those which he quotes directly. Here the directly quoted passages are given as in the original and put within
quotation marks.
** Morison has Bunda. Dutch sources only mention that the fleet was assembled at the Gili Islands off the southeast
coast of Madura. Bunda should probably read as Bundan, a place on the island of Giligentis.
At 1157 in the second attack, the Tanaka Squadron bombed the USS Marblehead from the
[port] quarter. Fourteen 250-kg bombs were dropped over the target scoring two direct and
four near hits. One of the direct hits “crashed through the starboard motor launch, pierced
the deck, and exploded below, wiping out the sick bay, demolishing the wardroom and near-
by cabins, and blowing a 6-foot hole in the deck. Fires broke out all over the stricken section.”
Another direct hit at the stern pierced “the main deck and exploded in the hand-steering
compartment.” With this [explosion], “all living quarters in that part of the ship were gutted
and leaks started.” Although the fires in the after part were extinguished soon, “the rudder
jammed hard left and the ship started steaming in circles with a 10-degree list to starboard.”
The attack caused a loss of “15 killed or mortally wounded, and 34, including the executive
officer” injured. Furthermore, the bow was also damaged by a near hit. 
At 1240, the 1st Air Group unit attacked HNLMS De Ruyter (reporting a military gain of
sinking the ship). [According to Morison, only] “her antiaircraft fire control [was] knocked
out” and disabled in this attack. In the last of four attacks, the 1st Air Group unit scored a di-
rect hit on the USS Houston. The 250-kg bomb “exploded on her main deck, [and] killed some
fifty men.” The shrapnel of the bomb which “knocked out the after gun turret,” “pierced the
turret in a hundred places and set fire to the powder” and blew up the turret. The crew of
the turret and “turret 3, except for two men, were all burned to death.” [The author seems to
think that the “after gun turret” and “turret 3” were different turrets. In fact, they are the
same turret.] The damage sustained in this engagement by both sides was as follows:
HNLMS De Ruyter: Serious damage to her antiaircraft fire control system (attacked by the
1st Air Gp)
USS Houston: Serious damage to her after gun turret (attacked by the 1st Air Gp)
USS Marblehead: Fires at the fore part; damage to the bow; rudder trouble (attacked by
Kanoya Air Gp)
Japanese aircraft: One land-based attack plane crashed itself, sixteen sustained hits
In this sea engagement, no torpedo attacks were conducted due to various reasons; in reality
the Navy was not able to sink even a single ship. The allied fleet repaired to Cilacap on 8
February. Since her after gun turret was destroyed, USS Houston was assigned for the time
being to escort important convoys between Port Darwin and Timor. Meanwhile, after having
her bottom temporarily repaired at Cilacap and after a further temporary repair at Ceylon,
USS Marblehead sailed westward to enter on 5 April the U.S. Naval dockyard in Brooklyn
(southeast of New York).
Related Operations
The major related operations conducted from 1 February onwards from the Kendari and the
Balikpapan bases were [in summary] as follows.(71) (The Ambon operation has been previ-
ously described.)
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A Change in Deployment
Having destroyed the bulk of the enemy aircraft in the Surabaya area with the first and sec-
ond attacks of Operation Z and having destroyed the main force of the allied surface units
in the Java area in the sea engagement off Java, the air units continued their reconnaissance
and search for the enemy in the Surabaya area, but because few enemy aircraft or naval ves-
sels were spotted, they returned to phase-two dispositions from the 6th onwards.(75) However,
since it was necessary that the 2d Air Raid Unit, whose current number of fighter planes was
inadequate, should from then on for a long period continue [the operation] to neutralize the
enemy air forces in the Java area, nine fighter planes of the 3d Air Group of the 1st Air Raid
Unit were incorporated in the 2d Air Raid Unit, while, due to the capacity of the Balikpapan
base, one element of the land-based attack planes of the Takao Air Group was kept in Kendari
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- Eight land-based attack planes of the
Kanoya Air Gp and one Type–0 fighter
plane of the 2d Carrier Div carried out an
attack on Kupang, destroying one [enemy]
10,000t-class merchantman; no enemy air-
craft was spotted either in the air or on the
ground.
- Nine land-based attack planes of the
Kanoya Air Gp and six Type–0 fighter
planes of the 2d Carrier Div carried out an
attack on Waingapu (Sumba Island); no
enemy [aircraft] was spotted either in the
air or on the ground. The unit bombed one
warehouse, which caught flames, but there
were no signs of use [by the enemy] at the
airfields in Waingapu, Seba (Savu Island),
and Reo (Flores Island).
- Two carrier-based bombers of the 2d Car-
rier Div carried out a reconnaissance
around the Makassar area, but no enemy
aircraft or naval vessels were seen.
- Three carrier-based bombers of the 2d Car-
rier Div searched for enemy naval vessels.
They spotted two submarines afloat, and re-
ported sinking one of them.
- Nine carrier-based bombers of the division
carried out an attack on [enemy] sub-
marines, and reported sinking one [enemy]







- Seven carrier-based bombers and one Type–
0 fighter plane of the 2d Carrier Div and
one land-based attack plane of the Takao
Air Gp carried out an attack on a transport
ship (accompanied by two gunboats, which
were spotted by the attack unit of the 1st
Air Gp; two direct hits of (60kg) bombs on
the ship set her ablaze, while one near hit
on each of the two gunboats were deliv-
ered.
to be brought under the command of the 1st Air Raid Unit commander.(81) Also on 4 February,
seventeen carrier-based bombers and eighteen Type–0 fighter planes of the unit dispatched
by the 2d Carrier Division, which had been incorporated to the 1st and the 2d Air Raid Units
to carry out operations until the end of the Ambon operation, were withdrawn from Kendari
and Balikpapan to Davao.(75)
9. The Capture of Makassar (See Illustrations No. 25 and No. 26)
As previously told, the following had been decided at the Manila Conference:(54)
1. [The operation to] seize Banjarmasin by sea shall be cancelled; the city shall be seized overland
by the Army Sakaguchi Detachment as quickly as possible. As for the air base to be used for the
air campaign against eastern Java, the air base on Bali Island shall be captured by the Army and
the Navy in conjunction around 21 February (two days before the landing on eastern Java).
2. Makassar shall be seized single-handedly by the Navy on 9 February (Day X + 63).
This [agreement] meant that the plan conceived by the Navy would be implemented, i.e. that
the air campaign to destroy the enemy air power in eastern Java before the Java landing op-
eration should be conducted with Balikpapan and Makassar as the front line bases on the
north and the east, and that after seizing Bali right before the landing in eastern Java, one el-
ement of the air unit should be pushed forward to the island to provide cover for the Java
landing [operation] as well as to cut off the enemy from the rear.
Preparations for the Operation
On 24 January, Dutch East Indies Unit Commander Vice Admiral Takahashi announced the
main points of the implementation of the operation to seize Makassar by Dutch East Indies
Unit Order No. 9, the outline of which is as follows.(54, 68, 72, 78) This operation was planned to
be carried out after the enemy air power in the Java area had been neutralized.
1. Forces employed for the invasion (Commander: 1st Base Force Commander Rear Admiral Kubo)
Bulk of the 1st Base Force, the 21st Destroyer Division, one destroyer division of the 2d Destroyer
Squadron, bulk of the Sasebo Combined Special Landing Force, 3d Construction Squad*
2. Support Units
The 2d Air Unit (the 11th Seaplane Tender Division as the core)
3. Outline of the operation
(1) The units of the 1st Base Force, which are engaged in [the operation to] seize Kendari, shall
successively return to the Bangka anchorage after the completion of the operation.
(2) One destroyer division of the 2d Destroyer Squadron, the 21st Minesweeper Division and
the 1st Subchaser Division shall return to the Bangka anchorage when the Ambon operation
is for the most part completed. 
(3) After assembling at the Bangka anchorage, the unit to seize Makassar shall depart on 5 Feb-
ruary, sail westward on the Celebes Sea, turn southward into the Makassar Strait, and seize
Makassar on 9 February.
(4) When the Ambon operation is for the most part completed, the 2d Air Unit shall return to
the Bangka anchorage and support the Makassar operation.
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* According to pp. 249, 381, 5th and 6th Construction Squads.
4. Others
Among the forces of the 1st Base Force, two minesweepers of the 21st Minesweeper Division
and the Myōkō-maru shall return to Cam Ranh Bay by 10 February to be incorporated into the
3d Escort Unit to participate in the Batavia landing operation.
Then on 28 January, the 7th Destroyer Division (which had accompanied the 2d Carrier Di-
vision) was added to reinforce the Dutch East Indies Unit. The Dutch East Indies Unit Com-
mander Vice Admiral Takahashi decided to assign this division to [the forces] for the Ambon
area and reassign another destroyer division currently assigned for the Ambon [operation]
to [the operation to] seize Makassar, making the destroyer divisions [for the Makassar oper-
ation] two in total. On the 29th, he notified the 2d Destroyer Squadron commander that after
the seizure of Ambon, the 8th and the 15th Destroyer Divisions, the 21st Minesweeper Divi-
sion and the 1st Subchaser Division should come under the command of the 1st Base Force
commander and participate in [the operation to] seize Makassar.(54)
Originally, [the operation to] seize Makassar had been planned in such a way that [the
ships] would sail from the Bangka [anchorage] around the west of Celebes to attack the city.
However, the movements of the enemy since the time of the launch of [the operations to]
seize Balikpapan and Kendari on 21 January had created a situation where compared to the
Balikpapan area where the counterattacks were intense, from counterattacks by submarines
to night attacks by surface vessels as well as air raids, there were almost no counterattacks
in the Kendari area. Therefore, on 28 January, Dutch East Indies Unit Commander Vice Ad-
miral Takahashi decided to conduct [the operation to] seize Makassar by sailing around the
east and south of Celebes,(78) which also made it easier to divert forces from the Ambon op-
eration [to the Makassar operation].
Judging that the diversion of forces [from the Ambon operation] would become easier
[by sailing around the south of Celebes], Dutch East Indies Unit Commander Vice Admiral
Takahashi contacted, after receiving the report of the success of the Ambon landing operation
on 31 January, Eastern Attack Unit Commander Rear Admiral Takagi about advancing [the
operation to] seize Makassar by one or two days.(78) The Eastern Attack Unit commander
replied that it was feasible to move up the operation by one day and started to move up the
operation from the 2d onwards, setting the date of the landing on Makassar on 8 February.(54)
However, after that and contrary to their expectations, the ground operations as well as the
minesweeping operations in the Ambon area got delayed and it was getting impossible to
divert the forces one day earlier. On 2 February, the Dutch East Indies Unit Commander
changed the date of the Makassar operation [again] to the 9th as originally scheduled.(78) Also,
in view of the hard fight experienced by the 1st Kure Special Landing Force on Ambon, the
Dutch East Indies Unit commander gave up [the idea to] have the Chitose participate in the
Makassar operation and decided to deploy only the Mizuho in that operation. Following this
decision and in order to make up for the shortage of reconnaissance seaplanes, it was decided
to have the reconnaissance seaplane unit of the Sanuki-maru, which was then in Balikpapan
(due to the damage she had sustained in the [enemy] air strike on 27 January), support the
[Makassar operation].(54)
Then, as a result of the (previously mentioned) sinking of Minesweeper No. 9 and the ac-
cidents, which crippled Minesweepers Nos. 11 and 12 on the afternoon of 2 February in the
bay of Ambon, Dutch East Indies Unit Commander Vice Admiral Takahashi judged it im-
possible to dispatch one element of the 21st Minesweeper Division to Cam Ranh Bay (i.e. he
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had planned to have two of the minesweepers participate in the operation to invade western
Java). On the 3d, he decided to incorporate two torpedo boats of the 21st Torpedo Boat Divi-
sion of the 2d Base Force into the 3d Escort Unit (the western Java invasion unit) to replace
those minesweepers.(54) On 4 February, the Dutch East Indies commander also decided to
bring in the minesweeper division of the 2d Base Force and the destroyers of the 4th De-
stroyer Squadron, which had been [temporarily] brought under the command of the 2d Base
Force and stationed in Balikpapan, in order to make up for the shortage of minesweepers
and also to support the Makassar operation unit. This unit had been scheduled to arrive in
Jolo around the 13th or the 14th to provide escort for the eastern Java landing unit.(56) (Fourth
Destroyer Squadron Commander Rear Admiral Nishimura had already left Balikpapan on
30 January, leading the Naka and the 2d Destroyer Division, heading for Lingayen Gulf to
prepare for the Java invasion operation.)
Plan of Operations, etc.
Assessment of the Enemy Movements Centering on Makassar
The assessment of the enemy movements by the Makassar invasion unit around 5 February
when the unit had assembled in Kendari was by and large as follows:(54, 78)
1. The [enemy] air power in eastern Java has suffered a major loss through the air campaign of
our land-based air units from Kendari and Balikpapan in early February.
2. The enemy air power in the Kupang area has been pushed toward western Java and Port Darwin
because of our daily air attacks conducted from the bases in Ambon and Kendari; [the enemy
power in] the Dutch East Indies is being divided by our air campaign to neutralize their power.
3. Since our land-based air units’ attack on the main force of the enemy combined fleet to the east
of the Madura Strait on 4 February, we have not seen powerful enemy surface naval vessels op-
erate on the Java Sea east of Surabaya.
4. Enemy submarines frequently appear in the Makassar Strait area. Despite the clearing opera-
tions, which were carried out several times, they are still rampant; it is quite dangerous for low-
speed convoys to sail the strait. 
5. It seems that one or two enemy submarines are constantly deployed in the Kendari area as well
as at the entrance of Staring Bay to keep an eye on our units coming and going, while seeking
an opportunity to make a surprise attack.
6. Before the opening of hostilities, the [enemy] strength on the ground around Makassar was re-
ported to be about 1,500 men, but thereafter it is unclear.
The Plan of Operations of the 1st Base Unit
On 1 February, 1st Base Unit Commander Rear Admiral Kubo announced the plan of oper-
ations of the unit by Signal Order No. 6,(110) a summary of which is as follows:
1. Outline of the advance toward Kendari
(1) Distribution of units
{1} Main unit (directly led by the 1st Base Force commander): the Nagara
{2} 1st Echelon (led by the 21st Destroyer Division commander): the 21st Destroyer Division
(minus the Hatsuharu), the Hokuriku-maru, the Nankai-maru, the Kinai-maru (the above
[three] carrying the main force of the Sasebo Combined Special Landing Force)
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{3} 2d Echelon (led by the captain of the Tsukushi): the Tsukushi, the Aotaka, the Ikushima-
maru, Submarine Chasers No. 3 and No. 14, Patrol Boats No. 1 and No. 2, the Matsué-
maru, the Montevideo-maru, the Yamashimo-maru, (the above [three] carrying the 5th and
the 6th Construction Squads), the San Clemente-maru (supply ship for the operation unit)
(2) Main points of the operation
{1} The 1st and the 2d Echelons shall depart [from the Bangka anchorage] at 0800 on 2 Feb-
ruary, and pass the Greyhound Strait (west of the Sula Islands) with each echelon in a
group. They shall advance to Kendari on the morning of 4 February.
{2} The main unit (the Nagara) shall leave the Bangka [anchorage] at 1600 on 2 February and
arrive at Kendari early in the morning on 4 February.
2. Distribution of forces (omitted by the author)
3. Actions of the units
(1) Transport Convoy
It shall leave Kendari (Staring Bay) around 2100 on the 6th of February, and enter the an-
chorage of Makassar around 0000 on the 9th, via Buton Channel and the channel to the south
of Selayar Island.
(2) Main Unit
It shall depart from Kendari almost at the same time as the transport convoy and take charge
of clearing the route ahead of the convoy while supporting it.
(3) Supply unit (omitted)
(4) The entry into the anchorage and the guarding (omitted)
4. Others (omitted)
The Plan of Operations of the Sasebo Combined Special Landing Force(68)
1. Assault Unit ([consisting of] about two and a half companies of the 2d Sasebo Special Landing
Force)
The unit shall embark in Patrol Boats Nos. 1 and 2, go ashore at the coast of Aeng Batu Batu
ahead of the main force, rapidly advance and promptly secure the bridge over the [Jene]berang
River, a strategic point, which leads to the airfield as well as to the urban area of Makassar. After
that, as the advance guard of the main force, it shall advance toward the Maros airfield and
seize it.
2. Main Unit ([consisting of] the Sasebo Combined Special Landing Force headquarters unit, the
2d Sasebo Special Landing Force (minus three companies), one company of the 1st Sasebo Spe-
cial Landing Force)
The unit shall land at the coast of Aeng Batu Batu in the wake of the assault unit; while covering
the advance of the assault unit, it shall seize the Maros airfield.
3. Detached Unit ([consisting of] the 1st Sasebo Special Landing Force (minus one and a half com-
pany))
The unit shall land along with the main unit. After crossing the [Jene]berang River, it shall head
for the Sungguminasa area. [From there,] it shall charge into the urban area of Makassar, seize
it and clear it of the enemy.
4. Afterwards, the force shall be assigned to mop up the enemy in Makassar and vicinity and guard
the area.
The Plan of Operations of the 2d Air Unit
Only the Mizuho had been scheduled to participate in the Makassar operation. However,
after the occupation of the Laha airfield by the 1st Kure Special Landing force at 0630 on 3
February, it became no longer necessary to keep the Chitose, the flagship of the 11th Seaplane
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Tender Division, at Ambon until the 9th. Thus, the plan was changed so that the 11th Seaplane
Tender Division should participate in the Makassar operation with its entire force. The plan
after the change was as follows:
The Mizuho, Patrol Boat No. 39 and three cutters shall head for Kendari, leaving the Kelang an-
chorage at 1500 on the 3d, while the flagship Chitose, Patrol Boats No. 34 and No. 38 shall stay
engaged in the Ambon operation until the 6th of February. They shall leave Piru Bay and reach
a point south of Selayar Island around the sunset of the 6th. At 0700 on the 8th, they shall join
the Mizuho at a point southeast of Selayar Island, to be in charge of the direct escort of the convoy,
the guarding against enemy submarines and aircraft as well as the guarding of the anchorage.
The Plan of Operations of the Land-Based Air Units
First Air Raid Unit Commander Rear Admiral Tada’s plan to support the Makassar opera-
tions was in outline as follows:(81)
1. During the advance from the Bangka anchorage to Kendari (2-4 February), the patrol for the
Makassar invasion unit against enemy submarines shall be carried out from the Kema base
(Menado) as designated by the Tōkō Air Group commander.
2. The guard against enemy aircraft and submarines at Kendari (Staring Bay) shall be provided
during the 4th and the 6th of February by Type–0 fighter planes of the 3d Air Group and Type–
0 fighter planes and carrier-based bombers of the unit dispatched from the 2d Carrier Division,
as designated by the 3d Air Group commander.
3. Orders for the subsequent operations shall be given later.
The Launch of the Operation
Neutralization of the Enemy Air Power and the Sailing of the Convoy
On 17 January, the 1st Air Raid Unit had launched a covert reconnaissance of Makassar from
Menado with one land-based reconnaissance plane of the 3d Air Group, while on 20 January
the 2d Air Raid Unit had launched its reconnaissance of Makassar from Tarakan with one
land-based reconnaissance plane of the Tainan Air Group.(71) After that, land-based recon-
naissance planes and Type–0 fighter planes of the Tainan Air Group and the 3d Air Group as
well as carrier-based bombers of the 2d Carrier Division carried out reconnaissance attacks
on Makassar, while flying boats of the Tōkō Air Group provided guard against enemy sub-
marines for the convoy heading for Kendari, and the 2d Carrier Division and Type–0 fighter
planes of the 3d Air Group patrolled the air above the Kendari anchorage. The enemy was
hardly seen during this period, and along with the results of Operation Z, it was concluded
that the Japanese forces had largely secured command of the air in that area.
The damage to the flagship of the 1st Base Unit Nagara, caused by the previously men-
tioned collision with the Hatsuharu off Kendari* [p. 202], was being repaired by the repair
ship Akashi at Davao from 27 January onwards and was completed on 1 February. The Nagara
immediately left Davao and arrived at the Bangka anchorage at 1600 on 2 [February].(59) In
the meantime, the 21st Destroyer Division (Wakaba and Nenohi), which had escorted the dam-
aged Hatsuharu to Davao [and arrived there] on the 29th of January, departed from Davao
on the next day, the 30th, leaving the Hatsuharu in Davao for repair, and arrived in the Bangka
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anchorage on the 31st.(59) As for the unit that had seized Kendari, the first batch of units with-
drawn [from Kendari] and the Hatsushimo ([of] the 21st Destroyer Division) with 1st Base
Force Commander Rear Admiral Kubo on board had returned to the Bangka anchorage on
the 29th, which was followed by the second batch on the 1st of February.(59)
At 0800 on 2 February, the Makassar invasion unit left the Bangka anchorage and headed
for Kendari, scheduled to sortie from Kendari on the 5th and land in Makassar on the 8th.(110)
As previously told, after its departure from the anchorage, the operation to seize Makassar
was postponed for one day, and [accordingly] the departure from Kendari was changed to 6
February. The 1st Echelon arrived at Staring Bay (a bay to the east of Kendari) around 2230
on the 3d, the Nagara at 0330 on the 4th, and the 2d Echelon around 0600 on the same day.(59, 110)
As for the units diverted from Ambon, the Mizuho and Patrol Boat No. 39 arrived in Staring Bay
on the evening of the 4th, the 15th Destroyer Division at 2030 on the 4th, the 21st Minesweeper
Division and the 1st Subchaser Division early in the morning on the 5th, and the 8th De-
stroyer Division on the morning of the 5th. Also, Submarine chaser No. 14, which had left
the Bangka [anchorage] on 3 February, arrived at the bay on the afternoon of the 5th. This
completed the advance to Kendari of the whole force of the Makassar invasion unit.(59, 68)
From the 4th onwards, while replenishing supplies at Staring Bay by mooring one ship
after another alongside the San Clemente-maru, the unit had ample discussions about the op-
eration until the sortie on the 6th.(93) During that time, at 1830 on the evening of the 4th, the
Suzukaze ([of] the 24th Destroyer Division [of] the main unit), came under a torpedo attack
by an enemy submarine while patrolling outside Staring Bay. Hit by one enemy torpedo at
her starboard bow, she sustained leaks in the fore boiler room and returned to the bay to
have emergency repairs.(68)
On the evening of 6 February, the Makassar invasion unit sailed from Staring Bay.(68, 93) At
0140 on the 7th, the 15th and the 8th Destroyer Divisions, which sailed ahead, spotted a sur-
faced [enemy] submarine, but let her slip when she submerged.(93) At 0845, the Michishio ([of]
the 8th Destroyer Division), while clearing the route ahead, detected an enemy submarine,
carried out an attack with antisubmarine depth charges and reported the result as con-
firmed.(68)
The Natsushio Torpedoed; the Landing
The convoy passed south of Selayar Island around noon on 8 February, changed course to
the northwest to head toward the southwest of Celebes.(68) Although it was partly sunny with
a slight breeze from the northwest and a calm sea in the morning, the weather got worse as
the convoy approached Makassar in the afternoon while visibility became poor.(93) Around
1630, out of concern about sailing with poor visibility as well as the guarding against the
enemy whose movements were unknown, 1st Base Unit Commander Rear Admiral Kubo
gave the following instructions to the units under his command [summary]:(110)
1. In order to confirm the position of the ships, commanders shall take such appropriate measures
as detaching certain ships, etc. 
2. Due to the poor visibility, some ships shall be sent ahead to guide the echelons. However, if vis-
ibility worsens, the measures to be taken are in outline as follows.
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(1) [The ships] shall enter [into the anchorage at Makassar] as far as is navigable, [temporarily]
drop anchor and launch large-sized motorized [landing] craft, which shall further advance,
guided by submarine chaser(s). The echelons shall follow the craft. 
(2) Depending on the situation and if unavoidable, the landing point shall be changed to [a
point further] south.
(3) When the circumstances make it inevitable, the landing shall be postponed for one day.
Troubled by poor visibility, the transport echelons managed toward sunset to reach the waters
about fifteen nautical miles south of Tanakeke Island and changed formation to enter into
the anchorage. At 2030, the echelons entered the depth zone of 200 meters or less, about ten
nautical miles southwest of Tanakeke Island, and the 21st Minesweeper Division started
sweeping mines on the route ahead.(68) At 2210, the 1st Patrol Boat Division, which had sailed
ahead, entered the planned anchorage, and the following convoy [also] changed course to
the northeast and headed toward the port of Makassar under poor visibility and a drizzle
that blanketed the surface of the sea. The ships kept exchanging signals and put on identifi-
cation lights in order to maintain formation. During these moments, it seemed as if there was
a total absence of alertness against the enemy.(93) At 2215, the Natsushio, the 1st ship of the
15th Destroyer Division, which was following the echelon in its wake, was hit by a torpedo
on her starboard quarter, flooding her engine room and crippling her. While she worked on
stopping the flooding on the spot, the fellow destroyers Oyashio and Kuroshio provided guard
on the waters nearby, but no enemy submarines were detected.(111) Meanwhile, the first land-
ing unit of the commando unit of the Sasebo Combined Special Landing Force, which had
entered into the 2d anchorage, made a successful landing on the coast of Aeng Batu Batu at
2340.(110)
At 0800 on that day [8 February], the element of the 2d Base Unit stationed in Balikpapan
but assigned to support the Makassar operation ([i.e.] the 1st Section of the 24th Destroyer
Division, the 9th Destroyer Division (minus the Yamagumo), the 30th and the 11th Mine -
sweeper Divisions and Patrol Boat No. 36) departed from the port of Balikpapan under the
command of 2d Base Force Commander Rear Admiral Hirose (on board of the Natsu gumo).
It crossed the Makassar Strait, reached the waters off Cape William [Tanjung Rangas] on the
west coast of Celebes around 2100, and headed for [the waters] off Makassar. At 2130, the
Minegumo ([of] the 9th Destroyer Division) spotted a surfaced enemy submarine and attacked
her with antisubmarine depth charges after illuminating and shelling her, results uncon-
firmed.(112)
On 9 February, the second landing unit of the commando unit of the Sasebo Combined
Special Landing Force landed on [the coast] of Aeng Batu Batu around 0050, which was fol-
lowed by the main unit of the Sasebo Combined Special Landing Force around 0340.(110) The
landing units reached the [Jene]berang River at 0400 and the Telo River at 0810, charged into
the urban area of Makassar at 1130, completely seized the area at 1230, and seized the Maros
airfield at 1900.(67, 68) The military gains of this land combat were seventy-seven abandoned
bodies and eighty-five men taken prisoners, while the loss sustained [by the special landing
force] was four killed and five injured.(67, 68)
In the meantime, based on the judgment that the torpedoed Natsushio was not likely to
sink, it was decided that the Kuroshio should tow the Natsushio to Kendari.(93) From 0330 on
the 9th, the Kuroshio began towing [the Natsushio] and started sailing, escorted by the Oyashio.
However, after three hours of towing, the wind direction suddenly changed south of
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Tanakeke Island, and at 0840 the Natsushio ended up sinking (with five men killed and six
seriously injured). Cdr. (later Capt.) Nagai Sumitaka, [then] captain of the destroyer Natsushio,
recalled that the failure of the towing was due to an overoptimistic judgment of the damage.
After rescuing the crew of the Natsushio, the 15th Destroyer Division (the Oyashio and the
Kuroshio) reached their designated patrol area, while the 8th Destroyer Division departed for
Jolo to provide escort for the Bali invasion unit, departing at 0600 on the 9th as scheduled.
Just after its departure, the 1st Section of the 24th Destroyer Division and the 9th Destroyer
Divison (minus the Yamagumo) from the Balikpapan unit arrived and started to patrol the
area.(68) With no enemy attack on the anchorage, the disembarkation made smooth progress
on the 9th.(68)
The Support Unit (the Nachi and the Haguro), which had left Davao at 1800 on 6 February,
entered the Banda Sea via the Ceram Sea on the 8th and took charge of the support for the
Makassar operation at 150 nautical miles southwest of Ambon. It discontinued the support
operation on the evening of that day, judging that the operation was more or less completed,
and entered Staring Bay at 1030 on 10 February. 
The Redeployment of the [Makassar] Invasion Units 
Judging that that operation was more or less completed after the seizure of the Maros airfield
on the evening of the 9th, 1st Base Unit Commander Rear Admiral Kubo had the 15th De-
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Japanese Special Landing Forces Rushing Forward, Picking Their Way Through the Bamboo Spears 
Set Up Against Paratroopers
stroyer Division (minus the Natsushio and the Hayashio) depart for Kendari at 0800 on the
10th in order to participate in the Kupang operation.(68) The minesweeping of the anchorage
[at Makassar] was carried out by the 21st, the 11th and the 30th Minesweeper Divisions, the
1st Patrol Boat Division, and the motor launches as well as the large-sized motorized [land-
ing] craft of the [1st Base] Unit. However, no mines were snagged, and the transport ships
shifted from the 2d anchorage to that inside the port around 1600.(110) After the minesweeping
mission was completed, the 30th and the 11th Minesweeper Divisions returned to their orig-
inal unit, while the destroyers of the 2d Base Unit also discontinued their support and headed
for Jolo one after another to cooperate in escorting the eastern Java invasion units.(112)
Although on 11 February the Sasebo Combined Special Landing Force was still mopping
up the enemy in the neighborhood, it was decided that two platoons of the force should par-
ticipate in the Kupang operation. They embarked on the ships of the 21st Minesweeper Di-
vision and the 1st Patrol Boat Division, both of which were also supposed to take part in the
Kupang operation, and left Makassar at 0700 for Kendari.(59, 110) The Hayashio of the 15th De-
stroyer Division also left her patrol area at 1500 for Kendari to take part in the Kupang oper-
ation. At 1600, 1st Base Unit Commander Rear Admiral Kubo entered into the port of
Makassar, leading the Nagara, and gave the necessary instructions and notifications.(68, 78)
At 0600 on the 12th of February, the commander left Makassar on the Nagara, and returned
to Staring Bay at 1700 on the 13th.(59) In the meantime, the 21st Minesweeper Division, the
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Illustration No. 25 — The Movements of the Units to Seize Makassar and Banjarmasin











































Illustration No. 26—The Operations of the Sasebo CombinedSpecial Landing Force
in the Attack on Makassar
1st Patrol Boat Division and the Hayashio, which had left Makassar earlier, returned to Staring
Bay on the evening of the 12th,(59) where the 1st Base Unit started on the preparations to cap-
ture Bali, while the others began their preparations to seize Kupang.(59) Makassar was located
at a distance of about 450 nautical miles from eastern Java, about 400 nautical miles from Ku-
pang, and about 330 nautical miles from Bali, and [the seizure of] this [place] completed the
network of air bases enveloping eastern Java.
The Operations of the Air Units
From the departure of the convoy until the completion of the capture operation, the 1st Air
Raid Unit, the 2d Air Unit and the Sanuki-maru were engaged in patrolling against enemy
aircraft and submarines as well as patrolling the route ahead and the flanks of the sailing
route, while searching for enemy in the vicinity and clearing the Makassar Strait of enemy
submarines as well as supporting the land combat. [However,] except for a raid by enemy
aircraft at 0340 on 10 February (causing no damage) on the tender ships of the 2d Air Unit,
which were conducting operations at anchor to the southwest of Bulunrue Island, no enemy
was seen at all.(71, 81) At 1920 on the 10th, the Chitose, Patrol Boats No. 34 and No. 38 discon-
tinued the operation and headed for Jolo to prepare for the subsequent eastern Java landing
operation,(68) while the Mizuho [also] left at 1900 on the 11th for Kendari along with Patrol
Boat No. 39 and Submarine chaser No. 2, to prepare for the operation to capture Bali.(68) Mean-
while on the 10th, the reconnaissance seaplane units of the Sanuki-maru advanced to the coast
of Parepare ([near] Makassar) to be engaged in operations there.(76) On the 15th, two Type–0
fighter planes of the 3d Air Group advanced to Makassar from Kendari for the first time,
which was followed by seven on the 17th ([no advance was made] on the 16th due to bad
weather.)(71)
Conversely, the allied forces were thrown in total confusion by the Japanese air attacks
(Operation Z) from 3 to 5 February. Although U.S. submarine S–37, being deployed outside
the port of Makassar, retaliated by sinking the Natsushio, no other air or naval counterattacks
were made. Even on land, after some resistance put up by a garrison consisting of merely
two companies, the strategic point Makassar was given up.(85, 86, 113)
10. The Seizure of Banjarmasin (See Illustration No. 25) 
[See also Vol. 3, pp. 391-394] 
On 25 January, after having returned to Gaoxiong from the Manila Conference, Sixteenth
Army Commander Lieutenant General Imamura, conform to the arrangements made at the
conference, issued the order to seize Banjarmasin overland. In line with this order, Detach-
ment Commander Sakaguchi drew up the following outline of the operation to seize Banjar-
masin:(88, 99) (Summary) 
1. Forces employed for the invasion operation
Commander: 146th Infantry Regiment Commander Col. Yamamoto Kyōhei
Strength of the overland task force: one infantry battalion, one artillery battery, and one engineer
company as the core
Strength of the seaborne task force: one infantry company, one engineer platoon and one inde-
pendent engineer platoon as the core
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2. Outline of the operation
(1) Overland operation
[The unit shall] leave Balikpapan in the evening of 30 January, go ashore near Tanahgrogot
at dawn on the 31st, and push through the jungle-covered Meratus mountains into the plain
of Banjarmasin, from where the unit shall rapidly advance and seize the Martapura airfield
as well as the urban area of Banjarmasin. 
(2) Seaborne operation
The unit shall leave Balikpapan at night on 30 January in large- and small-sized motorized
[landing] craft. By day it shall hide in inlets along the coast under the dense forest to conceal
its movements. Only at night it shall maneuver ahead and via Tanahgrogot, Pamukan,
Kotabaru, and Laut Strait, land on the coast southeast of Martapura to seize the airfield there.
On its way, it shall conduct a night raid on Kotabaru [on Laut Island] to obtain military sup-
plies and gather information.
(3) Cooperation by the Naval units
{1} The Navy 2d Base Unit shall dispatch one pilot officer to the seaborne task force.
{2} Aviation fuel and ammunition as well as a skeleton crew for preparing the airfield shall
be dispatched by the Eleventh Air Fleet and transported to Banjarmasin by sea in fishing
boats. One element of the fishing boats shall accompany the seaborne task force. 
On 30 January, the [Army] seaborne task force left Balikpapan in four large- and two small-
sized motorized [landing] craft as well as well as in fishing boats (the number of the latter is
unknown) along with one element of the naval units. The force reached Adang Bay at dawn
on the 31st. Then via Apar Besar Bay, Pamukan Bay and Klumpang Bay, it seized Kotabaru
at the northern tip of Laut Island on 10 February.(89, 114) Meanwhile, the advance unit of the
overland task force left Balikpapan on the morning of 31 January, seized Tanahgrogot on the
morning of 1 February, while its main force left Balikpapan on the next day the 2d and arrived
in Tanahgrogot on the 3d. After that, the overland task force entered the mountains covered
with rain forest. While being attacked by swarms of mosquitoes, land leeches and other in-
sects, they clambered up steep mountains, threw temporary log bridges over deep gorges
and pushed their way through the mountains for about 100 kilometers. After having driven
off a small enemy unit, which the force had encountered on its way, it rushed into the plain
of Banjarmasin. At 0900 on 10 February, the vanguard of the overland task force finally
reached the Martapura airfield and seized it.(89)
[Then,] taking command of the units of the overland task force, which arrived one after
another at Martapura, Regimental Commander Yamamoto completely seized the urban area
of Banjarmasin on the evening of that day. The officers and men of the overland task force
had marched about some 400 kilometers over bad tracks (of which 100 kilometers had con-
sisted of jungle). As many as about 80% of them developed malaria, which at one point even
made it difficult for the force to operate, but they attained their goal in the end.(86)
The seaborne task force reached Banjarmasin around 15 – 20 February; the naval base unit
reinforcements around the 20th.(115) After that, the conditioning of the airfield was started,
but the Navy air units did not immediately advance to the base; only one element of the 23d
Air Flotilla advanced there on 25 February. Thereafter the base was used as a staging base
for the advance to Bali.(71)
Prior to this, and after having launched a reconnaissance of Banjarmasin with one land-
based reconnaissance plane of the Tainan Air Group on 18 January, the 2d Air Raid Unit had
attacked Banjarmasin with Type–0 fighter plane[s] and land-based reconnaissance plane[s]
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on the 20th, the 25th, and the 27th and reported having set four PBY flying boats and four B–
17 heavy bombers ablaze. However, no more enemy planes had been spotted since then.
After the departure of the Army units, [the 2d Air Raid Unit] had reconnoitered the Army
front lines day after day and completed the operations as of 15 February.(71)
11. The Invasion of Southern Sumatra 
(See Attached Illustrations No. 1 and No. 2 [omitted], and Illustration No. 28)
On 31 January, the Army units in the Malay theater rushed into Johor Bahru on the bank op-
posite of Singapore. In the meantime, the southern Sumatra invasion [operation] (to capture
Bangka and Palembang; Operation L), which had been set on 6 February (Day X + 60)* in the
Cam Ranh meeting on 29 December, was postponed for four days till 10 February (Day X + 64)
as a result of the Manila Conference ([held] between 21 and 23 January), as previously told.(34)
In accordance with this result, on 31 January,** the Arrangement on the Air [Operations]
in Operation L was concluded between the commander in chief of the First Southern Expe-
ditionary Fleet, the Sixteenth Army commander, and the [Army] Third Air Force commander.
Furthermore, an Arrangement for Operation L was concluded between the commander in
chief of the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet and the [Army] 38th Division commander,(116)
both of which were [in outline] as follows:(117)
Arrangement on the Air [Operations] in Operation L
Arrangement on the Air [Operations] in Operation L between the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet
Commander in Chief, the Sixteenth Army Commander and the Third Air Force Commander 
First Southern Expeditionary Fleet Commander in Chief, V. Adm. Ozawa Jisaburō
Sixteenth Army Commander, Lt. Gen. Imamura Hitoshi
Third Air Force Commander, Lt. Gen. Sugawara Michiō
I. Name of Operation and Basic Dates
1. The operations against Bangka Island and Palembang shall be called Operation L.
2. The day when the advance party of the 38th Division lands in Mentok shall be indicated as
Day L, and is scheduled for 10 February. In case a change of date for Day L is required due
to the progress of the air operations, weather conditions or enemy movements, a decision
shall be made by 1200 on Day L – 6 upon deliberation between the First Southern Expedi-
tionary Fleet commander in chief and the Sixteenth Army commander.
However, regarding [matters involving] air operations, the Sixteenth Army commander
shall consult the Third Air Force commander. 
II. Forces to be employed
1. Navy
1st Air Unit: About 100 land-based attack planes, about 30 fighter planes, and 6 land-based
reconnaissance planes.
Malaya Unit: About 40 seaplanes.
2. Army
About 9 command reconnaissance planes,+ about 40 Type–1 fighter planes,+ about 30 Type–
97 fighter planes,+ about 9 assault planes,+ about 20 twin-engine light [bombers],+ and about
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30 heavy bombers.
+ Indicates aircraft to be advanced to the airfield[s] in southern Sumatra. Depending on the
condition of the airfields, the above number of aircraft shall be slightly changed.
III. [Air] bases to be used and distribution of forces
1. Navy
(a) When the Ledo [airfield] is fit for use: 
Ledo and Kuching [airfields]: 2 air groups of land-based attack planes, about 30 fighter
planes and 6 command reconnaissance planes. 
Kuantan: about 30 land-based attack planes. 
Sungai Petani: about 10 planes.
(b) When [the airfields in] Ledo and Kuching are unusable, [aircraft] shall be advanced in
the following way:
Kuantan: about 60 land-based attack planes and one element of the fighter planes.
Kahang: about 30 fighter planes.
About 30 land-based attack planes may use [the airfield] as an advance base for refueling.
If the XX Unit (note by the author: the [paratroop] raiding unit) should use [the airfield],
[the use by the land-based attack planes] shall be only until and including Day L – 3 or
on Day L + 1* and onwards.
Sungai Petani: about 10 land-based attack planes.
Kota Bharu: about 40 land-based attack planes.
2. Army
Kahang: about 25 Type–1 fighter planes and about 45 transport planes.
The remaining units to be employed for Operation L shall use the Kluang, Batu Pahat, Kuala
Lumpur, Ipoh, Ketil and other airfields. Depending on the readiness and other circumstances
of the airfields, the above disposition and the forces to be deployed will be changed.
3. The Army shall be charged with readying the Mentok and Palembang [air] bases. In the
preparation of Mentok, the Navy shall cooperate with the Army. In the initial days after the
seizure of the Mentok and Palembang [air] bases, Mentok shall be shared [by the Army and
the Navy] in the following way, whereas Palembang shall be used by the Army:
Navy fighter planes and others: about 30 planes.
Army fighter planes: about 30 planes.
When possible, the Army shall assist the Navy in the transport of its aviation fuel. The later
use of this [air] base shall be newly arranged between the Army and the Navy commanders
concerned.
IV. Outline of the operation
1. We shall be determined to swiftly destroy the enemy air power in Sumatra as well as neu-
tralize the enemy air power in Java. The areas assigned to [the Army and the Navy] are
roughly decided as follows. However, [both] shall attack the enemy in the other’s area as
occasion may require. 
Navy: [the area] east of the line connecting Mentok and Palembang ([the line] included).
Army: [the area] west of the above-mentioned line ([the line] included).
2. The Navy shall be in charge of attacking enemy naval ships. 
3. Covering of the transport convoy
(1) Under sail
(a) Direct cover on Day L – 1 by [both] Army and Navy fighter planes in conjunction
shall be provided as follows: 
Until 1400: the Navy.
From 1400 onwards: the Army. In case XX Unit (note by the author: the [paratroop]
raiding group) is used, the cover [will be started] roughly from 1700 onwards.
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In case XX Unit (note by the author: the [paratroop] raiding group) is used, the Navy
fighter planes shall provide cover [for the convoy] on its own as much as possible.
(b) The guarding under sail other than the above shall be charged to the Navy. 
(2) At the Mentok and Palembang anchorages and while sailing upstream
The guarding against enemy aircraft after both the Army and the Navy fighter planes
are advanced in the area shall be provided by both forces in conjunction; the guarding
other than the above shall be assigned to the Navy.
(3) Support for ground [operations] and for the operations to sail upstream
Support for the operations to sail upstream to Palembang shall mainly be assigned to
the Navy. Support for ground operations after that shall be assigned to the Army. How-
ever, the Navy shall assume this [task] until the Army aircraft are advanced to the area. 
V. Exchange of Information
The Army shall make efforts to reconnoiter the movements of the enemy air forces in the Batavia
area and provide the Navy with the information.
Arrangement on Operation L (118)
The arrangement on Operation L was in outline as follows:
1. Forces
(1) Army: 38th Division
(a) Advance party: two infantry battalions and two artillery batteries as the core, [in] eight
ships.
Mentok landing unit: half an infantry battalion as the core.
River-ascending Unit [up to] Palembang: one and a half infantry battalion and two ar-
tillery batteries as the core.
(b) Main force: two infantry battalions and one artillery battalion as the core, [in] fourteen
ships.
(2) Navy
(a) Forces to escort the advance party: the main force of the 3d Destroyer Squadron ([con-
sisting of] the (light cruiser) Sendai and four destroyers), a few minesweepers and sub-
marine chasers.
(b) Forces to escort the main force: the (light cruiser) Yura, the (coastal defense ship)
Shimushu, four destroyers of the 3d Destroyer Squadron and other small naval vessels.
(c) Supporting surface forces: the main force of the surface unit of the Malaya Unit ([con-
sisting of] five heavy cruisers (the flagship Chōkai, and the Kumano, the Suzuya, the
Mikuma and the Mogami of the 7th Cruiser Division), one aircraft carrier (the Ryūjō), two
auxiliary seaplane tenders (the Kamikawa-maru and the Sagara-maru), six destroyers, etc.).
(d) Air force: the 22d Air Flotilla in full force.
(e) River-ascending Unit for Palembang: the main force of the 9th Base Force ([consisting
of] auxiliary minesweeper[s], cutter[s], fishing boat[s], etc.).
2. Schedule for the departure of the transport ships from the assembly point and the start of the
landing ([and] going upstream)
Advance party:
- Mentok Landing Unit ([in] two ships): shall depart from the assembly point on the
evening of Day L – 6, arrive at the Mentok [anchorage] before daybreak, and swiftly go
ashore at Mentok.
- River-ascending Unit [up to] Palembang ([in] six ships): shall depart from the assembly
point on the evening of Day L – 6, arrive at the Mentok [anchorage] before daybreak and
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after shifting to [landing] craft and reaching the mouths of the Musi, the Telang and the
Saleh rivers, start going upstream early in the morning.
Main force ([in] fourteen ships): shall depart from the assembly point on the evening of Day
L – 4, and reach the mouth of the Musi River before daybreak on Day L + 2. Landing and
debarkation is expected [to be completed] in about ten days for the Mentok landing unit,
and about two weeks for the River-ascending Unit [up to] Palembang and the main force of
the division.
3. Support for the landing and disembarkation, and cooperation concerning the waterway of the
Musi River
(1) Small Navy vessel[s] shall lead the way when the [Army] advance party maneuvers craft
from the Mentok anchorage to the mouth of [each] river to go upstream.
(2) Members of the Navy Special Minesweeping Unit shall borrow fifteen large- and small-sized
motorized [landing] craft from the Army at the Mentok anchorage, in which they shall clear
the waterway of the Musi River and sweep the river sailing upstream from the river mouth
up to Palembang.
4. Others
Details of escort at sea, entry into the anchorage[s], guarding at the anchorage[s] and the water-
way shall be arranged between the 38th Division commander, the 3d Destroyer Squadron com-
mander and the 9th Base Force commander.
The Plans of Operation, etc.
The Plan of Operations of the [Navy] Malaya Unit
On 1 February, in accordance with the previously mentioned arrangements, the [Navy]
Malaya Unit Commander Vice Admiral Ozawa announced the plan of operations for Oper-
ation L at Cam Ranh Bay by Malaya Unit Operation Order No. 17, which was in outline as
follows:(119)
1. Operational aim
To swiftly put ashore the 38th Division at Bangka and near Palembang and seize the strategic
places in the neighborhood
2. Operational policy
(1) This operation shall be immediately launched when the enemy air power in the Malaya area,
southern Sumatra, western Borneo and western Java has been more or less neutralized.
(2) The transport ships shall stand by at Cam Ranh Bay and depart under the escort of the escort
unit at an opportune time. 
3. Disposition of Forces
(As shown in the following table)
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4. Outline of the tasks of each unit
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Unit Outline of tasks
Main Unit It shall leave Cam Ranh Bay at an appropriate moment and timely act depending on theenemy movements; [assigned to] support operations on the whole.
1st Escort Unit
1. Escorting the advance party, it shall leave Cam Ranh Bay on Day L – 6 (the 1st
Minesweeper Div and the 11th Subchaser Div (minus 1 submarine chaser) shall join
the 1st Escort Unit from [the waters] near the Anambas Islands), and act in line with
the Army-Navy agreement.
2. After [the party] enters into the anchorage, it shall take charge of guarding the anchor-
age as well as the north and the south entrances of the Bangka Strait.
2d Escort Unit
1. Escorting the transport convoy, it shall leave Cam Ranh Bay on Day L – 4 (the 41st
Minesweeper Div 1st Section shall join the 2d Escort Unit from [the waters] near the
Anambas Islands), and act in line with the Army-Navy agreement.
2. After the convoy enters into the anchorage, the Shimushu shall act as designated by the
9th Base Force Cdr, while the rest shall take charge of guarding the area surrounding
the anchorage.
1st Air Unit
1. By making use of air bases in the Malay Peninsula as well as in the western part of
Borneo, it shall conduct search and attack on enemy naval vessels in the Malacca
Strait, on the waters southeast of Singapore and on the western part of the Java Sea.
2. It shall be assigned to destroy the enemy air power in the western part of Borneo and
the Bangka and Palembang areas, while neutralizing the enemy air power in western
Java.
3. On Day L – 1 (until 1400, or the whole day if [Army] paratrooper units shall be em-
ployed), it shall take charge of guarding the advance party against enemy aircraft with
fighter planes.
4. The Type–0 fighter plane unit(s) shall advance to the Mentok land base when the base
is ready for use.
5. Communications (omitted)
6. Replenishments (omitted)
Outline of the Plan of Operations of the Army Units (Excluding the [Army] Air Units)
On 5 January at Saigon, Sixteenth Army Commander Lieutenant General Imamura received
[Southern Army] Operation Order Classified No. 32 from Southern Army Commander in
Chief General Terauchi. On 15 January, in accordance with the order, he concluded an
arrangement on Operation L with First Southern Expeditionary Fleet Commander in Chief
Vice Admiral Ozawa at Cam Ranh Bay (it was a general agreement with no details pro-
vided).(120) Then on 17 January at Hongkong, he issued an order to the 38th Division (minus
the Itō and the Shōji Detachments) to capture Mentok and Palembang.(121)
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2d Air Unit
1. It shall escort the transport convoy; [first] it shall guard the advance party against
enemy submarines and aircraft on Day L – 2 and against enemy submarines on Day L
– 1; then it shall guard the main force of the transport ships against enemy submarines
on Days L and L + 1.
2. It shall be assigned to guard the anchorage near Mentok against [enemy] aircraft.
3. It shall cooperate in the operation to sail upriver to Palembang, while supporting the
land combat.
3d Air Unit
1. The unit shall by and large operate along with the main unit, while taking charge of
attacking enemy naval vessels as well as attacking and driving off enemy aircraft.
2. It may be assigned to guard the advance party against enemy aircraft on Day L – 1
and the morning of Day L by separate orders.
Base Forces
1. The unit to sail upstream to Palembang shall be on standby at the Anambas [base],
and by and large follow in the wake of the 1st Escort Unit (while timely capturing the
light ships at the mouth of the Musi River, and obtaining the documents concerning
the waterways). [Then] it shall launch the operation to sail upstream to Palembang in
line with the Army-Navy agreement. The Eikō-maru shall cooperate in transporting
base personnel and matériel of the 2d Air Unit on her sail from the Anambas Islands
to Mentok. [She shall also cooperate] in setting up the base.
2. The Anambas Base Unit shall be in charge of securing the Anambas base, while
searching for and clearing mines on the sailing routes in the Anambas areas. The
Anambas Base Commander shall take command of the 1st Minesweeper Division, the
41st Minesweeper Division 1st Section, the 11th and the 91st Subchaser Divisions
while they are at anchor [at the Anambas Islands].
3. The Singora Base Unit shall continue its previous tasks.
Penang Base Unit [It shall] continue its previous tasks.
Submarine Unit
1. One submarine each shall be deployed at the north and the south entrances of the
Sunda Strait as well as [the waters] near the southern entrance of the Lombok Strait.
2. The remaining [submarines] shall make preparations for the subsequent operations as
designated by the 4th Submarine Squadron commander.
Others Units other than those assigned with particular tasks shall continue their previous tasks.
In accordance with this order, 38th Division Commander Lt. Gen.
Sano Tadayoshi drew up a plan of operations, which was in summary
as follows*:(117)
1. Disposition of forces
(1) Advance party ([in] 8 transport ships)
Commander: 229th Infantry Regiment commander (Col. Tanaka Ryō -
saburō)
Mentok Landing Unit
Commander: 229th Infantry Regiment 1st Battalion commander (Capt.
Orita Masaru); [consisting of] half an infantry battalion as its core.
Musi River Ascending Unit
Commander: 229th Infantry Regiment commander; [consisting of] one
infantry battalion and one artillery battery as its core.
Saleh River Ascending Unit
Commander: 38th Engineer Regiment commander (Lt. Col. Iwabuchi Tsuneo); [consisting
of] one infantry company, one artillery battery and one engineer company as its core. 
Telang River Ascending Unit
Commander: 229th Regiment 2d Battalion commander (Maj. Miyazawa Shigezō); [consisting
of] half an infantry battalion and one artillery section as its core. 
(2) Main force of the [38th] division ([in] 14 transport ships)
[Consisting of] two infantry battalions, one artillery battalion and one engineer company as
its core.
2. Outline of the conduct of the operation
(1) The Mentok landing unit
[The unit shall] carry out a surprise landing on the shore south of the Mentok airfield around
0300** on Day L. After seizing the airfield [first], it shall seize strategic points on Bangka Is-
land.
(2) The river-ascending units [up to] Palembang
After shifting to [landing] craft at the Mentok anchorage, the main force of the advance party
shall start sailing upstream from the mouth of the rivers around 0700 on Day L. In cooper-
ation with the paratrooper unit, which [will land in Palembang] ahead of them, it shall first
seize the airfield, resources and facilities in Palembang and its vicinity. After that, while
swiftly seizing the Martapura and the Tanjungkarang airfields as well as the oil producing
regions around [Talang] Abab and Limau, it shall prepare for [the operations] to destroy and
clear the enemy naval bases in the Lampung and Semangka Bays. The seizures of Martapura
and Tanjungkarang are scheduled for Day L + 6 and Day L + 9 respectively.
(3) The main force of the division shall reach the mouth of the Musi River on Day L + 2, ascend
the river in its [transport] ships [without changing ships], land at Palembang and extend
the military gains of the advance party.
Detailed Arrangements Between the 38th Division Commander and the 9th Base Force
Commander
On 1 February, both commanders concluded detailed arrangements on Operation L at Cam
Ranh Bay in accordance with the afore-mentioned arrangement between the First Southern
Expeditionary Fleet commander in chief and the Sixteenth Army commander, and that be-





* See also Vol. 3, pp. 270-71.
** The text has 0200.
tween the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet commander in chief and the 38th Division com-
mander as well as the operation orders of the senior commanders.(118) The contents of the
arrangements are omitted [here] because they overlap the plans of operation of the units.
The Plan of Operations of the Escort Unit
In line with the plan of operations of the Malaya Unit, 3d Destroyer Squadron Commander
R. Adm. Hashimoto Shintarō announced on 1 February at Cam Ranh Bay by means of 1st
Escort Unit Operation Order No. 3 the main points of Operation L to be implemented by the
1st and the 2d Escort Units.(118)
Malaya Unit 1st Escort Unit Order
1. In conformity with Malaya Unit Operation Order Classified No. 17, the 1st and the 2d Escort
Units of the Malaya Unit shall strive to accomplish the following tasks:
(a) 1st Escort Unit
[The unit shall] escort the transport ships of the Army advance party for Operation L from
Cam Ranh Bay to a point off Mentok, and put ashore [one element of] the party at Mentok,
while guiding and escorting the [landing] craft and boats [of the main force of the advance
party] to the mouths of the Musi and the Saleh rivers.
(b) 2d Escort Unit
[The unit shall] escort the transport ships of the Army main force for Operation L from Cam
Ranh Bay to the mouth of the Musi River.
2. Distribution of Forces (Note by the author: [as shown in] the table below)
3. The outline of operations of each unit
(a) The 1st Escort Unit
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1. Sendai shall leave Cam Ranh Bay at 1830 on Day L – 6, leading the transport ships,
while clearing enemy submarines around the mouth of the bay with her aircraft.
2. The 11th Destroyer Div (minus Shirayuki) shall leave Cam Ranh Bay at 1800 on Day L
– 6, and take charge of clearing the waters outside the bay of enemy submarines. At
an appropriate moment, it shall directly escort the transport ships, taking up their po-
sitions in the 1st protective sailing order.
3. The guide ships shall leave port at 1900 on Day L – 6, and guide the transport ships in
the order of the number of the section. They shall sortie from the north waterway, and
adopt the 1st sailing formation without separate orders.












































1. Sendai, the 11th Destroyer Div and Asagiri shall directly escort the transport ships (in
the 1st sailing formation) by adopting the 1st protective sailing order (C), and ad-
vance on the 1st sailing route at a normal speed of 8 knots. 
The aircraft of the Sendai shall provide guard against enemy submarines on the sail-
ing route ahead of the transport ships as much as possible, using Puolo Condore and
the Anambas Islands as their bases.
2. The 1st Minesweeper Div and the 11th Subchaser Div (minus Submarine Chaser No.
9) shall leave the Anambas base at an appropriate moment, join the transport ships at
a point 48 nautical miles 25º of Point C at 1200 on Day L – 3, and take up their posi-
tions in the 1st protective sailing order without separate orders. Two minesweepers
shall change places with the Shirayuki and the Asagiri, and guide the transport ships.
3. When relieved the of task of jointly guiding [the transport ships] by the 1st
Minesweeper Div and the 11th Subchaser Div (minus Submarine Chaser No. 9) at
1200 on Day L – 3, the 11th Destroyer Div and the Asagiri shall sail to the Anambas
base to load a full amount of fuel and join the transport ships at 0800 on Day L – 2.
All units and naval ships shall adopt the 1st protective sailing order (A); the Shirayuki
and the Asagiri shall take over the task of guiding the ships.
4. When reaching Point D around 1200 on Day L – 2, the 1st Minesweeper Div shall
carry out a simplified sweeping of the sailing route ahead of the transport ships
(using large minesweeping devices in a single-ship manner at a depth of 8 meters).
5. At Point W (14 nautical miles north of Point J), all naval vessels shall take up their po-
sitions in the 2d protective sailing order. 11th Subchaser Div (minus Submarine
Chaser No. 9) shall leave the line, sail ahead toward Mentok, and take charge of re-
connoitering and guarding the anchorage. 
6. At Point V (8 nautical miles north of Point J), the 1st Minesweeper Div shall start
sweeping mines on the sailing route ahead (using large minesweeping devices in a
pair-ship manner at a depth of 7.5 meters) without separate orders, and advance
along the planned sailing route.
(b) The 2d Escort Unit
(1) [The unit] shall depart from Cam Ranh Bay at 1800 on Day L – 4, escort the transport
ships carrying the main force of the 38th Division in conformity with the arrangements
between the Army and the Navy, and have them enter into the anchorage at the mouth
of the Musi River around 0000 on Day L + 2.
(2) After the above transport ships have arrived at the anchorage at the mouth of the Musi
River, [the unit shall] keep guard in the Bangka Strait according to the outline given on
the attached sheet[s].
(3) At the time of the departure of the transport ships carrying the advance party of the 38th
Division from Cam Ranh Bay on Day L – 6, two destroyers [of the unit] shall cover the
departure of these ships.
4. The Army-Navy arrangements (omitted by the author)
5. Communications (omitted by the author)
6. Replenishment (omitted by the author)











































1. [Each naval ship] shall operate according to “the main points regarding entry into the
anchorages” stated in the memoranda attached to the Army-Navy agreement. The
time to drop anchor at the Mentok anchorage is 0000 on Day L.
2. Patrol areas of each naval ship (omitted by the author)















































) 1. While on guard, the submarine chasers shall take up position near the Tajima-maru
and the Kinugawa-maru. When the [landing] craft of the river-ascending unit [up to]
Palembang are ready (around 0300 on Day L), they shall guide and escort the latter
respectively to the mouths of the Saleh and the Musi rivers. After that, they shall
guard the Mentok anchorage (Sector M).
2. From the time when the transport ships (minus the An’yō-maru and the Alaska-maru)
shift to the anchorage at the mouth of the Musi River on the evening of Day L until
the time [they start] sailing upriver on the early morning of Day L+1, one submarine













1. [The unit] shall be in the patrol areas and keep guard according to the outline on the
attached sheet[s].
2. The aircraft of the Sendai shall timely advance to the Mentok seaplane base when the











1. The unit shall sweep for mines at the northern part of the Bangka Strait, [the waters]
off the Mentok pier, and the anchorage at the mouth of the Musi River, in accordance
with the outline given on the attached sheets.
2. When the minesweeping at the anchorage at the mouth of the Musi River is com-
pleted on Day L, one of the minesweepers shall guide the transport ships (minus the
An’yō-maru and the Alaska-maru) and have them shift to the [new] anchorage by the
sunset of the day.
3. When the tasks in the above items are completed, [the minesweepers] shall go to their
patrol areas and keep guard according to the outline on the attached sheets.
The Plan of Operations of the Base Units(68)
1. The River-Ascending Unit for Palembang
[The unit], which consisted of the main unit, the minesweeping unit and the
supply unit, was supposed to carry out the following tasks under the com-
mand of the 9th Base Force Commander R. Adm. Hiraoka Kumeichi.
(1) Replenishment support for the minesweeping units
(2) Clearing the enemy on the land
(3) Setting buoys to show the sailing route
(4) Minesweeping and disposal of controlled mines and booms [at harbor
entrances and in the rivers]
(5) The transport and supply of matériel for the Mentok seaplane base
2. The Anambas Base Unit and the Singora Base Unit
[The units] shall carry out the tasks designated by the commander in line
with Malaya Unit Operation Order Classified No. 17 (the abovementioned
plan of operations of the Malaya Unit). 
The Plan of Operations of the 1st Air Unit
On 31 January, Malaya Unit Commander Vice Admiral Ozawa issued
the order concerning the deployment [of air units to the newly-acquired]
bases by Malaya Unit Telegraphic Operation Order No. 108, which was
in outline as follows:(118)
1. The Genzan Air Group and the Yamada Type–0 Fighter Plane Unit shall ad-
vance to the Kuching base on 3 and 5 February respectively; [both] shall ad-
vance to the Ledo base when the latter has been made ready for use.
2. The Mihoro Air Group shall advance to the Kuantan base on 6 February.
3. The Kanoya Air Group shall promptly advance to the Kuantan base, and [fur-
ther] advance to the Ledo base when the latter has been made ready for use.
In accordance with this [order], 1st Air Unit Commander R. Adm. Matsunaga Sadaichi gave
orders for the [air unit’s] plan of operations for Operation L, which was in outline as follows.
(Since the relevant materials are [no longer] extant, the author has reconstructed the plan
from action records, action reports and other documents.)
1. Disposition of Forces (as shown in the following table)
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9th Base Force Com-
mander R. Adm. 
Hiraoka Kumeichi
22d Air Flotilla Com-
mander R. Adm.
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36 Type–96 land-based attack planes
and 3 Type–96 fighter planes of the
Genzan Air Gp
A, B, C, D
Note by the author:
A =  Destroying [enemy] naval vessels 
B = Destroying the enemy air power in the area east of Bangka and Palembang as well as
in the western part of Borneo while neutralizing the enemy air power in western Java
C =  Providing escort for transport ships 
D =  Patrolling 
E =  Preparing air bases in Malaya 
2. Deployment [of air units to the newly-acquired] bases
(1) [Deployment of air units to the newly-acquired air bases shall be carried out] in accordance
with Malaya Unit Telegraphic Operation Order No. 108, (as previously told.)
(2) When the air base in Mentok has been seized and readied, Air Raid Unit C shall advance to
the base.
(3) The subsequent deployment [of air units] shall be ordered later.
The Plan of Operations of the 2d Air Unit
On 31 January, 2d Air Unit Commander Rear Admiral Imamura* issued the following order
by 2d Air Unit Operation Order No. 1 (summary):(122)
1. The outline of tasks and actions of each naval ship (as shown in the following table)






























































36 Type–96 land-based attack planes
and 9 Type–96 fighter planes of the 
Mihoro Air Gp

















A Type–0 fighter plane unit led by
Commander Yamada, [consisting of] 30
Type–0 fighter planes, one element of
the ground patrol section of the 9th



















dr 27 Type–1 land-based attack planes of
the Kanoya Air Gp A, B, D
Name of the ships Main tasks Actions
Kamikawa-maru
Preparations for the subsequent operations
Support for the [set-up] work of the Anam-
bas base and the guarding of the base
At anchor near Cam Ranh Bay base
by the 13th; then, she shall leave Cam
Ranh Bay on the afternoon of the 14th
to advance to the Anambas [base] on
the afternoon of the 16th.
* In the table on p. 262, the captain of the Kamikawa-maru (Capt. Shinoda Tarohachi) is listed as the commander
of the 2d Air Unit of the Malaya Unit. He replaced Rear Admiral Imamura as of 1 February.
2. Actions of the aircraft units
On Day L – 2, [the units shall] provide the advance party with direct escort against enemy sub-
marines and aircraft, while guarding the sailing route ahead of it as well as the sailing route
ahead of the main unit. On Day L – 1, [the unit shall] guard the sailing routes ahead of the ad-
vance party as well as of the main unit. On Day L, [the unit shall] provide the main unit with
guard against enemy submarines, while shifting their base from Anambas to Mentok.
After having advanced to the Mentok base, the unit was supposed to take upon itself the
task of guarding the area around the anchorage against enemy aircraft and submarines, while
supporting the river-ascending and landing operation to Palembang.
The Plan of Operations of the 3d Air Unit
After having completed Operation S (the operation to put the 18th Division ashore on
Endau), the 4th Carrier Division (minus the 2d Section, i.e. the Ryūjō and the Shiokaze; led by
R. Adm. Kakuta Kakuji) had entered into the port of Cam Ranh Bay at 1130 on 30 January
and was engaged in training, maintenance and replenishment for the subsequent opera-
tions.(71) By Malaya Unit Operation Order Classified No. 17 on 1 February, the unit was or-
dered to [also] participate in Operation L,(122) and undertake the task of attacking enemy naval
vessels and of attacking and driving off enemy aircraft while operating by and large along
with the main unit. The unit was also charged with the task of guarding the advance party
against enemy aircraft on Day L – 1 and on the morning of Day L by separate orders. Fur-
thermore, it was decided that the one destroyer of the 3d Destroyer Squadron that was to
form the 3d Air Unit along with the 4th Carrier Division would be the Shikinami.(120)
The Plan of Operations of the Submarine Unit
Having been informally informed on 24 January of the Malaya Unit’s plan of operations for
Operation L, and learning that the intended support and strength for that operation would
consist of three submarines (one at the south entrance of the Sunda Strait and one each at
the north and the south entrance of the Lombok Strait), the Submarine Unit commander (4th
Submarine Squadron Commander R. Adm. Yoshitomi Setsuzō) announced his plan of oper-
ations on 26 January, which was in outline as follows:(123)
1. The outline of the operation
[The unit] shall support Operation L by deploying three submarines at strategic points in the
rear of the enemy in order to destroy fleeing [enemy] units, while at the same time making
preparations for the coming Java operation with the other five submarines.
2. The outline of operations of the unit supporting Operation L
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Sagara-maru Support for the [set-up] work of the Anam-bas base and the guarding of the base At anchor near the Anambas [base].
One auxiliary submarine
chaser (designated by the
commander)
Transport of the base personnel and the
guarding of the Mentok base
After the departure of the aircraft
units on Day L, she shall leave Anam-
bas for Mentok.
Ditto Guarding of the Anambas base
She shall appropriately operate on the
waters surrounding the Anambas
base.
[The unit shall] depart from Cam Ranh Bay in order to be deployed at the
following points by Day L – 2.
I-55 ([of] the 18th Submarine Division): at the south entrance of the Lombok
Strait
I-56 ([of] the 19th Submarine Division): at the south entrance of the Sunda
Strait via the Lombok Strait
Ro-34 ([of] the 21st Submarine Division): at the north entrance of the Lombok
Strait
However, 4th Submarine Squadron Commander Rear Admiral Yoshi -
tomi had on 27 January been ordered by Malaya Unit Telegraphic Oper-
ation Order No. 103* to lead [among others] the Kinu, the Fujigawa-maru,
the Tatsumiya-maru and two destroyers of the 3d Destroyer Squadron
and advance to the Ledo area to carry out the operation to transport per-
sonnel and matériel for the base there, and on 1 February he was still en-
gaged in that operation (the details of which will be described later [p.
274]).(123) Therefore, because it was impossible to hand him Malaya Unit
Operation Order No. 17 concerning Operation L in person, the assign-
ment of the submarine units was announced by Malaya Unit Telegraphic
Order No. 113 on 2 February.(123) [However,] in this order, the previously
decided deployment of two submarines at the Lombok Strait and one at
the Sunda Strait was changed in such a way that two submarines should
be deployed at the Sunda Strait and one at the Lombok Strait. In accor-
dance with this order, the submarine unit commander left the deploy-
ment of I-55 and I-56 as he had planned, and changed the deployment
of Ro-34 from the north entrance of the Lombok Strait to the north en-
trance of the Sunda Strait.
The Plan of Operations of the Army Air Units(117)
By the end of January, the Army Third Air Force had already deployed its forces to the bases
in Sungai Petani, Ipoh, Alor Setar, and Ketil on the Malay Peninsula, and was preparing for
the operation against Sumatra by searching out the enemy air power as well as by attacking
enemy airfields from time to time. On 30 January, the Southern Army decided to employ the
1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group (a paratrooper unit) and give priority to [the seizure of] the
Palembang airfield, putting the unit under the command of Third Air Force Commander Lt.
Gen. Sugawara Michiō. The unit was supposed to be employed in the following way:
1. The unit shall seize the Palembang airfield to facilitate Operations L and H (the operation against
western Java) and, if possible, seize and secure the Palembang oil refineries before the enemy
destroys them.
2. The first drop or landing shall be carried out on the morning of Day L – 1; the operation shall
be aborted if the weather does not permit it.
3. The dropped or landed unit shall be put under the command of the Sixteenth Army commander
after the arrival of the main force of the 38th Division at Palembang.








* The text mistakenly has 10.
The Launch of the Operation
Postponement of the Operation Schedule (See Illustration No. 27)
As previously told, at the Manila Conference the Navy had made a draft arrangement [with
the Army] on 22 January that in principle it would chiefly use the Ledo airfield, which was
[still] an unknown quantity, and that it would use the Kuantan and the Kahang airfields for
the time being if the Kuching and the Ledo airfields were unusable; also Day L was set on 10
February (Day X + 64, which meant a four-day postponement [from the schedule decided
on in the Cam Ranh Agreement]). Then on 28 January, the (previously described) Arrange-
ment on the Air [Operations] in Operation L was concluded. Meanwhile, the Kawaguchi De-
tachment had seized the Ledo airfield at 1000 on 27 January. The seaplane(s) of the
Kamikawa-maru sent the following report after reconnoitering the Ledo airfield.(122)
1. The [main] Ledo airfield is located about five kilometers east of Ledo, with three runways; one
which runs from north to south is about 2,500 meters long, another which runs from east to west
is about 1,200 meters long, and the other which runs in between is about 1,200 meters long.
There are about seventy-nine large and small holes blasted by landmines, which are currently
being repaired by army units. The soil [appears] to be red clay, with some patches of grass; the
ground appears to be in comparatively good condition. No obstacles were found in the perime-
ter.
2. A dozen or more bridges on the road[s] from Singkawang to Ledo have been destroyed. Also a
dozen or more holes probably blasted by landmines were spotted on the road.
3. No Japanese forces were spotted other than large-sized motorized [landing] craft in Pemangkat
and the army in Ledo.
As previously told, by means of Malaya Unit Telegraphic Order No. 103 on 27 January, the
4th Submarine Squadron commander had been given the task to transport the personnel and
matériel to be advanced to the Ledo air base.(123) In accordance with this order, 4th Submarine
Squadron Commander Rear Admiral Yoshitomi launched the Ledo transportation operation,
departing from Saigon at 1400 on 30 January with [among others] the Fujigawa-maru (carrying
the personnel and matériel of the Genzan Air Group) and the Tatsumiya-maru (carrying the
advance personnel and matériel of the Kanoya Air Group for the Ledo base). On the early
morning of 2 February, escorted by the Kinu, the 44th Minesweeper Division and the Mu-
rakumo, the transport ships entered the port of Pemangkat, but it was decided to redirect
them to Pontianak because the conditions for the overland transport [from Pemangkat] were
bad. However, as a result of an investigation on the 3d of the actual conditions [for an over-
land transport from] Pontianak, it became clear that the transport conditions from Pemangkat
were better, so the transport ships sailed back again to Pemangkat on the 4th.(123)
However, the main roads to Ledo and the bridges on them were thoroughly destroyed,
and moreover the roads were dangerously steep; it was extremely difficult to repair them
for motorized traffic. In the end, among the several roads leading to Ledo, two routes, one
which connected Singkawang, Montrado, Bengkayang, and Ledo, and another which con-
nected [the sea and] Ledo via the Sambas river ([using] the waterway up to Sanggau) were
selected. However, on 1 and 2 February it was expected that the repair of the former route
would take two weeks and the latter one week.(123) Although the Kawaguchi Detachment co-
operated in the repair of the roads as well as in the disembarkation and transportation of
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fuel and ammunition with all its might, the fuel accumulated by 4 February was a mere 200
drums.(34) As for the airfield, the Kawaguchi Detachment reported on the same day that [a
runway of] 100 meters wide and 1,000 meters long had been completed.(34)
On 4 February, Malaya Unit Commander Vice Admiral Ozawa finally gave up the idea
to use the Ledo airfield and decided to conduct the operations by using the Kuantan and the
Kuching [airfields] (an assumption by the author based on the movements of the aircraft
units and other factors). At 1900 on that day, the invasion unit [of Operation L] was supposed
to leave Cam Ranh Bay. However, the Mihoro Air Group had not advanced to the Kuantan
[airfield] yet (the advance was scheduled for 6 February). As for the Genzan Air Group, only
twelve Type–96 land-based attack planes had advanced to the Kuching [airfield] (the advance
had been scheduled for 3 February) and, moreover, the airfield’s condition was bad. Having
no other choice and running out of time, the Malaya Unit commander decided on his own
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responsibility to postpone day L by two days and ordered the postponement to his subordi-
nate units by telegram.(122)
Without delay, Malaya Unit Commander Vice Admiral Ozawa conferred about the matter
with the Army side through Cdr. Wakatsuki Ryōzō (a gunnery staff officer of the Third Fleet)
who was seconded to the Sixteenth Army. On the afternoon of the 4th, Cdr. Wakatsuki visited
the staff section of the Southern Army headquarters along with the Sixteenth Army staff of-
ficers and held talks on a two-day postponement of Operation L.(34) The Southern Army head-
quarters insisted that at the Manila Conference it had been mutually agreed to carry out the
air campaigns by using airfields in the Malaya area in case the Ledo airfield was unusable,
and that it was now too late to use the impracticability of the Ledo airfield as an excuse for
a postponement of Operation L. The army sent the following telegram to the Navy Southern
Task Force commander:(34)
1. At the talks, which the OSAMU-SHŪDAN (note by the author: the Sixteenth Army) had with the
First Southern Expeditionary Fleet at Cam Ranh Bay today, a request for a two-day postpone-
ment of the launch of Operation L was made by the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet because
the airfields had not yet been made ready for use.
2. Presently, we have completed all our preparations and scheduled the start of our ground attacks
against Singapore from the 7th onwards. As the surrender [of Singapore] is imminent, we would
like to seize an opportune moment ahead [of the fall of Singapore] to carry out [Operation] L.
We would like your consideration for the realization of the above.
In reply, Southern Task Force Commander Vice Admiral Kondo wired that “[We] would like
a one- or two-day postponement be [decided] in talks between the Sixteenth Army and the
First Southern Expeditionary Fleet.”(34) Having no other choice, the Southern Army obtained
approval from the IGHQ Army Department and issued on the 5th an order to postpone [Op-
eration] L for two days until 12 February.(34)
During these negotiations [with the Army], another problem had arisen, which further
worsened the worries of Malaya Unit Commander Ozawa. Namely, when in accordance with
Malaya Unit Telegraphic Operation Order No. 108 of 31 January the advance team of the Mi-
horo Air Group arrived at Kuantan (assumed to have been on 2 or 3 February; the advance
of the Kanoya Air Group to the airfield seemed to have been postponed), it turned out that
the trees of the forest in front of the runway were so tall that the land-based attack planes
could not take off from the airfield with a regular load of bombs unless the trees in zone of
200 meters wide and 300 meters long were cleared. Although the advance team hurriedly
started cutting down the trees, it only managed in two days to fell the trees in a stretch of a
mere twenty meters, because many of them were giant hardwood trees.(34) On the other hand,
the Kuching airfield was located on a hill and difficult to enlarge, moreover its soil was
bad.(124) Among the aircraft of the Yamada Unit (twenty-one Type–0 fighter planes and four
land-based reconnaissance planes), which had advanced there on 5 February, two Type–0
fighter planes, two land-based reconnaissance planes, and one land-based attack plane (the
latter was an aircraft of the Mihoro Air Group which had given assistance in the air transport)
were badly damaged at the time of landing, causing slight injuries to four crew members. It
was reported that due to these incidents, the repair of the airfield would not be completed
before the 7th.(118)
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Realizing that the use of the Ledo airfield was beyond hope, that the felling of the trees
at the Kuantan airfield would require more time, and that, moreover, the condition of the
Kuching airfield was bad, the Malaya Unit commander judged that it would take another
four or five days before the land-based attack planes could be deployed. On the 5th, he made
a decision to postpone Operation L for another four days (the departure of the invasion units
was scheduled on the evening of the 6th); (a reconstruction by the author based on the Sagara-
maru Action Report and the Ishii documents). Consequently, the commander sent a telegram
to the Southern Army, which read: “We will dispatch our Chief of Staff R. Adm. Sawada
Torao (accompanied by Senior Staff Officer Captain Tomari) to Saigon on 6 February to dis-
cuss Operation L.” [See also Vol. 3, p. 300.] This telegram reached the Southern Army head-
quarters just after it had issued the order for a two-day postponement of Operation L.(34)
At 0800 on the 6th, Malaya Unit Commander Vice Admiral Ozawa wired the Malaya Unit
by means of Classified Telegram No. 628: “Day L shall be postponed until specifically ordered
otherwise.”(125) [See also Vol. 3, p. 304.] On that afternoon, First Southern Expeditionary Fleet
Chief of Staff Sawada and Staff Officer Tomari sought an approval for the postponement of
Operation L at the Southern Army headquarters in Saigon in the following way:(34) “Yesterday
on the 5th when [land-based] attack planes and fighter planes landed on [the] Kuching [air-
field], four aircraft were damaged because of bomb craters. We were informed that the repair
[of the airfield] should be completed on the 7th, which we consider very doubtful. As for the
Ledo airfield, on the other hand, the transport routes are long and poor, and the accumulation
of fuel and ammunition has yet to be completed. Furthermore, the Kuantan airfield in
Malaya, to which the [Navy land-based] medium-sized attack planes have advanced (note:
thirty-six land-based attack planes and nine Type–96 fighter planes of the Mihoro Air Group
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The Felling of the Giant Trees Surrounding the Kuantan Airfield
had advanced to the airfield on 5 February) is surrounded by a tall forest, and the trees in a
zone of two hundred meters wide and three hundred meters deep need to be cut down. How-
ever, we have managed to clear only twenty meters in two days, as many of the trees are
enormous. We fear that it will further take as much as ten days [if we continue] at this pace.
As the Navy [has decided to] have aircraft maintenance personnel as well engage in the work
of felling the trees, we would like you to approve at least another four days, that is, in total
a postponement of six-days.”*
Responding to this request, the Southern Army mainly accused the Navy of having made
insufficient preparations.(34) “In the arrangements for the air [operation] on 28 January con-
cluded after the Manila Conference, the Navy was supposed to advance to both the Kuantan
and the Kahang airfields for Operation L if the Ledo airfield was not fit for use. The Navy
should have thoroughly examined [the practicality of] the airfields. It is a terrible lack of
preparation [to say] at this time that the trees are an obstruction.” It was certainly a fault of
the Navy. Since the Kuantan airfield was supposed to be used [anyway] even when the Ledo
airfield was put to use, the Navy certainly should have surveyed it without delay. However,
the Navy had been confident [that the airfield could be used] because Army aircraft could
use it without problems.(124) (Note: That Army aircraft could use it was caused by a difference
in performance between the Army and the Navy aircraft.)
Although they did not come to an understanding after all, it was decided that the South-
ern Army would for the time being postpone the departure of the convoy of the 38th Division
scheduled for the evening of that day till the evening of the 7th, and check up on the situation
at Ledo. Meanwhile, considering that those trees had to be cut down the sooner the better, it
was [also] decided to dispatch about fifty men, mainly consisting of the cadre of a company
of the 20th Independent Engineer Regiment, which had been assigned to the Third Air force
and was fortunately assembling near Kahang, and have them cooperate in the felling of the
trees. In the meantime, the Navy arranged to immediately send about three tons of dynamite
from Saigon to Kuantan.(34)
On the 6th, the Combined Fleet headquarters stationed on Hashira-jima in the Inland Sea
learned that the Malaya Unit headquarters and the Second Fleet headquarters were con-
fronting each other [about the Sumatra operation], with the former insisting that Sumatra
landing operation should be [postponed and] carried out around the 16th due to the delay
in the preparation of the bases in Kuantan, Kuching, Ledo, etc., while the latter was pressing
the former to carry out the operation [as scheduled] from the point of view of the entire op-
eration and without worrying about the damage. After having communicated with central
command regarding the matter, the chief of staff of the Combined Fleet sent [his opinion] to
the chief of staff of the Second Fleet that it should not be [carried out] in such a rush.(46)
On the night of the 6th, the Southern Army headquarters sent the following telegram to
the IGHQ Army Department.**(34)
1. Today, we received another request for a further postponement of four days from the First South-
ern Expeditionary Fleet. The main reason for this was that trees in (some) place(s) around the
Kuantan airfield needed to be cut down, and even though the work had been started two days
ago, the amount of work was too much to tell when it would be finished.
278 Chapter V     /     The Forward Push of the Air Bases
* See also Vol. 3, p. 301.
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2. Although we were frustrated by this request, as it was made after such a long time since the
conclusion of the arrangements for Operation L, we immediately arranged the assistance of
[Army] engineers, and [at the same time] based on the concluded arrangements, urged [the
Navy] to use the Kahang airfield and took measures to let [the Navy aircraft] use army fuel, etc.
However, it was decided to determine a new date for Day L by tomorrow, the 7th, upon careful
examination of all the factors that the Navy said were still unclear.
Because of troubles with telegrams, etc., only fifteen engineers were transported on the 7th,
and it was decided that the remainder would be transported on the 8th. On that day [the
7th], the Malaya Unit commander officially proposed to the Southern Army commander in
chief that “We would like to postpone [Operation] L for another four days. However, we
would like to have [the convoy] depart as soon as the preparations for the air operation have
been completed.”*(34) From the point of view that the strength of the allied forces was being
increased day by day and that it was considered advantageous to conduct Operation L before
the completion of the capture of Singapore, the Southern Army headquarters were against a
postponement of Operation L, but reluctantly approved the request.(127) At 1925 on that day,
Malaya Unit Commander Vice Admiral Ozawa wired the following order.(126) “On the 7th,
the following arrangement was made with the [Southern] Army: Day L will be postponed
for another four days. However, [the operation shall be] launched as soon as the preparations
for the air operations are complete.”**
On the 8th, the Southern Task Force headquarters sent the Southern Army headquarters
a telegram to request a change in the invasion schedule as follows:(34) “L: on Day X + 70; H
(note by the author: eastern Java): on Day X + 81; I (note by the author: western Java): no
later than Day X + 81 (to be arranged between the Third Fleet and the Sixteenth Army).”
Having no choice, the Southern Army headquarters approved it, too.(34)
On 8 February, [Army] engineers and [Navy] maintenance personnel started blowing up
the trees in front of the runway of the Kuantan airfield.(128) On that afternoon, 1st Air Unit
Commander Rear Admiral Matsunaga ordered the land-based attack plane unit of the Mi-
horo Air Group to advance from the Kuantan airfield to the Kahang airfield and attack
Java(122) (which was called off later). Meanwhile the preparations of the land-based attack
plane units and Type–0 fighter plane units at the Kuching airfield was completed, and it was
decided that the Naval air units should launch the air operation to destroy the enemy air
power in the Batavia area from the 9th onwards.(129) Accordingly, it became possible to move
up the departure of the invasion unit scheduled for the 10th by one day.(30) At 1400 on the
9th, Malaya Unit Commander Vice Admiral Ozawa issued the following order.***(122)
1. The date of L is set for 15 February.
2. Each unit shall operate as planned.
Little Progress in the Prior Neutralization of the [Enemy] Air Power 
Having advanced in succession from Saigon to Kuching with its first nine planes on 30 Jan-
uary, the land-based attack planes of the Genzan Air Group launched a search and attack on
the enemy in the Karimata Strait from 1 February onwards.(71) Meanwhile, the Mihoro Air
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Group stationed in Kota Bharu ([on] the Malay Peninsula), having advanced one element to
Sungai Petani ([on] the Malay Peninsula) on 17 January, also started its search and attack on
the enemy in the Karimata Strait on 1 [February]. However, due to the bad condition of both
airfields, the aircraft were only allowed to load one fourth (i.e. one 250kg bomb or four 60kg
bombs) of their regular load of bombs, while the Type–1 land-based attack planes of the
Kanoya Air Group were unable to advance [their bases] from Thủ Dầu Một (an [air] base
north of Saigon). The general situation of [the progress of] the neutralization of the enemy
air power from the 1st until the departure of the invasion unit was as follows.(71)
1 [February]: Five land-based attack planes each of the Genzan and the Mihoro Air Groups
bombed the industrial zone on Belitung Island as well as Mentok, setting ablaze warehouses
and powder magazines. They also reported having spotted one [enemy] destroyer, one gun-
boat and six merchantmen at Mentok as well as on the waters near the Bangka Strait and
sunk a 6,000t-class merchantman. All of the aircraft returned to base.
2 [February]: Nine land-based attack planes of the Genzan Air Group and ten land-based attack
planes of the Mihoro Air Group carried out a search and attack mission on the enemy in the
Bangka Strait and on the west coast of Sumatra. They reported having spotted two [enemy]
destroyers and six merchantmen and inflicted serious damage to one 4,000t-class merchant-
man and also some damage to one 2,500t-class merchantman. All of the aircraft returned to
base.
3 [February]: Eight land-based attack planes of the Genzan Air Group and nineteen land-based
attack planes of the Mihoro Air Group carried out a search and attack mission on the enemy
in the areas of the Bangka Strait and Mentok. They reported having spotted eight [enemy]
light cruisers, six destroyers, twenty-four merchantmen and one auxiliary ship ([note by the
author] a considerable number of ships were counted twice) and sunk a 10,000t-class mer-
chantman, a 7,000t-class armed merchantman, and a 6,000t-class merchantman. All of the
aircraft returned to base.
[Meanwhile,] nine land-based attack planes of the Mihoro Air Group (of which one re-
turned to base due to a breakdown) carried out an attack on Singapore and bombed its com-
mercial port. They reported having scored a large number of direct hits on three 10,000t-class
merchantmen and the military facilities on the wharf. Seven planes were marked with bul-
lets, one made an emergency landing on the Kluang airfield used by the Army, but the others
returned to base. 
4 [February]: Nine land-based attack planes of the Genzan Air Group and six land-based attack
planes of the Mihoro Air Group carried out a search and attack mission on the enemy in the
Bangka Strait. They reported having spotted one [enemy] heavy cruiser, one light cruiser,
four destroyers, one escort naval ship, one small naval vessel and six merchantmen, and
sunk two 20,000t-class merchantmen and the escort ship. Two of the planes sustained hits
and made an emergency landing on Ledo, while others returned to base. 
5 [February]: Five land-based attack planes each of the Genzan and the Mihoro Air Groups car-
ried out a search and attack mission on the enemy in the Bangka area. They reported having
spotted two [enemy] cruisers, two destroyers, two auxiliary gunboats, one fishing boat (500
ton class), and one sailboat (200 ton class), and scored near hits on one auxiliary gunboat,
the fishing boat and the sailboat. All of the aircraft returned to base.
Four land-based attack planes of the Mihoro Air Group attacked the coastal areas of north-
ern Sumatra. They reported having spotted one [enemy] destroyer and two merchantmen
and scored near hits on the merchantmen. All of the aircraft returned to base.
Twenty-one Type–0 fighter planes and four land-based reconnaissance planes of the Ya-
mada Unit advanced from Kota Bharu to Kuching. However, due to the bad condition of
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the airfield, two Type–0 fighter planes, one land-based reconnaissance plane and one land-
based attack plane, which had assisted with the transport, were seriously damaged (as pre-
viously told) in this advance. Meanwhile, the aircraft that had advanced to the Kuching
airfield were three Type–96 fighter planes, four land-based reconnaissance planes, twenty-
one Type–0 fighter planes and eighteen Type–96 land-based attack planes.
The Army air units in the Malaya area had completed their deployment for the air cam-
paign to destroy the [enemy] air power in the Palembang area.(117)
6 [February]: Thirty-six land-based attack planes of the Mihoro Air Group (full force) advanced
from Kota Bharu and Sungai Petani to the Kuantan base. Also, nine Type–96 fighter planes
of the group advanced to Kuantan from Kota Bharu.
The Army air units launched their air campaign to completely destroy the [enemy] air
power in the Palembang area.(117)
7 [February]: No operations were conducted. 
8 [February]: The 22d Air Flotilla headquarters advanced to Kuching from Saigon.(75)
Six land-based attack planes of the Genzan Air Group carried out a search and attack mis-
sion on the enemy [on the waters surrounding] Bangka Island. They reported having spotted
two destroyers and two merchantmen and sunk one 10,000t-class merchantman out of them.
All of the aircraft returned to base.
The Mihoro Air Group did not conduct operations due to the felling of the trees in the ex-
tension zone of the runway. 
One land-based reconnaissance plane of the Yamada Unit carried out a reconnaissance of
the Batavia area. After spotting two battleships (which were later amended to ‘not battle-
ships’), twenty large merchantmen in the port and six large and twenty-seven small aircraft
on the airfield, as well as one Buffalo, one Spitfire and others in the air, it returned to base.(129)
Army aircraft spotted one [enemy] cruiser, two destroyers and twenty transport ships,
which had sortied from Batavia and were sailing northward, as well as one [enemy] de-
stroyer and seven transport ships, which were sailing southward on the waters north of Java.
From the 6th onwards, the Army air units reported having brought down or damaged
around 100 aircraft of the enemy air forces in the three-day air campaign to destroy the
enemy air power.(117)
On this day, the Navy air units (the Genzan, the Mihoro Air Groups and the Yamada Unit)
finally completed preparations to conduct attacks from the advance bases, and it was de-
cided to launch the air campaign to destroy the enemy air power in the Batavia area from
the 9th onwards. 
9 [February]: One land-based reconnaissance plane and fifteen Type–0 fighter planes of the Ya-
mada Unit carried out an attack on Batavia. All of the aircraft returned after reporting having
shot down twelve enemy aircraft and strafed eight, which were set ablaze. However, one
Type–0 fighter plane was seriously damaged when landing. The [enemy] movements recon-
noitered at Batavia were as follows:(129)
1. Naval ships at anchor in Batavia 
One Renown-class battleship, about twenty large merchantmen, and about twenty small
merchantmen. 
2. Kemajoran airfield 
Two large and seventeen small aircraft
3. Cililitan airfield 
Four Blenheim bombers and ten small aircraft
One land-based attack plane of the Kanoya Air Group conducted a survey of the Kuantan
base from Thủ Dầu Một and concluded that it was unusable as an operation base for Type–
1 land-based attack planes.(117) On that day, the invasion unit left Cam Ranh Bay. 
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The Sailing of the Convoy 
At 1900 on the 9th, the 1st Escort Unit and the convoy carrying the Army advance party left
Cam Ranh Bay.(118) Earlier, in view of the movements of enemy surface units in the Bangka
area for the past several days, Malaya Unit Commander Vice Admiral Ozawa had judged
that it was highly likely that his units would encounter powerful enemy surface units in the
coming Operation L. Therefore, in order to reinforce the support surface force, he had decided
to put the Yura of the 2d Escort Unit into the main unit and the Kashii into the 2d Escort Unit
instead of the Yura, and on 8 February he had changed the disposition of his forces in the fol-
lowing way.(118)
1. The Yura shall be removed from the 2d Escort Unit and added to the main unit. 
2. The Kashii shall be removed from the Anambas Base Unit and added to the 2d Escort Unit; ac-
cordingly the captain of the Kashii shall become the 2d Escort Unit commander.
3. The 91st Guard Unit commander shall become commander of the Anambas Base Unit. 
The force, which left Cam Ranh Bay on the 9th, consisted of the following [ships].(118)
The Sendai (the flagship of the 3d Destroyer Squadron), the 11th Destroyer Division (the Hatsu -
yuki, the Shirayuki, and the Fubuki), the Asagiri, and eight Army transport ships 
At 1920 when departing from Cam Ranh Bay, the Fubuki detected and attacked [an] enemy
submarine, with unknown results.(118) After that, the ships smoothly continued their sailing
southward. On that evening, the Uranami and the Murakumo, which had been engaged in the
Ledo operation, broke off the operation and left Pamangkat for the Anambas Islands. The
1st Section of the 41st Minesweeping Division also returned to the Anambas Islands. In the
meantime, on the early morning of the 9th, the Army units had successfully landed on Sin-
gapore Island and launched an all-out attack.
Around 1000 on the 10th, the 1st Escort Unit crossed the 10º N line and changed course
south southwestward toward the Anambas Islands. At 1800 on that day, the main unit and
the 3d Air Unit left Cam Ranh Bay as scheduled. This force consisted of the following [ships]:(68)
Main unit: The Chōkai (the flagship of the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet), the 7th Cruiser
Division (the Kumano, the Suzuya, the Mikuma, and the Mogami), the Yura, the 1st Section of
the 19th Destroyer Division (the Ayanami and the Isonami), and the 12th Destroyer Division
(the Shirakumo)
The 3d Air Unit: The 4th Carrier Division (the Ryūjō) and the Shikinami
On the 11th, the 1st Escort Unit still continued sailing south and by the evening reached a
point as close as about two hundred nautical miles north of the Anambas Islands.(118) The
main unit and the 3d Air Unit sailed after the 1st Escort Unit, closing in on it at sunset at a
distance of about seventy nautical miles behind. At sunset, the main unit spotted two torpedo
trails. Carrier-based attack planes of the 4th Carrier Division, the Yura and the Shirakumo car-
ried out an attack, but with unknown results.(119) At 1800, the 2d Escort Unit left Cam Ranh
Bay as scheduled, escorting the main force of the Army,(68) which consisted of the following
[ships]:
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The Kashii, the Shimushu, the 20th Destroyer Division (the Yūgiri and the Amagiri), Submarine
Chaser No. 9 and fourteen Army transport ships
On that day, the Kinu returned to Cam Ranh Bay from the Ledo operation in order to prepare
for the subsequent operations.(123)
On the early morning of the 12th, the Main unit and the 3d Air Unit caught up with the
1st Escort Unit at a point about 150 nautical miles north northeast of the Anambas Islands.(118)
At that point, one element of the escort unit changed places with the unit that had sailed
north from the Anambas Islands, and the former sailed to the Anambas Islands for refuel-
ing.(68) According to a subsequent air reconnaissance, one [enemy] cruiser, one gunboat and
some vessels that looked like transport ships were spotted sailing south on the waters north
of the Bangka Strait, and Malaya Unit Commander Vice Admiral Ozawa judged that the
enemy was still in a full-fledged escape from the Singapore area.(119) The commander decided
to advance with a force consisting of the main unit, the 3d Air Unit and the 3d Destroyer
Squadron to the waters of Bangka and catch and destroy the escaping enemy units before
the invasion units would reach the area.(118) From around 2000 or 2030, the units started sailing
southward, increasing their speed to 18 knots; the Chōkai, the 2d Section of the 7th Cruiser
Division, the Ryūjō, and the 19th Destroyer Division headed for a point about 130 nautical
miles east of Singkep, while the Sendai, the Yura, the 11th Destroyer Division, the 1st Section
of the 7th Cruiser Division and the 12th Destroyer Division headed for a point about 60 nau-
tical miles east of Singkep.(119) Around that time, the 1st Escort Unit was sailing southeast of
the Anambas Islands, while the 2d Escort Unit was sailing south on the waters east of the is-
land of Puolo Condore. In the meantime, the low speed unit of the Base Unit, [i.e.] the Otowa-
maru, the Rumoi-maru, eight auxiliary cutters and four fishing boats, had left the Anambas
Islands at 1500, and was sailing southward toward the Bangka area, intending to reach the
mouth of the Musi River on the early morning of the 15th.(68)
Around 0800 on the 13th, the units, which had advanced to catch the escaping enemy
units, reached their respective positions, ready to meet the fleeing enemy vessels.(130) By the
end of that day, the 3d Destroyer Squadron unit ([consisting of] the Sendai, the Yura, the 11th
Destroyer Division and the Asagiri) reported the following military gains:(118)
1403: The Hatsuyuki and the Shirayuki sank one British 4,000t-class merchantman.
1404: The Fubuki and the Asagiri sank a ship, which looked like a British 2,000t-class auxiliary
minelayer.
2245: The Sendai and the Yura sank a ship, which looked like a 3,000t-class auxiliary cruiser.
In the meantime, at 1845 one enemy aircraft came probing, which was followed by a raid of
five aircraft at 1940; they strafed and bombed the Fubuki and the Asagiri, but no damage was
sustained.(118) The 7th Cruiser Division unit did not spot any enemy other than an enemy
merchantman on fire, and at 1700, by an order of the Malaya Unit commander, [started] sail-
ing north toward the waters east of Cape Jang to be ready against the enemy [in the zone]
south of Singapore and north of Bangka Island. On that evening, the 1st Escort Unit and the
2d Escort Unit were sailing south, respectively at a point about forty nautical miles northwest
of Tambelan Island and about a hundred nautical miles north of Great Natuna Island.
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At 0045 on the 14th, the Fubuki and the Asagiri sank one British merchantman at thirty
nautical miles east of Cape Jabung. At 0800, 1st Escort Unit Commander Rear Admiral
Hashimoto decided the subsequent disposition of forces as follows:(118)
1. The Sendai and the 1st Section of the 11th Destroyer Division shall join the transport ships.
2. The Yura, the Asagiri and the Fubuki shall appropriately operate on these waters and attack
enemy naval vessels under the command of the captain of the Yura, and operate in such a man-
ner as to guard the area north of the transport ships as they sail south.
3. The Fubuki shall join the transport ships at 1800 (supposed to cover the transport ships sailing
into the Bangka Channel).
At 0600, the transport convoy of the advance party reached a point about forty-six nautical
miles east of Cape Jang and kept sailing southward. At 0800, three enemy aircraft came for
a raid and dropped bombs but caused no damage. Between 0910 and 0950 in the course of
joining the convoy, the Sendai and the 1st Section of the 11th Destroyer Division spotted three
floating mines about ten nautical miles south of Saya Island and got rid of them. Also, the
convoy [itself] spotted three floating mines and got rid of them between 1115 and 1230. The
friendly fighter planes started the direct escort in the air [over the convoy] from around 1000
onwards. Although six enemy aircraft came for a raid in the air above the convoy around
1230, which was followed by four aircraft around 1450, friendly fighter planes and antiaircraft
fire drove them off, and they caused no damage. The friendly fighter planes shot down some
of the enemy aircraft. The friendly fighter planes withdrew their direct escort at 1545 and re-
turned to base.(118)
At 1400, the transport convoy reached [the waters] about twenty nautical miles 200º [SSW]
off Saya Island, set its course at 170º [SSE] and headed for the Bangka Strait. At 1600, 1st Es-
cort Unit Commander Rear Admiral Hashimoto issued the following order:(118) “When
tonight entering into Mentok [anchorage], enemy merchantmen must not be attacked unless
they do harm to us. [Also,] when attacking enemy merchantmen, you have to focus on crip-
pling them and try as much as possible not to sink them.” The order was issued in view of
the experience that since the 13th, [the attack units], full of fighting spirit and too anxious to
attack, had wasted ammunition against an enemy that had almost no pluck to fight back,
and that, moreover, the penetrating power of the shells was so great that they just went right
through the ships’ sides without readily sinking them.(131)
Around 1815, the Army’s small cargo ship unit sailing in the wake of the 1st Escort Unit
at a distance of about twenty nautical miles encountered a 1000t-class British auxiliary gun-
boat and was coming under fire from the latter. However, the Yura, the Fubuki and the Asagiri,
which were covering the rear, soon came in for support and sank the gunboat. One of the
small cargo ships caught fire and was abandoned because there was no chance of extinguish-
ing it.(118) Around 1920, the convoy was strafed and bombed by eleven enemy bombers at a
point about seventy nautical miles north of Palembang, and the 9th Base Unit sustained some
damage.(68) The convoy reached Point J at 2100 and shifted to the formation for entering into
the Mentok anchorage. While the Hatsuyuki and the Fubuki, which had sailed ahead, provided
guard on the surrounding waters, it entered into the anchorage, guided by the Shirayuki. The
Hatsutaka of the 9th Base Force separated [from the convoy] at some point near Point J to
head for the mouth of the Musi River.(118) In the meantime, when on that day [the 14th] the
1st Section of the 7th Cruiser Division was operating on the waters east of Cape Jang, it re-
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ceived around 1430 a report from [an] aircraft of the Ryūjō [about spotting] one mid-sized
[enemy] merchantman at ten nautical miles east of Cape Jang and headed for the target.
Around 1620, the section spotted a ship, which looked like a British auxiliary mine layer, and
fired at her, but let her get away because she escaped into shallow waters, which appeared
to be a minefield. Meanwhile at 1120, a [scout] plane of the Suzuya reported having spotted
[an enemy] submarine on the waters west of Lingga Island and having attacked and sunk
her.(114) The main unit and the 3d Air Unit operated on almost the same waters as they had
on the previous day. Although they came under a surprise attack by nine heavy bombers in
the afternoon, they sustained no damage.(130) In the evening, a report came in: “The Army [para-
troop] raiding unit has successfully landed at Palembang at 1125 today, the 14th.”(114)
Between 0010 and 0100 on the 15th, the convoy entered into the Mentok anchorage as
scheduled. Around 0020, the Hatsutaka, which had headed for the mouth of the Musi River
[ahead], wired: “Spotted [a vessel], which looks like [an] enemy destroyer to the south of the
light ship at the mouth of the Musi River. Request to drive her off.” First Escort Unit Com-
mander Rear Admiral Hashimoto ordered the 11th Destroyer Division to attack her, and the
Fubuki headed for the mouth of the Musi River at 0055. Meanwhile, after guiding the trans-
port convoy into the anchorage, the Shirayuki seized [an enemy] 1,500t-class armed merchant-
man and [a] 200t-class small merchantman to the south of the anchorage, led them to Mentok
to hand them over to Submarine chaser No. 7, which seized from the ships nautical charts of
the waters around Singapore.(118)
After entering into the anchorage, the transport convoy immediately launched the oper-
ation to land in Mentok as well as prepare for the operation to maneuver [landing] craft to
the mouth of the Musi River. The Mentok landing unit and the [Musi River] landing craft
task force respectively left the anchorage at 0205 and around 0300.(132) The [Army’s] Saleh
River-ascending Unit and the Musi River-ascending Unit (including the Telang River Unit)
respectively reached the mouth of each river at 0545 and 0615.(133) In the meantime, the Fubuki
searched for the enemy naval vessel at the mouth of the Musi River along with the Hatsutaka.
However, unable to spot the vessel, she broke off the search at 0500 and returned to her patrol
area.(68) Meanwhile, finally at 0450, the 1st Escort Unit commander received a report from the
11th Subchaser Division commander that the landing had been successfully carried out at
0220. At 0545, the [Navy] Base Unit’s River-ascending Unit for Palembang (the unit to clear
the waterways [to Palembang]) arrived at the mouth of the Musi River.(118)
The deployment of forces around the sunrise on 15 February was as follows:
The north entrance of the Bangka Strait: the Sendai, the Hatsuyuki and the Fubuki
[The area] to the south of Saya Island and the east entrance of the Berhara Strait: the Yura and
the Asagiri
The Mentok anchorage:
The anchorage of the convoy: eight Army transport ships, the Eikō-maru, the Kōryū-maru,
Submarine Chasers Nos. 7 and 8
The waters [requiring] minesweeping: 1st Minesweeper Division (in the course of sweeping
mines)
The area south of the anchorage: the Shirayuki
The mouth of the Musi River: the Hatsuyuki, the Otowa-maru, the Rumoi-maru, eight auxiliary
cutters, four fishing boats and the Army task force in their landing craft
At the mouth of the Saleh River: the Army task force in their landing craft
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Illustration No. 28 — The Guarding at the Bangka Strait Anchorage and 
the Outline of the Operation to Sail Upstream to Palembang
At 0800, the 1st Minesweeper Division encountered one British torpedo boat off Cape Kelian
and sank her. At 0830, the Shirayuki [also] sank [one] British torpedo boat in the area south
of the Mentok anchorage. Around that time the Fubuki pursued a ship, which looked like a
British minelayer, and ran her aground to the north of Cape Ular. At 0930, the 1st
Minesweeper Division completed clearing the surrounding waters of mines (no tethered
mines [found]). In the meantime at 0830, the Army river-ascending units (consisting of small
shallow-draft [landing] craft, which did not need to worry about mines) started sailing up-
stream. Following that, the Navy River-ascending Unit for Palembang (for clearing water-
ways) started sailing upstream.(118) At 1400 on 15 February, Singapore finally fell.
Missing an Opportunity to Destroy the Enemy Fleet (See Attached Illustration No. 4 [omitted])
On the morning of 15 February, the main unit ([consisting of] the Chōkai, the 2d Section of
the 7th Cruiser Division, the 4th Carrier Division and the 19th Destroyer Division) and the
1st Section of the 7th Cruiser Division were operating on the waters about a hundred nautical
miles east northeast of Mentok. At 1000, the following report from a scout seaplane of the
Chōkai was sent:(134) “0938: Three enemy cruisers and five destroyers are sailing north in the
Gaspar Strait.” “0950: The enemy seems to be directly escorted by six destroyers and accom-
panied by one battleship.” It was followed by a report, which came from the 4th Carrier Di-
vision:(119) “1005: The [current] enemy position is thirty-five nautical miles 340º [NNW] of
Liat Island and on a course of 0º [N] at a speed of 12 knots.” (The position was actually a
mistake for twenty-five nautical miles 40º [NE of the island].) “No enemy aircraft carriers
were seen at the rear of the enemy cruisers.” The enemy position as of 1000 was about 160
nautical miles 145º [SSE] of the main unit. It was partly sunny with a wind of ten meters [per
second] from the north and a visibility of fifty kilometers, creating perfect weather conditions
for an attack.
Malaya Unit Commander Vice Admiral Ozawa made roughly the following judgments
and decisions:(119)
1. The enemy seems to have rallied a powerful unit and is heading northward in order to attack
our Operation L units.
2. [Judging from] the reconnaissance reports of the Batavia area before the launch of Operation L
as well as from the reports delivered by the aircraft of the Chōkai, it is certain that a battleship is
among the enemy unit.
3. We shall pick up the enemy movements by keeping on probing the enemy as much as possible
with our air force, and first of all attack them with our air units. Then, taking a favorable op-
portunity, our surface units shall rush at the enemy and destroy them.
At 1035, the Malaya Unit commander reversed course to head southeastward and issued the
following orders, while beginning to assemble his main unit in line for approaching the
enemy.(134) [First, he issued the following order] to the 22d Air Flotilla: “1035: Get ready for
an attack with the full force of the land-based attack planes.” [Also,] to the main unit: “From
1200 onwards, stand by and be ready for immediate sailing at a speed of 28 knots and for
the maximum battle speed in fifteen minutes.” Then at 1045, he ordered the 1st and the 3d
Air Units to carry out repeated attacks on the enemy, while ordering the 2d Air Unit to probe
the enemy fleet.(118)
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The main unit did fourteen knots, taking by and large a southeastern course.(134) A little
after 1100, a [scout] plane of the Chōkai reported as follows: “1108: The position of the enemy
main force is at twenty-five nautical miles 50º [NE] of Cape Berikat.” [That is to say,] the
enemy position as of 1100 was 115 nautical miles 140º [SE] of the main unit. Around that
time, the following report of the 2d Escort Unit Commander Capt. Kojima Hideo came in:(118)
“The position of the 2d Escort Unit as of 1000 is 0º37’N, 106º16’E. If things carry on like this,
it shall reach the mouth of the Musi River around 1100 on the 16th.” The 2d Escort Unit’s
scheduled entry into the anchorage had been around 0000 on the 17th. However, its current
position was forty-five nautical miles northeast of the main unit. Judging that it was danger-
ous to let the unit continue its course when a decisive battle with the enemy fleet was about
to be launched, Malaya Unit Commander Vice Admiral Ozawa ordered at 1125: “The 2d Es-
cort Unit shall temporarily evacuate to the north.”(119) At 1135, the 2d Escort Unit reversed
course and started to evacuate, setting its course at 0º [N].
At 1130, [an] aircraft of the 22d Air Flotilla sent in the following report:(134) “1100: The
enemy main force consists of a battleship and three cruisers as its core and sails at a speed of
18 knots on a course of 300º [WNW], accompanied by eight destroyers.” It was followed by
a report from [an] aircraft of the 4th Carrier Division: “1120: One battleship is among the
main force of the enemy.” At 1155, 22d Air Flotilla Commander Rear Admiral Matsunaga re-
ported: “1130: The attack [plane] unit has been launched.” After that, reports on the state of
the enemy poured in one after another from friendly aircraft.(134) From a scout seaplane of
the Chōkai: “1137: The enemy sails counting from the north in a line of five destroyers and
three cruisers. All turned 270º [W] together, [sailing] at a speed of 20 knots.” From [an] aircraft
of the 22d Air Flotilla: “1145: The position of the enemy main force is 50 nautical miles 0º [N]
of Gaspar Island [and they are sailing] at a speed of 20 knots.” From [an] aircraft of the 4th
Carrier Division: “1155: Spotted two enemy cruisers and one destroyer at 58 nautical miles 90º
[E] of Cape Tuing. They are [sailing] on a course of 0º [N] at a speed of 14 knots.” It was followed
by “1215: Correction: the enemy position is 22 nautical miles 2º [N] of Gaspar Island.”
The main unit was still approaching [the enemy fleet] at a speed of fourteen knots. Malaya
Unit Commander Vice Admiral Ozawa informed his subordinate units of his overall judg-
ment of the enemy situation as of 1240 as follows:(134) “The enemy main force consists of one
battleship, three cruisers and eight destroyers. Its position is at 2ºN 106º7’E and it is [sailing]
on a course of 350º [NNW].” Again, the following reports came in: From a [scout] seaplane
of the Chōkai: “1250: The position of the enemy main force is 55 nautical miles 105º [E] of
Cape Tuing. [The enemy is] sailing on the course of 310º [NW] at a speed of 14 knots.” “1315:
Add further two battleships to the force.” From the 4th Carrier Division commander: “1300:
The enemy strength consists of five large cruisers and eight destroyers. They are [sailing] on
a course of 310º [NW] at a speed of 14 knots.” From a scout seaplane of the Kumano: “1300:
[The position of] the enemy main force is 45 nautical miles 0º [N] of Cape Berikat. It is [sailing]
on a course of 310º [NW] at a speed of 18 knots.”
Although more than three hours had passed since the enemy was [first] spotted, friendly
air units had not yet conducted any attacks. Malaya Unit Commander Vice Admiral Ozawa
judged that if his unit would continue sailing southeastward, it was likely to meet head-on
with an enemy fleet that was superior to his unit and included a battleship. At 1328, the com-
mander changed his course northeastward at a right angle to the course of the enemy and
[also] issued the following orders:
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1. The Sendai, the Yura, the 11th Destroyer Division and the Asagiri shall join the main unit.
2. The main unit shall operate on the waters northeast of Cape Jang.
3. [The ships of] the 1st Escort Unit other than those above shall enter [and stay in] the mouth of
the Musi River.
While assembling around 1500, the Sendai, the Yura and the other ships that were ordered to
join [the main unit] started sailing north from the north entrance of the Bangka Strait. The
convoy also raised anchor at 1500 to head for the mouth of the Musi River.(118)
Setting its course virtually to the north at 1350, the main unit sailed as if it was backing
away from the enemy.(134) Then, it received the following reports: From a scout seaplane of
the Mikuma: “By the bombing attacks of our forces at 1335 [1325?], one large cruiser is sending
up black smoke. The formation of the enemy has lost coherence.” It was the first bombing
attack conducted on the enemy fleet by seven carrier-based attack planes of the 4th Carrier
Division. At 1406, [by ordering the main unit] “Stand by and get ready for immediate sailing
at 24 knots and at maximum battle speed in thirty minutes,” the Malaya Unit commander
eased the standby level of the engines. At 1430, he changed his course north northwestward
and kept this course so that he would maintain a distance of more or less 65 nautical miles
from the enemy. Right after that, friendly aircraft reported the enemy’s course reversal as
follows: From a scout seaplane of the Suzuya: “1417: The enemy reversed course.” From [an]
aircraft of the 4th Carrier Division: “1420: The enemy main force has reversed course. It is
[sailing] on a course of 120º [ESE] at a speed of 24 knots.” From a [scout] plane of the Mogami:
“1430: The enemy changed course to starboard.” From [an] aircraft of the 22d Air Flotilla:
“1430: At 1405 [we] bombed the main force of the enemy but did not score direct hits.”
Before the attacks of friendly air units had produced considerable military gains, the
enemy started reversing course to withdraw. At 1450, the [Japanese] main unit set its course
at 0º [N]. At 1500, it changed course again to the northeast, and then headed southeastward
at 1513, but it still kept sailing at a low speed. Then, the following reports were received:(134)
From a scout seaplane of the Kumano: “1515: The enemy has reversed course, [and sails] on
a course of 145º [SE]. There are no battleships. A Hawkins-class cruiser was wrongly taken
for a battleship. This is certain.” From the 4th Carrier Division commander: “1550: A Hawkins-
class cruiser was mistaken for a battleship.” From the 4th Carrier Division commander: “1600:
Based on the confirmed report from the aircraft that probed [the enemy], [I] partly revise the
report on the enemy strength as follows: [the enemy consists of] seven cruisers (three Emer-
ald-class, two Danae-class, and two Hawkins-class), and five destroyers. [There are] no battle-
ships.” Despite this report, Malaya Unit Commander Vice Admiral Ozawa did not yet
abandon his judgment that [a] battleship was among the enemy [fleet].(134)
Around 1600, there followed reports about the friendly land-based attack planes’ bombing
attacks, but the enemy still seemed to be evacuating on a course of 120º [SE] without having
sustained fatal damage. From this situation, the Malaya Unit commander judged that the
enemy had given up its plans due to the attack of our air units. Accordingly at 1620, the com-
mander issued an order to the 2d Escort Unit, which was evacuating to the north: “The 2d
Escort Unit shall operate as planned. Report your [current] position.”(118) In accordance with
this order, the 2d Escort Unit reversed course: its position [at that time] was 102 nautical miles
39º [NE] of Cape Jang. [Meanwhile,] aircraft continually reported on the enemy move-
ments.(134) Gathering from the reports, the distance to the enemy was expected to be 130 nau-
tical miles or more by 1700. Judging that an engagement was hardly likely on that day, the
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Malaya Unit commander ordered the 1st Escort Unit at 1700: “The 1st Escort Unit commander
shall return to his original tasks at an appropriate moment.”(118) In accordance with the order,
the 3d Destroyer Squadron unit returned to its deployment in the Bangka Strait area at mid-
night. At 1810, the aircraft reconnoitering [the enemy] reported that the enemy was still sail-
ing south. After ordering the air unit at 1810 to have “all aircraft stop the reconnaissance,”
the Malaya Unit commander decided to have the main unit guard the present waters by ap-
propriately operating there.(134)
Although the enemy had sustained some damage by the attacks of the Japanese air units,
which had caused two of the ships to send out black smoke, they sailed through the Gaspar
Strait at 1900 to the Java Sea. The attacks of the air units on that day had scarcely been able
to cause any serious damage, and the surface unit also missed an opportunity to have an en-
gagement.(134) Capt. Tanaka Kikumatsu, then captain of the Kumano of the 7th Cruiser Divi-
sion, criticized the conduct of the operation in his post-war memoir as follows:
If he [Vice Admiral Ozawa] had the intention to carry out a decisive battle with his main unit,
he should at least have kept the enemy in sight. I understand that he attached greater importance
to the air attacks, but by having the few bombers of the 4th Carrier Division carry out repetitive
attacks the whole day, I wonder whether he did not depend too much on aircraft [attacks]. And
it is regrettable that he ignored the positive statements by the aircraft of the Kumano (confirmed
by Aviation Officer Lt. Itō Motoé himself) as well as by 4th Carrier Division Commander Rear
Admiral Kakuta that there was no battleship among the enemy [fleet].
On the other hand, Malaya Unit Commander Vice Admiral Ozawa stated in his post-war
memoir the following:(38)
After this operation, 4th Carrier Division Commander Kakuta once asked me whether the sur-
face unit should not have hotly pursued and closed in on the enemy when the enemy had been
spotted. To that question, I answered in the following way:
1. The fleet should not distance itself too far from the transport convoy it was supposed to es-
cort. In addition, it was supposed to continue its task to catch and destroy as much as pos-
sible enemy vessels escaping from Singapore.
2. I judged that the enemy fleet had come out to conduct a rescue operation and had anticipated
our air raid to some degree. I never expected that at our first air raid the enemy would flee
in total confusion.
As for the enemy battleship, it was concluded afterward that a battleship had not been in-
cluded after putting together the reconnaissance reports and photos.
The Lack of Military Gains Produced by the Air Units 
On 10 February, twenty-seven land-based attack planes of the Mihoro Air Group advanced
from the Kuantan base to the Kahang base to prepare for the attack on Batavia. On the 11th,
the land-based attack planes of the Mihoro Air Group headed for the attack on Batavia, each
aircraft carrying seven 60kg bombs for use on land (about half [of the regular full load]) and
fuel loaded to capacity. However, because the fighter planes to cover the attack could not
take off due to bad weather at Kuching, the attack planes called off the [scheduled] attack
and conducted a search and attack on enemy naval vessels in the Bangka Strait [instead].(128)
The unit spotted three [enemy] cruisers, one destroyer and two merchantmen near Bangka
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Island and carried out a bomb attack, but the attack produced very few results, because the
evasive actions of the enemy were very skillful and because the unit had to use bombs for
use on land (with impact fuses; the fuses for attacks on naval vessels had not yet arrived).(71,
128) (It was reported that one cruiser and two merchantmen had been destroyed.)
On the 12th, seventeen land-based attack planes of the Genzan Air Group, twenty-six
land-based attack planes of the Mihoro Air Group, and twenty-seven land-based attack
planes of the Kanoya Air Group, seventy aircraft in total, carried out a search and attack on
enemy naval vessels in the Bangka Strait. They spotted three merchantmen, one cruiser, three
destroyers and two auxiliary vessels, and reported having destroyed one merchantman, one
cruiser, and one auxiliary vessel.(71, 81) On that day, eleven land-based attack planes of the
Genzan Air Group advanced to Kuching, by which the total number of the aircraft advanced
there became thirty-one.(135)
On the 13th, twenty-seven land-based attack planes of the Genzan Air Group, twenty-
eight land-based attack planes of the Mihoro Air Group and twenty-seven land-based attack
planes of the Kanoya Air Group, eighty-two aircraft in total, carried out a search and attack
on enemy naval vessels in the Bangka and Singapore Straits. They spotted some dozen mer-
chantmen, one destroyer and one auxiliary vessel and carried out attacks on them, but only
to report that they had only sunk one merchantman and seriously damaged another.(71, 81)
The poor bombing scores of the land-based air units were a big problem.
Note: “Yamada Takeo Hisōchō Nisshi” [The Journal of Chief Flight Warrant Officer Yamada
Takeo] put it in the following way: “Today, all squadrons had poor scores. Because all bombs
blanketed the [enemy] ships, at least one should have hit. But [the enemy] really must have
had all the devil’s luck that not a single bomb did hit them. Tomorrow, we are again sched-
uled to attack [enemy] naval vessels. We must score direct hits, for the honor of the Navy
air units as well. The squadron commander is also racking his brains over how to correct
the bomb run. He even said that he would award a prize to anyone who would offer him a
good idea. All of us feel really exasperated.” Furthermore, the entry on 14 February in the
“Sanagi Chūsa Nikki” [Diary of Commander Sanagi] relates: “The Malaya Unit was trying
hard to attack enemy naval vessels in the Singapore and Bangka Island areas with the entire
force of its air units and surface vessels. However, it is deplorable when, like on yesterday
the 13th, the mid-sized [land-based] attack plane units of the 22d Air Flotilla attacked an
enemy transport convoy with seventy-one aircraft in total only to sink no more than a single
ship. That should be called a worse than bad result.”
On the same day, seventeen Type–0 fighter planes and one land-based reconnaissance plane
of the Yamada Unit headed for an attack on Batavia but returned due to bad weather.(129)
On the 14th, twenty-seven land-based attack planes of the Genzan Air Group, twenty-
nine land-based attack planes of the Mihoro Air Group and twenty-seven land-based attack
planes of the Kanoya Air Group carried out a search and attack on enemy naval vessels in
the Bangka and the Singapore Straits. They spotted one [enemy] destroyer, four minelayers,
three auxiliary vessels and eight merchantmen, and reported having sunk one minelayer and
two merchantmen, run one minelayer aground and inflicted some damage to another, while
having inflicted serious damage to two merchantmen, some damage to one and minor dam-
age to another, and also run two merchantmen aground.(71, 81) Meanwhile, the Yamada Unit
provided direct escort in the air over the convoy for Operation L and reported that the unit
had shot down ten enemy Lockheed bombers (almost all) that had come for a raid between
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1235 and 1400 before they could bomb [the convoy]. Five Japanese aircraft were marked by
bullets, but all returned.(129)
[Concerning the operation for] the 15th, 1st Air Unit Commander Rear Admiral Mat-
sunaga had issued orders that six land-based attack planes of the Genzan Air Group should
take off at dawn and search for the enemy in the Bangka area, while the other aircraft should
be on standby, primarily to be serviced. At 1000, a [scout] plane of the Chōkai, which had been
searching for the enemy, reported having spotted an enemy fleet,(134) which was followed by
orders of the Malaya Unit commander to prepare for an attack at 1035 and to implement the
attack.(122) At 1040, the 1st Air Unit commander ordered all air raid units to attack the enemy
with their full force.(122) All units hurriedly prepared for the attack. [However,] some units
were unable to gather their full regular crew and [had to] conduct the mission with mixed
crews.(128) Twenty-three land-based attack planes of the Genzan Air Group took off from
Kuching at 1130, carried out bombings on the enemy fleet, whose formation had been broken
by the bombings of the carrier-based attack-plane unit of the Ryūjō at 1335 [1325?]. However,
without scoring direct hits, all returned with eight of them marked by bullets.(71) However,
this attack made the enemy fleet reverse course at 1417.(134) Twenty-seven land-based attack
planes of the Mihoro Air Group took off from the Kuantan base at 1235 to attack the enemy
fleet and carried out attacks from 1545 till 1634. They scored no direct hits either and all re-
turned to Kuantan with twelve of them marked by bullets.(71) The Kanoya Air Group also
hurriedly prepared for attack. At 1230, the first team of nine aircraft departed from the Thủ
Dầu Một base, which was followed by seventeen aircraft at 1342; they headed for an attack
on the enemy fleet. The land-based attack planes of the Kanoya Air Group had been sched-
uled to land on the Kahang base after the attack. Having received a telegram from the 22d
Air Flotilla Commander Rear Admiral Matsunaga, “1640: If it is not possible to return to base
before sunset, the unit shall suspend the attack and return. Sunset: 2021,” the 1st Squadron
reversed course and returned to base.(134) However, the 2d and the 3d Squadrons continued
their attack missions. Around 1842, they attacked the enemy fleet but none scored any direct
hits and almost all aircraft were marked by bullets. While the commander plane returned to
Thủ Dầu Một, six planes flew to Ledo, and ten to Kahang. Among the planes that had headed
for Ledo, one made an emergency landing in a dense forest area near the Ledo [airfield] and
caught fire, which killed all eight crewmembers.(71) One of the aircraft which had landed on
the Kahang [airfield] fell into a ditch on the left side of the runway and was seriously dam-
aged.(128) In the meantime, the Yamada Unit conducted patrols over Kuching with Type–96
fighter planes, while supporting the attack on the enemy fleet with one land-based recon-
naissance plane and six Type–0 fighter planes, but without spotting enemy aircraft, all re-
turned.(129)
The 2d Air Unit (seaplane unit) had carried out patrols over the anchorage as well as the
convoy (after its departure from the port) against enemy submarines and also patrols [against
enemy aircraft] day after day. However, no enemy was spotted other than some aircraft,
which had come to raid the Anambas area. From the 12th onwards, the unit searched for the
enemy [on the waters] south of the Anambas Islands and reported having spotted small
enemy naval vessels and a large number of merchantmen. Then on the 15th, after the scout
plane of the Chōkai had spotted the enemy, the unit reconnoitered the enemy fleet with its
full force and reported useful information on the enemy movements.(122) In the meantime,
the advance base personnel of the 2d Air Unit carried out a landing in front of the enemy at
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Mentok along with the army unit
and set up a seaplane base
there.(125) At 1300, one element of
the reconnaissance seaplane unit
advanced to the Mentok [base]
and carried out patrols over the
anchorage against enemy sub-
marines and aircraft, while sup-
porting the river-ascending units
to seize Palembang.(125) During
this period, on the 14th, the unit
reported having sunk an enemy
submarine, inflicted minor dam-
age to a gunboat and serious
damage to a torpedo boat, setting
the latter ablaze, and also de-
stroyed one merchantman. It also
produced a military gain of in-
flicting minor damage to an
[enemy] merchantman and lead-
ing [a] friendly destroyer to her
to sink her. Also on the 15th, the
unit reported military gains of
sinking an [enemy] auxiliary
gunboat, inflicting some damage
to one gunboat and minor dam-
age to another, and setting a mer-
chantman ablaze.(119, 122, 125)
At 1800 on the 10th, the 3d
Air Unit ([consisting of] the
Ryūjō, the Shiokaze, and the Shik-
inami) had left Cam Ranh Bay following the main unit of the Malaya Unit. At 0800 on the
13th, the unit advanced to [the waters] about 130 nautical miles 85º [E] of Singkep Island.
Afterwards, the unit appropriately operated on the waters north of Bangka Island to be ready
against the enemy in the Gaspar and Karimata Straits.(71) The unit guarded the air over the
main unit and the carrier with the carrier-based fighter planes, while patrolling against
enemy submarines with carrier-based attack planes. Also, it carried out a search and attack
mission on the enemy in the Bangka Strait with carrier-based attack planes; on the 13th, it
reported military gains of having sunk one merchantman, setting two ablaze, inflicting seri-
ous damage to one, some damage to another, and minor damage to two, while having run
another aground;(71) on the 14th, it reported military gains of having sunk one torpedo boat
tender in cooperation with a scout seaplane of the Mogami, and also having sunk an auxiliary
vessel and a gunboat, destroyed one minelayer, while having sunk one merchantman and
run another aground. There were no attacks by enemy aircraft or submarines.(68)
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A Seaplane Base
On the 15th, the 3d Air Unit was following in the wake of the main unit of the Malaya
Unit. At 0848, Type–96 carrier-based fighter planes on guard in the air drove off an enemy
flying boat, which had probed the main unit. The [air] unit was in the course of carrying out
a search and attack on the enemy in the Riouw and the Berhara Straits, while attacking enemy
gunboat[s] in the Palembang area. Learning that a [scout] plane of the Chōkai had spotted an
enemy fleet at 1000, the 3d Air Unit immediately separated from the main unit and started
advancing toward the enemy.(37) At that time, it was partly sunny with a wind of ten meters
[per second] from the north and a visibility of fifty kilometers, creating a perfect opportunity
for an air attack.
Note: The topnotch crews had been culled from the 3d Air Unit for the attack on Hawaii and
the unit was made up of scratch crews right before the opening of hostilities, so in fact they
had barely had time for practice and their bombing or torpedo attack skills were far from
polished. That is why Commander Kakuta left the cover provided by the main unit and
boldly advanced toward the enemy alone, so it would be easier to conduct repeated attacks
(by making it possible to conduct attacks from a close distance).(37)
At 1105, the first attack unit of seven carrier-based attack planes of the 3d Air Unit took off.
At 1325, the first attack unit bombed an Exeter-class cruiser, set her ablaze, and reported hav-
ing sunk or seriously damaged the ship.(71) At 1430 [1540?], the second attack unit of six car-
rier-based attack planes bombed the enemy fleet, but with no results. At 1630, the third attack
unit (the second attack by the first attack [unit]) carried out a bombing, but with no results.
At 1735, the fourth attack unit (the second attack by the second attack [unit]) took off. At
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The Sinking of a Large Oiler in the Bangka Strait at 1600 on 13 February
1900, the attack unit bombed a Leander-class cruiser and scored one to three near hits near
the stern. All aircraft returned including two that had been marked by bullets. At 2120, 4th
Carrier Division Commander Rear Admiral Kakuta reported the following:(134) “2120: The re-
connaissance report by the fourth attack unit. As of 1703 the enemy fleet was heading south
in the Gaspar Strait with thirteen ships sailing in a single line ahead, stretching for about
twenty nautical miles, largely at a speed of twenty knots or more. The head is reaching a
point twelve nautical miles 80º [E] of Liat Island. The two cruisers in the rear are sailing
southward while [still] on fire.”
Note: Cdr. Yoshitomi Shigema, the aviation staff officer [of the 4th Carrier Div], recollected the
following reasons why the carrier-based attack planes had not carried out torpedo attacks: 
1. The crews had not been given enough training.
2. The torpedoes had not been satisfactorily maintained or adjusted.
For those reasons, he was even less confident in torpedo attacks than in bombing attacks.
The reason why the land-based attack planes had not carried out torpedo attacks was be-
cause the condition of the airfields was so bad that they were not able to take off with a tor-
pedo load. 
Success of the Upriver Sail to Palembang
At 0530 on the 15th, the Otowa-maru and the rest of the Navy River-ascending Unit for Palem-
bang (the Otowa-maru, the Rumoi-maru, eight auxiliary cutters and four fishing boats) arrived
in the mouth of the Musi River and joined the Hatsutaka (carrying the Base Unit commander),
which had sailed ahead. At 1000, the unit completed the preparation for the upriver
minesweeping operation and started sailing upstream at 1030.(118) (Note: The Army units
going upriver to Palembang in [landing] craft had already started sailing upstream at 0830.)
However, for about two hours right from the start of the upriver sail, a total of thirty-nine
enemy aircraft came attacking [the Navy units] in twelve raids, and bombed and strafed the
minesweeping unit in rapid succession. The unit was kept busy returning fire, and on top of
that, many obstacles on the river bottom near the mouth of the river frequently severed the
minesweeping cables, which only allowed the unit to completely sweep mines in a stretch
of about ten nautical miles in the morning. At 1300, Base Unit Commander Rear Admiral Hi-
raoka called off the minesweeping for that day and ordered the [sub-]units to return to the
mouth of the river. By 1500, the units returned to the mouth of the river and evaded the
enemy air raids, which still went on persistently until the evening even after the units had
taken cover. Although no damage of the ships was sustained in this antiaircraft engagement,
it caused a few casualties.(68) At nightfall, Malaya Unit Commander Vice Admiral Ozawa in-
corporated three minesweepers of the 1st Minesweeper Division into the River-ascending
Unit.(118) At 1900 on that day, the Musi River Ascending Unit of the Army advance party
reached Palembang and started landing.(133)
On the 16th, with the support of three minesweepers incorporated as reinforcements and
the seaplane units, which had advanced to the Mentok base, the River-ascending Unit
changed the disposition of forces and restarted the minesweeping operation, sailing upriver
at 0800.(68) Around 0900, Minesweeper No. 5 spotted vessels, which looked like enemy gun-
boats, immediately reversed course, engaged them and sank one and crippled another. On
that day, fewer enemy aircraft interfered, and the minesweeping operation by and large made
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smooth progress. That is, around 1430, the unit reached the confluence of the Upang River
[with the Musi River], by and large the midpoint [between the mouth of the river] and Palem-
bang. At 2030 the unit reached Palembang and for the most part completed the scheduled
minesweeping operation.(118) Meanwhile at 1845, the convoy of the Army main force in four-
teen ships had reached the mouth of the Musi River, escorted by the 2d Escort Unit.(68)
On the morning of the 17th, the Shimushu, to which the [Army] 38th Division headquarters
had been transferred from the transport ship Gin’yō-maru, started sailing upriver, guiding
nineteen Army transport ships. However, at a point around three nautical miles upstream of
Borang Island, they encountered a yet-to-be-swept mine barrier, which made it impossible
for the transport ships to sail upriver. Consequently, after having the transport ships tem-
porarily drop anchor [there], the Shimushu [continued to] sail upriver alone; she reached
Palembang at 1435 and disembarked the divisional headquarters. The minesweeping of that
[barrier] was finally completed on the 19th (having disposed of twenty-eight mines), and the
Army convoy at long last reached Palembang at 1500 on the 22d.(68) In the meantime, because
at 1030 on the 17th, by means of Malaya Unit Telegraphic Operation Order No. 136, orders
concerning the operation to clear the waterways in the Malacca Strait and the Singapore area
had been issued, 9th Base Force Commander Rear Admiral Hiraoka in charge of the operation
began preparations (i.e. by sending the minesweeping force to the Singapore area).(118)
The Operations of the Surface Units from the 16th Onwards
As of the early morning on the 16th, [the surface unit] was deployed as follows:(118)
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Minesweeping on the Musi River (1)
[From the] Northeast of Cape Genting [to] the Berhara Strait: the Yura and the Asagiri
Off Cape Ular (the north entrance of the Bangka Strait): the Sendai and the Fubuki
The Mentok anchorage: Submarine Chasers Nos. 7 and 8, the Eikō-maru, the Kōryū-maru, and
three Army transport ships
The center of the [Bangka] Channel: the Hatsuyuki, the Shirayuki and Minesweepers Nos. 2 and 3
The mouth of the Musi River: the Base Unit, Minesweepers Nos. 1, 4 and 5, and five Army trans-
port ships
On that day, the 1st Escort Unit seized or destroyed the following enemy naval vessels:(118)
0140: The Sendai attacked [a] British patrol boat off Cape Ular and destroyed her.
0825: The Sendai inspected a British cutter, disarmed her and led her to Mentok. 
0900: Minesweeper No. 5 sank [an] enemy torpedo boat and disarmed [a] patrol boat.
0940: The Fubuki seized two British speed boats.
0945: The Sendai and the Fubuki seized a British tanker off the lighthouse of Cape Kelian.
1300: The 11th Subchaser Division seized [a] British cutter off Mentok.
1330: The Hatsuyuki destroyed a British submarine chaser at a point southeast of Nangka [Besar]
Island.
1630: The Yura and the Asagiri seized a small British gunboat and led her to Mentok.
At 1430, four enemy bombers bombed the Mentok anchorage and caused some damage to
the Tajima-maru. Another raid by six enemy bombers followed at 1645, but no damage was
sustained.(118)
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Minesweeping on the Musi River (2)
At 1800, Malaya Unit Commander Vice Admiral Ozawa issued an order to the 7th Cruiser
Division and the 19th Destroyer Division (minus the Isonami) to sail to the Anambas [base]
to replenish and stand by [there] for the coming Java operation. He also ordered the Kashii
to sail to the Anambas [base] when the transport convoy had entered the anchorage at the
Musi River. He further ordered Escort Unit Commander Rear Admiral Hashimoto to send
the Yura, the 11th Destroyer Division and the 1st Minesweeper Division to the Anambas
[base] by the 19th at the latest. At 1845 on that day, the 2d Escort Unit, which had escorted
the Army main force, entered the anchorage at the mouth of the Musi River as much as five
hours earlier than scheduled (as previously told).(118)
On the 17th, just as on the previous day, the escort unit [again] took charge of guarding
the area surrounding the anchorage. They seized the following enemy [vessels] in the Bangka
channel on that day:(118)
0730: The 1st Section of the 41st Minesweeper Division seized a British motor launch.
0830: Submarine Chaser No. 8 seized two British cutters.
1710: Patrol Boat No. 3 [actually Minesweeper No. 3] seized a British steam launch.
At 1140 on that day, the Southern Task Force issued telegraphic order No. 103, concerning
changes of the disposition of forces (in accordance with the completion of the Malaya oper-
ation). Its contents were as follows:(118)
1. As of 21 February, the disposition of forces shall be changed as follows:
(a) [To be transferred] from the Malaya Unit to the Dutch East Indies Unit: The Yura, the 11th
and the 12th Destroyer Divisions, the 1st Minesweeper Division, the Kamikawa-maru, two
auxiliary submarine chasers, two fishing boats, and the Tsurumi.
(b) [To be transferred] from the Malaya Unit to the air unit: The 22d Air Flotilla (minus the Mi-
horo Air Group), a detachment from the 21st Air Flotilla and a detachment (minus Type–96
carrier-based fighter planes) from the 23d Air Flotilla.
2. The Malaya Unit shall cooperate in the western Java invasion operation, while staying engaged
in its own mission.
Also on the 18th, the [surface unit] seized three small enemy boats in the Mentok area. In the
meantime, the 11th Destroyer Division and the Yura withdrew from their patrol areas respec-
tively at 0700 and at 1000, to head for the Anambas [base] to prepare for the Java operation.
Also the main unit and the 3d Air Unit, concluding at 0600 that Operation L was largely fin-
ished, left the waters north of Bangka Island where they had conducted support operations,
and headed for Cap Saint Jacques. Meanwhile, the Ayanami had its propeller damaged by an
uncharted reef on the 17th. Judging that the she would not be able to participate in the Java
operation, Malaya Unit Commander Vice Admiral Ozawa decided to keep the Ayanami in
the main unit and have the Isonami participate in the Dutch East Indies operation instead
(and transferred the latter to the Dutch East Indies Unit as of the 27th).(118)
From the 19th onwards, the units to participate in the subsequent Java operation left their
patrol areas one after another, and by the 25th, only the Shimushu, two auxiliary cutters and
two Army transport ships were left in Mentok. During this period, a small number of enemy
planes sporadically raided [the anchorage], but no damage was sustained. On the 21st, the
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shift in the disposition of forces was implemented as scheduled, and the units went into a
major shift for the preparation of the subsequent operations.(68, 118, 139)
The Operations of the Air Units from the 16th Onwards
On the 16th, all units of the 1st Air Unit performed maintenance.(128) A little after noontime
on the 17th, a scout seaplane of the Mogami, which had been dispatched to the Mentok sea-
plane base, spotted a large enemy merchantman and a destroyer to the south of the Gaspar
Strait. The air units carried out attacks on them; at 1615, fifteen land-based attack planes of
the Genzan Air Group sank the merchantman, and ten carrier-based attack planes of the
Ryūjō sank the destroyer at 1657.(71) The enemy ships were [the destroyer] HNLMS Van Nes
and [the transport ship] Sloet van de Beele, which were evacuating the personnel of the Bangka
[and Belitung] Garrison Army to Java.(136)
From the 16th through the 18th, the weather conditions around the Batavia area were bad,
and did not allow land-based reconnaissance planes to reconnoiter [the area]. On the 18th,
all units performed maintenance.(129) On the 21st,* the 1st Air Unit was transferred to the
Dutch East Indies Unit, except for the Mihoro Air Group, and started on the preparations for
the coming Java operations.(122) The 2d Air Unit continued its search for the enemy on the
surrounding waters and the guarding of the anchorage against enemy aircraft and sub-
marines also from the 16th onwards while supporting land combats; it attained considerable
military gains. The aircraft units withdrew from the Mentok base on the 19th and the 20th to
return to their [mother] ships in the Anambas base.(119, 122, 125) As mentioned previously, the
3d Air Unit, which had been on the waters north of Bangka Island along with the main unit,
concluded that the operation was largely finished and started sailing north toward Cap Saint
Jacques.(119) In the few days before its departure, the unit had reported to have sunk one
[enemy] destroyer (as previously told), run one merchantman aground and seriously dam-
aged another, while having shot down one PBY flying boat which had come for a raid.(71)
As for the 1st Air Unit, on the 21st, a Type–1 land-based attack plane of the Kanoya Air
Group conducted a survey of the Palembang and Gelumbang [airfields] (the latter had been
newly spotted about thirty-seven kilometers southwest of Palembang). Then on the 22d, a
Type–96 transport plane of the Genzan Air Group also conducted a survey of the Gelumbang
base. As a result, it was decided that the Navy should make use of the Gelumbang base be-
cause the Palembang base was small [and already full] by just accommodating the Army air-
craft. From the 24th onwards, the 22d Air Flotilla advanced to Gelumbang and launched the
Java operation in earnest from the 25th onwards, making use of this base.(135) In the meantime
on the 23d, three land-based reconnaissance planes and fifteen Type–0 fighter planes of the
Yamada Type–0 fighter plane unit advanced to the Mentok base and launched the operation
against the Java area from the 24th onwards, thus completing the preparations for the inva-
sion of western Java.
The Operations of the Submarine Units(60, 123)
Submarines I-55, I-56 and Ro-34, which had left Cam Ranh Bay for Operation L on 31 January
and replenished at the Anambas [base] on 2 February, reached their respective patrol areas
at the north entrance of the Lombok Strait, and the south and north entrances of the Sunda
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* Actually the 19th. See p. 421.
Strait. Submarine Ro-34 arrived in its patrol area at the north entrance of the Sunda Strait on
5 February. That evening, she spotted and attacked [an enemy] transport convoy and sank
one escorting destroyer. As she reported having used up her torpedoes, Submarine Unit
Commander Rear Admiral Yoshitomi [Setsuzō] ordered Submarine Ro-34 to return to Cam
Ranh Bay, while having Submarine I-55 shift to the north entrance of the Sunda Strait. On
the 15th, receiving the report on the spotting of the enemy fleet, the submarine unit com-
mander decided to block off the escape routes of this fleet at the north entrance of the Sunda
Strait. Accordingly, the commander ordered Submarine I-55 as well as Submarines I-53 and
Ro-33, which were operating in areas nearby to take up positions for the coming Java oper-
ation, to take up positions in a skirmish line at the north entrance of the Sunda Strait. How-
ever, unable to detect the enemy fleet, the commander gave orders to call off the skirmish
line at 1600 on the 16th. On 17 February, Submarines I-55 and I-56 left their patrol areas to re-
turn to Cam Ranh Bay [Staring Bay, pp. 332, 482]. During this period, the three submarines
reported military gains of having sunk three merchant ships and sunk another with uncon-
firmed results apart from the previously mentioned [sinking of] a British destroyer.
The Engagements of the Army Air Units 
The [Army] Third Air Force had been preparing for Operation L, while providing support
for the Malaya operation of the Twenty-fifth Army. That is, the force [started] keeping an eye
on the Medan airfield from 11 December onwards, and the airfields in Pekanbaru, Palembang
and Mentok from the 17th onwards, while carrying out attacks on 28 December, 16, 17 and
23 January. On 4 February, the Third Air Force headquarters advanced to Kluang, and from
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The Sortie of a Submarine































































Illustration No. 29 — The Outline of the Operations of the Submarine Unit of the Malaya Unit During 
Operation L (30 January – 17 February, 1942)
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the 6th onwards launched the air campaign to destroy the enemy air power mainly with its
fighter planes. The military gains of the force were reported as follows: On the 6th, [the force]
shot down fifteen [enemy] aircraft and destroyed eleven, on the 7th it shot down more than
a dozen and destroyed twenty, on the 8th, it shot down two and destroyed nine, and on the
13th it shot down five and destroyed four. In these operations, five aircraft of the force did
not return.(117)
At 1500 on the 13th, the first airdrop unit (commander: Maj. Kōmura Takeo) of the 1st
Raiding Group (the parachute unit) had completed its deployment at the Kahang and Kluang
airfields, while the second airdrop unit (commander: 1st Lieutenant Morisawa) was standing
by at Sungai Petani. At 0830 on the 14th, the first airdrop unit took off from both airfields,
and the airfield raiding unit and the oil refineries raiding unit completed their drops at 1126
and 1130 respectively. Whereas the airfield raiding unit seized the airfield by that evening,
the oil refineries raiding unit [finally] seized all the distillation towers at 0100 on the 15th
after fierce engagements. [Meanwhile] at 1130 on the 15th,* Raiding Group Commander Col.
Kume Seiichi carried out a forced landing at about ten kilometers south of the airfield, ad-
vanced to the airfield the next morning, and took charge of the overall command after that.
At 1300 on the 15th, the second airdrop unit also landed on the airfield without problems.**(117)
At 1930, Raiding Group Commander Colonel Kume advanced into the city of Palembang.
In cooperation with the advance party of the 38th Division, which had arrived in succession
from around 2100 [1900], the [paratroop] raiding unit secured the airfield as well as the city
of Palembang. Although the attack unit at the oil refineries area had suffered persistent coun-
terattacks by the enemy all through the night, the enemy counterattacks tapered off after
daybreak on the 15th, and the unit completed clearing the vicinity of the enemy by noon on
the 15th. On the 16th, the Third Air Force pushed forward its command post to Palembang,
and the fighter plane unit advanced twenty of its aircraft on the 16th and twenty-seven on
the 17th [to the airfield]. Also, two command reconnaissance planes advanced there on the
17th, and on the 18th, practically the entire fighter plane unit (about forty aircraft [in total])
advanced to Palembang. After that, no large enemy [air units] were spotted in southern
Sumatra except for sporadic air raids by small numbers of aircraft, and the Third Air Force
mainly took on the task of communicating orders for the 38th Division while reconnoitering
the routes ahead.(117)
The Operations of the Army Units (See Illustration No. 30)
The Mentok Unit
The first landing unit left the anchorage at 0205 on the 15th, and successfully landed around
0220 to 0230. There were no obstacles in the waterways or counterattacks with firearms from
the shore in the area where they landed. Although many British soldiers, who had escaped from
Singapore, were scattered over the area, none put up resistance. The main force seized the air-
field at 0640 and the urban area of Mentok at 0830.(132) The lighthouse was also seized at 0730
without meeting with enemy resistance. After that, the main force was stationed near Mentok;
they engaged in securing and readying the airfield as well as debarkation while clearing the is-
land of the enemy with one element. The force completed mopping up the whole island by the
19th.(121)
* Actually the 14th. See Vol 3, p. 331.
** Vol. 3, pp. 316-333 gives a detailed description of the airdrop operation. In several places, dates and times differ.
This also applies to the following summary of the operations of the 38th Division. See Vol. 3, pp. 333-345.
The [Army] River-Ascending Unit for Palembang
At 0830 [0800?] on the 15th, the [Army] river-ascending units all together started sailing up-
stream the Telang, the Musi and the Saleh Rivers, ahead of the naval vessels.(133) Despite the
three [enemy] air raids en route, the Musi River Ascending Unit, directly led by the advance
party commander Tanaka, reached Palembang at 1900 on the same day and started landing. On
that day, no contact was established with the paratrooper units.* It was not until around 1100
on the next day, the 16th that contact with the paratrooper unit at the BPM oil refinery was
finally established. As soon as having secured the urban area of Palembang and successfully
made contact with the paratrooper units, advance party commander Tanaka immediately started
marching southward. That is, he formed and sent off one company [Vol. 3, p. 337: platoon] on
bicycles toward Tanjungkarang at 1200 on the 15th,** which was followed by one motor car
company.(133) On the evening of the 16th, this advance party of the 38th Division spotted about
thirty-seven kilometers west of Palembang a large secret airfield of the enemy (the Gelumbang
base). [Meanwhile,] the Telang River Ascending Unit (the Miyazawa Battalion) had reached the
northern side of Palembang on the evening of the 15th, come ashore, advanced to the Palembang
airfield by the end of the day and made contact with the paratrooper unit. On the next day, the
16th, the unit reached the city of Palembang and joined the Musi River Ascending Unit.
The Saleh River Ascending Unit (the Iwabuchi Batallion) had sailed upriver, turned left from
the midstream of the Musi River, and advanced to the vicinity of the Martapura airfield around
0400 on the 19th, seizing it after a minor engagement.***(133)
The Main Force of the Division
The 38th Division headquarters had embarked on the Shimushu, and reached Palembang around
1500 on the 17th.(68) After his arrival at Palembang, Divisional Commander Lieutenant General
Sano took command of the Tanaka advance party as well as the paratrooper unit, putting the
latter newly under his command, and told off the advance party to seize Tanjungkarang. While
the vanguard unit of the party had already started heading south at 1200, the Miyazawa Battal-
ion [also] left Palembang on the afternoon of the 17th. Advance party commander Tanaka left
Palembang at 1200 on the 18th and arrived at the Martapura airfield at 0500 on the 19th, where
he took command of the Iwabuchi and the Miyazawa Battalions. At 0200 on the 20th, the Tanaka
advance party left Martapura, and its vanguard reached Tanjungkarang by daybreak on that
day. At 1200 on that day, the rearmost unit of the enemy left the pier in two gunboats. Because
his artillery had not yet arrived, the Tanaka advance party stood by idly and let them escape.(133,
137)
On the next day, the 21st, Sixteenth Army staff officer Itoda Isamu located the Tanjungkarang
airfield after great effort, but the airfield was still unfinished.(138) The Tanaka advance party
promptly set to preparing the airfield and completed a runway of 800 meters by the 25th; on
that afternoon, Type–97 fighter planes of the 12th Air Division advanced there.(117)
On the 20th, after the main force had reached Palembang, Divisional Commander Lieutenant
General Sano told off forces to seize Bengkulu (the Kanki Detachment), while ordering the Orita
Detachment on Bangka Island to shift to Palembang, leaving one element behind.(132)
The Kanki Detachment ([consisting of] the 38th Mountain Artillery Regiment headquarters,
one mountains artillery battery, one infantry battalion, and one tank company as its core) left
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* According to Vol. 3, p. 337, they established contact with the airfield unit and Colonel Kume.
** According to Vol. 3, p. 337, the 16th.
*** The route taken by the Iwabuchi Batallion is unclear. The route given here implies that they went up the Saleh
River, then turned right via the Kumbang River to the Musi River and just before Palembang turned left into
the Kommering River to Martapura. The map and description in Vol. 3, pp. 336, 339 implies that they went all
the way up the Saleh River and then made a right and left turn into the Kommering River.
Palembang on the 21st and seized Lahat and Bengkulu on the 22d and the 24th respectively.
The Orita Detachment, which had shifted to Palembang, was ordered to seize the Jambi oilfields.
On 4 March, the detachment seized Jambi; with this the main part of the Sumatra operation of
the 38th Division was completed.(121)
The Failed Counterattacks by the Allied Forces
As of 1 February, the allied air strength in this area had consisted of about fifty bombers and
about fifty fighter planes. However, due to the Japanese air attacks, which had started from the
6th onwards, their strength had been worn down day by day. Because powerful [Japanese]
fighter plane [units] provided cover for the convoy, the [allied] bombers, which had headed to
attack the convoy, were shot down before being able to do anything, not standing the slightest
chance. The desperate attacks against the [Japanese Army] Musi River-ascending Unit on the
15th were also fruitless; that evening, as the Japanese ground units advanced, [the allied air
























































Illustration No. 30 — Outline of the Operations of the Army Units (38th Division)
forces] eventually had to abandon the Palembang area, and by the 18th they had completely re-
treated to Java. The remaining strength that had managed to make it to Java consisted of only
twenty-five fighter planes and eighteen bombers, forty-three aircraft in total.(85, 139)
As for the [allied] surface unit, on the basis of information that the Japanese forces were on
the verge of advancing to Bangka, the following strength had been assembled at Batavia by 13
February (under the command of Rear Admiral Doorman): the Dutch cruisers HNLMS De
Ruyter, HNLMS Java and HNLMS Tromp, the British cruiser HMS Exeter, the Australian cruiser
HMAS Hobart, the U.S. Destroyers USS Bulmer, USS Barker, USS Whipple, USS Alden, USS [John
D.] Edwards and USS Edsall, the Dutch Destroyers HNLMS Banckert, HNLMS Van Ghent, HNLMS
Kortenaer, and HNLMS Van Nes. On the early morning of the 14th, the allied task force departed
from Batavia northward under the command of Rear Admiral Doorman of the Dutch Navy.
However, since HNLMS Van Ghent ran aground and sank en route, which kept HNLMS Banckert
behind to rescue her crew,(92) the force that sailed through the Gaspar Strait northward on the
early morning of the 15th consisted of five cruisers and eight destroyers. Although from around
noon until sunset on the 15th, the unit had come under persistent air attacks from the Japanese
forces, the only damage sustained was some slight damage to the U.S. destroyers USS Bulmer
and USS Barker by near hits. Commander Doorman gave up the attack halfway, reversed course
and returned to Batavia on the next day the 16th.(92) This to the enormous disappointment and
frustration of the allied headquarters.(85)
Along with the landing of the Japanese forces on Bangka Island, the garrison army on the
island had retreated to its southern coast. The unit had embarked on the Dutch destroyer
HNLMS Van Nes and the transport ship Sloet van de Beele on the 17th to evacuate to the south.
However, both ships were sunk on their way by an attack of Japanese aircraft, and only some
survivors were rescued by Dutch flying boats.(58) The garrison army at Palembang had consisted
of about 530 British, Dutch and Australian troops under the command of a Dutch colonel and
been equipped with trucks, a large number of light-armored cars, thirteen antiaircraft guns, and
five antiaircraft machineguns. The garrison stationed at the oil refineries had consisted of about
530 men under the command of a captain and been equipped with ten antiaircraft guns and
five antiaircraft machineguns. These units of about a thousand men [in total] were neutralized
by a far inferior Japanese paratrooper unit of about 300 men and retreated.(117)
12. The Capture by Surprise of Bali (See Illustration No. 31)
The Air Unit’s Insistence on the Capture of Bali
The (previously related) decisions made at the Manila Conference on 22 January were as fol-
lows:(53)
The seaborne capture [operation] on Banjarmasin shall be called off; Banjarmasin shall be seized
overland solely by the Army. [Instead] around Day X + 75 (two days before the landing on east-
ern Java), Bali shall be seized [to be used] as an air base from which to launch air operations at
the time of invasion of eastern Java.
The grounds for the Navy’s claims at the Manila Conference were as follows:(11, 34)
1. If the landing of Java is supposed to be conducted around 20 February as the Army insists upon,
we cannot provide an escort force for the unit to seize Banjarmasin. 
2. It is possible to adequately carry out the air campaign to destroy the enemy air power before
the invasion of eastern Java from the line [connecting] Balikpapan and Makassar, ([which is at
a distance of] about 450 nautical miles [from eastern Java]). 
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3. A comparison of the pluses and minuses of the capture of Banjarmasin against that of Bali prior
to the invasion of eastern Java gives the following results:
4. The above comparison shows that the risks of both invasions are pretty much the same. How-
ever, Bali is by far more advantageous, not only because of the certainty that the airfield is good,
but also because its location is strategically superior.
[At the Manila Conference] this claim was most strongly asserted by the Eleventh Air Fleet
headquarters in terms of the implementation of the air operation. Although the Dutch East
Indies Unit headquarters had considerable concerns about the risks of the capture [opera-
tion], it approved its implementation considering the effectiveness of the airfield and its tac-
tical value.(11) The Southern Army headquarters also approved of the Navy’s proposal and
decided to seize Banjarmasin overland, while specifically allocating fast ships for the Bali in-
vasion.(34)
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Items compared Bali Banjarmasin
Condition of the airfield
⊕ Enemy documents about the
airfield obtained in Tarakan con-
firm that the airfield is in good
condition.
⊖ Since no documents have
been obtained concerning the
airfield, it is difficult to judge [its
condition].
Distance of the invasion unit from
Surabaya at sunset on the day before the
invasion operation
⊕ It is possible to keep a dis-
tance of about 270 nautical miles
[from Surabaya] when faster
ships are used.
⊖ Even with faster ships, the
unit will come as close as about
250 nautical miles [to Surabaya].
The distance of the anchorage of the inva-
sion convoy from Surabaya
⊖ Since the distance is about
170 nautical miles, repetitive at-
tacks by enemy air power are
likely.
⊕ Since [the anchorage will be]
about 290 nautical miles away
[from Surabaya], counterattacks










Condition of the anchorage
⊖ Deep sea with fast currents ⊕ Shallow sea, good [for an-
choring]
Difficulty of the disembarkation
⊕ Close to the airfield ⊖ 30 kilometers or more to the
airfield
Neutralization of the enemy air power
⊕ It is easy to neutralize the
enemy air power in eastern Java
with fighter planes [from the air-
field].
⊖ Since it is rather distant, it
will be difficult to constantly
conduct operations to neutralize
[the enemy air power].
Cover of the convoy
⊖ The convoy will sail a long
distance.
⊕ The convoy will sail a short
distance.
Search of the enemy rear to cut off his es-
cape routes
⊕ [The airfield can] effectively
[be used] to search for the
enemy to the south of Java and
cut off his escape routes.
⊖ It will be difficult to search
the enemy rear and cut off his
escape routes.
Forces for escorting [the invasion unit]
⊕ It is possible to employ one
element of the Makassar inva-
sion unit.
⊖ If the invasion of eastern Java
has to be carried out sooner,
there will be no strength to spare
[for the escort].
The arrangements for the capture operation of Bali between the Third Fleet Commander
in Chief Vice Admiral Takahashi and the Sixteenth Army Commander Lieutenant General
Imamura were discussed in Manila on 23 January, following the Manila Conference. The
[concluded] arrangements may be reconstructed as follows:(53, 54, 68)
1. The date of invasion shall be set on 18 February ([or] Day X + 72; five days before the invasion
of eastern Java).
Note: At the Manila Conference [the capture of Bali] had been scheduled two days prior to the
invasion [of eastern Java], but that would not be early enough to use [the airfield] for the
operation to neutralize the enemy air power before the invasion; at the most it would just
be used as [a base to] cover the invasion convoy on the day before the landing. Therefore,
after examining the details between them, they seemed to have concluded that it was pos-
sible to move up the operation by three days. If five days prior [to the invasion of eastern
Java], the air units could be smoothly advanced there, the base could not only be used for
the neutralization of enemy air bases right before the landing in Java, but also be effectively
used for cutting off the enemy escape routes.
2. The Units Participating in the Operation
(1) The Army
One detachment of one infantry battalion as the core shall be extracted from the 48th Division
(currently in the Philippines) and employed [in the operation].
Note: Although in the Iwakuni Agreement, [the detachment] had been designated as one ele-
ment of the Sakaguchi Detachment, it became impossible to employ the [Sakaguchi] Detach-
ment because [the detachment] was already assigned to the overland operation to seize
Banjarmasin as well as to the maintenance of public order in the Balikpapan area.
(2) The Navy
The main force of the 1st Base Force and part of the destroyer divisions of the 2d Destroyer
Squadron led by the 1st Base Force commander.
3. The Main Points of the Operation
(1) The Army invasion unit shall leave Lingayen Gulf around 5 February, make the necessary
Army-Navy arrangements at Jolo, load the necessary naval air base matériel, and advance
to Makassar by 15 February.
(2) The Navy shall embark the advance team of the 5th Construction Squad and part of the con-
struction matériel, [currently] located in Tarakan, onto the Army transport ships at Jolo.
(3) On the early morning of 17 February, the invasion unit shall leave Makassar under the escort
of the Navy 1st Base Unit, enter into the Sanur anchorage of Bali before dawn on the 18th,
and swiftly land to seize the Denpasar airfield and strive to make it ready for use.
(4) The main force of the 5th Construction Squad and the transport ships carrying the base
matériel of the Eleventh Air Fleet shall reach Bali by 24 February under the escort of one el-
ement of the 1st Base Force, and disembark personnel and matériel.
From late January, the units concerned started preparations for the operation to seize Bali.(53)
However, due to the delay in the southern Sumatra operation in early February, the Java
landing operation was [re]set on 26 February (postponed for six days), which would expand
the interval period between the eastern Java operation and the Bali invasion operation to
eight days. On 14 February, Eastern Attack Unit Commander Rear Admiral Takagi offered
his opinion concerning the matter, which was in outline as follows:(78)
Due to the postponement of the schedule of the invasion of eastern Java, the interval between
it and the date of the Bali invasion operation becomes eight days, which means that the second
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operation to transport the base matériel will also be executed ahead of the landing in eastern
Java. It also means that the invasion unit shall on its own be exposed to the enemy bases at close
distance. Therefore it is necessary to thoroughly carry out search and attack missions with the
air units on the enemy air power as well as naval vessels in the area from Surabaya to the Sunda
Islands before the unit for the 1st [phase] of the Bali Raiding Operation leaves Makassar.
Dutch East Indies Unit Commander Vice Admiral Takahashi took the advice and requested
the air units to intensify their air attacks in the area.(78)
The Plan of Operations 
The 1st Base Unit 
The plan of operations of the 1st Base Unit was successively announced in accordance with
the telegraphic orders and instructions of the Dutch East Indies Unit. The outline of the plan
was in summary as follows:(54, 78)
1. Disposition of Forces 
(1) 1st [phase]: Raiding Operation 
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The Nagara, and the 21st De-
stroyer Div (minus the Hatsu -
haru)
Support for the entire operation
Invasion Unit 8th DestroyerDiv Cdr
The 8th Destroyer Div, 5th Con-
struction Squad, and one ele-
ment of the 3d Military
Supplies Dept ([in] two Army
transport ships)
1. Direct escort for the Army in-
vasion unit
2. Guarding of the anchorages












The Tsukushi, the Aotaka, 2d
Subchaser Div, Submarine
Chaser No. 1
1. Defense and guarding of the
anchorage







Kimishima-maru, the 52d Sub-
chaser Div, the 1st Subchaser
Div (minus Submarine Chaser
No. 1), and the Ikushima-maru
(2) 2d [phase]: Transport Operation
2. The Operations of Each Unit and the Outline of Operations 
(1) First [Phase]: Raiding Operation
{1} The transport echelon [of the invasion unit] shall leave Makassar at 0100 on 17 February.
From sunset on the 17th, the Arashio shall sail ahead and carry out a simplified clearing
of the anchorage, after which [the echelon] shall enter the Sanur anchorage of Bali at 0000
on the 18th, and swiftly put ashore the army units. 
{2} After [the disembarkation of] the army units, the transport ships shall strive to disembark
the base personnel and matériel as much as possible. They shall complete the disem-
barkation by and large by the evening of the 18th, and return to Makassar under the es-
cort of the 8th Destroyer Division. 
{3} The main unit shall leave Makassar on the morning of the 17th, and appropriately oper-
ate on the waters north of Bali on the evening of that day to support the transport eche-
lon. 
{4} After the return of the transport echelon to Makassar, the 8th Destroyer Division shall
return to its original unit. 
{5} The supply units shall continue their tasks at each place. 
(2) Second [Phase]: Transport Operation 
{1} The transport ships shall leave Balikpapan on 20 February under the escort of the 2d
Subchaser Division, reach Makassar on the 22d, where they shall stay on standby. 
{2} By and large on the evening of the 23d, the main unit, the transport echelon and the sup-
port unit shall leave Makassar. The transport echelon shall enter the Sanur anchorage on
the early morning of the 25th and carry out the disembarkation. 
{3} During the disembarkation operation, the main unit and other forces shall guard the area
around the anchorage and also catch and destroy escaping enemy naval vessels. 
{4} The supply unit shall continue its previous tasks. 
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Support for the entire operation






The 21st Destroyer Div (minus
the Hatsuharu), 2d Subchaser
Div, 5th Construction Squad
(the Toyosaka-maru and the
Hino-maru No. 3), and 2 trans-
port ships of the Eleventh Air
Fleet
1. Direct escort for the transport
ships
2. Destroying enemy naval ves-
sels
3. Setting up the airfield
Supply Unit
The Aotaka, the Hakusan-maru,
the Kimishima-maru, the
Ikushima-maru, 1st, 52d, and
12th Subchaser Divs, and the
Tsukushi
1. Defense and guard of the an-
chorage
2. Replenishment and protec-
tion of sea lanes
3. Cooperation with the 1st Es-
cort Unit
The Army Units 
The following [Army] force and commander participated in this operation:(140)
Force: The 3d Battalion (minus one company) of the 1st Taiwan Infantry Regiment, one mountain
artillery section, one independent engineer platoon and others 
Commander: 1st Taiwan Infantry Regiment 3d Battalion Commander Maj. Kanemura Matabē
The Kanemura Detachment was scheduled to embark on the Sagami-maru and the Sasako-
maru, leave Lingayen Gulf on 5 February, reach Jolo on the 8th, Makassar on the 15th, and
land on Bali on the 18th to swiftly occupy the Denpasar airfield and clear key places on the
island of the enemy.
The [Navy] Air Units
In relation to the change of the outline of the operation to seize Banjarmasin on 29 January,
which resulted in a reduction of the [prospective] use of the Bajarmasin base, the 2d Air Unit
was deployed [also] to Makassar, and the lines of operation were changed as follows:(75)
Makassar⧸ ⧹Tarakan ⎯⎯⎯ Balikpapan Bali⧹ ⧸Banjarmasin
Eleventh Air Fleet Commander in Chief Vice Admiral Tsukahara decided that at the time of
the operation to capture Bali, nine Type–0 fighter planes of the 3d Air Group of the 1st Air
Raid Unit, then stationed at the Kendari base, should be advanced to Makassar to be incor-
porated into the 2d Air Raid Unit. Second Air Raid Unit Commander Rear Admiral Takenaka
planned to advance nine Type–0 fighter planes and two land-based reconnaissance planes
of the Tainan Air Group from the Balikpapan base to the Makassar base and, along with the
[above] forces of the 3d Air Group, have them under his command provide guard in the air
over the Bali invasion unit from the [Makassar] base.(68, 71) The commander also planned to
destroy the enemy surface naval vessels as well as air power in Surabaya and the Flores Is-
lands area with the entire force stationed in Balikpapan and the forces in Makassar.(71)
The aircraft unit of the Sanuki-maru advanced from Balikpapan on 10 February to set up
a base at Ujung Parapa near Makassar under the command of Aviation Officer Lt. Cdr. Kōzai
Fusaichi, with five Type–0 observation seaplanes, one Type–95 reconnaissance seaplane, Pa-
trol Boat No. 36 and two fishing boats. The aircraft unit was supposed to provide guard
against enemy submarines for the Bali invasion units.(76)
Assessment of the Enemy Movements Centered on Bali 
(1) The enemy air power, with its main bases in Java, seems to be trying to get reinforcements
from the Port Darwin area by way of Kupang and Bali. Although its main force has suffered
substantial losses due to our frequent air attacks, considerable air counterattacks are to be
expected because Bali is very close to the enemy air bases. (2) After the devastating damage
caused by our air units in the Sea Engagement off Java on 4 February, powerful enemy naval
surface units have not been seen. However, since Bali is located close to an enemy fleet base,
it is necessary to be on an appropriate alert against surprise attacks by small naval vessels.
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(3) Although the deployment of enemy submarines is unclear, it is necessary to be on alert
against them as much as against naval surface vessels. (4) The Denpasar airfield on Bali is
suitable for use by land-based attack planes. (5) A garrison army of about one battalion is
stationed on Bali; it seems that the main force is stationed in Singaraja on its northern coast
and that an infantry guard of about one company or so is guarding the Denpasar airfield.(140)
The Launch of the Operation
The Prior Neutralization of the [Enemy] Air Power Made Little Progress
[An air campaign] by air units to preliminarily neutralize the [enemy] air power for the Bali
invasion operation was conducted in the following way:(71, 81)
14th [of February]: One land-based attack plane of the Takao Air Group reconnoitered weather
conditions but returned due to bad weather.
15th: One land-based attack plane of the Takao Air Group reconnoitered weather conditions
but returned due to bad weather.
Two Type–0 fighter planes of the 3d Air Group advanced from Kendari to Makassar, but the
other seven planes called off the advance due to bad weather.
16th: Two land-based attack planes of the Takao Air Group reconnoitered weather conditions
but returned due to bad weather.
As described above, the weather conditions in the Makassar Strait were very bad day in and
day out, and from 10 February onwards, hardly any air attacks on eastern Java were carried
out. [Even] the advance of fighter plane units to the Makassar [base] was not completed, ei-
ther.(71) In view of this situation, Dutch East Indies Unit Commander Vice Admiral Takahashi
anticipated that the weather would not improve for another few days and on the 16th decided
for the moment to postpone the Bali Operation for one day (so that [the invasion units would]
enter into the anchorage on the 19th).(78)
The weather was still bad on the 17th, and twenty-four land-based attack planes of the
Takao Air Group gave up an attack on enemy naval vessels in the Surabaya area and re-
turned. However, the seven Type–0 fighter planes of the 3d Air Group managed to advance
from Kendari to Makassar. 
Judging that any further postponement of the schedule would lead to a loss of opportu-
nity [for making the attack], Base Unit Commander Rear Admiral Kubo decided to launch
the invasion operation on the 18th as scheduled (and enter into the anchorage on the 19th).(78)
The Sailing of the Convoy
At 0100 on the 18th, the invasion unit ([consisting of] the 8th Destroyer Division (the Ōshio,
the Asashio and the Michishio), the Sasako-maru and the Sagami-maru) left Makassar as sched-
uled. After joining around 0400 on the waters southwest of Tanakeke Island the Arashio,
which had sailed ahead since the previous evening to clear the route of enemy submarines,
the unit sailed on a course of 245º [WSW] at a speed of 16 knots toward the eastern tip of the
Kangean Islands.(68)
From a little after sunrise (around 0715) onwards, the invasion unit proceeded under the
protection of an antisubmarine patrol provided by the aircraft unit of the Sanuki-maru and
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guarded by a fighter plane unit of the 3d Air Group against enemy aircraft. Around 1000,
the convoy entered within the three hundred nautical miles range from Surabaya; it reached
the waters near the Kangean Islands around 1530 and changed course toward the Lombok
Strait.(68)
On that day, other than one enemy flying boat, which came probing the invasion unit,
there were no enemy attacks. Around sunset (about 1900), as scheduled, the unit came within
the two hundred nautical miles range from Surabaya, where the Arashio sailed ahead in order
to sweep the anchorage for mines. At 2300, the invasion unit arrived off Sanur without prob-
lems and started entering into the anchorage.(68)
Around noon on that day, the 18th, Dutch East Indies Unit Commander Vice Admiral
Takahashi advanced to Balikpapan from Jolo, leading the Ashigara and the Yamakaze.(72) Ear-
lier, at 0100 on that day, the commander sent the following telegram to 1st Base Force Com-
mander Rear Admiral Kubo: “[The invasion unit shall] turn back if the 1st Base Force
commander judges the weather on the early morning of the 18th to be not suitable [for Navy
aircraft] to fly. In such a case, Operation “HA” (note by the author: Bali Invasion Operation)
shall be postponed for another day (so that the unit shall enter the anchorage on 20 Febru-
ary).”(78) Having received the telegram, 1st Base Force Commander Rear Admiral Kubo
replied at 0800: “The invasion unit for [Operation] “HA” has left Makassar at 0100 on the
18th, and is scheduled to enter [the anchorage at] Bali at 0000 on the 19th. This invasion [op-
eration] shall be determinedly carried out according to the above schedule unless major hin-
drances are caused by [severe] weather, etc.” On that day [the 18th], the air unit carried out
an air raid on Surabaya with twenty-seven land-based attack planes and eight Type–0 fighter
planes and reported having destroyed two [enemy] light cruisers and three destroyers and
[also] shot down thirteen fighter planes.(108)
On 19 February, the Arashio, which had sailed ahead and carried out a simplified
minesweeping of the anchorage off Sanur, had found no tethered mines.(68) At 0015, the in-
vasion unit entered the anchorage as scheduled. The first landing unit of the Kanemura De-
tachment left the anchorage in [landing] craft at 0100 and went ashore on the coast nearby,
but met with no enemy resistance. The 8th Destroyer Division commander reported: “0100
on the 19th: Landing successfully made at the scheduled point. Met with no enemy resist-
ance.”(54) Following the first landing, the landing units started to quickly disembark personnel
and matériel.
After sunrise at 0722, the invasion units came under continual enemy air raids as antici-
pated. First, around 0800, three enemy aircraft bombed the convoy, but caused no damage.
Then around 0830, enemy heavy bombers (the number of aircraft unknown) came for a raid.
Bombs directly hit the Sagami-maru amidships, which made her engines inoperable. Around
1000, four or five enemy heavy bombers raided the convoy, causing no damage, which was
followed by another raid by three enemy flying boats and four heavy bombers between 1030
and 1100, but causing no damage either. After that, the enemy constantly kept on probing
with one or two flying boats, and carried out repetitive attacks with aircraft in small numbers,
only to cause minor damage to the Sasako-maru with near hits. From a later damage survey,
it became clear that the Sagami-maru was able to sail using one propeller.(68)
At 1630, the Ōshio, which was patrolling the area off the anchorage, spotted an enemy
periscope. Then, four torpedoes attacked her; evading them, she carried out an attack with
antisubmarine depth charges, but with unknown results. The disembarkation from the trans-
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port ships was mostly completed by around 1700. Although the Sasako-maru had not finished
retrieving the [landing] craft, both ships raised anchor at 1725 and evacuated to the north of
the entrance to the Lombok Strait in order to avoid enemy air raids as well as attacks by sub-
marines. [From there] the Sagami-maru headed for Makassar at an actual speed of seven knots,
escorted by the 2d Section of the 8th Destroyer Division. The Sasako-maru reversed course
around 1930 and headed back to the Sanur anchorage to retrieve the landing craft. Around
2100, the ship entered the anchorage under the escort of the 1st Section of the 8th Destroyer
Division.(54)
On the morning [of the 19th], the Army units seized the Denpasar airfield, and the head
of the [Navy] construction squad sent the following report concerning the condition of the
airfield: “At the airfield, a runway of seventy meters wide and eight hundred meters long
shall be ready by the end of the 19th. From the 20th onwards, it can be used by eighteen
fighter planes, three land-based reconnaissance planes and nine land-based attack planes.
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Course of the invasion unit
Return route of the 8dg
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Illustration No. 31 — The Movements of the Invasion Unit and the Support Unit in the First [Phase] of the
Bali Raiding Operation
[A runway of] 1200 meters long can be additionally constructed for mid-sized land-based at-
tack planes.”(108) In the meantime, [the units for] the air attack against Surabaya turned back
due to bad weather again on that day; the land-based attack plane units returned after car-
rying out bombings on the Bawean Islands (about eighty nautical miles north of Surabaya)
on their way back.(71)
The First Phase of the Sea Engagement off Bali(54, 58, 68)
(From 2353 on 19 February till 0110 on 20 February) (See Illustration No. 32)
The 1st Section of the 8th Destroyer Division (the Ōshio and the Asashio) and the Sasako-maru,
which had entered in the Sanur anchorage again at 2130 on the 19th and finished retrieving
the landing craft around 2350, was about to start sailing. It was a dark cloudy night with the
[crescent] moon of the fourth lunar day and visibility was barely eight kilometers. At 2353,
the Asashio spotted the silhouettes of naval vessels on the waters about six kilometers to the
south and soon spotted two Java-class cruisers sailing northward at high speed. The enemy
vessels rapidly approached and at 0000 within a distance of 2,000 meters while launching
flares opened up on the Asashio. The Asashio immediately returned fire and started a gun bat-
tle on a parallel course [with the enemy ships]. However, since she had just started sailing
when she ran into them, the Asashio was unable to gain [sufficient] speed and lost sight of
the enemy ships after an artillery duel of [just] two minutes. Assuming that the enemy had
reversed course southward, the Asashio [also] turned southward while increasing her speed.
In this phase of the battle, no damage was sustained except for a searchlight on the Asashio
that was hit by shell fragments at 0001, while the effects of her gunfire remained unknown.
The Asashio reported: “Engaging with Java-class enemy [cruisers] [in] the Lombok Strait.”
The Ōshio, who was two to three kilometers ahead of the Asashio, saw the engagement of
the Asashio and started sailing to take part in the artillery duel, but she was too late. However,
at that time, at 0005, she spotted at a distance of about 6,000 meters one [enemy] destroyer
sailing northward while emerging from a smoke screen that trailed to the south, and she
changed course southward to attack her. At 0011, the Asashio, who was sailing closer to the
enemy [than the Ōshio], spotted on her starboard bow the [same enemy] destroyer sailing
on a parallel course and opened fire at a close range of 1,500 meters. Since the [enemy] de-
stroyer was trying to escape southward while laying a smoke screen, the Asashio fiercely pur-
sued her. During the pursuit, she spotted [another] two [enemy] destroyers appearing in the
distance. The Asashio ran the destroyer down and closing in to a distance of 1,000 meters
launched torpedoes; at 0016 she confirmed that the torpedoes had hit and sunk the destroyer.
While the Asashio was turning her bow to launch the torpedoes, the Ōshio appeared on the
port bow of the Asashio. At 0024, the Asashio spotted enemy naval vessels in the smoke screen
on her starboard side and fired at them, but she lost sight of them in the smoke screen. Both
[the Asashio and the Ōshio] sailed southward in search for the enemy. In a few minutes, they
spotted two U.S. destroyers sailing on a parallel course, and immediately opened fire. How-
ever, the enemy turned their bows to the far side while firing back at them, and disappeared
laying a smoke screen. It seemed that [the Asashio and the Ōshio] had inflicted considerable
damage to these enemy [destroyers]. Assuming that the enemy had escaped northward, both
[the Asashio and the Ōshio] turned right and headed northward. At 0042, the Asashio entered
into the wake of the Ōshio, and they proceeded in column. 
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An Asashio-class Destroyer
The Dutch Cruiser HNLMS Java
The U.S. Destroyer USS John D. Ford
The Dutch Destroyer HNLMS Piet Hein [Actually: HNLMS Evertsen]
At 0045, three minutes after they had swung in line, they spotted two [enemy] destroyers
sailing at a distance of 3,500 meters on their port bow on a parallel course, and immediately
opened up a concentrated fire. At 0047, one of the destroyers caught fire and sank, and the
other also caught fire. While keeping firing at the enemy destroyer in flames, both [the Asashio
and the Ōshio] reversed course southward, and again around 0110 reversed course north-
ward. Around 0110, the enemy vessel in flames disappeared, and they assumed that she had
sunk. Both [the Asashio and the Ōshio] sailed northward, keeping a strict guard [against
enemy vessels] on the surrounding waters. Around 0140, [both] returned to the waters off
Sanur, and continued patrolling, doubling from east to west at the center of the Lombok
Strait. The 8th Destroyer Division commander reported: “0140: Two Java-class enemy [cruis-
ers] escaped northward through the Lombok Strait. Among the three remaining destroyers,
two were sunk and one was seriously damaged. No damage to us.”
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Illustration No. 32 — The First Phase of the Sea Engagement off Bali 
(2353 on 19 February - 0110 on 20 February)
The Support Unit’s Nagara had left Makassar at 0800 on the 19th; after having joined up
with the 21st Destroyer Division, which had left Balikpapan at 1000, she had reached in the
evening a point eighty nautical miles north of the Lombok Strait, from where she was en-
gaged in the support operation. On receiving the report of a sea engagement from the 1st
Section of the 8th Destroyer Division, the unit sailed southward at full speed. En route, 1st
Base Force Commander Rear Admiral Kubo ordered the 8th Destroyer Division commander
to let his 2d Section join in as well. By that order, the Sagami-maru [was left] to sail north to-
ward Makassar on her own, while the 2d Section of the 8th Destroyer Division reversed
course at 0145 and headed toward the Lombok Strait.
The Second Phase of the Sea Engagement off Bali(54, 58, 68)
(From 0310 till 0323) (See Illustration No. 33)
At 0310 on the 20th, the 1st Section of the 8th Destroyer Division [the Asashio and the Ōshio]
again spotted two enemy cruisers and one destroyer sailing northward at high speed from
the south. At 0315, they launched an attack with gunfire and torpedoes at a distance of 3,200
meters. At 0323, they detected the sound of an underwater explosion and judged that a tor-
pedo had hit target, but they lost sight of the enemy in the silhouette of the mountains of
Bali. The 8th Destroyer Division commander reported: “0315: We are in a fierce fight against
two [enemy] Java-class cruisers off Sanur.” 
The Third Phase of the Sea Engagement off Bali(54, 58, 68)
(From 0341 till 0346) (See Illustration No. 33)
The 1st Section of the 8th Destroyer Division [the Asashio and the Ōshio] sailed at high speed
through the Badung Strait eastward in pursuit of the three enemy vessels that had escaped
northward from the waters off Sanur, and reached the waters northwest off Lembongan Is-
land at 0341 on the 20th, where they spotted a Tromp-class cruiser at a distance of 3,200 meters
on their port bow sailing on a parallel course. The section immediately launched an attack
with gunfire and torpedoes, while sailing on a parallel with the enemy on their port side.
The enemy cruiser returned fire, and an artillery duel at a close distance of 3,000 meters con-
tinued for a few minutes. Although the result of the torpedo attacks could not be confirmed,
many shells from both [the Asashio and the Ōshio] hit the enemy vessel. However, at 0346,
one enemy shell hit the Ōshio at the powder handling room of Turret No. 2 (near the mizzen-
mast). Although it was assumed that enemy vessel was seriously damaged in this engage-
ment, she continued sailing eastward and at 0350 disappeared into the gun smoke, while
exchanging fire with the 2d Section of the 8th Destroyer Division, which had come sailing
on the opposite course from the north.
The Fourth Phase of the Sea Engagement off Bali(54, 58, 68)
(From 0347 till 0354) (See Illustration No. 33)
The 2d Section of the 8th Destroyer Division, which had been ordered to reverse course at
0145 on the 20th, had reached the east entrance of the Badung Strait around 0340. Spotting
the flashlights of an artillery duel far ahead, the section had sailed westward to take part in
the engagement. At 0345, apart from the gun flashes seen on port bow, they spotted two U.S.
destroyers suddenly approaching out of the silhouette of Bali Island on starboard bow, sailing
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on an opposite course. At 0347, both sides simultaneously opened fire at each other at a dis-
tance of 3,500 meters. In two minutes from the start of the artillery duel, [the section] noticed
that the first ship of the enemy had instantly sunk. However, almost at the same time, the
Michishio was hit by enemy shell[s] at the engine room. With steam sharply blowing off, she
became unable to sail but was still pouring fire on the remaining [enemy] vessel.
Just when both the destroyers [of the 2d Section] started exchanging fire with the [enemy]
destroyers on starboard side, another [enemy] destroyer suddenly appeared at a close dis-
tance of 1,600 meters on portside sailing on an opposite course. Although the [Japanese] de-
stroyers fired at her [too], she disappeared straight into the gun smoke. She was followed by
one [enemy] cruiser, which sailed at a distance of 3,000 meters [also] on an opposite course.
At 0500, the Arashio opened fire at her; though the engagement lasted only for a short period,
the Arashio confirmed hits before the enemy vessel disappeared straight into the gun smoke.
It was believed that the remaining [enemy] destroyer sailing on the starboard side on oppo-
site course had been seriously damaged too in this engagement. However, as previously told,
the Michishio was crippled due to a hit in her engine room; this and other direct hits caused
sixty-four casualties including the chief engineer. Fortunately, there was no flooding, and
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Illustration No. 33 — The Sea Engagement off Bali
The Second Phase (0310-0323, 20 February)
The Third Phase (0341-0346, 20 February)
The Fourth Phase (0347-0354, 20 February)
while drifting the crew worked hard to make emergency repairs. The ammunition consumed
by each destroyer in these four phases was as follows:
The Ōshio 12.7-cm gun 217 shells about 36 salvos
The Asashio 12.7-cm gun 310 shells about 52 salvos
The Michishio 12.7-cm gun 62 shells about 10 salvos
The Arashio 12.7-cm gun 73 shells about 12 salvos
After the engagement, the 8th Destroyer Division picked up one Dutch officer, and nine non-
commissioned officers and men drifting on the waters off Sanur. From interrogations it was
learned that the enemy strength in the first phase of the engagement had consisted of two
Dutch cruisers, two U.S. destroyers, and one Dutch destroyer.
Incidentally, the Support Unit of the Eastern Attack Unit was not able to support this en-
gagement, because it had advanced to the Timor Sea in order to attack an enemy cruiser that
had been spotted [on the waters] west of Port Darwin on the 19th.(78)
The Withdrawal of the 1st [Phase Operation] Raiding Unit(54, 68)
The Nagara and the 21st Destroyer Division, who had hurried to the Lombok Strait from the
waters east of the Kangean Islands, finally reached the site around 0600, but they were too
late for the battle against the enemy fleet. First Base Force Commander Rear Admiral Kubo
had the Nagara and the Hatsushimo guard the north entrance of the Lombok Strait, while hav-
ing the rest of the 8th Destroyer Division as well as the 21st Destroyer Division rescue the
Michishio.
From 1000, the Arashio started towing the Michishio, and started withdrawing at an actual
speed of 8 knots. However, right after the start of the towing, some enemy heavy bombers
came for a raid and the towing cable was cut due to the evasive actions. The Michishio was
flooded because of near hits. The Ōshio was also flooded and became unable to sail at a speed
of more than 10 knots. First Base Force commander Rear Admiral Kubo ordered the Wakaba
to escort the Ōshio and had them sail ahead. The 8th Destroyer Division commander changed
ships from the Ōshio to the Asashio. The unit was divided into the following three groups for
withdrawal, and each sailed north in the following three groups.
1st Group: the Asashio, the Arashio towing the Michishio, the Nenohi
2d Group: the Wakaba and the Ōshio
3d Group: the Nagara and the Hatsushimo
The 1st Group again came under a bombing attack by seven [enemy] heavy bombers a little
after 1300 and suffered bombings by a total of twenty-six enemy aircraft by that evening.
But, fortunately, without sustaining [any more] damage, the group escaped out of the 200
nautical miles range from Surabaya by sunset. The other groups also sailed out of the 200
nautical miles range from Surabaya by sunset. After that, the 2d and the 3d Groups managed
to enter the port of Makassar between 1530 and 1600 on the 21st, and the 1st Group also fi-
nally managed to return to Makassar at 0130 on the 22d. Both the Sagami-maru and the Sasako-
maru also somehow returned to Makassar. On the afternoon of the 22d [21st, p. 373], Dutch
East Indies Unit Commander Vice Admiral Takahashi incorporated the 8th Destroyer Divi-
sion into the main unit and ordered the division to stay on standby in Makassar.
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The Communiqué by IGHQ
After entering the port of Makassar, the 8th Destroyer Division commander reviewed the
military gains of the sea engagement off Bali and reported the following conclusions:(54)
Based on this [report], the IGHQ [Navy Department] released the following communiqué:(109)
IGHQ [Navy Department] Communiqué (3.15 p.m., 21 February)
While carrying out an Army-Navy joint operation in the Bali area, two destroyers of the … De-
stroyer Division, part of a destroyer squadron of the Imperial Navy, encountered at 0000 on 20
February in the Lombok Strait east of Bali a combined enemy unit of U.S. and Dutch forces, con-
sisting of two cruisers and three destroyers. On encountering the unit, the destroyers immedi-
ately went on the offensive. After opening fire at 0040, they sank within ten minutes two enemy
destroyers and seriously damaged another. Further, they hotly pursued two enemy cruisers
who tried to escape and again engaged with them at 0315. The other two destroyers of the same
division, who had been engaged in a separate operation, hastened south to attack the enemy.
However, after sustaining damage by our gunfire and torpedo attacks, the enemy beat a hasty
retreat under the cloak of the night and fled from our sight. One of our destroyers sustained
damage in the engagement, but it does not prevent her from fighting or sailing.
The main officers, who participated in this engagement, were the following:(96)
8th Destroyer Division Commander: Capt. Abe Toshio (graduate of the 46th class of the Imperial
Japanese Naval Academy)
Captain of the destroyer Ōshio: Cdr. Kikkawa Kiyoshi (graduate of the 50th class)
Captain of the destroyer Asashio: Cdr. Yoshii Gorō (ditto)
Captain of the destroyer Michishio: Cdr. Ogura Masami (graduate of the 51st class)
Captain of the destroyer Arashio: Cdr. Kuboki Hideo (ditto)
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Phase Enemy Forces Military Gains
1st phase
(by the Ōshio and the Asashio)
2 Java-class cruisers
2 U.S. destroyers Inflicted considerable damage, butdetails are unknown
3 Dutch destroyers Sank all
2d phase
(by the Ōshio and the Asashio)
2 Java-class cruisers One slightly damaged (by a tor-pedo hit)
2 U.S. destroyers (Maybe the same ones as in the 1stphase engagement?)
3d phase
(by the Ōshio and the Asashio) 1 Tromp-class cruiser
Seriously damaged 
(One of the cruisers of the 2d phase
engagement)
4th phase
(by the Michishio and the Arashio)
2 U.S. destroyers Sank one and seriously damagedanother
1 De Ruyter-class (?) cruiser (Maybe the same one as in the 3dphase engagement?)
1 Destroyer (class unclear)
The Operations of the Air Unit
From 18 February onwards, the weather slightly improved and the air unit launched attacks
on [enemy] naval vessels in the Surabaya area. The following air operations were carried
out:(71, 75)
18th [of February]
- Four Type–0 fighter planes of the 3d Air Group patrolled in the air over the convoy but
spotted no enemy.
- Three Type–0 fighter planes of the group conducted a reconnaissance attack on the Bali
airfield but spotted no enemy.
- One land-based reconnaissance plane of the Tainan Air Group conducted a search for the
enemy but returned due to bad weather.
- One land-based reconnaissance plane of the group reconnoitered the Bali airfield, but spot-
ted no enemy.
- Fifteen Type–0 fighter planes and one land-based reconnaissance plane of the group at-
tacked Madiun and reported having shot down one [enemy] reconnaissance seaplane
and destroyed two fighter planes on the ground.
- Nine Type–0 fighter planes and two land-based reconnaissance planes of the group ad-
vanced from Balikpapan to Makassar.
- Eight Type–0 fighter planes of the group attacked Surabaya, engaged with twenty P–40s,
reported having shot down nine (of which three with unconfirmed results), all returned.
- One land-based attack plane of the Takao Air Group reconnoitered the weather conditions
and [reported] no impediments to an attack. [Accordingly], twenty-two land-based at-
tack planes of the group carried out an attack on the [enemy] naval vessels at Surabaya
and reported having scored direct hits on two light cruisers, who caught fire, as well as
on two destroyers and [also] near hits on a large merchantman. Nine aircraft were
marked by bullets, three crashed themselves, four crew were killed and two injured on
board.
19th
- A total of sixteen Type–0 fighter planes directly guarding the anchorage, spotted seven B–
17s and three B–24s and attacked them but failed to shoot them down.
- One land-based reconnaissance plane and five Type–0 fighter planes searched for the
enemy in Surabaya, Bali and the Madura Strait, and spotted eleven [enemy] merchant-
men, one minesweeper and one B–17.
- Three land-based attack planes searched for the enemy in the Sunda and the Java Seas,
spotted four B–17s, one twin-engine bomber, and one large flying boat. Two of them
were attacked by [enemy] fighter planes. 
- Although eighteen land-based attack planes and twenty-three Type–0 fighter planes were
[scheduled to] conduct attacks on Surabaya, the land-based attack plane unit called off
the attack due to bad weather; nine of them carried out bombings on the urban area of
Bawean Island [instead]. The Type–0 fighter planes engaged with thirty P–40s in the air
and reported having shot down seventeen (of which three with unconfirmed results).
One of Japanese aircraft crashed itself.
20th
- Eighteen Type–0 fighter planes advanced to the Bali base, after patrolling in the air over
the Bali anchorage. During the patrol, they had an [air] engagement with three [enemy]
light bombers and two dozens or more fighter planes, and reported having shot down
six. One of Type–0 fighter plane went missing after having gone to reconnoiter naval
vessel[s], of which it was unclear whether they were friend or foe.
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- Thirteen Type–0 fighter planes carried out an attack on Surabaya, but spotted no enemy.
- Nine of the Type–0 fighter planes that had advanced to the Bali base carried out an attack
on Malang, and reported having set ablaze four B–17s and destroyed another B–17 and
one twin-engine plane.
- Sixteen land-based attack planes carried out an attack on [an enemy] cruiser, but scored
no direct hits.
- Thirteen land-based attack planes went to conduct attacks on enemy naval vessels in the
Lombok Strait, but spotted no enemy. They carried out bombings on the urban area of
Banyuwangi (on the eastern end of Java) [instead].
Reconnaissance seaplanes of the Sanuki-maru provided the convoy carrying the [Bali] inva-
sion unit with patrols against enemy submarines when the unit left Makassar, but the details
are unclear.
The Engagements of the Army Units
At 0100 on the 19th, the Kanemura Detachment landed on the coast of Sanur without meeting
any enemy resistance at all. That night, with dark clouds hanging low and poor visibility,
was convenient for a surprise attack. Having carried out a sudden attack on the barracks in
Denpasar before dawn and seizing them, the detachment moved south and seized the airfield
around 1130. After that, the detachment took charge of securing the route[s] to transport
Navy air base matériel as well as guarding the airfield.(140)
The Second [Phase]: The Bali Transport Operation
The unit for the second phase of the transport operation, i.e. the Rakutō-maru, the Okitsu-maru
([of] the Eleventh Air Fleet), the Daitō-maru, the Toyosaka-maru, the Hino-maru No. 3 ([of] the
5th Construction Squad) left Balikpapan at 1700 on the 20th under the escort of the 2d Sub-
chaser Division, and reached Makassar at 1130 on the 22d.(59) On the 22d, Dutch East Indies
Unit Commander Vice Admiral Takahashi, leading the main unit, advanced from Balikpapan
to Staring Bay, where he issued the following orders.(54)
1. It seems that there are five to seven enemy cruisers and about ten destroyers in Batavia, and
one De Ruyter- and one Java-class [cruiser] and about five destroyers in Surabaya.
2. The Dutch East Indies Unit shall, with the support of the Air Unit ([of] the Southern Task Force)
and the Malaya Unit, cover the Sixteenth Army’s landings on Java, while catching and destroy-
ing enemy naval vessels.
3. Other than the following, all units shall operate in accordance with the outline stipulated in the
Dutch East Indies Unit Order Classified No. 9.
(a) The Nagara, the 8th Destroyer Division (minus the Ōshio and the Michishio), the 21st De-
stroyer Division (minus the Hatsuharu) and the 2d Destroyer Division shall escort the Rakutō-
maru, the Okitsu-maru, the Daitō-maru, the Toyosaka-maru and the Hino-maru No. 3 under the
command of the 1st Base Force commander. They shall leave the roads off Makassar on the
evening of 23 February, reach Bali before dawn on the 25th, and cover and guard the disem-
barkation of matériel, while catching and destroying enemy naval vessels fleeing through
the waterways both east and west of Bali.
(b) - (d) (The operations of the 2d Escort Unit and others — Omitted by the author)
(e) The main unit (the Ashigara, the Ikazuchi and the Akebono) shall reach the waters north of
Lombok on the night of the 24th. Thereafter, the unit shall take charge of covering and sup-
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porting the units for Operation HA [against Bali], and also take on the task of supporting
the whole operation while catching and destroying escaping enemy naval vessels by appro-
priately operating on the waters north of the Lombok Strait around 28 February. 
Although the 8th Destroyer Division, [namely] the Asashio and the Arashio who had not sus-
tained damage in the sea engagement off Bali, had been ordered to join the main unit, by this
order they were supposed to take again part in the [Bali] operation. Anticipating counterat-
tacks by enemy naval vessels, Base Unit Commander Rear Admiral Kubo decided to further
add to the forces for the second [Bali] operation the Tsukushi and the 1st Subchaser Division,
which were then at Makassar, as well as Submarine Chaser No. 21 of the 12th Subchaser Di-
vision, which had been newly formed and advanced to Staring Bay from mainland Japan.(68)
On 23 February, Base Unit Commander Rear Admiral Kubo issued to the units that had
assembled in Makassar for the second [Bali] operation the outline of the second operation,
which was in summary as follows:(68)
1. Disposition of forces
(1) The main unit (directly led [by the commander]: The Nagara, the 8th Destroyer Division
(minus the Ōshio and the Michishio) 
(2) The Echelon (led by the 21st Destroyer Division commander): The 21st Destroyer Division
(minus the Hatsuharu), the 2d Subchaser Division and Submarine Chasers No. 1 and No. 21
(3) The support unit: The Tsukushi
2. Main points of the operation
The units shall leave Makassar at 1800 on the 23d, pass the point of 6º21’S 118º25’E at 0400
on the 24th, the point of 7º40’S 116º9’E at 2030 [on that day], and reach the roads off Pantai
Timur at 0900 on the 25th. After that, they shall at that place conduct the disembarkation
and the guarding.
The following information on the enemy had by that time been found out from the statements
of the prisoners etc.:(54)
1. The enemy forces which had participated in the sea engagement off Bali 
Commander: Rear Admiral Doorman of the Dutch Navy
HNLMS De Ruyter, HNLMS Java and another cruiser as well as five destroyers
2. The base to where the enemy navy escapes is Cilacap (USS Houston stayed there around 5 or 6
February).
3. It seems that ten U.S. cruisers and twenty U.S. destroyers sometimes come to give support, while
they patrol the areas [surrounding] Australia as well as the Indian Ocean. 
4. The Dutch [Navy] possesses twelve submarines, and if U.S. and British submarines are included,
[the allies] have thirty to forty submarines.
5. Military supplies are delivered from the United States every day.
6. Others
(1) Seaplane bases: Surabaya and Cilacap
(2) Land bases: Surabaya, Batavia and many others
(3) Fuel bases: Semarang and Tebakubekun [?]*
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* In Dutch sources Semarang is never mentioned as a fuel base. The main fuel depots for the fleet were at
Surabaya, Batavia (Tanjung Priok), and Cilacap. Also a few strategically placed oil tankers were used as auxiliary
depots. Before the engagement at the Gaspar Strait on 15 February, the Allied Striking Force had partly refueled
at Telukbetung, south Sumatra. Maybe Tebakubekun should be read Telukbetung.
Based on air reconnaissance information gathered until 22 February, it was judged that one
A-class cruiser, one De Ruyter-class and one Java-class cruiser as well as five destroyers were
at anchor in the Surabaya area.(108) In the meantime on the 22d, for the first time eleven land-
based attack planes advanced to Bali, which increased the [total] strength on Bali to thirty-
two fighter planes, four land-based reconnaissance planes and eleven land-based attack
planes. However, the enemy had day after day persistently come to attack [the Bali airfield]
although in small numbers.(71)
At 1800 on 23 February, the Second [Bali] Transport Operation Unit left Makassar. Although
an enemy aircraft came probing around 1000 on the 24th, it did not lead to enemy attacks.
When the unit approached the 230 nautical miles range from Surabaya at 1700 that day, a report
came from [an] aircraft: “[Spotted] one enemy cruiser and three destroyers at sixty nautical
miles north of Surabaya.” Base Unit Commander Rear Admiral Kubo assumed that the enemy
was likely to be escaping in the direction of Bali or coming to shell the airfield on Bali. Therefore,
he advanced to the waters between the Kangean Islands and Bali, leading the Nagara, and the
21st and the 8th Destroyer Divisions to search for the enemy, but did not spot them.(68)
At 0800 on the 25th, the transport unit entered the anchorage and by the end of February
completed the disembarkation. Although there were a few air raids by enemy aircraft during
that period, no damage was sustained. Also, a few enemy naval vessels appeared but they
all fled without engaging. The Bali operation of the 1st Base Force was wrapped up as of 5
March.(68) In the meantime, the landings in eastern and western Java had been successfully
carried out on 1 March, and during that time the aircraft units, which had advanced to the
Denpasar [airfield], carried out a very effective air campaign.(71)
A Review of the Sea Engagement off Bali (See Illustrations Nos. 34, 35, and 36.)
Concerning the circumstances of the engagements in this sea battle, there are on the Japanese
side no records of the 8th Destroyer Division extant. The only available data consist of a frag-
mentary record of telegrams in the action report of the 2d Destroyer Squadron, some brief
accounts in the operation reviews, and the rough artillery records in the lessons of war com-
piled by the Yokosuka Gunnery School. As for records on the allied side, since there are al-
most no data available from the Dutch side, we have to chiefly rely on Morison’s The Rising
Sun in the Pacific. However, we cannot have complete faith in his account. I will try to examine
all these data together, although it may be difficult to expect a definite [reconstruction]*.
The First Phase
The opponent in the first phase of the engagement consisted of five ships: the Dutch cruisers
HNLMS De Ruyter and HNLMS Java, the Dutch destroyer HNLMS Piet Hein and the U.S. De-
stroyers USS [John D.] Ford and USS Pope.
The five ships sailed with HNLMS De Ruyter in the lead, followed by HNLMS Java, while
USS [John D.] Ford and USS Pope followed in their wake at a distance of 10,000 meters. The
latter two lagged behind because they had lost the wake of HNLMS Piet Hein for a while due
to a course change before rushing into the attack. When rushing into the attack, HNLMS De
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* After the Japanese publication of the present volume, a Dutch analysis of this battle appeared in Ph. M. Bosscher,
De Koninklijke Marine in de Tweede Wereldoorlog [The Royal Netherlands Navy in the Second World War], 1986, Vol.
2, pp. 263-270. With one exception, we have not incorporated his findings in the following description.
Ruyter had been prepared for an artillery duel with the enemy on starboard. The “two Java-
class enemy cruisers” that the Asashio had spotted at 2353 were correctly HNLMS De Ruyter
and HNLMS Java. Because the Japanese force had the mountains [on Bali] at the back, the al-
lied force spotted them too late. Consequently, both sailed past each other in an instant with
no time to spare for a [true] artillery duel. The [allied] cruisers disappeared to the north, with-
out [turning back to] repeat the attack.*
The enemy vessel that the Ōshio had spotted at an end of a smoke screen to the south at
0005 right after the artillery duel was HNLMS Piet Hein. For unknown purposes, HNLMS
Piet Hein had laid a smoke screen at the sight of the artillery duel ahead of her.** HNLMS


























































Illustration No. 34 — The Relative Positions of Both Forces during the First Phase of the Sea Engagement
off Bali
* The Asashio and the Java did exchange fire.
** According to Bosscher p. 266, by some unknown cause Piet Hein’s smoke generator had been activated, thereby
betraying her position to the Japanese.
Piet Hein and the Asashio rapidly closed the distance. Checked by the Asashio, HNLMS Piet
Hein turned right, and both came to sail on parallel courses. From 0010 onwards, HNLMS
Piet Hein came under fierce fire from the Asashio, which was followed by a direct hit of a tor-
pedo at 0016. The damage was huge and her speed rapidly decreased. At that time the Asashio
assumed that she had sunk her, but in reality [HNLMS Piet Hein] was moving about on the
waters nearby at low speed.
The two U.S. destroyers, who had followed in the wake of HNLMS Piet Hein, sailed into
the smoke screen the latter had laid and turned right to avoid it, where they came to sail on
a parallel course on the starboard side [of the Piet Hein] (i.e. her unengaged side). The two
vessels that the Asashio spotted at 0012 were these U.S. destroyers. Both destroyers were
about to join the engagement, but seeing the damage sustained by HNLMS Piet Hein, they
took evasive actions for some time, but ended up sailing southward on a parallel course with
the Asashio. However, when they came under concentrated fire from a Japanese force that
had been increased with the Ōshio, they hurriedly laid a smoke screen and fled southward.
Then, while sailing northward after reversing course, the Ōshio and the Asashio newly spotted
two destroyers (actually one) on their port side bows at 0045; [in fact] it was HNLMS Piet
Hein that the Asashio believed she had sunk. Although HNLMS Piet Hein was set ablaze by
the gunfire from the Ōshio and the Asashio directed at her for the second time around, she [in
fact] did not sink yet. Still more, what the Ōshio and the Asashio fired at from 0058 onwards
after [again] reversing course was still HNLMS Piet Hein. It seems that she [finally] sunk
around 0110. The Japanese ships assumed that they had sunk or heavily damaged another
vessel, but they must have wrongly taken the burning heavy oil spilt over the waters for an-
other vessel. In the final analysis, the conclusion that in the first phase of the battle they had
sunk two [enemy] destroyers and inflicted serious damage to a third appears to have been a
mistake for having sunk HNLMS Piet Hein [only].*
The Second, Third and Fourth Phases 
The allied naval vessels that appeared in the second phase and after were the Dutch cruiser
HNLMS Tromp, the U.S. destroyers USS Stewart, USS Parrott, USS [John D.] Edwards and USS
Pillsbury. They sailed in a column with the U.S. destroyers at the head, while HNLMS Tromp
followed at a distance of 8,000 meters. While sailing north at a speed of 25 knots, the U.S. de-
stroyers haphazardly fired torpedoes toward the Sanur anchorage around 0306, which nat-
urally hit nothing. During the torpedo launch action, the USS Pillsbury lost the wake of the
vessels in front of her, separated from the column and headed north of Lembongan Island
on her own. At 0310, the Ōshio and the Asashio spotted the enemy, but they mistook the three
U.S. destroyers for two cruisers and one destroyer.
The Ōshio and the Asashio opened up with gunfire and torpedo attacks against the supe-
rior enemy. After the opening of the battle, the column of the U.S. destroyers got into disarray
due to the smoke of the gunfire and also because USS Stewart had been hit in the steering-
engine room. [Consequently,] the third ship, USS [John D.] Edwards, became the lead, whom
the first ship, USS Stewart, followed, while the second ship, USS Parrott, became unable to
control its movements due to trouble with her rudder; she left the line and sailed northward
on the waters north of both ships.
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* Morison and other allied sources interpret the gunfire heard after USS Ford and Pope had managed to get away
as if the Asashio and Oshio had inadvertently fired at each other.
When the Ōshio and the Asashio changed course and started sailing eastward in pursuit
of the U.S. destroyers, HNLMS Tromp, who had lagged behind, sailed past the Sanur anchor-
age. [Hidden] in the silhouette of the island, she was not seen by the 8th Destroyer Division,
but she could not catch sight of the Japanese forces either because the latter had entered in
the blind zone on her starboard quarter. The Ōshio and the Asashio [first] spotted HNLMS
Tromp [on the waters] northwest of Lembongan, fired at her from her starboard quarter at
0341, and scored a number of direct hits. Although unable to operate her fire control and
searchlight, HNLMS Tromp also scored a direct hit on the Ōshio. While firing at [the Japanese
on] starboard, HNLMS Tromp also came under attack on her port side, which disabled the
port searchlight as well. The ship that was firing at her from the other side was the Arashio,
who had come sailing in on an opposite course.
The 2d Section of the 8th Destroyer Division [i.e. the Arashio and the Michishio] had rushed
right in between the enemy, who was sailing eastward divided into a northern and southern
group. USS Parrott, USS [John D.] Edwards, and USS Stewart, were sailing on their northern
side while on their southern side were HNLMS Tromp and USS Pillsbury, who was sailing
ahead [of HNLMS Tromp]. At 0347 the 2d Section opened up with gunfire and torpedo attacks
on USS [John D.] Edwards and USS Stewart while sailing on an opposite course and assumed
that they had sunk the first ship in the 7th salvo. However, simultaneously the Michishio re-
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Illustration No. 35 — The Relative Positions of Both Forces from the Second to the Fourth Phase of the 
Sea Engagement off Bali
ceived a direct hit in her engine room and became unable to sail. The Michishio continued
firing at the U.S. destroyers while turning her bow to the right and believed that she had in-
flicted serious damage to the second ship. After the Michishio had sustained damage, the
Arashio who followed in her wake spotted an enemy cruiser sailing on an opposite course
on her port side and fired a few salvos at the latter, but she disappeared on her port side
quarter. It was these [salvos] that had destroyed the port searchlight of HNLMS Tromp. Wit-
nessing the artillery duel between the Arashio and the Michishio and the [allied] units to the
north of them, USS Pilsbury spotted the Japanese destroyers [as well], but after only firing a
couple of salvos she evacuated [from the scene of action]. USS Parrott, who had separated
from the column [due to] steering trouble and sailed to the north of USS Stewart since then,
sailed east past the waters where the gun battle was going on, without exchanging fire with
the Japanese force at all. Although she ran aground off Cape Labuan, she got free on her own
and escaped to the north entrance of the Lombok Strait.
The actual forces in the engagement and the damage they sustained were as follows:
That is to say, the allied forces had sent out three cruisers and seven destroyers and sustained
the loss of having one destroyer sunk, one cruiser half damaged, and one destroyer slightly
damaged, while the Japanese only suffered a loss of having one destroyer seriously damaged
and another slightly damaged out of four destroyers (two at the initial phase of engagement).
The circumstances of the allied forces were as follows: It was on 17 February that the in-
formation came in that Japanese invasion units against Bali were about to leave Makassar.
ABDA Naval Forces Commander Vice Admiral Helfrich of the Dutch Navy (who had re-
placed Admiral Hart of the U.S. Navy on 11 February) issued an order to the Doorman unit
to immediately attack the enemy. At that time, the allied striking force under the command
of [Rear Admiral] Doorman had just retreated from the attack by Japanese air units in the
Gaspar Strait and dispersed to various [naval ports]. Judging that it would be too late to
make a sortie after having assembled his [full] strength, Rear Admiral Doorman issued the
following outline of attack:
1. Time and point of attack
The night of 19-20 February at the Badung Strait
2. The main points of attack
(1) The first attack unit (consisting of two cruisers and four destroyers currently stationed in
Cilacap) shall rush in at 0030 (Japan time) on the 20th.
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Japanese Navy Allied [Naval] Forces
The Ōshio (destroyer): minor damage; one hit
in a powder handling room 
The Asashio (destroyer)
The Michishio (destroyer): serious damage; hit
by several shells and crippled
The Arashio (destroyer)
HNLMS De Ruyter (cruiser), HNLMS Java
(cruiser) 
HNLMS Tromp (cruiser): some damage; hit at
places by 10 shells
HNLMS Piet Hein (destroyer): sunk
USS [John D.] Ford (destroyer), USS Pope (de-
stroyer)
USS Stewart (destroyer): minor damage; one
direct hit at the steering equipment
USS Parrott (destroyer), USS [John D.] Edwards
(destroyer), USS Pilsbury (destroyer)
(2) The second attack unit (consisting of one cruiser currently stationed in Surabaya and four
destroyers currently in the Sunda Strait) shall assemble at Surabaya and rush in three hours
after the charge of the first attack unit.
(3) The 3d attack unit (consisting of seven torpedo boats currently stationed at the Bali Strait
base) shall rush in one hour after the charge of the 2d attack unit.)
On the basis of such a plan, the operation was carried out. However, the third attack unit did
not even spot the Japanese destroyers and in spite of committing an overwhelmingly superior
unit, the allied naval force lost a favorable opportunity to destroy the transport convoy es-
corted by only two Japanese destroyers (later increased to four) due to the operating units’
dubious implementation of the operation.
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Illustration No. 36 — Outline of the Operations of the Allied Attack Units (17-20 February, 1942)
13. The Surprise Attack Operation Against Port Darwin 
(See Illustration No. 37)
The Plan of Operations for a Surprise Attack on Port Darwin 
We have already described the circumstances that led to the commitment of the Carrier Task
Force to the Southern Operation [pp. 211-212]. At that time, at 0000 on 31 January, R. Adm.
Ugaki Matome, the chief of staff of the Combined Fleet, sent the following telegram to Vice
Admiral Kondō, the commander of the Southern Task Force, outlining the intentions behind
the employment of the Carrier Task Force.(141)
1. With the fall of Singapore and the progress in the operations against Java and Celebes, the enemy
will look for paths of retreat from Java and Sumatra to Australia and the Indian Ocean. It is very
likely that we will see the British Indian Ocean Fleet and U.S. and Australian surface forces come
out to rescue and cover [the retreating forces]. By catching and destroying such forces as well
as destroying the fleeing transport convoys and, depending on the circumstances, destroying
the enemy forces in the Java area from the rear, the final operation of the southern operation
will be wrapped up and won in one stroke. For executing such an operation, the forces [men-
tioned in] Second Fleet Classified Telegram No. 781 are considered insufficient, and thus the
Carrier Task Force and one element of the Sixth Fleet have been added as reinforcements. 
2. During the period of employment of the Carrier Task Force, we want you to make absolutely
sure that the force shall be perfectly guarded against enemy submarines, so that it can be de-
ployed in attacking the bases of the enemy fleet and its air power as effectively and appropriately
as possible and in the shortest period of time. Also, we want you to pay due regard to clearly
defining the operations of friendly submarines so they will not be confused with enemy sub-
marines. 
In response, Southern Task Force Commander Vice Admiral Kondō drew up around 5 Feb-
ruary an internal draft plan of operations outlining a surprise attack on Port Darwin in the
rear of Kupang on 17 February, prior to the operation to seize Kupang (whose capture had
been postponed till 20 February at the Manila Conference), by a force consisting of the 2d
Carrier Division as the main body under the command of Eleventh Air Fleet Commander in
Chief Vice Admiral Tsukahara.
Note: The suggestion of 2d Carrier Division Commander Rear Admiral Yamaguchi [p. 212] was
accepted that, in view of the enemy surface unit’s night attack off Balikpapan, the primary
bases of the enemy should be attacked [first], because the conventional method of attacking
and neutralizing the enemy within 600 nautical miles [from a friendly base] and pushing
forward air bases by just 300 nautical miles carried the risk of being attacked by enemy sur-
face vessels at the time of invasion.(101)
The second part [of Vice Admiral Kondō’s plan of operations] outlined the incorporation of
the 2d Carrier Division into the First Air Fleet for the second carrier operation (the carrier
operation in the Indian Ocean).(141)
Then on 8 February, the main force of the Carrier Task Force (minus the 5th Carrier Divi-
sion (minus the Oboro), and minus the Arare and the Kagerō) and the 2d Submarine Squadron
were formally incorporated into the Southern Task Force, as previously told. With that and
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with the postponement of the Java operation, [the Southern Task Force] became less pressed
for time. Accordingly, at 1500 on 9 February, Southern Task Force Commander Vice Admiral
Kondō divulged his immediate plan for the southern operation as a whole, as well as his
plans for the first carrier operation (to destroy enemy forces that might come in the way of
the capture of strategic places such as Timor) and for the second carrier operation (to com-
pletely destroy the enemy by cutting off his paths of retreat at the time of Java operation).
These plans were as follows:(53)
Southern Task Force Telegraphic Order No. 92 [at] 1500 on the 9th
1. Because of our air attacks in early February, the enemy who has made Java his stronghold has
lost the best part of his naval and air power. Since it is highly likely that the remnants will at-
tempt to evacuate to Australia, India and South Africa as our invasion operations progress, it is
also quite likely that, in order to rescue [the evacuees], British, U.S., Dutch and Australian surface
forces will appear in the eastern part of the Indian Ocean. Further, it seems that one element of
the enemy forces has already evacuated to Port Darwin and its vicinity. According to intelli-
gence, one element of the U.S. air reinforcements, acting in concert with the British and Aus-
tralian forces, is using the place as its base. 
2. The Malaya Unit is currently carrying out an attack on the port of Singapore, and intends to
capture Bangka and Palembang in mid-February. Following the capture of Makassar, the Dutch
East Indies Unit and the air unit are going to capture Bali and Timor around 20 February, and
launch [the operation to] capture Java from around 25 February onwards. 
3. The Southern Task Force shall timely let the Carrier Task Force carry out carrier operations, first
in the Arafura Sea and then in the eastern part of the Indian Ocean. In these operations, it shall
try to completely destroy the enemy air power in the Port Darwin area as well as catch and de-
stroy enemy fleets and transport convoys, while attacking the enemy forces in the Java area
from their rear. While continuing their present tasks, the remaining units shall act in concert
with the above carrier operations and try to further expand the military gains, so that the clear-
ing [of the enemy] in the entire Dutch East Indies area will be accelerated.
4. The Carrier Task Force shall conduct the carrier operations in the following way: 
(1) First carrier operation (surprise attack on Port Darwin and vicinity) 
[The units] shall timely depart from Palau, advance to the Arafura Sea, and carry out a sur-
prise attack on Port Darwin and vicinity (around 19 February) on the day before the launch
of the capture [operation] of Timor, after which they shall put in at Staring Bay for replen-
ishment (in case the 3d Battleship Division is not going to participate in the operation, the
2d Section of the 4th Destroyer Division shall also remain in Palau as its guard unit).  
(2) Second carrier operation (carrier [operations] in the eastern part of the Indian Ocean) 
[The units] shall timely leave Staring Bay and advance to the Indian Ocean; they shall con-
duct carrier operations on the ocean for about five days, and if there is no change in the
enemy movements, they shall operate with the aim of reaching the waters south of the Sunda
Strait on 1 March. After that, they shall return to Staring Bay. 
5. In the first carrier operation, the Air Unit shall with one element carry out joint air strikes on
Port Darwin and vicinity. For the second carrier operation, they shall take on search and attack
missions over the waters where the Carrier Task Force operates, particularly the wide areas
ahead of the sailing route of the latter, using the bases on the southern coast of the Dutch East
Indies. At the same time, they shall conduct reconnaissance attacks on the Christmas and Cocos
Islands as soon as possible. 
6. The Dutch East Indies Unit shall let a force [consisting of] the 5th Cruiser Division as the core
operate in the Banda Sea during the first carrier operation and in the area southwest of Timor
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during the second carrier operation. The force shall be assigned to cover and accomodate the
Carrier Task Force while guarding its rear during the operation.
7. Submarine Unit A (the 4th and the 6th Submarine Squadrons) shall operate as scheduled; it shall
be assigned to watch and patrol the southern coast of the Dutch East Indies east of (and includ-
ing) Java as well as the Torres Strait and the Port Darwin area.
8. Submarine Unit B (the 5th Submarine Squadron) shall be assigned to watch and patrol the
coastal areas of Ceylon and India as well as the north entrance of the Malacca Strait and the
southern coast of Sumatra.
9. Submarine Unit C (the 2d Submarine Squadron) shall leave Staring Bay around 23 February
and advance into the Indian Ocean. The bulk of the unit shall advance while searching for the
enemy more or less 400 nautical miles southeast of Java, and swiftly reach the area south of the
Cocos Islands. After that and until about 1 March, it shall conduct patrols from a position on
the waters between about 97ºE and 100ºE beyond the 600 nautical miles range from Palembang.
One element shall be assigned to covertly patrol the regular sailing routes on the western coast
of Australia off Freemantle, after which it shall return to Staring Bay around 6 March.
Also, one designated submarine shall promptly be assigned to reconnoiter and watch the
Cocos Islands.
10. The main body of the Southern Task Force shall leave Palau on 18 February and advance to Star-
ing Bay, from where it shall advance into the Indian Ocean in tandem with the Carrier Task
Force and appropriately operate to support all operations.
11. In this operation, the forces operating in the Indian Ocean may be unified to carry out [partic-
ular] missions. The outlines of these missions shall be issued in separate orders.
On 10 February, Southern Task Force Commander Vice Admiral Kondō ordered the 2d Car-
rier Division (minus the 23d Destroyer Division) and the 7th Destroyer Division to return to
the Carrier Task Force.*(54) (In response, Eastern Attack Unit Commander Rear Admiral Ta -
kagi, who experienced a shortage of destroyers, strongly requested that the 7th Destroyer
Division should remain, which was finally approved on the 12th. The details will be de-
scribed later.) Then, at 0700 on 12 February, Southern Task Force Commander Vice Admiral
Kondō announced that during the carrier operations of the Southern Task Force, the units
operating in the Indian Ocean would operate under his unified command. Again on the 15th,
he issued the following order concerning the operations of the Carrier Task Force (Telegraphic
Order No. 53).(141)
1. In accordance with Southern Task Force Telegraphic Order No. 92, the Carrier Task Force shall
carry out carrier operations in the Port Darwin area as well as in the eastern part of the Indian
Ocean, according to the following schedule:
(a) The first [carrier operation]
[The force] shall leave Palau on 15 February, sail by way of the Molucca Strait ([at] 1800 on
the 17th), the Manipa Strait ([at] 1200 on the 18th), west of Babar Island ([at] 0300 on the
19th) to a point about 80 nautical miles south of Babar Island around 0600 on the 19th, from
where it shall launch the surprise air strike operation against Port Darwin. After that, it shall
put in at Staring Bay.
(b) The second [carrier operation]
[The force] shall leave Staring Bay around 25 February and sail by way of the Ombai Strait
and along the western side of the Savu Islands so as to reach the eastern part of the Indian
Ocean. After operating there, it shall return to Staring Bay.
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* See p. 345. Actually, this order was issued by the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet.
2. The air unit of the Southern Task Force shall, in concert with the above carrier operations, be
assigned to catch and destroy enemy forces as well as to search for and attack the enemy on the
waters where the Carrier Task Force operates, particularly the wide areas ahead of the sailing
route of the latter. 
3. Apart from the following operations, the air unit of the Southern Task Force shall operate ac-
cording to its assigned dispositions.
(a) The 1st Air Raid Unit
(1) From the departure of the Carrier Task Force from Palau till the completion of the oper-
ations of the force, the unit shall search for the enemy on the sailing route ahead of the
force in the area of the Molucca Strait and to the south, while clearing and neutralizing
[the enemy] in the northwestern part of New Guinea, Halmahera, and the Savu Islands.
(2) On 19 February, in concert with the surprise attack of the Carrier Task Force, it shall carry
out an air strike on Port Darwin with its land-based attack plane units at 1130 with the
facilities of the east airfield as their target.
(3) On the 19th, it shall search for the enemy in the Arafura and the Timor Seas with one el-
ement of large flying boats, ready against fleeing enemy vessels.
(4) After that, [the unit] shall search for and attack [the enemy] in the Arafura and the Timor
Seas as designated by the commander, while accelerating the advance to the Kupang
base. [The unit shall also] continue reconnaissance attacks on key places in northwestern
Australia.
(5) During the second operation of the Carrier Task Force, [the unit] shall search for the
enemy in as wide an area as possible on the sailing route ahead of the force in order to
catch and destroy enemy surface forces.
(6) If the [capacity of the Kupang] base permits, the bulk of the large flying boat units shall
be advanced to Kupang during the carrier operations.
(b) The 2d Air Raid Unit
(1) The unit shall accelerate the advance of the land-based attack plane units to the Jimbaran
[airfield] (note by the author: Bali). Upon its advance, the unit shall search for and attack
enemy naval vessels in the coastal areas of Java as well as in the Christmas Island area. 
(2) During the second operation of the Carrier Task Force, the unit shall search for and attack
the enemy on the sea in as wide an area as possible west of a line 160º [SSE] from the
Jimbaran base (west of a 120º [ESE] line until the land-based attack plane units of the 1st
Air Raid Unit will have advanced to Kupang). 
4. The 3d Air Raid Unit shall be incorporated into the Air Unit of the Southern Task Force and con-
duct the following search and attack [missions].
(1) After the advance of the land-based attack plane units to Palembang, [the unit] shall search
for and attack enemy naval vessels in the Cocos Island, Java and Sumatra areas.
(2) During the second operation of the Carrier Task Force, [the unit shall search for and attack
the enemy in the area] west of the Palembang line.
At 2030 on the 16th, 5th Cruiser Division Commander Rear Admiral Takagi sent the units
concerned the outline of operations regarding the cover for the units of the first carrier op-
eration by the following telegram: “The Eastern Support Unit (the Nachi, the Haguro, and the
Akebono) shall leave Staring Bay at 1500 on the 17th and, after having been joined by the
Ikazuchi en route, take charge of covering the units of the first carrier operation, while [also]
supporting the 2d Escort Unit. The operation schedule is as follows (the rest is omitted by
the author; it will be described later on in [the section on] the Timor Invasion Operation.)”(53)
The status of the Carrier Task Force when it left Palau for the first carrier operation was
as follows:(141) (as of 15 February [1942])
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1. The disposition of forces (as shown in the following table)
Note: The 1st Carrier Division (the Akagi and the Kaga), the 2d Carrier Division (the Sōryū and
the Hiryū), the 8th Cruiser Division (the Toné and the Chikuma) and the 1st Destroyer
Squadron (the Abukuma and seven destoyers)
2. The state of aircraft replacements
The 1st and the 2d Carrier Divisions have been provided at Truk with ten carrier-based fighter
planes, eighteen carrier-based bombers and fourteen carrier-based attack planes from the 5th
Carrier Division, which was going to return to mainland Japan.(100)
The Launch of the Operation
Reconnaissance and Sailing
At 1020 on 10 February, one land-based reconnaissance plane of the 3d Air Group took off
from Ambon, carried out a covert photoreconnaissance over Port Darwin and returned at
1720.
The results of the visual reconnaissance were as follows:(81)
1. There are two airfields [with a runway] of 1,500 meters to 2,000 meters long in the northern sub-
urbs of the city of Port Darwin. Five large planes and about twenty small planes were spotted
on the eastern airfield. Three [enemy] fighter planes were patrolling in the air at an altitude of
about 2,000 meters.
2. There is [a] seaplane base at the southeastern end of the city of Port Darwin. Three flying boats
were spotted in the neighborhood.
3. One vessel, which looked like a carrier-plane tender, about ten large merchantmen, eleven small
merchantmen and about five vessels, which looked like destroyers, were spotted in the bay.
4. No air bases were spotted on the Melville and Bathurst Islands.
5. Although adequate reconnaissance may not have been performed due to clouds, the objective
was by and large attained.
6. No damage was sustained.
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In connection with the Carrier Task Force’s attack on Port Darwin, the commander of the
land based air units, Vice Admiral Tsukahara, refrained from attacking Port Darwin until the
very day of the air strike.
At 1400 on 15 February, the Carrier Task Force left Palau for the first carrier operation (the
surprise attack on Port Darwin).(141) On that day, the Kanoya Air Group Detachment planned
to conduct a reconnaissance attack over the Lesser Sunda Islands with eighteen land-based
attack planes, but due to bad weather, attacked only Flores and the Alor islands.(81) [Mean-
while,] three large flying boats of the Tōkō Air Group searched for the enemy in the Banda
and the Timor Seas; at 1100, one of them spotted one [enemy] cruiser, three destroyers and
four transport ships sailing westward in the Timor Sea and went on probing, but did not re-
turn. Two land-based attack planes of the 1st Air Group took off to probe the above convoy
and spotted it at 1755, but it was too late to carry out an attack on that day. On that day, nine
land-based attack planes of the 1st Air Group carried out an attack on Dobo ([on] the Aru Is-
lands), while another nine on Fak Fak ([on] New Guinea).(81)
On the 16th, the Carrier Task Force sailed south, while having carrier-based attack planes
guard its sailing route ahead, carrier-based bombers patrol against enemy submarines, and
[some] carrier-based fighter planes provide escort [against enemy aircraft] in the air and also
[others] on standby on the carriers.(71) Although two Type–0 fighter planes of the 3d Air Group
Detachment carried out a search and attack mission on the enemy air power on Halmahera
and the surrounding waters, they did not spot the enemy. [Meanwhile,] land-based attack
planes of the 1st Air Group and large flying boats of the Tōkō Air Group carried out an attack
on the [enemy] convoy they had spotted on the day before in the Timor sea, but could not
attain large military gains.(81) Also, twenty-seven aircraft of the Kanoya Air Group Detach-
ment took off for the attack on this convoy, but they could not spot the enemy [convoy] due
to bad weather (to be described later.)
On the 17th, the Carrier Task Force [continued] sailing south on strict alert. Since no water
depths were provided on the nautical charts of the area, the Carrier Task Force sailed ahead,
greatly worried about the sailing route.(142) On that day, the Takao Signal Unit commander
reported that communication intelligence had shown that twenty-three U.S. naval vessels,
thirteen British naval vessels and two vessels of the Dutch East Indies had appeared in the
direction of Darwin and Batavia. [A] carrier-based attack plane of the Kaga, which was guard-
ing the sailing route ahead of the force, spotted one submerged enemy submarine at thirty-
four nautical miles 220º [SW] of the main unit, and neutralized her. At 2150, the Carrier Task
Force crossed the equator.(141) In the meantime, as for the land-based air unit, two large flying
boats of the Tōkō Air Group searched for the enemy in the Molucca and the Ceram Seas, but
spotted no enemy. Also, in order to attack the convoy spotted on the days before, four large
flying boats of the Tōkō Air Group and four land-based attack planes of the Kanoya Air
Group took off for the search while twenty-six land-based attack planes of the 1st Air Group
and nineteen land-based attack planes of the Kanoya Air Group took off for the attack, but
without spotting the enemy convoy, attacked their second target, [a] battery at Kupang.(81)
On the 18th, like the day before, the Carrier Task Force went on sailing further south on
strict alert.(53) The land-based air unit had six large flying boats of the Tōkō Air Group search
for the enemy [within a range of] 550 nautical miles between 120º [ESE] and 200º [SSW] from
Ambon, while having three land-based attack planes of the Kanoya Air Group search for the
enemy [within a range of] 650 nautical miles between 165º [SSE] and 200º [SSW] from
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Kendari. However, they spotted nothing more than one armed transport ship (sailing on a
100º [E] course at a speed of 16 knots) at 320 nautical miles 50º [NE] from Port Darwin and
two transport ships and a destroyer (on a northeastern course at a speed of 12 knots, directly
escorted by aircraft) at 90 nautical miles 268º [W] [from Port Darwin].(81)
On the 18th, the land-based air unit commander, Vice Admiral Tsukahara, reported on
the enemy movements: According to air reconnaissance of northwestern Australia, there are
one small aircraft carrier, a few destroyers and a few submarines. On 15 February, one class-
A cruiser, three destroyers and four transport ships were sailing westward in the Timor Sea,
but due to serious damage inflicted on three of the transport ships on 16 [February] by our
air attack, [the enemy] seems to have escaped to the south, abandoning plans to bring rein-
forcements to Java or Kupang. There are no other powerful units in western Australia, and
it is highly likely that the Australian main fleet and the U.S. Fleet reinforcements are stationed
on the east coast. The British Indian Ocean Fleet seems to be operating from its base on Cey-
lon with one element in the Cocos Islands and/or the Rangoon area. Its strength is estimated
to consist of two battleships, two aircraft carriers, two to three class-A cruisers, three to four
class-B cruisers and ten to twelve destroyers.(81)
Carrier Task Force Commander V. Adm. Nagumo Chūichi’s plans till that day [the 18th]
for the air strike on Port Darwin can by and large be pieced together as follows:(17, 141)
1. The enemy movements in the area of Port Darwin
(1) Since aircraft radio communications are sparse, the [enemy] movements are not very active.
The number of enemy aircraft on site can by and large be estimated at around 30 aircraft.
(2) The enemy vessels on site are one aircraft carrier-like vessel, one or two cruisers, some de-
stroyers and other [types of] ships, and about ten transport ships.
2. The formation of the attack units
(1) Commander: Cdr. Fuchida Mitsuo
(2) Formation of the aircraft units
3. Weather reconnaissance and armament
(1) The scheduled time for the weather reconnaissance plane of the 8th Cruiser Division to reach
the foremost [reconnaissance] point shall be set at 0600. 
(2) The carrier-based attack planes shall carry 800-kg bombs.
4. The status of the friendly forces (scheduled for the 19th)
(1) Land-based attack plane units shall carry out air strikes on the Port Darwin airfield at 1130.
(2) Large flying boats shall search for the enemy in the Arafura and the Timor Seas.








Akagi 9 18 18 45
188
Kaga 9 27 18 54
Sōryū 9 18 18 45
Hiryū 9 18 17 44
5. The scheduled movements of the carrier group (after the takeoff of the aircraft)
(1) In case of northwesterly winds: set course to 90º [E] and change course to 300º [NW]after
two hours.
(2) In case of northeasterly winds: set course to 270º [W] and change course to 60º [ENE] after
two hours.
(3) In case of southwesterly winds: set course to 60º [ENE] and change course to 240º [ESE] after
three hours.
(4) In case of southeasterly winds: set course to 330º [NNW] and change course to 130º [SE]
after two hours.
(5) In whichever case, [the carriers] shall sail at a speed of 20 knots. However, for take off and
landing of aircraft, their course may be shifted slightly upwind.
[An antiaircraft] guard in the air over the carriers shall be instituted prior to the take off of
the attack units and continued by and large until sunset.
The Destruction of Port Darwin
On the early morning of the 19th, the scout seaplane of the Toné took off and reached the
foremost [reconnaissance] point at 0600 for a weather reconnaissance, but could not make
radio contact due to trouble with its radio set. At 0825 after its return, it reported that the
weather was suitable.(143) However, before that, Carrier Task Force Commander Vice Admiral
Nagumo had already judged the weather to be suitable and issued the order to strike Port
Darwin. First of all at 0615, three Type–0 fighter planes of the Akagi to provide an [antiaircraft]
guard in the air took off and took up positions. (Although the guard was provided by a total
of fifteen aircraft in five shifts until 1735, no enemy was spotted.)(71) At 0622, the Type–97 car-
rier-based attack plane of the Akagi carrying Commander Fuchida, commander of the attack
plane unit, took off. The aircraft units of all carriers took off one after another and formed
formations above the Carrier Task Force. At 0700, the aircraft with the commander on board
flew over the flagship and headed to attack Port Darwin.(71) At 0745, the aircraft units de-
ployed for the attack over Melville Island and in full force went on to the attack at 0810; they
completed the strike a little after 0900, returned and were recovered by the mother ships by
1212. The military gains and losses reported were as follows:(71)
1. The carrier-based attack plane units of the Akagi ([led by] Cdr. Fuchida Mitsuo)
First Sqdn (nine carrier-based attack planes): Bombed and seriously damaged the railway pier
and two merchantmen on both sides of it; no damage was sustained.
Second Sqdn (nine carrier-based attack planes): Bombed a large merchantman and scored a near
hit at the bow; no damage was sustained [by the Japanese side].
2. The carrier-based bomber units of the Akagi ([led by] Lt. Chihaya Takehiko)
First Sqdn (nine carrier-based bombers): Inflicted some damage to a destroyer and minor dam-
age to a merchantman; no damage was sustained.
Second Sqdn (nine carrier-based bombers): Inflicted serious damage to two merchantmen, which
were set ablaze, and some damage to another; one aircraft was marked by bullets.
3. The carrier-based fighter plane unit of the Akagi (nine carrier-based fighter planes [led by] Lt.
Cdr. Itaya Shigeru)
Shot down four enemy fighter planes in an air engagement and set four [enemy] bombers [on
the ground] ablaze and destroyed another four [on the ground] by strafing; three aircraft were
marked by bullets. 
4. The carrier-based attack plane units of the Kaga ([led by] Lt. Cdr. Hashiguchi Takashi)
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First Sqdn (nine carrier-based attack planes): Scored all direct hits on virtually the whole ad-
ministrative district; seven aircraft were marked by bullets. 
Second Sqdn (nine carrier-based attack planes): Scored all direct hits on the [enemy] Navy head-
quarters and the southeastern side of the administrative district; no damage was sustained. 
Third Sqdn (nine carrier-based attack planes): Scored one hit at the stern of a merchantman and
another hit at the railway pier. The direct hits caused serious damage; the squadron [also] sank
two small merchantmen by near hits; no damage was sustained. 
5. The carrier-based bomber units of the Kaga ([led by] Lt. Ogawa Shōichi)
First Sqdn (nine carrier-based bombers): Bombed the east airfield, blew up two hangars and set
them ablaze; bombed the west airfield, blew up the hangar[s] and barrack[s] and set them
ablaze; strafed a barrack and [a] radio direction locator station; one aircraft crashed itself and
another was marked by bullets. 
Second Sqdn (nine carrier-based bombers): Bombed one 5,000t-class merchantman and set her
ablaze, sank another, and strafed one armored car and set it ablaze; five aircraft were marked
by bullets. 
6. The carrier-based fighter plane unit of the Kaga (nine carrier-based fighter planes [led by] Lt.
Nikaidō Yasushi)
Shot down four [enemy] fighter planes and one flying boat in an air engagement, strafed one
[enemy] flying boat and set it ablaze; four aircraft were marked by bullets.
7. The carrier-based attack plane units of the Sōryū ([led by] Lt. Abe Heijirō)
First Sqdn (six carrier-based attack planes): Bombed a large merchantman, with little result;
three aircraft were marked by bullets.
Second Sqdn (six carrier-based attack planes): Bombed two large merchantmen, with little result;
one aircraft was marked by bullets.
Third Sqdn (six carrier-based attack planes): Bombed barrack[s], with enormous result; no dam-
age was sustained.
8. The carrier-based bomber units of the Sōryū ([led by] Lt. Cdr. Egusa Takashige)
First Sqdn (nine carrier-based bombers): Instantly sank one destroyer, set ablaze another and
one mid-sized merchantman as well as heavy oil tank[s]; six aircraft were marked by bullets.
Second Sqdn (nine carrier-based bombers): Set one oiler and one flying boat ablaze; strafed a
gunboat, barrack[s] and others; one [Japanese] aircraft sank during an emergency landing on
the water (the crew were rescued) and four aircraft were marked by bullets.
9. The carrier-based fighter plane unit of the Sōryū (nine carrier-based fighter planes [led by] Sub-
lieutenant Fujita Iyozō)
Directly covered the attack units, strafed one auxiliary cruiser and reduced her speed.
10. The carrier-based attack plane units of the Hiryū ([led by] Lt. Cdr. Kusumi Masashi)
First Sqdn (nine carrier-based attack planes): Bombed one 10,000t-class cargo ship, set her ablaze;
positive to have sunk her. 
Second Sqdn (nine carrier-based attack planes): Bombed one 10,000t-class oiler, set her ablaze;
positive to have sunk her.
A total of four aircraft of the 1st and the 2d Squadrons were marked by bullets.
11. The carrier-based bomber units of the Hiryū (eighteen carrier-based bombers [led by] Lt.
Kobayashi Michio)
Sank one 10,000t-class and one 7,000t-class merchantman, seriously damaged one class-B cruiser
and inflicted considerable damage to one 7,000t-class and one mid-sized merchantman; two air-
craft were marked by bullets.
12. The carrier-based fighter plane unit of the Hiryū ([led by] Lt. Nōno Sumio )
Shot down one [enemy] fighter plane in an air engagement, seriously damaged two large and
two small aircraft [on the ground] by strafing, set ablaze three large and three small planes and
two flying boats; one aircraft crashed itself and seven were marked by bullets.
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As for the land-based air units, one land-based reconnaissance plane reconnoitered Port Dar-
win at 1010, which was followed by twenty-seven land-based attack planes of the Kanoya
Air Group and twenty-seven land-based attack planes of the 1st Air Group, which raided
Port Darwin and bombed the east airfield at 1037 and 1040. The unit reported as military
gains that all bombs had hit the airfield facilities as well as the runways, engulfing one large
hangar on the south side, two small hangars and neighboring facilities in a huge fire (the
large hangar on the north side was already on fire), while setting two large planes ablaze,
and seriously damaging one mid-sized and four small planes. One aircraft was marked by
bullets.(81)
At 1005, aircraft of the Akagi returning from Port Darwin spotted one 6,000t-class auxiliary
cruiser about 100 nautical miles north of Port Darwin. Carrier Task Force Commander Vice
Admiral Nagumo immediately ordered the 8th Cruiser Division to probe the enemy, while
ordering the 2d Carrier Division to attack her. On receiving the [returning] units of the first
attack, 2d Carrier Division Commander Rear Admiral Yamaguchi promptly prepared for a
second attack, and the second attack units (consisting of nine carrier-based bombers each of
the Sōryū and the Hiryū) took off at 1306. At 1406, [a] scout seaplane of the Toné reported that
the location of the [enemy] auxiliary cruiser was 30 nautical miles 10º [N] of Cape Fourcroy
[and that she was sailing] on a 200º [SSW] course at a speed of 18 knots. From 1456 to 1512,
the carrier-based bomber unit of the Sōryū strafed and bombed the enemy about 10 nautical
miles 0º [N] of [Cape] Fourcroy, scored three direct hits with 250 kg bombs and rendered her
unable to sail, while the carrier-based bomber unit of the Hiryū spotted one 1,000t-class mer-
chantman at 32 nautical miles 350º [NNW] of Cape Fourcroy at 1456, attacked and reported
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Illustration No. 37 — The Operations of the Carrier Task Force in the Air Strike on Port Darwin 
(15-21 February, 1942)
to have sunk her. The loss sustained by Japanese forces was one aircraft that was marked by
bullets; all aircraft returned at 1700.(71, 141)
At 2430 on the 19th, the Carrier Task Force commander reported the military gains in his
Summary Report of the Actions No. 5 as follows.(141)
1. After having reconnoitered the weather with a scout seaplane of the 8th Cruiser Division, we
carried out [the operation] to attack Darwin at 0830 on the 19th as scheduled.
At 0825, we were spotted by an enemy twin-engine flying boat; we pursued it but let it slip
away to the south.
2. The military gains
(a) One large and ten small [enemy] aircraft were shot down, four large and three small planes
and three flying boats were strafed and set ablaze, and two large and three small planes
were strafed and destroyed, amounting to twenty-six aircraft (all on site)
(b) Eight transport ships, two destroyers, and one submarine chaser were sunk. One destroyer
was seriously damaged. Other than the above, one hospital ship and some small boats were
spotted but they were not attacked. No aircraft carriers or submarines were spotted inside
the bay.
(c) As for ground facilities, all (three) hangars on both the east and west airfields and one bar-
rack were set ablaze. The buildings in the neighborhood of the administrative district and
the Navy headquarters as well as the mooring pier were bombed and destroyed. [Also,] bar-
rack[s] at the northeastern end of the urban area were bombed and set ablaze.
(d) The carrier-based bombers of the 2d Carrier Division (eighteen bombers) and a scout sea-
plane of the 8th Cruiser Division carried out the second attack on one 6,000t-class auxiliary
cruiser and one 1,000t-class transport ship, which were fleeing on the waters north of Cape
Fourcroy at 1500; they sank the transport ship and crippled the auxiliary cruiser. (Since three
No. 25 normal bombs directly hit the latter and caused a fire, it was assumed that she must
have sunk later.)
3. Losses
One carrier-based bomber of the Kaga and one carrier-based fighter plane of the Hiryū crashed
themselves and met a heroic end.
4. Remarks
(a) The enemy hardly has a will to fight.
(b) Except for the fire directed at the previously mentioned aircraft that crashed themselves,
[the level] of the [enemy] antiaircraft fire cannot be considered particularly superior, [con-
sidering that only] a few aircraft were marked by bullets while conducting horizontal bomb-
ing runs at an altitude of 3,000 meters.
5. During this operation, at 0930 on the 17th, one submerged [enemy] submarine was spotted at
2º30’N 127º26’E and neutralized.
Note by the author: [S.W.] Roskill states in The War at Sea that “great damage was done to the
port and to the shipping in it.”
In the meantime on that day [the 19th], large flying boat[s] of the Tōkō Air Group, which
were searching for the enemy in the western part of the Arafura Sea and the eastern part of
the Timor Sea, spotted one (Canberra-class) cruiser at a point sixty-three nautical miles 247º
[WSW] of Port Darwin. However, this naval vessel was lucky to avoid an attack, because she
was a little out of the maximum attack range of the carrier-based planes and because she was
spotted after the land-based attack planes’ attack on Port Darwin.(141)
The Carrier Task Force completed the operation and headed for Staring Bay as scheduled,
and at 1015 on 21 February, it safely put in at the bay.(141)
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14. The Capture of Timor (See Illustrations No. 38 and No. 39)
The State of Affairs up to the Capture [Operation]
The Invasion Schedule and the Units Involved
In the Tokyo Agreement concluded on 10 November 1941, it was stipulated that the [opera-
tion to] capture Kupang should be executed by around Day X + 60 (6 February) following
the [operation to] capture Ambon. Then, in the conference at Cam Ranh Bay on 29 December
[1941], it was decided that the Ambon and Kupang operations should be carried out in par-
allel with the Makassar Strait and the east of Celebes lines of operation, constituting three
lines of operation. Accordingly, the capture [operation] was fixed on Day X + 65 (11 February).
However (as described previously [p. 99]), partly due to the Navy’s wish to capture Kupang
before Makassar, in the plan of operations of the Dutch East Indies Unit announced on 29
December ([and] revised by about 5 or 6 January), it was decided that the capture [of Kupang]
should be carried out on Day X + 59 (5 February).
As for the units to be employed in the capture, it was decided that the Army should divert
the Itō Detachment ([consisting of] three battalions of the 38th Division as the core) from
Hong Kong, while the Navy was supposed to add minesweepers and submarine chaser[s]
of the 1st Base Force to the main force of the 2d Destroyer Squadron as the escort force. Also,
the Eleventh Air Fleet planned to advance to this area the necessary strength of land-based
attack planes and fighter planes. Further, it was decided that the 9th Construction Squad,
which was to be newly organized on 15 January, should be employed.
After that, in connection with the delay in the Menado and the Kendari operations, the
[operation to] capture Ambon was postponed (for six days) to 31 January, and along with
that the [operation to] capture Kupang was postponed to Day X + 74 (20 February) at the
Manila Conference of 22 January.(53) Meanwhile, earlier on 16 January, the 3d Yokosuka Spe-
cial Landing Force (a paratrooper unit) had advanced to Tarakan to be dropped on Balikpa-
pan, but the operation was hindered by the delay in the preparation of the airfield, leaving
them on standby in Tarakan. On 27 January, as a result of a discussion between the air unit
of the Southern Task Force and the Dutch East Indies Unit, it was decided that the force
should be employed for the Kupang operation.(67) Because of this [change], the employment
of one element of the 1st Kure Special Landing Force, scheduled to be dispatched from
Ambon to capture Kupang, was called off; instead, it was decided that one element of the
Sasebo Combined Special Landing Force (two platoons) and another small element of the 3d
Yokosuka Special Landing Force (which does not conduct paradrop operations) should par-
ticipate in the [Kupang] operation from Makassar.(53)
The Issue of Invading Portuguese Timor
In relation to the Kupang operation, the decision of how to deal with Portuguese Timor, a
third country, was one of the issues in conducting the war. In the beginning of January 1942,
intelligence was received that an element of Dutch East Indian and Australian troops had
invaded the Dili area of Portuguese Timor,(34) and this became a serious problem for Tokyo
as the Kupang operation was drawing near. It was on 20 January that the issue was taken up
at the Liaison Conference between IGHQ and the Government for the first time,(41) and at the
next conference on the 28th, Prime Minister Tōjō and Chief of Navy General Staff Nagano
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sharply differed in opinion on the issue and could not reach agreement.* Prime Minister Tōjō
maintained that as long as the enemy troops are deployed in Dili, it is only natural to mop
them up, but that Japanese troops should be promptly withdrawn from the [Portuguese] ter-
ritory, once they had mopped up the enemy in the city, whereas Chief of Navy General Staff
Nagano maintained that the withdrawal of our troops from Portuguese Timor should depend
on the attitude of the Portuguese as well as the circumstances at the time.(1, 41, 144) Taking into
account that in a prolonged war in the future, Dili would be an important operational base
for neutralizing Australia, the chief of Navy General Staff could not easily approve a with-
drawal [of Japanese forces]. In the end, at the liaison conference on 2 February, a compromise
plan was agreed on: “After mopping up the British, Dutch and Australian forces on Por-
tuguese territory, the Imperial [Japanese] forces shall withdraw from the area concerned, as
long as Portugal ensures the neutrality [of the territory]. However, if it is unavoidable in
terms of the attitude of the Portuguese and the other circumstances of the entire operation,
the [Japanese forces] can continue to use [the place] as a base for operations.”(144)
Earlier on 5 January, at the same time as issuing an order to the Sixteenth Army to capture
Ambon and Kupang, the Southern Army headquarters had sent a telegram to [the Army De-
partment of] IGHQ that they would like to receive as soon as possible actual proof that the
enemy forces were using Portuguese Timor,(34) but they had been left without a reply. How-
ever, all of a sudden on 4 February, the Southern Army headquarters received an advisory
telegram from the Navy, which read: “In view of the present situation where both Australian
and Dutch East Indies forces have occupied Portuguese Timor, we would like, at the time of
[the operation to] capture Timor, to have an element of the Itō Detachment go ashore in Dili
(under the escort of the Navy) almost simultaneously with the landing in Kupang and seize
the vicinity.” The Southern Army promptly wired central [command] requesting directives.(34)
On 7 February, both the Navy and the Army Departments of IGHQ issued orders con-
cerning the capture of Kupang and Dili.(42, 43, 145, 146) This order stated that unless Portugal took
hostile action, [both forces] were supposed to respect the sovereignty [of Portuguese Timor]
as much as possible. On 7 February, having received the Imperial Order concerning the cap-
ture of Kupang and Dili, the Southern Army for the first time confirmed the policy of central
[command] and, on the same day, wired a reply to the Southern Task Force approving the
advisory telegram of 4 February.(34) Accordingly, on 9 February, Southern Task Force Com-
mander Vice Admiral Kondō issued an order to seize Dili. Earlier, from around 5 February,
Dutch East Indies Unit Commander Vice Admiral Takahashi had started preliminary nego-
tiations with Sixteenth Army Commander Lieutenant General Imamura. On 7 February, he
sent an official advisory telegram and by the [Sixteenth Army’s] telegram of approval of 11
February, the arrangement between them was officially concluded. The arrangement read in
outline as follows:(24)
1. Almost simultaneously with [the operation to] seize Kupang, one element of the Itō Detachment
(for which adequate escort shall be provided) shall be put ashore in Dili and vicinity in Por-
tuguese territory in order to seize the city (with seizing the airfield as the main purpose).
2. Depending on the situation after seizing Kupang, the Itō Detachment shall seize the Kolbano
airfield overland and make it ready for use.
Details shall be decided after consultation between Detachment Commander Itō and the 2d
Destroyer Squadron commander.
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* See also Vol. 3, p. 381.
Since the particulars concerning the seizure of Dili as well as the official text of the arrange-
ments with Sixteenth Army Commander Lieutenant General Imamura had been decided,
Dutch East Indies Unit Commander Vice Admiral Takahashi sent on the same day, the 11th,
the following communication to Rear Admiral Takagi, commander of the Eastern Attack
Unit, who was supposed to implement the operation:(54)
Third Fleet Classified Telegram No. 271 [at] 1500 on the 11th
Concerning the landing and occupation of Dili, it is requested that arrangements in line with
the following main points be made with [Army] Detachment Commander Itō and the 21st Air
Flotilla before they are carried out:
1. Summary of the Policy of the Government in [Navy Ministry] Secretariat Classified Telegram
No. 146 (brought and explained by Staff Officer Koseki) 
(a) In order to secure air base[s] and prospective base[s] of operations, [the invasion] shall
be conducted for the purpose of clearing the British, Australian and Dutch forces [from
the territory] and shall be carried out, while trying not to make an enemy of the Por-
tuguese forces. Therefore, before entering [Portuguese territory], various parts of the ter-
ritory shall be reconnoitered, and the use of airfield[s] and the requisitioning of buildings
shall take the form of obtaining approval of the Portuguese [authorities] beforehand, un-
less the Portuguese units become hostile toward us.
(b) At or after 0800 on the 20th, the Government will give the necessary notifications to the
Portuguese. 
2. The main points of the arrangements
(a) [The invasion unit] shall advance to Dili and vicinity before dawn on the 20th and dis-
embark. The landing points shall be selected in such a way that visual identification of
friend or foe from the air will be easy. It will be better to avoid the front of Dili as much
as possible and appropriately land at a more distant place. 
Metinaro, ten nautical miles west* of Dili or Aipelo to the west of Dili seem to be suitable
[landing points].
(b) [The invasion unit] shall advance on Dili by and large after dawn while friendly aircraft
keep watch in the air. Simultaneously, handbills (to the effect that the purpose of our
forces is to clear the British, Australian and Dutch forces [from the territory], and that
the Portuguese forces should avoid hostilities [against us]) shall be dropped from the
air. 
(c) After that, depending on the enemy movements, reinforcements shall be brought in and
the ground units shall be covered and supported from the sea.
(d) Concerning the preliminary air reconnaissance over the landing points, arrangements
with the air unit must be made as soon as possible. 
(e) The construction squad to be employed for the Dili operation shall be designated later.
At the same time, Dutch East Indies Commander Vice Admiral Takahashi issued the order
to seize Kupang and Dili to 2d Escort Unit Commander Rear Admiral Tanaka, which was in
outline as follows:(54)
1. The schedule of the operation to capture the Dutch East Indies shall be changed as follows:
(1) Batavia and Surabaya: 26 February
(2) Kupang and Dili: 20 February
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* Actually east of Dili
(3) Bali: 18 February (as scheduled)
2. The 2d Escort Unit shall escort one element of the Itō Detachment to Dili by 20 February with
one element. It shall also make arrangements with Detachment Commander Itō concerning [the
operation to] seize the Kolbano airfield.
At the same time, Dutch East Indies Unit Commander Vice Admiral Takahashi informed
Tokyo that no naval special landing forces would be employed in the invasion operation
against Dili and that it would be alright if the Government’s notification would be given to
the Portuguese side at or after 0800 on the 20th.(54) Also, it was decided that one element of
the 1st Construction Squad ([currently in] Kendari) would be employed for Dili.(78)
The Issue of Which Forces to Assign to the Invasion of Timor
1. The Participation of the 1st Patrol Boat Division
In view of the Ambon operation, the necessity of being able to conduct small-scale
minesweeping operations with shallow-draft large-sized motorized [landing] craft
was keenly felt, which led to the decision that the small-scale minesweeping unit ([con-
sisting of] four large-sized motorized [landing] craft loaded [on the vessels of] the 1st
Patrol Boat Division and specially-assigned minesweeping personnel) that had been
organized in the Makassar operation should be brought in. [Accordingly,] it was de-
cided to incorporate the 1st Patrol Boat Division into the 2d Escort Unit and put the
specially assigned personnel (who belonged to the 1st Base Force) onto the patrol boats.
Second Destroyer Squadron Commander Tanaka had also requested an increase in the
number of minesweepers, but this was not realized due to a lack of available forces.(54)
2. The Assignment of the 7th Destroyer Division (three destroyers)
As of 30 January, the 7th Destroyer Division, which had been assigned to the carrier
air unit and advanced to Palau, was transferred to the Eastern Attack Unit, where the
1st Section was incorporated into the 2d Escort Unit to engage in the Ambon operation,
while the 2d Section accompanied the 5th Cruiser Division and became [part of] the
Support Unit. However, along with the decision to commit the Carrier Task Force to
the southern theater, the Combined Fleet [also] issued an order to the 2d Carrier Divi-
sion and the 7th Destroyer Division to return to the Carrier Task Force as of 10 Febru-
ary. Regarding this [order], Eastern Attack Unit Commander Rear Admiral Takagi and
2d Destroyer Squadron Commander Rear Admiral Tanaka strongly requested that the
7th Destroyer Division should stay, which was finally confirmed on the 12th.(54)
3. The Issue of the Participation of the Seaplane Tenders
As of 9 February, the deployment of the seaplane tender force of the Dutch East Indies
Unit was envisioned in the following way:(54)
The Chitose: Shall directly cover the eastern Java invasion unit from Jolo.
The Mizuho: Shall engage in the service of aircraft at Staring bay; therefore it is all right if she
cannot be employed for the invasion operation against eastern Java.
The Sanuki-maru: Crippled and remains at Balikpapan; her aircraft units shall advance to Makas-
sar and support the Bali invasion operation as well as the eastern Java invasion units.
The Kamikawa-maru and the San’yō-maru: Shall directly cover the western Java invasion units
from Cam Ranh Bay.
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Therefore, no seaplane tenders were available for the Timor operation. Concerned about this,
21st Air Flotilla Commander Rear Admiral Tada requested the air unit commander that since
it would be difficult to securely provide the invasion units with patrols against enemy aircraft
or submarines, or with support for the land combats from the Kendari base, which was 385
nautical miles away, the 11th Seaplane Tender Division should cooperate in the operation.
The 2d Destroyer Squadron commander also strongly requested it of the Dutch East Indies
Unit. On 11 February, Dutch East Indies Commander Vice Admiral Takahashi sent a telegram
to the 11th Seaplane Tender Division to the effect that there was a possibility that the Mizuho
might be made to support the Timor operation for a while prior to the Surabaya operation.(78)
After that, on the 16th, it was decided that the Mizuho and Patrol Boat No. 39 should be in-
corporated into the 2d Escort Unit, while the aircraft unit of the Sanuki-maru, Patrol Boat No.
36 and two fishing boats should be incorporated into the 2d Air Unit.(54)
The Plan of Operations
Plan of Operations of the Eastern Attack Unit
Eastern Attack Unit Commander Rear Admiral Takagi successively issued his orders con-
cerning the operation to capture Timor, which were, as of 16 February (and launched as of
the 17th), in summary as follows:(78)
1. Forces to be employed and their distribution
2. Supporting friendly forces
(1) The 1001 Unit ([i.e.] the 3d Yokosuka Special Landing Force) of the Eleventh Air Fleet, fighter
plane units and land-based attack plane units
(2) The Army Itō Detachment ([consisting of] three infantry battalions as the core) in five trans-
port ships
3. Tasks























5th Cruiser Div (minus the
Myōkō), the Akebono and the
Ikazuchi
2d Escort Unit 2d Destroyer Sqdn Cdr
The Jintsū, the 16th Destroyer
Div, the 15th Destroyer Div
(minus the Natsushio), the 7th
Destroyer Div 1st Section, the
21st Minesweeper Div ([only]
Minesweepers Nos. 7 and 8),
Patrol Boats Nos. 1 and 2, two
plts of the Sasebo Combined
SLF, the Mizuho, Patrol Boat
No. 39, 4 naval transport
ships ([with] the 1st Construc-
tion Squad and one element
of 3d Yokosuka SLF [on
board])
(1) In cooperation with the Army Itō Detachment and the 1001 Unit of the Eleventh Air fleet,
the unit shall seize Kupang and the vicinity and secure the Kupang airfield.
(2) In cooperation with the Army Itō Detachment, the unit shall carry out a sudden attack to
seize Dili ([in] Portuguese Timor) as well as occupy and secure the airfield there. 
(3) On top of the support for the above operations, the support unit shall also provide cover in
the first carrier operation to be conducted by the carrier operation unit.
4. Outline of the operation
(1) The Support Unit
{1} The 5th Cruiser Division (minus the Myōkō) and the Akebono shall leave Staring Bay at
1500 on 17 February. After approaching the 1st Echelon of the 2d Escort Unit on the morn-
ing of the 18th, [the unit] shall change course eastward. At night on the 18th, about 30
nautical miles north of Romang Island, it shall turn northward, and about 110 nautical
miles north of the island again change course westward. After approaching the 2d Ech-
elon on the morning of the 19th, [the unit] shall [further] sail westward and, at night on
the 19th, it shall operate around the area to the north of the Alor Strait. Thereafter, it shall
appropriately operate, depending on the enemy movements.
{2} The Ikazuchi shall replenish in Staring Bay on the 18th and join [the unit] at 38 nautical
miles 145º [SE] of Maromaho at 1100 on the 19th.
(2) The 2d Escort Unit
On top of [sailing along] the invasion route designated in Third Fleet Classified Telegram
No. 199 (note: the route between Kambing and the Alor Islands), [the unit shall operate] as
designated by the commander.
5. The operations of the Carrier Task Force and the air unit
On the morning of 19 February, a day prior to the invasion of Timor, our Carrier Task Force shall
conduct a surprise attack on enemy air power and naval vessels in Port Darwin as well as on
facilities situated there. Also, the air unit shall, in concert with this operation, attack Port Darwin
from the Ambon and Kendari bases. 
The Arrangements Between the 2d Escort Unit and the [Army] Itō Detachment
In accordance with the Dutch East Indies Unit Order of 11 February and the instructions from
the Third Fleet chief of staff, 2d Escort Unit Commander Rear Admiral Tanaka made arrange-
ments with Detachment Commander Itō on 14 February at Ambon, which were in summary
as follows:(54)
1. The distribution of the transport convoy
(1) The 1st Echelon: the units [to seize] the Kupang area
(2) The 2d Echelon: the units [to seize] the Dili area
2. The invasion forces
(1) Army 
{1} The Kupang Area: the Itō Detachment (commander: Major General Itō): the 38th Infantry
Group headquarters, two infantry battalions and one mountain artillery battalion as the
core 
{2} The Dili Area: One element of the Itō Detachment, [that is] one infantry battalion as the
core
(2) Navy
{1} The Kupang Area: One battalion of the 3d Yokosuka Special Landing Force (the main
force shall parachute down, while the other element shall make a seaborne landing) and
two platoons of the Sasebo Combined Special Landing Force
3. The assembly points, times and dates of departure, landing points, times to start landing, etc.
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Each echelon shall change anchorage to the anchorage outside the Ambon port by 1700 on the
day before the date of departure in the above.
4. The main points of the escort (omitted)
5. The entry into the anchorage and the cover of the landing [operation] etc. (omitted)
6. The movements of the transport ships after the landing (omitted)
The Plan of Operations of the Other Units
On 14 February at Ambon, 2d Escort Unit Commander Rear Admiral Tanaka disclosed the
outline of the operation to seize Timor by means of 2d Escort Unit Order No. 5.(54) This order
stated that the southern coast, which was considered to be weakly defended, was chosen as
the landing point for Kupang, and that in tandem with the operation of the 1001 Unit, which
would conduct a paradrop operation on an area near the northern coast, [the invasion unit]
should capture Puton [Penfui] airfield as well as Kupang while cutting off the only road lead-
ing to the east.
Also, it stated that the units to capture Dili should first of all occupy an area along the
coast west of Dili and try as best as they could not to provoke the [authorities of] Portuguese
Timor, while appropriately operating in accordance with the course of the diplomatic nego-
tiations. In the meantime, since the Mizuho and Patrol Boat No 39 had been incorporated in
the 2d Escort Unit as previously told, the commander formed the 2d Escort Unit air unit and
assigned the unit to guard the sailing route as well as the anchorage of the 1st Echelon against
enemy aircraft and submarines, while providing support for the ground combat of the land-
ing units. The captain of the Mizuho reported that his operation plan was to leave Kendari at
1400 on the 17th, [operate] on the waters near Binongko the whole day on the 18th, near the
Alor Strait the whole day on the 19th, and near Maikuru [? Nai Kliu? Naibonat?] on the north-
west coast of Timor around 0000 on the 20th, and after that operate depending on the weather
conditions and the enemy movements.(54)
As for the land-based air unit, twenty-two large flying boats of the Tōkō Air Group had
been advanced from Kema to Ambon from the 1st through the 10th of February, while nine-
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teen Type–0 fighter planes and two land-based reconnaissance planes of the 3d Air Group
had been advanced from Kendari to Ambon from the 4th through the 9th of February.(71, 81)
Also, thirty-eight Type–96 land-based attack planes of the 1st Air Group had been advanced
from the 7th through the 11th from Menado and Kendari to Ambon, which was followed by
1st Air Raid Unit Commander Rear Admiral Tada, who advanced to Ambon from Kendari
on 12 February to direct the Timor operation.(75)
The plan was that the land-based air unit should carry out attacks on enemy air power
and military facilities in the area, as well as search for and attack enemy naval vessels in the
Arafura and the Timor Seas, while [also] providing support to the Carrier Task Force during
the first carrier operation and providing direct escort in the air against enemy aircraft for the
[Timor] convoy. The plan also included dropping the paratrooper unit at a point twelve kilo-
meters northeast of the Kupang airfield and, in conjunction with the Army Itō Detachment,
having the unit capture Kupang and vicinity and secure the airfield.
The Launch of the Operation
Prior Neutralization of the [Enemy] Air Power(71, 81)
The air unit, which on 25 January had advanced to Kendari (seized on the 24th), launched a
strike on Kupang with fighter planes as early as on the 26th and gradually intensified the air
strikes, virtually neutralizing the Kupang airfield by the end of January. Thereafter, following
the advance of airplane units to Ambon, the search and attack missions in the [Kupang] area
were further intensified, but the enemy was barely seen; even in reconnaissance attacks in
western New Guinea on 9 February, no enemy aircraft were spotted. In the meantime (as
previously told), a large number of [enemy] naval vessels and aircraft were spotted in a re-
connaissance over Port Darwin by a land-based reconnaissance plane of the 3d Air Group
on the 10th. No enemy aircraft was spotted in a reconnaissance over the Dili area on the 11th
([conducted by] one land-based attack plane of the Kanoya Air Group).
Since then, reconnaissance attacks had been carried out day in and day out in the Kupang
and Dili areas. However, only several merchantmen but no enemy aircraft were spotted. Dur-
ing this period, as mentioned previously, an enemy convoy ([consisting of] one heavy cruiser,
three destroyers, three large and one mid-sized transport ships) was spotted to the west of
Port Darwin on the 15th and the 16th, and attacks were carried out with ten large flying boats
as well as thirty-five land-based attack planes of the 1st Air Group. However, they reported
of having only seriously damaged three large transport ships (one of which had confirmedly
sunk). The accurate shooting of the enemy heavy cruiser on the contrary had inflicted damage
on twelve aircraft, which were marked by bullets, and seriously injured two men and one
slightly.
According to the Dai-ichi Kūshū Butai Sentō Gaihō (Summary Action Report of the 1st
Air Raid Unit), the circumstances of this attack were as follows, with special attention paid
to the skillful evasive actions and the accurate antiaircraft fire of the enemy:(81)
1. At 0400 [on the 16th], four large flying boats of the Tōkō Air Group took off to search for enemy
transport convoys and, at 0830, one of them spotted a convoy [consisting of] one U.S. large
(Chester-class) cruiser, one large destroyer, two destroyers, three 8,000 ton or larger transport
ships and one 6,000t-class transport ship, a total of eight vessels, at 570 nautical miles 193º [S]
Chapter V     /     The Forward Push of the Air Bases 349
of LU (note by the author: Ambon). [The flying boat] appropriately and effectively kept on prob-
ing and guided the attack unit.
2. From 0630 onwards, thirty-five middle-sized land-based attack planes of the 1st Air Group and
ten large flying boats of the Tōkō Air Group took off one after another and carried out a bombing
attack on the enemy vessels from 1045 until about 1150 at an altitude of 3,500 to 4,500 [meters].
Although all four squadrons of the 1st Air Group bombed the enemy large cruiser in their first
attack, no effective hit was scored due to her large high-speed (thirty knots) evasive actions. In
the second attack, all squadrons carried out attacks on the transport ships; one squadron scored
two direct hits with No. 6* regular bombs and four effective near hits, which caused one ship to
stop and list. (It is certain that she will sink.) Each of the other two squadrons scored two effec-
tive near hits with No. 6 bombs (four in total) at the large transport ships.
The Tōkō Air Group completed its bombing by 1150. When it was leaving the battle site after
having scored several effective near hits, it spotted nearby one [enemy] large cruiser, which was
evacuating at a speed of 30 knots on a 200º [SSW] course, and two destroyers, which stayed
with the transport ships. It also spotted that out of the three transport ships that had stopped,
two were in flames and another was seriously damaged. Based on the above, it is certain that at
least three transport ships had been seriously damaged. Detailed reports of the military gains
will follow after examining the results from the detailed reports and the photos [to be] provided
by the Tōkō Air Group.
3. The Kanoya Air Group Detachment had planned to search for the enemy with three aircraft and
attack them with twenty-four aircraft, by having them take off after 0500. However, due to the
bad weather at the base and its vicinity, the takeoff [was delayed till] 1100 before the twenty-
seven aircraft [finally] took off to attack the enemy. Because of the frequent rain showers in the
area where the enemy was expected to be at that time, they were in the end unable to spot the
enemy.
4. Two Type–0 Fighter Planes of the 3d Air Group Detachment carried out a search and attack
[mission] on the enemy air power on Halmahera and the surrounding areas, but did not spot
the enemy. 
5. Losses: Twelve mid-sized land-based attack planes of the 1st Air Group were marked by bullets,
two men were seriously injured and one man slightly injured. 
In the attacks today, while taking very skillful evasive actions, the enemy large cruiser de-
livered a very fierce, accurate and continual antiaircraft barrage as a Houston-class [cruiser] had
done the other day.
Tomorrow, we shall further search for and attack this enemy.
Contrary to the accurate antiaircraft fire of the enemy, the bombing accuracy of the Japanese
forces was rather poor. This was supposedly caused by a lack of adequate frontline bombing
practice and also because of problems with the Japanese bombsights.
Note: Earlier, on 14 February, (a part of?) a Norden bombsight had been seized from a PBY flying
boat at the Ambon Seaplane Base. This bombsight used a small gyrocompass to ensure that
the bombsight would stay vertical, which enabled such an accurate bombing that effective
[results] could be expected even in single aircraft bombings. On the other hand, we Japanese
used [level] bubble bombsights that were poor in accuracy, for which we compensated to
some extent by training and with formation bombings. Although we had seized the bomb-
sight, we lacked, among others, the production technology for small gyrocompasses and
until the end of the war were never able to copy this bombsight.(124)
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The Sailing of the Invasion Units
On the morning of the 17th, the 2d Escort Unit and the 1st Echelon (the Kupang invasion
unit) left Ambon, while on the next day, the 18th, the 2d Echelon (the Dili invasion unit) left
Ambon.(54) Also, the Mizuho and Patrol Boat No. 39 left Staring Bay on the 17th.(68) On the
morning of the 18th, the Mizuho unit reached Binongko Island, where they set up a seaplane
base to provide the 1st Echelon with a guard against enemy aircraft and submarines; the unit
dismantled the base by the evening and [again] sailed south. At 0420 on the 19th, when the
1st Echelon was sailing southwestward fifty nautical miles off Timor in parallel to the coast,
it came under an attack by a torpedo, but it sustained no damage nor had it any clue [from
where the torpedo had come].
At 2330 on the 19th, the 2d Echelon began the operation to enter into the anchorage, while
the minesweeping unit of the 1st Echelon, which had sailed ahead, entered into the 1st an-
chorage east of Cape Mali around 2000 to start sweeping for mines; it completed the sweep-
ing by 2400 and reported no tethered mines. At 0600, the Mizuho reached off Cape Lewolein
on the northern coast of Lomblen Island, set up a seaplane base in the bay and guarded the
1st Echelon against enemy aircraft and submarines. On that day, as previously told, the Car-
rier Task Force and the air unit attacked Port Darwin in large numbers and inflicted devas-
tating damage on the naval vessels on site as well as the port facilities and the airfield.
Meanwhile, the Support Unit was sailing southward and advanced into the Timor Sea on
the 20th, to be ready against the [enemy] heavy cruiser, which the aircraft of the Eleventh
Air Fleet had attacked on the 16th (the enemy was not spotted in the end). During this period,
the air unit carried out reconnaissance attacks on Kupang and the vicinity (its battery in par-
ticular) as well as the waters surrounding that area, and also reconnoitered the Port Darwin
area. It barely spotted enemy vessels or aircraft other than some merchantmen, except for
those in the Port Darwin area. On the 18th, a thorough reconnaissance of the dropping point
at Kupang was carried out.(71)
The Landing in Kupang and the Uphill Battle of the Airborne Unit
At 0050 on 20 February, the 1st Echelon entered the 1st Anchorage east of Cape Mali and the
unit to land on the coast east of Cape Mali made a successful landing at 0240. At 0410, the
second landing unit also came ashore.(54) In the meantime, about 450 men of the unit of the
first drop of the 3d Yokosuka Special Landing Force were dropped on a pasture to the north
of Babau at 1045, without meeting with any enemy resistance. The Army unit seized High-
land 385, halfway between the landing point and Kupang by the end of the day, while the
3d Yokosuka Special Landing Force advanced to the east of Babau around 1200, fought a
fierce battle against a large enemy unit equipped with tanks and armored cars, and com-
pletely seized Babau at 1755. Also after that, the 3d Yokosuka Special Landing Force contin-
ued to battle with powerful enemy units, but after having driven off the enemy in front
westward at 1926 and getting native people to show them a shortcut to the airfield, the force
headed for the airfield. The 3d Yokosuka Special Landing Force had gotten in fierce engage-
ments with the enemy because by advancing along the main road from Kupang to Dili, they
[unintentionally] came to cut off the escape route of the enemy. The losses sustained by the
force amounted to two platoon commanders and three dozen non-commissioned officers
and men killed, and one platoon commander and forty to fifty non-commissioned officers
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and men injured.(147) In the meantime at sea, the main unit sailed to the north of Kupang,
while the Support Unit took up a position to the south of Kupang to support the operation.
Also, the Mizuho left Lomblen Island in early morning and provided guard for the anchorages
and support for the land combat, while appropriately operating on the waters south of Alor
Island.
At 0900 on 21 February, the center attack unit of the Itō Detachment charged into the city
of Kupang. At 1024 and in the same way as the day before, about 250 men of the unit of the
second drop of the 3d Yokosuka Special Landing Force were dropped on the [above-men-
tioned] pasture and headed for Babau; from around noon, the unit conducted a fierce two-
hours battle near Babau against a large enemy unit, equipped with tanks and armored cars,
after which the unit drove off the enemy. Then, contact with the first drop unit was estab-
lished, and [the unit] advanced along the bypath in the mountain forest toward the airfield.
At 1200, the Itō Detachment completed clearing [the enemy] from the city of Kupang and
also seized the landing point for the 4th anchorage at Tenau to the north [of the other three
anchorages]. At 1400, one element of the center attack unit of the Itō Detachment seized the
Kupang airfield. After having handed over the guard [of the airfield] to the 1st Sasebo Special
Landing Force detached force, which had advanced with them, they joined the main force.
In the meantime, the right attack unit of the Itō Detachment had at 1730 advanced to Oesau,
a key point on the enemy escape route toward the east.(54) At night, the 1st Sasebo Special
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The Navy Paratrooper Unit About to Land


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Landing Force detached force commander sent the following report on the condition of the
airfield: “2250: The area of the airfield is about 600,000 square meters and there are 220 or
more holes blasted in the center. Fighter planes can use [the airfield] from the 23d onwards
and there will be no hindrances to its use ([by] mid-sized land-based attack planes from the
25th [onwards]).(54)
The minesweeper units dealt with the minesweeping at each anchorage and in the wa-
terways, but found no tethered mines. The Support Unit, which had operated on the waters
west of Roti Island during the daytime, judged that the objectives of the operation had been
more or less attained and started withdrawing toward Staring Bay in order to prepare for
the Java operation.(54) On that day, as the Java operation was approaching, Dutch East Indies
Unit Commander Vice Admiral Takahashi let the Mizuho unit return to her original unit.
After retrieving her aircraft in the afternoon, the Mizuho sailed in the evening northward
through the Alor Strait toward the Makassar Strait.(54)
At 0600 on the 22d, the vanguard of the paratrooper unit finally reached the airfield.
Meanwhile from the early morning onwards, the Itō Detachment fought a fierce engagement
in the Oesau area, the escape route of the enemy, and drove off the enemy (during this en-
gagement, the detachment requested the Navy to bomb the enemy, in which the land-based
attack planes cooperated). From around 2210, the detachment turned to the pursuit of the
escaping enemy, caught them and made them surrender to the east of Naibonak at 1000 on
the 23d. The enemy consisted of about 1,000 men equipped with about 100 armored cars and
other vehicles.(104)
At 1600 on the 22d, the Support Unit put in at Staring Bay, where the unit joined the main
unit of the Dutch East Indies Unit; the Ikazuchi and the Akebono, which had been in the Sup-
port Unit, were incorporated into the main unit, while the Kawakaze and the Yamakaze, which
had been in the main unit, were put into the Support Unit instead. At 0000 on the 23d, as
previously told, the Dutch East Indies Unit commander issued the outline of the Java Inva-
sion operation, which was [in summary] as follows:(54)
1. (The enemy movements in the Batavia and Surabaya areas — Omitted by the author)*
2. (The plan of the Dutch East Indies Unit — Omitted by the author)
3. (a) (Concerning the second [phase] of transport operation in Bali — Omitted by the author)
(b) The 2d Escort Unit shall be disbanded at 1800 on 24 February. The vessels of each unit shall
operate according to the following outline.
(1) The 2d Destroyer Squadron (minus the 8th, the 15th, and the 18th Destroyer Divisions)
shall sail to Makassar and replenish [there], after which it shall get to the waters south
of Cape Selatan around 1600 on the 26th. After that, it shall operate on the waters north-
west of the 1st Escort Unit to take charge of supporting the latter as well as catching and
destroying enemy naval vessels.  
(2) The 15th Destroyer Division shall be assigned to guard the Kupang area, after which it
shall operate in accordance with Southern Task Force Telegraphic Order No. 106 (i.e.
joining the main unit of the Southern Task Force; it shall take charge of towing and re-
plenishing).
(3) The 21st Minesweeper Division (minus Minesweepers Nos. 11 and 12) and Patrol Boats
Nos. 1 and 2 shall escort the transport ships ([of] both the Navy and the Army) that are
currently in the Timor area to Kendari, as soon as they are empty after disembarkation;
after that they shall in consultation with the 21st Air Flotilla commander escort the 21st
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Air Flotilla transport ships to Kupang.
(4) The 2d Section of the 7th Destroyer Division shall replenish at Makassar, after which it
shall operate as designated by the 5th Cruiser Division commander.
(c) The Tomozuru shall escort the Sasako-maru from Makassar to [the waters] off Takisung (eigh-
teen nautical miles north of Cape Selatan) and embark one element of the Army Sakaguchi
Detachment [on the latter], after which they shall join the 1st Escort Unit [on the waters]
south of Cape Selatan around 1200 on the 26th.
(d) The 5th Cruiser Division (minus the Myōkō), the 1st Section of the 7th Destroyer Division,
the Yamakaze and the Kawakaze shall appropriately operate in the rear area of the 1st Escort
Unit, taking charge of its support as well as catching and destroying enemy naval vessels.
The 5th Cruiser Division commander may at his discretion arrange the tasks of the 4th
and the 2d Destroyer Squadron commanders.
(e) The operations of the main unit (as previously told)
By this order, the 2d Escort Unit came to be disbanded on the evening of the 24th and all ves-
sels from destroyers and above were to pull out of Kupang immediately to participate with-
out a moment of respite in the eastern Java invasion operation; the 15th Destroyer Division,
[however,] was to join the Southern Task Force to participate in the carrier operation to the
south of Java, while the 21st Minesweeper Division (Minesweepers Nos. 7 and 8) and the 1st
Patrol Boat Division (Patrol Boats Nos. 1 and 2) were to be kept on site to guard and escort
the transport ships. However, the advance of the Support Unit to the southwest of Timor to
support the carrier operation to the south of Java and to guard its rear at the time of Java in-
vasion operation was to be called off, and its tasks were to be changed to the support and
cover of the eastern Java invasion unit after advancing to the north of Surabaya.
Since the minesweeping in front of the city of Kupang was completed on the 22d, the
transport ships shifted their anchor from the 4th Anchorage in the Semau Strait to the waters
in front of Kupang on the 23d to start disembarkation. The minesweeping unit had completed
the minesweeping in Kupang Bay by 1600, and because the 1st Minesweeping Division* was
ordered to take charge of guarding Dili, it left Kupang for Dili at 1600 on the 23d. On that
day, nine fighter planes and two land-based reconnaissance planes of the 3d Air Group of
the 1st Air Raid Unit advanced to the Penfui airfield, while the seven flying boats of the Tōkō
Air Group advanced to the Tenau seaplane base.(81)
At 1200 on the 24th, 2d Escort Unit Commander Rear Admiral Tanaka left Kupang for
Makassar, leading the Jintsū and the 16th Destroyer Division.(54) Only the 21st Minesweeper
Division and the 15th Destroyer Division, the latter being on standby to join the Southern
Task Force, were left in Kupang. While sailing to Makassar, the 2d Escort Unit Commander
transmitted an order to his subordinate units that the 2d Escort Unit would be disbanded at
1800. In this operation, with no enemy air or submarine attacks, and moreover no mines,
which had been anticipated and for which a cautious stage-by-stage minesweeping operation
had been conducted, the surface unit had in the end sustained no losses at all.(54)
The Landing at Dili
At 0130 on 20 February, when the 2d Echelon started preparing for the landing operation
after having entered the 1st Anchorage under the escort of the 7th Destroyer Division, it sud-
denly came under fire from land. The escorting destroyers immediately returned fire, which
Chapter V     /     The Forward Push of the Air Bases 355
* Actually the 1st Patrol Boat Division. See pp. 298, 345.
silenced the enemy fire. At 0220, the first landing unit successfully landed, and the second
landing was also carried out successfully around 0530, both with no losses on the Japanese
side.(54) At 1100, the army landing unit seized the Dili airfield, eliminating powerful enemy
resistance. The airfield had no signs of recent use; since it had no runways and land mines
were laid at places, it was judged that it would take seven days before fighter planes could
use the airfield. At 1230, the army unit rushed into the urban area of Dili and rescued thirty
Japanese who had been put in detention.(54)
On the 21st, the 3d Air Group Detachment commander examined the condition of the air-
field and wired that with the construction matériel brought to the site or requisitioned on
site, it was expected to take ten days before it could accommodate about twenty fighter
planes.(45) Worried about this, the 7th Destroyer Division commander dispatched the captain
of the destroyer Ushio to the shore to hold talks with the 3d Air Group Detachment com-
mander, the 1st Construction Squad, the Army units, etc. As a result, they [now] forecasted
that it would be available for fighter planes in four days, and he reported this to the depart-
ments and sections concerned.(54)
The disembarkation was continued on the 22d and the 23d; on the 24th, the 1st Section of
the 7th Destroyer Division handed over the tasks to guard Dili to the 1st Patrol Boat Division
and left Dili for Makassar at 0830.(110) At 1500 on that day, the transport ships of the 2d Echelon
left Dili for Kupang under the escort of the 1st Patrol Boat Division, which completed the




















Illustration No. 39 — The Outline of the Invasion of Dili (20 February, 1942)
withdrawal of the surface unit at Dili, and only the ground units remained. At 0700 on the
25th, the 2d Echelon arrived at Kupang. Concerning the attitude of the Portuguese in the Dili
operation, the 2d Escort Unit commander sent the following report at 0000 on the 25th:(53)
According to the report of the 7th Destroyer Division commander, at the time of landing on Dili,
only the Australian troops had fought back. The Portuguese forces did not put up resistance
and the government officials did not evacuate to the suburbs, either. After having occupied Dili,
the army has wholly respected the sovereignty [of the Portuguese] by using the barracks of Aus-
tralian forces, etc. However, the Portuguese seem to feel offended; in every negotiation with the
Japanese, they quibbled that they were not able to provide answers without instructions from
the home government, as if they had no intention to cooperate with us.
Because the Allies had no powerful forces stationed in the Timor area and the flames were
licking around their feet in the Java and Port Darwin areas, they could not send reinforce-
ments. The Australian ground troops in Timor consisted of about 2,000 men.(95)
In this way, Timor, located halfway between Australia and Java and forming a strategic
point for supply of forces and materials, was seized, and the eastern Java part of the [Japan-
ese] envelopment of Java was completed. Still more, by the end of January, Rabaul on New
Britain, a strategic point of communications between the United States and Australia, had
already fallen in the hands of the Japanese forces as well. 
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Chapter VI The Drafting of the Java Invasion 
Operation Plan
1. The Circumstances Until the Launch of the Operation
[The Circumstances] up to the Manila Conference
Although no extant documents concerning the Army-Navy Central Agreement of 5November 1941 clearly mention fixed dates for the Java invasion, it seems that thehigh command had in mind to let the forces land on Java roughly around day X +
100 and capture the island within twenty days after the landing.(34)
Then in the Tokyo Agreement of 10 November, the outline of the plan became fairly con-
crete, and the following points were agreed upon:(34)
1. The landing on Java shall be scheduled by and large for Day X + 80 (26 February). However,
the Army Department of IGHQ expressed disapproval of this schedule in terms of the available
tonnage and the shipping schedule.
2. The Sixteenth Army ([consisting of] the 2d, the 48th Divisions and one element of the 38th Di-
vision as the core) shall be employed for the invasion of Java, and the Navy Dutch East Indies
Unit shall provide the escort at sea.
3. The air operation against Java shall be conducted in the following way:
(1) Prior to the landing on Java, air campaigns on eastern and western Java shall be carried out
in concert from the following seized bases.
{1} Eastern Java: Banjarmasin and Makassar as the frontline [bases], including Balikpapan
and Kendari
{2} Western Java: Southern Sumatra and Kuching
(2) Responsibility for the air campaigns
{1} Eastern Java: the Navy (the Eleventh Air Fleet)
{2} Western Java: the Army and the Navy in conjunction (the Third Air Force and the
Eleventh Air Fleet)
4. Others
(1) The 48th Division shall be diverted from the operations in the Philippines and be scheduled
to leave Manila on Day X + 70 (16 February). 
(2) The main force of the Sixteenth Army shall head for western Java from Taiwan and southern
Indochina, while the element of the 38th Division shall head there from Hong Kong.
(As previously told), in [Navy] Southern Task Force Order Classified No. 1 issued on 15 No-
vember in accordance with these agreements, the Java operation was envisioned roughly as
follows:(47)
1. In concert with the Air Unit, the [naval] special landing forces shall seize Menado, Kendari and
Makassar. Apart from this and in parallel with the above, Tarakan, Balikpapan and Banjarmasin
shall be captured in conjunction with the Army to advance air bases to each place.
2. As the operations in the Malaya area progress, Bangka and Palembang shall be seized at an ap-
propriate opportunity, and air bases [there] shall be made ready for use.
3. The concerted air campaigns against eastern and western [Java] shall be intensified from the
bases in the items above in order to tighten the envelopment and neutralize the enemy air power,
after which the Sixteenth Army shall be disembarked near Batavia and Surabaya. 
4. One submarine element shall be advanced to the Indian Ocean to cut off the shipping of supplies
to the Dutch East Indies from the south.
In Dutch East Indies Unit (Philippines Unit) Operation Order No. 1, which was issued on 23
November in accordance with the above, the following operational outline was indicated:(47)
1. The following three lines of operations shall be [pursued]:
The Makassar Strait area: The line leading to Tarakan, Balikpapan and Banjarmasin
The area east of Celebes: The line leading to Menado, Kendari and Makassar
The Banda Sea area: The line leading to Ambon and Kupang
Note: The Ambon, Kupang line was supposed to be implemented at an appropriate opportunity,
depending on the progress of the other two operations.
2. The Air Unit shall be advanced to the Makassar Strait area to intensify the air campaign to de-
stroy the enemy air power in Java. Assisted by this air campaign, the main force of the Sixteenth
Army shall be put ashore near Batavia and another corps near Surabaya to swiftly capture Java.
Around that time, the [operation] to capture southern Sumatra had not yet been given shape.
With this operational concept in mind, the plunge was taken and hostilities were opened,
but since the operations, including the Hawaii [operation], the sea engagement off Malaya,
the Philippines invasion operation and the Malaya invasion operation, had made smooth
progress, the Southern Army headquarters judged that it would be advantageous to complete
the [entire] operation as soon as possible and planned to move up the schedule of the inva-
sion operations. It led to the conference at Cam Ranh Bay on 29 December, where revisions
were made to the Tokyo Agreement of 10 November, and (as previously told) the invasion
schedule was changed as in the following table.(62)
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Makassar Around Day X + 45* Day X + 54 Day X + 53
Banjarmasin By and large aroundDay X + 50 Day X + 54 Day X + 53
Bangka and 
Palembang Day X+ 85**
By and large around
Day X + 80 Roughly day X+ 60
* The text mistakenly has 54.
** The text mistakenly has 58.
However, after the launch of the operation to advance the air bases, it was strongly asserted
at the operational meeting between the Southern Task Force, the Dutch East Indies Unit and
the Air Unit on 18 January at Palau that, taking into consideration the preparation of the
seized air bases, the allocation of escort naval vessels and the minesweeping schedule of the
anchorages for the invasion [operations], etc., it was not feasible to execute [the operations]
exactly according to the schedule specified in the Cam Ranh Agreement. Thus, as described
previously, from 21 January onwards a conference to revise the Cam Ranh Agreement was
held at Manila (the Manila Conference) and, on 28 January, the invasion [operation] schedule
was changed in the following way:(62)
1. The invasion schedule shall be changed as follows:
Western Java: Day X + 75* (21 February; postponed for five days)
Eastern Java: Day X + 77 (23 February; postponed for seven days)
Southern Sumatra: Day X + 64 (10 February; postponed for four days)
Makassar: Day X + 63 (9 February; postponed for ten days)
2. The seaborne [operation] to seize Banjarmasin shall be called off; instead, Bali shall be captured
around day X + 75* (two days prior to the landing on eastern Java) in order to make use of it as
a base for the air operations at the time of the invasion of eastern Java. 
[The Circumstances] After the Manila Conference Until the Launch of the
Operation
The Situation of the Units to Be Involved [in the Operation]
The situation of the units to be involved in the Java invasion [operation] as of 28 January was
roughly as follows:(53, 62, 68, 71, 78, 118, 119)
1. The Dutch East Indies Unit
The main unit (directly led by the Ashigara): at Davao, directing the whole operation
The 4th Destroyer Squadron (minus 4th Destroyer Division and the Yamagumo): in the course of
the Balikpapan operation
The 2d Base Force: in the course of the Balikpapan operation (one element in Tarakan) 
The 5th Destroyer Squadron: assembling in Gaoxiong to escort the 48th Division 
The 2d Destroyer Squadron (minus the 18th Destroyer Division): in the course of the Ambon
operation along with the 21st Minesweeper Division and the 1st Subchaser Division 
The 5th Cruiser Division (minus the Myōkō): in the course of supporting the Ambon operation
along with the 2d Section of the 6th Destroyer Division
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* The text mistakenly has 57.
Java Day X + 103 By and large aroundDay X + 80 Roughly day X+ 70
Remarks
1. The landings on Java were scheduled for 16 February, ten days earlier than in the
Tokyo Agreement
2. The capture of Bangka and Palembang was scheduled for 6 February, twenty days ear-
lier than in the Tokyo Agreement
3. [The capture of] Makassar and Banjarmasin was postponed due to the delay in the
Tarakan and Menado operations
The 1st Base Force (minus the 21st Minesweeper Division and the 1st Subchaser Division): two
patrol boats were in the course of the Kendari operation (one element at the Bangka anchor-
age)
The 11th Seaplane Tender Division and two patrol boats: in the course of supporting the Kendari
and the Ambon operations
2. The Air Unit
The Eleventh Air Fleet headquarters: at Davao; directing the whole operation
The 21st Air Flotilla (minus the main body of the Kanoya Air Group) and the 3d Air Group: in
charge of the air operations in Celebes, the Banda Sea as well as in the central and southern
Philippines, with its main force in Kendari and one element in Menado and Davao
The 23d Air Flotilla (minus the 3d Air Group): in the course of air operations in the Makassar
area with its main force in Tarakan (and all land-based attack planes in Jolo)
The 2d Carrier Division, the Maya, the 7th Destroyer division, and the 2d Section of the 27th
Destroyer Division: after completing the Ambon operation, arrived at Palau on the 28th
3. The Malaya Unit
The main unit (directly led by the Chōkai): in Cam Ranh Bay; directing the whole operation 
The 7th Cruiser Division, and a few destroyers of the 3d Destroyer Squadron: in the course of
supporting the Endau and the Anambas operations
The 3d Destroyer Squadron (minus one element): in the course of the Endau operation
The main force of the 9th Base Force: in the course of the Anambas operation
The 22d Air Flotilla: conducting air campaigns in the Malaya area, with its main force in southern
French Indochina
The 4th Submarine Squadron: in Cam Ranh Bay; in preparation for the subsequent operations
4. The Submarine Unit
The 5th Submarine Squadron: in the course of the Indian Ocean operation (with its headquarters
in Penang) 
The 6th Submarine Squadron: returning to Davao from the Port Darwin operation
5. The main body of the Southern Task Force
The 1st Section of the 4th Cruiser Division, the 2d Section of the 3d Battleship Division, the 4th
Destroyer Division: in Palau, directing the whole operation
6. The Army Units
The Sixteenth Army headquarters and the 2d Division: assembling in Gaoxiong and Tainan
The 48th Division: in the course of assembling at Lingayen Gulf in the Philippines (the delay in
the capture of the Bataan Peninsula prevented them from departing from Manila Bay). 
The 38th Division (the Shōji Detachment): in Hong Kong (due to leave 29 January and assemble
at Gaoxiong on the 31st)
The Outline of the Arrangements Between the Commanders of the Army and the Navy
The arrangements between the Army and the Navy commanders were made on 24 January
in accordance with the Manila Agreement, and following the formal implementation of the
Manila Agreement on the 28th, they came into effect on the 30th. The outline of the parts rel-
evant to the Java invasion was as follows (details will be described later):
1. The landing areas and dates
Area No. 1: Bantam Bay and Merak Bay (the main force of the Sixteenth Army), on Day H (21
February)
Area No. 2: Patrol (Shōji Detachment)
Area No. 3: Kragan (48th division) on Day I (23 February) 
2. Assembly points and departure dates
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The units for Areas No. 1 and No. 2: Gaoxiong and then Cam Ranh Bay on Day H – 8
The units for Area No. 3: Lingayen Gulf and then Jolo on Day I – 7
3. The responsibility for the air operations
(1) The air operations against Java: the Army shall take charge of western [Java] and the Navy
of central and eastern [Java]
(2) Guard against [enemy] submarines (of the transport ships under sail and the anchorages):
entirely assigned to the Navy
(3) Antiaircraft guard in the air (ditto): the Army [shall take charge of the units for] Area No. 1
and the Navy of those for Area No. 2 (the Army [shall take charge of the guard] after [the
Shōji Detachment] has separated [from the main convoy]); the Navy [shall take charge of]
those for Area No. 3.
(4) Support for the ground operations: the Army [is responsible for] western [Java] and the
Navy [for] eastern [Java]
(5) Attacks on enemy naval vessels: mainly [the task of] the Navy
The Operational Policy of the Southern Task Force Commander
As mentioned previously [p. 331], on 9 February, the Southern Task Force Commander V.
Adm. Kondō Nobutake announced his plan for the entire southern operation by means of
Southern Task Force Telegraphic Order No. 92, which was in outline as follows:(53)
1. The Malaya Unit is currently carrying out an attack on the port of Singapore and intends to cap-
ture Bangka and Palembang in mid-February.
2. Following the capture of Makassar, the Dutch East Indies Unit and the Air Unit are going to
capture Bali and Timor around 20 February, and launch [the operation to] capture Java from 25
February onwards.
3. The Carrier Task Force shall try to completely destroy the enemy air power in the Port Darwin
area as well as catch and destroy enemy fleets and transport convoys, while attacking the enemy
forces in the Java area from their rear by carrying out carrier operations in the eastern part of
the Indian Ocean in order to accelerate the clearing [of the enemy] from the Dutch East Indies
in general.
4. The Submarine Unit shall watch and patrol the area to the north of Australia, Ceylon, the coastal
areas of India, the Malacca Strait and the area south of Java.
5. The main body of the Southern Task Force shall advance into the Indian Ocean in tandem with
the Carrier Task Force to support the whole operation.
The Operational Policy of the Dutch East Indies Unit Commander
As mentioned previously, on 28 January, the day when the Manila Agreement came into ef-
fect, the [Navy] Dutch East Indies Unit Commander V. Adm. Takahashi Ibō announced his
plan for the operations of the Dutch East Indies Unit after the Makassar operation and until
the Java invasion operation by means of Operation Order No. 9, which was (as previously
told) in outline as follows:(54, 56, 90)
1. After the capture of Ambon, the Eastern Support Unit, the 2d Escort Unit, the 1st Base Unit and
the 2d Air Unit shall capture Makassar, Bali, and Kupang.
2. The 3d Escort Unit and the 1st Air Unit shall escort and disembark the Sixteenth Army in west-
ern Java, while the 1st Escort Unit, the 2d Base Unit and the 2d Air Unit [shall do the same] in
eastern Java.
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3. The date of the landing on western Java is set for 21 February (Day H), and that on eastern Java
for 23 February (Day I).
The Problems in the Java Invasion [Operation] in Terms of Strength
The Dutch East Indies Unit’s plan to capture Java contained considerable problems in terms
of strength.
1. The shortage of escort strength
(1) Because [now] four operational lines toward eastern and western Java, Bali and Ku-
pang are supposed to be simultaneously pursued in parallel, extreme lack of strength,
particular that of escort forces is anticipated.
(2) Concerning [the operational line towards] western Java in particular, merely two light
cruisers, thirteen or fourteen destroyers and several minesweepers are allotted as the
core strength to escort a large convoy made up of as many as fifty-five transport ships.
A reinforcement of escort forces as well as minesweepers and naval defense vessels is
required.
(3) Since the 2d Destroyer Squadron and the 1st Base Force are executing operations al-
most concurrently in Celebes and the Banda Sea, destroyer forces are particularly lack-
ing.
(4) Summing up, a reinforcement of a total of about three destroyer divisions, [namely]
at least another destroyer division for western Java and two more for the area to the
north of Australia and eastern Java all together, is required.
2. The shortage of support forces
Because [the units] in all areas are tied up with escorting the invasion units, leaving no
strength to spare, it is anticipated that in case of a full-scale counterattack by powerful
enemy surface vessels, the lack of support strength will lead to serious consequences.
Against these problems, Southern Task Force Commander Vice Admiral Kondō took the fol-
lowing measures:
1. A reinforcement of destroyers
(1) [He] transferred the 21st Destroyer Division ([consisting of] four destroyers), which had ad-
vanced to Davao on 21 January escorting the 101st Fuel Depot, to the Dutch East Indies Unit.
(2) On 28 January, [he] transferred as of 30 January the 7th Destroyer Division ([consisting of]
three destroyers) and the 1st Section ([consisting of] two destroyers) of the 6th Destroyer Di-
vision to the Dutch East Indies Unit respectively from the carrier-based air unit and from
the Air Unit. (The former was supposed to return to its original unit after completing the
Timor operation on the 24th [of February].)
With these [measures], three destroyer divisions (nine destroyers) were added.
2.The support strength 
(1) [The forces in] the eastern Java area shall be provided with support by the main body of the
Southern Task Force and the carrier-based air unit in concert with the Air Unit and the Sub-
marine Unit. For this purpose, [an] appropriate advance base for the fleet and submarines
shall be set up in the Banda Sea area.
(2) For [the forces in] the western Java area, support by the forces of the Malaya Unit shall be
considered, depending on the war situation in the southern Sumatra and Malaya areas.
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The Preparations of Each Unit
In response to the reinforcement of destroyers, Dutch East Indies Com-
mander Vice Admiral Takahashi incorporated the 21st and the 7th De-
stroyer Divisions into the Eastern Attack Unit, intending to assign them
for the time being to the operations in the area of the 5th Cruiser Divi-
sion, the 2d Destroyer Squadron and the 1st Base Force, while planning
to add the 1st Section of the 6th Destroyer Division to [the forces in] the
western Java area. Also, at 1600 on 29 January, in consequence of the
Manila Agreement, the Dutch East Indies Unit commander ordered 4th
Destroyer Squadron Commander R. Adm. Nishimura Shōji to sail to Lin-
gayen, leading one destroyer division as the core on 30 and 31 January
to escort and bring the 48th Division to Jolo by around 12 February, while
having the other forces of the 4th Destroyer Squadron remain in Balik-
papan and be put under the command of 2d Base Force Commander R. Adm. Hirose Suéto.
From 20 January onwards, the 5th Destroyer Squadron (commander: R. Adm. Hara Ken-
zaburō) in charge of the western Java [operation] had in Taiwan steadily made preparations
for the operation. On 27 January, it had already at Gaoxiong concluded the Army-Navy
arrangements concerning the invasion operation with the Sixteenth Army, the 2d Division
and the Shōji Detachment (of the 38th Division). [The preparations of] the other units [can
be gathered] from the following order issued by the Dutch East Indies Unit commander on
29 January:(63)
1. The forces to be incorporated to the 3d Escort Unit from the 1st Base Force for the Batavia oper-
ation shall be the Shirataka, two minesweepers and one half of the 1st Defense Unit.
2. The San’yō-maru shall join the Shirataka en route and sail to Cam Ranh Bay by 7 February; the
two minesweepers as well as the one half of the 1st Defense Unit in the above item [shall sail
there] by 10 February. 
3. The 1st Section of the 6th Destroyer Division shall sail to Cam Ranh Bay by 10 February by way
of Davao.
4. The 1st Base Force shall be relieved of the task to guard Ambon, which was ordered by means
of Third Fleet Classified Telegram No. 907.
Notes by the author:
1. The 1st Section of the 6th Destroyer Division was at that time under the command of the Air
Unit and in charge of escorting the ship[s] transporting air base matériel to Kendari from
Davao.
2. The Shirataka and the 1st Base Force were stationed at the Bangka anchorage and engaged
in the defense of the area.
3. The minesweeper unit of the 1st Base Force was participating in the Ambon operation fol-
lowing the Kendari operation.
4. Although it had been planned to also send the Sanuki-maru to Cam Ranh Bay along with the
San’yō-maru, the former sustained damage in the [enemy] air raid at Balikpapan on 27 Jan-
uary, which led to the cancellation of her sailing [to Cam Ranh Bay].
In the meantime, the Malaya Unit had by 30 January designated the 11th Destroyer Division
(three destroyers), the 12th Destroyer Division (two destroyers) and the 1st Minesweeper Di-
vision (five minesweepers) as [respectively] the two destroyer divisions of the 3d Destroyer
Squadron and one of the minesweeper divisions of the 9th Base Force that were to participate
364 Chapter VI     /     The Drafting of the Java Invasion Operation Plan
5th Destroyer
Squadron Com-
mander R. Adm. Hara
Kenzaburō
in the western Java operation, and communicated this to the Dutch East Indies Unit com-
mander and 5th Destroyer Squadron Commander R. Adm. Hara Kenzaburō.
Meanwhile on 9 February, Southern Task Force Commander Vice Admiral Kondō issued,
by means of Telegraphic Order No. 93, the order to organize the 2d Submarine Squadron
into Submarine Unit C and the 4th and the 6th Submarine Squadrons into Submarine Unit A
(as of 18 February). He also ordered, by means of Telegraphic Order No. 94, the 2d Carrier
Division and the 1st Section of the 7th [4th] Destroyer Division to respectively return to the
Carrier Task Force and to the main body [of the Southern Task Force] as of 10 February.(53) 
Partial Changes in the Disposition of Forces of the Dutch East Indies Unit
1. The measures taken after the 21st Minesweeper Division had sustained damage
Since (as previously told) the 21st Minesweeper Division had sustained the loss of having
Minesweeper No. 9 sunk and Minesweepers No. 11 and No. 12 damaged in the Ambon
Bay minesweeping operation, Dutch East Indies Unit Commander Vice Admiral Taka-
hashi called off the division’s participation in the western Java operation. Instead, he
changed the disposition of forces having the 1st Section (two torpedo boats) of the 21st
Torpedo Boat Division of the 2d Base Force, which was engaged in protecting the shipping
lanes in the rear in the Makassar Strait and the Celebes Sea, join the western Java opera-
tion. The Dutch East Indies Unit, which was already suffering from a lack of strength to
protect the shipping lanes in the rear, requested reinforcements and, as a result, the
minelayers Tsubame and Kamome, attached to the Sasebo naval station, were put by means
of IGHQ Navy Department Instruction No. 50 under the operational command of the
commander in chief of the Combined Fleet as of 5 February and transferred to the Dutch
East Indies Unit of the Southern Task Force. These two boats were put under the command
of the 2d Base Force commander, replacing the 1st Section of the 21st Torpedo Boat Divi-
sion, to take charge of protecting the shipping lanes.
2. The measures taken following the damage to the Sanuki-maru
Since the Sanuki-maru had been crippled due to the damage inflicted by the [enemy]
bombings at Balikpapan on 27 January, Dutch East Indies Unit Commander Vice Admiral
Takahashi decided on the same day to keep her in Balikpapan and issued an order to put
her (with Patrol Boat No. 36 and two fishing boats attached to her) under the command
of 2d Base Force Commander Rear Admiral Hirose, with instructions to assign her the
task of neutralizing enemy submarines in the Makassar Strait and later from 7 February
onwards to incorporate her in the 1st Base Force.
3. The problem of the continuous employment of the 11th Seaplane Tender Division
In the initial plan, the 11th Seaplane Tender division was supposed to break off [its oper-
ations] after the capture of Ambon and Makassar until its deployment for the invasion
operation against eastern Java. However, the division was engaged in both the Kendari
and Ambon operations for a longer period than anticipated, which put it in a situation
that it barely had time to service its aircraft. Therefore, on 2 February, Dutch East Indies
Unit Commander Vice Admiral Takahashi gave informal instructions that the Chitose
should sail to Jolo to prepare for the eastern Java operation when the Ambon operation
was largely completed, while the Mizuho should continue to carry out the Ambon and
the Makassar operations, after which she should enter Staring Bay for service, and that it
would be all right if she were not ready in time for the eastern Java operation.
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The Postponement of the Landing Date [on Java] Until 26 February
[The landing dates] arranged in the Manila Agreement were the 10th of February for Bangka
and Palembang, and the 21st and 23d for western and eastern Java respectively. However
(as previously told), due to the delay in the Bangka and Palembang operations, the landing
on Java had necessarily been postponed as well. After conferring with the Southern Army
headquarters on 9 February, [the new landing dates] were set on Day X + 81 (27 February)
for western Java and no later than Day X + 81 for eastern Java. However, on the 9th, when
this order was issued, Malaya Unit Commander V. Adm. Ozawa Jisaburō launched Operation
L one day earlier, because the outlook for the construction of bases and the deployment of
the air unit had become clear. Following the advance of [Operation] L by one day, Dutch East
Indies Unit Commander Vice Admiral Takahashi (at Davao) conferred with the Sixteenth
Army (at Cam Ranh Bay) by telegram and on the next day, 11 February, he issued the fol-
lowing order to change the invasion schedule:(54)
1. Batavia and Surabaya: [on] 26 February (Day X + 80)
2. Kupang and Dili: [on] 20 February
3. Bali: [on] 18 February
With this [change], the landings on both eastern and western Java came to be carried out on
26 February.
The Assembling of the Invasion Convoys Completed
1. The units for the western Java invasion [operation] assemble in Cam Ranh Bay (10 Feb-
ruary)
On 29 January, all fifty-five ships of the convoy of the main force of the Sixteenth Army
had assembled in Gaoxiong. The convoy [then] advanced to Cam Ranh Bay in the follow-
ing four groups. Fifth Destroyer Squadron Commander Rear Admiral Hara (the 3d Escort
Unit commander) sailed ahead, leading the Natori, and arrived in Cam Ranh Bay on 3
February prior [to the convoy’s arrival].
1st Group: twelve ships; escorted by the 2d Section (the Nagatsuki and the Minazuki) of the 22d
Destroyer Division
Departed at 1200 on 1 February; arrived at 0900 on 6 February
2d Group: seventeen ships; escorted by the 1st Section (the Harukaze and the Hatakaze) of the
5th Destroyer Division
Departed at 1200 on 3 February; arrived at 0900 on 8 February
3d Group: eighteen ships; escorted by the 1st Section (the Fumizuki and the Satsuki) of the 22d
Destroyer Division
Departed at 1000 on 5 February; arrived at 0900 on 10 February
4th Group: eight ships; escorted by the 2d Section (the Asakaze and the Matsukaze) of the 5th De-
stroyer Division
Departed at 1200 on 6 February; arrived at 0900 on 10 February
In the meantime, from the eastern part of the Dutch East Indies, the Shirataka, the Myōkō-
maru (a transport ship of about 5,000 tons), the 1st Section (the Hatsukari and the Chidori)
of the 21st Torpedo Boat Division arrived at 1200 on 9 February, and again, at 1200 on the
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10th, the 1st Section (the Akatsuki and the Hibiki) of the 6th Destroyer Division, the San’yō-
maru and Patrol Boat No. 35 arrived in Cam Ranh Bay. Thus, all the units for the western
Java invasion [operation], except for the forces from the Malaya Unit that were to join en
route, had assembled in Cam Ranh Bay. 
2. The units for the eastern Java invasion [operation] assemble in Jolo (13 February)
Fourth Destroyer Squadron Commander Rear Admiral Nishimura (the 1st Escort Unit
commander), who had left Balikpapan leading the Naka and the 2d Destroyer Division
(minus the Harusame) on 30 January, arrived in Lingayen Gulf on 2 February. The
Harusame, which was to join from Davao en route, [first] called at Tarakan for replenish-
ment and arrived in Lingayen Gulf on 3 February. The remaining force of the 4th De-
stroyer Squadron in Balikpapan had been instructed to arrive in Jolo on the 13th or the
14th, after cooperating in the Makassar invasion operation of the 2d Base Force under the
command of 2d Base Force Commander Rear Admiral Hirose.
At 0800 on 8 February, 1st Escort Unit Commander Rear Admiral Nishimura, leading
the Naka and the 2d Destroyer Division and having put the 53d Subchaser Division (three
auxiliary submarine chasers) of the Third Southern Expeditionary Fleet under his com-
mand and supported by the Kuma also of the Third Southern Expeditionary Fleet, left
Lingayen, escorting the thirty-nine transport ships of the 48th Division. The commander
had requested 2d Base Force Commander Rear Admiral Hirose to provide him with a re-
inforcement of escort strength and had gotten a reinforcement of three submarine chasers.
By 1400 on 13 February, all of the convoy put in at Jolo.
In the meantime, the 2d Base Force and the remaining force of the 4th Destroyer
Squadron had left Balikpapan on the 8th. After having participated in the Makassar op-
eration on the 9th, they called off the support for the operation on the evening of the 10th,
sailed north and reached Jolo on the 13th. Also, calling off the Makassar operation at 1930
on 10 February, the Chitose, Patrol boats Nos. 34 and 38 of the 11th Seaplane Tender Divi-
sion sailed north and arrived in Jolo at 1830 on the 13th, which completed the assembly
of almost the whole strength of the unit for the eastern Java invasion [operation] at Jolo.
3. The advance of the main unit of the Dutch East Indies Unit to Jolo (14 February)
At 1700 on 13 February, Dutch East Indies Unit Commander Vice Admiral Takahashi left
Davao leading the Ashigara and the Yamakaze. After having been joined by the Murasame
and the Samidare, which had sailed from Jolo to meet and guard them on the next day,
the 14th, he put in at Jolo at 1530.
Insufficient Results of the Air Campaign to Destroy the Enemy Air Power
1. Eastern Java
The main force of the land-based air unit, which had advanced to the line Balikpapan —
Kendari in late January, launched an air campaign to destroy the enemy air power in east-
ern Java (Operation Z) and reported the following military gains (as previously told [pp.
233-244]).
3d [of February]: It had shot down or destroyed about sixty enemy aircraft and inflicted damage
to twenty.
4th: It had sunk two [enemy] cruisers and inflicted serious damage to another, and some or
minor damage to another two. 
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5th: It had shot down or destroyed eleven [enemy] fighter planes.
It was considered that this three-day air operation had destroyed the main force of the
enemy naval surface vessels and delivered a serious blow to the enemy air power in east-
ern Java.
After that, the land-based air unit carried out air strikes on Surabaya, Malang, Bali and
other places with more than a dozen aircraft on the 7th, the 8th and the 9th. From the 10th
onwards, in order to act in concert with the first carrier operation of the Carrier Task Force,
it shifted the focus of its attacks to western New Guinea as well as the Arafura Sea. From
mid-[February], with the Bali operation ahead, the land-based air units again planned to
conduct attacks on eastern Java [p. 311]. However, due to bad weather, which lasted for
several days, it was not able to carry out air operations other than just an attack on
Surabaya with twenty-three land-based attack planes and eight fighter planes on 18 Feb-
ruary, one day before the raid on Bali. In the attack, the unit engaged with twenty [enemy]
P–40 fighter planes above Surabaya and reported military gains of having shot down nine
(three of which unconfirmed).(71)
2. Western Java
As for [the air campaign on] western Java, on 9 February, sixteen fighter planes of the Air
Unit of the Malaya Unit carried out strikes on Batavia for the first time from Kuching [p.
281]. Then on 11 February, twenty-seven land-based attack planes made a sortie for the
first time from the Malay Peninsula for an attack on western Java. (However, due to bad
weather the fighter plane unit was unable to participate, and the target of the attack was
changed to [enemy] naval vessels in the Bangka area [pp. 290-291].)
After that, the Navy air units were day after day busily occupied with attacking enemy
naval vessels in the Bangka area [pp. 291-292]. Also, the poor condition of the airfield at
Kuching did not allow the aircraft [to take off] with a full load of fuel, which made it dif-
ficult for them to conduct air strikes on Java. On the other hand, the Army air unit had
advanced powerful fighter plane and bomber units to Palembang from the 17th to the
18th of February, and launched a large-scale air campaign to destroy the enemy air power
in western Java day in and day out from the 19th onwards. As many as thirty to fifty
fighter planes and bombers were employed day after day, directing their attacks towards
the airfields in Buitenzorg, Bandung, Kalijati, Batavia, etc.(117)
The Malaya Unit’s Cooperation in the Western Java Operation
As described previously, the western Java invasion unit was particularly short of escort and
support strength. However, before the Manila Conference the outlook for the war situation
in the Singapore area was still dim, which made it impossible to estimate how much support
could be expected from the Malaya Unit. In late January, after the Manila Conference, it was
decided that, apart from the 5th Destroyer Squadron, two destroyer divisions, one mine -
sweeper division, and the Yura from the Malaya Unit, some minesweeping and defense
strength from the 1st Base Force as well as the 1st Section of the 6th Destroyer Division of
the main body of the Southern Task Force should be added, which considerably increased
the escort strength. However, since considerable counterattacks by [enemy] air as well as
surface and submarine forces were expected against the advance of a large convoy of as many
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as fifty-five ships to Batavia, the last bastion of the allied forces, it was
feared that even with this [reinforced] strength, the direct escort forces
would still be insufficient, and that in case of a counterattack by an
enemy fleet, the convoy would be totally bereft of support forces. On ad-
vancing to Cam Ranh Bay on 3 February, 5th Destroyer Squadron Com-
mander Rear Admiral Hara had made a request to First Southern
Expeditionary Fleet Commander in Chief Vice Admiral Ozawa for [the
latter’s] support and cooperation at the time of the western Java invasion
[operation]. In response to the request of the 5th Destroyer Squadron
commander, Commander in Chief [Ozawa] had advised that the First
Southern Expeditionary Fleet would cooperate as much as possible if the
war situation in the Malaya area would permit it, and that [Rear Admiral
Hara] should offer his opinion to the Second Fleet since [such a matter]
should be dealt with through the fleet, while indicating that he would dispatch the 7th
Cruiser Division for support if it should prove necessary.
On the evening of 16 February, when the outlook for the Bangka and Palembang opera-
tions had become clear, Malaya Unit Commander Vice Admiral Ozawa informed the South-
ern Task Force of his cooperation in the Java operation: “Regarding the Java operation, we
won’t mind if from 21 February onwards the Yura, the 11th and the 12th Destroyer Divisions,
the 1st Minesweeper Division, the Kamikawa-maru, two auxiliary submarine chasers, two
fishing boats and the supply ship Tsurumi should be transferred to the Dutch East Indies
Unit.”(63) Also on the 17th, without waiting for orders from the Southern Task Force, he issued
on his own initiative an order to 7th Cruiser Division Commander R. Adm. Kurita Takeo
about the support for the 5th Destroyer Squadron: “The 7th Cruiser Division commander
shall lead both the 7th Cruiser Division as well as 19th Destroyer Division (minus the Isonami)
and take charge of the support for the 3d Escort Unit of the Dutch East Indies Unit at the
time of the Java operation.”(63)
Having been notified by the Malaya Unit, the Southern Task Force issued on the 17th a
preliminary order to transfer one element of the surface forces of the Malaya Unit to the
Dutch East Indies Unit; at the same time it announced its plan to put the main force of the
22d Air Flotilla of the Air Unit of the Malaya Unit back under the command of Eleventh Air
Fleet Commander in Chief Vice Admiral Tsukahara in order to conduct the air campaign on
Java under a unified command.(63) The order read: 
Second Fleet Classified Telegram No. 978
Southern Task Force Telegraphic Order No. 103 [idem p. 298]
1. As of 21 February, the disposition of forces shall be changed as follows:
(a) [To be transferred] from the Malaya Unit to the Dutch east Indies Unit: The Yura, the 11th
and the 12th Destroyer Divisions, the 1st Minesweeper Division, the Kamikawa-maru, two
auxiliary submarine chasers, two fishing boats, and the Tsurumi.
(b) [To be transferred] from the Malaya Unit to the Air Unit: The 22d Air Flotilla (minus the Mi-
horo Air Group), a detachment from the 21st Air Flotilla and a detachment (minus Type–96
carrier-based fighter planes) from the 23d Air Flotilla.
2. The Malaya Unit shall cooperate in the western Java invasion operation, while staying engaged
in its own mission.
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7th Cruiser 
Division Commander
R. Adm. Kurita Takeo
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On the early morning of the 18th, 5th Destroyer Squadron Commander Rear Admiral Hara
sent a request to the chief of staff of the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet concerning the
cooperation by the Malaya Unit.(63)
1. Besides carrying out a preliminary air campaign to destroy the enemy air power, I request that
in the western Java operation there will be conducted at the same time an operation to destroy
enemy naval vessels in the western part of the Java Sea as well as in the Sunda Strait.
2. Concerning the cooperation by the 7th Cruiser Division, I request that, in the light of the recent
increase in enemy naval vessels in the western part of the Java Sea, the 7th Cruiser Division will
[first] operate near the Karimata Strait, and thereafter sail by and large along with the transport
ships while staying in close contact so that it can immediately destroy enemy vessels. Also, if
possible, I would like the Ryūjō to take appropriate actions and provide support as well, so that
it will be able to attack enemy naval vessels.
3. Our unit will leave Cam Ranh Bay on 18 February.
Having received this telegram of request, Malaya Unit Commander Vice Admiral Ozawa
gave on the 18th an order to 22d Air Flotilla Commander Rear Admiral Matsunaga concern-
ing the air operations against western Java: “The 1st Air Unit shall contact the Eleventh Air
Fleet and assume the responsibility for conducting a timely search and attack mission on
enemy naval vessels in the western part of the Java Sea and the Sunda Strait, in addition to
its mission of destroying the enemy air power in western Java.”(63) By this order, the units for
the western Java invasion [operation] were able to depart from Cam Ranh Bay with the
prospect of being able to obtain from the Malaya Unit by and large the support and cover
they had hoped for. 
The Participation of the Sakaguchi Detachment in the Eastern Java Invasion Operation
After having captured Davao, Jolo, Tarakan and Balikpapan one after another and dispatched
one element to capture Banjarmasin, the Sakaguchi Detachment was in charge of clearing
Balikpapan [of the enemy] and maintaining public order with its main force. However, since
it was decided that the Navy should take charge of the military administration and the guard-
ing of Dutch Borneo, the detachment was successively handing over the tasks to the Navy
side. Then, the successive delays in the schedule of the Java operation gave the Sakaguchi
Detachment some leeway in its schedule to reorganize the unit after the seizure of Balikpa-
pan. On 10 February, when the seizure of Banjarmasin was accomplished, the detachment
offered to the Sixteenth Army a proposal to participate in the eastern Java operation. The Six-
teenth Army then assigned the Sakaguchi Detachment to land in eastern Java and charge to
Cilacap to seize the place. Thus, leaving about one battalion to maintain public order in
Samarinda and Balikpapan, most of the rest of the Sakaguchi Detachment came to participate
in the Java operation.
On the 17th, 4th Destroyer Squadron Commander Rear Admiral Nishimura held talks on
the escort for the Sakaguchi Detachment with 48th Division Commander Lt. Gen. Tsuchihashi
Yūitsu in Jolo, where the following was decided:(56) (Summary)
1. The Sakaguchi Detachment shall embark on the Ehime-maru and the Havana-maru, and join the
convoy of the 48th Division in the Makassar Strait. The Navy shall assign the Kawakaze and Sub-
marine Chaser No. 4 of the 1st Escort Unit for its escort.
2. As for the rear units of the detachment, since the Sasako-maru and the Sagami-maru, [currently]
engaged in the [operation to] capture Bali, will return to Makassar on 20 February or later, they
shall be sent to Banjarmasin to embark the [rear units of the] detachment, and disembark them
roughly by about 27 February. The Navy shall escort these ships with forces of the 2d Base Force.
The Situation Right Before the Invasion [Operation]
The western and the eastern Java invasion units of the Dutch East Indies Unit had respec-
tively assembled in Cam Ranh Bay and Jolo on 12 and 13 February, and were hurriedly
preparing for the operation, aiming to land on 26 February. The developments until 21 Feb-
ruary right before the invasion of Java were in summary as follows:
14 February: The positions of the units involved as of that day were as follows:
Cam Ranh Bay: The 5th Destroyer Sqdn (the Natori, the 5th and the 22d Destroyer Divs), the
1st Section of the 6th Destroyer Div, the Shirataka, the Myōkō-maru, the 1st Section of the
21st Torpedo Boat Div, the San’yō-maru, Patrol Boat No. 35 and fifty-five transport ships
of the Army (the main force of the Sixteenth Army)
Jolo: The Ashigara (the flagship of the Third Fleet), the 4th Destroyer Sqdn (the Naka, the 2d
Destroyer Div, the 9th Destroyer Div (minus the Yamagumo), the 24th Destroyer Div
(minus the Suzukaze)), the Itsukushima (the flagship of the 2d Base Force), the Wakataka,
the 11th, the 30th and the 20th Minesweeper Divs,* the 21st Subchaser Div (six submarine
chasers), the Chitose, Patrol Boats No. 34 and No. 38, the 54th Subchaser Div and thirty-
nine transport ships of the Army (the 48th Div)
Balikpapan: The 2d Section of the 21st Torpedo Boat Div (the Tomozuru), the Sanuki-maru
(minus the aircraft unit) and two transport ships of the Army (the Sakaguchi Det) 
Makassar: The aircraft unit of the Sanuki-maru and Patrol Boat No. 36
Palau: The 4th Cruiser Div (minus the Chōkai, the flagship of the Second Fleet [Malaya Unit]),
the 3d Battleship Div, the 8th Cruiser Div, the 1st Destroyer Sqdn (the Abukuma, the 17th
Destroyer Div, the 2d Section of the 27th Destroyer Div), the 1st Carrier Div (the flagship
of the First Air Fleet), the 2d Carrier Div, the 4th Destroyer Div, the 18th Destroyer Div
(minus two destroyers) and the Akigumo
15 February
1. The Carrier Task Force (the 1st and the 2d Carrier Divs, the Takao, the Maya, the 8th Cruiser
Div, the 1st Destroyer Sqdn (minus the 6th Destroyer Div, the 1st Section of the 27th De-
stroyer Div and the 21st Destroyer Div), the 18th Destroyer Div (minus two destroyers) and
the Akigumo) left Palau for Port Darwin for the first carrier operation.(68)
2. The Dutch East Indies Unit commander postponed for one day the departure of the main
unit (the Ashigara and the Yamakaze) from Jolo, scheduled for the 16th, to the 17th, so as to
arrive in Staring Bay on the 19th.(53) It was because the schedule of the Dutch East Indies op-
eration was postponed and also because the meetings in Jolo took too much time.
3. The Malaya Unit launched [the operation to] capture Bangka and Palembang (as previously
told [p. 295]).
4. Singapore, Britain’s largest base in East Asia, surrendered.
16 February
1. Since it was not possible to conduct the expected search and attack missions in the Surabaya
area due to bad weather in the Makassar Strait area day after day, Dutch East Indies Unit
Commander Vice Admiral Takahashi decided to postpone the operation to capture Bali for
one day, to be executed on the 19th, (as previously told [p. 311]).(78)
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* Actually: the 11th and 30th Minesweeper Divs, and Minesweeper No. 20. See p. 126.
2. Since considerably powerful [enemy] naval surface vessels including cruisers were spotted
by an air reconnaissance over the Surabaya area, the Dutch East Indies Unit commander
called off the main unit’s sailing to Staring Bay and changed [its destination] so as to advance
to Balikpapan to be ready for the Bali operation.(62)
3. Malaya Unit Commander Vice Admiral Ozawa reported to the Southern Task Force that he
would not mind if the forces [in his unit] that were supposed to participate in the western
Java invasion operation would be transferred to the Dutch East Indies Unit from 21 February
onwards (as previously told [p. 369]). 
4. At midnight, the Sixteenth Army communicated that it would request arrangements to be
made with the 48th Div concerning the participation of the Sakaguchi Det and the escort to
be provided (as previously told [p. 370]). 
5. At 1840 on that day, the Dutch East Indies Unit commander incorporated the aircraft unit of
the Sanuki-maru, Patrol Boat No. 36 and two fishing boats (at Makassar) into the 2d Air Unit.
17 February
1. At 0615, the Dutch East Indies Unit commander left Jolo for Balikpapan, leading the main
unit (the Ashigara, the Kawakaze and the Yamakaze).
2. Fourth Destroyer Sqdn Commander Rear Admiral Nishimura held talks in Jolo concerning
the outline of the escort of the Sakaguchi Det.
3. The Malaya Unit commander issued an order to the 7th Cruiser Div and the 19th Destroyer
Div to support the 5th Destroyer Sqdn at the time of the western Java invasion [operation]
(as previously told [p. 369]).
4. Southern Task Force Commander Vice Admiral Kondō issued preliminarily orders to the
forces of the Malaya Unit that were to be transferred to the Dutch East Indies Unit and the
Air Unit as of 21 February [for the Java operation], while issuing an order to the Malaya Unit
to support the western Java invasion operation (as previously told [pp. 298, 369-370]).
18 February
1. At 1000, the unit for the western Java invasion [operation] left Cam Ranh Bay.
2. The unit to capture Bali left Makassar before dawn (as previously told [p. 311]).
3. The main body of the Southern Task Force and the remaining force of the Carrier Task Force
(the Atago, the 3d Battleship Div and the 4th Destroyer Sqdn*) left Palau for Staring Bay.
4. At 1400, the main unit of the Dutch East Indies Unit advanced to Balikpapan.
19 February
1. In the early morning, the unit for the first [phase of the] Bali raiding operation successfully
made a surprise landing on Bali (as previously told [p. 312]).
2. The Carrier Task Force carried out a surprise attack on Port Darwin, and the land-based at-
tack planes of the Air Unit also attacked the place in concert with the former; they reported
having sunk twenty or more enemy ships in the port, shot down or destroyed twenty or
more enemy aircraft while having inflicted serious damage to the airfield, port facilities and
others (as previously told [p. 341]). 
3. The unit for the western Java invasion [operation] was sailing southward on the waters east
of Puolo Condore.
4. At 0800, the unit for the eastern Java invasion [operation] left Jolo.
5. In the evening, the Chitose left Jolo.
6. The 22d Air Flotilla was transferred to the 3d Air Raid Unit (as previously told).
20 February
1. In the early morning, the 2d Escort Unit disembarked the Army Itō Detachment at Kupang
and Dili (as previously told [pp. 351, 355-356]).
2. The 3d Yokosuka Special Landing Force parachuted down near Kupang (as previously told
[p. 351]).
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* Actually: Division
3. Before dawn, the 8th Destroyer Division in the course of the Bali operation had engagements
with a powerful enemy surface unit and reported military gains of having sunk three de-
stroyers and seriously damaging one cruiser (as previously told*); [also] before dawn, the
Dutch East Indies Unit commander left Balikpapan for Bali, leading the Ashigara, the
Kawakaze (dispatched from the 4th Destroyer Squadron for the direct escort of the main unit)
and the Yamakaze, to support the 7th Destroyer Division** (as previously told).  
4. In the evening, the unit for the western Java invasion [operation] reached the waters between
Puolo Condore and the Anambas Islands and sent the destroyers and the lesser escort naval
vessels ahead to the Anambas Islands one after another for replenishment. 
5. The unit for the eastern Java invasion [operation] was sailing southward in the Celebes Sea
and approached the north entrance of the Makassar Strait in the evening. [Meanwhile] at
0800, the Chitose reached Dondon Bay*** in the northwestern part of Celebes, to [start] her
mission to guard the invasion unit against [enemy] submarines.
6. Due to the appearance of an enemy task force on the waters northeast of Rabaul, the Com-
bined Fleet ordered the 1st Air Group to advance to the area of the [equatorial] Pacific Islands
by means of Telegraphic Order No. 76. 
7. The Army 38th Division marched overland southward from Palembang and captured Tan-
jungkarang on the shore of the Sunda Strait opposite from Java.
8. The fighter plane unit of the Air Unit advanced to Bali (as previously told [p.321]).
21 February
1. At 0800, the forces transferred from the Malaya Unit joined the unit for the western Java in-
vasion [operation] about 100 nautical miles north of the Anambas Islands.
2. The Southern Task Force commander officially announced the date of Java invasion (day Z)
as 26 February (as previously told.****).
3. In the morning, the main body of the Southern Task Force and the Carrier Task force, both
having departed from Palau, the latter of which had finished the air strike on Port Darwin,
arrived in Staring Bay (as previously told [p. 341]).
4. Because the sea engagement off Bali was over and no [immediate] counterattacks by the
enemy fleet were expected anymore, the main unit of the Dutch East Indies Unit, which had
been heading for the Bali area to support the 8th Destroyer Division, changed course en
route and headed for Staring Bay (as previously told [p. 322]).
5. The Dutch East Indies Unit commander issued the following change of the disposition of
his forces:
(1) He ordered the Mizuho and Patrol Boat No. 39, engaged in the Kupang operation, to re-
turn to their original unit (which had taken up positions for the eastern Java invasion
operation, as previously told [p. 365]).
(2) He incorporated the 8th Destroyer Division into the main unit and had it stay on stand-
by in Makassar (as previously told*****).
6. In the early morning, the unit for the eastern Java invasion [operation] reached the north
entrance of the Makassar Strait. In the evening, it reached a point about 80 nautical miles off
Samarinda and heading for a point off Balikpapan, it sailed along the western side of the
strait.
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* Probably p. 320 is meant, but there different figures are cited.
** Probably the 8th Destroyer Division is meant. See also below: item 4 under 21 February
*** Dondo Bay?
**** Probably p. 366, but there the announcement is made by the Dutch East Indies Unit commander. See
also Vol. 3, pp. 440-41.
***** Probably p. 319, but there the date is mistakenly given as 22 February. See also Vol. 3, pp. 440-41.
2. The Army–Navy Arrangement and the Plan of Operations of
Each Unit
The Army–Navy Arrangement for the Java Invasion Operation ([at] Manila)
On 23 and 24 January, after having come to terms at the Manila Conference, the units to be
involved in the Java invasion operation made the following Army-Navy arrangements (the
outline of which has already been given [pp. 361-362]). The arrangement had the following
contents(148) and came into effect along with the Manila Agreement of 28 January.*
Memorandum of the Arrangements for Operation H between the Sixteenth Army, the
Third Air Force, the Third Fleet and the Eleventh Air Fleet [See also Vol. 3, pp. 226-233]
I. Distribution of the landing forces, landing points, names for landing sectors and their re-
connaissance
1. Landing points and names for landing sectors
(1) Units in the first transport
{1} Area No. 1 ([assigned to] the 2d Division and the main force of the units under the
direct control of the army)
Sector A Landing Unit ([consisting of] 2 infantry battalions and a reconnaissance reg-
iment as its core): on the south side of Merak
Sector B Landing Unit ([consisting of] 2 infantry battalions as its core): on the north
side of Merak
Sector C Landing Unit ([consisting of] the main force of the [2d] Division and the
main force of the units under the direct control of the army): along Bantam Bay
{2} Area No. 2 ([assigned to] the Shōji Detachment, [consisting of] 2 infantry battalions
as its core): [on the coast near] Patrol
{3} Area No. 3 ([assigned to] the 48th Division as its core)
Sector D: Right Wing Unit ([consisting of] 3 infantry battalions as its core): on the
north side of Kragan
Sector E: Left Wing Unit ([consisting of] the main force of the division): on the south
side of Kragan
(2) Units in the second transport
Area No. 1: Batavia (or Bantam) about 100,000 tons
Area No. 3 Surabaya (or Kragan) about 50,000 tons
(3) Units in the third transport
Area No. 1: Batavia (or Bantam) about 100,000 tons
2. Reconnaissance of the landing points
(1) Reconnaissance by aircraft
Army: Thirty copies of the photomaps roughly on a scale of 1 to 25,000 of the landing
coasts of Areas No. 1 and No. 2 shall be delivered to the [Sixteenth] Army headquarters
in Saigon by around 10 February (three copies of which shall be delivered to the 12th
Seaplane Tender Division (the Kamikawa-maru) in Cam Ranh).
Navy: Thirty copies of the photomaps roughly on a scale of 1 to 25,000 of the landing
coast of Area No. 3 shall be delivered to the 48th Division in Jolo (the Pata anchorage)
by around 10 February.
374 Chapter VI     /     The Drafting of the Java Invasion Operation Plan
* The document referred to in note 148 could not be located. We have generally followed here the version given
in Vol. 3.
(2) Other prior reconnaissance, if necessary, shall be conducted by arrangement between
the commanders of the landing corps, escort units and air units.
II. Assembly points, arrival and departure dates of the transport ships (as shown in the follow-
ing table)
III. Starting date and time of the landings and the schedule
1. Starting date and time of the landings and the schedule 
The first day of the landings are set as follows:
Eastern Java: on Day I
Western Java: on Day H
Although Days H and I are scheduled for “XX” (note by the author: pending), the Sixteenth
Army commander shall fix [them] after due consultation with the commander in chief of
the Third Fleet by 1200 on Day H – 9. However, if further changes to these [dates] become
necessary after the departure [of the units], [new dates] shall be decided upon through con-
sultations each time.
2. Start of the landings
Entry into the anchorage shall be made around 0000 for both Day H and Day I. Although
the start of the landings is set at 0200 for both Day H and Day I, [the landings] in each area
shall be started as soon as [the units] in the area are ready.
3. Landing schedule
(1) Units in the first transport
Area No. 1: [shall be completed] roughly in seven days.
Area No. 2: [shall be completed] roughly in five days. Depending on the circumstances,
on Day H + 2 and onwards, units yet to be disembarked may be [again] transported and
put ashore at Area No. 1. The decision of whether to implement [this] shall be made by
the Sixteenth Army commander after due consultation with the 4th Destroyer Squadron*
commander.
Area No. 3: [shall be completed] roughly in five days.
(2) Units in the second transport
Area No. 1: [shall be completed] roughly in five days.
Area No. 3: [shall be completed] roughly in five days.
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Leave Gaoxiong during the period between
the beginning till the 6th of February one
after another and assemble in Cam Ranh
Day H – 8
Area No. 3 Lingayen then theJolo/Pata anchorage
Complete embarkation by 7 February, leave
on 8 February and assemble at the Pata an-
chorage on 12 February
Day I – 7
Second
Area No. 1 Advance from the mainland [Japan] to Cam Ranh first, and then go ashore inBatavia (or Bantam)
Area No. 3 Advance from Lingayen to Jolo or Davao and then go ashore in Surabaya (or Kra-gan)
Remarks The Sixteenth Army commander shall determine the second and later transports after due con-sultation with the commanders of the 4th and the 5th Destroyer Sqdns.
* Actually: 5th Destroyer Squadron.
IV. Distribution of the convoy of transport ships, the commander’s whereabouts, and the escort
forces:
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Second Area No. 1Area No. 3 To be determined depending on the situation at the time
V. Route of the convoys
As shown in Supplement No. 1 (omitted by the author)
VI. Reconnaissance and diversions
The Navy air units shall conduct feint bombings of enemy naval bases and others in the
Probo linggo area (note by the author: southeast of Surabaya).
VII. Anchorage and the formation at the anchorage
Anchorages and the transport ships’ formation at the anchorage shall be determined by the
commander of the landing corps after due consultation with the commander in charge of
the escort.
VIII. Outline of landing attack
Although [the landing shall be made as] a surprise landing in principle, it shall be carried
out by assault if the situation should require it.
IX. Use of air units
1. Forces to be employed
(1) The Eleventh Air Fleet
About 80 Type–1 land-based attack planes, about 35 Type–96 land-based attack planes,
about 70 Type–0 fighter planes, and about 5 land-based reconnaissance planes
(2) The Third Fleet
About 50 reconnaissance seaplanes
(3) The [Army] Third Air Force
About 15 command reconnaissance planes, about 4 army reconnaissance planes, about
40 Type–1 fighter planes, about 50 Type–97 fighter planes, about 20 assault planes, about
20 twin-engine light bombers, and about 30 heavy bombers
The above forces may slightly be increased or decreased depending on the situation.
2. Bases to be used
(1) [Bases] in Sumatra, Borneo and others
{1} The Palembang [airfield] shall be made ready and used by the Army. The Navy may
use this [base] by advancing some land-based attack planes, or as a staging base for
about thirty-six land-based attack planes when attacks on enemy surface forces in
the Indian Ocean are necessary.
{2} The Mentok [airfield] shall be made ready for use mainly by the Army, but with the
cooperation of the Navy. The Army and the Navy shall share the airfield with about
thirty fighter planes each. However, when the Army starts using the Tanjungkarang
airfield, the Navy shall exclusively use the Mentok airfield.
{3} The Ledo [airfield] shall be used by the Navy. However, the Army may advance sev-
eral command reconnaissance planes there.
{4} As for the airfields other than the above, those in Sumatra shall be used by the Army,
and those in Borneo by the Navy.
(2) [Bases] in Java
{1} [The airfields in] Batavia and Cililitan (note by the author: east of Batavia*) shall be
made ready for use by the Army and shared by the Army and the Navy in the fol-
lowing way:
The Navy: about 36 land-based attack planes and about 27 fighter planes
The Army: about 20 twin-engine light bombers and about 15 command reconnais-
sance planes
{2} The Buitenzorg [Bogor] and Kalijati [airfields] shall be made ready and used by the
Army. However, if the Batavia or Cililitan airfields cannot be used or if it takes more
time than expected to make them ready, the Navy shall advance about 27 fighter
planes to the Kalijati [airfield].
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* Actually: South of Batavia; the civil airfield, Kemayoran, was east of the city
3. Outline of operations
(1) [We shall] promptly destroy the enemy air power in Java. The areas assigned [to the
Army or the Navy] in particular are as follows:
{1} The areas assigned [to the Army and the Navy] after the advance of the Army air
units to Palembang are roughly decided as follows:
The Navy: [the area] east of 108ºE
The Army: [the area] west of 108ºE
{2} In general the Navy shall mainly take charge of destroying the remnants of the enemy
air power after the Army has gone ashore.
(2) The attack on enemy naval vessels shall be mainly assigned to the Navy.
(3) Cover of the convoy under sail and at anchorage
{1} The main force of the Sixteenth Army
(a) The Navy shall be charged with the cover before and on Day H – 2.
Note: [The cover] in the area north of 5ºN shall be provided by the First Southern
Expeditionary Fleet.
(b) The cover of the transport convoy up to the point of separation of the Shōji De-
tachment from the main force of the army ([indicated as] point “J” in Supplement
No. 1) on Day H – 1 shall be charged to the Navy. After that, the Navy shall take
charge of the cover of the Shōji Detachment, and the Army of the cover of the rest
of the main force of the [Sixteenth] Army. However, guarding against [enemy]
submarines shall be wholly assigned to the Navy.
{2} The 48th Division
Along with guarding against [enemy] submarines, the Third Fleet shall take charge
of guarding in the air [against enemy aircraft over the anchorage] as well, from the
time when the transport convoy enters the anchorage until the advance of the fighter
plane unit of the Eleventh Air Fleet there. After that, the Eleventh Air Fleet shall take
over [the task of] guarding.
{3} The antiaircraft guarding in the air over the anchorage
The guarding in the air against [enemy] aircraft shall be provided by the Army all
the time until sunset on Day H + 2 over the anchorage for the units landing in Ban-
tam, and on Day H + 1 over that for the units landing in Merak. After that, it shall
provide cover in the air [against enemy aircraft] as needed depending on the situa-
tion.
(4) Support of the ground operations
{1} The area of the main force of the Sixteenth Army
(a) The Army shall be in charge of the direct support of the ground operations.
(b) The Navy shall be in charge of cutting off the transport routes of the enemy in
the Cilacap area. It shall [also] be in charge of attacking enemy reinforcements or
forces in retreat when requested by the Army.
{2} The area of the 48th Division
The Third Fleet shall be in charge of direct support of the ground operations and the
Eleventh Air Fleet shall appropriately provide support at the request of the Army.
The Army shall join in [the direct support] if possible.
4. Information
(1) Military gains of [the campaign] to destroy the [enemy] air power, the results of recon-
naissance of enemy airfields, weather information and others shall promptly be shared
between the Army and the Navy air units.
(2) Other information concerning enemy movements and others shall be exchanged every
time [it is obtained].
5. Allotment [of facilities] and rules about the use of the shared airfields
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The allotment [of facilities] and rules about the use of the airfields shared by the Army and
the Navy shall be arranged between senior commanding officers of the Army and the Navy
[units] which [actually] use the airfield.
6. Identification of friends
Conforms to the agreement between the Southern Army and the Combined Fleet.
X. Defense facilities of landing bases
1. The landing bases shall be set up as follows:
For Areas No. 1 and No. 2: Batavia (Bantam shall be used at the beginning.)
For Area No. 3: Surabaya (Kragan shall be used at the beginning).
2. The Navy shall take charge of the sea defense, the Army of the defense on land, and both
shall jointly take charge of the air defense.
XI. Move of the transport ships after the completion of disembarkation
After completing disembarkation, [the transport ships] shall separately return under the di-
rect or indirect cover of the escort unit in the area to the required areas.
XII. Signal Communications
As specified in the signal communication arrangement in the separate volume (omitted by
the author)
XIII. Others
1. The 48th Division shall have an element seize the Bali airfield in conjunction with the Navy
no later than Day I – 2 to make it ready for use, with the aim of advancing a naval air base.
2. The Navy, in concert with the ground operations, shall neutralize [the enemy on] the waters
south of Java, and block the enemy’s retreat.
3. Details other than the above shall be discussed and decided between the commanders of
the landing corps, escort forces and air units concerned.
As mentioned before, along with the Manila Agreement, which had officially become effec-
tive on 28 January, this draft of the arrangements for Operation H (of 23 January) [officially]
came into effect on 30 January. Although the dates of Day H and Day I had been respectively
set for Day X + 75 (21 February) and Day X + 77 (23 February), later on 10 February, due to
the delay in the southern Sumatra operation, the dates of Day H and Day I were revised to
26 February [for both].
The Plan of Operations of the Dutch East Indies Unit
As previously told, on 28 January, Dutch East Indies Unit Commander Vice Admiral Taka-
hashi announced the plan of operations of the Dutch East Indies Unit from the Makassar op-
eration until the Java invasion operation ([by means of] Operation Order No. 9), the outline
of which was as follows:(54, 55, 56)
I. Mission
After the capture of Ambon, the Dutch East Indies Unit shall capture Makassar, Bali and Kupang
with the Eastern Support Unit, the 2d Escort Unit, the 1st Base Unit and the 2d Air Unit. At the
same time, it shall escort and put ashore the Sixteenth Army on western Java with the 3d Escort
Unit and the 1st Air Unit, and on eastern Java with the 1st Escort Unit, the 2d Base Unit and the
2d Air Unit. The date of landing in western Java is scheduled for 21 February (Day H) and that
in eastern Java for 23 February (Day I).
II. Disposition of forces
The disposition of forces shall be planned as in the following table and set in motion by special
orders after occupying Ambon. 
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16th Cruiser Div (minus the Nagara)
and 24th Destroyer Div 2d Section
1. To support the entire operation
2. To support the operation in the Makas-





















4th Destroyer Sqdn (minus 4th De-
stroyer Div, 24th Destroyer Div 2d
Section, and the Yamagumo)
5 minesweepers of the 2d Base
Force, 21st Subchaser Div, the
Wakataka, one half of the 2d Defense
Unit
1. To escort the 48th Div and capture the
Surabaya area 
2. To destroy enemy surface forces on the
waters to the east and the south of Bor-
neo 


















2d Base Force (minus 5 minesweep-
ers, 21st Subchaser Div, the
Wakataka, 2d Gunboat Div 2d Sec-
tion, one half of the 2d Defense
Unit), the Itsukushima, Patrol Boats
Nos. 36 and 37, 2d Kure SLF, 11 fish-
ing boats and 1 small cargo ship
1. To escort the 48th Div and set up the
landing base
2. To secure the shipping lanes in the
Celebes Sea and the Makassar Strait
3. To ready the airfields in Tarakan and Ba-
likpapan 
4. To cooperate with the Sakaguchi Det in
its capture of Banjarmasin
5. To cooperate in guarding against
[enemy] submarines at Jolo and Davao





















dr 11th Seaplane Tender Div, Patrol
Boats Nos. 34, 38, and 39, 1 plt of the
Sasebo Combined SLF, 6 fishing
boats and 1 small cargo ship
1. To support the 1st Escort Unit and the
2d Base Unit
2. To guard the transport convoys against
[enemy] aircraft and submarines and to





















5th Destroyer Sqdn, the Yura, 2 de-
stroyer divs of the 3d Destroyer
Sqdn, 5 minesweepers of the 9th
Base Force, one element of the 1st
Base Force
1. To escort the main force of the 16th
Army and to capture the Batavia area
2. To set up the landing base
3. To escort the second and the third trans-
port of the main force of the Army
4. To destroy enemy surface forces on the




















The Kamikawa-maru, the San’yō-maru,
Patrol Boat No. 35, 2 submarine
chasers of the 9th Base Force, the
Chōsa-maru, 1 plt of the 2d Kure SLF
1. To support the 3d Escort Unit
2. To guard transport convoys against




















dr 5th Cruiser Div (minus the Myōkō),
7th Destroyer Div, 6th Destroyer Div
2d Section
1. To support the 2d Escort Unit and the
1st Base Unit
2. To destroy enemy surface forces in the
Molucca, the Banda and the Flores Seas
III. The main points of the execution of the Java operation and the outline of operations of each unit 
1. Western Java 
(1) After making arrangements with the Sixteenth Army commander at Gaoxiong, the 3d
Escort Unit commander shall advance to Cam Ranh Bay roughly by around 4 February
to make the necessary preparations for the operation. 
(2) The convoy of the Sixteenth Army shall advance from Gaoxiong to Cam Ranh Bay by
around 10 February under the direct escort of the 5th Destroyer Squadron. 
(3) The 3d Escort Unit (other than the forces to be transferred from the Malaya Unit) shall
leave Cam Ranh Bay around 13 February, escorting the convoy of the main force of the
Sixteenth Army. It shall take command of the forces transferred from the Malaya Unit
en route around 17 February and, with the support and under the cover of the Air Unit
of the Malaya Unit and the Army air units, it shall put ashore the army units at Bantam
Bay, Merak and Patrol before dawn on 21 February. While taking charge of cover and
support of the landing operations, it shall [also] take charge of clearing the areas sur-
rounding the anchorage of enemy submarines and destroying enemy surface forces there.
It shall also set up a landing base along Bantam Bay with one element. 







































dr 2d Destroyer Sqdn (minus 18th De-
stroyer Div), 9th Construction
Squad, 2 plts of the Sasebo Com-
bined SLF, one element of the 3d
Military Supplies Dept, 
3 minesweepers of the 1st Base Force
(at the time of [the operation to] cap-
ture Kupang)
1. To escort the Army Itō Det and capture
Kupang
2. To rapidly prepare and secure the air-
field there
3. To destroy enemy surface forces in the
Molucca, the Banda and the Flores Seas
4. To guard the sea near Menado and

















1st Base Force (minus one element),
the Nagara, 21st Destroyer Div
(minus the Hatsuharu), 1st Patrol
Boat Div (minus 6 patrol boats), 5th
and 6th Construction Squads, bulk
of the Sasebo Combined SLF (until
[the operation to] capture Makas-
sar), one element of the 3d Military
Supplies Dept, 5 fishing boats, 8th
Destroyer Div (until [the operation
to capture] Bali), 15th Destroyer Div
(until [the operation to capture]
Makassar)
1. To seize Makassar and rapidly prepare
the airfield there, while destroying
enemy surface forces on the waters in
the area 
2. To escort the army units, carry out a
sudden attack on Bali and rapidly pre-
pare the airfield there























dr Bulk of the Sasebo Combined SLF
(after the capture of Makassar), 2d
Gunboat Div 2d Section
























dr 24th Special Base Force (from 5 Feb-
ruary onwards)
1st Kure SLF (except for the units
kept in Legaspi and Jolo)
To guard Ambon
(4) The San’yō-maru and Patrol Boat No. 35 shall, by separate orders, arrive in Cam Ranh
Bay by around 11 February, leave the bay around 13 February and join the Kamikawa-
maru around 16 February, while taking charge of the guarding of the transport convoy
against [enemy] aircraft and submarines. After that, the 1st Air Unit shall continue the
guarding of the transport convoy against [enemy] aircraft and submarines and support
the 3d Escort Unit.  
(5) By special orders, the 1st Base Force shall set up defenses at the port of Batavia. 
2. Eastern Java 
(1) After making arrangements with the 48th Division commander at Gaoxiong,* the 1st Es-
cort Unit commander shall escort the convoy of the division, which is at Lingayen, with
the 4th Destroyer Squadron and advance to Jolo by around 12 or 13 February. 
(2) The 2d Base Unit commander shall have the forces, which are to be incorporated into
the 1st Escort Unit, advance to Jolo by 12 February, cooperate in sweeping the anchorage
[of mines] and clearing enemy submarines in the neighboring areas, and join the 1st Es-
cort Unit after the 4th Destroyer Squadron arrives in Jolo. 
(3) The 1st Escort Unit shall leave Jolo around 16 February, escorting the convoy of the 48th
Division, and with the support and under the cover of the 2d Air Unit and the Air Unit
of the Southern Task Force, it shall put ashore the army units at Kragan before dawn on
23 February. While in charge of the cover and support of the landing operation, it shall
also take charge of clearing the areas surrounding the anchorage of enemy submarines
as well as destroying enemy surface forces there. 
(4) The 2d Air Unit shall sail to Jolo after the Makassar operation, after which it shall coop-
erate with the 1st Escort Unit by guarding the transport convoy against [enemy] aircraft
and submarines while roughly sailing along the 1st Escort Unit, and support the landing
combat and ground combat of the army units. 
(5) The 2d Base Unit shall deploy its forces at key places along the Makassar Strait and take
charge of clearing enemy submarines from the sailing routes of the 1st Escort Unit. It
shall also by and large follow in the wake of the unit to the Kragan anchorage and set up
a landing base there. [Then] when required, it shall take back its forces that have been [tem-
porarily] incorporated in the 1st Escort Unit, after which it shall clear the waterway leading
to the Surabaya port, clear the area within the port and set up defenses there. 
Due to changes in the circumstances, the disposition of forces in Operation Order No. 9 was
later changed to some extent in the following way: 





















































The Jintsū, 15th and 16th Destroyer Divs, 7th Destroyer Div
1st Section, 1st Patrol Boat Div and 21st Minesweeper Div
* Actually at Manila, see p. 391
Remark: The terms Eastern Attack Unit, and Eastern and Western Java Invasion Units have been
employed by the author for convenience’ sake. 
The Units Involved in the Western Java Invasion [Operation]
The Army-Navy Arrangements Between the Sixteenth Army and the 5th Destroyer
Squadron 
The outline of the arrangement made at Gaoxiong on 27 January was as follows:(63)











































dr The Nagara, 21st Destroyer Div (minus the Hatsuharu), theTsukushi, 1st, 2d, 5th [52d?], and 12th Subchaser Divs, the
Kimishima-maru, the Ikushima-maru, the Aotaka, the Hakusan-
maru, one half of the 1st Defense Unit, 1st Signal Unit and the
Sanuki-maru [According to the order of the 3d Fleet, the latter
was under the command of the 2d Base Force until 6 Febru-

























dr 5th Destroyer Sqdn (the Natori, 5th and 22d Destroyer Divs),
the Yura, 11th and 12th Destroyer Divs, 1st Minesweeper Div,
6th Destroyer Div 1st Section, the Shirataka, the Myōkō-maru















The Kamikawa-maru, the San’yō-maru, Patrol Boat No. 35, 91st


























The Naka, 2d Destroyer Div, 9th Destroyer Div (minus the Ya-
magumo), 24th Destroyer Div (minus three destroyers), 11th
and 21st [30th?] Minesweeper Divs, Patrol Boat
[Minesweeper?] No. 20, 21st Subchaser Div, the Wakataka and










dr The Itsukushima, 21st Torpedo Boat Div 2d Section, 2d Gun-
boat Div 1st Section, 31st Subchaser Div, one half of the 2d
Defense Unit, 2d Signal Unit, the Sanuki-maru (minus the air-
craft unit), Patrol Boat No. 37, 8 auxiliary naval vessels, 9 fish-
















11th Seaplane Tender Div (the Chitose and the Mizuho), Patrol
Boats Nos. 34, 38, 39 and 36, the aircraft unit of the Sanuki-
maru, and 2 fishing boats
1. The signatories 
The Sixteenth Army commander, the 2d Division commander, the Shōji Detachment commander
and the 5th Destroyer Division commander 
2. The assembly points and the program at the assembly points
(a) The transport ships shall successively arrive at Gaoxiong by 5 February, and then assemble
at Cam Ranh Bay by 10 February.
(b) The program at Cam Ranh Bay
11 February: Meetings between the landing units of each sector and the escort units of each
area, meetings between the captains of the ships and meetings concerning communications 
12 February: Training by the army as such
3. The distribution of the transport ships (omitted)
4. The landing points and the distribution of forces (as in the following table) 
5. The times and dates of the landings and the schedules (omitted) 
6. The outline of the escort 
(1) Scheduled sailing route: As shown in Separate Illustration No. 77 (omitted by the author)
(2) The sailing speed: 8 knots at normal speed 
(3) Direct escort shall be provided. 
The forces: the Natori, the Yura, sixteen destroyers, five minesweepers, and another vessel,
of which the Yura, six destroyers and five minesweepers shall join en route.
(4) The protective sailing formation (omitted)
7. The entry into the anchorages, the landing combat and the cover (omitted)
8. The movements of the transport ships after the landing and the later-arriving transport ships
(omitted) 
9. Others (omitted) 
The Plan of Operations of the 3d Escort Unit 
In accordance with Dutch East Indies Unit Operation Order No. 9, the aforementioned Army-
Navy arrangement and the subsequent orders and instructions, 3d Escort Unit Commander
Rear Admiral Hara announced on 1 February en route from Gaoxiong to Cam Ranh Bay his
plan of operations for the capture of western Java by means of 3d Escort Unit Order No. 2,
which was in outline as follows:(63)
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Sector A South of Merak 2 Inf bns and a reconnaissance unit(Major General Nasu) 1st Group; 8 ships
Sector B North of Merak 2 Inf bns(Colonel Fukushima) 2d Group; 7 ships
Sector C Western part ofBantam Bay
The main force of the [2d] Div and
the main force of the units under
the direct control of the [16th]
Army
(Colonel Satō)
3d Group; 32 ships
Area No. 2 Coast of Patrol 2 Inf bns(Colonel Shōji) 4th Group; 7 ships
1. The distribution of forces
(1) The 1st distribution of forces
(2) The 2d distribution of forces (from the entry into the anchorages onwards)
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The Natori, 11th Destroyer Div,
1st Minesweeper Div (minus 1
minesweeper), the Shirataka, the
Myōkō-maru and one half of 1st
Defense Unit
To support the entire es-
cort as well as the opera-
tion
1st Guide Unit 5th Destroyer Div Cdr 5th Destroyer Div
To guide and escort the 3d
Group (Sections 1 to 4
until the the point where
the 2d Guide Unit sepa-
rates [from the main con-
voy])
2d Guide Unit 22d Destroyer Div Cdr
22d Destroyer Div,* 12th De-
stroyer Div and 21st Torpedo
Boat Div 1st Section
To guide and escort the
1st and 2d  Groups (and
also Sections 5 and 6 of
the 3d Group until the
separation point)
3d Guide Unit Capt of the Yura
The Yura, 6th Destroyer Div 1st
Section, 22d Destroyer Div 2d
Section, and 1 Minesweeper of
the 1st Minesweeper Div
To guide and escort the
4th Group
Remarks
1. The Yura, the 11th and the 12th Destroyer Divs and the 1st Minesweeper Div shall be trans-
ferred to the 3d Escort Unit around 16 February.
2. Until being joined by the Yura, the 6th Destroyer Division commander shall take command
of the 3d Guide Unit.
* According to the original archival document: minus the 2d Section. See also the item directly below it.














To support and direct the
entire operation, and pro-
vide guard to the whole
[convoy]
1st Guard Unit 22d Destroyer Div Cdr
22d Destroyer Div 1st Section,
12th Destroyer Div, 21st Torpedo
Boat Div 1st Section
To guard Sectors A and B
2d Guard Unit 5th Destroyer Div Cdr 5th Destroyer Div To guard Sector C
2. The outline of the escort at sea (omitted by the author) 
3. The outline of the entry into the anchorages (omitted by the author) 
4. The outline of the guarding of the anchorages (omitted by the author) 
5. The outline of the operations of the minesweeper unit (omitted by the author) 
6. The outline of the operations of the defense unit (omitted by the author) 
7. Communications (omitted by the author) 
8. Supply (omitted by the author) 
Concerning the outline of operations of the five fishing boats deployed as rescue ships for
the army transport ships, 3d Escort Unit Commander Rear Admiral Hara gave the outline
by Order No. 3 below on 10 February:(63)
1. The names of the fishing boats 
The Kōyō-maru No. 6 (73 tons), the Taiei-maru No. 2 (61 tons), the Nanshin-maru No. 48 (50 tons),
The Rokkō-maru No. 12 (56 tons), and the Tenjin-maru (40 tons)
2. The Natori shall dispatch about ten armed communications personnel led by a sub-lieutenant
or ensign. 
3. The fishing boats shall sail ahead to the Anambas Islands, leaving Cam Ranh Bay on Day H –
10. Then, they shall leave the islands on the afternoon of Day H – 6 and, by way of Point D, join
the 3d Escort Unit near Point I, after which they shall sail in the wake of the escort unit and
enter into the anchorage of Area C.
4. After their arrival at the landing sector, the fishing boats shall be attached to the 1st Defense
Unit until separately ordered otherwise, and stand by for rescue [operations] of the army trans-
port ships.
In addition, the 3d Escort Unit commander issued orders on the outline of setting up of a
land [base] at Batavia (by the means of Order No. 6 on 15 February), the supply plan at the
landing points (by means of Order No. 6 on 15 February), and the outline of the second trans-
port of the main force of the Sixteenth Army (by means of Order No. 6 on 15 February).(63)
After having been assigned to support the 3d Escort Unit by Malaya Unit Telegraphic Op-
eration Order No. 39 on 17 February [p. 369], 7th Cruiser Division Commander Rear Admiral














11th Destroyer Div Cdr 11th Destroyer Div To guard Sector C
4th Guard Unit Capt of the Yura
The Yura, 6th Destroyer Div 1st
Section, 22d Destroyer Div 2d
Section and 1 minesweeper of
the 1st Minesweeper Div







To sweep for mines in
the outer areas of Area C
and the anchorage of
Batavia
Defense Unit Capt of the Shirataka
The Shirataka, one half of the 1st
Defense Unit and the Myōkō-
maru
Defense of Bantam Bay
Kurita announced the outline of the support for the 3d Escort Unit on 21 February as fol-
lows:(63)
The 7th Cruiser Division and the 19th Destroyer Division (minus the Ayamami) shall leave
Anambas at 1800 on 22 February (Day H – 4), and reach an area close to the transport convoy
at 1200 on 24 February, after which they shall appropriately operate on the western part of the
Java Sea to support the 3d Escort Unit. 
The Plan of Operations of the 1st Air Unit 
On 12 February at Cam Ranh Bay, 1st Air Unit Commander R. Adm. Fujita Ruitarō* an-
nounced the operations of the 1st Air Unit in the Java invasion operation by means of Oper-
ation Order No. 1,(55) which was in outline as follows: 
1. The outline of tasks and operations of the naval vessels (as shown in the following table) 
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* According to the tables on pp. 380, 383, the captain of the Kamikawa-maru (Capt. Shinoda Tarohachi) was the
commander of the 1st Air Unit. According to pp. 163, 218, R. Adm. Fujita Ruitarō was the commander of the
2d Air Unit, which was to support the eastern Java operation.
Name of Ships Main Tasks Operations
Kamikawa-maru
Support for and guard of base
operations at the Anambas Is-
lands and the Batavia area
1. She shall stay at anchor while on guard near the Anam-
bas Base.
2. Subsequent operations shall be ordered later.
San’yō-maru
Support for and guard of base
operations at the Anambas Is-
lands and the Batavia area
1. She shall advance to the Anambas [area] by Day H – 7.
2. Subsequent operations shall be ordered later.
Patrol Boat No. 35 Transport of base personneland matériel
1. She shall advance to Mentok on the morning of Day H
– 7.
2. She shall sail to Lepar Island from Mentok on Day H –
6.
3. She shall leave Lepar Island on Day H - 1, arrive in
Bantam Bay on the morning of Day H, refuel from the
Tsurumi on Day H, leave the bay on the morning of
Day H + 1 and arrive at Patrol on the afternoon of Day
H + 1.
4. Subsequent operations shall be ordered later.
Shōnan-maru
No. 7 and No. 12
Guard of the base and the
mother ships under sail
1. They shall guard the Anambas base.
2. Subsequent operations shall be ordered later.
Two fishing boats
Transport of base personnel
and matériel and guard of the
base
1. They shall sail to Lepar Island from Mentok on Day H -
6.
2. On Day H, after the takeoff of the aircraft unit, they
shall dismantle the Lepar base, and sail to Bantam Bay.
3. Subsequent operations shall be ordered later.
2. The distribution [of forces] for the air campaign*
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* The following table is based on the “Action Report of the San’yō-maru.” See: JACAR (https://www.jacar.go.jp/)
Ref: C08030661900 昭和16年11月7日～昭和17年5月23日　山陽丸戦闘詳報(4). There are, however, a number
of differences. The major ones are: (1) The departure and arrival points on Day H – 2: Lepar Island (Ditto); (2)
The tasks of the San’yō-maru on Day H – 1: Direct escort of the transport convoy ([of] the detachment unit) against
enemy submarines; and (3) On Day H, two observation seaplanes of the Kamikawa-maru and the San’yō-maru shall
























































1015 (1430) Ditto Ditto
1230 (1545) 1 Observationseaplane Ditto
1345 (1645) Ditto Ditto
1445 (1745) Ditto Ditto
1545 (1845) Ditto Ditto






































0800 (1200) 1 Observationseaplane
Kamikawa-
maru
1015 (1415) Ditto San’yō-maru






1445 (1845) Ditto Kamikawa-maru



























































0900 (1300) 1 Observationseaplane
Kamikawa-
maru
1000 (1400) Ditto San’yō-maru
1100 (1500) Ditto Kamikawa-maru
1215 (1615) Ditto San’yō-maru
1330 (1730) Ditto Kamikawa-maru
1445 (1845) Ditto San’yō-maru
























































0800 (1200) 2 Observationseaplanes
Kamikawa-
maru
0900 (1300) Ditto San’yō-maru
1000 (1400) Ditto Kamikawa-maru







1330 (1730) Ditto San’yō-maru
1445 (1845) 2 Observationseaplanes
Kamikawa-
maru
1645 (1950) Ditto San’yō-maru























































1330 (1730) 1 Three-seaterrecon. seaplane
1545 (1950) Ditto


































The planes shall take




the landing at the
base, three observa-




After the landing on
the base [at Patrol],
two observation sea-
planes of the San’yō-
maru shall continue
the guard of the an-
chorage.
The others shall im-
mediately refuel. The
actions thereafter












3. The setup of bases (omitted by the author)
4. Communications (omitted by the author)
5. Communications with the fishing boats (omitted by the author)
The Units Involved in the Eastern Java Invasion (Operation)
The Arrangements Between the 4th Destroyer Squadron and the [Army] 48th Division
Having reached Manila from Lingayen Gulf overland, 4th Destroyer Squadron Commander
Rear Admiral Nishimura concluded on 4 February with the [Army] 48th Division com-
mander the Army-Navy arrangements on the eastern Java invasion operation. The outline
of the arrangements was as follows:(56)
1. The outline of the operation
[The units shall] leave Lingayen Gulf on 8 February, arrive in Jolo on 12 or 13 February, and
after making necessary preparations there, leave Jolo on Day I - 7 (note: 16 February) and enter
into the anchorage for the landing points at night on Day I - 1.
2. The program at the assembly points:
7 February at Lingayen at 1330 Meetings between the captains of the ships and
those concerning communications
14 February at Jolo at 0930 Meetings on details between the escort unit and the
[transport] ships
at Jolo at 1330 Meetings between the captains of the ships
3. The main points concerning the sail from Lingayen Gulf to Jolo (omitted)
4. The distribution of the transport ships (omitted by the author)
5. The landing points and the distribution of forces to the landing points (as in the following table)
6. The time and date of the landing and the landing schedule
(1) The date of the start of the landing, Day I, is set on Day X + 77 (23 February). [The units
shall] leave Jolo on Day I – 7, drop anchor at 0100 on Day I, and start landing at 0200 on that
day. However, if there are mines at the anchorage and their clearing is expected to require
time, [the units] may enter the anchorage when the clearing is completed.
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Unit Core Forces(Commander) Landing Point
Places to Advance to
After Landing
Imai Unit 2 Inf bns and 1 mountain artillery bn(Colonel Imai) Kragan,
Sector B
Sedan, Meduran*
Kitamura Unit Reconnaissance Regt(Lieutenant Colonel Kitamura) Bojonegoro




Tanaka Unit 2 Inf bns and 1 mountain artillery bn(Colonel Tanaka) Cepu
* The text says Mazuran. In Vol. 3, p. 238, it is Mazeran. The “Action Report of the 4th Destroyer Squadron” (第
4水雷戦隊戦闘詳報42/2/8-3/10(5); JACAR Ref: C08030111000, pdf 31/51) says that it is a place about 3 km
southeast of Cape Bendo. This would be Meduran. The supposition in Vol. 3, p. 238 that it might be a corruption
of Semarang is wrong.
** The reference cited above proves the identification of Bonjōru/Ponjōru and Bulūjaku with Bancar and Bulujowo
or Bulujawa in Vol. 3 to be correct.
(2) The landing schedule
[The landing shall be completed] roughly in five days, and in terms of the disembarkation
of the military supplies, [the transport ships] shall change anchorage to an area to the east
of Cape Bendo from Day I + 2 onwards.
7. The outline of the escort
(1) The scheduled sailing route: As shown in Separate Illustration No. 84 (omitted by the au-
thor)
(2) The sailing speed: 8 knots at normal speed
(3) Direct escort shall be provided. The strength [of the escort] is:
Between Lingayen and Jolo: One cruiser and four destroyers (to which three submarine
chasers and one minelayer shall be added up until the Apo [Reef] Channel.)
Between Jolo and Kragan: One cruiser, nine destroyers, two minesweepers, six submarine
chasers and one minelayer
(4) The protective sailing formation (omitted by the author)
8. The entry into the anchorage, the landing combat and the cover (omitted by the author)
9. The movements of the transport ships after the landing (omitted by the author)
10. Others (omitted by the author)
The Plan of Operations of the 1st Escort Unit
1. The plan of escort for the sailing from Lingayen to Jolo ([as in] Operation Order No. 4; [issued
on] 6 February; contents omitted)
2. The general plan of landing operation ([as in] Operation Order No. 6; [issued on] 12 February)
On 12 February, 1st Escort Unit Commander Rear Admiral Nishimura advanced to Jolo
where, after discussions with 2d Base Force Commander Rear Admiral Hirose and 11th Sea-
plane Tender Division Commander Rear Admiral Fujita, he announced his plan for the land-
ing operation, which in summary was as follows:(56)
(1) The distribution of forces 
{1} First distribution of forces (from the departure from Jolo until the issue of the order to
change into the formation to enter into the anchorage)
(Note by the author: as in the following table)
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2d Destroyer Div, 21st Subchaser Div
and the Kawakaze
To clear the sailing route ahead





24th Destroyer Div (the Umikaze), the
Wakataka, 11th, 30th, the 20th
Minesweeper Divs,* the Myōkō-maru, one
half of the 1st Defense Unit**






9th Destroyer Div (minus the 
Yamagumo)
To guard the rear of the trans-
port ship unit
* Actually: 11th and 30th Minesweeper Divs, and Minesweeper No. 20
** Actually: 2d Defense Unit. See pp. 380, 383.
{2} Second distribution of forces (after the issue of the order to change to the formation to
enter into the anchorage)
(2) The outline of the escort at sea (omitted)
(3) The outline of the entry into the anchorage (omitted)
(4) The outline of the guard of the anchorage (omitted)
(5) Communications (omitted)
(6) Others (omitted)
Since it was decided that the Sakaguchi Detachment should participate in the eastern Java
operation, 1st Escort Unit Commander Rear Admiral Nishimura issued an order that the
Kawakaze and the Submarine Chaser No. 4 should be dispatched to Balikpapan to escort the
Havana-maru and the Ehime-maru with the Sakaguchi Detachment on board to join [the main
convoy].
The Plan of Operations of the 2d Base Unit(53, 55, 142)
1. The disposition of forces (as in the following table)
Chapter VI     /     The Drafting of the Java Invasion Operation Plan 393


















Div Cdr 21st Subchaser Div






2d Destroyer Div 2d Section and 11th
Minesweeper Div
To sweep the route ahead of






24th Destroyer Div 1st Section and the
Wakataka






2d Destroyer Div 1st Section, 30th and
20th Minesweeper Divs*
To guard the front of the trans-
port ship unit, sail ahead to the






9th Destroyer Div (minus the 
Yamagumo)
To guard the rear of the trans-
port ship unit

















31st Subchaser Div (3 submarine
chasers)
To clear the waters south of the





the boats] 21st Torpedo Boat Div 2d Section
To escort the second landing
unit of the Sakaguchi Det
* Actually: 30th Minesweeper Div and Minesweeper No. 20.
** Actually: 2d. See p. 383.
2. The outline of the operations of each unit
(1) The main unit (The Itsukushima)
[The unit shall] leave Jolo principally ahead of the convoy of the 1st Escort Unit, and while
supporting [the unit], [sailing] by way of Tarakan, Balikpapan and Banjarmasin, enter Kra-
gan around Day H + 1,*** and support the operation to occupy Surabaya.
(2) The 1st Guard Unit (The 31st Subchaser Division)
[The unit] shall operate principally in the Balikpapan area and take charge of clearing enemy
submarines on the scheduled sailing route of the 1st Escort Unit in the area south of the
Makassar Strait.
(3) The 2d Guard Unit (The 2d Section of the 21st Torpedo Boat Division)
[The unit shall] sail to Makassar and escort the Army transport ships Sasako-maru and Sagami-
maru from there to Banjarmasin to embark the Sakaguchi Detachment, after which the unit
shall escort them to Kragan.
(4) The 3d Guard Unit (The 1st Section of the 2d Gunboat Division and the 54th Subchaser Di-
vision)
[The unit shall] principally be responsible for clearing the areas of Davao, Jolo and Tarakan
of enemy submarines, while protecting the sea lines of communication.
(5) The Surabaya invasion unit (The 30th, the 11th and the 20th Minesweeper Divisions** and
the 21st Subchaser Division)
After entering into the Kragan anchorage and sweeping the anchorage for mines and pro-
viding guard there under the command of the 1st Escort Unit commander, [the unit shall]
come back under the command of the 2d Base Force commander from the time when they
would be required to take charge of occupying the port of Surabaya and clearing the water-
ways.
(6) The unit attached (omitted)
Note by the author: The names of units were given by the author for convenience’s sake.
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30th, 11th and 20th Minesweeper
Divs,**and 21st Subchaser Div (6 subma-
rine chasers)
To come back under the [origi-
nal] command roughly on Day
I + 1 and clear the waterways
to Surabaya
Land Unit 2d Kure SLFCdr 2d Kure SLF (minus one element)




The Sanuki-maru (minus the aircraft
unit), Patrol Boat No. 37, 8 auxiliary
naval vessels, one half of the 2d Defense
Unit and 9 fishing boats
1. Replenishment 
2. To protect the sea lines of
communication and guard
anchorages
3. To transport the base
matériel for the Banjarmasin
base
* Actually: 2d. See p. 383.
** Actually: 30th and 11th Minesweeper Divs and Minesweeper No. 20.
*** Or Day I + 1. Day I was the code name for the eastern Java operation; Day H the code name for the western
Java operation.
The Plan of Operations of the 2d Air Unit and Its Circumstances
The 2d Air Unit, which consisted of the 11th Seaplane Tender Division, Patrol Boats Nos. 34,
38 and 39, one platoon of the Sasebo Combined Special Landing Force, six fishing boats and
one small cargo ship, was supposed to support the 1st Escort Unit and the 2d Base Unit by
guarding the transport convoy against [enemy] aircraft and submarines as well as to support
the [Army] 48th Division in its landing combat (as previously told).
On 18 February, the 11th Seaplane Tender Division staff (at the Pata anchorage of Jolo)
communicated the following operation schedule of the division to the staff of the 4th De-
stroyer Squadron:(62)
1. The operation schedule of our unit (minus the Mizuho, Patrol Boat No. 39 and the Ebisu-maru)
until the morning of the 20th is as follows:
(a) The Chitose: shall leave this anchorage at 1915 on the 19th; [sailing] at a speed of 24 knots,
she shall pass by the waters east of your unit around 0000 on the 20th and arrive in Dondo
Bay (note by the author: located to the north of the Gulf of Tomini [on the northwest coast]
of Celebes) around 0830 on the 20th.
(b) Patrol Boat No. 34: shall leave Tarakan around 1300 on the 19th and arrive in Dondo Bay
around 0600 on the 20th.
(c) Patrol Boat No. 38: shall leave this anchorage around 0900 on the 19th, and [by sailing] at a
speed of 14 knots, arrive in Dondo Bay at 0800 on the 20th.
2. The Ebisu-maru shall follow in the wake of the transport convoy up to the Wota* (note by the
author: unknown) anchorage. 
3. The Mizuho and Patrol Boat No 39 are expected to join our unit around 24th or the 25th.
4. The aircraft unit of the Sanuki-maru is studying [the possibility] to move to somewhere near
Baha** (note by the author: to the west of Gulf of Tomini [on the west coast] of Celebes) from
around the 21st.
The Mizuho, which had been incorporated in the 2d Escort Unit to engage in the Kupang op-
eration, returned to her original unit at 1000 on the 21st and headed for Celebes.(54)
The Plan of Operations of the Land-Based Air Unit 
The arrangements for the Java operation between the Sixteenth Army, the [Army] Third Air
Force, the Third Fleet and the Eleventh Air Fleet came into effect on 28 January; their contents
have been previously related [p. 374-97]. Moreover, the outline of [the land-based air unit’s]
support for the first and the second carrier operations of the Carrier Task Force has also been
described [p. 331]. On 19 February (two days earlier than the scheduled day, the 21st) the
22d Air Flotilla headquarters, the Genzan Air Group, the main body of the Kanoya Air Group
and the Type–0 fighter plane unit of the 22d Air Flotilla of the Air Unit of the Malaya Unit
were transferred to the 3d Air Raid Unit, so as to participate in the Java operation under the
unified command of the Eleventh Air Fleet commander in chief in accordance with the phase-
three disposition of forces. The phase-three disposition of forces of the Air Unit of the South-
ern Task Force was as follows:(135)
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* Most likely Oti is meant. 
** Most likely Baya is meant.
Note: The Kamogawa-maru was sunk at the north entrance of the Lombok Strait on 2 March.
396 Chapter VI     /     The Drafting of the Java Invasion Operation Plan












































dr 21st Air Flotilla
(minus the main
body of the Kanoya
Air Gp, 1st Air Gp
and the Katsuragi-




1. To destroy the enemy air power in
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That is, the Air Unit planned to accelerate the air campaign over Java with the 23d Air Flotilla
from the east and the 22d Air Flotilla from the west, while carrying out consecutive attacks
on key places in northwestern Australia with the 21st Air Flotilla and the 3d Air Group to
contain the operations of the enemy. Also, in concert with the operations of the Carrier Task
Force, the unit was supposed to carry out search and attack missions in the eastern part of
the Indian Ocean to catch and destroy enemy surface forces.
The Plan of Operations of the Army Units
On 20 January, the Southern Army commander issued the following order to capture Java
by way of Southern Army Operation Order Classified No. 43.
Southern Army Order [See also Vol. 3, p. 155.]
1. The overall operations of the Southern Army are progressing as scheduled.
2. In conjunction with the Navy, I intend to swiftly capture Java. 
The cooperation with the Navy shall be based on General Agreements No. 2 and No. 4.
3. The commander of the Sixteenth Army shall swiftly capture Java in the following manner:
(a) Exploiting the results of the neutralization of [the enemy] air power on Java, he shall almost
simultaneously land his main force in western Java and an element in eastern Java. When
conducting the landing operations, interference from enemy naval and air forces is expected.
(b) After the landing, he shall defeat the enemy and promptly seize Batavia, Surabaya and Ban-
dung.
(c) He shall swiftly make air bases in Java ready for use.
4. The commander of the Third Air Force shall support the Sixteenth Army’s operation in the fol-
lowing manner:
(a) As soon as the airfields on Bangka Island and southern Sumatra have been made ready for
use, he shall advance there, without missing an opportunity, as much strength as possible,
swiftly destroy the enemy air power in western Java, and directly and closely support the
landing operations of the main force of the Sixteenth Army.
(b) As soon as the air bases in Java are ready for use, he shall swiftly advance an element of his
force.
5. The captain general of the Shipping Transport Command shall closely support the operations
conducted by the commanders of the Sixteenth Army and the Third Air Force.
6. I shall [command from] Saigon.
The plan of operations of the Southern Army at that time was as follows:
Western Java: [The units] under the direct command of the Sixteenth Army, 2d Division, and
two battalions of the 38th Division
Eastern Java: 48th Division ([consisting of] nine infantry battalions as the core)
Sumatra: the main force of the 38th Division ([consisting of] four infantry battalions as the core)
Eastern Borneo: The Sakaguchi Detachment
The areas north of Australia: The Itō Detachment ([consisting of] three battalions of the 38th
Division)
Note: The operation to capture Bali was not yet on the table around that time.
The Sixteenth Army’s plan for the Java invasion operation ([as of] 27 January) was in outline
as follows:
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1. Mission
(1) The main force of the Sixteenth Army shall, in conjunction with the Navy, land with the
units of first transport in western Java ([at] Merak, Bantam Bay and Patrol) before dawn on
Day H, defeat the enemy and swiftly capture first Batavia and then Bandung without a
break.
(2) The 48th Division shall land in eastern Java ([at] Kragan) before dawn on Day I, capture
Surabaya and then Malang, and swiftly subjugate eastern Java.
(3) In order to advance a naval air base to be used at the time of [the operation to] capture east-
ern Java, the 48th Division shall on Day I – 5 in conjunction with the Navy carry out a sudden
attack on Bali with one element, swiftly seize the airfield there and make it ready for use.
2. Disposition of forces for the capture of western Java
(1) The 2d Division ([consisting of] seven infantry battalions, three field artillery battalions, one
heavy field artillery battalion and one tank regiment as the core)
{1} Before dawn on Day H, one element shall land near Merak and the main force along
Bantam Bay, to swiftly advance to the line of Ciujung River first.
{2} One powerful element shall be swiftly dispatched toward Buitenzorg to divide the
enemy in the Batavia and the Bandung areas and secure as forward as possible a footing
for the seizure of Bandung.
{3} The main force of the division shall advance through the areas along the road connecting
Serang, Tangerang and Batavia toward Batavia and the sector to its south, and swiftly
capture the place.
(2) The Shōji Detachment ([consisting of] two infantry battalions and one mountain artillery
battalion of the 38th Division as the core)
{1} [The detachment] shall land in Patrol before dawn on Day H and swiftly secure the Kali-
jati airfield.
{2} [The detachment] shall take control of the crossing point of the Citarum River to divide
the enemy in the Bandung and the Batavia areas, and depending on the situation, shall
capture Batavia with one element.
(3) The disposition of forces for the capture of eastern Java
The 48th Division ([consisting of] eight infantry battalions and four mountain artillery bat-
talions as the core)
{1} [The division shall] land in Kragan before dawn on Day I, defeat the enemy and swiftly
seize Surabaya.
{2} [The division] shall have one powerful element charge toward Cilacap to cut off the es-
cape routes of the enemy.
{3} [The division shall] land in Surabaya swiftly after capturing the place and set up a base,
while clearing eastern Java [of the enemy].
(4) The disposition of forces for the capture of Bali
The 48th Division shall have one element ([consisting of] one infantry battalion as the core)
conduct a sudden attack on Bali on Day I – 5 to seize the airfield there.
Since it was decided, as previously told, that the Sakaguchi Detachment should participate
in the eastern Java invasion operation, [a new] disposition of forces was decided upon as fol-
lows by around 17 February:
1. The bulk of the Sakaguchi Detachment ([consisting of] two and a half infantry battalions as the
core) shall participate in the operation in eastern Java.
2. The Sakaguchi Detachment shall first of all embark in Balikpapan its detachment headquarters
and one infantry battalion in the transport ships and sail south under the escort of the Navy.
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After joining the 48th Division en route, it shall sail together and land near Kragan along with
the 48th Division before dawn on Day I.
3. Then, the detachment shall have the transport ships sail back to Banjarmasin to embark its re-
maining force of about one and a half battalion and bring them to Kragan.
4. After having completed preparations and assembling its force near Kragan, the detachment
shall charge toward Cilacap at a dash, seize the place, and cut off the escape routes of the enemy
from Batavia and Bandung.
5. The 48th Division shall be relieved of the task to charge toward and seize Cilacap. 
6. The 48th Division commander shall make the necessary revisions in the arrangements with the
4th Destroyer Squadron commander concerning the participation of the Sakaguchi Detachment
and arrange for the detachment the escort during the sailing and the outline of the landings,
etc.
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Chapter VII The Implementation of the Java Invasion
Operation
1. Outline of the Progress of the Operation
Although, as previously told, the scheduled dates of the Java invasion operation wereat [the conference for] the Cam Ranh Agreement on 19* December moved up to DayX + 70, they were again postponed to Day X + 75 and Day X + 77 (21 and 23 February)
at the Manila Conference on 23 January. 
The main force of the Sixteenth Army ([consisting of] the 2d Division as the core), which
was supposed to land in western Java, had advanced to Taiwan from mainland Japan in late
January, and in early February further advanced under the escort of the 5th Destroyer
Squadron to stand by at Cam Ranh Bay.
The 48th Division, which was supposed to land in eastern Java, came under the command
of the Sixteenth Army after completing the operation to capture Manila. The division assem-
bled in Lingayen, departed on 8 February under the escort of the 4th Destroyer Squadron
and sailed south. Then, as previously told [p. 379], due to the delay in the preparations for
the western Java invasion [operation], the date of the landings on Java was eventually set on
Day X + 80 (26 February).
Following the decision on the schedule, the units involved in the western Java invasion
[operation] left Cam Ranh Bay on 18 February and sailed south, escorted by the 5th Destroyer
Squadron and the reinforcement from the Malaya Unit (the 7th Cruiser Division that was to
join from the Anambas Islands, leaving there on the 22d). In the meantime, the units involved
in the eastern Java invasion [operation], which were temporarily standing by at Jolo, departed
on 19 February and sailed south toward Java.
However, due to the unsatisfactory results of the air campaign to destroy the enemy air
power, the prospect that considerable strength of the enemy had survived became very likely.
Consequently, following a proposal offered by Dutch East Indies Unit Commander V. Adm.
Takahashi Ibō on 23 February, it was decided that the landing on Java should be further post-
poned for two days until 28 February. This postponement made the western and eastern Java
invasion units bide their time, the former by reversing course on the waters east of the Anam-
bas Islands and the latter by temporarily staying off Balikpapan.
The land-based air unit launched air attacks on eastern Java from 18 February onwards
from Kendari and then from Bali, while the units stationed at Kuching and those which had
advanced from French Indochina by temporarily using the Gelumbang base (located by army
units on 16 February about forty kilometers southwest of Palembang) launched attacks on
*Actually: 29 December. See pp. 359-60.
western Java from 25 February onwards. In the meantime, the Army Third Air Force ad-
vanced to Palembang on 18 February and launched attacks on western Java from the 19th
onwards.
Both the eastern and western [Java invasion] units entered the Java Sea on the morning
of 26th February. However, first of all in the western [Java Sea] area, several enemy naval
vessels including cruiser[s] were spotted near Batavia on the morning of 27th, which was
followed by the spotting in the eastern [Java Sea] area of a powerful enemy fleet consisting
of more than a dozen naval vessels off Surabaya. While postponing the landing on Java for
another day and letting the convoys temporarily evacuate to the north, Dutch East Indies
Unit Commander Vice Admiral Takahashi issued an order to assemble the escort vessels to
destroy the enemy.
Whereas the enemy naval vessels in the western [Java Sea] area sought shelter in [the port
of] Batavia by evening, the powerful unit in the eastern part [of the Java Sea] sailed northward
in search of the Japanese Navy, which led to a major sea engagement with the 5th Cruiser
Division and the 4th and 2d Destroyer Squadrons. The sea engagement lasted from the
evening till the early morning of the next day, in which the Japanese Navy sunk two enemy
cruisers and two destroyers, and routed the others (the sea engagement off Surabaya). On 1
March, the invasion unit successfully landed in Kragan. On that day, in a daytime sea en-
gagement, the surface unit destroyed the remnants of the enemy fleet. 
No enemy movements were spotted in the western part after that, and before dawn on 1
March, the convoy reached Bantam Bay and started landing. Right after [the convoy’s] entry
into the anchorage, two enemy cruisers raided the anchorage under the cloak of darkness.
However, the 5th and 3d Destroyer Squadrons and the 7th Cruiser Division on site immedi-
ately encircled the enemy and sank both ships by a concentrated fire of shells and torpedoes
(the sea engagement off Batavia). During this engagement, some [Japanese] transport ships
were sunk or seriously damaged by torpedoes that seemed to have been launched by friendly
naval vessels, but it caused no major hindrance in the landing operation.
The army units that had landed in western Java occupied Batavia on 5 March and closed
in on the Bandung stronghold with one element. Meanwhile, those that had landed in eastern
Java seized Cilacap on 8 March, while closing in on Surabaya. 
In the meantime, the main body of the Southern Task Force, which had advanced from
Palau, the Carrier Task Force, which had carried out the attack on Port Darwin, and the 2d
Submarine Squadron and others, which had advanced from mainland Japan, were [all gath-
ering] at Staring Bay. On 25 February, they left the bay to advance to the waters south of Java
and to the Indian Ocean in an operation to cut off the escape routes of the enemy. From 28
February until around 8 March, starting with air strikes on Cilacap, the units shelled Christ-
mas Island, while catching and attacking the escaping enemy units. Meanwhile, one element
of the submarine unit operated as far as in the vicinity of Freemantle on the southwestern
coast of Australia. After having sunk some enemy naval vessels and about forty transport
ships, in early March [all units] returned to Staring Bay (the submarine units to Penang).
On 9 March, the enemy ground forces surrendered, and the operation to capture Java was
completed.
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2. From the Launch of the Operation Until the Landings
Further Postponement of the Landing Dates
The Java invasion operation was planned in such a way that the air campaign to destroy the
enemy air power should be carried out over western Java from western Borneo and southern
Sumatra and over eastern Java from southern Borneo and Celebes; by exploiting the results,
large invasion forces should be advanced almost simultaneously into eastern and western
[Java]. However, with the air campaign to destroy the enemy air power in Java launched
from mid-February in the state as roughly [summarized] in the following table, the results
fell short of expectations.(71)
✓: attacks implemented; ✘: attacks called-off; (   ): the bases from which the units took off; the military gains as re-
ported*
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Date Western Java Eastern Java
9 February
✓ 16 Type–0 fighter planes and 2 land-based
recon. planes of the 22d Air Flotilla conducted
([from] Kuching) an attack on Batavia; shot
down 12 [enemy aircraft] and destroyed 8,
which caught flames; 1 Type–0 fighter plane
was seriously damaged in landing.
17 Land-based attack planes and 9 Type–0
fighter planes of the 23d Air Flotilla conducted
([from] Balikpapan) an attack on Malang; shot
down 1 P–40.
11 February
✘ 27 Land-based attack planes of the 22d Air
flotilla intended to attack Batavia; since the
fighter planes were unable to attend [the unit],
it changed the plan and attacked [enemy] naval
vessels in the Bangka [Strait] (taking off from
Kahang and returning to Kuantan); destroyed 1
[enemy] cruiser and 2 merchantmen.
15 February
The full force of the 22d Air Flotilla carried out
an attack on the enemy fleet to the north of the
Gaspar Strait ([from] Kuching, Kuantan and
Thủ Dầu Một); no direct hits.
23d Air Flotilla ([from] Balikpapan) conducted
weather reconnaissance and returned due to
bad weather.
16 February 23d Air Flotilla conducted weather reconnais-sance ([from] Balikpapan).
17 February
15 Land-based attack planes of the 22d Air
Flotilla conducted an attack on [enemy] naval
vessels to the south of Bangka Island ([from]
Kuching); sank 1 [enemy] merchantman.
✘ 25 Land-based attack planes of the 23d Air
Flotilla ([from] Balikpapan) intended to attack
Surabaya, but returned due to bad weather.
* See also pp. 281, 290, 292-94, 311, 321-22. The numbers differ slightly.
On the early morning of 22 February, Dutch East Indies Unit Commander Vice Admiral Taka-
hashi put in at Staring Bay, met with Southern Task Force Commander Vice Admiral Kondō,
examined the results of the above-described air campaigns and made the following judg-
ment:(53)
1. Although the Army air units have finally launched their attack on the 19th in western Java, the
Navy air units are still stationed in Kuching and Kuantan, far away [from the targets], and have
not yet launched the air campaign to destroy the enemy air power in Java. [Enemy] naval surface
vessels including cruiser[s] have been spotted in Batavia, and it seems that considerable [enemy]
air strength has survived.
2. Although the air campaign to destroy the enemy air power in eastern Java has been launched
in earnest on the 18th, a considerable number [of enemy aircraft] including B–17s and P–40s re-
main on the bases in the area. As for the [enemy] naval surface vessels, units including cruisers
are also still stationed in the Surabaya area.
3. To summarize the above, the results of the air campaign both in eastern and western Java are
[still] unsatisfactory, and it is necessary to wait for [better] results by postponing the landing
dates for about two days.
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18 February
✓ 23 Land-based attack planes and 15 fighter
planes of the 23d Air Flotilla attacked Surabaya
([from] Balikpapan); destroyed 2 [enemy] cruis-
ers and 3 destroyers and shot down 4 fighter
planes; 3 [friendly aircraft] crashed themselves,
4 crews killed and 2 wounded on board, and 7
aircraft were marked by bullets.
19 February
Land-based recon. planes of the 22d Air Flotilla
reconnoitered Batavia ([from] Kuching) and
spotted 1 [enemy] ship which looked like an
aircraft carrier, 3 cruisers and 40 merchantmen.
✓ 60 Army fighter planes and bombers  ([from]
Palembang) attacked Bandung and Buitenzorg;
engaged with 30 enemy aircraft or more; shot
down or destroyed 28 [enemy] aircraft.
✘ 18 Land-based attack planes and 24 fighter
planes of the 23d Air Flotilla intended to attack
Surabaya ([from] Balikpapan), but unable to
enter [the sky over Surabaya] due to bad
weather, attacked Bawean Island and other tar-
gets instead.
20 February
Land-based attack planes of the 22d Air Flotilla
reconnoitered Batavia and spotted 5 [enemy]
cruisers, 8 destroyers 50 or more merchantmen,
10 flying boats, and 3 recon. seaplanes.
✓ About 50 Army fighter planes and bombers
attacked Kalijati ([from] Palembang); destroyed
5 planes.
27 Fighter planes and 3 land-based recon.
planes of the 23d Air Flotilla advanced to Bali.
✓ 22 Fighter planes of the 23d Air Flotilla at-
tacked Surabaya and Malang ([from] Balikpa-
pan and Bali); set fire to 4 B–17s and destroyed
1 B–17 and 1 twin-engine plane.
21 February
✓ About 30 Army fighter planes and bombers
attacked Kalijati and Bandung ([from] Palem-
bang); shot down or destroyed 8 [enemy] air-
craft.
✓ 13 Type–0 fighter planes of the 23d Air
Flotilla attacked the vicinity of Surabaya ([from]
Bali and Balikpapan); shot down 3 P–40s and
destroyed 3 small planes.
✓ 21 Land-based attack planes of the flotilla at-
tacked the naval vessels at anchor in Surabaya
port ([from] Balikpapan); destroyed 1 [enemy]
cruiser and 1 merchantman and shot down 1 P–
40.
In accordance with this judgment, Dutch East Indies Commander Vice Admiral Takahashi
sent on the morning of 22 February the following advisory telegram to Sixteenth Army Com-
mander Imamura (also notifying the Southern Army):*(30)
In view of the activities of enemy aircraft and naval vessels in the Java area as well as the results
of our air campaigns, I would like to postpone the date of the start of landing for two days until
28 February and discuss this with you.
On the same day, he issued the following order to his subordinate units by means of Third
Fleet Classified Telegram No. 445:**(53)
The dates of the start of landing of Operation SU (note by the author: eastern Java operation)
and Operation YA (note by the author: western Java operation) shall be postponed until 28 Feb-
ruary. 
The units for Operation SU shall stay on standby near Balikpapan; the units for Operation
YA shall appropriately act as designated by their commander. 
[Issued at] 1200, on the 22d
In the meantime, the chief of staff of the Southern Task Force also wired the chief of staff of
the Southern Army a telegram to the same effect, while at the same time requesting the
Army’s cooperation in the Navy Air Unit’s advance to the Gelumbang base (which had been
located by Army units on 19 February about forty kilometers southwest of Palembang) and
the preparation of the base. Having received the advisory telegram, the Southern Army head-
quarters expressed disapproval lest an unnecessary postponement of the invasion schedule
would lead to squandering an opportune moment to attack. However, since their units were
already at sea under the escort of the Navy and it was no use opposing [the Navy] at that
moment, [the headquarters] consented to the postponement of the invasion schedule on the
condition that the invasion schedule would not be further postponed. The Army also prom-
ised that it would provide adequate support for the Navy concerning the latter’s [use of] the
Gelumbang airfield.(30)
The Conduct of the Operation by the Commanders of the Southern Task
Force and the Dutch East Indies Unit
In parallel with the consultation with the Army, Southern Task Force Commander Vice Ad-
miral Kondō and Dutch East Indies Unit Commander Vice Admiral Takahashi discussed the
outline of the subsequent operations and on the 22d made the following decisions:(53)
1. In view of the presence of enemy surface vessels in the Surabaya area, the operation of the core
force of the 5th Cruiser Division to act in concert with the second carrier operation shall be called
off. The force shall quickly be sent to the Makassar Strait area to support the units for the eastern
Java invasion [operation].
2. At the same time, since the Timor operation is on the whole making smooth progress, the de-
stroyer forces, such as the 2d Destroyer Squadron, the 7th Destroyer Division and others, shall
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* See also Vol. 3, p. 443.
** See also Vol. 3, p. 443.
be withdrawn from the area as of 24 February in order to be advanced to the Makassar Strait
[as well] to support the invasion unit.
3. One destroyer division of the 2d Destroyer Squadron shall be made to participate in the carrier
operation from the area near Timor. This is a measure taken to supplement the insufficient de-
stroyer strength of the carrier operation unit.
4. The main unit of the Dutch East Indies Unit shall advance to the waters north of the Lombok
Strait to support the entire operation as well as to catch escaping enemy units.
5. The core force of the 1st Base Force shall carry out the second phase of the Bali [operation, i.e.]
the transport operation on 25 February, while being prepared for [enemy] units escaping from
the Java area. 
Based on these discussions, Southern Task Force Commander Vice Admiral Kondō issued
on the 22d the following order by means of Southern Task Force Telegraphic Order No. 106:(53)
1. As of 26 February, one destroyer division designated by the Dutch East Indies Unit commander
shall be removed from the unit and transferred to the main body of the Southern Task Force.
2. The above-mentioned destroyer division shall join the Southern Task Force near the Ombai Strait
on 26 February.
Further on the 23d, by means of Telegraphic Order No. 107, [the Southern Task Force com-
mander] revised one part of the order issued by means of Telegraphic Order No. 92 (note: the
outline of the operation of the Carrier Task Force issued on 9 February) in the following way: 
[Part of] the order issued by means of Southern Task Force Telegraphic Order No. 92 shall be
revised in the following way:
1. The task assigned to the core force of the 5th Cruiser Division in the second carrier operation
shall be deleted; the Dutch East Indies Unit commander shall determine the operations of the
division.
2. [The time and place of] the return of the Submarine Unit C after the second carrier operation
shall be changed; it shall return to Ambon around 10 March.
On the same day, Dutch East Indies Unit Commander Vice Admiral Takahashi also issued
the order concerning the operations of the 5th Cruiser Division, the 2d Destroyer Squadron,
the 1st Base Force and other units involved in the Java invasion operation by means of Third
Fleet Classified Telegram No. 459, which is in outline as follows (as previously told [pp. 322-
23, 354]):(53)
1. It seems that there are five to seven enemy cruisers and about ten destroyers in Batavia, and
one De Ruyter- and one Java-class [cruiser] and about five destroyers in Surabaya.
2. The Dutch East Indies Unit shall, with the support of the Air Unit ([of] the Southern Task Force)
and the Malaya Unit, cover the Sixteenth Army’s landings on Java, while catching and destroy-
ing enemy naval vessels.
3. Other than the following, all units shall operate in accordance with the outline stipulated in the
Dutch East Indies Unit Order Classified No. 9.
(1-3) Omitted
(4) From the evening of the 26th onwards, the 5th Cruiser Division (minus the Myōkō), the 1st
Section of the 7th Destroyer Division, the Yamakaze and the Kawakaze shall appropriately op-
erate in the rear of the 1st Escort Unit, taking charge of its support as well as catching and
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destroying enemy naval vessels. The 5th Cruiser Division commander may at his discretion
arrange the tasks of the 4th and the 2d Destroyer Squadron commanders.
(5) The operations of the main unit (the Ashigara, the Ikazuchi and the Akebono) (omitted)
On the morning of 23 February, Southern Task Force Commander Vice Admiral Kondō re-
ceived a reply telegram from the Southern Army that the latter consented to setting the land-
ing date on 28 February, and issued the following order:(53)
Southern Task Force Telegraphic Order No. 108 [at] 1300, the 23d
The Southern Task Force shall in close conjunction with the Southern Army determinedly carry
out the landing operations in eastern and western Java roughly on Day Z + 2 (note by the author:
Day Z denotes 26 February) and destroy the base and center of the Dutch East Indies, while at
the same time catching and destroying the enemy forces in the east Asian seas at a stroke. Each
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Illustration No. 41 — The Movements of the Bases of the Air Units (27 January-18 February, 1942)
unit shall operate as planned, and particularly through close cooperation and by making thor-
oughgoing and careful preparations and conducting dauntless attacks, thoroughly envelop and
destroy the enemy forces around the island of Java, thereby enhancing and accomplishing the
military gains of the southern operation in general.
The Unsatisfactory Prior Neutralization of the Enemy Air Power Both in
Eastern and Western [Java]
On 20 February, a search plane of the 22d Air Flotilla (the 3d Air Raid Unit) had spotted a
powerful unit including five cruisers and eight destroyers in the Batavia area. However, since
the unit used the Kuching [airfield] as its front base, from which the aircraft could not take
off with a full load of fuel, it was fairly difficult for the unit to implement an attack in the
Batavia area. Because of this [issue], the unit planned to advance its land-based attack planes
to Gelumbang in southern Sumatra and started transporting its base matériel. However, due
to the distance of the airfield from the coast, the transport made little progress, which hin-
dered the advance of the land-based attack planes. Whereas Army air units had launched
their air campaign to destroy the enemy air power in the Batavia area from Palembang, at-
tacks by the Navy air unit had not yet been launched, a situation that was particularly serious
in regard to attacking the [enemy] surface vessels.(135)
On 24 February, the Southern Task Force wired the following telegram to the chief of staff
of the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet and the 22d Air Flotilla commander under the name
of its chief of staff:(150)
Second Fleet Classified Telegram No. 41
The date of the landings on Java is now approaching, but the fact that we have not yet been able
to get an opportunity to destroy the enemy surface forces in the Java Sea area will greatly affect
the implementation of the landing operations. Therefore, success in the air operations in the
[coming] several days is desperately hoped for. Since the Army has offered its cooperation (cf.
81st Signal Unit Classified Telegram No. 769) and also in view of the condition of the Gelumbang
base ([see] Classified telegram, No. 822 from the Shimushu), I want you to be ready to promptly
destroy enemy aircraft as well as naval vessels in the area before the implementation of the land-
ing by accelerating as much as possible the preparation of this base conjointly with putting it to
use. The transport convoy is already under sail, and since the date of landing has already been
postponed for two days in view of the intensification of the air campaign, no further postpone-
ments of the date will be allowed. At this juncture, I want you to arrange that the attack on
enemy naval vessels in western Java area shall be carried out with the full force of the Mihoro
Air Group. The above is pursuant to the orders [received].
[Then] it became likely that the Gelumbang base would be available from 25 February, and
first of all thirty-three land-based attack planes and one transport plane of the Genzan Air
Group and six land-based attack planes of the Kanoya Air Group advanced to the base on
the 24th. On the 25th, the Genzan Air Group carried out an attack on Batavia with twenty-
seven land-based attack planes, along with thirteen Type–0 fighter planes and one land-based
reconnaissance plane that had advanced to Mentok, and reported having shot down four
Spitfires and set ablaze two small planes.(71) However, according to a reconnaissance by the
search plane, one Class-A cruiser, two Class-B cruisers and five destroyers were spotted in
the Batavia port, and also one Class-B cruiser and one gunboat were spotted in the Sunda
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Strait, sailing north.(119) On the 26th, twenty-five land-based attack planes of the Kanoya Air
Group advanced to Gelumbang from Thủ Dầu Một (French Indochina), while twenty-nine
land-based attack planes of the Genzan Air Group returned to the Kuching [airfield] instead,
after which the Kanoya Air Group mainly took charge of the air attacks in western Java.(71)
(Because the transportation of fuel and ammunition was inadequate at Gelumbang, it was
difficult for two air groups to simultaneously use the airfield.) In the meantime, the Mihoro
Air Group of the Malaya Unit dispatched five Type–96 carrier-based fighter planes to directly
guard the base from the air against enemy aircraft, while advancing ten land-based attack
planes to Kahang on the 26th, to be ready for search and attack missions in the Batavia area. 
The Air Unit also pushed forward bases toward eastern Java and gradually intensified
the air attacks. However, despite almost daily attacks, enemy surface naval vessels were still
operating in the area. The outline of the attack was as follows:(71) (The bases used for the
attack are put within parentheses.)
22d [February] Six Type–0 fighter planes attacked Malang, etc. ([from] Bali)
23d Fourteen Type–0 fighter planes attacked Malang, etc. ([from] Bali)
24th Fifty-one land-based attack planes attacked Surabaya ([from] Kendari, Bali, and
Balikpapan); Nine Type–0 fighter planes attacked Surabaya ([from] Bali)
25th Twenty-two land-based attack planes attacked Surabaya ([from] Balikpapan);
Nine Type–0 fighter planes attacked Surabaya ([from] Bali)
26th Twenty-six land-based attack planes attacked Surabaya ([from] Makassar);
Eight Type–0 fighter planes attacked Surabaya ([from] Bali)
On 26 February, Air Unit Commander V. Adm. Tsukahara Nishizō informed the Southern
Task Force and the Dutch East Indies Unit of the following general enemy movements [ob-
tained] by air reconnaissance:(53)
1. According to a reconnaissance by land-based reconnaissance planes on the morning of the 25th,
one large enemy cruiser, three light cruisers, five destroyers, some small naval vessels and thirty
or more merchantmen were spotted in the port of Surabaya, and one cruiser and more than a
dozen merchantmen in the port of Batavia.
Although the Air Unit has been attacking enemy naval vessels every day, it is difficult to de-
stroy enemy naval vessels in quick order. In view of the fact that powerful naval vessels of the
Southern Task Force have already advanced to the Sunda and the Java Seas, taking up positions
so that they could prevent the escape of the enemy and destroy them, it may be better if they
take action to further advance to neutralize enemy ports and completely contain and capture
the enemy naval vessels. 
2. The military gains of the air campaigns in eastern Java since 18 February are forty-three aircraft
shot down (of which eleven were unconfirmed), and forty-eight aircraft set ablaze. Although
the Army has also attained considerable military gains in western Java, about fifty fighter planes,
about forty bombers and about twenty flying boats of the enemy still survive, and they are start-
ing to wage guerrilla warfare. Since the 26th, Bali has been reinforced with the main body of
the 3d Air Group (about twenty Type–0 fighter planes and about ten aircraft, which had earlier
been incorporated in the 2d Air Raid Unit), and with these we intend to rapidly clear and destroy
the [remaining] enemy aircraft.
Having earlier discussed the matter with Southern Task Force Commander Vice Admiral
Kondō, Dutch East Indies Unit Commander Vice Admiral Takahashi had called off the 5th
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Cruiser Division force’s support for the carrier operation and ordered it to advance to the
Java Sea [instead]; he had also called off the forces of the 2d Destroyer Squadron’s [partici-
pation in] the Timor operation earlier than planned and hastened them to advance to the
Java Sea. In view of the movements of the enemy heavy cruiser[s] in the Surabaya area on
the evening of the 24th, he [further] had instructed them to advance as soon as possible.(53)
Meanwhile, the Myōkō, who had been damaged by an [enemy] air strike in Malalag Bay
(south of Davao) on 4 January, had completed its repairs and left Sasebo on 20 February. The
Dutch East Indies Unit commander had [also] ordered this ship to swiftly advance to Makas-
sar, having decided to incorporate her into the main unit upon her arrival, which was due
on 26 February.(72)
In the meantime, Dutch East Indies Unit Commander Vice Admiral Takahashi had left
Staring Bay on the early morning of 23 February, leading the main unit (the Ashigara, the
Ikazuchi, the Akebono and the Yamakaze (who had replaced the Kawakaze)* and arrived in
Makassar on the 25th. [Then] considering the enemy movements in the Surabaya area, he
advanced to the waters north of the Kangean Islands, leaving Makassar on the morning of
the 26th. He also ordered the Myōkō to join the main unit near the Kangean Islands, after
quickly replenishing at Makassar.(72)
Despite all possible measures taken to accelerate the air campaign also in western Java, a
reconnaissance report of the 3d Air Raid Unit on the 25th reported the continuing presence
of a powerful [enemy] unit in the Batavia area. Therefore, Southern Task Force Commander
Vice Admiral Kondō decided to add to this operational unit the 4th Carrier Division, which
was then on standby at Cap Saint Jacques (south of Saigon) after completing Operation L,
and ordered it on the morning of 27 February to advance.(134)
The Operations of the Surface Unit in the Western Java Area
The Sailing of the Convoy (See Illustrations No. 42 and No. 43)
At 1000 on 18 February, the 3d Escort Unit left Cam Ranh Bay, escorting fifty-six Army trans-
port ships (one ship had been added). It was a large unit, [consisting of] one light cruiser, ten
destroyers, three naval vessels of other types, and fifty-six transport ships, totaling as many
as seventy ships.(150) Since the Ayanami of the 19th Destroyer Division had hit an uncharted
reef at the Anambas Islands on the previous day, it was decided that the Isonami of the main
unit of the Malaya Unit should take over her tasks. The change caused the 19th Destroyer
Division commander to change ships to the Uranami, and the Isonami to separate from the
Chōkai and head for the Anambas, while the Ayanami joined the Chōkai and headed for Cap
Saint Jacques.(150)
On the evening of the 20th, the convoy reached a point about 250 nautical miles northeast
of the Anambas Islands, where one element of the 3d Escort Unit sailed ahead for the islands
for replenishment, and the unit, which had been on standby at the Anambas Islands, replaced
it and escorted the convoy. As of the 21st, the Yura, the 11th and the 12th Destroyer Divisions,
the 1st Minesweeper Division, the Kamikawa-maru, the Tsurumi and others were transferred
from the Malaya Unit to the Dutch East Indies Unit.(150) The convoy passed through the waters
between the Anambas Islands and Great Natuna Island towards midnight on that day. [Also]
on that day, 7th Cruiser Division Commander R. Adm. Kurita Takeo, who had been on
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standby at the Anambas Islands, communicated to the units involved that he would leave
the islands at 1800 on the 22d, leading the 7th Cruiser Division, along with the 19th Destroyer
Division and approach the convoy at 1200 on the 24th, and that from that time on [his unit]
would appropriately operate in the western part of the Java Sea to support the 3d Escort
Unit.(119)
Around noon on the 22d, the 3d Escort Unit reached a point about eighty nautical miles
northwest of Singkawang. The [total] strength including the forces transferred from the
Malaya Unit had become a total of eighty-three ships, consisting of two light cruisers, fifteen
destroyers, two torpedo boats, five minesweepers, three naval vessels of other types and
fifty-six transport ships. There the convoy received the [above-mentioned] order from the
Dutch East Indies commander: “The landing on Java shall be postponed until 28 February.
The units for the Batavia operation shall appropriately operate as designated by their com-
mander.”(150) Because of this order, the convoy reversed course at 1400 and [started] sailing
north on a 320º [NW] course. Due to this change in schedule, the 7th Cruiser Division post-
poned its departure from the Anambas Islands for two days until the 24th.(119) At 2040* on
that day [the 22d], one enemy PBY flying boat came flying over the Anambas anchorage.
At 1400 on the 23d, after having sailed on a reverse course for one day, the convoy re-
versed again and set a 140º [SE] course. Due to the two-day postponement, all vessels were
scheduled to refuel while under sail between that afternoon and the 24th. The refueling
started with the Natori and the Yura, and was finished on the morning of the 24th.(150) At
1650** on the 24th, the aircraft of the Kamikawa-maru patrolling against enemy submarines
about forty nautical miles off Singkawang spotted [an] enemy submarine and attacked her.
The 3d Escort Unit also dispatched the Harukaze and the Fubuki to neutralize the area while
carrying out an attack with antisubmarine depth charges, but the results were unknown. The
reconnaissance seaplanes of the Yura also supported the operation.(150) At 1800 on that day,
the 7th Cruiser Division and the 19th Destroyer Division left the Anambas Islands and sailed
south. At 0930 on the 25th, the Harukaze and the Fubuki returned to the escort unit. At 1600
on the 25th, the convoy passed the Karimata Strait without incident and entered into the Java
Sea. At 1100 while en route off Cape Jang, [the 7th Cruiser Division] was approached by an
enemy flying boat, which came probing. An observation seaplane[s] of the Kamikawa-maru
attacked [the enemy], but let it slip away due to a squall.(119) At 1800 on that day, the 7th
Cruiser Division and the 19th Destroyer Division approached the rear of the 3d Escort Unit
at a distance of about 140 nautical miles. In the meantime, air reconnaissance reported that
one Class-A cruiser, two Class-B cruisers and five destroyers were in the port of Batavia as
of 1005, and that one Class-B cruiser and one gunboat were sailing north in the Sunda Strait
as of 1130.(119)
On the morning of the 26th, the convoy reached the waters about 215 nautical miles north-
east of Batavia.(150) At that time, the 7th Cruiser Division unit was reaching a point about fifty-
five nautical miles north of the convoy.(119) No search planes spotted the enemy except for the
aircraft of the Kumano, which spotted two merchantmen and one destroyer-like ship to the
northeast of Batavia. However, one enemy flying boat came probing at 1000, as well as at
1300. In the meantime, the 7th Cruiser Division unit [further] gradually approached the con-
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voy, and around 1400, the unit and the convoy spotted each other at the 4ºN* parallel, after
which the unit shifted to the support operation, while keeping on sailing to the south of and
in parallel with the 3d Escort Unit.(119) R. Adm. Hara Kenzaburō, commander of the 5th De-
stroyer Squadron, requested 7th Cruiser Division Commander Rear Admiral Kurita to pro-
vide the following support operations.(150)
1. The actions of our unit shall be changed as follows:
From 1200 on the 26th onwards, [our unit] shall [continue] sailing westward along the 4ºS par-
allel to reach a point 4º00‘[S] 107º05‘E at 0400 on the 27th, from where the main force and the
detachment shall separate and head for their landing points as scheduled, the main force setting
a 210º [SSW] course and the detachment a 155º [SSE] course.
2. In view of the enemy movements in the Batavia and Sunda Strait areas, I would like you to see
to it that [your unit] generally operates along with our unit until the morning of the 27th, and
thereafter with one element support and assist the main force, but with the bulk [of your unit]
support and assist the detachment for Patrol.
3. Communication signals (omitted by the author)
The Appearance of a Powerful Enemy Surface Unit
At 0530 on 27 February, the 3d Escort Unit reached the separation point about 140 nautical
miles north of Batavia and separated as planned. While appropriately sailing westward about
forty nautical miles south of the 3d Escort Unit, the 7th Cruiser Division unit launched four
search planes at 0800 at one hundred nautical miles north of Batavia toward the Sunda Strait,
the port of Batavia and Patrol. At 0935**, the aircraft of the Kumano spotted one large [enemy]
cruiser, two light cruisers and two destroyers at thirty-five nautical miles 310º [NW] of
Batavia. The enemy fleet was sailing on a steady 160º [SSE] course at a speed of twenty knots;
its position was eighty-five nautical miles 220º [SW] of the current position of the 7th Cruiser
Division. 
Having received the report, 7th Cruiser Division Commander Rear Admiral Kurita made
the following initial judgment:(119)
1. In order to block our invasion unit, the enemy will operate on the waters north of the Sunda
Strait and thereafter head for Batavia. 
2. Since it is very likely that mines have been laid and [enemy] submarines etc. are in hiding in
the areas north of the Sunda Strait, the best way to proceed is not to advance to catch the enemy
outside the port of Batavia. 
3. We shall keep on operating near the convoy and if the enemy should sail northward [toward
us], then we shall destroy them.
Then at 0948, the aircraft of the Kumano reported: “The large cruiser in front is huge and we
suspect that she is a battleship. Although we checked up on her at a distance of four thousand
meters, we are not sure.” “0935: The enemy has reversed course. His new course is set at 345º
[N].”(150) *** Even after receiving these reports, 7th Cruiser Division Commander Rear Admiral
Kurita continued sailing northward on a 0º [N] course. On the other hand, the 3d Escort Unit
* Actually: the 4ºS parallel. See also Illustration No. 42.
** The original sources state: 0900.
*** Not mentioned in the source cited in note 150. Most of the following pages seem to be based on a mixture of
sources: the reports of the 5th Destroyer Division, the 7th Destroyer Division, and the Captain of the Mogami.
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Illustration No. 42 — The Movements of the Units for the Western Java Invasion [Operation], Map No. 1
(21 February – 1 March, 1942)
commander (5th Destroyer Squadron Commander Rear Admiral Hara) who [also] had re-
ceived these reports judged as follows and made up his mind [to attack]:(150)
1. The enemy has made a sortie in order to attack our invasion unit.
2. I will immediately have the transport convoy evacuate northward and, together with the 7th
Cruiser Division unit, swiftly confront this enemy with the Natori, the Yura and the bulk of the
destroyers, determined to destroy them.
In line with this decision, 3d Escort Unit Commander Hara immediately ordered the trans-
port convoy, which was heading for Area No. 1 under his direct command, to reverse course
under the command of the 5th Destroyer Division commander, while ordering the unit for
Area No. 2 to reverse course, too. Along with this, the commander also requested the Air
Unit to attack [the enemy].
At 1030, 5th Destroyer Squadron Commander Hara contacted 7th Cruiser Division Com-
mander Kurita in the following way:(150)
1. Our unit shall temporarily reverse course at 1030 at 4º25‘S 106º40‘E.
2. I have ordered the detachment for Patrol to reverse course, too.
3. I would like you to have your unit repulse the enemy reported by the aircraft of the Kumano.
4. I would like you to inform us about your position.
Note by the author: At that time, there was a distance of about thirty nautical miles between
the 7th Cruiser Division and the 5th Destroyer Squadron.
[Then] 5th Destroyer Squadron Commander Hara started sailing southward on a 200º [SSW]
course toward the enemy, leading the Natori, the 11th and the 12th Destroyer Divisions.
The 7th Cruiser Division’s Avoidance of a Decisive Battle
Whereas 5th Destroyer Squadron Commander Hara took such measures [as described
above], 7th Cruiser Division Commander Kurita, without responding [to the former], con-
tinued sailing northward, while taking the following measures.(119)
1. At 0930, he ordered the aircraft of the Kumano to conduct the scheduled search missions.
2. At 1000, he ordered the aircraft of the Mikuma and the Mogami to probe the enemy spotted by
the aircraft of the Kumano.
3. At 1024, two Type–0 reconnaissance seaplanes of the 2d Section of the 7th Cruiser Division were
launched for probing.
The 7th Cruiser Division and the 5th Destroyer Squadron on site continued cooperating with
each other in this fashion. R. Adm. Kurita Takeo, commander of the 7th Cruiser Division was
a graduate of the 38th class of the Naval Academy, whereas R. Adm. Hara Kenzaburō, com-
mander of the 5th Destroyer Squadron, was a graduate of the 37th class, but the 7th Cruiser
Division commander had been promoted earlier [and was therefore actually the senior com-
mander on site].
At 1040, 5th Destroyer Squadron Commander Hara ordered the Yura to join him. By this
order, the Yura separated from the unit for Area No. 2 at 1115 and rushed westward to join
the Natori. The unit for Area No. 2 [then] evacuated northward under the command of the
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6th Destroyer Division commander. While sailing southward, 5th Destroyer Squadron Com-
mander Hara ordered the 5th Destroyer Division to join him, while ordering the convoy to
evacuate to the Bangka Strait. Commander Hara continued sailing south, leading the Natori,
the 11th and the 12th Destroyer Divisions. However, with no response from the 7th Cruiser
Division about its position, he changed course to 120º at 1120 in order to locate it. Meanwhile,
after retrieving the search planes at 1040, 7th Cruiser Division Commander Kurita finally
started sailing south and after conveying at 1130 his current position, he communicated [his
decision] to 5th Destroyer Squadron Commander Hara: “The 2d Section of the 7th Cruiser
Division and the Shikinami shall provide support on the waters where the Natori operates,
while the rest of the unit shall do so on the waters where the Yura operates.”(150) Then at 1140,
while sending off the 2d Section (the Mikuma and the Mogami) of the 7th Cruiser Division
southeastward, he changed course to 125º [ESE], away from the enemy (which was supposed
to be on the waters southwest [of the division]), leading the 1st Section (the Uranami and the
Shikinami*) of the 19th Destroyer Division. The enemy movements reported by the probing
aircraft of the 7th Cruiser Division during these hours were as follows:(119)
The aircraft of the Mogami at 1115: The enemy force consist of one Glasgow-class and two 
Danae-class [cruisers] and two destroyers.
The aircraft of the Mogami at 1127: No battleships or aircraft carriers accompany the enemy.
The aircraft of the Mikuma at 1140: The enemy changed course to 90º [E].
The aircraft of the Mikuma at 1300: The enemy position as of 1220 is fourteen nautical miles
356º [N] of Cape Kait, [sailing] on a 95º [E] course at 
twelve knots.
The aircraft of the Mikuma at 1300: The enemy changed course to 0º [N] at eighteen knots.
The aircraft of the Mogami at 1305: The enemy reversed course; he is at nineteen nautical 
miles 290º [WNW] of Cape Krawang and set on a 0º [N]
course.
The report at 1300 of the enemy sailing northward clearly indicated that the enemy was pre-
pared to attack the Japanese forces. Based on this, 7th Cruiser Division Commander Kurita
finally made contact at 1330: “I will head for the enemy, sailing on a 230º [SW] course at six-
teen knots,” while ordering [his unit] to be ready from 1430 onwards to immediately increase
the speed to twenty-eight knots. In the course of joining the 7th Cruiser Division, 5th De-
stroyer Division Commander Hara communicated to the 7th Cruiser Division commander:
“In the light of the current movements of the enemy, I would like to defeat the enemy in front
[of us] on the waters northwest of Batavia, with the 7th Cruiser Division, the Yura, the Natori,
the 11th, the 12th and the 19th Destroyer Divisions, while postponing the date of landing for
another day.”(159) Further, he communicated to the Dutch East Indies Unit commander: “The
enemy is prepared to take the offensive against our transport convoy with one large cruiser,
two light cruisers and two destroyers. Presently, while having the transport ships temporarily
reverse course, we are gathering surface forces to defeat [the enemy] first. [Thus,] we have
no choice but to postpone the date of landing for another day. I would like your approval
for a one-day postponement.” He also communicated the matter to Sixteenth Army Com-
mander Lieutenant General Imamura, who was on one of the ships of the transport con-
voy.(150)
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* Probably the Isonami is meant. The Shikinami was part of the 2d Section.
At 1340, the 5th Destroyer Division unit and the 1st section of the 7th Cruiser Division
came within sight [of each other]. The 2d section of the 7th Cruiser Division, which at one
point had [operated] separately, also joined them. Since he had had no response whatsoever
from 7th Cruiser Division Commander Kurita to his “I would like to defeat the enemy in
front [of us with my unit] joined by yours” inquiry communicated at 1345, he resent at 1400
the telegram by signal (i.e. the telegram that he would like to postpone the date of landing
for another day to defeat the enemy in front).
Without responding to it either (and remaining on a 230º [SW] course), 7th Cruiser Divi-
sion Commander Kurita only signaled the outline of the subsequent search mission of the
7th Cruiser Division. Also, without gaining speed, he maintained his speed at sixteen knots.
Meanwhile, 5th Destroyer Squadron Commander Hara issued the following order concern-
ing the outline of the subsequent operations to the 3d Escort Unit:(150)
1. It seems that the enemy will try to block our transport ships with [a force consisting of] one
large cruiser, two light cruisers and two destroyers as the core.
2. The Natori, the Yura the 11th and the 12th Destroyer Divisions shall, along with the 7th Cruiser
Division and the 19th Destroyer Division, defeat the enemy in front on the waters northwest of
Batavia.
3. The date of landing shall be postponed for another day.
4. The transport ships shall appropriately operate as designated by the commanders of the 22d
and the 6th Destroyer Divisions, while being strictly on guard against enemy aircraft and sub-
marines, so as to enter the scheduled route at 3º53‘S 107º10‘E at 0500 on the 28th.
Meanwhile, after having received a report from the aircraft of the Mikuma [saying], “1443:
The enemy changed course to 215º [SW],” 7th Cruiser Division Commander Kurita swiftly
wired 5th Destroyer Squadron Commander Hara at 1445: “The enemy is very likely to flee
into Batavia or other [ports]. If [the enemy] should flee into Batavia, I would like to have the
2d Section of the 7th Cruiser Division directly support [the landing units in] Area No. 1 and
the 1st Section to operate appropriately blocking the waters east of Batavia.”(119) To this mes-
sage, 5th Destroyer Squadron Commander Hara replied at 1450: “Regarding the current sit-
uation that the enemy vessels have escaped into Batavia, our unit shall appropriately operate
on the waters northeast of Northwatcher* tonight, while on guard against the enemy. To-
morrow morning, as in your plan, I would like the support of the 7th Cruiser Division split
into its sections in the landings of the main force as well as of the detachment.”(119)
At 1450, the aircraft of the Mogami reported: “The enemy is about to flee into Batavia,
[sailing] at ten nautical miles 20º [NNE] of Batavia.” Also, a land-based attack plane unit of
the Kanoya Air Group reported: “1450: We finished bombing at 1437. Scored two direct hits
at the first ship, which we are sure caught fire. They are at ten nautical miles 28º [NNE] of
Batavia, basically sailing on a 206º [SSW] course. We are flying in a formation of eight air-
craft.”(119) At 1455, 7th Cruiser Division Commander Kurita urged 5th Destroyer Squadron
Commander Hara: “I suggest you proceed with the operation at this opportunity. A one-day
postponement is not convenient for us in terms of the fuel [situation] of our destroyers.”(119)
However, 5th Destroyer Squadron commander replied: “Due to the landing times, it is too
late [to resume] the landing operation today. We have arranged to postpone the landing by
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* Actually: Noordwachter, the northernmost island of the Pulau Seribu Islands. It had a lighthouse erected in
1869; nowadays known as Pulau Sabira or Pulau Jaga Utara.
one day.” After communicating at 1500 that “[he would] stop the pursuit,” 7th Cruiser Divi-
sion Commander Kurita suspended the operation to approach [the enemy], again detached
the 2d Section of the 7th Cruiser Division and the Shikinami to separately operate [in the area
of the Natori], while he himself reversed course and took a northeastward course. His position
at that time was sixty-five nautical miles north of Batavia.(150)
The 5th Destroyer Squadron also suspended the pursuit and started sailing northward to
support the transport convoy. At 1500, a telegram came from the chief of staff of the Com-
bined Fleet: “In consideration of the enemy movements in the Batavia area, it is appropriate
that the 7th Cruiser Division commander shall take a unified command of the units in the
said area.”(150) It was sent by the Combined Fleet headquarters, and showed that the head-
quarters was no longer able to put up with the exchange of telegrams between the 7th Cruiser
Division and the 5th Destroyer Squadron. At 1500, 7th Cruiser Division Commander Rear
Admiral Kurita wirelessed to the Dutch East Indies Unit as well as the Air Unit: “The enemy
consists of one large cruiser, two light cruisers and two destroyers. Although the support
unit and the bulk of the 3d Escort Unit were heading to attack the enemy en masse, he will
very likely flee back into [the port of] Batavia. Unless [the enemy] would be destroyed by a
full-scale air attack, it will be difficult to conduct the disembarkation for several days in suc-
cession. In terms of fuel, the 7th Cruiser Division cannot stay in this area for long. I would
like you to see to the matter of the air attack.”(119) Furthermore, the 7th Cruiser Division com-
mander [announced] his plan of operations for that night: “Tonight, the 1st Section of the 7th
Cruiser Division and the 1st Section of the 19th Destroyer Division shall appropriately oper-
ate [in the area] one hundred nautical miles northeast of Batavia, while the 2d Section of the
7th Cruiser Division and the Shikinami shall be on the waters northeast of Northwatcher
[Noord wachter] along with the Natori, to be ready against the appearance of the enemy.”(119)
On the evening of the 27th, the Southern Task Force and the Dutch East Indies Unit com-
manders sent the following telegraphic orders concerning the disposition of forces.(150)
1. The 7th Cruiser Division and the 4th Carrier Division (minus the 2d Section) shall be transferred
to the unit for the Batavia invasion [operation] (including the destroyers accompanying each
division).
2. The 7th Cruiser Division commander shall take operational command of the unit for the Batavia
invasion [operation].
Rear Admiral Kurita, commander of the 7th Cruiser Division, who had newly assumed the
unified command of the units on site by these orders, requested Southern Task Force Com-
mander Vice Admiral Kondō to increase the allotment of supply ships. Also, concerning the
operations on the next day the 28th, he ordered the 5th Destroyer Squadron to sweep for
mines on the waterway south of Northwatcher [Noordwachter] (where [an enemy] auxiliary
transport ship had been spotted by the aircraft of the Kumano on the 27th), and at the same
time issued an order to dispatch one of its destroyers to escort the 4th Carrier Division, which
was expected to reach the Karimata Strait on the 28th. He further ordered the Kamikawa-maru
to attack an enemy submarine, which had also been spotted on that day [the 27th] to the
south of Northwatcher [Noordwachter].(119) Furthermore, at night a reply came from the Six-
teenth Army commander, which read that he had no objection to the postponement of Day
H for another day but that he would like to execute [the operation for] Day I without post-
poning the date, unless it caused problems.(150)
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Heading for the Landing Points
On 28 February, 5th Destroyer Squadron Commander Rear Admiral Hara ordered the Yura
to return to its original unit (the 3d Destroyer Squadron), while ordering the 1st Minesweeper
Division (minus Minesweeper No. 5) to sweep for mines and the Matsukaze to return to the
Karimata Strait to escort the 4th Carrier Division.(150) The units for Areas No. 1 and No. 2
[changed course and] started sailing toward the landing points on the planned sailing routes
respectively at 0415 and 0500. In the morning, search planes of the 7th Cruiser Division spo-
radically reported having spotted a small number of destroyers, patrol boats, submarines,
merchantmen, etc. on the waters north of Batavia.(119) The aircraft of the 22d Air Flotilla re-
ported the results of a reconnaissance of the port of Batavia conducted in the morning: “1050:
Spotted fifteen large merchantmen and one large flying boat in the port of Batavia,” which
raised suspicion that the cruisers spotted on the day before might have escaped somewhere.
Around noon, the 1st Section of the 7th Cruiser Division approached about ten nautical miles
west of the unit for Patrol so that it could provide direct support for it, when at 1215, it re-
ceived a report from the Yura: “1200: Spotted one enemy cruiser and one destroyer at forty-
five nautical miles 280º [W] of Boompjes Island [Pulau Biawak], sailing on a 250º [WSW]
course at twenty knots.”(119) Since the location was about forty-eight nautical miles south of
the current position of the 1st Section of the 7th Cruiser Division, it judged that it could catch
up with the enemy outside the port of Batavia if it closed in on him now, and at 1230 headed
for the enemy, setting its course on 200º [SSW]. However, after having received at 1417 a re-
port from the aircraft of the Kumano that “one Glasgow-class and one light cruiser had stopped
at about ten nautical miles 20º [NNE] of Batavia,” the section judged that the enemy had al-
ready put in at Batavia port. It called off its southward sailing, reversed course at 1450 and
sailed northward to reach in the evening the waters about forty nautical miles north of Patrol,
the position where it was supposed to support the Patrol unit.(119)
At 1900, the units for Area No. 1 turned toward the landing points on a 210º [SW] course,
reached a point eighteen nautical miles north of St. Nicholas Point [Tanjung Pujut] at 2020,
and split into the units for Sectors A and B and those for Sector C. At 2210, 5th Destroyer
Squadron Commander Rear Admiral Hara wirelessed the 22d Air Flotilla and the [Army]
Third Air Force and requested them to pay particular concern to the guarding of the anchor-
ages at dawn on the next day. At 2245, the captain of the Mikuma sent the following report of
the reconnaissance results over Batavia conducted by the aircraft of the Mogami.(150)
The results of the reconnaissance of the Batavia area conducted at 8 p.m. on the 28th by the aircraft
of the Mogami (reconnaissance altitude: 1,500 meters)
1. One large cruiser moored at the pier, one light cruiser at anchor inside the wing dam, and further
three flying boats.
2. One gunboat and two patrol boats patrolling the mouth of the bay. 
3. One destroyer and one large transport ship sailing westward on the waterway north of Cape
Kait.
4. One submarine sailing eastward on the said waterway.
At 2300, the Harukaze, which was guiding the invasion unit for Bantam Bay, spotted one
enemy cutter, and in cooperation with the Fubuki, shelled the cutter and caused her to run
aground.(150) In the meantime at 2120, the unit for the Patrol area had come under probing
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Illustration No. 43 — The Movements of the Units for the Western Java Invasion [Operation], Map No. 2
(27 February – 1 March, 1942)
and an attack by two enemy aircraft at a point about thirty nautical miles north of Patrol, but
sustaining no damage, it continued sailing south.
The Engagements of the 1st Air Unit
On 31 January, the San’yō-maru left Balikpapan along with Patrol Boat No. 35 (with one pla-
toon of the 2d Kure Special Landing Force on board) and put in at Cam Ranh Bay on 8 Feb-
ruary. [Then] at 1700 on the 17th, the San’yō-maru left Cam Ranh Bay and arrived at the
Anambas Islands at 1700 on the 19th, where she joined the Kamikawa-maru to carry out the
direct escort of the transport convoy against enemy submarines from 21 February onwards.
There was nothing unusual on that day. On the 22d, a base was set up in Toboali (on the
southern coast of Bangka Island; [the advance to] Lepar Island was called off), to where one
Type–0 [three-seater] reconnaissance seaplane and four Type–0 observation seaplanes ad-
vanced. Although nothing unusual [was spotted] while guarding against [enemy] sub-
marines, at 2015* one enemy flying boat flew over the Anambas anchorage, but slipped away
without conducting a bomb attack. Nothing unusual was spotted on the 23d. On the 24th, at
1635, one Type–0 reconnaissance seaplane of the Kamikawa-maru spotted a surfaced subma-
rine at fifteen nautical miles southeast of the convoy and dropped a bomb. It scored a near
miss but the results were unknown, because the submarine had submerged. It further guided
two of the [convoy-]guarding destroyers to the spot to attack it with antisubmarine depth
charges [See p. 411]. In the meantime, three Type–0 observation seaplanes and two Type–0
reconnaissance seaplanes of the Kamikawa-maru had advanced to the Toboali base. That
evening, land-based attack planes of the Genzan Air Group spotted four or more enemy sub-
marines at the north point of the Karimata Strait and neutralized them. On the 25th, one
Type–0 reconnaissance seaplane and two Type–0 observation seaplanes of the Kamikawa-maru
moved [their base] from the Anambas Islands to Toboali. During the operation, one Type–0
observation seaplane spotted one enemy flying boat probing the 7th Cruiser Division at
eighty-three nautical miles 91º [E] of Cape Jang ([on] Lingga Island) and attacked it, but had
to let it slip away due to a squall (as previously told [p. 411]). Meanwhile, one Type–0 recon-
naissance seaplane of the Kamikawa-maru flew to an uninhabited island one hundred kilo-
meters northwest of Batavia, escorted by one army fighter plane, to rescue the flight crew of
an army aircraft, which had made an emergency landing there, successfully rescued them
and brought them to their army unit in Palembang. On that day, while moving to the Toboali
base, two Type–0 reconnaissance seaplanes and one Type–0 observation seaplane of the
San’yō-maru spotted a surfaced submarine sailing south at twenty-five nautical miles 290º
[WNW] of Pejantan Island. They scored near misses, but the results were unknown. 
On the 26th, nothing unusual was spotted other than four enemy flying boats, which a
Type–0 reconnaissance seaplane of the Kamikawa-maru spotted at thirty nautical miles 240º
[SW] of the convoy. On the 27th, with the discovery of an enemy fleet by the aircraft of the
Kumano, it was decided that [the unit] should support [the neutralizing of the fleet] as much
as possible, besides its original tasks. Accordingly, one Type–0 reconnaissance seaplane
searched the whole area of the Sunda Strait and the waters surrounding the Thousand Islands
[Pulau Seribu], but spotted no enemy other than two enemy minesweepers at 1525, which
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were sweeping for mines [in an area] eight nautical miles 20º [NNE] of Cape Pontang while
sailing on a 270º [W] course. On the 28th, in addition to the scheduled direct escort [of the
convoy] against enemy submarines, one Type–0 reconnaissance seaplane carried out a search
and attack mission against enemy submarines on the waters south of Northwatcher [Noord -
wachter] Island, only to spot one destroyer and one gunboat at about twenty nautical miles
northwest of Batavia. Meanwhile, the advance base personnel for the bases for the next op-
erations ([at] Bantam Bay and the coast of Patrol) and Patrol Boat No. 35 left Toboali. 
The Operations of the 3d Air Raid Unit Fell Short of Expectations 
It was decided that the bulk of the Air Unit of the Malaya Unit ([consisting of] the 22d Air
Flotilla as the core) should come under the command of the Air Unit of the Southern Task
Force to take part in the Java operation as the 3d Air Raid Unit on 19 February ([the transfer
was] advanced by two days from the 21st in view of the enemy movements). 
On 19 February, the Genzan Air Group conducted a search mission over the Java Sea from
Kuching with four land-based attack planes, but spotted no enemy.(71) One land-based recon-
naissance plane of the Yamada Unit conducted a reconnaissance over Batavia and spotted
one Class-A cruiser, three light cruisers and forty merchantmen [p. 403].(129) On that day, a
survey of the Mentok base was conducted, and it was reported that [a runway with] a length
of 1,000 meters and a width of 200 meters was completed and that the felling of the rubber
tree forest on the extension of the runway would be completed on the 21st.(122) On the 20th,
no campaign was conducted due to the preparations for the advance of the bases. On the
21st, the Genzan Air Group conducted a search mission over the western part of the Java Sea
from Kuching with four land-based attack planes, but only encountered one PBY flying boat
(which fled).(71) [On that day,] one land-based attack plane of the Kanoya Air Group headed
for Palembang from Thủ Dầu Một to conduct a survey of the base,(135) while the Yamada Unit
engaged in preparations for the advance to Mentok. On the 22d, four land-based attack
planes of the Genzan Air Group [again] conducted a search mission over the Java Sea from
Kuching only to spot no enemy, while one transport plane of the air group headed for Palem-
bang from Kuching to conduct a survey of the Gelumbang base. On that day, due to bad
weather, the Type–0 fighter planes’ advance to Mentok was called off.(71) 
On the 23d, four land-based attack planes of the Genzan Air Group [again] searched for
the enemy on the western part of the Java Sea, but only spotted several merchantmen, which
had either sunk or run aground. On that day, fifteen Type–0 fighter planes and three land-
based reconnaissance planes of the Yamada Unit advanced from Kuching to Mentok with
the support of eight land-based attack planes and one transport plane of the Genzan Air
Group.(129) [En route,] the land-based attack planes of the group spotted enemy submarine[s]
at twenty-five nautical miles 180º [S] of Pejantan Island, which led to a dispatch of two other
land-based attack planes to attack them, but the latter were unable to spot them. [That day,]
the land-based attack plane of the Kanoya Air Group that had been dispatched to conduct a
survey on the base, returned to Thủ Dầu Một, and it was decided that first of all six land-
based attack planes of the group should be advanced to Gelumbang on the 24th and then
twenty-five planes on the 26th.(135)
On the 24th, thirty land-based attack planes of the Genzan Air Group advanced to Gelum-
bang from Kuching to be ready for an attack on Batavia on the 25th. On that day, the Type–
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0 fighter plane units [that had moved to] Mentok spotted two Dornier-type flying boats and
reported having shot down one of them. [In the meantime,] while advancing to Gelumbang,
the Genzan Air Group spotted four enemy submarines on the waters to the south of Pejantan
Island and neutralized them [p. 420]. [On that day] a land-based reconnaissance plane of the
Yamada Unit reported on the enemy movements around Batavia as of 1200 as follows:(135)
1. Inside the port: one large cruiser, ten merchantmen and eight large flying boats
2. Cililitan: eight large and seven small aircraft
3. Kemayoran: three large and two small aircraft
On the 25th, at 1000, twenty-seven land-based attack planes of the Genzan Air Group took
off from the Gelumbang base, and in cooperation with thirteen Type–0 fighter planes and
one land-based reconnaissance plane of the Yamada Unit, headed for an attack on enemy
vessels at anchor at Batavia. Between 1200 and 1230, they bombed a British heavy cruiser
(with fifty-two 250-kg [bombs]), scored a direct hit at her stern and reported having destroyed
the cruiser.(71) Although the unit was supposed to return to the Kuching base, it [had to] return
to the Gelumbang base due to bad weather. The enemy antiaircraft fire was extremely fierce,
and inflicted damage to eleven aircraft, which were marked by bullets, and left two crew
members slightly injured. The thirteen Type–0 fighter planes that accompanied the unit en-
gaged in the air over Batavia with eight Spitfires coming to intercept them and reported hav-
ing shot down four (one of which unconfirmed). After that, they reported having strafed the
Cililitan airfield, destroyed two small planes, which were set ablaze, while one element re-
ported having strafed the oil tanks at the port and set ablaze three of them. After this en-
gagement, one land-based reconnaissance plane and one Type–0 fighter plane did not
return.(135)
On the 26th, the land-based attack planes of the Genzan Air Group returned to Kuching,
and replacing them, twenty-five land-based attack planes of the Kanoya Air Group advanced
to the Gelumbang base.(135) Since the Gelumbang [base] was situated far from the coast, it
was difficult to transport fuel and ammunition. On top of that, with no facilities for sleeping,
etc., the crew had to go so far as to sleep under mosquito nets hung over the wings. Although
large, the airfield was not in a condition to accommodate two air groups for continuous op-
erations. 
At 0900 on the 27th, on learning that the reconnaissance seaplane of the Kumano had spot-
ted an enemy fleet, [the unit] tried to conduct an attack on the enemy. However, the Genzan
Air Group in Kuching was not able to take off due to bad weather in the area of the base,(71)
while the Kanoya Air Group in Gelumbang launched only eight of its land-based attack
planes with 60-kg land bombs due to the delay in [the transport of] fuel and ammunition. At
1430, they spotted the enemy fleet at fifteen nautical miles 28º [NNE] of Batavia, carried out
an attack, scored two or more direct hits on the vessel in front (a heavy cruiser) causing two
fires to erupt amidships. Another land-based attack plane completed preparations for an at-
tack and headed for the enemy fleet alone. However, unable to spot it, it bombed a 2,000t-
class merchantman it had spotted (at anchor) at twenty nautical miles north of Batavia, and
inflicted considerable damage by near misses. Meanwhile, the Type–0 fighter planes of the
Yamada Unit patrolled the air above the convoy but did not spot the enemy.(135)
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The Summary Report of the Actions of the 3d Air Raid Unit on the 28th read as follows:(135)
1. The Yamada Unit 
(1) One land-based reconnaissance plane reconnoitered Batavia, spotted two flying boats and
fourteen mid-sized merchantmen in port; no other [ships including] naval vessels were spot-
ted. 
(2) Nine Type–0 fighter planes in total patrolled the air over the transport convoy but spotted
no enemy. 
2. The main body of the Kanoya Air Group
Two land-based attack planes carried out a search mission in the southern part of the Java Sea
west of 110ºE [longitude]. Although one returned due to bad weather, the other [spotted] at 1225
an 8,000t-class merchantman at sixty nautical miles 20º [NNE] of Cape of Indramayu, sailing
on a 110º [E] course at twelve knots.
3. The Genzan Air Group 
Due to bad weather at Kuching and the soft ground of the airfield, it did not take off.
Note: The Genzan air Group was supposed to advance to and operate from Gelumbang. 
The Mihoro Air Group of the Malaya Unit Failed to Provide Effective Support 
As previously told, the bulk of the Air Unit of the Malaya Unit was incorporated into the Air
Unit of the Southern Task Force and supposed to participate in the Java operation as the 3d
Air Raid Unit under the unified command of Eleventh Air Fleet Commander in Chief Vice
Admiral Tsukahara. However, the Mihoro Air Group was kept in the Malaya Unit to remain
engaged in the northern Sumatra operations. Then, by the (previously-mentioned) instruc-
tions given to the Malaya Unit on the 24th [p.408], the group was assigned to carry out an
attack on enemy vessels in the western Java area with its full force.
On the 26th, ten land-based attack planes took off from the Kuantan base at 1500, landed
in the Kahang base at 1600, where they completed refueling, and took off from the Kahang
base at 0855 on the 27th for a search and attack mission in the Batavia area. Having learned
at 1100 about the telegram from an aircraft of the Kumano that it had spotted an enemy fleet,
they headed for an attack on the enemy but unable to spot the enemy fleet due to low visi-
bility, all returned to the Kahang base at 1800.(71) On the 28th, the air unit left Kahang to return
to Kuantan, which meant that they failed to provide effective support for the air operation
to destroy the enemy air power in Java.
The Belated Advance of the 4th Carrier Division 
The 4th Carrier Division, which had returned to Cap Saint Jacques ([in] French Indochina)
on 19 February, was on standby for the subsequent operations. However, since the land-
based attack plane unit did not produce significant results in the air campaign in the western
Java area, Southern Task Force Commander Vice Admiral Kondō issued at 0850 on the 27th
the following order by means of the Second Fleet Classified Telegram No. 50.(150) Southern
Task Force Telegraphic Order No. 114: “The Malaya Unit commander shall have the 4th Car-
rier Division (minus the 2d Section) promptly advance to the Java Sea area to have it support
the operations of the Dutch East Indies Unit.” In line [with the above], Malaya Unit Com-
mander Vice Admiral Ozawa issued Malaya Unit Telegraphic Order No. 156, which read:
“1150, 27 February: The 4th Carrier Division (minus the 2d Section) shall operate as [in-
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structed] in Southern Task Force Telegraphic Order No. 114.”(134) Then at 1600 on the 27th,
Southern Task Force Commander Vice Admiral Kondō incorporated the 7th Cruiser Division
as well as the 4th Carrier Division (minus the 2d Section) into the Dutch East Indies Unit (in-
cluding the destroyers accompanying the divisions).(150) In accordance with this, Dutch East
Indies Unit Commander Vice Admiral Takahashi issued the following order by means of
Third Fleet Classified Telegram No. 519.(119)*
1. The 7th Cruiser Division and the 4th Carrier Division (minus the 2d Section) shall be transferred
to the unit for the Batavia invasion [operation].
2. The 7th Cruiser Division commander shall take operational command of the unit for the Batavia
invasion [operation].
Based on this order, the 4th Carrier Division hurriedly left Cap Saint Jacques on the afternoon
of the 27th to rush to the Java Sea but it was not in time for the engagements before the 28th. 
The Engagements of the Army Air Units 
The main force of the [Army] Third Air Force had advanced to the Palembang airfield on
both 17 and 18 February, carried out attacks on the airfields in Batavia, Kalijati, Bandung and
Buitenzorg from the 19th until the 25th, and reported having shot down or destroyed 211
enemy aircraft. The numbers of the army aircraft advanced at that time was as follows.(117)
By 16 February: 20 Type–97 fighter planes 
By 17 February: 20 Type–97 fighter planes, 7 Type–1 fighter planes and 2 command 
reconnaissance planes 
18 February: Almost the full force of the Type–1 fighter planes 
On 17 February, the [Army] 12th Air Division advanced the 11th Air Group to Palembang to
assign the latter to [guard] the oil refineries against enemy aircraft and cover the anchorage
of the Sixteenth Army. [Then] on the 22d, after the capture of the Tanjungkarang airfield, [the
division] advanced one element to the airfield as the advance unit, which was followed by
the advance of the main force on the 24th. The group reported military gains of having shot
down or destroyed 132 [enemy] aircraft by the 25th, and from the 27th onwards, took charge
of the cover of the convoy under sail and the guarding of the anchorage against enemy air-
craft.
The Sailing of the Convoy for the Eastern Java Invasion [Operation]
(See Illustrations No. 44 and No. 45) 
At 0800 on 19 February, the 1st Escort Unit left Jolo, escorting thirty-eight Army transport
ships. The [escort] strength at that time consisted of the Naka, the 24th Destroyer Division
(one destroyer), the 2d Destroyer Division (four destroyers), the 9th Destroyer Division (three
destroyers), the 30th Minesweeper Division (two minesweepers), the 11th Minesweeper Di-
vision (two minesweepers), Minesweeper No. 20, the 21st Subchaser Division (five submarine
chasers), the Wakataka, the Hayatomo, and the Ebisu-maru, that is, one light cruiser, eight de-
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stroyers, five minesweepers, five submarine chasers, and three vessels of other types, totaling
twenty-two naval vessels, which, including the thirty-eight transport ships, made up a large
unit of a total of sixty ships. At 1930, Submarine Chaser No. 16 in the front line detected
enemy submarine[s], attacked [them] with depth charges and searched for the enemy until
2100. However, nothing in particular was detected, so the results remained unknown.(56) On
that day, the Carrier Task Force and the Air Unit carried out an air strike on Port Darwin,
while the unit to capture Bali left Makassar (as previously told [p. 337; pp. 311-12]).
On 20 February, the 1st Escort Unit sailed southward on the Celebes Sea roughly on a 200º
[S] course and in the evening approached a point about seventy nautical miles from the north
entrance of the Makassar Strait. On that day, while the sea engagement off Bali occurred be-
fore dawn, [the operations] to capture Kupang and Dili were launched. The main unit [of
the Dutch East Indies Unit] (the Ashigara, the Kawakaze and the Yamakaze) rushed toward Bali
to support the unit to capture Bali, leaving Balikpapan around 0300 (as previously told [p.




1Bg (c x 1, d x 5)
Main Unit (c x 2, d x 2)
2Sd Unit (c x 1, d x 4)
5S Unit (c x 2, d x 4)

















































































    /3F) Myōkō,







Illustration No. 44 — The Operations of the Eastern Java Invasion Unit and the Units Involved Before the
Sea Engagement off Surabaya (21-27 February, 1942)
373]). Meanwhile, the Myōkō, who had sustained damage by the enemy air strike in Malalag
Bay, completed a speedy repair at Sasebo, left the port at 1400 and sailed toward Makassar.(72)
At 1100 on 21 February, the 1st Escort Unit crossed the equator and at 1930 turned to head
for an area off Balikpapan on a 250º [WSW] course. From that day onwards, a direct escort
by the fighter planes of the 2d Air Raid Unit was provided. In the meantime at 1000, the
Mizuho, who had been in the middle of the Kupang operation, was ordered to return from
the 2d Escort Unit to her original unit and without a break participate in the eastern Java op-
eration (as previously told [p. 373]).(54)
On the morning of the 22 February, the 1st Escort Unit arrived off Balikpapan. At 0800,
the Ehime-maru and the Liverpool-maru with the Sakaguchi Detachment on board, left Balik-
papan, escorted by Submarine Chaser No. 4, the Aotaka of the 1st Base Force, and the 2d Gun-
boat Division, and joined the 1st Escort Unit at a point north of Aru Bank at 1200. Around
1345, when [the unit] had passed through the narrow waterways of Aru Bank, an order of
Dutch East Indies Commander Vice Admiral Takahashi came in: “The landing dates shall be
postponed until 28 February. [The unit] shall stay on standby near Balikpapan.” [The unit]
reversed course at 1400, and around 2200 dropped anchor off the mouth of the river at Sa-
punang about thirteen nautical miles southwest of Balikpapan to temporarily ride at anchor
[there].(54) On that day at 1600, the eastern support unit (the 5th Cruiser division, the Ikazuchi
and the Akebono) returned from the Timor operation to Staring Bay, where the 5th Cruiser
Division’s task of supporting the second carrier operation was changed to supporting the
1st Escort Unit by advancing into the Java Sea (as previously told [pp. 354-55]). Meanwhile,
Dutch East Indies Unit Commander Vice Admiral Takahashi issued an order that the 2d Es-
cort Unit, then engaged in the Timor Operation, should be disbanded as of 24 February, and
that the main force of the 2d Destroyer Squadron and the 1st Section of the 7th Destroyer Di-
vision, too, should swiftly advance to the Java Sea after replenishing at Makassar (as previ-
ously told [pp. 354-55]). 
On 24 February, the 1st Escort Unit left its temporary anchorage south of Balikpapan. At
1600, one enemy flying boat approached [the unit] to probe from the south from a long dis-
tance, but friendly fighter planes and observation plane[s] shot it down.(56) On that day, at
0830, the 1st Section of the 7th Destroyer Division left Dili for Makassar and the 2d Destroyer
Squadron (the Jintsū and the 16th Destroyer Division) left Kupang at 1200 also for Makas-
sar,(54) while the 5th Cruiser Division (the Nachi and the Haguro) and the Yamakaze and the
Kawakaze left Staring Bay at 1200 to advance to the Java Sea.(75) At 2300, the 1st Escort Unit
temporarily rode at anchor at thirty nautical miles off Kotabaru on Laut Island to adjust the
sailing schedule. In the meantime, the main unit of the Dutch East Indies Unit appropriately
operated in the area northeast of the Kangean Islands to support the second Bali [transport]
operation.
On 25 February, the Sasako-maru (which had left Makassar on the 24th) under the escort
of the Tomozuru arrived in Banjarmasin at 0900, where the embarkation of the Yamamoto
Regiment of the Sakaguchi Detachment was started. In the meantime, at 0730 the 1st Escort
Unit left the temporary anchorage off Kotabaru, began to sail southward and entered the
Java Sea in the middle of the night.(56) The 5th Cruiser Division (minus the Myōkō), the Ya-
makaze and the Kawakaze sailed westward on the waters south of Makassar, rushing around
noon towards the waters south of Banjarmasin, where they were supposed to join the 1st Es-
cort Unit.(78) Also, at 1900, the 2d Destroyer Squadron (the Jintsū and the 16th Destroyer Di-
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vision) left Makassar to follow in the wake of the 1st Escort Unit.(54) On that day, 1st Base
Force Commander R. Adm. Kubo Kyūji arrived in Bali at 0800 and started the disembarkation
of the unit of the second phase of the transport [operation], while the Dutch East Indies Unit
commander called off the support for the Bali operation and returned to Makassar in the
evening. 
At sunrise on 26th February, the 1st Escort Unit reached a point forty nautical miles south
of Cape Selatan (south of Banjarmasin) and continued sailing westward. Around noon, the
Sasako-maru and the Tomozuru, who had sailed from Banjarmasin, joined them and by sunset
they reached a point 150 nautical miles north of Surabaya.(56) Around 0630, the 5th Cruiser
Division unit caught up with the 1st Escort Unit and shifted to the support operation by sail-
ing westward ahead of the 1st Escort Unit on its starboard bow.(78) By the evening, the 2d De-
stroyer Squadron unit also joined the 1st Escort Unit and shifted to the support operation by
taking a position on its port side quarter.(54) In the meantime between 1245 and 1330, the 1st
Escort Unit and the 2d Destroyer Squadron unit were probed by one enemy flying boat and
later at 2005 bombed by two enemy four-engine heavy bombers, but they sustained no dam-
age.(56) At 1500, 1st Escort Unit Commander R. Adm. Nishimura Shōji contacted 5th Cruiser
Division Commander R. Adm. Takagi Takeo: “I suspect that the transport ships were spotted
by the enemy. To be prepared against an appearance of enemy naval vessels tonight, I would
like [you] to search for the enemy on the waters north of Surabaya before sunset with the
aircraft of the 5th Cruiser Division. If [enemy] naval vessels should appear, I plan to have
the aircraft of the Naka probe them at night and destroy the enemy with the full force of our
unit.”(56) Accepting this proposal, 5th Cruiser Division Commander Rear Admiral Takagi
searched for the enemy in the area between Bawean Island and Surabaya, but only spotted
three [enemy] patrol boats to the north of Surabaya.(78) On the other hand, the reconnaissance
over Surabaya by aircraft of the 2d Air Raid Unit still reported that several powerful enemy
naval vessels including cruisers were at anchor [there]. At 2150, 2d Air Raid Unit Commander
R. Adm. Takenaka Ryōzō sent the following assessment about the enemy movements:
1. Outside the port: one heavy cruiser, two light cruisers, several destroyers and torpedo boats at
anchor.
2. North entrance of Surabaya port: two destroyer-like vessels sailing eastward.
At 2330, the 1st Escort Unit commander requested the 5th Cruiser Division commander: “It
is required to guard in particular against the enemy, who might come for an attack from the
Surabaya area when the transport ships enter into the anchorage. We have figured out our
countermeasures, however, if possible, I would like you to look out for [the enemy] by posi-
tioning appropriate naval vessels near the north entrance of Surabaya.” 
The Operations of the 2d Air Unit
On 19 February, the convoy left Jolo. The Chitose, which had been guarding the sailing route
ahead of the convoy while providing guard in the air against [enemy] aircraft, spotted noth-
ing unusual.(68, 79) At 1915 on that day, the Chitose left Jolo for Dondo Bay (on the north coast
of Celebes). Patrol Boat No. 34 left Tarakan for Dondo Bay around 1300, while Patrol Boat
No. 38 left Jolo around 0900 [also] for Dondo Bay. At 0830 on the 20th, the Chitose put in at
Dondo Bay and provided the whole day [the convoy] with a guard on the sailing route ahead
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as well as a guard in the air [against enemy aircraft], but nothing unusual was spotted. Patrol
Boats No. 34 and No. 38 had respectively put in at Dondo Bay around 0600 and around 0800.
On the 21st, the Chitose and Patrol Boat No. 38 put in at Tambu Bay (on the west coast of
Celebes) after having left Dondo Bay and provided a guard in the air against enemy aircraft
and submarines in the same way as the previous day. On the morning of the 22d, the Chitose,
coming from the Gulf of Tambu, entered the port of Balikpapan and stayed at anchor there.
On that day, a guard against [enemy] aircraft and submarines was again provided in the
same way as the previous day. On the 23d, while remaining at anchor in Balikpapan, the Chi-
tose continued providing the convoy with a guard against [enemy] aircraft and submarines
from the air. On the 24th, while providing the convoy with a guard in the air against [enemy]
aircraft and submarines in the same way as the previous day, the Chitose left Balikpapan for
Laut Island. On that day, one enemy flying boat came probing [the convoy], but the fighter
planes of the Tainan Air Group shot it down [p. 426].(68) On the 25th, the Chitose dropped an-
chor near Kotabaru on Laut Island, and on the 26th near Cape Selatan to provide the convoy
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Illustration No. 45 — The Outline of the Movements of the 2d Air Unit
with a guard in the air against [enemy] aircraft and submarines. The Mizuho joined her [off]
Cape Selatan, and provided a guard in the air against [enemy] aircraft and submarines along
with her. In the meantime, the aircraft unit of the Sanuki-maru provided the convoy with a
guard in the air against [enemy] aircraft and submarines from Baya ([in] central Celebes).
The Sanuki-maru’s aircraft unit is presumed to have operated along with the Chitose after that,
but its operations are not clear.
The 2d Air Raid Unit Largely Neutralized Eastern Java
The major operations of the 2d Air Raid Unit from 19 until 26 February were as follows:(71)
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Date Unit Forces Outline of Operations Reported Military Gainsand Losses
19th
[Feb]
Takao Air Gp 18 land-based attackplanes
Attacked the urban area of
Bawean Island
Tainan Air Gp
6 Type–0 fighter planes Patrolled in the air over theBali anchorage
Raided by a total of 7 B–
17s and 3 B–24s; could not
shoot them down
23 Type–0 fighter planes Attacked Surabaya; engagedwith 30 P–40s in the air







Attacked enemy naval ves-
sels in Madura Bay Scored no hits
13 land-based attack
planes
Attacked enemy naval ves-
sels in the Lombok Strait
No enemy naval vessels
spotted; bombed the city
of Banyuwangi [instead]
Tainan Air Gp
13 Type–0 fighter planes Attacked Surabaya No enemy spotted
9 Type–0 fighter planes Attacked the airfield[s] nearMalang
Set fire to 4 B–17s and de-
stroyed 1 B–17 and 1 twin-
engine plane
3d Air Gp 4 Type–0 fighter planes Patrolled over the Bali an-chorage
Raided by 3 light bombers
and 20 fighter planes; shot
down 6 fighter planes
21st
Takao Air Gp 21 land-based attackplanes
Attacked naval vessels at an-
chor in Surabaya port
Destroyed 1 cruiser and 1
merchantman
Tainan Air Gp 7 Type–0 fighter planes Attacked the airfields inMaospati and Malang
Shot down 1 P–40; 1 land-
based attack plane badly
damaged during an emer-
gency landing; destroyed 3
small planes
3d Air Gp 6 Type–0 fighter planes
Provided cover for the land-
based attack plane unit at-
tacking Surabaya; engaged
with 10 P–40s
Shot down 3 P–40s, set fire
to 1 B–17 and destroyed 2
mid-sized planes and 1
small plane
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22d
Tainan Air Gp
12 Type–0 fighter planes Provided direct escort in theair over the convoy Spotted no enemy
6 Type–0 fighter planes Attacked Yogyakarta and Se-marang
Set fire to 1 B–24 and 2
twin-engine planes and
destroyed 9 planes of other
types
4 Type–0 fighter planes Attacked the Pasirian airfield
Set fire to 1 B–17 and de-
stroyed 5 B–17s and 2
twin-engine planes
6 Type–0 fighter planes Attacked [the airfields in]Pasirian and Malang
Set fire to 4 B–17s and 1 P–
40, and destroyed 2 twin-
engine planes
3d Air Gp 3 Type–0 fighter planes Carried out a reconnaissanceattack on Yogyakarta
Set fire to 2 large and 1
mid-sized planes and de-
stroyed 1 large, 3 mid-
sized and 5 small planes
23d Tainan Air Gp
9 Type–0 fighter planes
Provided cover for the land-
based attack planes attacking
Malang; engaged with 6 P–
40s
Shot down 3 P–40s
8 Type–0 fighter planes Provided direct escort in theair over the convoy Spotted no enemy
24th
Takao Air Gp
9 land-based attack planes Attacked Malang Destroyed 2 twin-engineplanes
9 land-based attack planes Attacked naval vessels inSurabaya Sank 1 merchantman
15 land-based attack
planes Ditto
Destroyed 2 cruisers and 1
merchantman
Tainan Air Gp 10 Type-0 fighter planes Provided direct escort in theair over the convoy Shot down 1 flying boat
25th
Takao Air Gp 22 land-based attackplanes
Attacked naval vessels at an-
chor in Surabaya [port]
Bombed cruiser[s]; scored
no hits; 4 [Japanese planes]
marked by bullets
Tainan Air Gp
9 Type–0 fighter planes
Provided cover for the land-
based attack plane unit at-
tacking Surabaya; engaged
with 13 P–40s
Shot down 8 P–40s (4 of
which unconfirmed)
10 Type–0 fighter planes Provided direct escort in theair over the convoy Spotted no enemy
During this period, the 1st Air Raid Unit supported the Timor operation, while at the same
time carrying out the attack on Port Darwin as well as the attack on the neighborhood of
Surabaya.
3. The Sea Engagement off Surabaya
(See Attached Illustrations No. 5 and No. 6)
The Appearance of a Powerful Enemy Surface Unit (27 February)
Around sunrise on 27 February, the 1st Escort Unit reached [a point] about fifty nautical miles
northwest of Bawean Island and at 0700 turned to head for Kragan on a 190º [S] course. Both
the 5th Cruiser Division unit (the 5th Cruiser Division, the 1st Section of the 7th Destroyer
Division and two destroyers of the 24th Destroyer Division) and the 2d Destroyer Squadron
(the Jintsū and the 16th Destroyer Division) were sailing westward, supporting the 1st Escort
Unit from a position about fifty nautical miles to the northeast of the latter. At 0900, 5th
Cruiser Division Commander Rear Admiral Takagi issued the following order concerning
the deployment of the units on site around the time of the [convoy’s] entering into the an-
chorage.(56)
Unless enemy movements significantly change, [the units on site] shall be deployed to the fol-
lowing [areas] around the time of the [convoy’s] entry into the anchorage tonight:
1. The area north of Surabaya: 2d Destroyer Squadron (minus the 15th, the 8th and the 18th De-
stroyer Divisions)
2. The area between the Karimunjawa Islands and Jati Point: the 1st Section of the 7th Destroyer
Division
3. The 5th Cruiser Division, the Yamakaze, and the Kawakaze shall, depending on the situation at
Kragan, appropriately operate within a range of ninety nautical miles [from Kragan] between
the Karimunjawa Islands and Bawean Island.
From around 1100, the 2d Destroyer Squadron changed course southeastward to take a po-
sition to cover the northwest of the 1st Escort Unit, while at 1200 the 5th Cruiser division
steered southward and followed the 1st Escort Unit. Although the 2d Destroyer Squadron
was bombed around 1150 by two enemy heavy bombers, no damage was sustained. About
then, a telegram came in from [an] aircraft of the 2d Air Raid Unit, which read: “1150: Five
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26th
Tainan Air Gp 12 Type–0 fighter planes Provided direct escort in theair over the convoy Spotted no enemy
Takao Air Gp
5 land-based attack planes Searched for the enemy in theIndian Ocean
Spotted 1 aircraft carrier
and 1 submarine
4 land-based attack planes Searched for the enemy in theSunda and Java Seas
Spotted 3 light cruisers, 3
destroyers and 2 torpedo
boats (which later put in at
Surabaya port)
enemy cruisers and six destroyers [are spotted] at sixty-three nautical miles 310º [NW] of
Surabaya, steering 80º [E] at twelve knots.”(56) The location was about sixty nautical miles to
the south of the convoy and 120 nautical miles from the 5th Cruiser Division. Having received
this report, 5th Cruiser Division Commander Rear Admiral Takagi headed for the enemy
from 1230 onwards, steering a 150º [SE] course and increasing his speed. While launching
[an] aircraft of the Nachi at 1307 to probe the enemy, he issued at 1320 the following order to
the 4th Destroyer Squadron (the 1st Escort Unit) and the 2d Destroyer Squadron.(56)
1. Five enemy cruisers and six destroyers were reportedly spotted at sixty-three nautical miles
310º [NW] of Surabaya steering 80º [E] at a speed of eighteen knots.
2. The 5th Cruiser Division shall immediately head for the enemy. The location [of the division]
as of 1300 is 165 nautical miles 328º [NW] of Surabaya, sailing at a speed of twenty-four knots.
3. The 2d Destroyer Squadron shall join [the division] on the spot. At 1315, one aircraft has been
launched for probing.
In the meantime, at 1245, 1st Escort Unit Commander Rear Admiral Nishimura had ordered
the 4th Destroyer Squadron to “Complete preparations for torpedo warfare,” while launching
at 1255 an aircraft of the Naka for probing. While ordering at 1300 the captain of the Wakataka
to let the convoy change course westward and evacuate under his command, Commander
[Rear Admiral Nishimura] assembled the 4th Destroyer Squadron (the Naka, the 2d Destroyer
Division, the 1st Section of the 9th Destroyer Division — one light cruiser and six destroyers),
changed course southeastward from around 1310 onwards and headed for the enemy.(56)
From 1315 onwards, the 2d Destroyer Squadron (one cruiser and four destroyers) [also]
headed for the enemy, sailing on a 150º [SE] course at twenty-one knots, while expecting to
be joined by the 5th Cruiser Division.(54)
The reports delivered thereafter from the aircraft of the 2d Air Raid Unit were as follows:(54)
1225: [The enemy consisting of] three destroyers, three cruisers, two cruisers and three destroy-
ers, are [sailing] in three columns. Two torpedo boat-like vessels are sailing along at both
sides [of the fleet]. [They are] sailing on a 120º [ESE] course at eighteen knots.
1245: The enemy sails on a zigzag course, all turning their bows at certain intervals, but he cur-
rently advances roughly on a 90º [E] course.
The aircraft of the Nachi also spotted the enemy and reported as follows:(54)
1405: The enemy consists of two Class-A cruisers, three light cruisers and nine destroyers and
is at forty-five nautical miles 194º [SSW] from the reference point, steering 180º [S] at twenty-
four knots.
1425: The enemy seems to be heading for Surabaya.
1455: The enemy is putting in at Surabaya.
At that moment, Rear Admiral Takagi, commander of the 5th Cruiser Division formed the
following judgment:
It is not possible to firmly judge whether the enemy movements are an offensive against our
transport convoy or an action to avoid our daytime air raid over the port of Surabaya.
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1. If the enemy flees into [the port of] Surabaya, it is possible to execute the landing tonight as
scheduled by watching and staying on guard at the north entrance of Surabaya.
2. If the enemy sails northward, it is likely that we can catch up with him by the evening and we
will need to destroy him in a night engagement.
According to this judgment, 5th Cruiser Division Commander Takagi issued the following
order:(54)
1. The enemy cruiser unit seems to head for Surabaya.
2. The 5th Cruiser Division shall take a position to the east of the transport ships and appropriately
slow down.
3. The 2d Destroyer Squadron shall operate so as to take its assigned position for tonight.
When he received this order issued at 1510, the 1st Escort Unit commander had [at 1425*] al-
ready given an order to the transport convoy, “Change course at 1500 to head for the planned
landing point,”(56) while he himself reversed course at 1430, and returned to his position [of
escorting] the transport convoy. [Meanwhile] the 2d Destroyer Squadron continued sailing
southeastward to head for the waters north of Surabaya, its scheduled deployment point
that night. From 1500 onwards, the transport convoy one by one changed course southward
and headed again for Kragan. However, reports came in one after another that the enemy
fleet, which at one point had shown signs of putting in at Surabaya, had again started sailing
northward. 
[From]
The aircraft of the Nachi: 1523: The enemy shows no signs of putting in [at Surabaya]. The enemy
steers a 60º [ENE] course at eighteen knots.
The aircraft of the Nachi: 1615: The enemy reversed course, steering 20º [NNE] at eighteen knots.
The aircraft of the Nachi: 1620: The enemy sails on a 0º [N] course at eighteen knots.
The aircraft of the Nachi: 1648: The enemy sails on a 315º [NW] course at twenty-two knots.
On receiving these reports, 5th Cruiser Division Commander Takagi immediately increased
his speed, and issued an order to the 2d and the 4th Destroyer Squadrons: “1635: I will steer
220º [SW] at twenty-one knots. We shall combine, while enticing the enemy.”(56) R. Adm.
Tanaka, commander of the 2d Destroyer Squadron had already accelerated his speed to
twenty-eight knots at the first report of the Nachi.
Receiving the reports of the enemy’s course reversal a little late, 4th Destroyer Squadron
Commander Nishimura had at 1600 according to schedule already shifted to the operation
of having the convoy enter into the Kragan roadstead. However, learning before long that
the enemy had reversed course, he headed for the enemy, leading the 4th Destroyer Squadron
unit (the Naka, the 1st Section of the 9th Destroyer Division and the 2d Destroyer Division),
while assigning the 24th Destroyer Division commander to command the convoy. Thus, by
around 1650, all [escort] units (the 5th Cruiser Division and the 2d and the 4th Destroyer
Squadrons) were heading for the enemy more or less in parallel. The 2d Destroyer Squadron,
which sailed ahead, reported: “1659: We see masts that appear to be the enemy’s. The direc-
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* See Action Reports of the 2d and 4th Destroyer Divisions (JACAR Ref: 4th DS: C08030111200 7/59; 2d DS:
C08030093600 37/59).
tion from us is 150º [SE] and the distance is twenty-nine kilometers.”(62) (At that time, the
weather was fine with the time of sunset at 1950 and a [gibbous] moon of about the twelfth
lunar day that had [already] risen at 1653.)
The lineup and strength of the Japanese forces at that time was as follows:(78)
The 5th Cruiser Division unit (support unit)
The 5th Cruiser Division (the Nachi and the Haguro), the 1st Section of the 7th Destroyer Di-
vision (the Ushio and the Sazanami), the Yamakaze and the Kawakaze
The 2d Destroyer Squadron
The Jintsū and the 16th Destroyer Division (the Yukikaze, the Tokitsukaze, the Hatsukaze and
the Amatsukaze)
The 4th Destroyer Squadron unit
The Naka, the 2d Destroyer Division (the Murasame, the Samidare, the Harukaze* and the Yū-
dachi), and the 9th Destroyer Division (the Asagumo and the Minegumo)
In total: two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers and fourteen destroyers
(151)
For reference: 
The total numbers of guns and torpedoes [of the vessels that participated in the engagement]: 
20-cm guns: 20 (the Myōkō*** and the Haguro)
14-cm guns: 14 (the Jintsū and the Naka)
12.7-cm guns: 78 (the Ushio, the Sazanami, the Yamakaze, the Kawakaze, and the 16th, the 2d and the 9th De-
stroyer Divisions)
12-cm guns: 12 (the Myōkō*** and the Haguro)
8-cm guns: 4 (the Jintsū and the Naka)
61-cm torpedo tubes: 168
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* Probably a mistake for the Harusame; the Harukaze belonged to the 5th Destroyer Division.
** The number differs from that in the list on p. 735.
*** Probably the Nachi is meant. The Myōkō did not appear on the scene until after the battle, together with the
main unit of the Dutch East Indies Unit.




Myōkō-class [the Nachi] 10,000 35.5 20-cm x 10 12-cm x 6 61-cm x 16** 
Jintsū-class (the Naka) 5,195 35.25 14-cm x 7 8-cm x 2 61-cm x 8
Ushio-class (the Sazanami) 1,680 38.0 12.7-cm x 6 61-cm x 9
Yamakaze-class (the Kawakaze,
the 2d Destroyer Div) 1,685 34.0 12.7-cm x 5 61-cm x 8
Yukikaze-class (the 16th De-
stroyer Div) 2,000 35.0 12.7-cm x 6 61-cm x 8
Asagumo-class (the Minegumo) 1,961 35.0 12.7-cm x 6 61-cm x 8
The First Phase of the Daytime Engagement (from 1725 until 1850)(54, 56, 78, 62)
While steering 270º [W] to join the 5th Cruiser Division, 2d Destroyer Squadron Commander
Tanaka spotted masts at 150º [SSE], which appeared to be the enemy’s. At the same time, he
recognized the masts of the 5th Cruiser Division at 320º [NW] and approached them steering
300º [WNW]. At 1720, he took a position eight kilometers ahead of the 5th Cruiser Division
and headed for the enemy steering 180º [S], while launching the aircraft of the Jintsū at 1731.
Since the 2d Destroyer Squadron had joined him, 5th Cruiser Division Commander Takagi
incorporated the 1st Section of the 7th Destroyer Division as well as the Yamakaze and the
Kawakaze, which were [all] under his direct command, into the 2d Destroyer Squadron. These
units then moved into position as the second unit of the 2d Destroyer Squadron. At 1738, 5th
Cruiser Division Commander Takagi issued the order, “I plan to deploy southward to attack.
The enemy is at forty nautical miles 157º [SSE] of us.” He [also] launched two artillery ob-
servation planes from each ship, totaling four planes.
At 1739, on changing course southward, the 2d Destroyer Squadron spotted the masts of
enemy cruisers at a distance of twenty-eight kilometers 150º [SSE]. Gradually changing
course southwestward, the squadron began to sail on a parallel course with the enemy, while
the 5th Cruiser Division also changed course westward to sail in parallel astern of the 2d De-
stroyer Squadron. At 1745, the 2d Destroyer Squadron increased its speed to thirty knots
steering 230º [SW] and opened fire, first of all from the Jintsū, at the leading enemy destroyer,
which was closing in from 150º [SSE] as close as 16,800 meters. At 1747, the enemy destroyers
also started returning fire, which was followed at 1748 by the enemy cruisers, who also
opened fire, and their shells began to drop near the 2d Destroyer Squadron. At 1747, the 5th
Cruiser Division also opened fire at the enemy cruisers at a distance of 22,000 to 25,000 me-
ters. Since the enemy shells kept dropping all around, the 2d Destroyer Squadron, steering
280º [W], moved away from the enemy at 1750, and stopped firing. Spreading smoke screens,
the squadron evacuated on a 300º [WNW] course. 
Just then, the 4th Destroyer Squadron appeared from the north, sailing southward straight
at the enemy at a speed of thirty knots. Crossing in front of the 2d Destroyer Squadron and
closing with the enemy, it launched from 1804 till 1815 twenty-seven Type93 Torpedoes
against the enemy cruiser unit roughly at a distance of 15,000 to 12,500 meters before evacu-
ating while spreading smoke screens. At 1805, the Jintsū also launched four torpedoes from
the farther side of the 4th Destroyer Squadron. However, some torpedoes exploded before
running far, throwing up large columns of water, which led to quite confused interpretations
at the different (command) staffs; some guessed that the explosions were those of enemy
mines and others misjudged that the torpedoes had hit enemy vessels.
During this period, the 5th Cruiser Division continued firing at the enemy, sailing on a
parallel course, while maintaining a distance of roughly over 20,000 meters, but due to the
frequent evasive actions of the enemy vessels, the division was unable to get effective results
and only wasted its shells. Nevertheless, at least several shells seemed to have scored direct
hits, for some disorder became noticeable in the columns of the enemy. Although from 1800
until around 1820 the enemy shells fell short, their fire gradually became more accurate after
that. Quite frequently dye-capped shells* (note by the author: shells which would color the
water columns red, blue, etc., depending on the vessel in order to facilitate the observation
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* According to Morison, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, p. 345, the Houston used crimson dye in her shells.
of the impact results) straddled [the division]. At 1822, the 5th Cruiser Division started tor-
pedo warfare. However, only the Haguro launched eight torpedoes, whereas the Nachi was
unable to launch hers because of launcher trouble.
Around that time, while sailing on parallel courses and with the shell and torpedo warfare
continuing, the engagement moved westward. At 1834, the 24th Destroyer Division com-
mander reported: “We are coming under a bombing attack of a dozen or more enemy
bombers.” Noticing that the distance to the convoy had already been reduced to about twenty
nautical miles, 4th Destroyer Squadron Commander Nishimura immediately gave the order:
“The convoy must evacuate to the west.”
Since the enemy was superior in cruisers, 5th Cruiser Division Commander Takagi’s initial
battle plan was to appropriately entice the enemy into a daytime engagement, and [then] de-
stroy him at a stroke in a night engagement, making the most of the superior [Japanese] tor-
pedo power. However, the enemy had already come close enough to the convoy and any
closer approach could not be allowed. At 1833, although there was still one and a half hour
before sunset, [Commander Takagi] gave the order: “All ready to charge!” Around that time,
a vessel in the enemy fleet seemed to have sustained damage; spreading thick smoke screens,
[the enemy] started to cover the damaged vessel, and his formation became seriously disor-
dered. [Considering] that he must not miss this war opportunity, Commander Takagi gave
at 1837 the order: “All charge!” The [first phase of the daytime] engagement, which had
started at 1745 with the opening fire of the Jintsū, lasted about fifty minutes. Although the
damage inflicted on the enemy was not clear, at least two or three enemy vessels had pre-
sumably sustained damage. At the charge of the Japanese Navy, the enemy started to evac-
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The Cruiser Myōkō
The Cruiser Jintsū
uate southeastward in a disorderly formation. No loss was sustained on the Japanese side,
but the consumption of shells (torpedoes) was as follows:
20-cm guns (the Nachi and the Haguro): 1,271 shells
14-cm guns (the Jintsū and the Naka): 171 shells
Type93 Torpedoes (the Haguro, the 4th Destroyer Squadron and the Jintsū): 39 torpedoes
The Second Phase of the Daytime Engagement (from 1850 until 1950)(54, 56, 62, 78)
At 1839, all [Japanese] units turned left at once and proceeded to charge. Counting from the
right, the line of battle consisted of the 4th Destroyer Squadron, the 2d Destroyer Squadron
and the 5th Cruiser Division. At that moment, the formation of the enemy was in total dis-
order and started to retreat southeastward, spreading thick smoke screens. Around 1920, the
Naka, the flagship in the lead of the 4th Destroyer Squadron opened fire at the enemy cruiser
unit at a distance between 15,000 and 12,000 meters and then launched four torpedoes, while
its subunits, the 2d and the 9th Destroyer Divisions, pushed even closer to the enemy. Then,
the 2d Destroyer Squadron, which was sailing in parallel on the north side of the 4th De-
stroyer Squadron, broke into the smoke screen belt spread by the enemy, where they encoun-
tered the enemy who had reversed course to cover the damaged vessel. At 1924, the flagship
Jintsū first of all launched torpedoes at a distance of 18,000 meters, after which the 16th De-
stroyer Division and the 1st Section of the 7th Destroyer Division, the Yamakaze and the
Kawakaze, rushed in even further and, closing to 9,000 or 8,500 meters, launched torpedoes.
However, since the enemy again made a wide turn spreading smoke screens, the results of
the torpedoes were unknown. The 5th Cruiser Division sailing on the north side of the 2d
Destroyer Squadron, while firing at the enemy from a great distance of 25,000 meters, [also]
launched sixteen torpedoes from a long distance against the enemy vessels, who were re-
versing course from 1918 until 1924. After that, the division [also] reversed course. The results
of this torpedo attack were, as a matter of course, unknown.
At 1934, The 2d Destroyer Division of the 4th Destroyer Squadron, which had taken the
southernmost course, drew near the enemy cruisers as close as 10,000 to 7,500 meters to
launch torpedoes. The Asagumo and the Minegumo of the 9th Destroyer Division closed in
even closer and launched torpedoes at a range of 6,000 meters, when all of a sudden two
enemy destroyers jumped out of the smoke screen belt, which instantly led to a two-against-
two artillery duel between fellow destroyers at a close distance of 3,000 meters. The first ves-
sel quickly reversed course and fled back into the smoke screen. The Asagumo and the
Minegumo concentrated their fire on a British destroyer with the sign H–27 on her side, which
had come out next, and crippled her. However, one enemy shell hit the engine room of the
Asagumo, stopped her engine and also caused an electric power failure. Nevertheless, she
dauntlessly continued firing in cooperation with the Minegumo, and finally sank the British
vessel at 1954.
Around that time the sun set, and also because of the artillery smoke and the smoke
screens, visibility on the battle site rapidly decreased. The battle site had gradually moved
southward, and the positions of the 4th and the 2d Destroyer Squadrons drew very near to
the coast, presumably within twenty nautical miles north of Cape Awarawar, where many
huge explosions of what seemed to be controlled mines were spotted (note: they later turned
out to have been the self-destruction of Type93 Torpedoes [going off in the middle of their
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run]). Judging that it was not appropriate to come closer to waters fortified by the enemy,
5th Cruiser Division Commander Takagi decided to stop the pursuit, swiftly assemble his
forces, rearrange them, and by taking a position roughly between the convoy and the enemy,
conduct a search and patrol mission to search for the enemy and destroy him. Accordingly,
at 2005 Commander Takagi issued the order to the 2d and the 4th Destroyer Squadrons: “All
units swiftly assemble and prepare for a night engagement.”
Meanwhile, Dutch East Indies Unit Commander Vice Admiral Takahashi had communi-
cated that the main unit was hurrying to the battle site, leaving the waters north of the
Kangean Islands on that evening after having been joined by the Myōkō, who had arrived
from Sasebo. At 2025, Commander Takagi replied: “We have inflicted serious damage to one
enemy cruiser and some damage to a few destroyers, but [the status of] the other [ships] is
unknown. We would like you to swiftly join us.” Then from 2027, the 5th Cruiser Division
began to retrieve all of its aircraft (three aircraft of the Nachi and two aircraft of the Haguro),
which had been employed in the daytime engagement.
[Earlier,] at 1940, after all his units had completed launching their torpedoes, 2d Destroyer
Squadron Commander Tanaka had given the order: “Assemble.” The flagship Jintsū slowed
down to wait for the units to assemble. At 2015, the 1st Section of the 7th Destroyer Division,
and the Yamakaze and the Kawakaze joined her. However, while witnessing the artillery duel
between the 1st Section of the 9th Destroyer Division and the [two] enemy destroyers, the
16th Destroyer Division had reversed course after launching its torpedoes to support the sec-
tion, thereby delaying its action to join. The division finally joined at 2037. Having assembled,
the 2d destroyer Squadron headed northwestward to join the 5th Cruiser Division.
[As for the engagement of] the 4th Destroyer Squadron, Commander Nishimura had
rushed into the attack after issuing at 1906 to the convoy the order: “We have sunk three
enemy cruisers and are pursuing [the others]. The convoy shall head for the landing points
as scheduled.” At 1920, his flagship Naka had come under fire of the 20-cm guns of the USS
Houston, one of whose salvos straddled her so perfectly that water columns totally sur-
rounded and covered the entire ship. The 1st Section of the 9th Destroyer Division had
pushed closest to the enemy. However, when about to launch her torpedoes, the Minegumo
had to haul out of her line in order to evade the torpedoes launched by friendly vessel[s];
she lost sight of the enemy in his smoke screen and lost the opportunity to launch. Then the
artillery duel [of the section] with the [two] enemy destroyers had followed. At 2000, the
Naka had been joined by the 2d Destroyer Division, but since he was caught in a situation
where the status the 9th Destroyer Division was unclear and also the movements of the
enemy were unknown because of the smoke screens they had spread, Commander
Nishimura considered the risks to the transport convoy and at 2015 issued the order, “The
transport convoy shall reverse course. The battle site has not been cleared yet,” after which
he offered at 2030 his opinion to the 5th Cruiser Division commander: “Under such circum-
stances, it is difficult for the transport convoy to enter into the anchorage. So, I had them re-
verse course at 2015. I think we will need to clear the enemy in a night engagement.”
In the meantime, the aircraft of the Jintsū was probing the enemy and had begun reporting
the movements of the enemy vessels one after another. At 2020, 5th Cruiser Division Com-
mander Takagi issued an order concerning the outline of the subsequent operations: “We
shall conduct patrols around this area, [keeping] the enemy to the east [of us] with the 5th
Cruiser Division, the 2d Destroyer Squadron and the 4th Destroyer Squadron in that order
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from the north, and destroy him in a night engagement tonight.” [Meanwhile] at 2016, the
aircraft of the Jintsū reported that the enemy was sailing on a 310º [NW] course. Since the
enemy had reversed course and again set about to attack the Japanese forces, 4th Destroyer
Squadron Commander Nishimura [once again] ordered: “2034: The transport convoy shall
swiftly reverse course.” “2035: The enemy is heading for the transport convoy.” At 2045, the
aircraft of the Jintsū again reported: “The main force of the enemy is [sailing] on a 310º course
at twenty knots.” While dropping flares, the aircraft of the Jintsū kept on probing the enemy.
The ammunition consumed during this period [the second phase of the daytime engage-
ment] was as follows:
20-cm gun shells (the Nachi and the Haguro): 302 shells 
14-cm gun shells: 50 shells 
12.7-cm gun shells: 515 shells 
25-mm gun: 256 bullets 
Type93 torpedoes: 98 torpedoes 
The First Phase of the Night Engagement (from 2050 until 2110)(54, 56, 62, 78)
At 2027, the 5th Cruiser Division stopped on the sea to start retrieving the five aircraft that
had been employed for the daytime engagement. At 2052, when just about to complete re-
trieving the last aircraft, it spotted silhouettes of presumably enemy naval vessels approach-
ing from 150º [SE]. Since the enemy started firing star shells at 2055, the 5th Cruiser Division
evaded the enemy by all at once accelerating to twenty-eight knots and spreading smoke
screens. (The last aircraft was nearly left out [on the sea], but fortunately raised before the
vessels gained speed.) At 2107, after completing preparations for shelling, the division was
about to reverse course, when the 2d Destroyer Squadron came sailing in between the divi-
sion and the enemy. On top of this, due to the smoke screens of the enemy and his change of
course, the division lost sight of the enemy in the direction of 120º [ESE]. Having spotted the
firing of star shells at the 5th Cruiser Division, the 2d Destroyer Squadron hurried toward
the enemy, and at 2106 the Jintsū launched torpedoes from a distance of 19,000 meters while
sailing on a parallel course. However, since the enemy swung to the right and kept going,
the squadron let him escape to the east.
In the meantime, around that time, the following reports [finally] came in concerning the
situation of [the Asagumo of] the 9th Destroyer Division of the 4th Destroyer Squadron: “2020:
[the Asagumo is] sailing on one engine under the escort of the Minegumo, steered by man-
power, on a 280º [W] course at twelve knots. Now checking the damage on the body and the
crew. No leaks. Since the Asagumo is unable to sail for long, she will sail to a point near the
convoy, drop anchor and make emergency repairs. Our location is sixty-three nautical miles
215º [SSW] from the base point.” “2040: Restored the engine in working order and are able
to sail on one engine at a maximum speed of twenty-four knots. We engaged with one enemy
cruiser together with the Minegumo and sank her.” “2150: The Asagumo has dropped anchor
at 6º38’S 111º43‘E. Now conducting emergency repairs on the damaged parts.” 
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The Second Phase of the Night Engagement (from 0030 until 0100)
After the first night engagement, the aircraft of the Jintsū kept on probing the enemy, while
frequently dropping flares over him. From 2250 onwards, relieving the aircraft of the Jintsū,
the aircraft of the Naka started to probe the enemy. However, from around 2330 onwards,
communications with the aircraft of the Naka were disrupted, and the enemy’s whereabouts
were lost after he had sailed southward closer inshore. After ordering the 2d Destroyer
Squadron, “0000: Since the enemy movements are unclear, the 2d Destroyer Squadron shall
sail close to the 4th Destroyer Squadron,” 5th Cruiser Division Commander Takagi started
sailing south. However at 0033, when the 5th Cruiser Division was sailing south on an 180º
[S] course, it sighted at a distance of 15,000 meters, 152º [SE], the silhouettes of four vessels
sailing northward. At 0040 after reversing course, the division set on a 0º [N] course, increased
its speed to thirty-three knots to sail north on a parallel course with the enemy. Just before
the 5th Cruiser Division reversed course, the enemy had started firing star shells.
While sailing on a parallel course with the enemy and keeping him at a distance of 12,000-
13,500 meters, the division fought back with slow salvos (salvos from alternate guns at longer
intervals, because the division had consumed much of its ammunition during the daytime
engagement and only a little was left) and without using searchlights, measuring the distance
by eye under the moonlight. At 0053, sailing on a parallel course [with the enemy], the divi-
sion launched torpedoes (the Nachi eight and the Haguro four). Since the division was falling
away from the enemy after launching the torpedoes, it [also] stopped shelling and reduced
its speed to twenty-eight knots, when around 0106, suddenly a huge explosion with flames
soaring up to the sky occurred. Around 0110, it was followed by [another] explosion and an-
other flame shot up to the sky. It was confirmed that the torpedoes had instantly sunk one
[enemy] vessel, and set another ablaze. While immediately reporting this to the 2d and the
4th Destroyer Squadrons, 5th Cruiser Division Commander Takagi kept sailing north at a re-
duced speed, waiting for both units [to join]. However, around 0125, he rapidly lost sight of
the enemy. He changed to a 90º [E] course, launched at 0145 an aircraft of the Nachi to probe
[the enemy] and [kept on] searching for him setting on a 150º [SE] course at 0200, but could
not find him. Meanwhile, the 2d Destroyer Squadron, which was positioned to the southwest
of the 5th Cruiser Division, had immediately increased its speed to sail north when it had
spotted the enemy’s firing of star shells. After seeing the large columns of flames at 0108, the
squadron pursued the enemy on a 45º [NE] course from 0120 onwards, and further pursued
the enemy fleet, setting on a 90º [E] course at 0130.
The 4th Destroyer Squadron, positioned further southwest of the 2d Destroyer Squadron,
was not in time for this engagement. [Then] expecting the arrival of the main unit of the
Dutch East Indies Unit on the battle site in a short while, 5th Cruiser Division Commander
Takagi wired: “0210: The Ashigara and the Myōkō will soon join us. Be careful in identifying
friendly forces.” Although the aircraft of the Nachi searched for the enemy until around 0245
in the neighborhood of the battle site, no enemy was spotted within a radius of twenty nau-
tical miles with the burning enemy vessel at the center. It further searched for the enemy as
far as to the vicinity of the port of Surabaya, but did not spot him. Since the whereabouts of
the enemy remained unknown even at 0135, Commander Takagi had the 2d and the 4th De-
stroyer Squadrons take up their respective guard positions, with the order, “Guard the south-
eastern side of the convoy.” The numbers of shells ([and] torpedoes) consumed in the first
and second phases of the night engagement were as follows:
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The first phase: 
Type93 Torpedoes (the Jintsū): 4 torpedoes
The second phase:
20-cm guns (the Nachi and the Haguro): 46 shells
Type93 Torpedoes: 12 torpedoes
Cdr. Suékuni Masao, then gunnery staff officer of the 5th Cruiser Division, recalled the en-
gagements as follows:
When we encountered the enemy at 1730, I thought that the sun would set soon. So, I figured
out that we could destroy the enemy if we carried out a night engagement after the engagement
at dusk. At that time, the staff officers shared the unspoken thought that our convoy could pos-
sibly be destroyed if the 5th Cruiser Division should sustain damage in the engagement, and
that [the division] should [only] conduct an “outranging” artillery duel at a distance of 23,000
to 20,000 meters (note by the author: a situation where the enemy shells would not reach the
Japanese vessels but the Japanese shells could reach the enemy) and at an appropriate moment
launch Type93 torpedoes to finish it off.
We launched torpedoes at 1826, [ordered] “all ready for charge” at 1833, and then ordered
to charge at 1837. After supporting the charge of the destroyer squadrons for a while by sailing
on a parallel course with the enemy, the 5th Cruiser Division shifted to the pursuit of the enemy
on a south-southeast course from around 1840. Around 1850, when the torpedoes of the first
launch were supposed to have reached the enemy vessels, no explosions, which should have
been caused by hits, occurred. Commander Takagi asked his staff what to do next. In response,
Senior Staff Officer Nagasawa Kō answered that we should conduct a night engagement. When
someone of the staff asked the signal officer about the time of sunset, it was reported as 1950,
which reminded [the staff] for the first time that sunset was quite some time off. We still had
about a good hour before sunset, but with no particular course to be taken, we [just] continued
the engagement. However, from around that time, both the enemy and us [had to] sail in or out
of the smoke screens that the destroyers on both sides had spread, which naturally slowed down
the artillery duel. In this engagement, every time our vessels appeared from the smoke screens,
enemy shells came instantly flying at them. We, on the other hand, needed some measuring
time to calculate our firing data. (Later, when we reviewed the engagement at Makassar, we
suspected that the enemy must have used radar for its gunnery that time.*) 
After the charge, around 1918, we carried out the second launch of torpedoes. Then from
around 1924, the destroyer squadrons launched torpedoes. From around that time onwards, a
number of large water columns were spotted particularly on the waters near the 2d Destroyer
Squadron, which made us fear that the squadron was heading into an enemy minefield. The
fear of enemy minefields made us reverse course and sail away from the shore, and consequently
away from the enemy.
When the daytime engagements were mostly over, we ordered [the units] to report the re-
maining amounts of ammunition. In an hour and a half, overall reports came in all together,
which revealed that the remaining amounts of ammunition had gotten unexpectedly low, and
we became suddenly concerned about the remaining amounts.
In the night engagements, we conducted shelling [at the enemy] from a distance of 17,000
to 18,000 meters without using searchlights. The chief gunner had requested to turn off the
lights, because he could not see the targets when they were on.
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* Although most sources maintain that none of the Allied ships had radar, HMS Exeter had actually just been
refitted with Type278 early-warning radar and Type284 fire-control radar, https://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/HMS_Exeter_(68).
In the daytime engagement, the launching tubes of the Nachi had malfunctioned and she
could not launch her torpedoes. [The truth was that] the launching crew had forgotten that the
valve to supply compressed air to the launching tubes had already been turned fully open; by
the torpedo chief’s order to open the valve, they tried to open [it] but were unable to turn it any
further, because it had already been fully opened; consequently, it was reported that the launch-
ing tubes had malfunctioned. In actual engagements, unexpected and absurd things do happen.
However, the torpedoes that could not be launched [in the daytime engagement] because of
this [mistake] were launched in the night engagement and achieved a great success by sinking
two enemy (main force) cruisers. This instantly retrieved the honor of the torpedo chief and his
men, which had been lost in the daytime engagement. In this world you never know what may
turn out to your advantage.
After the night engagement, we [again] checked the remaining amounts of shells and tor-
pedoes; the amounts were low enough to make us extremely concerned about how to handle
this in future engagements.
Reflecting on the engagements, I realized that drills would usually come to a close after a
series of attack actions triggered by the “all charge” order were finished, and that we rarely con-
ducted post-attack training. I keenly felt that, without adequate training for the actions to be
taken after attacks, it is difficult to destroy the enemy, because people do not perform better in
actual engagements than in normal training.
The Main Unit of the Dutch East Indies Unit Came to Assist But Too Late to
Participate in the Engagement
On 27 February, around the time when the 5th Cruiser Division, the 2d and the 4th Destroyer
Squadrons encountered the enemy fleet on the waters southwest of Bawean Island, the Dutch
East Indies Unit commander had [already] advanced to the waters north of the Kangean Is-
lands, leading the Ashigara, the Myōkō, the Ikazuchi and the Akebono (having left Makassar on
26 February*). In view of the enemy movements in the Surabaya area, Dutch East Indies Unit
Commander Vice Admiral Takahashi had at 1420 an instruction sent under the name of his
chief of staff to the 1st Base Unit engaged in the Bali operation to advance the Kinu and [some]
destroyers to the area where the 5th Cruiser Division and the 2d Destroyer Squadron were
operating. In response, 1st Base Force Commander Rear Admiral Kubo replied at 1700 that
he would dispatch the Kinu and the 8th Destroyer Division (minus two destroyers).(54)
On receiving the report from 5th Cruiser Division Commander Takagi that he had en-
countered the enemy, Dutch East Indies Unit Commander Vice Admiral Takahashi decided
to immediately rush to the site and sent a telegram: “1830: Our position as of 1830 is ‘HO-
WA-RE-19’ and we expect to reach [a position] about forty nautical miles southeast of Bawean
Island at 0230.” While communicating its own position to the 5th Cruiser Division, the main
unit rushed to the battle site roughly on a 270º [W] course, and at 2330 radioed its plan of
operations as follows: “The main unit shall basically combine with the 5th Cruiser Division.
The other units shall take up appropriate positions. We shall do our utmost to destroy the
enemy in a night engagement tonight, and completely destroy the remnants of the enemy in
a subsequent daytime engagement.”
Around 0230, the main unit reached the waters south of Bawean Island. However, unable
to sail west any farther due to the situation on the battle site, the unit operated in the sur-
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* The Myōkō actually joined later. See p. 410.
rounding waters at high speed for a while, while sending a telegram to the 5th Cruiser Divi-
sion: “Report your next attack plan.” In the meantime, 4th Destroyer Squadron Commander
Nishimura offered his proposal: “0420: In terms of the remaining enemy surface strength, I
think it better to postpone the start of the landings for one day. The convoy seems to be [still]
evacuating to the north,” to which Dutch East Indies Unit Commander Takahashi responded
that he had no objections; [accordingly, the start of] the landing in eastern Java was postponed
for one day. During these hours, a reconnaissance by the aircraft of the Nachi and a search
mission conducted by the surface units made it clear that no enemy other than the blazing
damaged vessels were seen at the battle site. The main unit advanced from the area south of
Bawean Island to the area to its west, and at 0600 specified the designated meeting point for
the 5th Cruiser Division in the following [telegram]: “0600: Join [the main unit] at sixty-three
nautical miles 292º [WNW] of the reference point at 0700. The main unit is bearing 0º [N] at
sixteen knots.”
The Transport Convoy’s Entry into [the Anchorage off] Kragan
The sun rose, while the 5th Cruiser Division and the 2d Destroyer Squadron were [still] un-
able to get further information about the enemy movements. At 0730 on the 28th, [they]
joined the main unit at the designated meeting point. Fourth Destroyer Squadron Com-
mander Nishimura ordered the transport convoy “to operate so as to reach, at 1200 today on
the 28th, the point that you were designated to reach at 1200 on the 27th ([in accordance with]
Escort Unit Order Separate Illustration, No. 2),(54)” and again shifted to the formation to escort
the convoy. At 0815, the Asagumo, which had sustained damage the previous night, [also]
joined, escorted by the Minegumo. It was decided that the Asagumo should sail to Balikpapan
to repair the damage, while the 9th Destroyer Division commander changed ships to the
Natsu gumo.
Dutch East Indies Unit Commander Takahashi assigned the guarding of the areas east of
the convoy to the 2d Destroyer Squadron, the 5th Cruiser Division and the main unit in that
order from the south, and each unit broke up its columns to take up their respective positions.
Tanaka, commander of the 2d Destroyer Squadron, sent the 1st Section (the Ushio and the
Sazanami) of the 7th Destroyer Division, which had a short cruising range, to Banjarmasin
for replenishment, while returning the Yamakaze and the Kawakaze to the 5th Cruiser Division
unit at the latter’s request,(54) which changed the [distribution of] forces in the following way:
The 2d Destroyer Squadron unit: The Jintsū and the 16th Destroyer Division
The 5th Cruiser Division unit: The Nachi, the Haguro, the Yamakaze and the Kawakaze
The main unit: The Ashigara, the Myōkō, the Ikazuchi and the Akebono
The transport convoy: The Naka, the 2d Destroyer Division, the 9th Destroyer Division (minus
the Asagumo and the Yamagumo), the Shirataka,* the 21st Torpedo Boat Division 1st Section,
the 11th and the 30th Minesweeper Divisions, Patrol Boat** No. 20, the 21st Subchaser Divi-
sion, the Myōkō-maru,*** and the forty-three army transport ships
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* A mistake for the Wakataka. The Shirataka was part of the western Java escort (p. 366).
** Actually Minesweeper.
*** The Myōkō-maru was part of the western Java convoy (p. 366).
The Kinu (the flagship of the 4th Submarine Squadron) and the 8th Destroyer Division (minus
the Asashio and the Arashio), which had been dispatched by the 1st Base Force, also joined
the transport convoy around 1330. At the request of the 4th Destroyer Squadron commander,
they guarded the rear of the convoy on its eastern port quarter, while sailing south [along
with it].(62)
Right before entering into the anchorage, the minesweeping unit and the convoy came
under a persistent attack by about ten enemy dive-bombers, their near misses caused the
Tokushima-maru some leaks and made her run aground on the coast, while direct hits inflicted
a loss of about 150 casualties on the Johor-maru. She also sustained minor damage, but since
her hull and engine were still intact, she continued sailing and entered into the anchorage
for Kragan at 0235 on 1 March [along with the other ships], as scheduled. Even after their
entry into the anchorage, the enemy repeated its persistent attacks while dropping flares.
Meanwhile, three [enemy] torpedo boats raided the anchorage, of which the Harusame sank
one and destroyed the other [two]. Also after sunrise, [enemy] fighter planes strafed [the
Japanese forces], however, at 0400 the army units successfully landed the first landing unit.
Destroying the Remnants of the Enemy Fleet
At 1103 on the morning of 1 March,
while patrolling in an area about ninety
nautical miles west of Bawean Island,
the 5th Cruiser Division unit spotted at
64º [ENE] one enemy cruiser and one
destroyer (which later turned out to be
two), sailing westward. Since the 5th
Cruiser Division had used up much of
its ammunition in the engagements
since the 27th, it decided to enlist the
Ashigara and the Myōkō to attack the
enemy. The division informed all units
of its decision, while launching two ob-
servation seaplanes between 1117 and
1128. Around that time, the enemy
started to escape by changing course to
[first] northward and then eastward,
while spreading smoke screens. The 5th
Cruiser Division also changed course
eastward and began to pursue him, and
along with the main unit, which was
sailing around from the west to the
north, they took up positions to launch
a pincer attack on him from the north
and the south.
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The British Heavy Cruiser HMS Exeter About to Sink
Both units pursued the enemy from the south and the north; at 1150, the main unit first
of all opened fire from a distance of about 23,500 meters, and then the 5th Cruiser Division
followed, opening fire from around 1225 from about 16,000 to 18,000 meters away. Although
the enemy tried to escape eastward spreading smoke screens, the cruiser took a number of
direct hits from around 1240 onwards, which caused fires and reduced her speed. Around
1250, the units simultaneously conducted a concentrated torpedo attack and delivered a de-
cisive blow to the cruiser. It was the British heavy cruiser HMS Exeter. Then, the units con-
centrated their fire on the remaining two destroyers; the British destroyer sank at 1330, while
the other destroyer escaped eastward, taking advantage of a squall. Ordering the 5th Cruiser
Division unit to leave for Banjarmasin for replenishment, Dutch East Indies Unit Commander
Takahashi hotly pursued the fleeing destroyer, leading the main unit. The [enemy] destroyer
escaped as far as the southern coast of Borneo where she was bombed by aircraft of the 4th
Carrier Division and the Eleventh Air Fleet. The main unit spotted her crippled from the
[bombing] damage, and sank her at 1540. The former British destroyer was the HMS En-
counter, whereas the destroyer sunk later was the USS Pope.
The number of shells ([and] torpedoes) expended in the daytime engagement on 1 March
was as follows:
20-cm guns (the Ashigara and the Myōkō): 1,171 shells
ditto (the Nachi and the Haguro): 288 shells
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The HMS Exeter at the Moment of Being Hit by Torpedoes
12.7-cm guns (the Ashigara): 14 shells
ditto (the Ikazuchi): 279 shells
Type93 torpedoes (the Nachi, the Haguro, the Ashigara and the Myōkō): 24 torpedoes 
Type93 torpedoes (the Ikazuchi, the Yamakaze and the Kawakaze): 11 torpedoes
The remaining number of shells and torpedoes of the 5th Cruiser Division after this engage-
ment was as in the following table:(78)
Note: The number of shells loadable to each 20-cm gun: 200 shells(69)
The number of torpedoes loadable to each ship: 24 torpedoes(151)
Lessons Learned and Reviews After the Sea Engagements
1. The Action Report of the 5th Cruiser Division(78) (submitted on 20 March)
(1) Concerning the large blackish gray water columns
We guessed, [judging from] the location of the battle site at that time (about fifty nautical
miles northwest of the north entrance of [the port of] Surabaya and about twenty nautical
miles north of the closest coast) that the supersized blackish gray water columns that ap-
peared in large numbers in the daytime engagement off Surabaya on 27 February must have
been controlled mines of the enemy and reported as such in our summary report of the ac-
tions sent by telegram. However, some later reports of other units took them for [Japanese]
torpedoes that had self-destructed.
However, in the engagement with the British vessel HMS Exeter on 1 March, we con-
firmed three times that about the same time and in the same areas where enemy shells had
landed, the aforementioned supersized blackish gray water columns (guessed from memory,
not measured by instruments, about five or six meters wide and about seventy or eighty
meters high, and taking about thirty seconds to disperse and disappear) had appeared mixed
[with the enemy shell splashes].
Whether these were a means employed by the enemy, particularly at the time of test-fir-
ing their guns in order to facilitate the measuring of the impact points of their shells, or
whether they were used as a threat or for cover, we still entertained many doubts on a tech-
nical level, for if we saw that in the engagements of 27 February, when we were all charging
toward the enemy, the enemy, apart from wrapping himself in chemical smoke screens
spread by the main ships and also in sooty and chemical smoke screens emitted by the de-
stroyers of their direct escort, had moreover created walls of large black water columns with
presumably a special type of shells on the route ahead of our destroyer units, the fact remains
that those water columns were too supersized to have been created just by 20-cm gun shells. 
Then, when the recollections of observations by the flight crews were put together and
added, it turned out that no circular ripples, which must have been caused by dropping
shells, had been spotted at all right before the appearances of the large water columns. [Ap-
parently,] the large water columns were not created by explosions caused by something
dropped, but were consistent with columns that had arisen directly from the water. More-
over, after comprehensively judging the accounts of several persons of other units, who had
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Name of Ship Main Guns Remaining Torpedoes
Nachi 7 shells per gun 4
Haguro 19 shells per gun 4
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participated in the daytime engagement on 27 February (but who had not yet had an op-
portunity to satisfactorily review [the engagement]), as well as the accounts of [other] per-
sons concerned of friendly units who had participated in the engagement, suspicions
hardened that [the water columns] might have been caused by the self-destruction of
friendly torpedoes.
If [the water columns] were [indeed] caused by the self-destruction of [our] torpedoes,
it would be a grave situation, which would require a prompt and thorough examination in
order to take countermeasures.
However, this is not certain either, because among the torpedoes launched four times [in
total] on 27, 28 February and 1 March by our unit (minus the Myōkō), only one torpedo,
which had been launched at night, was suspected of having self-destructed. 
(2) Ideas about [using special] 20-cm gun shells for finding the range in test-firings. 
Even if explosive shells are fired at [actual] target ships by 20-cm guns in long-range artillery
duels, ranging the fire from aboard a ship remains difficult, as has always been said.
If we would apply the idea of throwing up large columns of water, as suggested by this
engagement, to smoke shells for the 20-cm guns, conduct research and create special smoke
shells that can throw up smoke/water columns similar to those caused by shells but by far
larger than those thrown up by regular shells, and launch such smoke shells along with the
[other] shells at the time of ranging the fire (or when we intend to make more reliable ob-
servations of shelling distances), they would certainly enable us to easily observe the dis-
tance [between the enemy and us] even without observations by aircraft, and obviously give
us an advantage when carrying out artillery duels.
I think it is essential to speedily research and create special smoke shells for observation. 
(3) It is imperative to conduct thorough drills and gain the skills [required] for sudden artillery
duels.
As seen in the engagements on 27 February and the engagement on 1 March, the enemy
spread smoke screens on an extensive scale and fired [at us] skillfully making use of them
by sailing in and out of them, which in many cases made it difficult for us to visually confirm
him from our side. Therefore, it is imperative to conduct thorough drills to improve the skills
[required] for sudden artillery duels against targets, which would come in and go out of
sight, making use of smoke screens. The traditional trainings for combat skills are far from
sufficient. Even more “severe” drills are required.
(4) When attacking the enemy by encircling him, it is absolutely necessary to take adequate
measures on a technical level as well as on a tactical level to prevent friendly torpedoes
launched from the opposite side of the enemy from doing harm to [other] friendly vessels.
There are indications that in the engagement [of 1 March], the passing torpedoes, which
the Yamakaze reported around 1315 to the 5th Cruiser Division and which the 5th Cruiser
Division evaded with a sudden wide swerve, must not have been enemy torpedoes but
friendly torpedoes launched from the north of the enemy (launched at 130º [by] the Ashigara
at 1300), which had run [past the enemy] and were coming [toward the division].
We became painfully aware of the absolute necessity in terms of combat duties that the
launching times, the position in relation to the enemy at the time of launch, and direction of
the line of fire are promptly reported to friendly forces on the opposite side of the enemy,
while making sure that the [friendly] forces receive it.
(5) Apart from the need to use ammunition efficiently by quickly evaluating the damage in-
flicted on the enemy, appropriately shifting firing targets, and avoiding the unnecessary
shelling of disabled enemy vessels, one should also not stick to one target more than neces-
sary while letting other enemy vessels slip away.
It is extremely difficult in combat to judge whether the enemy has been totally disabled
or not. In the engagement [of 1 March], considerable time presumably passed since the exact
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moment that HMS Exeter had really been disabled until it was confirmed that she had lost
her fighting capacity, [that is] when the traverse and the elevation of her gun turrets became
odd and [she] stopped firing. Also, by continuously attacking the enemy cruiser, [we let]
one of the enemy destroyers slip away, which put us in a situation that later we had to pursue
her over a long distance to catch her. 
(6) A damaged vessel loses speed sooner than expected; nevertheless, it is difficult to detect the
speed reduction of a damaged enemy vessel from aboard one’s ship.
In the engagement [of 1 March], the shells we fired around 1250 continuously deflected
to the right. It was because the enemy vessel had suddenly reduced her speed (which became
known later). According to observations from our aircraft, by around 1256, the enemy [ves-
sel] already seemed to have almost completely stopped.
I think this should be particularly kept in mind when making observations either from
aircraft or vessels ([on the latter], the observations need to be made by personnel other than
those in charge of range taking, and the results should be advised to the fire-control officer
or the range-taking officer, since those right in the heat of artillery duels will not easily detect
[the reduction in speed].)
2. The Action Report of the 4th Destroyer Squadron (23 March)
(1) In such exceptional circumstances as accompanying a large convoy that could not make
more than eight knots and with a distance of merely about one hundred nautical miles be-
tween the enemy and the convoy, we nevertheless completed the operation successfully. We
owe that of course to the tremendous spirit and technical skill [of our forces], but, among
others, it also depended greatly on the following factors.
{1} The Japanese side mostly had the upper hand in the air. Although enemy [aircraft] came
for an attack on the convoy, none participated in the engagements; on the other hand,
we made the most of our land-based attack planes and aircraft carried on board the ves-
sels. While [having our aircraft] keep on reporting on the enemy movements and block
his surprise attack maneuvers, we concentrated our forces for seizing the offensive, and
throughout made one-sidedly better use of all aircraft for observing the situation and
the results of shelling as well as for probing at night. 
Moreover, in our further review of [the engagement], we noticed that the enemy [still]
had flying boats and land-based aircraft among its remaining forces, all of which had
their own bases at close distance, and that though there might have been some obstacles,
he was still in a position where he could have used them in a much better way. If he had
made use of them in reconnaissance, observation of the situation (or observation of the
artillery duel) or probing at night, we think that [our fight against the enemy] would
have involved considerable difficulties. Among the various reasons that prevented the
enemy from conducting the war in such a way were weak points attributable to the allied
forces, [poor] daily trainings (no great amount of training seems to have been given [to
the crews] of the flying boats, not to mention the training [of the crews] of land-based
aircraft, who presumably had been given no training at all), and poor tactics, etc. Nev-
ertheless, our appropriate use of ship-based aircraft was to a high degree [responsible
for our success]. However, when considering sea engagements against America, which
will certainly involve considerable obstacles, we cannot expect the same perfect use of
ship-based aircraft as this time, therefore I think that further research and improvement
will be required concerning the performance of ship-based aircraft in air engagements,
their cruising time and speed, or the number of aircraft to be carried on board, the meas-
ures against blast [damage produced by the main guns], or the continuous use of ship-
based aircraft.
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{2} On the afternoon of the 26th, several enemy naval vessels consisting of two light cruisers
as the core were cruising outside the port of Surabaya and then put into port, [which
gave an opportunity to] the 1st Escort Unit to make an outline of precautions to take in
case [it had to] separate the 4th Destroyer Squadron for an attack on the enemy and [thus]
already getting ready for an attack at any time. I think it not only helped the 4th De-
stroyer Squadron to quickly assemble immediately after the first report of the spotting
of a powerful enemy fleet on the 27th, swiftly join the 5th Cruiser Division and the 2d
Destroyer Squadron to concentrate forces for seizing the offensive and to get the upper
hand in the engagement, but it also enabled the transport convoy to appropriately oper-
ate in perfect order. 
{3} The enemy fully revealed the weaknesses of the allied forces by:
1) Its confused rout after [the Japanese attack in] the first phase of the daytime engage-
ment (when the Japanese torpedoes reached him)
2) The escape of the USS Houston and the HMAS Perth when the enemy lost the HNLMS
De Ruyter and the HNLMS Java in the night engagement
3) The fact that the signal staff of the USS Houston had been dispatched to work on the
HNLMS De Ruyter for communications (this was brought to light in the interrogation
of the prisoners)
{4} The enemy was very passive in his use of destroyers, whereas we were totally aggressive
as is our tradition. On top of that, our performance from our torpedoes down to our guns
was far superior; such ships as the enemy destroyers are not even worth considering.
Also in the light of the hard fighting of the 8th Destroyer Division in the Lombok Strait,
it is regrettable that in this fight the superior power of our destroyers could not be fully
demonstrated in their torpedo power. Nevertheless, I think that we gave the enemy a
massive lesson in combat leadership and combat spirit.
(2) Although the first launch [of our torpedoes] in the daytime engagement was carried out
under totally favorable circumstances, [including] a perfect launching point and precise re-
ports by our aircraft about the speed of the enemy, we were not able to fully demonstrate
our torpedo power because many torpedoes self-destructed [halfway], which was very re-
grettable. Since the employment of Type93 torpedoes [in attacks] is one of the [main] tactics
of the Imperial Navy for certain victory, these self-destructions are a crucial problem in a
decisive battle. Therefore, it is necessary to immediately improve the detonators and remove
these worries. According to the torpedo chief of the HMS Exeter, who later became prisoner,
he saw some exploding in reaction to her wake while [she was] taking evasive actions (at
twenty-five knots) after spotting the wake of our torpedoes.
(3) In the daytime engagement, the enemy consisted of five cruisers (of which two were
equipped with 20-cm guns), and ten destroyers,* whereas Japanese forces consisted of two
heavy cruisers, two light cruisers and fourteen destroyers, [which meant] that in power both
sides were almost equivalent. In reality, we fought against the five [cruisers] of the enemy
cruiser unit with two [cruisers] of our cruiser division and two destroyer squadrons. The
circumstances at the time of the charge of the destroyer squadrons were somewhat like a
decisive battle. Under such circumstances, the 5th Cruiser Division fired at the enemy cruiser
unit at a distance of about 26,000 to 21,000 meters. [However,] before having inflicted con-
siderable damage to the [enemy] ships other than the HMS Exeter (the second ship), whose
damage was serious enough to let her drop out of line, [the division] used up more than
half of the ammunition loaded on the ships. Also, even when the [Japanese] destroyer
squadrons shifted to a pursuit battle, taking advantage of the enemy, whose formation had
become totally disorderly at their charge, no perfect results were attained, either. These may
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* Actually nine: four American, three British and two Dutch destroyers.
be considered partly due to the enemy’s skillful evasive actions, but I [rather] think that it
was because the shelling was carried out at too great a range.
It was observed from afar that there might be some scope for reconsideration of the de-
cisions concerning effective shelling ranges. And, the various issues of artillery duel tactics,
including the “outranging” tactics to be used at the beginning of an engagement, [might be
reviewed] with a mind to decisive battles when encountering the main force of the enemy
taking the present battle into consideration. I think we need to further re-examine the
amounts of ammunition etc. loaded [onto our vessels] based on the changes in various battle
situations.
(4) I think that the following matters require prompt research and measures for improvement:
{1} Fire control when the enemy takes skillful and bold evasive actions
{2} Comparison and examination of evasive actions and methods to make the most of our
firepower, and studying appropriate evasive actions
{3} To re-examine the outline of our current night engagement tactics in such night engage-
ments where the enemy uses star shells on a large scale, as well as to study the use of
them.
3. The Action Report of the 2d Destroyer Squadron (dated 12 March, submitted 23 March)
(1) It is extremely difficult to carry out a charge from one direction against an [enemy] cruiser
unit in daytime because the enemy can freely take evasive actions, and also because there is
little difference between his speed and ours. I keenly felt the necessity for torpedoes that can
instantly be launched at a favorable opportunity and with an oblique second-stage run (and
running in a circular pattern at their final stage).
It is necessary to immediately distribute such torpedoes also to the destroyer squadrons.
(2) When a superior enemy rapidly advances toward us at the beginning of an engagement, the
S-launch (note by the author: a long-distance launch)(152) is also effective against [such] cruiser
units. 
Since our squadron had taken a favorable position against the enemy also at the initial
stage of this sea engagement, I am certain that if we had carried out [the S-launch], with the
Jintsu and one element of our destroyers combined, we could have achieved a huge effect.
Traditionally there is a preconceived idea that destroyer squadrons should avoid S-
launches, particularly against cruiser units. However, it is more sensible that we should de-
terminedly conduct such launches at favorable opportunities.
That is to say, since the critical turning point between win or lose as was shown in this
sea engagement will be decided in the blink of an eye, I was made fully aware that we should
determinedly carry out torpedo warfare at any favorable opportunity. For this purpose, I
consider it necessary also for destroyer squadrons to study and drill S-launches.
(3) It is extremely difficult to fight a night engagement (particularly when visibility is high)
against enemy cruiser units, whose vessels can sail at a same speed and can freely take eva-
sive actions. This is the reason why we failed to satisfactorily pursue [him] in this night en-
gagement. Accordingly, I keenly felt that it is also essential [in engagements] against an
[enemy] cruiser unit to approach the enemy up to the visibility limit and as soon as his di-
rection becomes clear conduct O-launches (note by the author: covert launches from a [long]
range, which are carried out in such a [stealthy] way that even a launching action would
not be detected by the enemy).
If S- and O-launches were to be carried out by the destroyer squadrons, the number of
torpedoes on hand on the destroyers may not be sufficient, but even if the number of torpedo
launches is reduced or if the launches would be carried out by only part of the destroyers, I
still think that implementing these [S- and O-] launches at favorable opportunities will bring
advantages to the overall situation.
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Particularly, the O-launch carried out this time by 5th Cruiser Division in its simultane-
ous artillery and torpedo duel, was extremely effective.
(4) In relation to the previous three items, I think that a thorough study and tactical drills against
cruiser units are most urgently required. 
(5) When launching torpedoes during daytime against enemy cruiser units, which take a zigzag
evasive action, it is better to launch them at a maximum spread angle with no deflection
angle set.
(6) The self-destruction of Type93 torpedoes in this sea engagement was confirmed by later in-
vestigations.
[This meant that] at least dozens of torpedoes self-destructed in the daytime engagement,
and that the large water columns that the Jintsu spotted right after having launched her [tor-
pedoes] in the first phase of the night engagement were probably caused by the self-deto-
nation of our torpedoes as well.
Since these self-detonations of our torpedoes, which [our men] “had launched after dar-
ing to jump into the midst of the enemy,” will affect their morale, it is urgently required to
take steps [to prevent it].
(7) The guarding in this engagement after sunset could better have been assigned to the 2d De-
stroyer Squadron, the 5th Cruiser Division and the 4th Destroyer Squadron in that order
from the north.
Even if the enemy could possibly have come for an attack on the convoy from either way
[north or south], it would have been easier for either of the destroyer squadrons to advance
into his sailing route and have an opportunity to charge toward him while the 5th Cruiser
Division was [engaging him] in an artillery duel. In order to destroy a superior enemy cruiser
unit, I think it a standard move to swiftly advance destroyer squadrons (destroyer divisions)
into the sailing route of the enemy while friendly cruisers [engage him] in an artillery duel,
and at a favorable opportunity have [the destroyers] shift and charge toward him.
Neither in the first nor the second phase of the night engagement did the destroyer
squadrons have time to advance to positions to charge [against the enemy].
(8, 9) (Omitted by the author — these items concern submarines; will be described later.)
(10) The artillery ability of the enemy cruisers was excellent; the dispersion area of their shells
fired in salvos by four to six guns from about twenty kilometers afar was [only] about 150
to 200 [meters].
It is necessary [for our forces] to study and take steps to narrow down the dispersion
area of our guns.
(11) It seems that the enemy destroyers accompanied [the cruisers] only to directly escort the
main unit and to spread smoke screens. They seem to have had no intention to carry out ag-
gressive torpedo attacks ([or] charges) either in the daytime and the night engagements,
which gave us an impression that their power to conduct torpedo warfare is inferior.
(12) The enemy used dye-capped shells in daytime and star shells (British and U.S. forces) at
night. However, the range of the star shells must have been almost the same as our shells;
in the artillery duel against the 5th Cruiser Division (at a range of about eighteen kilometers),
the star shells exploded so close that I thought that they must rather have hampered [than
helped] the enemy’s visual confirmation. We visually confirmed that all his shells fell short.
(13) It is better to conduct artillery warfare without using searchlights when visibility is high. I
keenly felt it when firing at [enemy] submarines.
Also, as seen and clearly shown in the battle example of the 8th Destroyer Division in
the Lombok Strait, in some cases, the use of searchlights is rather disadvantageous even on
a dark night.
Particularly, it is true when charging with a small number of vessels into a large number
[of enemies] to fiercely attack from a close range.
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I think that from now on artillery drills without using searchlights need to be greatly en-
couraged for destroyer squadrons. 
Capt. (then Cdr.) Takedai Takashi of the Navy Technical Department, who was in charge of
torpedoes at that time, wrote the following recollection of the self-destruction of the Type93
torpedoes:(153)
In February 1942, on the sea [off] Surabaya, a Japanese elite division of the latest cruisers and a
destroyer group consisting of the 2d and 4th Destroyer Squadrons, also made up of destroyers
of the latest type in the world, caught up in a skillful operation with an enemy fleet ([of] five
cruisers and six destroyers) and were poised to destroy the latter at a stroke. The enemy fleet
was just like a small bird stalked by a predatory eagle, and its destruction was just a matter of
time.
The Japanese cruiser division operated in perfect order, just as in the yearly Pacific Ocean
exercises. At a range of about 30,000 meters, it carried out the first long-distance concentrated
[torpedo] launch; in concert with this, the destroyer squadrons carried out the second launch,
and over a hundred torpedoes simultaneously ran toward the enemy vessels.
The torpedoes were the pure oxygen Type93 torpedoes, which were [at that time] the best per-
forming torpedoes in the world. Sixty-one centimeters in diameter, four meters long and carry-
ing 1.5 tons of explosive in their warhead, they resembled a baby whale when they rushed like
lightning several meters below the surface of the sea off Surabaya towards the enemy fleet,
rolling their massive bodies. The total amount of explosive added up to about two hundred
tons; no matter how [skillfully] the enemy vessels would try to evade them, they would have
no way to escape from the gigantic swarm of torpedoes, ready to catch them as if in a net. The
biggest show of the century was just about to begin. The officers and men shuddered imagining
the impending gruesome scene of the enemy vessels being annihilated at a stroke. 
However, after plunging into the water and running for about five hundred to one thousand
meters, the launched torpedoes exploded with a terrific bang, tossing up huge splashes. One
after another the torpedoes exploded, and they were followed by those from other vessels.
The torpedoes exploded too early. The moment they passed through the safety distance, the
fuze automatically actuated and set off the explosive. They literally self-destructed.
The number of the torpedoes that self-destructed in this sea engagement reached as many
as about one third of the launched torpedoes. It was a true disaster. What had the Navy Technical
Department been doing? What about the personnel in charge of torpedoes? The operational
units were so angry that they just wanted the personnel responsible to take their own lives. You
can imagine our panic when we were told the news. Having no idea at all about the cause, we
had no excuse to offer. We had no words to apologize to the officers and men of the operational
units, who risked their lives in battle. As the competent person in charge of the torpedoes, I felt
more dead than alive. However, since taking my life would not solve this problem, I promptly
set up an investigation panel in the Navy Technical Department to investigate the cause. Upon
the return of the fleet to the Inland Sea [of Japan], all persons involved, from the director down
to the personnel in charge of torpedoes, immediately presented themselves to investigate the
situation. I felt completely miserable at that time; scolded and yelled at everywhere, I felt more
dead than alive.
[Then] the results became clear; the main cause was a manifestation of the fighting spirit of
the Imperial Japanese Navy personnel.
The fuze worked in such a way that, after running through the safety distance, the inertia
mechanism in it would be set free; when [the torpedo] hit something with a force above a fixed
level, the inertia mechanism would tip forward and release the firing pin, which would strike
into the detonator by force of a spring and detonate the explosive. The force, at which the inertia
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mechanism would move, was adjusted with [special] measuring instruments. It would not move
at a small force; it was supposed to actuate only when a force above a fixed level operated on
it. However, in the sea engagement [off] Surabaya, the fuze was actuated at a very low level.
How could that happen?
[When] the fuzes of the remaining torpedoes of the sea engagement were put on the testing
instrument in the presence of the persons concerned, about half of the fuzes actuated on a small
force that deviated from the standard setting. No wonder that they had exploded on the impact
of waves at the moment they ran out of the safety distance. We investigated in detail the causes
why the fuzes were adjusted to such a substandard level. In the end, it turned out that, display-
ing the Japanese spirit of loyalty and patriotism, those in charge of adjusting the fuzes had set
them to a somewhat lower level for fear that it would be a serious problem if the fuzes should
not actuate when the torpedoes hit enemy vessels. That is why, after running five hundred or a
thousand meters and getting out of the safety distance, the torpedoes self-destructed under the
impact of the waves. At that time, torpedoes were also adjusted both at the naval arsenals and
military supplies departments. However, none [of those adjusted there] self-destructed.
The main cause for the self-destruction turned out to be the devotional zeal of the Imperial
Japanese Navy personnel. I am not sure even now whether I should deplore or be impressed
[by their devotion].
Also R. Adm. of Engineering Ōyagi Shizuo, an authority on Type93 torpedoes remarked in
his recollections: “It was a matter of eternal regret that we had provided each vessel with a
sensitivity adjuster for the fuzes.”
The “Excerpts of lessons learned in the Greater East Asia War and observations by the
Yokosuka Gunnery School,” prepared on 24 August 1944, has the following to say on shelling
distances and the firing on targets taking evasive actions: 
I. Shelling distances
1. Example engagement 
In the engagement off Surabaya (27 February – 1 March, 1942), our large cruisers, although
at one moment having closed to about fifteen kilometers on the enemy, on the whole con-
tinued the artillery duel from a considerable distance of twenty to twenty-five kilometers,
during which, due to the evasive actions of the enemy, they used up most of their ordnance,
and that without achieving satisfactory military gains. 
2. Observations by the Yokosuka Gunnery School
(1) To open fire from as long a range as possible, at which results may [still] be expected,
promptly deliver a preemptive strike on the enemy, and at a favorable opportunity close
in on him to within decisive-battle range and destroy him at a stroke is what gunnery
textbooks teach. However, once an artillery duel has begun, it is difficult [to continue]
the artillery duel at close range. This tendency is all the stronger when the enemy guns
are powerful. [Therefore,] you need to “go one step closer” and open fire at a closer range,
where it is possible to demonstrate considerably bigger firing results. (The weakness
commonly seen in combat psychology is to overestimate the power of the enemy and to
take your own damage too seriously, which may be regarded as one of the factors that
makes closing in on the enemy difficult.)
(2) You need to see to it that that you do not continue a long-range artillery duel for [too]
long without confirming the results or unconsciously let it go on while admitting that
the results are unsatisfactory, as if you have forgotten your real ability for a fierce attack
at short range.
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(3) There are indications that make us think that maybe [the participating units]
overindulged in long-range shelling from a force of habit acquired in normal drills, where
skills are honed through firing drills for the initial stages of an engagement, the most
difficult stage of all engagement stages. However, the main point of engagements lies in
the destruction of the enemy, and the essential and most important condition for this is
to fiercely attack him by closing in on him at short range for a decisive battle, while long-
range shelling is [nothing more than] a means of preemptive attacks. It would be the best
if both [methods] are combined, however, when implementing them, you rather need to
attach more importance to the former.
In other words, since short-range shelling is extremely difficult [to implement] in ac-
tual battle, you need to have enough grit to endure some sacrifices to win the battle,
while courageously deciding and determinedly implementing [short-range shelling].
(4) [The following] needs to be avoided: to continue distant shelling while being distracted
by enemy shellfire; to totally forget your effective shelling range, due to being too cau-
tious about enemy shellfire made more effective by radar; or to miss an opportunity to
fiercely attack him from close range by not fully understanding your own skills.
(5) Since a fierce attack from close range is the main characteristic of decisive battles, you
need to clearly grasp the distances at which to conduct a decisive battle.
(6) Although the main points of conducting a fierce attack from close range may differ de-
pending on the circumstances, they are generally considered to be the following:
{1} When confronting an enemy with great fire power, make your silhouette as small as
possible, so as to reduce the accuracy of his shelling, and conduct a fierce attack by
rapidly approaching him at close range, bringing rapid fire into play and reducing
the difference in fire power between him and us (particularly the difference in power
per shell).
{2} When our fire power is superior [to that of the enemy], we shall destroy him while
keeping him at a distance, so as not to allow him access into the midst of our units.
(7) The firing distance shall be decided by keeping in mind the mission, the purpose of the
shelling, the power and the skills of the enemy and us, the power of the guns, the armor,
the meteorological and terrestrial circumstances, the length of time available for the en-
gagement, the current amount of ammunition, etc. However, assuming [our] present
skills, the power of our guns and our armor, etc., the following is usually considered an
appropriate standard under the present conditions.
Note by the author: Since the tables included cases of shelling using radar,* [only] the
tables of the cases where radar was not used or the accuracy of the radar was bad were
selected, with the following results: 
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* Although we use the term “radar,” it should be kept in mind that the Japanese naval equivalent den[pa] tan[shingi]
(electronic wave search device) was a far more primitive system than the American radar systems. In fact,
during the war the Japanese never developed a fully functional and effective air-search, surface-search, or
fire-control radar. See David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie, Kaigun; Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial
Japanese Navy 1887-1941. Annapolis, Naval Institute Press 1997, pp. 411-15.
The (desirable close) range at the time of decisive battles
(1) Daytime
(2) Nighttime ([or] at times of low visibility) 
II. Firing at targets taking evasive actions
1. Example engagement 
In the engagement off Surabaya, our cruiser division carried out shelling from about twenty
kilometers, which allowed the enemy to take evasive actions (while also using smoke
screens). Although the division fired a large number of shells (using up most of the ordnance
on board), it did not attain remarkable military gains.
In other past engagements, the enemy with few exceptions [always] seemed to take eva-
sive actions, in which, even if he consisted of a single vessel or vessels in formation, he dras-
tically changed course in various ways, and sometimes even abruptly changed speed. Also,
in general, he often used smoke screens while taking evasive actions. 
When he thought that we might use torpedoes, he sometimes took large evasive actions
and even reversed course in order to evade our torpedoes as well.
The delay in noticing the enemy’s evasive actions or the failure to communicate [the
enemy movements] to the [fire control] command station sometimes led to a lack of appro-
priate measures.
2. Observations by the Yokosuka Gunnery School
(1) The first principle in firing at a target taking evasive actions is to shorten the firing dis-
tance. Although the closing-in distance should differ according to the type and move-
ments of the enemy vessels, visibility, etc.,
{1} the distance needs in general to satisfy the following conditions:
a. It should enable us to notice the enemy’s course changes without delay and make
it relatively easy to determine the enemy’s [future] course.
b. It should enable our adjusted fire to score hits before the enemy’s change of course
takes effect.
{2} In view of the above, the desirable close-in ranges in the following table shall gener-
ally be considered appropriate:
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Type of Vessel Target Range Remarks
Battleship Battleship 20,000 Vessels with 36-cm guns were also taken into account.
Cruiser Cruiser 12,000
Destroyer Destroyer 5,000




(2) In order to reduce the effects of the enemy’s evasive actions or contain his evasive actions,
it is advantageous to concentrate fire or simultaneously fire from different directions
and, if possible, to conduct a pincer attack.
(3) Whereas there are no particularly [difficult] points when firing at short range, when it
comes to shelling from farther distances, the firing method to be taken can be variously
thought of in the following ways making the lateral control of the fire very difficult:
{1} Shortening the intervals of salvos. In order to implement this, alternate firing [the fir-
ing of the guns of a multiple gun turret in turn] is generally considered advantageous.
However, in the case of vessels equipped with a [small] number of guns, where the
number of shells to be fired in an alternate-firing salvo very much decreases, salvos
of all guns together are rather more advantageous. (In general, salvos using all guns
together are more advantageous for vessels, which carry six or less guns).
{2} Applying the measurement-based fire control method, where the data of plotted
ranges on the fire control table* are used [to decide the line of fire].
{3} Applying the dispersion fire method.
{4} Applying the [farthest/closest] limit fire method when the enemy is expected to take
large evasive actions.
{5} Applying the range-rate-based fire control method using the firing calculator against
slow evasive actions of the enemy.
Based upon this method, you should try to shorten the time between noticing the
course changes of the enemy and measuring his position and control your fire in such
a way so as to obstruct the enemy’s evasive actions, when his plan of evasive actions
(particularly such plans as changing course to a farther side at the sight of our over-
shot shells, expecting our fire control correction [to a nearer side]) is detected (or an-
ticipated). (Study and drills are necessary regarding the decision on the enemy’s
[new] course, the estimation of the angle of change of his course, which do depend
on the delay in detecting the enemy’s course change and the time spent [for the de-
tection], as well as regarding the share of responsibility for the adjustments and ad-
justment methods between the ship’s commander and the chief of the fire control
command station.)
In short, it is not easy to apply each item of the above; there is no better way at
present than to conduct intense drills on each vessel according to her armaments and
facilities.
(4) Since long-range gunfire not only produces poor results but also raises concerns about
wasting ammunition, you need to pay particular attention to confirming the fire results
and keeping your gunfire under control.
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Firing Vessel Target Vessel Firing Range
Large cruiser
Large cruiser Within 12 km
Destroyer Within 7 km
Destroyer Destroyer Within 7 km
* For a discussion of Japanese fire control systems and their problems, see David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie,
Kaigun; Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy 1887-1941. Annapolis, Naval Institute Press
1997, pp. 250-53.
The Engagements of the 2d Air Unit
The Engagements of the 2d Air Unit
On the early morning of 27 February, the 2d Air Unit dropped anchor off Cape [Tanjung]
Puting, and carried out operations.(79) On that day, an enemy fleet was spotted off Surabaya,
which made the convoy evacuate westward along with one element of the escort unit. Al-
though part of the aircraft unit of the Chitose and the Mizuho seemed to have participated in
the engagements, the details are unclear. According to a journal kept by Yamada Shigeru, the
weather was so bad that day that they only flew a very few flights.[106] At night, the 2d Air
Unit left the area off Cape [Tanjung] Puting for Bawean Island.
On the 28th, the 2d Air Unit dropped anchor [off] the west coast of Bawean Island and
provided guard [for] the transport convoy [against] the remnant [enemy] vessels [which had
survived] the engagement off Surabaya. However, other than having spotted three 2,000t-
class auxiliary gunboats and eight torpedo boat-like ships (sailing southward in the Surabaya
Strait), and a few submarine chasers at several nautical miles offshore at the north entrance
of the strait, they did not see any enemy vessels.(53)
On 1 March, the 2d Air Unit operated in the same way as the previous day near the west
coast of Bawean Island. Since at 0945 the staff of the 1st Escort Unit reported the following
movements of enemy aircraft, 2d Air Unit Commander R. Adm. Fujita Ruitarō decided to
directly guard for the time being the echelon in the air [against enemy aircraft] with aircraft
that was supposed to be employed for supporting the land combat.(56)
1. Last night, there were persistent attacks by enemy light bombers throughout the night. After
the moon set, they continued their attacks, dropping large flares. Although the exact number of
aircraft was unclear, ten or more aircraft [were spotted]. 
2. This morning, at 0736, ten four-engine bombers came for a raid, along with more than a dozen
fighter planes (P–40s), which had come at 1735. The fighter planes repeatedly strafed the convoy
and the landing craft from a low altitude for twenty minutes. Both the bombers and the fighter
planes evacuated bearing 240º [SW].
3. Yesterday at dusk, just before entering into the anchorage, we were persistently probed by three-
engine enemy flying boat[s].
4. Nine observation seaplanes as well as two Type–0 fighter planes arrived in the air [over the con-
voy] at 0815 (right after the enemy fighter planes evacuated).
The Type–0 observation seaplanes on guard in the air above the convoy reported having shot
down three Northrop light bombers, while those in support of the land combat reported hav-
ing blown up six enemy tanks on the road near Kragan, and [also] supported [the ground
units] by a bombing attack on an enemy position.(71) On that day, eleven Type–0 observation
seaplanes took off at 1240 for an attack on the enemy cruiser and destroyer, but could not
spot them due to a squall. It was [well] after the enemy vessels had been sunk when they
spotted the friendly unit.(56) Since it turned out that the coast near Kragan was shallow for a
good distance from the shore and not fit for a [seaplane] base, it was decided that [the air
unit] should continue the air campaign [with its base] near Bawean Island until a better base
was found.(56)
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The Land-Based Air Unit Sinks the Tender USS Langley
On the 27th, the 1st Air Raid Unit was not able to conduct an attack on the enemy fleet due
to bad weather, and on the 28th, no attack was conducted either, other than a search mission
by flying boat[s]. On 1 March, twenty-seven land-based attack planes of the Kanoya Air
Group Detachment carried out a bombing attack on naval vessels in the port of Surabaya
and reported having inflicted damage to two destroyers, two submarines, two special service
vessels and one merchantman. However, due to the accurate and fierce antiaircraft fire, four-
teen were marked by bullets (of which two made an emergency landing on Bali).(81)
Meanwhile, at 0950 on the 27th, the 2d Air Raid Unit spotted the U.S. Tender USS Langley
(at 368 nautical miles 265º [W] of the Bali base sailing on a 230º [SW] course at ten knots),
and at 1340 sank her with sixteen land-based attack planes of the Takao Air Group stationed
at Bali.(71) According to a U.S. book They Fought with What They Had by Walter D. Edmonds
[pp. 315-16], the tender carried thirty-two P–40s on her deck. Lt. Adachi Jirō, who led the at-
tack unit, recalled the attack as follows:
The fighter plane unit took off first guided by a land-based reconnaissance plane and advanced
without directly covering the attack unit. I made the sortie as the commander of the attack unit
and spotted the enemy fleet sailing northward. The enemy sailed with two destroyers in a line
abreast with the tender USS Langley in the rear, following the former. When our attack unit ap-
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The U.S. Tender USS Langley
peared above the enemy fleet, it split and started an evasive action. The bombs delivered by the
1st Kusuhata Squadron (led by Lt. Kusuhata Yoshinobu) did not score a hit; I aborted my bomb-
ing run twice, carried out the bombing on the third try, and scored a hit at the fore part of the
flight deck. Our bombs straddled the tender, and three 250-kg bombs and three 60-kg bombs
hit her. Since they were land bombs with instantaneous fuses, they caused large fires upon hit-
ting her, setting the aircraft and the fuel bunker ablaze. When we entered the bombing run for
the third time, we came under defensive fire from the destroyers, but it was nothing serious.
The [enemy] escort destroyers transmitted in plain that the USS Langley was coming under a
bomb attack by enemy aircraft.
We circled the scene once, but considering that enemy fighter planes might come for support
from the Cilacap area, we left at a proper moment to return [to base].
Although [our] fighter plane unit had left the base earlier, they had not spotted the enemy
[tender], but while returning to base, they [finally] spotted the tender in flames and strafed her.
After returning to base, I reported that we believed that we had sunk the USS Langley. However,
staff officers Yasunobu Takeo and Nomura Ryōsuke judged that we had only inflicted damage
on her, but had not sunk her. That time, I wished we could have carried our regular bombs with
us but I remember that we only had land bombs.
Note by the author: According to The Rising Sun in the Pacific by [Samuel] Morison [p. 363],
the ship had been crippled by too many fires and leaks, so the destroyer escort “scuttled
the old tender with torpedo and shellfire.”
The land-based attack planes, which left the Banjarmasin base on 27 February, also spotted
the enemy fleet off Surabaya [p. 432], but they were not able to attack it; the Takao Air Group
because of [its assignment to] attack the tender [USS Langley], and the Kanoya Air Group
Detachment because of bad weather.(71) On that day, a total of fourteen Type–0 fighter planes
of the Tainan Air Group from Banjarmasin provided the transport ships with direct escort in
the air [against enemy aircraft]. Two aircraft of the third shift reported having driven away
two B–17s and shot down one flying boat. [However,] all three Type–0 fighter planes of the
sixth shift, which took off at 1430, went missing due to bad weather. [Meanwhile], the Type–
0 fighter planes of the Tainan Air Group stationed in Bali were engaged in patrolling in the
air over the Bali base while providing cover for the land-based attack planes conducting the
attack on the USS Langley, and reported having strafed the tender with machineguns, set five
or more mid-sized aircraft ablaze, inflicted damage to five or more aircraft and shot down
one four-engine flying boat and one two-engine flying boat. One of the Japanese aircraft got
hit and went missing.(71) The Type–0 fighter planes of the 3d Air Group also stationed in Bali
were [also] assigned to the cover of the land-based attack planes conducting the attack on
the tender as well as to cover the land-based attack planes conducting an attack on Surabaya
(the latter was called off due to bad weather). While the Type–0 fighter planes in charge of
[covering] the Surabaya attack [unit] did not spot the enemy, those in charge of covering the
attack on the tender reported having strafed three aircraft on the deck of the tender and set
them ablaze, and shot down two flying boats (one of which was unconfirmed).
On 28 February, the 2d Air Raid Unit carried out an attack on the airfield[s] near Surabaya
as well as an attack on Christmas Island, while providing the convoy with direct escort in
the air [against enemy aircraft] and reported having shot down one four-engine flying boat
and two Buffalo fighter planes.(71) 
On 1 March, the 2d Air Raid Unit [again] directly guarded the convoy and [the base on]
Bali in the air [against enemy aircraft], while carrying out a search mission in the Indian
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Ocean, as well as attacking the airfield[s] near Surabaya. Reporting military gains of having
set two large aircraft ablaze and inflicting damage on two large aircraft, fourteen P–40s and
eight Buffalo fighter planes, they all returned [to base].(71)
The Engagements of the 4th Carrier Division
On the morning of 1 March, the 4th Carrier Division reached a point north of the Karimata
Strait. On receiving the previously-mentioned report [pp. 444-45] that one enemy cruiser and
one destroyer had been spotted near Bawean Island, the division launched six carrier-based
attack planes at 1300. The attack [plane] unit reached the site at 1505; since the [enemy] cruiser
had already been sunk by the 5th Cruiser Division, the unit carried out a bombing attack
([with] six 250-kg bombs and twenty-four 60-kg bombs) on the destroyer [USS Pope], which
was trying to escape, and crippled her. (As has already been told [p. 445], the destroyer was
sunk by the main unit of the Dutch East Indies Unit that pursued her.) 
Meanwhile, [another] six carrier-based attack planes bombed a 10,000t-class cargo ship
in the port of Semarang at 1640; the ship ran aground and caught fire, after which all planes
returned to the carrier.(71)
The Situation of the Allied Forces
According to The Rising Sun in the Pacific by [Samuel] Morison, the following unit had made
a sortie to attack the Japanese invasion unit:(92)
Commander: Rear Admiral Doorman of the Dutch Navy (flagship HNLMS De Ruyter)
Forces: The Dutch light cruiser HNLMS De Ruyter, the British heavy cruiser HMS Exeter, the
U.S. heavy cruiser USS Houston, the Australian light cruiser HMAS Perth, the Dutch light
cruiser HNLMS Java, the U.S. destroyers USS John D. Ford, USS Paul Jones, USS [John D.] Ed-
wards, USS Alden, the British destroyers HMS Electra, HMS Encounter, HMS Jupiter, the Dutch
destroyers HNLMS Witte de With, and HNLMS Kortenaer, totaling two heavy cruisers, three
light cruisers, and nine destroyers
From the Japanese record and The Rising Sun in the Pacific by Morison we may infer the fol-
lowing state of affairs on the allied side:
1. [The allied unit which] in the beginning engaged with the 2d Destroyer Squadron was the British
destroyer unit.
2. In the initial artillery duel, HNLMS De Ruyter was hit by a dud shell.
3. None of the torpedoes in the first torpedo attack by the 4th Destroyer Squadron hit the enemy.
4. At 1838, a shell hit the engine room of HMS Exeter, which caused confusion in the formation [of
the allies]. (The shell is presumed to have been fired by the Haguro.)
5. At 1845, in the middle of the confusion, the Dutch destroyer HNLMS Kortenaer was hit by a tor-
pedo and instantly sank. (The torpedo is presumed to have been fired by the Haguro.)
6. The speed of HMS Exeter dropped to fifteen knots, and she pulled back into the smoke screen
spread by the Australian cruiser HMAS Perth, covered by the British destroyers.
7. It were the British destroyers HMS Encounter and HMS Electra who exchanged fire at short range
with the Asagumo and the Minegumo. Both vessels had reversed course and carried out the attack
in order to cover HMS Exeter, however, HMS Electra was sunk by the 9th Destroyer Division. It
was HMS Electra who delivered a direct hit on the Asagumo.
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8. After the daytime engagement, HMS Exeter* and HNLMS Witte de With retreated to Surabaya.
9. It were the four cruisers, HNLMS De Ruyter, USS Houston, HMAS Perth and HNLMS Java, and
the British destroyers HMS Jupiter and HMS Encounter, who had reversed course and around
2100 attacked the 5th Cruiser Division, which was retrieving its aircraft.
10. After the first phase of the night engagement, the four U.S. destroyers headed for Surabaya for
replenishment.
11. While the remaining forces were sailing eastward** near the coast, the British destroyer HMS
Jupiter hit at 2255 a mine laid by the Dutch and sank.
12. The remaining forces started sailing northward from 2300. At 2347, they passed the spot where
HNLMS Kortenaer had sunk and took her crew onto HMS Encounter, who [then] headed for
Surabaya. 
13. Only four ships, [i.e.] HNLMS De Ruyter, HMAS Perth, USS Houston and HNLMS Java partici-
pated in the second phase of the night engagement against the 5th Cruiser Division.
14. HNLMS De Ruyter and HNLMS Java were hit by torpedoes of the 5th Cruiser Division and sank.
Right after that, USS Houston and HMAS Perth changed course southwestward and escaped to
Batavia. They successfully avoided being spotted [by the Japanese forces] since the latter
searched for them in an area east [of the battle site]. (Both vessels went down after having ex-
changed fire with a Japanese fleet off Batavia on the early morning of the 1st, as will be described
later.)
15. Around 0000 of 1 March, the British cruiser HMS Exeter left Surabaya accompanied by the British
destroyer HMS Encounter and the U.S. destroyer USS Pope. They tried to head for Cilacap by sail-
ing east of Bawean Island, then turning westward to sail by way of Batavia and [through] the
Sunda Strait. However, they were caught by the main unit of the Dutch East Indies Unit and
sunk.
16. In the end, among the allied forces that had participated in the sea engagement off Surabaya,
only four U.S. destroyers managed to escape. They passed through the Bali Strait on the early
morning of 1 March and successfully escaped after breaking through the guard of the 21st De-
stroyer Division and the Tsukushi, who were on guard off Bali Island.
The characteristics of the enemy naval vessels were as shown in the following table.(154)
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* The text mistakenly includes HMS Encounter.
** Actually westward, see also Morison p. 350, 355.





(Dutch light cruiser) 6,450 32.0 7 x 15-cm N/A
HMS Exeter
(British heavy cruiser) 8,390 32.0 6 x 20-cm 3 x 10-cm 6 x 53-cm
USS Houston
(U.S. heavy cruiser) 9,050 32.7 9 x 20-cm 8 x 12.7-cm N/A
HMAS Perth
(Australian light cruiser) 6,980 32.5 8 x 15-cm 8 x 7-cm 4 x 53-cm
HNLMS Java
(Dutch light cruiser) 6,670 31.0 7 x 15-cm N/A
Note: Due to engine trouble, the U.S. destroyer USS Pope did not participate in the sea en-
gagement off Surabaya.(176)
Reference: A comparison of the guns and torpedo [launchers] employed by both sides in the sea en-
gagement off Surabaya
Note: Since the USS Houston had sustained damage at her after turret by a Japanese air attack
some time ago [4 February], the number of her 20-cm guns was calculated as six. As seen in
this table, the offensive power of the Japanese side was overwhelmingly superior [to that of
the allies].
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USS John D. Ford
USS Paul Jones




1,190 35.0 4 x 10-cm A few 20-mmmachineguns 6 x 53-cm
HMS Electra
(British) 1,375 36.0 4 x 12-cm 1 x 10-cm 4 x 53-cm
HMS Encounter
(British) 1,375 36.0 4 x 12-cm 1 x 10-cm 4 x 53-cm
HMS Jupiter
(British) 1,690 36.0 6 x 12-cm 1 x 10-cm 5 x 53-cm
HNLMS Witte de With
(Dutch) 1,650 36.0 4 x 12-cm 1 x 8-cm 6 x 53-cm
HNLMS Kortenaer
(Dutch) 1,640 36.0 4 x 12-cm 2 x 8-cm 6 x 53-cm
Size of Guns (or Torpedoes)
Total Numbers
Japanese Side Allied Side
20-cm Guns 20 12




6112-cm Guns 12 22
10-cm Guns 0 31*
8-cm Guns 4 4
Torpedo launchers 160 x 61-cm 79 x 53-cm
* If based on the table on pp. 462-63, the number of allied 10-cm guns (excluding the USS Pope) would be 22,
not 31. The author probably misread the Japanese numbers in the original manuscript.
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The Dutch Light Cruiser HNLMS De Ruyter
The U.S. Heavy Cruiser USS Houston
The Australian Light Cruiser HMAS Perth
4. The Sea Engagement off Batavia (28 February - 1 March)
(See Attached Illustration No. 7)
At 2350 on 28 February, 3d Escort Unit commander (5th Destroyer Squadron Commander
Rear Admiral Hara) gave the order [to shift to] the second disposition of forces (the disposi-
tion after the transport ships’ entry into the anchorage). On this order, each unit started for
its patrol area, keeping a strict guard. The 2d Section of the 7th Cruiser Division headed for
an area about twenty nautical miles 10º [N] of St. Nicholas Point [Tanjung Pujut]. Both the
Merak and Bantam Bay [sections of] the transport convoy completed entering into their an-
chorages at 0000 on 1 March without problems. The main forces(150) of the Japanese Navy
near the convoy’s anchorages at that time as well as their characteristics(151) were as follows:
1. Bantam Bay
7th Cruiser Division 2d Section (support unit)
The Mikuma, the Mogami and the Shikinami
5th Destroyer Squadron
The Natori
5th Destroyer Division (the Asakaze, the Harukaze and the Hatakaze) 
11th Destroyer Division (the Hatsuyuki, the Shirayuki and the Fubuki) 
Two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser and seven destroyers in total
2. The Merak area
22d Destroyer Division (the Satsuki, the Minazuki, the Nagatsuki and the Fumizuki)
12th Destroyer Division (the Shirakumo and the Murakumo)
Six destroyers in total
3. Characteristics (as shown in the following table)
The First Phase of the Engagement(150) (from 0009 until 0100)
At 0009, the 11th Destroyer Division’s Fubuki, who was patrolling in the easternmost part of
Bantam Bay, spotted black silhouettes at a distance of 10,000 meters, 85º [E], and immediately
reported to the 3d Escort Unit: “Spotted two silhouettes of naval vessels, which look like
enemy vessels, to the northeast of Babi Island.” Then after confirming that the black silhou-
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Mogami-class 8,500 37.0 10 x 20-cm 8 x 12.7-cm 12 x 61-cm
Natori-class 5,170 36.0 7 x 14-cm 2 x 8-cm 61-cm (Type8)
Asakaze-class 1,270 37.25 4 x 12-cm 6 x 53-cm
Fubuki-class
(Shirakumo-class) 1,680 38.0 6 x 12.7-cm 9 x 61-cm
ettes were those of two [enemy] cruisers, she continued at 0013: “Spotted enemy cruisers.
Our position is two nautical miles west of Cape Babi. The enemy is sailing on a 240º [WSW]
course.” In the meantime, at 0018, the Natori and the 11th Destroyer Division (minus the
Fubuki), which were patrolling in an area about eight nautical miles north of St. Nicholas
Point [Tanjung Pujut], also spotted enemy-like silhouettes at a distance of about 20,000 me-
ters, 115º [ESE]. Then around 0030, the Fubuki, who had sailed around Babi Island hugging
its coast to hide herself in the silhouette of the island, took up a position about 8,000 meters
behind the enemy and kept reporting on the enemy movements. [Meanwhile] at 0029, the
Harukaze of the 5th Destroyer Division, who was patrolling the area between Babi Island and
Panjang Island around that time, also spotted the two enemy cruisers at a distance of 8,000
meters, 60º [ENE] and reported it. [By] around that time, the Natori also reached the conclu-
sion that the silhouettes presumed to be enemy [vessels] were [indeed] two enemy cruisers.
Based on the above enemy movements, 3d Escort Unit Commander Hara made up his
mind that in order to secure the safety of the transport convoy, he needed to quickly gather
the support forces, [i.e.] the 2d Section (the Mikuma and the Mogami) of the 7th Cruiser Divi-
sion, and the Shikinami to promptly defeat the enemy. At 0029, he ordered the Natori and the
11th Destroyer Division: “Prepare for torpedo warfare. The 11th Destroyer Division shall fol-
low in the wake [of the Natori.]” [Then] at 0030, he ordered the 2d Section of the 7th Cruiser
Division and the 5th Destroyer Division (the Harukaze, the Hatakaze and the Asakaze) to “as-
semble!”
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The Cruiser Mogami
The Cruiser Natori
At that time, 3d Escort Unit Commander Hara had the following plan of action: “It is possible
that the enemy will try to escape seeing our powerful [cruisers of the] 7th Cruiser Division,
2d Section, appear. Then we may lose the opportunity to catch and destroy him. So, first of
all, we will entice him into broader waters with the Natori and the destroyer divisions; in
that way, we shall avoid waters where there is a risk of mines and also keep away from the
anchorage. Once the enemy has got deeply involved in the engagement, we shall bring in
the 2d Section of the 7th Cruiser Division and destroy him at a stroke. I consider this the best
way. The Natori and the destroyer divisions shall operate as a destroyer squadron, while the
2d Section of the 7th Cruiser Division shall act as the main unit; [both] shall close in on the
enemy and carry out a joint attack, closely cooperating with each other. Tonight, under the
[bright] moonlight of the almost full moon ([of] fourteenth lunar day) with a high visibility,
we will be able to operate in the same way as we do in daytime.”
At 0035, the Harukaze reported: “Spotted two enemy cruisers at 70º [ENE], to the southeast
of Babi Island.” Since at 0037 the enemy opened fire on the Japanese transport convoy, the
Harukaze immediately threw up a very effective smoke screen between the enemy and the
transport convoy. Meanwhile, the Fubuki, who was reporting on the enemy movements by
probing him from behind, took advantage of the enemy’s right turn at 0043. At 0044, she
launched (nine torpedoes) at the second enemy vessel sailing on a parallel course on her port
beam from a short range of about 2,500 meters and [also] fired (sixteen shells) for about two
minutes using her searchlights, after which she saw that her torpedo[es] had hit the enemy
vessel and made the latter slow down. The first enemy vessel returned fire at the Fubuki using
her searchlights, but inflicted no damage.
Having seen that the enemy had opened fire on the Japanese convoy, 3d Escort Unit Com-
mander Hara at 0045, in order to immediately relieve the crisis, ordered the 11th and the 5th
Destroyer Divisions: “Destroyer units, charge!” Along with this, at 0047, he [also] ordered
the 12th Destroyer Division (the Shirakumo and the Murakumo), who were in an area near
Thwartway Island [Dwars-in-den-Weg, Pulau Sangiang], to “Join!” In the meantime, the 2d
Section of the 7th Cruiser Division and the Shikinami, which were preparing for the engage-
ment on the 0010 radio-telephoned report that the enemy had been spotted, started sailing
southward toward the enemy, following the 0030 order to assemble. Furthermore, after the
Harukaze had thrown up her smoke screens, the 5th Destroyer Division was assembling at a
point to the north of the convoy’s anchorage. North of Panjang Island at 0052, in order to
cover the convoy, the Hatakaze fired on the first vessel of the enemy at a range of 3,500 meters
using her searchlights. Although she [also] came under fierce enemy fire, she sustained no
damage. At 0056, 3d Escort Unit Commander Hara ordered the 5th Destroyer Division to
charge. After having completed her shelling, the Hatakaze joined the Harukaze. They were
then joined by the Asakaze as well, and at 0102 the 5th Destroyer Division completed assem-
bling at about ten kilometers north of St. Nicholas Point [Tanjung Pujut].
The Second Phase of the Engagement(150) (from 0100 until 0116)
The 11th Destroyer Division (minus the Fubuki), which on the order to charge was approach-
ing the enemy, started its charge at 0056, bearing 135º [SE]. At 0110, despite fierce enemy fire,
it carried out a torpedo launch (nine per vessel) from a range of 3,500 - 3,800 meters while
sailing on a parallel course at the second enemy vessel on starboard beam, after which [the
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destroyers] evacuated northward, throwing up smoke screens. After having assembled, the
5th Destroyer Division, too, promptly changed to the charge; it reached around 0110 a launch-
ing point while sailing on a parallel course with the enemy on starboard beam. However,
fierce enemy fire hit the flagship Harukaze, causing trouble with her steering and forcing her
to turn to port, thereby missing her opportunity to launch. The Hatakaze was also unable to
launch due to the water columns caused by enemy near misses. Only the third vessel, the
Asakaze, launched her torpedoes (six of them) at 0113 at the first enemy vessel on starboard
beam from a range of 3,700 meters while sailing on a parallel course with the latter, after
which the division was forced to evacuate northward.
In the meantime, the Natori had from 0100 onwards changed to the charge bearing 135º
[SE]; at 0113 she opened fire at the first enemy vessel using her searchlights and at 0114
launched four torpedoes at the latter on starboard beam while sailing on a parallel course.
After that, she ordered the 3d Escort Unit, “Those who have finished their [torpedo] launch
shall join the Natori,” and evacuated northward, throwing up smoke screens. Meanwhile, at
0106, the 12th Destroyer Division, which was [also] rushing toward the site, visually con-
firmed the enemy at a range of about 13,000 meters, at 15º on her right. The 2d Section of the
7th Cruiser Division and the Shikinami also spotted the enemy ahead at 0106. After marking
time until the destroyers had completed their attacks, from 0113 onwards, they gradually
shortened the distance to the enemy while sailing on a parallel course, bearing 110º [ESE].
During that time, at 0116, the Mikuma launched her first aircraft for probing. From around
0056, the Shirataka, which had been on the waters to the north of the convoy and [temporarily]
evacuated to the west so as not to encumber the charge of the Natori and the destroyers, [also]
started advancing toward the enemy; she opened fire from 0114 onwards and scored hit[s].
During this period, the enemy returned fire on the Natori and the destroyer divisions using
all his guns including main guns, auxiliary guns and machineguns. Due to the [Japanese] at-
tacks until that time, the enemy had sustained serious damage, lost speed as well as control
over his movements, and his formation became very much disorderly. On the Japanese side,
the Shirayuki and the Harukaze sustained damage, including eight casualties each.
The Third Phase of the Engagement(150) (from 0116 until 0132)
At 0119, the 2d Section of the 7th Cruiser Division, sailing on a parallel course with the enemy
bearing 110º [ESE], launched six torpedoes each against the first enemy vessel from a range
of 11,200 meters, and reversed course to port because they came too close to Babi Island.
Around that time, the enemy, who had been pouring fire on the 11th Destroyer Division (the
Hatsuyuki and the Shirayuki), also started firing at the 5th Destroyer Division (the Harukaze
and the Hatakaze) around 0118. At 0118, the Harukaze again got a fix on the enemy, and at
0119, while ordering to prepare for a torpedo launch at the enemy on starboard beam on a
parallel course, turned to port. However, due to the water columns thrown up by the enemy
shells, she again lost an opportunity to launch. Around that time, the enemy was beginning
to turn to starboard to reverse course. Maintaining her readiness, the Harukaze swiftly ap-
proached the enemy; at 0126 she launched six torpedoes at the first enemy vessel and re-
versed course to starboard to evacuate northward; after two minutes, she spotted large water
columns presumably caused by hits of her torpedoes. Meanwhile, the Hatakaze launched six
torpedoes at a range of 3,800 meters, and evacuated westward, splitting from the Harukaze.
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Earlier at 0122, the 2d Section of the 7th Cruiser Division had opened fire on the second
enemy vessel from a range of 11,200 meters using searchlights. A number of direct hits caused
fires and explosions of the turrets on the enemy vessel, providing a quite spectacular view,
and her speed got slower all the time. Although the enemy had also started returning fire on
the 2d Section of the 7th Cruiser Division from 0122 onwards, the power of his searchlight[s]
was too weak to enable him to carry out effective shelling. At 0125, due to trouble with her
main [power] switch, the Mikuma became unable to use her searchlights and main guns, after
which only the Mogami continued her shelling, using searchlights. At 0127 the Mogami
launched six torpedoes against the second enemy vessel. 
At 0130 the main [power] circuit of the Mikuma was restored, and after sending a telegram
to the entire fleet, “We will finish off the enemy from now,” she opened fire at the second
enemy vessel at a range of the 9,000 meters using her searchlights and scored a large number
of direct hits. The fierce attacks by all [Japanese] vessels caused huge fires on the first enemy
vessel, while the concentrated fire at her portside bow caused the second enemy vessel to
list to port. Meanwhile, the Natori, who had evacuated northward after having completed
the first launch earlier, again got a fix on the enemy movements. At 0130 she opened fire
using searchlights at the second enemy vessel, who had come within a range [as close as]
8,000 meters, but since she entered a smoke screen at 0132, she halted firing. Meanwhile, the
12th Destroyer Division had been rapidly advancing toward the enemy; [of this division] the
Murakumo was the first [to open fire]; at 0130, using her searchlights, she started firing at the
first enemy vessel (who was [already] crippled by now). [Then] both vessels [of the division]
launched nine torpedoes each at both the first and second enemy vessels, and confirmed that
their torpedoes hit both of them. This [attack] seemed to have aggravated the second enemy
vessel’s difficulty in sailing. On the Japanese side, only the Shikinami had sustained minor
damage to a part of her propeller due to near misses during this period. 
The Fourth Phase of the Engagement(150) (from 0138 until 0206)
At 0135, 3d Escort Unit Commander Hara ordered the units, which had finished their first
launch, to report on their preparations for the next launch. (Note by the author: it [usually]
took five to twenty minutes [to load the launchers] on smooth waters.) At that time, the first
enemy vessel was already on the verge of sinking. While setting a 90º [E] course at 0133 and
pursuing the enemy, the 2d Section of the 7th Cruiser Division spotted at 0135 the first enemy
vessel practically coming to a halt, and opened fire at her from a range of 7,300 meters. At
0142 the section confirmed that the first enemy vessel had sunk, and stopped firing. But then
getting a fix on the second enemy vessel at 0146, they immediately approached the latter and
at 0150 opened fire at her using searchlights. By that time, the enemy vessel had lost most of
her means to fight, including her main guns, which had fallen completely silent. At 0156, the
section stopped firing and detached the Shikinami to finish off the enemy. She launched a tor-
pedo to deliver the final blow, which brought the enemy vessel to a complete halt, and she
finally sank at 0206.
Prior to this, the destroyer divisions had been ordered by 3d Escort Unit Commander
Hara at 0140 to “form a single column behind [the Natori] in the order of their number,” and
they had completed assembling by 0200 [at a point] about five nautical miles north of St.
Nicholas Point [Tanjung Pujut], where they were about to reverse course right away to head
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for the enemy. However, since the first enemy vessel had already sunk and the second vessel
had lost most of her means to fight by that time, the commander ordered the 5th and the
12th Destroyer Divisions at 0200 to: “Go and guard the transport convoy.” Following this
order, both the 5th and the 12th Destroyer Divisions returned to their patrol areas. At first,
the 3d Escort Unit staff had judged the two [enemy] vessels to be one Glasgow-class [cruiser]
and one light cruiser. However, as a result of later [interrogations] of prisoners, it was learned
that they were the Australian light cruiser HMAS Perth (the first vessel) and the U.S. heavy
cruiser USS Houston (the second vessel) who had been attempting to reach Cilicap after flee-
ing from [the battle off] Surabaya.
Capt. Sakiyama Shakao, captain of the Mikuma of the 7th Cruiser Division, described the
engagement [off Batavia] in his “Report on the battle circumstances” to the 5th Destroyer
Squadron commander in the following way:
1. At 0010, the Natori called that two vessels, which looked like large enemy cruisers had been
spotted two nautical miles southeast of Babi Island. We immediately formed a single column,
increased speed, reported it, and completed preparations for an engagement.
2. By measuring the flash of the enemy’s firing of star shells we assessed [the distance of the enemy
from us] as 26,000 - 27,000 meters.
3. At 0104, we increased our speed to thirty knots, when we spotted the enemy at 30º to the left.
Artillery duels [had already opened]; especially when the enemy fired red tracer shells, the red
[tracers] of their Pom-Pom guns streaming toward our friendly units together with the star shells
and smoke screens produced quite a magnificent sight. Since we noticed that the enemy was
taking evasive actions and sailing [now] on a reverse course on starboard bow of the Natori and
the destroyers, we decided to conduct the fight with the enemy on our port hand. However, the
enemy movements were still not clear. We wanted to launch an aircraft, but we could not be-
cause of the wind direction.
4. In a while, we received a report that the enemy was bearing 45º [NE]. After [taking a good look]
through the rifts in the smoke screens, we changed to a 60º [ENE] course, and prepared for an
engagement with the enemy on starboard. Although we realized that sailing at high speed in a
night engagement might be excessive, we set our speed at the second war speed [twenty-one
knots], hoping to arrive at the decisive battle site sooner. However, considering that [the course
and speed] not only would not let us take up a position [as close as] 9,000 meters where we ex-
pected to start illuminating the enemy, but would [actually] carry us away from the enemy, I
ordered to set a 110º [ESE] course [and increase speed to] the third war speed [twenty-four knots].
In the meantime, to my great joy, the wind direction became favorable. At 0116, the first air-
craft was launched. Feeling relieved that finally we would be able to begin the engagement with
the enemy on the starboard, I ordered all aircraft to take off. However, the third aircraft slid
from its platform onto the port catapult, where the second aircraft had already been set on; [both
aircraft] with their flight crews on board got stuck and were unable to take off.
5. Through our launch of an aircraft, the enemy became aware of us and [fired] shells which strad-
dled us ahead and astern, which was a bit unpleasant. At 0118, we attacked the HMAS Perth
who sailed on our starboard on a reverse parallel course, launching six torpedoes each at a 40º
angle to the right from a range of 10,000 meters, while she was sailing at twenty knots (twenty-
four knots at most). After a few moments, I ordered to [fire at the enemy] using searchlights.
The enemy sailed remarkably fast. 
6. The sound of enemy shells landing nearby felt as if they were directly hitting us.
As Babi Island was approaching ahead, the navigation officer, the communications officer
and others lost patience and requested  to change course. Since there was a risk of getting [too]
close to the enemy by changing course to starboard, we boldly put the helm hard aport and sus-
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pended firing so as to get ready to fire at the enemy from our port hand sooner. We [hurriedly]
prepared for firing from our port hand, while keeping our searchlights on for the sake of the
Mogami. Interestingly, most of enemy shells dropped in front of us, as if he had set the wrong
deflections by judging from the waves produced by our paravane chains that we were sailing
at a very high speed. And while we were changing course, all his shells dropped on starboard
and then astern, as if he had aimed at our searchlights or had no idea about our course change.
Around that time, our torpedo attacks sounded like the sudden [explosions of] antisubmarine
depth charges. As the enemy shells roared under water, [the sound] made me worry whether
we might have sustained damage. I truly experienced a baptism of fire. Although the enemy
turned his searchlights toward us, they were weak, whereas ours were very strong.
7. We resumed the engagement bearing 285º [WNW] and at 0124 we again opened fire while sail-
ing on a 260º [W] course. [Scored] direct hits, which presented a spectacular sight. The enemy’s
speed was dropping a little.
In the same way as before, the enemy shells dropped in front of our bow. The navigation of-
ficer was shouted at by the captain, having tried to change course possibly [to avoid] friendly
destroyers, or something else, or enemy shells; the officer later seemed to feel ashamed. [Then]
the [main power] switch broke down, which made us unable to use searchlights or our main
guns. The captain considered it damage inflicted by enemy shells, and ordered the fourth ship
[the Mogami] to turn on her searchlights. He was greatly relieved at the report that the problem
had been fixed, and he ordered the unit to launch [torpedoes]. However, the torpedo chief in-
sisted that the enemy was dropping speed and that no gunfire [had been observed], and we fi-
nally [decided] not to launch ours, while the fourth ship [the Mogami] launched hers.
After that, reports came in: [Our shells and torpedoes are] torturing [her], they have hit her
and caused fire, her turret[s] have been blown off, she is about to sink, etc. Very good! The cap-
tain also watched from nearby the 12[.7]-cm [antiaircraft] guns.
Due to our high speed, we were sailing past the enemy; we turned to port to reverse course,
and bearing 90º [E], fired at her [at a range of] 7,000 [meters]; scored direct hits; splendid!
At 0143, HMAS Perth suddenly went down and sank.
8. Since it was reported that the other vessel was presumably heading for the Babi Island waterway,
we moved ahead, increasing our speed to the third war speed [twenty-four knots], and to the
fourth war speed [twenty-seven knots]. While sailing on a 165º [SSE] course, we spotted the sil-
houette of the enemy vessel. She still seemed to be firing her Pom-Pom guns, but her main guns
did not seem to work.
On the way, we spotted a cutter, which made me worry that a friendly destroyer might have
been hit, but with no time to check those on board, we [kept on] sailing. Since the Shikinami sail-
ing ahead of us prevented us from turning our searchlights [on the enemy and firing at him], I
ordered her to move to the left. At 0150, we [again] opened fire at a range of about 6,500 [meters].
The second salvo scored a hit, after which we kept scoring hits. After three minutes, we spotted
waves ahead, reversed course at a point close to shore, and resumed firing. Our shells hit, caused
fires, blew off her foretop, and flames burst out. [The staff on] our bridge observed the battle
situation with great excitement; even without conveying orders to the engine room things went
well.
9. [The enemy vessel] did not sink despite such [enormous] damage. I thought for a moment that
she had run aground. She came to a halt, whereas we continued sailing at a high speed. In night
engagements, sailing at high speed is problematic, so I gave orders [to slow down to] strong
speed [fifteen knots] and to normal speed [twelve knots], etc., just for my own peace of mind.
The enemy [vessel] had sustained concentrated fire at her port bow, which had blown off
her turret[s] and caused fire; she listed to port and began to sink, losing [all] means to fight and
we stopped firing.
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10. The torpedo chief offered a proposal that since the Shikinami did not seem to have launched her
torpedoes yet, perhaps you could let her launch hers. Accordingly, I ordered her to launch one
torpedo and charge.
Although the torpedo chief said that I should let her decide the number of torpedoes to be
launched, I thought we should not waste them. While I was wavering about letting her decide
[the number], the transmission [of the order] was finished. The Shikinami launched [only] one
torpedo, but I could not tell whether it was because she faithfully executed the order, or because
she herself made the decision.
This torpedo attack sped up the enemy vessel’s sinking, and she went down with her bow first.
It was 0205.
11. Although the enemy had consisted of [only] two vessels, it was not clear when they had dis-
banded the formation or when they had reversed course.
12. I was deeply grateful to my men that they supported and guided their captain with such a battle
spirit. 
I was also relieved that the vessels behind me instantly reacted [at unanticipated orders to
increase their speed] to high speed, and followed me in good order. (The rest omitted by the
author.) 
The Damage Sustained by the Army Transport Ships and
Minesweeper No. 2
At 0135 on 1 March, Minesweeper No. 2, who was guarding the transport convoy [on the
waters] south of Panjang Island, was hit by a torpedo on starboard in her boiler room; she
broke up at that section and capsized. Around that time, the transport ships were also hit by
torpedoes, which caused the loss of the Sakura-maru, who sank, while the Ryūjō-maru, the
Hōrai-maru and the Tatsuno-maru sustained serious damage. Among them, the Ryūjō-maru
was carrying [Sixteenth] Army Commander Imamura on board, and was in the middle of
the second landing operation. [The accident caused] Army Commander Imamura to swim
around just in his life vest in a sea covered with heavy oil for about three hours until he was
finally picked up and rescued around 0430. In view of the launching points, the lines of fire,
and the performance of the torpedoes, it was certain that these torpedoes were among those
which the 7th Cruiser Division had launched in its second launch.(150) (The tails of Type93
torpedoes were recovered near the landing area of the army.)(199) However, concerning this
incident, it was generally believed that enemy torpedo boats had intruded into the anchorage
following the attack by the enemy cruisers and had inflicted the damage [to the vessels]. It
was because Commander Imamura had graciously accepted the apology of the Navy side
that this fact was kept from becoming publicly known.
Lessons of War and Observations After this Sea Engagement
The lessons of war drawn by 5th Destroyer Squadron Commander Rear Admiral Hara and
the observations he made were according to the “Action Report of the 5th Destroyer
Squadron” the following:
1. When implementing plans of operations, we need to take appropriate measures at appropriate
moments as the movements of the enemy which we are facing change. More often than not, you
should not stick to plans that have been drawn up long before. When the defeat of the enemy
air power, which should be a necessary condition when implementing landing operations, has
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not yet been completed, you also need to accordingly change at an appropriate moment [the
schedule of] the advance of the transport ships and the execution of the landing operation, just
like this time in the Java landing operation. Particularly, in the operations of the land-based air
units, the conditions of the advance bases are often unknown, which at times hinders them from
carrying out air campaigns to destroy the enemy air power as planned. Therefore, the com-
mander on site’s judgment of the enemy movements needs to be respected and without sticking
to the basic plans, instructions need to be given in such a way that the operations at the front
can be implemented appropriately and with ease. 
2. Although it is essential to reinforce the support forces so as to match the movements of the
enemy, it will be useless unless the specially-dispatched reinforcements arrive in time for the
engagement. The dispatch of the Ryūjō this time is a good example of such [a case]. Thus, I think
careful consideration is required so that appropriate reinforcements will be dispatched to an
appropriate place at an appropriate time.
3. The sea engagement off Batavia, which occurred on waters very close to the anchorage of the
transport convoy, was extremely disadvantageous for us as escort unit to fight. The conceivable
reasons for this were that in the first place the landing was forced in an area close to waters
where powerful enemy surface forces existed, and that in the second place, we did not have
forces enough to conduct the landing operation while carrying out attacks on the enemy. At that
time, our escort forces were not enough [in strength] to defeat the enemy surface forces before-
hand and grasp the command of the sea in the surrounding areas, and we did not have sufficient
time, either. [Therefore,] it became necessary for us to have the indirect escort forces further ad-
vance and enhance their operations in concert with the air campaign to destroy the enemy air
power, by which we would locally gain the upper hand [over the enemy] and hence locally gain
command of the sea before the landing operation. If the enemy had intended to aggressively
carry out an offensive in the engagement off Batavia, he could have conducted a far more effec-
tive attack by taking advantage of the home ground. [Therefore], I think this will make a good
example when conducting landing operations in the future.
4. When a concentrated attack of all units (and vessels) becomes excessively dense in night en-
gagements, it is common that consecutive direct hits by the units (or vessels), water columns
created by their torpedo hits as well as the flashes of enemy gunfire make it extremely difficult
to judge the general situation on both sides, observe the landing of shells, or to assess the effect
of torpedoes etc. It is crucial to report the damage to the enemy, such as a dropping of his speed,
or fires. However, at the sight of water columns or black smoke caused by friendly shells landing
near the enemy, all units (and vessels) too quickly jumped to report them as the results of their
own shelling or torpedo hits. Although it may boost morale, there is some fear that it may in-
stead not only crowd communications but also mislead the judgment of the commanders.
5. Although such issues as the depth of torpedo [trajectories] or excessive running range in torpedo
attacks against [enemy] cruisers have traditionally been studied, in the engagement off Batavia,
again many trails of torpedoes, presumably launched by our cruisers, ran through waters very
close to [our] destroyer divisions then in the middle of charging toward the enemy, which made
us feel in danger of getting hit.
6. Shelling conducted only with medium-caliber guns on cruisers or lesser vessels can degrade
the enemy’s fighting ability, but it is not [strong] enough to sink them. In many cases, torpedo
attacks are required to completely sink them. [However,] when conducting torpedo warfare
such as in the recent engagement where the engagement occurred on waters very close to the
anchorage of the transport convoy and where many units engaged in the night engagement
took up positions to make a pincer attack on the enemy, we need to pay special attention to the
direction of the lines of fire.
7. The fighting ability of our special-type destroyers was superior and their reputation as the
[Navy’s] principal weapon particularly in night engagements was confirmed in the successive
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engagements in the Java area. In the future, we need to attach greater importance to drills for
night engagements, so as to make the most of their strong points; at the same time the perform-
ance of the special-type destroyers should be further improved; [on top of that,] the crew [of
these vessels], from the captain and staff officers down to those in important positions, should
be specially selected as has been done before, and appropriately assigned, so that [these de-
stroyers] will form the elite of our navy and a national treasure both in name and reality. Also,
I keenly felt that the [performance of the] torpedoes of the Natori-class cruisers was very poor,
and that they must be quickly upgraded to Type90 or Type93 [torpedoes].
Note by the author: The torpedoes of the vessels that participated in the engagement(155)
Mikuma-class: Type93 (with an [effective] range of 20,000 meters [when running at] 48 knots,
a range of 30,000 meters [when running at] 41 knots, with a range of 38,000 meters, [when
running at] 36 knots)
Natori-class: Type8 (with an [effective] range of 10,000 meters [when running at] 39 knots)
Harukaze-class: Type6 (with an [effective] range of 6,000 meters [when running at] 37 knots)
Hatsuyuki-class: Type90 (with an [effective] range of 7,000 meters [when running at] 45 knots)
Shirakumo-class: Type90
Shikinami-class: Type90
8. We need to see to it that friend-or-foe identification signals shall be given swiftly.
Needless to say, this is without fail necessary when the enemy and us are mixed up in a night
[engagement]. However, when deployed for patrolling and [sailing] on guard, sometimes there
is a lack in swiftness [in giving signals and responding], possibly due to a hasty conclusion that
vessels approaching the patrol area border must be friends. A little delay in response nearly led
sometimes to a situation that was only seconds away from an unfortunate friendly fire [inci-
dent].
Not only the signal staff but also the crew on the bridge during a patrolling deployment
need all to be fully aware of this.
9. General observations on providing escort for landing operations
(1) Although attaching Class-A cruisers to an escort unit as its support unit and have the former
support the latter may increase confidence, they [usually] support [the escort unit] in a
roundabout way, which, more often than not, does not fit the actual situation. We need to
put the support unit and one element of the air unit under the unified command of the escort
unit commander and have them operate at a short distance of the escort unit depending on
the enemy movements so as to make the most of them.
(2) Since in sea areas such as where we carried out the recent Java operation, the days when
seaplanes are not able to operate in terms of weather and sea conditions are rare, I think it
would be best to have seaplane tenders like the San’yō-maru or the Kamikawa-maru sail to-
gether within the columns of the transport convoy and assign [these tenders] to guard
against enemy aircraft and submarines under the direct command of the escort unit com-
mander ([because such tenders] are able to retrieve their aircraft at sea, it becomes possible
for the escort unit to neutralize enemy submarines by itself).
10. Needless to say, the escort forces should not leave the landing point too early. A review of the
course of invasion operations until now indicates that it is one or two days after the convoy’s
entry into the anchorage that the enemy flocks to the [landing point], which makes me think
that we need to have the escort forces remain [at the landing point] until at least the disem-
barkation is completed. Nevertheless, in such local invasion operations as the seizure of a
[nearby] air base, I think it stands to reason to first of all only disembark the things required for
the immediate engagements, and have the transport convoy leave the anchorage for the time
being and at the appropriate moment [return and] carry out the second and third transports.
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5. The Main Body of the Southern Task Force Advances to the
South of Java (See Illustration No. 47)
On 22 February, Southern Task Force Commander Vice Admiral Kondō had made various
arrangements with Dutch East Indies Commander Vice Admiral Takahashi, who had put in
at Staring Bay on that day, concerning the outline of the Java invasion operation. Those di-
rectly relevant here concern the second carrier operation, which were the following (as pre-
viously told [p. 404]):(53)
1. In view of the presence of enemy surface vessels in the Surabaya area, the operation of the core
force of the 5th Cruiser Division to act in concert with the second carrier operation shall be called
off. The force shall quickly be sent to the Makassar Strait area to support the units for the eastern
Java invasion [operation].
2. As a measure to supplement the insufficient destroyer strength of the carrier task force, one de-
stroyer division shall be extracted from the 2d Destroyer Squadron currently engaged in the
Kupang operation to participate in the carrier operation from the area near Timor.
Meanwhile on the same day, Southern Task Force Commander Vice Admiral Kondō sent a
proposal to the Southern Army to postpone the starting date of the landing [operation] for
two days. At 1830, he informed the carrier task force that the departure of the main body of
the Southern Task Force from Staring Bay had been set for 0800 on 25 February.
At 0830 on 25 February, following the departure of the Carrier Task Force from Staring
Bay, Southern Task Force Commander Vice Admiral Kondō left the bay for the Indian Ocean,
leading the main body of the Southern Task Force ([consisting of] the 4th Cruiser division
(the Atago, the Takao and the Maya), and the 4th Destroyer Division 1st Section (the Arashi
and the Nowaki). Having followed in the wake of the Carrier Task Force until 1530, the main
body separated from the former and headed for the Ombai Strait. [Then] joined around noon
on 26 February at Ombai Strait by the Hayashio of the 2d Section of the 15th Destroyer Divi-
sion, who had cut short the Kupang operation, the main body headed for the waters south
of Sumba Island and reached the waters south of Sumbawa Island on the 27th. On that day,
the sea engagement off Surabaya took place in the eastern part of the Java Sea while in the
western part an enemy fleet [was spotted] making a sortie (it was later [judged to] have es-
caped into the port of Batavia), which led to the afore-mentioned delay of the landing oper-
ations both in eastern and western Java for one day (the postponement of the eastern Java
[operation] was decided in the early morning of the 28th).
Also on the 28th, the main body continued to sail westward, and on the early morning of
that day it reached the waters south of Bali. At 1000, Southern Task Force Commander Kondō
sent the following telegram to commanders in chief as well as commanders of all units of
the Southern Task Force by way of Second Fleet Classified Telegram No. 56: “From now on,
the main body of the Southern Task Force shall sail to the waters about seventy nautical miles
south of Cilacap, after which it shall meet, catch and destroy the evacuating enemy while
cruising from east to west on the waters south of Java.”(141)
On the early morning of 1 March, the main body of the Southern Task Force reached the
waters about seventy nautical miles south of the Cilacap, after which, it gradually pushed
southward while cruising from east to west on the waters south of Java. Between 0142 and
0529, the 1st Section (the Arashi and the Nowaki) of the 4th Destroyer Division sank four
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enemy merchant ships.(58) On top of that, at 0740, the Arashi captured a Dutch merchantman
(1,000t-class), while between 1330 and 1620, the aircraft of the Takao carried out a bombing
attack on an armed Dutch ship ( 7,000 tons) and caused a large fire on her.
6. The Operations of the Carrier Task Force (Until 1 March)
The distribution of forces for the second carrier operation by the Carrier Task Force was as
follows.(141, 143, 156) (Although the 2d Section of the 3d Battleship Division had been incorporated
in the main body of the Southern Task Force, it was returned to the 3d Battleship Division as
of 16 February to participate in the second carrier operation.) 
The outline of the planned operations of the units was as follows:(156)
1. The air raid unit, the support unit and the guard unit shall leave Staring Bay at 0700 on the 25th,
conduct the first refueling at Point A (11º50’S, 117º40’E) at 1800 on the 27th, and the second re-
fueling at Point B (16º20’S, 107º20’E) at 1800 on 1 March. Thereafter, while searching for enemy
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fleets, they shall advance to the waters south of Java by way of Point C
(17º30’S, 104º30’E), and Point D (10º0’S, 101º10’E). If [the units] spot enemy
fleets or transport convoys, [they] shall operate generally westward so as to
cut off the enemy’s escape routes while carrying out air attacks, and quickly
and completely destroy him by repeatedly conducting fierce attacks. After
having destroyed enemy carriers, the support unit and the bulk of the guard
unit shall be advanced with the intention to completely destroy the enemy
in concert with the air campaign. Depending on the circumstances, [enemy]
transport convoys shall be captured. If the units should spot no enemy fleets
or transport convoys even as far as Point D, the units shall advance to Point
E (9º20’S, 106º10’E) around 0600 on the 4th, where they shall conduct an air
raid on [enemy] transport convoys in the Cilacap area, and head for Point F
(15º0’S, 110º0’E), where they shall have the third refueling before returning
to Staring Bay.
2. Depending on the enemy movements, [the units] may shift to the second dis-
position of forces and have a detached unit (the 2d Carrier Division, the 2d
Section of the 3d Battleship Division, four destroyers, and the Ken’yō-maru)
operate separately. In that case, the detached unit shall operate so as to be
able to return to Staring Bay in the middle of March unless specifically or-
dered otherwise.
At 0830 on 25 February, the Carrier Task Force left Staring Bay for the In-
dian Ocean for the second carrier operation.(68) While strictly patrolling
against enemy submarines including on the route ahead and also guard-
ing in the air against enemy aircraft, the Carrier Task Force sailed south-
ward and passed through the Ombai Strait at 0930 on the 26th. On the
27th, having received reports from the land-based air unit of spotting an
enemy carrier (at 368 nautical miles 265º [W] of Bali), Carrier Task Force
Commander V. Adm. Nagumo Chūichi signaled: “After finishing refu-
eling, the Carrier Task Force shall swiftly advance to take up a position
to the south of the enemy carrier and completely destroy her tomorrow
early in the morning. The supply unit and the 1st Section of the 15th De-
stroyer Division shall directly head for the area of Point B and stay on
standby.”(141) However, the [enemy] carrier (the converted U.S. seaplane
tender USS Langley) was severely damaged by a land-based attack plane
unit of the Takao Air Group and sank on the same day.
On the 28th, an aircraft patrolling the route ahead of the Carrier Task
Force spotted an armed merchantman and carried out an attack ([with]
one 60-kg bomb, which missed). However, other than her, the Carrier
Task Force spotted no enemy. At 0700 on 1 March, the Carrier Task Force
reached the waters about 140 nautical miles 150º [SE] of Christmas Island. On that day, the
force sank one Dutch merchantman (the Modjokerto, 8,082t, [equipped with] one 3-inch anti-
aircraft gun and two machineguns), one U.S. oiler (the Pecos, [equipped with] two antiaircraft
guns and a number of small machineguns) and one U.S. destroyer (the USS Edsall).
The circumstances at the time of the sinking of the U.S. Destroyer USS Edsall were as fol-
lows:(156) (See Illustration No. 48)
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At 1722, Carrier Task Force Commander Vice Admiral Nagumo ordered V. Adm. Mikawa
Gun’ichi, commander of the support unit: “The support unit (minus the 3d Battleship Division
2d Section) shall sink the enemy light cruiser that is following us astern.” Almost simultaneously
with this order, the support unit (the Hiei, the Kirishima, the Toné and the Chikuma), too, spotted
the [enemy] masts at a distance of about thirty kilometers 335º [NNW], reversed course and
headed for the attack. At that time, three aircraft of the Sōryū were directly escorting the force
in the air. Although the weather was fine, a rather dense mist covered the surface of the sea
while at sea level the wind was blowing from 130º [SE] at ten meters per second; visibility was
thirty-five kilometers. From around 1732, the Chikuma opened fire at a range of 21,000 meters.
At 1745, the 3d Battleship Division launched three Type–95 reconnaissance seaplanes to observe
the artillery engagement, and at 1747 started firing with its main guns at a range of 27,000 me-
ters. The Toné opened fire at a range of 23,500 meters around 1815. However, because the enemy
made large right-about turns almost every minute and often skillfully threw up smoke screens,
the Japanese forces were hardly able to score hits. 

















Southern Task Force, 
Main Body
From 28th till 5th
From 28th till 8th
Christmas Isl




Illustration No. 47 — The Sea Area of the Second [Carrier] Operation of the Main Body of the Southern Task
Force and the Carrier Task Force
Since the attacks by the surface units were not producing the intended results, eight carrier-
based bombers of the Akagi and nine of the Sōryū respectively took off at 1800 and 1805, car-
ried out dive bombings from 1827 until 1857 ([and dropped] nine 500-kg and eight 250-kg
bombs). With many direct hits and near misses, the enemy destroyer lost her speed and fi-
nally came to a halt. During this period and holding their fire, the surface units gradually re-
duced the distance. From around 1850, they resumed firing, and making use of [all guns
including] secondary guns and antiaircraft guns, they finally sank the enemy destroyer at
1901. The shelling of the surface units lasted as long as one hour and fourteen minutes; the
amount of ordnance consumed was enormous as seen below:
The 3d Battleship Division:   297 36-cm shells and 132 15-cm shells
The 8th Cruiser Division:      844 20-cm shells and 62 12.7-cm shells
Concerning this engagement, the 3d Battleship Division and the 8th Cruiser Division made
the following observations.(158, 159)
The 3d Battleship Division
1. Since the enemy was a destroyer sailing alone and did not need to take into consideration how
to bring her gun power into play due to the distance between us, she was able to freely move
without restriction, which enabled her to take skillful evasive actions and throw up smoke
screens. (It looked as if she made a right-about turn almost every minute or changed course
after observing our discharges.)
2. Because we fired roughly at a range between 28,000 meters and 24,000 meters, which made the
flight time of our shells fairly long (about forty-five seconds or more), and because the intervals
between our salvos were also long, it became even easier for the enemy to take evasive actions.
3. From the beginning [of the engagement], the Hiei and the Chikuma had figured out that the
enemy was not a light cruiser but a destroyer, and hence carried out the shelling using the tar-
get-gauging calculator.*
Although entertaining some doubts, the Kirishima and the Toné dealt with her as a light cruiser
([of the] Marblehead-class).
The 8th Cruiser Division
1. Long-range firing at a fast vessel that freely takes evasive actions lowers the hit rate and ends
up consuming an unexpectedly large amount of ordnance.
In order to [avoid] this [situation] in these kinds of artillery duels, it is absolutely essential
to heed the following [points]:
(1) To carry out shelling from a range as close [to the enemy] as possible.
The appropriate firing range for the main guns on our vessel to fire on [enemy] destroyers
should be deemed to be within 10,000 meters.
(2) If it is impossible to wait for [an opportunity to] close in on the enemy due to circumstances,
you should closely watch the enemy movements while conducting slow fire; rapid fire shall
be conducted only when the fire is seen to produce results. 
2. You need to try to confirm the type of enemy vessel before opening fire.
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* For fire control the Japanese Navy used the British-derived “fire control director [hōiban]” and “fire control
table/calculator [shagekiban],” to which they had added a uniquely Japanese instrument to measure the speed
and course of the target, the so-called “sokutekiban [gauging-the target-calculator].” See David C. Evans and
Mark R. Peattie, Kaigun; Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy 1887-1941. Annapolis,
Naval Institute Press 1997, pp. 250-53.
480 Chapter VII     /     The Implementation of the Java Invasion Operation
End of gunfire
End of fire from secondary guns
Fire resumed
End of fire from main guns
Fire from secondary guns started












































































































Support Unit (minus 2D/3S)
 separated from the main body
Legend
Smoke screenOpening of fire







Illustration No. 48 — The Engagement of the Support Unit of the Carrier Task Force 
with the USS Edsall (U.S. Destroyer)
1 March 1942, on the waters to the south of Christmas Island
The Toné mistakenly took the enemy vessel in the engagement for a Marblehead-class [cruiser],
which considerably disadvantaged her in terms of the artillery duel as well as in terms of gaug-
ing the speed and course of the target.
7. The Operations of the Submarine Units (See Illustration No. 49)
Southern Task Force Commander Vice Admiral Kondō had informally announced to the
units concerned that he would combine the 6th Submarine Squadron (Commander: R. Adm.
Kawano Chimaki), then under his direct command, with the 4th Submarine Squadron, cur-
rently incorporated in the Malaya Unit, to form Submarine Unit A (under the command of
4th Submarine Squadron Commander R. Adm. Yoshitomi Setsuzō) and put it under his
[Kondō’s] unified command. On 1 February, by means of Second Fleet Classified Telegram
No. 820, the Southern Task Force commander announced the outline of operations for Sub-
marine Unit A at the time of the Timor, Bali and Java invasion operations, the main points of
which were as follows:(60)
1. Mission
(1) To catch and destroy reinforcements and/or escaping forces of the enemy. 
(2) To watch and attack key enemy areas.
2. Deployment
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The Battleship Hiei
The Cruiser Toné
(1) Five submarines in the area [off] the southern coast of Java and the Sunda
Islands (roughly within sixty nautical miles offshore). However, before
the landing on Java, two submarines each shall be deployed at the south-
ern entrances of [both] the Sunda and the Lombok Straits. After the land-
ings two or more submarines shall be deployed off Cilacap.
(2) Two submarines in the Torres Strait
(3) One submarine [off] Port Darwin
In accordance with this outline, Rear Admiral Yoshitomi, Submarine Unit
A commander, issued on 5 February the following order by means of
Submarine Unit A Telegraphic Operation Order No. 1:
1. The deployment of the 4th Submarine Squadron
[At] the southern entrance of the Sunda Strait, [the area] off Cilacap, and the
southern entrance of the Lombok Strait
2. The deployment of the 6th Submarine Squadron
[At] Port Darwin and the Torres Strait
Since the 2d Submarine Squadron was [also] transferred to the Southern Task Force later on
8 February, Southern Task Force Commander Vice Admiral Kondō formed with this squadron
Submarine Unit C, and on 9 February, by means of Telegraphic Order No. 92 (as previously
told [pp. 331-32]) he outlined his plans for all units [of the Southern Task Force] including
the submarine units. The items concerning the submarine units will be cited again.* It was a
very grand plan:(141)
7. Submarine Unit A (the 4th and the 6th Submarine Squadrons) shall operate as scheduled; it shall
be assigned to watch and patrol the southern coast of the Dutch East Indies east of (and includ-
ing) Java as well as the Torres Strait and the Port Darwin area.
8. Submarine Unit B (the 5th Submarine Squadron) shall be assigned to watch and patrol the
coastal areas of Ceylon and India as well as the north entrance of the Malacca Strait and the
southern coast of Sumatra.
9. Submarine Unit C (the 2d Submarine Squadron) shall leave Staring Bay around 23 February
and advance into the Indian Ocean. The bulk of the unit shall advance while searching for the
enemy more or less 400 nautical miles south of Java, and swiftly reach the area south of the
Cocos Islands. After that and until about 1 March, it shall conduct patrols from a position on
the waters between about 97ºE and 100ºE beyond the 600 nautical miles range from Palembang.
One element shall be assigned to covertly patrol the regular sailing routes on the western coast
of Australia off Freemantle, after which it shall return to Staring Bay around 6 March. Also, one
designated submarine shall promptly be assigned to reconnoiter and watch the Cocos Islands.
Submarine Unit A, Guarding Java and [the Area] to the East
On 6 February, Submarine Unit A Commander Rear Admiral Yoshitomi issued the details
on the deployment of the submarines of the 4th Submarine Squadron in the Java operation
by means of Submarine Unit A Operation Order No. 2. In accordance with this order, Sub-





* The quote on pp. 331-32 is from the Action Report of the 2d Destroyer Squadron. The quote here is from the
Action Report of the 1st Destroyer Squadron. The main difference is that the first report says that the search
for the enemy should be conducted southeast of Java, while all other reports say south.
marines I-53, I-54 and I-58 left Cam Ranh Bay on 7 February, and Submarine Ro-33 on 8 Feb-
ruary, for their respective stations. However, since on the 9th the [landing] date of the Java
operation became likely to be postponed, Submarine Unit A Commander Rear Admiral
Yoshitomi ordered the submarines, which were under sail southward toward their stations,
to stand by in the Anambas Islands [instead].
On 11 February, after having been notified that the invasion schedule for Batavia and
Surabaya had been postponed until 26 February and the schedule for Bali and Kupang until
20 February, the Submarine Unit A commander gave orders regarding the operations of each
submarine by means of Telegraphic Operation Order No. 42. [Accordingly], submarines I-
53, I-54, and I-58, as well as submarine Ro-33, left the Anambas Islands on 13 February, while
submarine Ro-34 left Cam Ranh Bay on 17 February, heading for their respective stations for
the Java operation. The operations of each submarine will be outlined below.
Submarine I-54 (with the 18th Submarine Division commander on board): Having left the
Anambas Islands on 13 February, she reached via the Lombok Strait her patrol area in the west-
ern part of the waters south of the Sunda Strait roughly around the 20th, pulled out [from the
area] on 4 March, and returned to Staring Bay on the 9th. During this period, she attacked three
merchant ships and sank one 10,000t-class passenger ship. She [also] heard a sound presumably
caused by a [torpedo] hit on a 15,000t-class tanker, but the result was unclear.
Submarine I-53: Having left the Anambas Islands on 13 February, she took up position along
with her fellow submarines (I-55 and Ro-33) on 15 February on a skirmish line in order to ob-
struct the escape routes of the enemy fleet [then] sailing northward through the Gaspar Strait
[p. 300]. However, having spotted no enemy [there], the line was called off on the evening of
the 16th and she advanced to [the area] off Cilacap through the Lombok Strait, after which she
pulled out of the area on 4 March and returned to Staring Bay on the 8th. During this operation,
she sank one 10,000t-class and one 15,000t-class merchantman. 
Submarine I-58: Having left the Anambas Islands on 13 February, she arrived at her patrol area
in the eastern part of the waters south of the Sunda Strait around the 20th via the Lombok Strait,
pulled out [from the area] on 4 March and returned to Staring Bay on the 8th. During this period,
she sank one 15,000t-class tanker as well as one 4,000t-class and one 3,000t-class merchantman.
Submarine Ro-33: Having left the Anambas Islands on 13 February, she operated in the Sunda
Strait for an attack on the enemy fleet on the 15th, after which she arrived in her patrol area in
the western part of the waters south of the Lombok Strait. Then from the 21st to the 24th, she
was deployed for watching [enemy movements] near Bali until returning to her original patrol
area. On 1 March, she advanced to [the area] off Cilacap due to a change in her deployment on
the 28th, after which she pulled out from the area on 4 March and returned to Staring Bay on
the 8th. During this period, she spotted a considerable number of enemy merchant ships, de-
stroyers and submarines and attacked them, but every time she failed to produce results due to
evasive actions of the enemy.
Submarine Ro-34: Because Submarine I-57 had become unable to conduct operations for the
rest of the February due to an outbreak of dysentery, it was decided that the Ro-34 would replace
her and take up position in the patrol area in the eastern part of the waters south of the Lombok
Strait. She left Cam Ranh Bay on 17 February, and after having been deployed for watching
[enemy movements] near Bali from the 21st to the 24th along with Submarine Ro-33, she re-
turned to her original patrol area on the 24th. She [again] changed her position to [an area] off
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Cilacap from the 28th onwards. However, she did not spot any enemy vessels other than once
spotting [an] enemy destroyer; she pulled out of the area on 4 March and returned to Staring
Bay on 7 March.
In the meantime, after having watched [enemy movements] in her patrol area at the southern
entrance of the Sunda Strait during Operation L [the southern Sumatra operation], Submarine
I-56 returned to Staring Bay on the 21st, where she stayed on standby. [Then] on 4 March she
was ordered by the Southern Task Force commander to hurriedly deploy to [the area] off
Cilacap to watch [enemy movements] in this area; she left port on the morning of the 5th for
[the area] off Cilacap and took charge of patrolling from the 8th onwards. However, on the
afternoon of the next day, the 9th, she was ordered to return to Staring Bay. She left the patrol
area on the same day and put in at Staring Bay on 12 March. During this period, she was not
able to sink a single ship.
[Meanwhile,] the 6th Submarine Squadron operated in outline as follows:
Submarine I-121: She left Davao on 9 February, [arrived] in the Arafura Sea on the 14th,
[reached] the waters west of Port Darwin on the 16th (where she supported the air campaign
by communicating weather information) and returned to Staring Bay on the 28th; other than
several times spotting enemy aircraft, she spotted no enemy.
Submarine I-122: She left Davao on 9 February, and [reached] the Torres Strait on the 15th,
where she engaged in watching [enemy movements] until the 26th, and returned to Staring Bay
on the 28th. Other than encountering one enemy patrol boat, she spotted no enemy.
Submarine I-123: She left Davao on 19 February, and reached the Torres Strait on the 24th, where
she laid mines at night on the 25th and returned to Staring Bay on 9 March. She spotted no
enemy during this deployment.
Chōgei: She left Davao on 20 February, put in at Staring Bay on the 23d, and directed the oper-
ations.
The operations of Submarine Unit B (in the areas along the coast of Ceylon and India as well
as the north entrance of the Malacca Strait) are omitted here, because they were not directly
related to the Java invasion operation.
Submarine Unit C, Guarding [the Area] South of Java
On 21 January,* Combined Fleet Commander in Chief Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku an-
nounced his plans for the carrier operations of the Southern Task Force by means of Tele-
graphic Operation Order No. 54 (as previously told), in which he disclosed that one element
of the Sixth Fleet would be transferred to the Southern Task Force (the name of the vessels
and the timing would be given later).(141) On 3 February, the Navy General Staff informally
notified the 2d Submarine Squadron that it should participate in the carrier operations in the
southern [theater]. The 2d Submarine Squadron returned to Yokosuka in early February after
having participated in the Hawaii operation right at the opening of hostilities, and was doing
maintenance in preparation for the operation in the Indian Ocean. On 8 February, the 2d Sub-
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* Probably a misprint for 31 January, see pp. 211-12.
marine Squadron was officially transferred to the Southern Task Force
by means of Combined Fleet Telegraphic Operation Order No. 64.(141)
Conform to this order, Southern Task Force Commander Vice Admiral
Kondō gave orders to form Submarine Unit C with the 2d Submarine
Squadron, while ordering the squadron to advance to Palau as soon as
possible. The forces of the unit consisted of the following:
Submarine I-7 (flagship)
7th Submarine Division (Submarines I-1, I-2, and I-3)
8th Submarine Division (Submarines I-4, I-5, and I-6)
The Santos-maru
On 16 and 17 February, the 2d Submarine Squadron advanced to Palau
(Submarines I-1 and I-6 directly headed for Staring Bay and put in there
on 22 February due to their delayed departure from Yokosuka). On 16 February, Southern
Task Force commander ordered 2d Submarine Squadron Commander R. Adm. Ichioka
Hisashi to sail to Staring Bay, and thus the [whole] squadron put in at the bay on the 21st
and the 22d.
Although the main points of the operations of Submarine Unit C are not very clear in de-
tail, they are presumed to have been as follows [See also pp. 331-32, 482]:
1. [The squadron] should leave Staring Bay on 23 February.
2. The 7th Submarine Division shall sail and search for [the enemy] along the regular sailing routes
on the western coast of Australia and, after patrolling the area off Freemantle, return to Staring
Bay around 6 March.
3. Submarine I-7 and the 8th Submarine Division should sail while searching for the enemy on the
waters about four hundred nautical miles from the southern coast of Java and reach the area
south of the Cocos Islands. After that and until about 1 March, they should reach a point between
about 97ºE and 100ºE beyond the six hundred nautical miles range from Palembang, conduct
patrols [there] and then return to Staring Bay around 10 March.
4. Submarine I-4 should reconnoiter and watch [enemy movements near] the Cocos Islands.
The operations of the submarines of Submarine Unit C were as follows:
Submarine I-1: She left Staring bay at 1700 on 23 February, using only one of her engines. At
that time, her starboard engine was out of order and needed repair at a naval arsenal. On the
25th, the submarine passed through the Ombai Strait. She searched for the enemy while sailing
on the waters northwest of Australia; on 3 March she sank one 8,000t-class armed merchantman
(the Dutch ship Sianter, 8,667 tons) at a point four hundred nautical miles northwest of Sharks
Bay.(160) She returned to Staring Bay on the 11th, and was ordered to leave the bay for Yokosuka
on the 15th.
Submarine I-3 (with the 7th Submarine Division commander on board): At 1630 on 22 February,
she left Staring Bay along with Submarine I-2. At 0135 on the 23d, she spotted [an] enemy sub-
marine, but did not have an opportunity to attack her. On 2 March, she passed the skirmish line
X–4, and headed for a point six nautical miles 270º of Cape Leeuwin. On 3 March, she spotted
and attacked one 7,000t-class cargo ship sailing westward but let her slip away. Then on 6 March,
she reconnoitered Sharks Bay as ordered, spotted one surfaced [enemy] submarine, fired at the





latter but let her slip away, without being able to score a hit. After reporting on the reconnais-
sance results of Sharks Bay, she put in at Penang on 14 March by way of Skirmish Line Q–2.
Submarine I-2: On 22 February, along with Submarine I-3, she left Staring Bay to advance to
the Indian Ocean. At 2103 on 1 March, she spotted two mid-sized cargo ships at 31º50’S 113º30E’
and sank one of them (the Dutch ship Parigi, 1,172 tons)(160) with two torpedoes. [Then,] at 0358
on the 2d, she also spotted one mid-sized merchantman off Freemantle, attacked her but gained
no results. She [further] spotted one large cargo ship at 2000 and attacked her but let her slip
away when counterattacked. After that, she was persistently pursued by two enemy patrol
boats, which did not allow her to surface from 0700 on the 3d until 2000 on the 4th. On 5 March,
she left her patrol area to head northward for Skirmish Line Q–2. On the 11th, she again sank
one merchantman (the British ship Chilka, 4,360tons)(160), crossed Skirmish Line Q–2 on the 12th,
and put in at Penang on the 14th.
Submarine I-4 (with the 8th Submarine Division commander on board): She left Staring Bay
on 23 February and advanced into the Indian Ocean. On the 28th, she sank one mid-sized cargo
ship (the Dutch ship Ban Ho Guan, 1,693 tons)(160) on the waters southwest of Bali, after which
she headed for the Cocos Islands as ordered to conduct shelling but the results were unclear.
Thereafter, by way of Skirmish Line Q–2, she put in at Penang at 1250 on 8 March.
Submarine I-5: Although she left Staring Bay on 23 February, she came under friendly fire from
two aircraft on the waters west of Timor on the 25th. This caused serious injury to the captain
and two non-commissioned officers and caused her to put in at Kupang, where she underwent
emergency repairs; she left there on the 27th back for Staring Bay. However, at 0908 on the 28th,
she ran aground on the south side of the North Channel at the entrance of Kendari. After that,
a rescue operation was conducted under the command of the 6th Submarine Squadron com-
mander, the senior commander on site. Although she was finally successfully refloated at 1640
on 20 March, she was unable to join the [designated] operations.
Submarine I-6: At 0800 on 23 February, she left Staring Bay and advanced to the Indian Ocean.
[On her way to her designated position] at 1230 on the 25th, she was also mistakenly fired on
by friendly aircraft on the waters west of Timor (a little after the friendly fire [incident] on Sub-
marine I-5) but sustained no damage. On 8 March, she put in at Penang by way of Skirmish
Line Q–2. During [her deployment], she spotted no enemy. 
Submarine I-7 (the flagship of the 2d Submarine Squadron): She left Staring Bay on 23 February
and advanced to the Indian Ocean. Having sunk a passenger cargo ship (the Dutch ship Le
Maire, 3,271 tons)(160) at a point 250 nautical miles 330º [NW] of the Cocos Islands at 1300 on the
4th, she put in at Penang at 1030 on 9 March by way of Skirmish Line Q–2.
Santos-maru: She left Yokosuka on 21 February and arrived in Palau on the 27th. Then she left
there on 1 March and put in at Staring Bay on the 5th, where she stayed until 25 March, engaging
in the rescue operation of Submarine I-5.
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8. The Army Units Sweep Across Java
Before dawn on 1 March, escorted by the [Navy] 3d Escort Unit, the main force of the Six-
teenth Army put the Satō Detachment ashore near Cape Awuran at the mouth of Bantam
Bay, the Nasu and the Fukushima Detachments near Merak and the Shōji Detachment near
Eretan to the east of Batavia. Meanwhile before dawn on the same day, escorted by the [Navy]
1st Escort Unit, the [Army] 48th Division and the Sakaguchi Detachment also successfully
landed in front of the enemy near Kragan to the west of Surabaya. As early as by the end of
the day, the main force of the army had advanced one element to the line of the Ciujung
River, while the Shōji Detachment had advanced to the whole area of the Kalijati airfield,
and the Sakaguchi Detachment to the area near Blora. The 48th Division had also driven the
enemy back to fifty kilometers or more from its landing point and secured the latter.
In western Java, the Nasu Detachment of the 2d Division reached the area near Leuwiliang
on the evening of the 3d, seized the town after a fierce fight with an Australian garrison near
the town at the night on the 4th and reached the front of Buitenzorg [Bogor] on the next day,
the 5th. [Meanwhile] on the 3d, the Fukushima and the Satō Detachments respectively
reached the areas near Maja and Balaraja, where their advance was temporarily hindered by
destroyed bridges. On the afternoon of the 3d, the 2d Division commander decided to trans-
fer the main force of the division to the Buitenzorg area where the war situation was making
steady progress, and transferred one element of the Fukushima and the Satō Detachments
to the Nasu Detachment. On the night of the 5th, the Nasu Detachment determinedly carried
out a night attack on Buitenzorg, drove back 2,000 to 3,000 Australian troops to the south
and seized the place at 0600 on the 6th. Meanwhile at 2130 on the 5th, the Satō Detachment
seized Batavia. The 2d Division continued its advance toward Bandung* when on the early
morning of the 8th, it received a report from the Army that the enemy in Bandung had offered
to surrender, which was followed by an Army order concerning the occupation of Bandung
received on the afternoon of the 9th. In accordance with the order, the division occupied the
city with about two battalions.
In the meantime, at 1200 on the 1st, the raiding unit of the Shōji Detachment, assigned to
charge toward the Kalijati airfield, had rushed into the airfield and completely seized it at
1230. Although the airfield was in [good] condition and available for immediate use, it was
impossible to report it to the Army headquarters or the 3d Air Division because no commu-
nications could be established. Before dawn on the 2d, the main force of the detachment ar-
rived in Subang, where around 1100 it came under attack of a powerful mechanized enemy
unit from the Bandung area, and narrowly defeated it after an engagement of an hour and a
half. On that afternoon, the 3d Air Division forced its advance to the Kalijati airfield, and in-
tensified its support for the Shōji Detachment. On the 3d, despite several attacks by powerful
enemy tank units, [the detachment] successfully frustrated the enemy’s intentions with the
effective support of the air division. Having learned the situation of the bitter fight of the
Shōji Detachment, the Army headquarters was deeply concerned about the war situation in
that area. On the 4th, the headquarters requested the Southern Army to airlift one element
of the 38th Division [to the area], but this was not approved.
Judging that uselessly making a defensive stand when enveloped by the enemy would
only lead to self-destruction, the detachment commander decided that the best way was to
488 Chapter VII     /     The Implementation of the Java Invasion Operation
* It was slightly more complicated than the impression given here. See Vol. 3, pp. 500-501.
carry out a sudden assault [on Bandung] and seize the city before the stronghold got well
prepared and requested the 3d Air Division commander to support him. From the 5th on-
wards, with close cooperation of the air division, the detachment shifted to the attack on Ban-
dung and seized Lembang on the night of the 7th. That night, an enemy messenger bearing
a flag of truce arrived at the detachment headquarters and offered a cease-fire by Major Gen-
eral Pesman, the garrison commander of the Bandung sector.
Moreover, the Sakaguchi Detachment, which had been assigned to cut off the enemy es-
cape routes by seizing Cilacap on the southern coast of central Java, had seized Blora on the
night of the 1st. Thereafter having captured key places such as Surakarta, Yogyakarta, Mage-
lang, Semarang, Purwokerto in succession, it finally seized Cilacap on the 8th.
The 48th Division with the task of capturing Surabaya in eastern Java commenced its op-
eration on 4 March when the [temporary] bridge over the Solo river was completed near
Cepu.* The main force of the division charged around the clock along the road connecting
Cepu, Kertosono, Jombang, and Mojokerto while fighting off resistance by the enemy and
reached Mojokerto on the 6th, whereas a raiding unit, which had charged toward Bojonegoro
seized the city on the morning of the 3d, continued its advance eastward, and captured La-
mongan on the 7th, and Gresik on the 8th.** 
Army Commander Imamura, who had learned in the middle of the night of the 7th of
the enemy’s offer to surrender to the Shōji Detachment, considered that the offer of surrender
of the commander of the garrison in the Bandung sector should be expanded to a surrender
of the entire allied army stationed in the Dutch East Indies. He demanded the presence of
not only Major General Pesman but also of Governor-General [Tjarda van] Starkenborgh
[Stachouwer] of the Dutch East Indies and Lieutenant General Ter Poorten, the commander
of the Dutch East Indies Forces (and chief of the Dutch East Indies Army Department). At
1800 on the 8th, he opened at Kalijati the meeting concerning the cease-fire.*** Although the
Dutch East Indies side was reluctant to accept an overall surrender at the meeting, the army
commander demanded: “The Japanese army demands your overall and unconditional sur-
render. If you cannot accept it, we shall promptly reopen hostilities and resort to force until
the Dutch East Indies Army is destroyed. If you should have the intention to surrender totally
and unconditionally, you must give an order that [your forces] shall stop all resistance after
1200 tomorrow, the 9th, and that each regional unit shall surrender to the Japanese Army in
its area.”****
At 1200 on the 9th, the Dutch East Indies side put in outline the following broadcast on
the air:*****
The Japanese Army succeeded in breaking through into the intermountain area of Bandung. It
has taken complete command of the air, which made it impossible for us to put up resistance in
the intermountain area of Bandung. Therefore, we had no choice but to hold cease-fire negoti-
ations.
The Japanese Army demanded prompt talks with our governor-general and me. In these talks,
the Japanese Army commander made the following demands on 8 March:
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* A fuller version may be found in Vol. 3, p. 555.
** According to Vol. 3, p. 567, on the 9th.
*** See Vol. 3, p. 531.
**** See Vol. 3, pp. 532-33. The text in the present volume has been somewhat abridged. 
***** See Vol. 3, p. 534.
1. Our overall surrender.
2. A prompt discontinuance of all hostilities.
3. The raising of white flags as a proof of our overall surrender.
4. All forces shall be disarmed and handed over. For this purpose, after disarmament, units in
positions shall assemble at clearly visible places, and other units in barracks. Collected
weapons and ammunition shall be gathered and put under supervision.
5. The demands stated in Items 1 to 4 shall be completed by 1200 on 9 March.
6. Bodies identified as Japanese military, [Japanese] prisoners of war, and deceased and living
Japanese residents shall be promptly handed over.
7. Any kind of destruction is prohibited. For example, the destruction of war materials,
weapons, ammunition, roads or traffic structures is forbidden.
8. Communications with foreign countries are prohibited.
9. The operations of the Japanese Army shall be continued.
10. If the above demands are not met, attacks will be immediately resumed. In order to ensure
[compliance with] the demands, armed patrol units necessary to maintain public order shall
be formed and provided with a certain number of weapons and ammunition. These patrol
units need to be supervised by officers as much as possible. The patrol units shall be made
distinguishable by a white armband and a white flag.
After due consideration, I finally had no option but to meet these stipulated demands. I order
you to suspend the current hostilities and obey the above-mentioned demands.
When you have received this order, or when you have been contacted by the Japanese Army
commander, I ask you to communicate or broadcast [this] through the available radio commu-
nication facilities and broadcasting stations, on every whole hour and every thirty minutes start-
ing at 0900 until 1200.
This order applies also to the Navy and all directors of customs.
Major General Pesman, on behalf of the Chief of the Dutch East Indies Army Department
At that time, the positions of [Japanese] units were as follows:
Shōji Detachment: in Lembang (since the evening of the 7th)
Nasu Detachment: in Cimahi (since 0200 on the 9th)
The 2d Division commander: in Kalijati (since before the noon on the 9th)
Satō Detachment: in Krawang (since the night of the 7th)
Fukushima Detachment: near Cibarusa, about thirty kilometers southwest of Krawang, march-
ing toward Krawang
Sakaguchi Detachment: Cilacap
48th Division: near Surabaya and Malang
Following the surrender of the main force of the Dutch East Indies Army, the enemy units in
all areas, including about 11,000 British and U.S. troops [stationed] in areas southeast of Ban-
dung, surrendered one after another, and the invasion of the whole of Java was completed
by around 12 March. 
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9. The [Naval] Operations Around Java After the Landing of the
Army Units
The Devastation of Cilacap by the Carrier Task Force
The Carrier Task Force, which had sunk the armed Dutch merchantman Modjokerto, the U.S.
special service vessel Pecos, and the U.S. destroyer USS Edsall on 1 March, was joined by the
1st Supply Unit and the 1st Section of the 15th Destroyer Division at 0047 on 2 March at
16º15’S 107º16’E, then by the 8th Cruiser Division at 0144 at 16º16’S 107º7’E, and further by
the 1st Section of the 3d Battleship Division at 0450 at 16º16’S 106º29’E, and was sailing west-
ward bearing 270º [W]. On that day, no enemy was spotted. At 2150, the 1st Supply Unit and
the 15th Destroyer Division separated from the main unit at 16º6’S 103º42’E.(141)
On 3 March, the force spotted no enemy either; Carrier Task Force Commander Vice Ad-
miral Nagumo issued the following order concerning the attack on Cilacap on the next day,
the 4th:(141)
Carrier Task Force Signal Order No. 49
1. At 1100 tomorrow on the 4th, the Carrier Task Force shall reach a point about 230 nautical miles
215º [SW] of the lighthouse of ‘JG’ (note by the author: Cilacap), and launch the first attack unit.
Then, the second attack unit shall be launched as soon as it is ready, and they shall destroy
enemy naval vessels at anchor in the port of Cilacap.
2. The formation of the aircraft unit:
The first attack unit: the 4th formation
The second attack unit: the 5th formation (minus the 11th and the 12th attack units)
The carrier-based attack plane units shall form formations of six aircraft each as long as guiding
planes are available. Each carrier shall assign nine of its aircraft for securing air supremacy,
while assigning one element of its fighter planes to cover the carrier-based attack plane units in
the air. 
3- 7. (Omitted by the author: [items concerning] guarding against [enemy] aircraft and submarines,
etc.)
8. Target assignments
(a) Carrier-based attack planes and bombers: primarily [enemy] naval vessels and secondly
[enemy] merchantmen
(b) Carrier-based fighter planes: enemy aircraft in the air and aircraft at seaplane bases
9- 10. (Omitted by the author: [items concerning] assembling after the attacks; ordnance, etc.)
On 4 March, due to bad weather, the Carrier Task Force postponed the attack on Cilacap until
the next day, the 5th.(141) On that day [the 4th], aircraft guarding the route ahead of the force
spotted one [enemy] destroyer and one merchantman. One of them attacked the destroyer
but did not score a hit. An attack unit (consisting of ten carrier-based bombers) took off, too,
but did not spot the enemy due to low visibility. Also, aircraft of the Hiryū spotted an enemy
cargo ship ablaze (the Dutch armed merchantman Enggano 5,000* tons at 12º4’S 108º1.5’E.**
The Chikuma and the Urakaze were sent to deal with her, and at 2043 they sank her with their
torpedoes.(141) In executing this task, the Chikuma had at first shelled her. However, since the
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* The text mistakenly has 15,000 tons.
** The exact spot is differently cited in the original documents.
Chikuma used armored shells, whose penetrating power was too strong, the shells did not
explode inside the [cargo] ship, and she just uselessly punched holes through [the Enggano’s]
topsides (the sides above the water), but could not sink her despite the many shells she
wasted; in the end, she used her torpedoes. Concerning the attacks on merchantmen, the
Malaya Unit had already suffered the same bitter experience in the Bangka Sea (i.e. since
merchantmen do not sink instantly even if hit by many shells, [naval vessels] tend to use
more shells than necessary). However, this lesson of war was not immediately conveyed to
the Carrier Task Force, which led to the useless expenditure of a large number of shells.(124)
Meanwhile, Carrier Task Force Commander Vice Admiral Nagumo issued his outline for
the attack on the next day by means of Signal Order No. 50.
On 5 March, the Carrier Task Force carried out its attack on Cilacap and reported having
sunk or inflicted damage on almost all ships at anchor in the port (the attack was led by Cdr.
Fuchida Mitsuo). According to the summary report of the actions, the military gains were as
follows:(141)
1. Sunk four large and fifteen mid-sized merchantmen, nineteen in total.
2. Bombed and destroyed a few barracks, warehouses, freight cars and antiaircraft batteries.
3. Inflicted serious damage on one small naval vessel.
The Japanese side only sustained damage to a few of its aircraft, which were marked by bul-
lets.
At 1030 on 6 March, at a point about 13ºS 109ºE, the Carrier Task Force separated into the
main unit ([consisting of] the 1st Carrier Division, the 3d Battleship Division 1st Section, the
8th Cruiser Division, the Abukuma and six destroyers) and the detached unit ([consisting of]
the 2d Carrier Division, the 3d Battleship Division 2d Section and four destroyers), sailed
eastward intending to clear the remnants of the enemy, but spotted none.(141)
On the early morning of 7 March, the detached unit bombed and destroyed [enemy]
ground facilities (the telegraph station, pier[s] and oil tank[s]) on Christmas Island for about
twenty minutes. The enemy raised a white flag, which led the force to think that the island
could easily be captured with a small force. On that day, the aircraft unit of the Sōryū sank
two armed merchantmen at a point about ninety nautical miles 300º [WNW] of Christmas
Island.(71) After that, neither the main unit nor the detached unit spotted any enemy; at 1030
on the 11th, the Carrier Task Force returned to Staring Bay without incident.(141)
Earlier, when changing anchorages at Palau, the Kaga had hit an uncharted reef in the east
waterway and sustained minor damage to her hull, which caused some leaks. The vessel had
participated in the first and the second carrier operations after emergency repairs conducted
by her crew. However, as a result of an examination of her bottom on her return to Staring
Bay on 11 March after the second carrier operation, it was decided that, since the damage
was serious enough to raise concern about her participation in the attack on Ceylon, she
should return to mainland Japan for a while for repairs. As of 13 March, she was removed
from the Carrier Task Force and transferred to the guard unit.
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The Main Body of the Southern Task Force Destroys Enemy Vessels [on the
Waters] South of Java (See Illustrations No. 50 and No. 51)
On the early morning of 1 March, the main body of the Southern Task Force reached the wa-
ters about seventy nautical miles south of Cilacap, after which, it gradually pushed south-
ward while cruising from east to west on the waters south of Java (as previously told
[pp.475-76]). The military gains reported on that day were four merchantmen, who were
sunk,(58) one ship, who was set ablaze, and another, who was captured. On the morning of 2
March, the Hayashio captured a Dutch ship (1,100 ton). As of the noon that day, the location
of [the main body of] the Southern Task Force was about three hundred nautical miles south
of Cilacap. At 1340, the chief of staff of the force sent the following telegram concerning the
subsequent operation schedule:(141)
From: Chief of Staff of the Second Fleet
To: The Dutch East Indies Unit (minus the Supply Unit), the Air Unit, and the Carrier Task Force
Second Fleet Classified Telegram No. 63 ([at] 1340, [on] 2 March 1942)
1. The main body of the Southern Task Force ([consisting of] the 4th Cruiser Division (minus the
Chōkai), the 4th Destroyer Division 1st Section) shall operate on the waters south of Java, and
after passing a point about 160 nautical miles 196º [S] of Bali at 1000 on the 3d, it shall reach a
point about one hundred nautical miles 150º [SE] of Cilacap at 0800 on the 4th, to act in concert
with the attack to be conducted by the Carrier Task Force.
2. The oiler Tōei-maru [A] and the [destroyer] Hayashio shall join the main unit at a point around
160 nautical miles 204º [SSW] of Bali at noon on the 3d, and follow in the wake of the unit.
3. Since the ships captured in our area (most of which will be provided with a crew, sail our naval
flag and hoist antiaircraft identification marks (the national flag)) will be sent to Bali or Makassar,
see to it that they will not be attacked.
After having sent this telegram, [the Southern Task Force] received a report from the land-
based air unit that two enemy destroyers had been spotted at a point about three hundred
nautical miles southwest of Bali and one [enemy] light cruiser about one hundred nautical
miles to their south. On receiving this report, Southern Task Force Commander Vice Admiral
Kondō gave orders to the Atago and the Takao to go in hot pursuit of the enemy light cruiser,
and to the Maya and the 1st Section of the 4th Destroyer Division to go in pursuit of the
enemy destroyers, and destroy them.(68)
In accordance with the order, the Atago and the Takao sailed south at twenty-six knots
bearing 130º [SE], searching for the enemy. At 2200, at 15º38’S 113º13’E, they spotted at about
18,000 meters at 73º [ENE] the silhouette of a vessel, which looked like an enemy [vessel]
that gradually approached them. After taking a good look, she was identified as a U.S. Mar-
blehead-class* cruiser; at 2225, with their searchlights on, they opened fire at the enemy at a
range of 5,200 meters, and sank her at 2232. Although the enemy was seen to have fired from
her aft turrets during the artillery duel, it was unclear where her shells had landed.(162) In the
meantime, the Maya and the 1st Section of the 4th Destroyer Division hotly pursued the
enemy destroyer (the British destroyer HMS Stronghold). At 1912, first of all the Maya opened
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* She actually was the destroyer USS Pillsbury. The mistake is understandable as both the USS Marblehead and
the USS Pillsbury were four-stackers. 
fire at a range of 15,400 meters, and then the 1st Section of the 4th Destroyer Division at a
range of 10,500 meters at 1951. They sank her at 2028.(162)
At 1000 on 3 March, the main body of the Southern Task Force reached a point about 160
nautical miles 196º [S] of Bali, and changed course westward. At 1036, the 1st Section of the
4th Destroyer Division caught up with the U.S. Gunboat USS Asheville, opened fire at a range
of 8,500 meters, and sank her at 1108. Around noon that day, the main body joined the Tōei-
maru and the Hayashio, who had operated separately, and carried out a refueling at sea.(68)
At 0800 on 4 March, the main body of the Southern Task Force was cruising around 280
nautical miles 170º [S] of Cilacap, and from 0740 until around 0900, it sank one Australian
sloop, one British oiler, one British merchantman and one British minesweeper.(68) Meanwhile
at 1620, the Arashi seized an armed Dutch merchantman (7,089 tons, carrying about 250
marines and about 250 sailors called “cadets”), wich the land-based air unit had spotted and
reported.(163) Further at 2030, the Atago seized another Dutch ship (1,030 tons).(68) As of that
day, the main body of the Southern Task Force completed the carrier [operation] on the sea
to the south of Java, and returned to Staring Bay at 1305 on 7 March without incident.(61)









Number of shells fired:
Maya:     635
Arashi:    250
Nowaki:  345



































Number of shells fired
Age of the moon: 
15 [days]
Main guns (AAA guns)
Atago:      54     (15)
Takao:    116       (5)
Illustration No. 50 — The Engagements with a British Destroyer and a U.S. Cruiser
The Actions of the [Land-Based] Air Unit
The major operations carried out by the 1st Air Raid Unit were as follows:(71, 81) (The military
gains [cited below] are those that were reported.)
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The Cruiser Atago
The U.S. Cruiser USS Marblehead






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































1 March: Twenty-seven land-based attack planes of the Kanoya Air Group conducted an attack
on [enemy] cruisers in the Surabaya area. [Having spotted no cruisers], they inflicted damage
on two destroyers, two submarines, two special service vessels and one merchantman.
3 March: One land-based reconnaissance plane and nine Type–0 fighter planes of the 3d Air
Group Detachment raided Broome ([on] the northern coast of Australia), brought down four
[enemy] aircraft and set twenty-four aircraft [on the ground] ablaze; two Type–0 fighter
planes did not return (of which one crew was rescued on the 21st). [Another] land-based re-
connaissance plane and eight Type–0 fighter planes of the 3d Air Group Detachment carried
out an attack on Wyndham ([on] the northern coast of Australia), set ablaze one [enemy]
transport plane, one hangar, and six hundred drums.
4 March: One land-based reconnaissance plane and nine Type–0 fighter planes conducted a re-
connaissance attack on Port Darwin, and set five bombers ablaze; four of Japanese aircraft
were marked by bullets.
During these days, the Tōkō Air Group conducted a search mission over the waters up to six
hundred nautical miles southwest of Kupang as well as patrolling the surrounding areas,
while the 3d Air Group Detachment patrolled in the air above Kupang, but spotted almost
no enemy. On 5 March, the 21st Air Flotilla headquarters and the Kanoya Air Group were
transferred to the Northern Task Force; they left Kendari at 0830 for Kasumigaura.
[Meanwhile,] the major operations carried out by the 2d Air Raid Unit were as follows:(71)
(The military gains [cited below] are those that were reported.)
1 March: Seven land-based attack planes of the Takao Air Group carried out an attack on the
Blimbing airfield ([in] eastern Java) and inflicted damage on fourteen P–40s and five Buffalo
fighter planes [on the ground]. [Another team of] seven land-based attack planes [of the
group] carried out an attack on the Yogyakarta airfield and set two large aircraft ablaze and
blew up one large aircraft. [One element of] twenty-five Type–0 fighter planes (in five shifts)
of the Tainan Air Group on patrol in the air over the convoy [against enemy aircraft] also
spotted enemy aircraft on the Blimbing airfield and inflicted damage on one twin-engine
aircraft and more than a dozen fighter planes. Also, six Type–0 fighter planes of the 3d Air
Group [went for] an attack on Blimbing, while providing cover to the land-based attack
plane unit, carried out an attack and inflicted serious damage on seven P–40 fighter planes
and three Buffalo fighter planes.
2 March: Fourteen land-based attack planes of the Takao Air Group carried out a bombing attack
on the Yogyakarta airfield, set two large aircraft ablaze and blew up two other large aircraft.
Nine Type–0 fighter planes of the Tainan Air Group carried out an attack on a reconnaissance
seaplane base to the north of Malang, blew up one four-engine flying boat, two twin-engine
flying boats, and one [single-engine] flying boat, while six [other] Type–0 fighter planes of
the group conducted an attack on Yogyakarta and Malang and blew up two twin-engine air-
craft.
3 March: Twenty-four land-based attack planes of the Takao Air Group carried out an attack on
the Bandung airfield and set two aircraft ablaze. Six Type–0 fighter planes of the Tainan Air
Group attacked Cilacap and set one PBY flying boat ablaze, while twelve [other] Type–0
fighter planes of the group carried out an attack on Bandung and brought down one P–40
fighter plane and blew up eight aircraft [on the ground]. Twelve Type–0 fighter planes of
the 3d Air Group provided cover for the units carrying out a bombing on the Bandung [air-
field], and also blew up seven large and two smaller aircraft.
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4 March: Twenty-three land-based attack planes of the Takao Air Group carried out an attack
on the naval vessels at anchor in the port of Cilacap, sank four merchantmen and one cruiser,
while destroying five merchantmen.
From 5 March onwards, [the Air Unit] spotted almost no enemy, except for a few merchant-
men and submarines [on the waters] near Java, and by 9 March, no enemy was in sight. Dur-
ing this period, the Takao Air Group carried out search missions in the Indian Ocean day
after day, whereas the Tainan Air Group and the 3d Air Group busily patrolled in the air over
the convoy anchorage as well as over the Bali base while providing cover for the land-based
attack plane units to attack [enemy] airfields.
The 3d Air Raid Unit from 1 March onwards also day after day carried out search missions
in the eastern parts of the Indian Ocean as well as on the waters south of the Sunda Strait,
reconnaissance attacks in western Java, a reconnaissance over the Cocos Islands, and attacks
on Christmas Island, while conducting patrols in the air over Patrol as well as over the con-
voy. In the attack on Bandung on 4 March, twenty-five land-based attack planes of the
Kanoya Air Group made a sortie and reported having inflicted damage on eight large, four
mid-sized and four small aircraft as well as setting ablaze one hangar. Meanwhile, the main
body of the Kanoya Air Group was transferred to the Northern Task Force as of 5 March and
took off from the Gelumbang base [first] for the Thủ Dầu Một base to head back for Tokyo
Bay. Also, the Genzan Air Group moved to Saigon from the 7th to the 10th of March, in order
to participate in the operations in the Burma area.(71)
As for the Mihoro Air Group of the Malaya Unit, it put five of its Type–96 carrier-based
fighter planes under the command of 22d Air Flotilla (3d Air Raid Unit) Commander R. Adm.
Matsunaga Sadaichi on 4 March and advanced them to Kalijati, leaving Gelumbang at 0915.
Although one of them was seriously damaged at the time of the advance, the fighter plane
unit actively conducted patrols in the air over the convoy from Kalijati, and then headed for
the Penang base on the 6th by way of Mentok.(135) Four land-based attack planes, which had
been dispatched [from the air group] to Sungai Petani as well as the land-based attack plane
unit of the Mihoro Air Group, which had been stationed at the Kuantan base, also presumably
moved to the Penang base on the 6th.
[In the meantime,] the major operations of the 1st Air Group (the 12th Seaplane Tender
Division) were as follows.
At 0400 on 1 March, 3d Escort Unit Commander Rear Admiral Hara reported the success-
ful landing in the Patrol area. On receiving this report, 1st Air Unit Commander R. Adm.
Imamura Osamu sent an order to the Toboali Base Commander: “[They] successfully landed.
Promptly advance [the aircraft].”(122) Accordingly, all aircraft stationed at the Toboali base left
by 1115. Three Type–0 observation seaplanes and one Type–0 reconnaissance seaplane each
of the Kamikawa-maru and the San’yō-maru arrived in Bantam Bay one after another a little
after noontime and provided guard against enemy submarines at the anchorages in Bantam
Bay as well as for Merak.(55) At 1905, [a] Type–0 reconnaissance seaplane of the Kamikawa-
maru spotted a periscope on the waters southwest of St. Nicholas Point [Tanjung Pujut], car-
ried out a bombing and scored a direct hit. Following that, [a] Type–0 observation seaplane
of the San’yō-maru also attacked the submarine and scored a direct hit. Then they dropped a
smoke marker to guide two friendly destroyers and have them attack the submarine, judging
that fatal damage had been inflicted. Since no location along the coast of Bantam Bay was
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found suitable for a base, [the unit] narrowly managed to set up a base by the evening on an
uninhabited island in the western part of the bay.
However, because the base did not have adequate space to set up a camp, [the personnel]
slept in an enemy gunboat which had run aground on the island. Since the sea was calm and
had an appropriate depth, the place was about fit for use.
In the meantime, two Type–0 observation seaplanes each of the Kamikawa-maru and the
San’yō-maru advanced to the Patrol area as well to provide guard over the convoy anchorage
against enemy submarines. During that time, they fought off frequent raids by enemy fighter
planes. However, enemy strafing set ablaze one Type–0 observation seaplane that was in the
middle of refueling and inflicted damage on another which made it unable to fly. Since also
the waves were high at Patrol, which made it difficult to set up a base there, the remaining
two Type–0 observation seaplanes called off the use of the Patrol base and shifted to the Ban-
tam base.(122)
Thereafter, the 1st Air Unit provided every day direct guard over the anchorage against
enemy aircraft as well as submarines. On the 2d, the unit reported having sunk three enemy
submarines and driven back enemy bombers, which had come for a raid. On the 4th, at the
request of the Army, the unit provided support for the ground combat, in which it bombed
enemy strongholds and attacked [enemy] tanks. Meanwhile, the Kamikawa-maru and the
San’yō-maru had left Anambas at 1900 on the 2d and put in at Bantam Bay at 1130 on the 5th.
Although the Kamikawa-maru had been removed from the Dutch East Indies Unit and trans-
ferred to the Malaya Unit on the 4th, she continued her operations.(122) On that day [the 4th],
at 1420, the oiler Erimo (14,050 tons) was sunk by enemy torpedo attacks at 4ºS 108ºE; recon-
naissance seaplanes of the Kamikawa-maru and the San’yō-maru were dispatched to reconnoi-
ter the situation and neutralize the enemy submarines, but they spotted no enemy. From that
time on, neither enemy aircraft nor submarines were spotted either in Bantam Bay or [near]
Patrol.(55)
On the 8th, Southern Task Force Commander Vice Admiral Kondō removed the Kamikawa-
maru, which he had earlier transferred to the Malaya Unit, from the Malaya Unit, and trans-
ferred the San’yō-maru to the unit instead.(55) On that day, the Kamikawa-maru left Bantam Bay
for Singapore (and put in at Seletar on 11 March). The San’yō-maru, who was at anchor in
Bantam Bay until the 10th, participated in the Andaman operation from the 22d. [Meanwhile]
it was decided that the Kamikawa-maru should operate as designated by the Fourth Fleet com-
mander in chief; she headed for the southeastern theater.(63)
The 2d Air Unit (the 11th Seaplane Tender Division), which was operating on the waters
near the west coast of Bawean Island on 1 March (as previously told [p. 458]), set up a base
at Karangdawa about three nautical miles west of Cape Awarawar on the 2d.(71) Thereafter,
the Chitose, the Mizuho and the aircraft of the Sanuki-maru day after day provided guard in
the air above the convoy, and conducted patrols against enemy submarines as well as search
missions over the Java Sea, while [also] supporting the ground combat. The military gains
the unit reported in the Surabaya invasion operation were as shown in the following table.(79)
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In this period, on the 4th, the Mizuho sailed to Kendari to repair her hull and engine; after
she underwent maintenance until the 9th, she headed back for the Surabaya area. After the
overall surrender of the Dutch East Indies on the 9th, the 2d Air Unit put in at Kragan on the
12th, dismantled the Karangdawa seaplane base and left Awarawar at 2000 for Makassar,
where the unit put in at 1130 on the 14th.(169) The aircraft unit of the Sanuki-maru presumably
returned to the Sanuki-maru at anchor in Balikpapan on 12 March.
As for the 4th Carrier Division, it had reached a point to the north of the Karimata Strait
on the morning of 1 March(72) and supported the 5th Cruiser Division’s attack on the enemy
cruiser unit [HMS Exeter, p. 445, 461]. Then on the 2d and the 3d, it carried out search missions
in the western parts of the Java Sea, in the Karimata Strait as well as in the coastal areas of
northern Java, while searching for remnant [enemy] vessels [in] Cilacap, and reported mili-
tary gains of having sunk one 6,000t-class merchantman, and having two 500-ton class mer-
chantmen run aground.(71) Then in accordance with the telegraphic order of the Southern
Task Force issued at 2040 on the 3d that [the 4th Carrier Division] should be removed from
the Dutch East Indies Unit and transferred to the Malaya Unit as of 5 March,(53) the division
left the western part of the Java Sea that night for Singapore, and put in at the port on 5
March.(72)
The Engagements of the Army Air Units(117)
At 2000 on 28 February, [Army] Third Air Force Commander Lt. Gen. Sugawara Michiō had
given orders to the 12th Air Division and the 3d Air Division that the former should cover
the sailing of the convoy and provide guard over the anchorages against enemy aircraft,
while the latter should from 1 March onwards mainly provide direct support to the opera-
tions of the main force of the 2d Division and the Shōji Detachment. In accordance with these
orders, the 12th Air Division took charge of providing antiaircraft guard over the anchorages
with a total of fifty-five aircraft on 28 February, a total of ninety aircraft on 1 March and a
total of seventy-four aircraft on the 2d. From the 3d onwards, the division provided antiair-
craft guard over the Merak and Bantam Bay anchorages with its main force, while guarding
the Palembang refineries from the air.
Meanwhile on 1 March, the 3d Air Division directly supported the engagements of the
2d Division and the Shōji Detachment with its full force. Upon the seizure and conditioning
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advanced one element of the 59th Air Group and the main force of the 27th Air Group, which
was followed by the advance of the main force of the 3d Air Division to the airfield as early
as on the 3d. On that day, [the air division] carried out attacks on mechanized enemy units
coming for a counterattack toward the airfield, destroyed and set ablaze the major part of it,
and completely crushed the intentions of the enemy [Vol. 3, p. 513, 521]. From the 4th on-
wards, the air division supported the engagements of the Shōji Detachment with its main
force and those of the 2d Division with one element, while carrying out attacks on the air-
fields near Bandung, thereby facilitating the Shōji Detachment’s charge toward Bandung.
The Eastern Java Units Clear [the Sea of] the Enemy 
At 0235 on 1 March, the 1st Escort Unit led the convoy carrying the main force of the 48th
Division into the Kragan anchorage with the direct support of the 5th Cruiser Division unit
and the 2d Destroyer Squadron unit, and the army unit successfully made its first landing at
0400. After that, the surface unit mainly engaged in guarding near the anchorage of the con-
voy as well as watching the area at the north entrance of the port of Surabaya, ready against
escaping enemy vessels. At that time, no chain of command existed between the 1st Escort
Unit Commander (4th Destroyer Squadron Commander Rear Admiral Nishimura) and 2d
Destroyer Squadron Commander Rear Admiral Tanaka; the 2d Destroyer Squadron unit [sim-
ply] supported the 1st Escort Unit. 
At 0405 on 1 March, the Natsugumo of the 9th Destroyer Division spotted an enemy tor-
pedo boat and fired at the latter using her searchlights, but she was not able to sink the boat.
At 0605, again an enemy torpedo boat intruded into the anchorage; the Murasame of the 2d
Destroyer Division immediately responded by firing at the boat but the enemy escaped,
spreading a smoke screen.(62) Following the persistent [air] raids of the previous night, on
this day again from around 0735 onwards ten four-engine bombers and more than a dozen
enemy fighter planes raided the anchorage of the convoy. Although the fighter planes re-
peatedly strafed the convoy and the landing craft from a low altitude for about twenty min-
utes, fortunately no damage was sustained. At 0815, right after the enemy fighter planes had
left the scene, nine friendly observation seaplanes and two Type-0 fighter planes finally ap-
peared in the sky over the convoy.(62)
At 1120, the 4th Destroyer Squadron commander received orders from Dutch East Indies
Unit Commander Takahashi that he should take the 2d Destroyer Squadron commander
under his command regarding the guarding [of the waters] surrounding the anchorage of
the transport ships off Kragan.(62) In line with this order, 4th Destroyer Squadron Commander
([and] 1st Escort Unit Commander) Nishimura gave orders to assign the guarding of the wa-
ters to the west of 112ºE to the 4th Destroyer Squadron and the 2d Base Force, while that of
the waters to the east of 112ºE to the 2d Destroyer Squadron.(53) It was around that time that
the 5th Cruiser Division spotted the enemy cruiser and two destroyers to the west of Bawean
Island. (The daylight engagement on 1 March.) 
On that day, the following enemy raids occurred:(53, 62)
0935: The Jintsū spotted two wakes of enemy torpedoes at 100º starboard* and evaded them;
the 1st Section of the 8th Destroyer Division guarding the patrol area conducted an attack
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with depth charges at the point where the torpedo wakes had started. However, in the sub-
sequent search no clues were detected, and the section reported having almost certainly
sunk [the enemy] ([at] forty-eight nautical miles 230º [SE] of Bawean Island). 
1343: Enemy aircraft raided and bombed the convoy anchorage but inflicted no damage. 
2223: The Jintsū spotted a surfaced enemy submarine; the Amatsukaze and the Hatsukaze imme-
diately pursued and attacked her with depth charges, but the results were unclear ([at] forty-
eight nautical miles 230º [SE] of Bawean Island). 
2332: The Natsugumo and the Minegumo detected an enemy submarine and attacked her; having
spotted oil and air bubbles welling up, they reported the results as certain ([at] the outer
area of the convoy anchorage).
The small-scale minesweeping, which had been conducted on that day from early morning
onwards, made smooth progress; it was roughly completed in the morning with no mines
snagged. By sunset, the convoy completed shifting its anchorage to the second anchorage
(an anchorage closer to the shore). Meanwhile at 2305, the Tomozuru of the 21st Torpedo Boat
Division put in at Kragan from Banjarmasin without incident, escorting the Sasako-maru car-
rying the Sakaguchi Detachment on board.(62)
The situation on 2 March was as follows:(53, 62)
0438: The Jintsū spotted a surfaced enemy submarine; the Yukikaze and the Tokitsukaze headed
for an attack but since she submerged at a point 1,000 meters* from them, the result of their
depth charge attack was unclear ([at] fifty nautical miles 235º [SW] of Bawean Island). 
0532: The Tokitsukaze spotted a surfaced enemy submarine. As she was approaching, the enemy
submerged at a point 5,500 meters from her. She conducted a depth charge attack, but with
unknown results. 
0655: The Yukikaze spotted an enemy submarine which was about to submerge and conducted
a depth charge attack, but with unknown results ([at] thirty-four nautical miles 200º [SSW]
of Bawean Island). 
2040 The Yukikaze spotted a surfaced enemy submarine, but the enemy submerged shortly. She
conducted a depth charge attack but with unknown results ([at] thirty-one nautical miles
233º [SW] of Bawean Island).
On that day, the aircraft of the Naka took off at 1250 for a search mission over the outer sea
areas of the anchorage ranging from the north entrance of the port of Surabaya to Bawean
Island to the Karimunjawa Islands, but spotted no enemy. At 1540, 1st Escort Unit Com-
mander Nishimura reported the progress of the disembarkation of the transport ships to the
chief of staff of the Third Fleet: “The disembarkation of the Army transport ships in our area
has been making very smooth progress. It is expected that [the disembarkation of] about fif-
teen ships will be completed by tomorrow evening, the 3d, and that of the remaining ships
by around the 6th.” 
The situation on 3 March was as follows: 
2002 The Jintsū spotted a surfaced enemy submarine. The Amatsukaze headed for an attack; at
2026, at a range of 2,000 meters, she started firing at [the submarine] using her searchlights
and scored a number of hits. Then she carried out a depth charge attack at the center of the
spot where oil and bubbles were welling up and spreading all over the area, and reported
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having sunk [the enemy submarine] with certainty. While engaging with this enemy, she
spotted the wake of a torpedo and evaded it. ([at] forty-one nautical miles 234º [SW] of
Bawean Island) 
2105Having detected a submerged [enemy] submarine, the Yūdachi carried out a depth charge
attack, spotted flames and black smoke arising, and reported the result as certain ([at] 700
meters 333º [NW] of Cape Petokol). 
On that day, the aircraft of the Naka took off to guard the outer sea area of the convoy an-
chorage and the north entrance of the port of Surabaya but spotted no enemy other than
[one] patrol boat of about 200-ton [along] the west coast of the north entrance channel. Mean-
while, the destroyers took turns heading for Banjarmasin for replenishment.(53)
At 1100 on 4 March, 1st Escort Unit Commander Nishimura sent the following telegram
to the chief of staff of the Third Fleet after having discussed with the Army side the escort of
the transport ships after their disembarkation had been completed:(62) “Since the disembarka-
tion of the Army transport ships in our area has made such smooth progress that it is likely
that everything will be completed by the end of the 6th, it was decided in principle that the
ships should [be sent back] to mainland Japan by way of Saigon, and that one element should
directly sail to Gaoxiong after sailing part of the route along with the others. Therefore, we
would like you to know that we have agreed that our unit shall directly escort the above con-
voy until it passes through the Karimata Strait and that indirect escort shall be provided
thereafter.” On that day, aircraft of the Jintsū searched for the enemy on the waters nearby,
but spotted no enemy other than one patrol boat at the north entrance of [the port of]
Surabaya, and it was judged that most of the enemy surface vessels had been destroyed.
However, enemy submarines were still considered to be around. Concerning [the mission
of] destroying [enemy] submarines, the 1st Escort Unit received the following telegram.(62)
(Third Fleet Classified Telegram No. 638)
Putting together the statements of a captured U.S. submarine captain, we may conclude that
British, Dutch and U.S. submarines are crowding near our landing points in an unorganized
way, and that, moreover, due to their prolonged operations ([for example,] the submarine USS
“Baachi,”* which was sunk on 21 January, had replenished only once at Balikpapan, after having
left Manila on 11 December), their fighting power has remarkably deteriorated. Although we
are more than aware that the crew of our destroyers and lesser vessels are exhausted from pro-
longed engagements for days and nights on end, taking this opportunity, I would like you to
more aggressively hunt enemy submarines, thoroughly carry out attacks until their sinking is
confirmed, and thereby produce adequate military gains. Moreover, it seems that U.S. sub-
marines [usually] surface some (illegible) hours after sunset and their battery charging would
finish in four or five hours. In such a case, conducting clearing operations at night will be a par-
ticularly effective method.
Also, 2d Destroyer Squadron Commander Tanaka expressed his views as to [the mission of]
destroying [enemy] submarines in his action report of 12 March in the following way: 
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1. In the mission to completely destroy enemy submarines in this operation, we were able to
achieve phenomenal results because the dispositions of the clearing units were appropriate, the
[bright] moonlight made it easy to spot enemy submarines at an early stage, the enemy was to-
tally exhausted from our clearing [operations] carried out for days and nights on end, and be-
cause the power of the depth charges was enhanced due to shallowness of the waters. It was
very efficient to relentlessly conduct day and night attacks on “enemy submarines that would
gather to get their prey in sight,” and, above all, to carry out rapid clearing operations around
one hour after sunset, when they would surface. 
2. It seemed that the enemy submarines swarmed around without any direction, simply taking
aim at our convoy. It did not look like an organized deployment. On top of that, their skills in
launching torpedoes were poor; the torpedo wakes were obvious (like those running on com-
pressed air) and their speed was thought to be about thirty-five knots at best. 
This is also evident from the fact that since the opening of hostilities no enemy torpedoes
have hit [Japanese] naval vessels sailing at high speed (sixteen knots or more).
If we sail at an appropriate speed, appropriately use a [destroyer] screen and take appropri-
ate evasive actions, I consider it easy to force our way through waters where so far enemy sub-
marines have appeared and are likely to be hiding underwater.
At 0415 on 5 March, the Tokitsukaze of the 16th Destroyer Division, who was on her way back
to her patrol area after refueling at Banjarmasin, came under a torpedo attack by an enemy
submarine at a point eighteen nautical miles 300º [WNW] of Bawean Island. She promptly
evaded the attack and carried out a depth charge attack. When she spotted a large amount
of heavy oil and many bubbles welling up, she reported having confirmedly sunk the sub-
marine.(53) At 0630 1st Escort Unit Commander Nishimura received the following telegram
from Dutch East Indies Commander Takahashi.(56)(63)
Third Fleet Classified Telegram No. 643 
1. After putting together various kinds of information, it seems that as a result of the recent en-
gagements, the enemy fleets in the Dutch East Indies area have all been destroyed except for
some of the smaller vessels. 
2. All units  shall continue their previous tasks other than [those specified] below and particularly
strive to completely destroy enemy submarines and capture enemy vessels: 
(a) The main unit (the Ashigara and the 1st Section of the 7th Destroyer Division) shall leave the
site on the night of 4 March and put in at Makassar on 5 March. 
(b) The 5th Cruiser Division shall sail to Makassar after replenishment. 
(c) The 1st Base Force commander shall sail to the Batavia area leading the Nagara, the Tsukushi,
the 2d Subchaser Division, the 21st Minesweeper Division (minus Minesweepers No. 11 and
No. 12) and the 21st Subchaser Division and put himself under the command of the 3d Escort
Unit commander. 
(d) Submarine Chaser No. 1 shall sail to Makassar to take charge of guarding the place.
(e) The 8th Destroyer Division (minus the Ōshio and the Michishio) and the 21st Destroyer Di-
vision (minus the Hatsuharu) shall continue their previous tasks under the command of the
8th Destroyer Division commander. 
(f) The 4th Destroyer Squadron commander shall continue his previous tasks leading the 2d
Destroyer Squadron and the forces of the 2d Base Force operating near Kragan, while watch-
ing the northern channel of Surabaya. 
(g) The 11th Seaplane Tender Division commander shall support the 4th Destroyer Squadron
commander with one element of his force in watching enemy vessels evacuating from
Surabaya.
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On that day, aircraft of the Naka searched the vicinity for the enemy, but spotted none, other
than one patrol boat near the mouth of the bay.(62)
On 6 March, no enemy was spotted in either the patrol areas or the convoy anchorage.
On that day, 1st Escort Unit Commander Nishimura sent [the following] telegram about the
schedule of the return of the transport ships: “It was decided in the talks with the Army that
the Army transport ships in our area should leave Kragan on the morning of the 8th and
pass through the Karimata Strait, and that the major part of them should return to mainland
Japan by way of Saigon, while one element should sail to Gaoxiong or Singapore.” Along
[with this telegram], he issued the 1st Escort Unit Order concerning the escort of the convoy.(62)
At 1430 on 7 March, 1st Escort Unit Commander Nishimura sent the following telegram
to 2d Destroyer Squadron Commander Tanaka and 2d Base Force Commander Hirose
Suéto:(62)
1. I shall leave the anchorage at 0900 on the 8th leading the 1st Escort Unit (4th Destroyer Squadron
(minus the 4th Destroyer Division, the 24th Destroyer Division, the Asagumo and the Yamagumo),
the 11th Minesweeper Division, Minesweeper No. 20, the 31st Subchaser Division (minus Sub-
marine Chaser No. 11)) to escort the transport convoy of thirty-nine ships up to the north en-
trance of the Karimata Strait, except for the Tokushima-maru, who was beached due to leaks and
will be left behind under a guard. I shall return to Kragan on the morning of the 13th. During
my absence, the 2d Base Force commander and the 2d Destroyer Squadron commander shall
cooperate with each other and continue the tasks given in Dutch East Indies Unit Classified
Telegram No. 643.
2. The three Army transport ships to be sent to Balikpapan shall be escorted by naval vessels des-
ignated by the 2d Base Force commander.
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The Miserable State of the Port of Surabaya at the Time of the Invasion
On that evening, a report came from 11th Seaplane Tender Division Commander Rear Ad-
miral Fujita, “One element of the main force of our Army charged into Surabaya at 1550 and
seized one half of the city (reconnoitered by aircraft).”(62) The guard against escaping [enemy]
naval vessels was tightened, but nothing unusual was spotted.
At 0900 on 8 March, the 1st Escort Unit left the Kragan anchorage for the Karimata Strait
escorting thirty-nine transport ships returning to mainland Japan. On that day, no enemy
was spotted either in the Kragan anchorage or in the patrol areas to the north of Surabaya.
At 0230 on 9 March, the 8th Destroyer Division commander guarding the waters near Bali
reported having sunk one enemy minesweeper (attacked by the Arashio), and requested 2d
Destroyer Squadron Commander Tanaka to dispatch one destroyer for guarding the Bali
channel. At 0400, the [2d Destroyer Squadron] commander hurriedly dispatched the Hat-
sukaze, who was patrolling her [assigned] patrol area, to the north entrance of the Bali chan-
nel, while he had the Tokitsukaze at the Kragan anchorage leave the anchorage area to be
deployed at Patrol Area A.(53) In the meantime, considering the enemy movements in the Bali
area, the commander of the 1st Escort Unit, who had almost reached midpoint between Cape
Puting and the Karimunjawa Islands escorting the returning transport convoy, promptly had
the 9th Destroyer Division (minus the Asagumo and the Yamagumo) return to be put under
the command of 2d Destroyer Squadron Commander Tanaka in order to tighten the guarding
of the area. However, no enemy was spotted since then.(62) On that day, the Dutch East Indies
forces on Java came to accept a general unconditional surrender, and the Combined Fleet an-
nounced the completion of the stage-one, phase-three operations.
On 10 March, judging from the unconditional surrender of the Dutch East Indies forces
and other intelligence that almost no operational enemy vessels remained in the Surabaya
area, 2d Destroyer Squadron Commander Tanaka offered his opinion to 1st Escort Unit Com-
mander Nishimura that the deployment to watch the north entrance of [the port of] Surabaya
and the east entrance of Madura Bay should gradually be withdrawn.(53) Meanwhile on the
early morning of the 10th, 1st Escort Unit Commander Nishimura received Third Fleet Clas-
sified Telegram No. 779 (sent at 1520 on 9 March), concerning the [change of] operations of
all units and vessels in consequence of the forming of the Second Southern Expeditionary
Fleet, which read as follows:(63)
In consequence of the reorganization of the Second Southern Expeditionary Fleet on 10 March,
all units (vessels) shall operate as follows:
1. The 5th Destroyer Division and the San’yō-maru [shall operate] as designated by the commander
in chief of the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet.
2. The Nichiyū-maru, the Seian-maru, the Sanuki-maru, the 30th Minesweeper Division, the 32d
Minesweeper Division, and the 31st Subchaser Division [shall operate] as designated by the
commander in chief of the Third Southern Expeditionary Fleet.
3. The Kamikawa-maru [shall operate] as designated by the commander in chief of the Fourth Fleet.
4. Other units (vessels) shall continue current tasks until a new disposition of forces is announced.
5. The following units shall be added to the disposition of forces of the Dutch East Indies Unit: 
Submarine Unit ([under the command of] the 6th Submarine Squadron commander): 6th Sub-
marine Squadron
(a) The 13th Submarine Division and Submarine I-23 [correctly: I-123] shall return to mainland
Japan for maintenance as designated by the commander [of the Dutch East Indies Unit].
(b) Other units (vessels) shall operate as designated by the [squadron] commander.
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In accordance with this telegram, 1st Escort Unit Commander Nishimura removed the 31st
Subchaser Division at 0810 and also removed the 11th Minesweeper Division and
Minesweeper No. 20 at 0825 from the line to return to their original units.
At 1400, at the north end of the Karimata Strait, the 1st Escort Unit commander ordered
the 2d Destroyer Division to escort the convoy, which was returning to mainland Japan, up
to Singapore, while he himself reversed course for the Kragan anchorage, leading the Naka.
As of that day, the stage-one, phase-four disposition of forces [of the Combined Fleet] was
put into effect as follows:(63)
Southern Task Force Telegraphic Order No. 127 (issued at 1010 on 10 March)
The disposition of forces of the Southern Task Force in the Combined Fleet stage-one, phase-
four disposition of forces shall remain as they are except for those mentioned below, until or-
dered otherwise by special order:
1. The Third Fleet shall become the Second Southern Expeditionary Fleet, and the Third Fleet com-
mander in chief shall become the Second Southern Expeditionary Fleet commander in chief.
2. As of 12 March, the 5th Destroyer Division shall be removed from the Dutch East Indies Unit
and transferred to the Malaya Unit, while the 24th Destroyer Division shall be removed from
the Malaya Unit and transferred to the Philippines Unit.
Accordingly, Dutch East Indies Unit Commander Vice Admiral Takahashi issued the follow-
ing order:(63)*
Dutch East Indies Unit Classified Telegram No. 21 (issued [at] 2000 [on] 10 March)
1. Each base force [incorporated] in the 1st and the 3d Escort Units shall respectively return to the
2d and the 1st Base Units. 
2. The 1st and the 3d Escort Unit commanders shall respectively be relieved of the command of
the 2d and 1st Base Units.
3. The 1st and the 3d Escort Unit commanders shall have the forces, other than those required for
the escort of Army transport ships, sail to Makassar in such a way as designated by the com-
mander [of each force].
4. The 2d Destroyer Squadron (minus the 8th, the 15th and the 18th Destroyer Divisions) shall
gradually withdraw from its deployment in watching the north entrance of [the port of]
Surabaya and the east entrance of Madura Bay, and send the [deployed vessels] to Makassar.
5 The 1st Base Unit commander shall continue his previous tasks, leading his own forces as well
as the forces of the 2d Base Unit in the Java Sea area (minus the 22d Special Base Force head-
quarters and the Itsukushima).
6. After handing over his current tasks, the 22d Special Base Force commander shall sail to Balik-
papan via Makassar, leading the Itsukushima.
7. The 2d Air Unit shall dismantle its provisional base and sail to Makassar.
On 11 March, having received this order, 1st Escort Unit Commander Nishimura called off
his plan to return to Kragan, changed it in such a way as to sail to Makassar after refueling
at Banjarmasin on his way. He withdrew the 9th Destroyer Division from the command of
2d Destroyer Squadron Commander Tanaka and ordered the division to join the Naka at Ban-
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jarmasin.(62) All units left their patrol areas one after another for Makassar. On that day, the
2d Destroyer Squadron was removed from the Dutch East Indies Unit and transferred to the
main body of the Southern Task Force, and [its divisions and vessels were told] to sail to their
home ports as soon as possible for maintenance as designated by the [2d Destroyer Squadron]
commander.(53)
The Western Java Units Clear [the Sea of] the Enemy
With the direct support of the 7th Cruiser Division, the 3d Escort Unit had put the convoy
carrying the main force of the Sixteenth Army into the Merak and the Bantam Bay anchorages
at 0000, and into the Patrol anchorage at 0140 on 1 March. After having sunk two enemy
cruisers who had come raiding Bantam Bay, the unit mainly guarded the waters surrounding
the anchorages of the convoy. The major engagements on that day were as follows:(63)
Area No. 1
1. At 0330, the 12th Destroyer Division ([consisting of] the Shirakumo and the Murakumo), patrolling
Area G, spotted an enemy destroyer (HNLMS Evertsen) at a point about five nautical miles west
of Thwartway Island [Pulau Sangiang], engaged her and scored more than a dozen hits. Sinking
from the stern, the enemy threw up smoke screens and escaped into Lampung Bay. Later inves-
tigations revealed that HNLMS Evertsen had run aground on Sebuku Island and sunk around
1700 after huge explosions.
2. Simultaneously at 0330, the 11th Destroyer Division (the Fubuki and the Hatsuyuki) patrolling
near Babi Island spotted one 5,000t-class oiler sailing south of the island, shelled and sank her. 
3. At 0400 the 1st Defense Unit and the Myōkō-maru put a landing force on Panjang Island and
seized the whole area along the coast. Also, minesweeping of Bantam Bay using large-sized mo-
torized landing craft was carried out, but no mines were snagged as of around 0600.
4. At 1023, the Hatsuyuki detected an enemy submarine at a point thirty-five nautical miles 170º
[SSE] of the lighthouse on Babi Island and promptly attacked her with depth charges, but the
results were unclear.
5. Although the Tsurumi sustained some damage from a torpedo attack by [an] enemy submarine
at 1355 at the mouth of Bantam Bay, she was still able to sail at slow speed and supply oil [to
the other ships]. The Natori as well as the Harukaze and the Hatakaze of the 5th Destroyer Division
attacked the submarine with depth charges, guided by aircraft of the Natori, and reported having
sunk her with certainty.
6. At 1922, the 22d Destroyer Division (the Fumizuki and the Satsuki) attacked [an] enemy subma-
rine with depth charges at a point three nautical miles 325º [NW] of the lighthouse on Toppers
Island [Pulau Tampurung], guided by a Type-0 reconnaissance seaplane of the Kamikawa-maru
and a Type-0 observation seaplane of the San’yō-maru, but the results were unclear.
7. At 2000, the 1st Minesweeper Division detected [an] enemy submarine at a point five nautical
miles 78º [ENE] of St. Nicholas Point [Tanjung Pujut] and attacked her with depth charges; after
spotting many bubbles and a large amount of oil welling up, they reported that the results were
certain.
8. At 2125, the Hatsuyuki and the Fubuki spotted one British destroyer and one minesweeper* ac-
companied by two torpedo boats, promptly attacked them, and at 2200 sank the destroyer and
had the minesweeper run aground.**
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Area No. 2
1. At 1605, the Yura came under attack from [an] enemy submarine at 6º4’S 108º0’E; she evaded
the attack and sustained no damage. Promptly, she carried out a depth charge attack on the
point where the [enemy] torpedoes had been launched, while having the Nagatsuki sweep the
waters but both obtained no clue [about the movements of the enemy submarine].
2. From the previous night onwards, a total of fifty enemy bombers in groups of three to seven
aircraft at a time came raiding more than a dozen times during the night and the day, and at-
tacked the convoy (mainly with torpedoes). However, every time the 1st Section (the Akatsuki
and the Hibiki) of the 6th Destroyer Division, the Nagatsuki and Minesweeper No. 5 shelled them
and drove them back. Minor damages and casualties were sustained by a few transport ships,
but they caused no hindrance to the disembarkation operation.
3. The search for and clearing of mines at the Patrol anchorage on that day resulted in no mines
snagged.
The major actions taken on 2 March were as follows:
Area No. 1
1. At 1145, the Hatakaze of the 5th Destroyer Division conducted a depth charge attack against [an]
enemy submarine at a point 8.5 nautical miles 339º [NNW] of St. Nicholas Point [Tanjung Pujut]
guided by a Type-0 reconnaissance seaplane of the Kamikawa-maru, but the result was unclear.
2. At 1300, the Hatsuyuki of the 11th Destroyer Division detected [an] enemy submarine at a point
7.2 nautical miles 178º [S] of Pebelokan Island. She carried out a depth charge attack, spotted a
small amount of oil welling up, and concluded that [the attack] had to some extent been effec-
tive.
3. At 1515 the Fumizuki of the 22d Destroyer Division conducted a depth charge attack on [an]
enemy submarine at a point fifty-five* nautical miles 325º [NW] of the light house on Toppers
Island [Pulau Tampurung] led by [a] Type-0 reconnaissance seaplane of the Kamikawa-maru. She
felt sound of explosions below her bottom and considered that [the attack] had to some extent
been effective.
4. At 1810, the Hatsuyuki detected an oil trail and the propeller sound of a submarine at seven nau-
tical miles 135º [SE] of Babi Island, and conducted a depth charge attack in cooperation with [a]
Type-0 reconnaissance seaplane of the Kamikawa-maru. Having spotted a large amount of oil
welling up and the surfacing of a part of the upper structure [of a submarine], she reported the
result as certain.
In Area No. 2, neither enemy submarines nor surface units were spotted; only a total of twelve
aircraft came for a raid. 
From the 3d onwards, attacks by enemy submarines and air raids drastically decreased.
However, at 1325 on the 4th, the oiler Erimo came under a torpedo attack by [an] enemy sub-
marine in the Java Sea (at 4º22’S 108º23’E) and eventually sank at 1505 (as previously told [p.
499]). Although 162 members of the crew including the captain were rescued by the Yura,
eighteen shared the fate of the ship. The ship was heading for Singapore alone after finishing
refueling the 7th Cruiser Division unit.(63) Other than this, the Japanese side sustained no
loss. On the 6th, the aircraft of the Natori spotted sixty or more mines at an area four nautical
miles 10º [N] of the lighthouse on the jetty of Tanjung Priok, which were disposed of with
the forces of the 1st Defense Unit.
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From the 4th onwards, all units shifted one after another [to their designated locations]
to prepare for the subsequent operations in the following way:(63)
[March]
   4th:   The 11th Destroyer Division and the Yura left for Singapore.
The 1st Section of the 22d Destroyer Division escorted fourteen returning [transport] ships
[up to] the north end of the Karimata Strait, after which the section sailed for Cam Ranh Bay.
      The Nagara, the Tsukushi, the 2d Subchaser Division, the 21st Minesweeper Division
(minus Minesweepers No. 11 and No. 12), and the 21st Subchaser Division, which had been
operating in the eastern Java area, sailed to Batavia, led by the 1st Base Force commander,
where they were put under the command of the 3d Escort Unit commander.
   5th:   The Kamikawa-maru and the San’yō-maru put in at Bantam Bay.
The Nagatsuki of the 22d Destroyer Division escorted eight [transport] ships returning to
Singapore [up to] the north entrance of the Karimata Strait, from where she headed for Cam
Ranh Bay.
   6th:   The 6th Destroyer Division was removed from the Dutch East Indies Unit and transferred
to the Philippines Unit.
   7th:   The Minazuki of the 22d Destroyer Division escorted ten [transport] ships returning to
Singapore [up to] the north entrance of the Karimata Strait, from where she headed for
Cam Ranh Bay.
   8th:   The Hatakaze of the 5th Destroyer Division headed for Singapore escorting the Tsurumi.
 10th:   The Asakaze of the 5th Destroyer Division headed for Singapore escorting eleven [trans
port] ships returning to Singapore.
The Harukaze and the Matsukaze of the 5th Destroyer Division sailed toward Singapore.
The 3d Escort Unit commander was relieved of his command over the 1st Base Force and
the forces of the latter returned to their original units. Meanwhile, it was decided that the
3d Escort Unit should head for Makassar, leaving behind the forces required to escort the
Army transport ships.
 11th:   The Nagara sailed for Makassar.
 12th:   The 3d Escort Unit commander headed for Makassar, leading the Natori.
In the meantime, when the sea engagements off Batavia took place, the 1st Section of the 7th
Cruiser Division and the 19th Destroyer Division (minus the Ayanami and the Shikinami) had
taken up position in an area about thirty nautical miles north of Bobos Point to support the
Area No. 2 Unit. Then, joined by the 2d Section [of the 7th Cruiser Division] and the 4th Car-
rier Division at 0100 on the 4th at a point of 4º48’S 107º34’E, they pulled out of their deploy-
ment and headed for Singapore to get ready for subsequent operations. At 1900 on the 5th,
they put in at Singapore without incident and completed their support operations in the Java
[invasion] operation.(126)
The Formation of Special Base Forces
On 9 March, stage-one, phase-three operations ended with the fall of Java, the last stronghold
of the Dutch East Indies, and the focus in the tide of the war for the Southern Task Force
shifted to the area west of Java, i.e. the Burma Sea [Andaman Sea], and the eastern part of
the eastern Indian Ocean. That is to say, among the plans drawn up were the northern Suma-
tra invasion operation (Operation T), which before the opening of hostilities had [already]
been planned for execution after the fall of Singapore, the Burma operation, which after the
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smooth progress of the Southern operation was decided to be launched ahead of schedule,
the Andaman Islands operation (Operation O), which was to be dealt with along with the
Burma operation, and the surprise attack operations in the Ceylon Area (Operation C), to be
conducted mainly by the Carrier Task Force in early April.
From 10 March onwards, the Combined Fleet put the stage-one, phase-four operations in
motion (by means of Combined Fleet Telegraphic Operation Order No. 87), in which the
Dutch East Indies Unit was assigned to guarding the areas in its charge, clearing away rem-
nants of the enemy, protecting the shipping lanes, developing natural resources, implement-
ing a military administration and conducting the second or later transports of army units. In
the Army-Navy Central Agreement Concerning the Implementation of a Military Adminis-
tration in the Occupied Areas(146) of 26 November 1941, it was stipulated that the military ad-
ministration in Borneo, Celebes, the [Lesser] Sunda Islands, and the Moluccas was mainly
assigned to the Navy. In the subsequent Army-Navy Central Agreement Concerning the
Guarding of British Malaya and the Dutch East Indies Areas as of 20 January 1942,(43) it was
laid down that [all areas] in Java and Sumatra, except for naval zones and premises as well
as air bases assigned to the Navy, should be assigned to the Army, whereas [all areas] in the
Dutch East Indies other than Java and Sumatra should be assigned to the Navy, except for
posts and stations of Army units.
In early January 1942, in line with these agreements, the following plan for the organiza-
tion of base forces had been taking shape in the Naval General Staff:
Surabaya
A base force consisting of the current 1st Base Force as the core shall be stationed [there] to take
charge of Java and the Lesser Sunda Islands area (The guarding of Java itself is assigned to
the Army).
Balikpapan
A base force consisting of the current 2d Base Force with the 2d Kure Special Landing Force
added as the core shall be stationed [there] to take charge of Dutch Borneo.
Makassar (including the guard on the land)
A base force consisting of the current Sasebo Combined Special Landing Force with some surface
defense forces added as the core shall be stationed [there] to take charge of the area of Celebes
(including the guard on land).
Ambon
A base force consisting of the current 1st Kure Special Landing Force with some surface defense
forces added as the core shall be stationed [there] to take charge of the areas to the north of
Australia (including the guard on land).
Among them, first of all the 24th Special Base Force was formed on Ambon as of 5 February.
Then, following a partial revision of the Wartime Formation of the Imperial Japanese Navy
of the fiscal year 1941, made as of 10 March [1942], the Third Fleet was disbanded and the
Second Southern Expeditionary Fleet was newly established. Simultaneously, the 21st, the
22d, and the 23d Special Base Forces were formed respectively at Surabaya, Balikpapan and
Makassar, and together with the 24th Special Base Force incorporated into the Second South-
ern Expeditionary Fleet. 
The forces at the time of their formation were as follows:(164)*
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* The text contains a number of mistakes. We have revised the text based on the original sources.
21st Special Base Force (Surabaya; Commander: R. Adm. Kubo Kyūji)
The Shirataka, Minesweepers Nos. 8, 11, and 12, the 1st Subchaser Division (Submarine
Chasers Nos. 1, 2 and 3,) the 2d Subchaser Division (Submarine Chasers Nos. 13, 14 and 15,)
the Ikushima-maru, the 1st Port Administration Department (the above [from] the 1st Base
Force)
The Tatsumiya-maru, the 33d Air Group ([formerly] attached to the Third Fleet)
The 21st Signal Unit, and the 21st Submarine Base Unit (the above newly formed) 
22d Special Base Force (Balikpapan; Commander: R. Adm. Hirose Suéto)
The Wakataka, Minesweepers Nos. 15 and 16, and the 21st Subchaser Division (Submarine
Chasers Nos. 4, 5, 6, 16, 17, and 18), the Tatsuharu-maru, the Imizu-maru, the 2d Port Admin-
istration Department (the above [from] the 2d Base Force)
The 2d Guard Unit (newly formed with the 2d Kure Special Landing Force)
23d Special Base Force (Makassar; Commander: Capt. Mori Kunizō)
The Aotaka and the 12th Subchaser Division ([from] the 1st Base Force)
The Chidori, the Manazuru, the Shinkō-maru [A] and the 54th Subchaser Division ([from] the
2d Base Force)
The 3d Guard Unit (newly formed with the 2d Sasebo Special Landing Force)
The 35th Air Group ([formerly] attached to the Third Fleet) 
24th Special Base Force (Ambon; Commander: R. Adm. Hatakeyama Kōichirō)
The Hatsukari, the Tomozuru, and the Seian-maru ([from] the 2d Base Force)
The 52d Subchaser Division ([from] the 1st Base Force)
The 24th Navy Signal Unit
The 4th Guard Unit
Revision of the Disposition of Forces of the Dutch East Indies Unit
After the revision of the Wartime Formation on 10 March, the Dutch East Indies Unit greatly
changed in character from being up to that time an invasion operation unit with the Third
Fleet as its basis into a unit with defense forces as its core (the Second Southern Expeditionary
Fleet).(164) That is, since the Java invasion operation was mostly completed, the forces of other
units, which had been incorporated into the Dutch East Indies Unit to participate until that
time in the operation according to the Southern Task Force phase-three disposition of forces,
left the command of the Dutch East Indies Unit commander one after another from the be-
ginning of March. Some returned to their original units, while other units were transferred
to different units or made to operate as designated by the commander in chief of the Com-
bined Fleet, and other units again were put in the main body of the Southern Task Force to
return to mainland Japan for repairs and the maintenance of hulls, engines and ordnance.
Meanwhile on 7 March, the Dutch East Indies Unit had been given orders to carry out oper-
ations to clear enemy remnants from and seize important places in Dutch New Guinea after
the fall of Java.(100)
The phase-four disposition of forces of the Dutch East Indies Unit announced on 15 March
was as follows:(165)
Dutch East Indies Unit Classified Telegram No. 132
The disposition of forces of the Dutch East Indies Unit shall be changed as follows:
1. [The units] under the direct command of the main unit: The Ashigara and the 16th Destroyer
Division 2d Section shall support all operations.
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2. The Java Guard Unit: [led by] the 21st Special Base Force commander; the 21st Special Base
Force, the Tsubame, the Kamome, the Tsukushi, the 1st Survey Unit, and the Myōkō-maru.
3. The Borneo Guard Unit: [led by] the 22d Special Base Force commander; the 22d Special Base
Force, the Itsukushima and the Kenryū-maru.
4. The Celebes Guard Unit: [led by] the 23d Special Base Force commander; the 23d Special Base
Force.
5. The Ambon Guard Unit: [led by] the 24th Special Base Force commander; the 24th Special Base
Force (except for those transferred to the N invasion unit).
The tasks of 2, 3, 4 and 5: Guarding the assigned areas, the clearing of enemy remnants, as
well as protecting shipping lanes and implementing the military administration (except for 2)
in their assigned areas.
6. The N Invasion Unit: [led by] the 11th Seaplane Tender Division commander; the 11th Seaplane
Tender Division (minus Mizuho), the Nagara, the 2d Gunboat Division (minus Kamitsu-maru),
the 16th Destroyer Division 1st Section, the Tomozuru, the Hatsukari, Patrol Boats Nos. 1, 2, 38,
and 39, the Seian-maru, the Hokuriku-maru, and the 4th Guard Unit shall capture strategic places
on Ceram Island, Halmahera Island as well as the former Dutch New Guinea. The N invasion
unit shall assemble in Ambon by 27 March. The Tomozuru shall escort the Hayatomo from a point
off Davao (5º40’N 127º40’E, where she will be sailing southwards at noon on the 21st) to Ambon.
7. The 1st Escort Unit
[Led by] the 4th Destroyer Squadron commander; the 4th Destroyer Squadron (minus the 2d,
the 4th, the 24th Destroyer Divisions and [minus] the 9th Destroyer Division 2d Section) shall
escort the transport of reinforcements of the 48th Division. 
8. The 3d Escort Unit
[Led by] the 16th Cruiser Division commander; the 16th Cruiser Division (minus the Nagara)
and the 22d Destroyer Division shall escort the transport of reinforcements of the main force of
the Sixteenth Army.
Note by the author: Along with the revision of the Wartime Formation as of 10 March, the 5th
Destroyer Squadron was disbanded, and with the Natori the flagship of the squadron, the
Nagara (formerly [in] the 16th Cruiser Division) and the Kinu (the former flagship of the 4th
Submarine Squadron), the 16th Cruiser Division was [re]organized and transferred to the
Second Southern Expeditionary Fleet.
9. Attached Units: Other than those specified otherwise, [attached units] shall continue their
presently assigned tasks.
Remarks:
(1) Those currently operating in the Java area, except for those to be transferred to the N inva-
sion unit, shall, after completion of their current tasks, shift to the disposition of forces given
above as designated by the 21st Special Base Force commander. 
(2) The Taikō-maru shall take on board two large-sized motorized landing craft as well as special
service personnel for four landing craft.
(3) When the invasion of Christmas Island [is decided], [the operation shall be carried out by]
the 1st and 3d Escort Units as the core. Details of the operation shall be given later.
10. The Lessons of War in the Air Campaign in the Dutch East
Indies [Operation]
Lessons of War; General [Issues]
From “The Greater East Asia War’s Lessons of War ([section] Air Operations)” prepared in
October 1942 by the Naval Investigation Committee on Engagements and Lessons of War
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(Subcommittee on Air Operations), the following passages may be extracted concerning the
Dutch East Indies [campaign]:[75]
The Operations of the Enemy 
1. Air Forces 
Although not as unenterprising as the U.S. air forces in the Philippines, the enemy was very
slow in implementing his air operations. 
(1) He may not have had a [clear] idea of [how to conduct] air campaigns to destroy the air
power [of the opponent], or [maybe] his implementation of such campaigns was very in-
consistent. It was plain to see that we pushed our forces forward while capturing [certain
areas] in order to seize the bases [there] and advance our air forces. Also, it was evident that
[the enemy could have attained] very effective results if he had attacked [us] at the small
bases we had seized, where we had concentrated as many aircraft as could be accommo-
dated. Nevertheless, the enemy only sporadically came to make attacks with just a small
number of aircraft. At first, the air forces of the Dutch East Indies and Australia often raided
our convoys as well as our bases. However, interception by our fighter planes inflicted on
them immense losses, ending in all or most of their aircraft being shot down. No sooner had
our fighter planes advanced to the bases we had captured than they disappeared. After our
invasions of Balikpapan and Menado, [enemy aircraft] seldom came to make raids. 
On learning through several air engagements that the American four-engine bombers
were seldom brought down by our fighter planes owing to their heavy armor, [the enemy]
tenaciously continued attacks with a small number of these aircraft. Nevertheless, [these at-
tacks] never constituted a [true] air campaign to destroy the opponent’s air power. 
(2) [The enemy] did not conduct powerful air operations when there was a major opportunity
to attack. Even at such critical moments to attack as when our invasion convoys had started
sailing, and the enemy faced an emergency, he did not attack them while they were under
sail. Even after [our convoys] reached the invasion points, the enemy did nothing more than
conducting raids with a small number of aircraft only at dawn and dusk, taking advantage
of the absence of patrols in the air [over the landing points] by our fighter plane units (which
had to take off from the bases in the rear). Only our invasion of Bali created a situation where
the enemy seemed to feel as if a dagger had been pointed at his throat, which [finally] made
him to repeatedly conduct attacks on us. But even then, he stopped his attacks after a number
of our fighter planes had advanced there. 
(3) [The enemy] used his forces [only] in small-scale [units] (the largest number of aircraft in
his formations was twelve; usually his aircraft flew in groups of four or five, or in groups of
even smaller numbers). He did not seem to have an idea of how to make the most of collec-
tive power. Consequently, his attacks [only] produced small and indecisive results. 
(4) [The enemy] was not seen to strongly keep up his attacks.
Although repeated attacks were conducted on our convoy carrying the forces to capture
Menado as well as [on our forces] at the Bali base, both attacks lasted only for a few days
and stopped once our fighter plane units had advanced. In the other cases, his attacks were
even less tenacious. 
Attacks by such large land-based attack planes as B–17s and B–24s were also sporadic. 
(5) When [enemy] aircraft in small numbers raided the bases where our fighter planes had been
advanced, they conducted relatively brave attacks. 
Many of them bravely and determinedly carried out bombings from a low altitude,
though presumably one of the reasons was that there was almost no antiaircraft [artillery]
fire at all at these bases. 
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2. Surface forces 
(1) Although the major part of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet as well as the Dutch surface vessels gener-
ally used Surabaya as their base, they conducted almost no operations, other than one or
two small-scale actions, that should be considered aggressive. It seems that after the opera-
tional range of our air force had reached as far as Surabaya, [the enemy vessels] ordered into
action sustained considerable damage from attacks by our [air] units, and that the major
part of them evacuated to Australia or to the western parts of the Dutch East Indies, while
some damaged vessels remained in Surabaya to undergo repairs.
Then, prior to [our] launch of the Java invasion operation, the major part of them again
assembled on the waters near Surabaya. [However,] in the course of the operation, our forces
gained command of the eastern and western ends of the Java Sea, which cut off the escape
routes of the enemy and [then] the sea engagement off Surabaya took place.
(2) As our Malaya invasion operation made progress, the major part of the British naval surface
vessels [first of all] took charge of escorting escaping vessels. Then, other than some which
escaped to the Indian Ocean, [most of] the vessels remained in the areas of Batavia and
Surabaya, and operated almost in the same way as the U.S. and Dutch naval vessels.
(3) Although enemy submarines appeared in all operational areas, their power was not great,
and they inflicted [only] insignificant damage on us.
Replenishment
1. Replenishment of aviation fuel, bombs, and machinegun ammunition 
(1) [The replenishment in] the eastern Borneo and Java areas
Since the Tarakan airfield was too small and had no space for expansion and Balikpapan
had been swiftly seized, the fighter plane units shifted [to Balikpapan] in just ten-odd days.
Because of that, the supply of fuel, bombs, etc. could more or less be covered by the amounts
that had been carried as the first reserve supply (note by the author: the amounts transported
on the ships carrying the construction squad at the time of the invasion [operation]). How-
ever, at Balikpapan, due to the loss of the Nan’a-maru on 23 January, who had been bombed
by enemy aircraft right before putting in at the port, caught fire and sunk in the end, and
the Tatsugami-maru, who had also sunk on the next day the 24th at the anchorage due to
enemy torpedo[es], large amounts of aviation fuel, bombs, machinegun ammunition, etc.
that should have been disembarked there were totally lost. On top of that, because the ship
that advanced to Balikpapan carrying the construction squad was not loaded with the first
reserve [supplies], the advance of the aircraft units was temporarily impeded. However,
they took stopgap measures by landing the aviation fuel carried on the Kamogawa-maru and
the Okitsu-maru, who had advanced there next, and [also] by hurriedly sending there the
Rakutō-maru (attached to the Navy Ministry) who was in the port of Tarakan after loading
her with the aviation fuel kept at the island.
After that, the Nagisan-maru (attached to the Combined Fleet), who was on her way to
Davao with a full load of aviation fuel, and the Yūbari-maru (attached to the Navy Ministry)
with a full load of bombs and machinegun ammunition were [also] added to the Air Unit of
the Southern Task Force and hurriedly diverted to Balikpapan, which helped the operation
to be conducted without hindrance. 
As for the Banjarmasin [airfield], it was decided that, due to changes in the plan for the
subsequent operation [to seize it], the amount of fuel, machinegun ammunition, etc. required
for the advance of the aircraft units for [just] a short period of time should be forwarded
[from Balikpapan]. And since it was considered that it would be fine to do this by small ves-
sels [because the operation was to be conducted] by maneuvering small craft along the coast,
the transport was carried out using a dozen or more fishing boats requisitioned by the
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Eleventh Air Fleet and the Third Fleet. Concerning the Makassar [airfield], it was decided
to transport the amount of fuel required for the advance of about twenty fighter planes for
about one week. [Eventually,] the fuel was transported on the ships carrying the construction
squad and the military supplies department at the time of the advance.
As for Bali, since the decision to capture the place was made in late January based on
the progress of the [other] operations, the first reserve of fuel [to be sent] there was loaded
at Jolo on the transport ships Sagami-maru and Sasako-maru, both carrying the army unit that
was to capture the island, and transported to the island. However, due to the conditions at
the Bali anchorage, it was difficult to quickly disembark the fuel from the ships, and it was
not possible to disembark the entire load. Then, due to a coal supply problem, the Rakutō-
maru and the Okitsu-maru, who [were supposed to] advance to Bali next [were delayed,
which caused] a delay in the transport of fuel and bombs. On top of that, the Kamogawa-
maru was sunk on 2 March by a torpedo attack of an enemy submarine in the Lombok Strait
and all the fuel, bombs, etc. that she carried were lost. [These circumstances] led to a tempo-
rary suspension of the advance of land-based attack plane units [to the Bali airfield] and the
airlift of machinegun ammunition together with the maintenance personnel from Makassar.
(2) The Ambon area 
As soon as the Ambon [base] was captured on 31 January and readied, one element of the
3d Air Group as well as the 1st Air Group advanced there. Since the amount of the first re-
serve loaded along with the construction squad on the ship was too small, it was supple-
mented by hurriedly disembarking what was loaded on the Hino-maru No. 5 and the
Lyons-maru, who had advanced there first, and what was loaded on the Komaki-maru, who
had advanced there next. 
(3) The eastern Celebes and Timor areas 
The first reserve loaded along with the construction squad on the ship carrying the squad
for Menado did not include bombs, and the ship with the construction squad for Kendari
had not loaded bombs, fuel, etc. at all. Therefore, the amount [of fuel and ammunition] re-
quired for the Menado base was disembarked mainly from the Amagisan-maru and the Katsu -
ragi-maru, which accompanied the Menado invasion units, whereas in Kendari, the
preparations for the operation were made by disembarking all [remaining fuel and ammu-
nition] from the Amagisan-maru, who had advanced there first, and part [of the supply]
loaded on the Nisshun-maru, who had advanced there next. 
As for the Kendari [base], where all land-based attack planes [operating in this theater]
were to be concentrated in early February to launch Operation Z, large amounts of fuel,
bombs, etc. had become necessary. Therefore, in addition to the above two ships, the Ten-
zan-maru, who had been added on 15 January, was fully loaded with aviation fuel and bombs
at Sasebo and sent to Kendari. 
As soon as the major part of the 1st Air Raid Unit had advanced to Kupang after the cap-
ture of the place on 20 February, the Nisshun-maru and the Tenzan-maru were advanced from
Kendari, and the Hino-maru No. 5 from Ambon to take charge of providing supplies. 
In late February, the 1st Air Group was shifted to Rabaul, which was followed by the
shift of the 21st Air Flotilla headquarters and the Kanoya Air Group Detachment to Kisarazu.
Replacing them, the 2d Air Raid Unit advanced to Kupang from Bali; the Yūbari-maru, the
Nagisan-maru, the Okitsu-maru, and the Rakutō-maru, who were deployed in the Bali area,
followed, and thereafter the supplies in this area were provided from the load on these ships.
2. The supply of provisions (omitted by the author) 
3. The replacement of aircraft 
From around the time of shifting to the Dutch East Indies area, all units suffered from a gradual
attrition of aircraft, which was caused not only by the damage or loss sustained but also caused
by their intensive use as well as wear and tear. On top of that, a shortage of spare parts delayed
516 Chapter VII     /     The Implementation of the Java Invasion Operation
the complete repair of aircraft. Under these circumstances, upon the completion of replacement
aircraft, air crews from the front [were dispatched] to fly the replacement aircraft from Taiwan
or mainland Japan. 
However, after the [air units’] advance to Kendari and Balikpapan, the distance became
markedly long while operations gradually increased, which made the air transport of replace-
ment aircraft more and more difficult. Due to such circumstances, eighteen replacement Type-
0 fighter planes [had to be] transported by sea up to Davao on the Zuihō to supplement [the air
units].
As for spare parts, those for the Type-0 fighter planes and tires for the Type-96 land-based
attack planes in particular were not smoothly supplemented. Therefore, [the maintenance of]
aircraft was [sometimes] completed by cannibalizing other aircraft, whose repair lagged behind
time, by using [parts] of different types of aircraft, or by reusing nondurable parts. In such ways,
every measure was taken to prepare for the day-to-day engagements. 
4. The supply of fuel and clear water for the naval vessels (omitted by the author) 
Matters That Affected Operations
1. Weather
The plan was that after the capture of Balikpapan, Bali should be captured by [first] destroying
the enemy air power in eastern Java or neutralizing the major part of it. However, as previously
told, bad weather in the eastern part of the Java Sea seriously impeded the execution of the op-
eration, and the capture of Bali was inevitably postponed for one day.
2. The condition of the seized bases 
(1) Davao and Jolo 
Both airfields had large inclinations (a part of the Davao [airfield]: 1/25 and the Jolo [airfield]:
1/25 - 1/50) and were narrow. On top of that, the Davao airfield had a soft ground, which
was frequently swept by sudden showers in the earlier period [after our capture]. [Conse-
quently,] it took respectively sixteen and fifteen days before our land-based attack plane
units were advanced to Davao and Jolo.
Even after their advance, due to the steep gradients, our land-based attack planes were
unable to take off [from the airfields] with a full load, and they were never able to display
the full capabilities of the aircraft. However, the enemy’s inactivity during this period helped
them to complete the operations without major frustrations.
(2) Tarakan
Use of this airfield by land-based attack planes had not been part of the plan. However, due
to the soft ground and frequent torrential rains, even its use by fighter planes was seriously
impeded. It not only led to a miscalculation about [the plan of] dispatching aircraft to cover
the air over the units to capture Balikpapan, but also caused damage to not a few aircraft at
the time of their take-off or landing.
3. The use of the airfields on Sumatra 
In connection with the condition of the airfields in western Borneo, the First Southern Expedi-
tionary Fleet and the Air Unit of the Southern Task Force repeatedly negotiated with the Army
side on the 22d Air Flotilla’s use of the Palembang airfield, but they did not reach an agreement
and it was decided that [the Navy] was to use the Gelumbang airfield. However, due to the dif-
ficulty of [transporting] supplies to the airfield, it became practically impossible to execute the
air campaign to destroy the enemy air power in western Java as scheduled.
4. Replenishments
The plan was that after the capture of Davao on 20 December, the necessary facilities should
swiftly be set up there so as to make it a supply base for the units advancing toward the southern
theater. However, it was not easy to realize it. In early January, the major part of the 1st Air Raid
Unit had advanced to the place and conducted air campaigns day after day, which was followed
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by the advance of the supply ships of the Air Unit to Menado and Tarakan after their capture in
mid-January. Even then, the mid-sized land-based attack plane units and seaplane units still
used [Davao] as their base from where to conduct operations.
Due to these circumstances, the amounts of fuel and bombs kept in Davao had gradually
decreased and it became impossible to cover the attrition only with the capacity of the supply
ships that occasionally put in at the port. Therefore, [the Navy] used the Matsumoto-maru of the
Third Fleet to hurriedly transport the aviation fuel kept on Palau. They [also] disembarked part
of the first reserve of the auxiliary aircraft transport vessels that happened to be at anchor, and
even put into drums the aviation fuel loaded in bulk on the oiler Hishi-maru, who had put in at
the port on her way back to mainland Japan, and transported them to the airfield. [As seen from
the above,] it was felt quite difficult to provide supplies there. 
That is, after one month or more had passed since the capture of Davao, the city had not yet
substantially assumed its role as a supply base. Since it turned out impossible to have the place
provide supplies for the [air] units advancing [to Davao] and further south, the air units became
entirely dependent on mainland Japan or Taiwan for supplies.
The Lessons of War [Drawn] by the Commander of the Genzan Air Group
The lessons of war below represent the personal view of Cdr. Maéda Kōsei, commander of
the Genzan Air Group based on his experiences from the opening of hostilities until July
1942. The passages relating to the Dutch East Indies operation may be excerpted as follows:
I. Air operations
1. Patrol and Search [Missions]
(1) Weather
{1} The weather in the South China Sea and the Java Sea
We learned from experience in December, January, February and March that over the
southern oceanic areas cumulonimbi clouds develop and rise very quickly with the
top of the clouds often reaching 10,000 meters, while bringing on fierce squalls [to
the area] below them. [Even if] we saw just a few clouds on our way to a patrol [mis-
sion] in the morning, on our return in the afternoon, we were often forced to make a
long detour due to the development of cumulonimbi clouds.
The clouds sometimes linger over the sea at night. When flying aircraft, caution
is required. 
{2} The weather in the northern part of the Indian Ocean
From our experience in March, fair weather generally continued in the northern part
of the Indian Ocean during this period, which made it easy to conduct patrols. 
However, [dense] mist often caused poor visibility. When drawing search mission
patterns, caution is required.
(2) Prohibition of using radio communications 
Despite strict controls, [some] crews had the bad habit of secretly using it. It is necessary
to see to it [that it will not be used]. 
2. Reconnaissance
(1) Many mistakes occurred when identifying types of vessels. It needs to be done carefully. 
In general, large cruisers were often mistaken for battleships and destroyers for light
cruisers. An extreme case was that [an] Army aircraft reported a number of fishing boats
it had spotted in the Malacca Strait as a large transport convoy. There was even a case of
having mistaken lighters in the naval port of Singapore for aircraft carriers. There may
possibly be a case in the future that the enemy uses decoy carriers. [Identification of
types] requires attention. 
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(2) When conducting reconnaissance, not only visual reconnaissance but also photo recon-
naissance is absolutely necessary. 
(Examples omitted by the author)
3. Probing
It is necessary to have a skilled officer crew with excellent tactical insight conduct probing.
In general, the usual exercises tend to make [crews] think light of probing. [However,]
probing an enemy who deploys fighter planes is by far the most difficult [mission] of all.
4. Attacks
(1) When conducting an attack with a large number of aircraft, it is better to assign the tar-
gets of the attack to them beforehand. 
In actual engagements, [attacks] generally tend to concentrate on easy targets, which
creates a risk that attacks are over-concentrated on some [targets], while leaving others
intact. When the enemy situation is known, I think we need to roughly assign targets [to
the attack units] before takeoff according to the number of aircraft [available]. 
(2) Since it is very unlikely that bombing attacks on [enemy] naval vessels under sail by sin-
gle aircraft produce results, [bombing attacks] should be carried out by a team of nine to
twenty-seven aircraft in formation that drop bombs all at once.
The bombing results of our group in the seven months from the opening of hostilities
are as follows:
5. Operations to Destroy [Enemy] Sea Lines of Communication
It is difficult to thoroughly destroy [enemy] sea lines of communication with land-based air-
craft, unless considerably large forces are employed. When the air strength is insufficient, it
is essential to also deploy surface forces, particularly submarines. On top of that, it is better
to have air unit commanders take a unified command of both [the air and naval forces].
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Type of Bombing
Attack
Number of Attacks on
Naval Vessels
Number of Ships
Sunk or Destroyed Success Ratio
Bombing by a single
aircraft 22 2 2/22




Bombing by a team of
six aircraft in formation 4 1 1/4
Bombing by a team of
eight or nine aircraft in
formation
16 7 7/16




As the fate of Singapore was about to be sealed, the enemy was desperately conducting
last-minute rescue [operations] or trying to escape, which made the traffic between Singa-
pore and Java as well as Sumatra very busy.
That is, the total number of enemy naval vessels that the patrol aircraft of our group spot-
ted in the Bangka and the Karimata Straits between 1 and 17 February reached seventy-six
or more (including destroyers). Although we were able to attack thirty of them, the number
of vessels we [actually] sank or destroyed were only nine in total. The reason for this was
that due to its cramped conditions and the poor quality of its ground at that time, the Kuch-
ing airfield allowed in the beginning only about a section of the group to advance. Since it
was anticipated that bombing attacks had to be conducted mainly by single patrol aircraft,
we requested the cooperation of friendly surface vessels, only to find out that eventually no
vessels were dispatched at all. If the condition of the Kuching airfield had been good and fit
for use by a large number of aircraft, we could have destroyed most of those enemy vessels.
II. The air units’ shift of bases
1. The air units’ method of shifting bases needs to be studied for drastic improvements.
Needless to say, winning or losing air operations solely depends on appropriate preemp-
tive strikes and a concentration [of forces]. In order to make the most of the advantage of
inner lines in a [vast] operational area that stretches for close on five thousand nautical miles
[only] with a small number of air units, nothing is more important indeed than the swift
shift of bases.
Whereas the shifts of our aircraft units [in this operation] were easily and swiftly carried
out without accidents, the embarkations and disembarkations for the transfer of our base
personnel and matériel took considerable days and much effort at some places. [Partly due
to] the speed of the transport ships, [shifts] took many days and were not easily [accom-
plished].
In view of the [current] situation in the transportation of base matériel, [we need to do
the following] for a swift shift of bases: 
(1) The [current] shifting system where all units transport their own stuff every time they
shift, should be changed in such a way that, like bombs and fuel, military supplies de-
partments and the Yokosuka Naval Air Technical Arsenal shall prepare [equipment and
matériel] at the bases concerned, and that the shifting unit shall borrow and use it at the
site and return it when they are shifting [somewhere else]. 
(2) Whereas warrant and higher-ranking officers can in general bring [a minimum amount
of] personal items necessary for the shift and leave other belongings in their houses, non-
commissioned officers and men bring [not only] their duffle bags [but also] all their other
belongings, taking transfers to [other] sites into consideration. Moreover, unmarried men
bring all their stuff including even the stuff they use at their lodgings, which adds up to
a considerable amount. We need to keep these unnecessary things at military supplies
departments in mainland Japan and they should [only] be sent on to another place on
request at the time of a transfer [of personnel]. 
(3) At least five transport aircraft should be assigned to each unit so that base personnel
needed for ongoing operations right after the shift can be airlifted. 
(4) Since others have to be transported by transport ships, we need to assign fast transport
ships specified for the purpose with the right set of equipment for embarkation/disem-
barkation.
2. Sometimes [air units] need to rapidly advance only their aircraft unit to a base with no fa-
cilities in order to execute operations for several days. 
Our unit had to advance twice to the Gelumbang airfield which had no base facilities at
all, the first time for the attacks on Java from 24 to 26 February and the second time for the
support of the Carrier Task Force’s [operation in] the Indian Ocean from 3 to 6 March. In
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view of these experiences, we keenly felt that the following points need to be studied and
prepared from early on:
(1) If in addition to the regular crews, base personnel, signal personnel, nurses as well as
portable radio equipment parts, spare tires, beddings and provisions were to be put on
vacant seats of the aircraft, operations with only the aircraft units may be implemented
for a couple of days at best; it is difficult to implement them any longer due to fatigue of
the crews. 
(2) One blanket per person will do for bedding in the tropics; even if it is impossible to carry
blankets due to the loading capacity, it is absolutely necessary to carry mosquito nets.
(3) Although we camped under the wings of the aircraft hanging mosquito nets from them,
sometimes we could not sleep due to squalls at night. Simple portable tents fit to be car-
ried on aircraft are required.
(4) If machine gunners take up positions at the machineguns [on the aircraft on the ground]
at the time of enemy air raids, it is likely that they will also be killed or injured along
with [the damage to] the aircraft. It is better to bring simple ground mountings for 20-
mm machineguns which will enable them to be used as antiaircraft artillery, appropri-
ately set them up around the airfield to be ready against enemy aircraft.
(5) Although rifles are necessary for guarding on the ground, it is difficult to load and carry
them on aircraft. Therefore, it is better to supply portable ground stands for the 7.7-mm
machineguns that are fitted on the aircraft so that they can be used for the guarding on
the ground.
(6) Since bomb carts for 250-kg [bombs] cannot be loaded on aircraft, it is necessary for the
Yokosuka Naval Air Technical Arsenal to always provide carts together with the bombs.
Since the bombs were ready but the carts were not provided this time, we managed to
mount the 250-kg bombs on the aircraft using carrying pole[s]. In a case like this, it would
be convenient if simple portable carrying pole[s] for 250-kg bombs would be manufac-
tured and supplied. Also, I think that we need to research [and work on] a simple knock-
down cart for 50-kg bombs. 
(7) When military supplies departments prepare [aviation] fuel, they also need to provide
fuel trucks as well. This time, fuel was provided but the trucks were not, and we had to
manually fuel [each aircraft]. Although it [usually] takes much time to manually refuel,
we managed to do it relatively swiftly since we had brought along gasoline filters, which
we had specially built by cutting drums in halves. In order to deal with such situations,
[air units] need to be supplied with large light-weight gasoline filters suitable to be car-
ried on aircraft.
(8) It is not easy to implement operations in circumstances where air crews [have to] cook
their own meals without adequate cooking utensils. Moreover, it is difficult to bring their
own eating utensils. I think it would be easy and convenient if such mess gear as used
in the Army is provided.
Some of the canned sweet red bean rice among the canned food we had brought
along this time as part of our provisions had gone bad and turned black.
(9) Air crews need to be supplied with a regulation light-weight case of a fixed size like the
wicker trunk provided to Army officers [to facilitate] the shift of aircraft units.
III. Replacement of aircraft
It should be made a principle that personnel from mainland Japan should fly replacement air-
craft to battlefronts.
At the outset of the war, [replacement aircraft] were flown to battlefronts by personnel of
units from the mainland. However, it was changed afterwards in such a way that front personnel
were dispatched to the mainland to fly them back [to the battlefronts]. But even when we dis-
patch personnel to fly back replacement aircraft that have reportedly completed their test flights
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at the Yokosuka Naval Air Technical Arsenal in mainland Japan, the fact remains that none of
these planes have been tuned perfectly enough to meet the demands in actual fights (particu-
larly, their performance was unsatisfactory when they were flown at a high altitude), and the
dispatched personnel need to spend another several days performing maintenance work on the
aircraft they flew [to the front].
During these periods [of transport and maintenance], unexpected enemy movements really
worry us. It is of course not absolutely impossible to dispatch personnel from operational units
to fly [replacement aircraft], considering the number of crews in reserve at the [less] busy mo-
ments of an operation. There might be some advantage anyways in having part of crews return
to mainland Japan in turns and let them have an opportunity for some mental rest. However,
from another point of view, not a few [personnel] are feeling uncomfortable at returning to main-
land Japan alone, leaving many brothers in arms at the front, which means [returning to main-
land Japan to fly replacement aircraft] does not necessarily give mental rest to those assigned.
When considering that the operations are the top priority, we need to make it a principle that
replacement aircraft should be flown [to the fronts] by personnel of the units in the mainland.
IV. Drills
1. I think that we need to set up a training base suitable for every theater of operations, deploy
a suitable target ship, at suitable moments pull back elements of an aircraft unit depending
on the progress of the operations and have them conduct drills.
In my opinion, the bombing drills against the Settsu, conducted from 10 October until
the end of November before the opening of hostilities, were very effective in that the drills
gave [the participants] the confidence to face the enemy and destroy him. Bombing and tor-
pedoing always require tireless trainings. Although [my men] have been making efforts to
maintain and improve their skills by faithfully conducting as many drills as possible in their
spare moments between missions [even] after the opening of hostilities, they were not able
to produce the results they had hoped for, since it was often impossible to obtain suitable
targets regardless. The need for such [drills] is keenly felt, [particularly] under current cir-
cumstances where a large number of new crews are being allocated to operational units and
where trainings to upgrade copilots to [full-fledged] pilots are constantly required as in mid-
sized land-based attack plane units.
2. I [also] keenly felt that the regular studies and drills for reconnaissance and probing are re-
markably deficient. From now on, we need conduct drills that are more useful in actual en-
gagements.
(1) In regular exercises, enemy movements can easily be gathered from the so-called exercise
situations, while this is not the case at all in actual engagements. Also, whereas in regular
exercises not much attention needs to be paid to obstruction by enemy aircraft, in actual
engagements we do. Since both reconnaissance and probing are inevitably conducted
from afar at a high altitude, they consequently take place under conditions that are very
different from everyday conditions, for which reason we experienced failure so often. 
(2) As a result of [reconnaissance and probing] conducted from a long distance at high alti-
tudes, it is extremely difficult to identify types of ships, etc. We need to regularly practice
solid basic trainings in identifying types of enemy naval vessels.
(3) Photo reconnaissance is absolutely necessary. [However,] photographing skills are gen-
erally not sufficient. Trainings in photo reconnaissance [skills] from a high altitude are
required.
(4) We need to thoroughly conduct drills in how to probe with probing aircraft.
3. I [also] keenly felt our lack of study and drills in [improving] our capacity to operate at night
and execute night attacks. I think we need to stage from now on more exercises [on night
operations].
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V. Aircraft and ordnance
1. I keenly felt that not only the performance of our Type-96 land-based attack planes but also
even that of our Type-1 land-based attack planes do not meet the requirements of modern
warfare. I think we need to swiftly work on a mid-sized land-based attack plane that will
meet the following conditions.
(1) In order to deliver effective attacks on the enemy while eliminating interceptions by
enemy fighter planes with a single land-based attack plane, fast speed is absolutely nec-
essary; its cruising speed needs to be 250 knots or more and its maximum speed needs
to be 300 knots or more when flying at an altitude of 4,000 meters.
Also, [the fuselage of] the plane needs to be strong enough to enable [us] to dive at
an angle of 30 degrees or more when engaging enemy aircraft.
(2) [The plane] needs to be able to carry at least two No. 50 bombs or one 1-ton torpedo as
offensive weapons.
(3) Considering the geographical features of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere
which stretches over a vast area close on 5,000 nautical miles, [the plane] needs to have
a practical action radius of 1,500 nautical miles at minimum in offensive conditions in
order to adequately display our offensive power.
(4) In order to break through bad weather and fully demonstrate its cruising range, [the
plane] needs to be able to fly at an altitude of 10,000 meters or more.
(5) Defensively, [the plane] needs to be [as flame-proof] as U.S. B–17s so as not to easily catch
fire by attacks of enemy fighter planes. It needs no saying that the more machineguns
are fitted for its defense, the better. Nevertheless, in my opinion it is adequate to equip
it with 13-mm machineguns (with a high rapidity of fire) at its nose and tail as long as
they do not harm its previously-mentioned performance [requirements].
2. The currently used Type–98 land-based reconnaissance planes are [already] wanting in per-
formance. In my opinion, we need to promptly work on a [new] reconnaissance aircraft with
a cruising range of at least 1,500 nautical miles, putting top priority on its speed.
3. We need to work on a telescope that is easily usable for reconnaissance on aircraft.
After coming through several sea engagements in this [operation], I keenly felt that the
drills for crews to identify types of naval vessels were insufficient. Moreover, unlike in reg-
ular exercises, in actual engagements we were often compelled to conduct reconnaissance
from a [long] distance at high altitudes; for such cases, we need telescopes that are usable
on aircraft. They should be swiftly worked on.
4. When taken from a high altitude, the currently used air photos are unclear, and in most
cases, they are so unclear that it is difficult to identify types of naval vessels on them. We
need to work on an on-board camera suitable for [photographing from] high altitudes.
5. My group has installed in the aircraft fuselages a simple space for processing photo films
where during the flight we can process the reconnaissance results or the impact of shells,
and present them upon landing, which has enabled us to promptly obtain very precise
knowledge. In my opinion, large land-based reconnaissance aircraft as well as mid-sized
land-based attack planes need to be outfitted with such equipment.
6. In some cases, [even] two direct hits from 60-kg regular bombs at the bow only listed a mid-
sized merchantman, without easily sinking her. Also, 60-kg bombs are too small for light
cruisers or submarines. In my opinion, we need to newly manufacture and provide 150-kg
regular bombs.
I think that the appropriate standard [sizes of] bombs to be used are the following:
a battleship:                                          500-kg to 800-kg regular bombs
a large cruiser:                                     250-kg to 500-kg regular bombs
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a large merchantman:            ⎫
                                            ⎬          150-kg regular bombs
a submarine:                            ⎭
a small merchantman:           ⎫
                                            ⎬          60-kg regular bombs
a destroyer:                              ⎭
an attack on an airfield:                      150-kg to 250-kg regular bombs
a stronghold:                                        500-kg to 800-kg regular bombs
a city:                                                     use of a mix of various types of bombs
troops on the ground:                         regular bombs with a size of 150 kilograms or more
[In my opinion], it is in general more expedient to drop a small number of large bombs with
a wider damage radius than dropping a large number of small bombs with a smaller damage
radius in attacking airfields or [enemy] troops on land.
When in the future large land-based attack planes are to be put into service, we need to
work on 1.5-ton bombs.
7. We need to work on a light torpedo with a total weight of 500 kilograms for attacks on mer-
chantmen.
During the period from 1 until 17 February mainly at the Bangka and Karimata Straits,
our unit bombed as many as thirty merchantmen, who were conducting rescue [operations]
or were trying to escape from Singapore, but those we scored hits on and sank were just
nine ships. In view of the fact that the strike accuracy was very poor in bombings by a single
aircraft, I think we need to work on such a torpedo. In regard to merchantmen, I think that
we can produce certain results even if such a torpedo runs on the surface of the waters.
Therefore, a simple one with a running range of [as short as] 500 meters needs to be worked
on.
8. We need to work on a large antisubmarine machinegun to be fitted on mid-sized land-based
attack planes.
Although mid-sized land-based attack planes were often employed for guarding against
or attacking enemy submarines, antisubmarine bombing attacks by mid-sized land-based
attack planes produced very few results. I think we need to work on a large machinegun
[effective enough to] make it impossible for enemy submarines to submerge.
11. The Conclusion of the Java Invasion Operation
Military Gains and Losses
Although it is impossible to show the military gains and losses of each unit during an iden-
tical period of time due to a lack of data, the gains and losses thought at that time to have
been gained or sustained mostly during the period of the Dutch East Indies operation were
as follows (some numbers only cover the period of the Java operation while others include
periods after the Java operation):*
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* The following lists and tables contain a number of problems when compared to data given earlier in the present
volume or to data found in the archival records, Japanese or Allied. For the sake of consistency, we have silently
corrected some of the data, but left most of them as they are in the Japanese text. These lists should be handled
with caution. It is beyond the scope of the present translation project to try to solve the problems which these
lists present.
1. The military gains and losses of the Dutch East Indies Unit, Part I
The military gains and losses in the operations to capture Tarakan, Balikpapan,
Menado and Kendari from 16 December 1941 until 24 January 1942 as reported at that
time were as follows:(68)
(1) The military gains
Sank: 1 Minelayer
4 Submarines
[Aircraft] brought down: 6 aircraft
[Ships] captured: 3 (1 merchantman, 1 light ship, and 1 steam launch)
Abandoned bodies: about 520 men
Captured ordnance:
Armored cars: 4
Field guns: a few
Bombs, machineguns and rifles: large numbers
Disposed mines: 325
(2) The losses
Sunk: The Tatsugami-maru (auxiliary personnel transport ship), the Sumanoura-maru (oiler),
the Nan’a-maru (transport ship), the Myōken-maru, the Kankō-maru (auxiliary gunboat), and
Minesweepers No. 13 and No. 14
Shot down: 2 Aircraft
Seriously damaged: Patrol Boat No. 37 and 2 aircraft
Killed in action: 258 men
Wounded in action: 361 men
2. The military gains of the Dutch East Indies Unit, Part II
The military gains of the Dutch East Indies Unit during the period from the capture of
Ambon until the completion of the Java operation, i.e. from 24 January until 10 March
1942 were as shown in the following table:(68)






































































Minegumo 1 Mar Sank 1 Ditto
Harusame Ditto Sank 1 tor-pedo boat Ditto
Yūdachi 3 Mar Sank 1 Ditto































Hatsukaze Ditto Sank 1 Ditto
Arashio,
Asashio Ditto Sank 1 Ditto
Amatsukaze 3 Mar Sank 1 Ditto



























































































































































































































































































That is, [the Dutch East Indies Unit]
Sank: 7 cruisers, 13 destroyers, 29 submarines, 7 merchantmen/ 
transport ships and 4 other types of ships
Destroyed: 1 destroyer
Brought down: 13 aircraft
Inflicted damage to: 20 aircraft
However, despite the [reported] number of sunken submarines (twenty-nine submarines),
according to the documents made available to the public by the United States after the
war,(176) the submarines sunk during the Dutch East Indies operation were just the follow-
ing four submarines:
1. U.S. submarines
SS-174 USS Shark: sunk on 11 February off Menado
SS-176 USS Perch: sunk on 3 March north of Surabaya
2. Dutch submarines
K-XIX: Sunk on 26 January in the Makassar Strait
K-XIII: Sunk in the eastern part of the Indian Ocean in early 1942
3. The losses sustained by the Dutch East Indies Unit, Part II(68)
(between 24 January and 10 March)




Name Date Degree of Damage Cause
Cruiser Nagara 25 Jan
Minor damages (will with-
stand military operations
after emergency repairs at
Davao)
Minor collision with the Hat-
suharu near the mouth of the
Bay of Kendari
Destroyer Hatsuharu 25 Jan Ditto (ditto)
Minor collision with the Nagara
near the mouth of the Bay of
Kendari
Ditto Suzukaze 4 Feb Ditto (emergency repairs pro-vided by the Akashi)
Leaks caused by a torpedo at-
tack from an enemy submarine,
while patrolling the mouth of
the Bay of Kendari
Ditto Natsushio 8 Feb Sunk
Sunk by a torpedo attack from
an enemy submarine at 50 NM
southwest of Makassar
Ditto Michishio 20-21 Feb Minor damages (engines in-operable)
Hit in the sea engagement off
Bali
Ditto Ōshio 20-21 Feb
Ditto (will withstand engage-
ments and cruising, though
hit at the searchlights and the
powder handling room)
Hit in the sea engagement off
Bali and in an air raid the next
morning
Ditto Asagumo 27 Feb Ditto (able to cruise on herown)
Hit in the first phase of the sea
engagement off Surabaya
That is, [The Dutch East Indies Unit sustained the following losses:]
Sunk: 1 Destroyer and 2 minesweepers
Sustained minor or some damage: 1 Cruiser, 7 destroyers, 2 minesweepers and 1 aux-
iliary seaplane tender
4. The military gains and losses reported by the Carrier Task Force(68)
(1) The first carrier operation (attack on Port Darwin)
Brought down 8 enemy aircraft, set 10 aircraft ablaze and inflicted serious damage on 5
Sank 2 destroyers and 8 auxiliary naval vessels
Inflicted serious damage on 7 naval vessels
Set 3 hangars ablaze
(2) The second carrier operation (carrier operation [on the waters] south of Java)
Sank 1 destroyer, 5 merchantmen, 1 minesweeper, 13 special service vessels and others
(3) Losses sustained (aircraft): 1 carrier-based bomber and 1 carrier-based fighter plane, which
crashed themselves
5. The military gains reported by the main body of the Southern Task Force(68)
Sank [enemy] vessels [of] 1 cruiser, 1 destroyer, 1 gunboat, 1 sloop, 1 oiler, 1 minesweeper
and 6 merchantmen
Inflicted damage on 1 armed merchantman
Captured 4 merchantmen
6. The military gains and losses reported by the Air Unit of the Southern Task Force(75)
(4 January - 6 April)
(1) Losses inflicted on the enemy air force (as shown in the following table):
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Ditto Harukaze 1 Mar Ditto (will withstand engage-ments)
Hit in the sea engagement off
Batavia
Ditto Shikinami Ditto Ditto Ditto
Minesweeper No. 9 2 Feb Sunk
Sank after contacting mine[s]
while sweeping the port of
Ambon
Ditto No. 11 Ditto Some damage (unable tocruise on her own)
Sustained some damage by
mine[s] while sweeping the port
of Ambon
Ditto No. 12 Ditto Ditto Ditto




Sanuki-maru 27 Jan Some damage (emergency re-pairs provided)
Leaks and ran aground in an
[enemy] air raid at Balikpapan
469 aircraft in total
(2) Enemy naval vessels sunk or destroyed (as shown in the following table):
(3) The Losses [of the unit itself]
{1} Aircraft
{2} Naval vessels
4 Transport ships were sunk
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Shot down
(unconfirmed within parentheses)














24 (12) 111 (37) 19 (0) 3 (0) 77 (31) 34 (33) 38 (18) 28 (4)
157 (49) 177 (86)
334 (135)




































Fighter Planes Flying Boats Total
Crashed themselves 12 6 14 2 34
Hit or marked by bullets 2 0 2 0 4
Total 14 6 16 2 38
7. The military gains and losses reported by the Submarine Unit of the Southern Task
Force(60)
(1) The military gains of Submarine Unit A
Sank 6 merchantmen
Inflicted damage on 1 oiler
(2) The military gains of Submarine Unit C
Sank 3 merchantmen
(3) The losses
Submarine I-5 (Submarine Unit C) sustained damage by friendly fire from our aircraft
8. The military gains and losses reported by the army units(166)
(1) The military gains obtained on Java (until 25 March)
Prisoners of war: 82,618 men in total
Captured goods:
177 Aircraft
A total of 940 [large] guns
4,228 Heavy and light machineguns
80,778 Rifles and pistols
5,153 Searchlights
1,728,585 Shells and ammunition
89,071,820 Cartridges for machineguns and rifles
36,000 Bombs
Vehicles, tanks, armored cars and special service vehicles, 1,059 in total
9,500 Automobiles
7,108 Train carriages
About one-year [supply] of medicines for 100,000 men
(2) The losses sustained in the Java operation
Meanwhile on 10 March, the Emperor granted the following Imperial Rescript to the com-
manders in chief of the Combined Fleet and the Southern Army.(62)
The Army and Navy units operating in the Dutch East Indies theater have in close and effective
cooperation and covering enormous distances overcome numerous difficulties, fought bravely,
and destroyed the enemy’s air power and fleets, while at the same time determinedly carrying
out the most difficult landing operations in various areas, crushing strong enemy [forces] every-
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Unit
Up to 1 March 2-5 March
Killed Wounded Killed Wounded
Shōji Detachment 63 165 19 26
Sakaguchi Detachment 1 18 2 28
2d Division 15 10 64 180
48th Division 91 254 0 21
Total 170 447 85 255
where, and by completely and boldly demolishing every major base of the enemy with great
speed, they swept away the military forces of the enemy. We highly approve of them.
An Assessment of the Enemy Movements in the Southwestern Theater
According to the “Greater East Asia War’s Lessons of War ([section] Air Operation),” the as-
sessment of the enemy movements after the Dutch East Indies operation was virtually com-
pleted was as follows:
I. Australia 
1. Air forces
(1) U.S. Air Forces
It seems that reinforcements from the mainland of the United States had finally gotten
on track and that they were trying to bring aircraft [to the front], when the swift invasion
of Java by the Japanese forces took them by surprise. (The USS Langley, which was sunk
at a point south of Cilacap on 27 February, had been transporting a full load of reinforce-
ment aircraft. It is also presumed that about thirty large aircraft destroyed on the ground
at Broome on 3 March had been on their way to Java as reinforcements, too.) Accordingly,
we expect that in Australia, not only a remarkable number of reinforcements for Australia
and the Dutch East Indies have been assembled but that also a considerable number of
U.S. air forces will be transported and assembled there in the future. 
(2) The forces that escaped from Java to Australia
Since both [the routes between Java and] the Lesser Sunda Islands and [between Java
and] Sumatra were cut off and Java was swiftly captured, it is presumed that the enemy
air forces on Java that had [successfully] escaped to Australia were limited to a very small
number of large aircraft.
(3) The Australian Air Force 
Although it is clear that [some of the] Australian Air Force had been dispatched to the
Dutch East Indies, details are not known. Accordingly, it is difficult to assess its current
power.
According to an estimate by the Navy General Staff, the Australian Air Force is being
reinforced with about 150 aircraft per month on average, including those which returned
from overseas deployment, reinforcements provided by the United States and Britain
and those which are domestically manufactured (2 February). 
2. Surface Forces
Apart from the naval vessels proper to the Australian Navy, we may assume that roughly
the following vessels are present in the area:
(1) U.S. Naval vessels
{1} Reinforcements
Although it is difficult to confirm the [number of U.S.] naval vessels [mentioned] in
the intelligence reports of early January, in view of the intelligence report communi-
cated right before the sea engagement off Surabaya (27 February) that a considerable
number of U.S. naval vessels had been [seen at anchor] in Sharks Bay on the west
coast of Australia, it is thought that a certain level of reinforcements has been pro-
vided on top of the remaining forces of the Asiatic Fleet.
{2} Task Force
Although the force seems to have returned to Hawaii after its operations in the
Rabaul area, in view of the [past] case of having returned to Sydney after the first
surprise attack [operation] (in the Marshall Islands on 1 February), we cannot exclude
the possibility that the force is operating in Australian waters.
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{3} The forces that escaped from Java
About four destroyers, [which escaped] after the sea engagement off Surabaya, and
a few destroyers and submarines that had escaped prior to the engagement seem to
be staying in the Australia area.
(2) British and Dutch naval vessels
{1} It is thought that part of the British vessels (the bulk of them [were operating] in the
India area) as well as some of the Dutch destroyers, who were in the Java area before
the [Japanese] invasion operation against Java, have escaped to Australia.
{2} The British battleship HMS Warspite is likely to have left the west coast of the United
States and be operating in the Australia area or in the Indian Ocean.
II. India and Burma
1. Air forces in the India area
(1) Currently deployed forces: about 230 aircraft
(2) Reinforcements
About 150 aircraft from North Africa as well as from the Middle and the Near East (an-
ticipated to be completed in early April)
About 100 aircraft reinforced by Britain and the United States 
About 80 aircraft in preparation to be sent as reinforcements from Britain and the United
States
2. Air forces in the Burma area (Intelligence provided by the Army 5th Air Force)
(1) Forces
Large aircraft: About 20 aircraft, mostly Blenheims.
Small aircraft: 50-60 aircraft, of which Hurricanes were largest in number; about 20 of
them were P–40s.
(2) Replacement air forces
So far, it seems that replacements other than those required to keep up the strength [in
the area] as shown in the previous item will not be brought in.
(3) Deployment of the forces
{1} Magwe (60 nautical miles about 210º [SW] of Mandalay)
It seems to be a core base of enemy forces retreating from Rangoon; 12-13 large air-
craft, a few mid-sized aircraft and forty-odd small aircraft. 
{2} Akyab: about 20 [aircraft], mostly small.
{3} The Taunggyi area (85 nautical miles about 140º [SE] of Mandalay)
Sometimes two or three aircraft appear. There are five airfields in the area.
{4} Lashio: Two or three aircraft sometimes appear.
(4) The operational movements of enemy air forces
{1} Bombing of cities
[The enemy] has executed bombing attacks on the border areas with Thailand. The
bombing attacks on Bangkok are only conducted on moonlit nights with two or three
aircraft.
No air raids have been conducted since early February.
{2} Bombing of bases
No particular bombing attacks have been conducted other than those by P–40s on
the Chiang Mai [base] (330 nautical miles north north-west of Bangkok).
3. Surface forces
(1) Forces
2 to 3 Battleships (both [or either one of] HMS Royal Sovereign and HMS Ramillies, and
HMS Revenge)
2 Carriers (HMS Hermes, HMS Indomitable)
4 Class-A cruisers (HMS Cornwall, HMS London, HMS Sussex and HMAS Canberra)
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About 10 Class-B cruisers
About 13 destroyers
Several submarines
Other than the above, it seems that the enemy has a few auxiliary aircraft carriers.
The Battleship HMS Warspite is likely to operate in this area. Another battleship and
two aircraft carriers are anticipated to be sent in as reinforcements in the near future.
(2) Bases
Colombo, Bombay, Mombasa (the east coast of Africa) and Durban (the southeast coast
of Africa)
(3) Submarines
Having lost all their bases in the Dutch East Indies and Malaya areas, it is thought that
enemy submarines will use bases in Ceylon and Perth (western Australia) in the future. 
Since the enemy may turn places in the Dutch East Indies that we have not yet seized
into supply bases for submarines, it is necessary to be on guard against this [possibil-
ity].
Evaluation of the World Situation and the Fundamental Principles in
Conducting the War 
On 7 March 1942, the following evaluation of the world situation was agreed upon at the li-
aison conference between IGHQ and the Government:(144)
Evaluation of the World Situation (excerpt)
I. Measures the United States and Britain are likely to take
From now on, the United States and Britain will cooperate all the more closely in military,
economic, financial and other fields. While unitedly striving to degrade the military power of
the Axis [Powers] on the one hand, they will on the other hand strive for a rapid buildup of
their own military power. By making the conduct of the war against the Axis Powers in Europe
their top priority, they will try in conjunction with the Soviet Union to turn the war situation in
that theater to their advantage, while striving to secure and strengthen the bases that will enable
them to strike back at and attack Japan. And when their power becomes superior, they will plan
a counterattack against Japan at a stroke. That is,
1. For the time being, along with the United States and the Soviet Union, Britain will first of
all try to rapidly destroy the military capabilities of Germany and Italy, while securing the
Mediterranean Sea and western Asia, so as to block Japan, Germany and Italy from cooper-
ating [with each other]. 
In the east, Britain will strive as much as possible to maintain her naval supremacy in
the Indian Ocean as well as to secure India and Australia in order to make counterattacks
against Japan and to keep the British Empire united. 
2. For the time being, along with Britain and the Soviet Union, the United States will first of
all try to rapidly destroy the military capabilities of Germany and Italy, while in Australia
and the Indian Ocean areas, striving to secure and strengthen the bases from where to launch
counterattacks against Japan. It also will strive to concentrate powerful naval and air forces
in the Pacific and with one element try to conduct guerrilla-type actions, such as sabotaging
Japanese shipping lanes, or conducting surprise attacks on pivotal areas of Japan. 
3. While supporting the Soviet Union and the Chiang [Jiang] regime [on the one hand], the
United States and Britain are on the other hand pinning their hopes on a move by the Soviet
Union to check Japan or its participation in the war against Japan and they are doing their
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utmost to realize this. For the time being, they may also plan to obtain bases in the eastern
part of the Soviet Union from where to attack Japan.
4. At an appropriate moment when their military strength has become strong enough, the
United States and Britain will shift to large-scale offensives against the Axis [Powers]. It is
highly likely that against Japan they will in conjunction with the Soviet Union and China,
try to directly attack pivotal areas in Japan from the continent, while with their main force
launching counterattacks to recapture one strategic point after another [in the southern areas]
from the direction of Australia and the Indian Ocean.
[However,] it will be by and large in 1943 or later before they will be able to execute such
large-scale offensives.
Reference: Situation in Australia and India (Omitted by the author)
II. The measures the Soviet Union is likely to take (Omitted by the author)
III. The measures Germany and Italy are likely to take (Omitted by the author)
IV. The movements of the Chongqing regime (Omitted by the author)
V. The movements of neutral countries (Omitted by the author)
VI. The changes in the national strength of the countries
1. The United States and Britain’s war potential
(1) The United States
The United States is likely to devote all its energies to improving bottlenecks in its pro-
duction sectors and getting ready for a total war. Generally speaking, until the end of
1944 its military readiness and production capacity [to supply] military demand will
have made dramatic progress.
However, after that, due to shortages of resources that are dependent on the outside
world, of labor and transport capacity, the rise in production capacity may gradually
come to a standstill.
(2) Britain
If current conditions continue, a slight increase in its military capacity will still be likely
in the future.
However, in terms of human resources, the British mainland has almost reached its
limit. Since in terms of physical resources, it further has to depend on overseas countries
particularly the United States, and with the loss of its naval supremacy as well as its
[overseas] territories and colonies, its war potential will inevitably show a tendency to
decline. 
(3) An overall observation about the United States and Britain’s war potential
The United States and Britain’s total war potential when combined is very strong; they
have the capacity to rapidly create a war capability superior to that of Japan and prose-
cute the war for a longer period of time.
Although they are on the whole also very strong in their fighting spirit, they have
the following weak spots.
{1} Their human military potential is not as [excellent] as their physical military poten-
tial.
{2} Although [they] have a massive military potential, the political and economic systems
of the United States and Britain, those of the United States in particular, have not yet
been put on a footing essential for prosecuting a total war. From now on, numerous
conflicts and complications will arise before such a footing is established.
{3} Although they have superior armaments, the loss of operational bases has markedly
reduced their value.
{4} Britain’s war potential very much depends on its maritime transport capacity. 
{5} The maritime transport capacity of the United States is poor compared to its national
power, which makes it impossible for the country to give Britain all-out support.
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{6} The impact of isolating and separating the United States and Britain from each other
on their ability to prosecute the war is incomparably greater than that of isolating
and separating Japan and Germany from each other.
{7} It is possible that isolating and separating Britain from its self-governing dominions
and colonies may lead to the fall of the country in the end.
{8} Since the living standards of the people of the United States and Britain are high and
a fall in these standards may cause much pain, a continuation of the war with no
hope for [immediate] victory will foment social instability and bring about a decline
in morale in general. Particularly, the defeat of Britain will have a huge impact on
[the morale of] the United States.
{9} While the ties between the United States and Britain are natural, the alliance between
the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union is unnatural, and contains many con-
tradictions.
{10} Since the policies adopted by Roosevelt and Churchill tend to be speculative and ad-
venturous, not all people necessarily are willing to follow their leadership.
2. The Soviet Union’s war potential (Omitted by the author)
3. Germany and Italy’s war potential (Omitted by the author)
Following this evaluation of the situation, Japan decided on the following fundamental prin-
ciples in conducting the war to be adopted from now on (excerpts).(144)
The Fundamental Principles in Conducting the War to Be Adopted from Now on (7 March 1942)
1. In order to make Britain surrender and the United States lose its will to fight, [Japan] shall con-
tinue expanding the military gains it has already achieved, and at appropriate opportunities
take aggressive measures, while preparing a political and military system that will be invincible
for a long time.
2. By securing the occupied areas and the main lines of communication, [Japan] shall expedite the
development and use of [natural] resources essential for its national defense, establish a condi-
tion of self-sufficiency and strive to strengthen the military power of the nation.
3. A concrete plan for a more aggressive conduct of war shall be decided upon after having taken
into consideration such circumstances as the Japan’s national power, the progress of the opera-
tions, the war situation between Germany and the Soviet Union, the relations between the
United States and the Soviet Union, and the movements of the Chongqing [regime].
4. The measures to be taken against [movements of] the Soviet Union (Omitted by the author)
5. The measures to be taken against [movements of] the Chongqing [regime]. (Omitted by the au-
thor)
6. The cooperation with Germany and Italy (Omitted by the author)
Evaluation of the Achievements of the Initial Operations
On 11 March 1942, IGHQ and the [Japanese] government made the following evaluation of
the achievements of the initial operations:(144)
What are the differences in the achievements of the initial operations, compared to the plans in
terms of [Japan’s] military, economic, and political [goals]?
I. Military
1. [Achievements] against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands
As a result of the fact that the [Japanese] Army and Navy have achieved far greater initial
military gains than expected, both the United States and Britain have been put on the de-
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fensive for the time being, which has created a situation that is advantageous [to Japan] in
terms of the defense of its territory and securing its vital shipping lanes. Moreover, it has
brought an opportunity to be now able to shift to an offensive strategy by making use of the
current tide of the war, contrary to the expectations that [Japan] would be forced to adopt a
defensive strategy in order to carry on a drawn-out war to a successful finish.
Explanation:
(1) Except for some delay in the Philippines (note by the author: the capture of Bataan Penin-
sula), the army operations have progressed on the whole by about one month faster [than
planned]. Also, the losses of our forces were unexpectedly light.
Above all, this made it possible to already launch the Burma operation, which was
expected to be conducted after the rough completion of the southern operation, with the
reserve strength that had been spared early on in the southern theater.
(2) Whereas our naval operations have not just dealt a great blow to the main forces of the
U.S. and British fleets in the Pacific area at the beginning of the hostilities but [actually]
destroyed most of the enemy surface forces in the East, our own losses were unexpect-
edly small. For the time being, this has led to a reversal of offensive and defensive posi-
tions in the military power balance between the enemy and us in the Pacific and Indian
Oceans.
(3) Also, the air operations of the [Japanese] Army and Navy have destroyed the huge
enemy air power at a relatively low cost and produced more military gains than ex-
pected. Therefore, [the Japanese forces] will be ready to deal with a rapid reinforcement
of enemy air forces and prevent a massive enemy air power from being deployed in the
Pacific and Indian Oceans in the future.
(4) It is likely that when the United States and Britain regain their military power in the fu-
ture, they will plan large-scale offensives, making use of their remaining bases for coun-
terattacks.
(5) Particularly the psychological blow dealt [by Japan] to the enemy military at the begin-
ning of the hostilities must have been immense. 
2. [Achievements] against the Chongqing [regime]
Concerning [the achievements against] the Chongqing [regime], the enormous military gains
in the initial operations, particularly the quicker-than-expected cutting of the Burma route
[to supply the Chongqing regime] (note by the author: the capture of Rangoon, the starting
point of the Burma route on 8 March) have led us to expect that they will have a considerable
impact on the [regime’s] power of resistance. 
3. [Achievements] against the Soviet Union (Omitted by the author)
4. [Effects] on Germany and Italy (Omitted by the author)
II. Politics
If, with a focus on the [Japanese] Empire, we compare the current world situation with what
had been expected before the opening of the hostilities, there is on the whole not much difference
with what had been expected at the beginning, though most developments have been more fa-
vorable to the Empire than expected.
Explanation (Omitted by the author)
III. Economics
Owing to the huge military gains at the beginning of the hostilities,
1. Securing the [natural] resources in the areas specified in the plans and cutting off the supply
of essential materials to the United States and Britain were for the most part achieved earlier
[than planned].
2. The maritime transport capacity was on the whole maintained as planned.
3. The prospect is certain that compared to the plans, the acquisition of materials, oil in partic-
ular, is likely to achieve excellent results.
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Although it may be expected, as shown in the above, that our war capacity in terms of
materials will on the whole be strengthened more than planned, our food security still needs
consideration.
Explanation
1. Maritime transport capacity
Although there are some differences in the factors by which the [total] tonnage is calculated,
the shipping capacity on the whole has mostly stayed [on the level] specified in the plans.
Namely, the decrease in the use of captured ships and the larger-[than-expected] number
of requisitioned ships and ships which need repair are offset by the increase in the number
of charters from foreign countries and the smaller number of lost or destroyed ships (C
ships). Moreover, the ships returning to mainland Japan from now on will be counted as an
increase in shipping capacity.
2. Steel 
(1) The planned [production amount]
{1} The [planned] amount of steel produced in the fiscal year 1941 shall be [changed] to
4,500,000 tons, which was set at the time of opening of the hostilities, from 4,760,000
tons, which was specified in the materials mobilization plan.
{2} As for the amount for the fiscal year 1942, the amount produced during the southern
operation shall be reduced to 3,800,000 tons when calculated on an annual basis.
(2) An estimation based on the current [production amount]
{1} The [actual] amount of steel produced in the fiscal year 1941 reached 4,650,000 tons,
which was 150,000 tons more than planned.
{2} For the fiscal year 1942, given that the shipping capacity remains as specified in the
plan, the prospect is that a production level of 5,000,000 tons can be secured by in-
tensifying the collection of scrap iron and using [the materials] in store.
3. Rice (Omitted by the author)
4. Materials to be obtained in the southern areas (except for oil)
The [amounts] specified in the plans will more or less be attained.
5. Oil
(1) Expected amounts to be obtained from the southern areas
([The numbers] in the explanation as given by the president of the [Cabinet] Planning
Board at the Imperial Conference on 5 November [1941])
                                                 1st year                   2d year                  3d year
Borneo:                                     300,000 kl           1,000,000 kl           2,500,000 kl
Sumatra:   southern area                    —              750,000 kl           1,400,000 kl
              northern area                    —              250,000 kl              600,000 kl
total                                           300,000 kl           2,000,000 kl           4,500,000 kl
(2) The expected amount to be obtained in the fiscal year 1942
British Borneo                         700,000 kl
Tarakan                                    250,000 kl
Sanga Sanga                            300,000 kl
Sumatra                                    500,000 kl
Total                                      1,750,000 kl
Thus, with the completion of Java invasion operation and taking the first stage of the invasion
operations as completed, the prospects for the shift to the subsequent operations were very
bright.
540 Chapter VII     /     The Implementation of the Java Invasion Operation
A Critical Review [of the Operation]
Although the Dutch East Indies operation looked as if it had progressed smoothly, the symp-
toms of the causes that would become the source of many troubles in the future were already
visible, namely:
1. Offense-related [matters]
(1) The antisubmarine attacks were often ineffective.
(2) The accuracy of horizontal bombing deteriorated (due to a lack of training).
(3) It was very difficult to bring down large enemy aircraft.
2. Defense-related [matters]
(1) While the hit rate of the enemy antiaircraft fire was good, ours was poor.
(2) [Our forces] lacked the notion of protecting their bases, due to which no adequate
countermeasures were taken and [our bases] were susceptible to enemy surprise at-
tacks.
(3) [Our forces] had a poor notion of emergency repairs (such as measures to fix damage
caused by shots or bombs) and their skills were poor. (For instance, the case of the de-
stroyer Natsushio off Makassar.)
(4) The defensive capacity of our land-based attack planes was remarkably poor. (Note:
It was impossible to increase their defensive capacity with the technology on hand at
that time since longer cruising ranges to enable them to conduct operations over the
open seas were given priority.)
3. Others
(1) A serious lack of capabilities to set up bases
(2) Insufficient communication capabilities, particularly the insufficient capability of sig-
nal communications of the rapidly constructed land bases.
Among these problems, the fact that the antisubmarine attacks were not effective be-
came the source of enormous problems in later periods.
Reference: The actual performance of antisubmarine attacks by the Japanese Navy at that time
1. The performance of the sonar equipment (Type93 Mark I and Mark III) on the destroyers of the
fleet [in a test mission to] clear [hostile] submarines (according to ‘A study on the improvement
of the underwater detection skills of the fleet’) 
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The [successful] detection rate of totally submerged submarines 50%
The percentage of false detections in the total number of detections 50%
The detectable distance 1700 [meters]
Accuracy
Margin of error in terms of direction + -6.5º
Margin of error in terms of distances 4%
The maximum speed at which detection [is possible] 14 knots (though noise from the directionof the bow was large)
The capability to receive sounds emitted by hostile submarines Able to detect their direction when sailingat 18 knots
The interference of sounds emitted by other [friendly] vessels
Sometimes it is difficult to detect [the
enemy] due to mutual [friendly] interfer-
ence
(Findings)
Their [main] weakness is their poor reliability with too many [reports of] false detections. [Also]
their performance varies very much according to the season and sea areas.
2. Findings on the maintenance of the underwater detection equipment(167) (according to ‘A study
on the improvement of the underwater detection skills of the fleet’)
(1) Having served in the fleet and actually having handled underwater detection equipment
and personally having made efforts to service the equipment, we keenly feel that the un-
derwater detection equipment still possesses a great many mechanical defects, that it is too
intricate [for the personnel in charge] to handle, and that the personnel are so unskilled that
it is currently impossible to expect them to perfectly tune up the equipment.
When we look at the circumstances of the troubles, we found that about 130 cases of the
about 330 problems [reported] in about six months were caused by poor maintenance and
service. 
This large number proves how important it is in the current [situation] of the fleet to
service the equipment in order to fully bring into play our underwater detection skills. Al-
though there may be various measures to counter this [situation], the following will gener-
ally be needed:
{1} To quickly improve the current underwater detection equipment so that all mechanical
defects will be eliminated. 
{2} To study and improve its installation.
{3} To simplify the equipment.
{4} To prepare manuals with illustrations and send them quickly to the vessels on which the
equipment is installed.
{5} To rapidly prepare textbooks for the handling of the underwater detection equipment
and distribute them. 
{6} In the courses on underwater detection equipment at schools, the main emphasis needs
to be put on handling the actual equipment firsthand, and it is necessary to particularly
emphasize the lessons on servicing as well as on how to locate and fix problems.
{7} All naval arsenals should swiftly train a number of skilled workers and set up acceptance
test sites [for when the equipment is received from the factory], so that it will be impos-
sible that imperfect installations, deficient equipment or incompletely tuned-up equip-
ment will pass through [inspection].
{8} The number of personnel attached to the staff of the fleet and in charge of underwater
detection [operations] should be increased; at least one special duty officer or warrant
officer should be assigned to each division, and on top of that, warrant officers with a
knowledge of underwater detection [operations] should be put on board of (vessels or a
vessel of) each unit as personnel attached to the unit or as a crewman.
{9} Skilled workers should be sent on the Akashi to be assigned to each division.
{10} Lectures for the torpedo chiefs in charge should be given at [antisubmarine warfare]
school or other places at the beginning of [every] fiscal year.
{11} Appropriate instruments necessary in testing and checking the equipment, such as
testers, should be developed, manufactured and quickly provided to the units using the
equipment.
{12} Items concerning the periodic inspections of the underwater detection equipment should
be studied, specified [and included] in the inspection regulations at the time of building
or repairing vessels.
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The distance at which totally submerged submarines are acousti-
cally locatable
500 [meters] or less to locate them with
certainty
{13} As for the hydrophones, the types and the number of spare parts as well as the tools for
service and maintenance should be increased in view of the troubles reported this time.
(2) As stated in the above, [the fact] that no detailed [wiring] diagrams nor manuals were dis-
tributed to each vessel seriously hindered maintenance. This was particularly the case with
the sonar equipment.
We hope that such documents will swiftly be distributed. From my experiences this time,
we suspect that [the Navy] may have left the work concerning the sonars entirely to the
manufacturing companies.
In one example, the circuit of the receiver of the Type93 Mark4 sonar had been unknow-
ingly changed. Because of this, the personnel dispatched from the Yokosuka Naval Arsenal
([an] assistant-engineer and several men), who should have been working most closely [with
the manufacturing companies] and who should have had the best knowledge of handling
the latest weapons, were not aware that the schematic sheet[s] they had brought along were
different [from the actual wiring] until they were told by engineer[s] of the Navy Technical
Department. It was a good example; it made us keenly feel that the [manufacturing] com-
panies, the Navy Technical Department, the naval arsenals and the operational units did not
even [properly] communicate, and in particular that the school, which is supposed to train
the personnel handling the equipment, is least of all informed. 
We decided to mention [here] the change in the circuit of the receiver of the Type93 Mark4
[sonar] (Receiver No. 14 and later [numbers]) just for reference, because it does show that
not only operational units but even the school is not informed. (Separate illustrations omitted
by the author.)
(3) The number of troubles considered to be careless mistakes by [either] naval arsenals or [man-
ufacturing] companies is significantly large. [The fact that] a large number of troubles derives
from faulty equipment is most troublesome to operational units, the fleets in particular. It is
quite a challenge for operational units to locate mistakes in wiring or misplaced parts. A few
examples [of faults] found in the Type93 Mark3 sonars installed on [the destroyers of] the
2d Destroyer Squadron are the following: 
{1} In the sonars installed on six destroyers (the Kuroshio, the Yukikaze, the Ōshio, the Arashio,
the Shiranui and the Kagerō), 500 kΩ instead of 100 kΩ resistor[s] were set at R6 in the
grid of the resistors of the receiver. 
{2} [A] 10 kΩ resistor was placed instead of a 100 kΩ [resistor] for R8 of Receiver T5 of [the
sonar on] a destroyer (the Hatsukaze).
{3} [The electric current] did not pass through the resistor[s] of the projection-reception relay
when the the switch circuit worked (the Shiranui).
(4) Faulty installations are so-called irrecoverable mistakes. In view of the difficulty in changing
equipment on already-built vessels, we hope that the installation of such equipment will be
done with particularly great care and meticulousness. (The rest omitted by the author; items
on faulty installations.)
(5) It is surprising that the basic tune-up of the Type93 sonars is very much defective, which
makes us suspicious about the skills of the naval arsenal workers. When Mark3 sonars in-
stalled on [the destroyers of] the 2d Destroyer Squadron were looked at, only one of [the de-
stroyers], the Yukikaze, had the basic tune-up of its equipment mostly completed, while the
basic tune-up of the equipment on all other vessels had to be done all over again from the
beginning by [personnel] attached to the staff. Also, all the submarines of the 4th Submarine
Squadron, who were equipped with Mark4 sonars, [had to] have the basic tune-up of the
equipment done all over again.
The situation of the 4th Submarine Squadron (Omitted by the author)
(6) The tune-up of the sonars (Omitted by the author)
(7) Maintenance and [other important] points of attention
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Although many troubles derive from poor maintenance and service as mentioned in the
above, the maintenance methods and [other important] points of attention do not go beyond
what is [provided in] the lectures at the beginning of [each] fiscal year and the items men-
tioned in the reference documents handed out there.
The reason why [maintenance] is not thoroughly done is because the sonar personnel
are not willing to do it. We felt that even when they notice malfunctions or the unsatisfactory
operation [of the equipment], the personnel tend to leave the troubles as they are due to a
lack of confidence in testing and tuning up the equipment. Since acoustic equipment is spe-
cial in the sense that insignificant malfunctions will greatly affect [its operation], particularly
in such intricate weapons as sonars, where [multiple] functions operate in correlated ways,
just a trivial malfunction in one part will quite often disable [the entire] detection [process]. 
In view of this [aspect], maintenance training needs to be stressed also in the education
of the trainees at schools. Just for reference and in order to grasp the general tendencies, let
us give you a few examples below: (Examples omitted by the author).
(8) Findings on the maintenance of sonars on each vessel in [some] destroyer squadrons
{1} 1st Destroyer Squadron
1) [The personnel of] this squadron are generally able to tune up the transducers but
have not yet acquired the proper tune-up methods.
2) Many use the latch on the headphones in an opposite way. 
3) Not a few are inadequately installed. (Inadequate points omitted by the author.) 
4) [They tend to] drag the wires of the resistors to control the output of the receivers or
the oscillation strength, but such acts will easily disfigure the parts, which then be-
comes the main cause of noise while having little effect [on improving the output].
{2} 2d Destroyer Squadron
1) The maintenance of the equipment
[Personnel] of all vessels make efforts to maintain the equipment but their efforts are
off the point and lack efficiency.
We recorded, as seen in the [list] of problems, inadequate checking of the circuits,
inadequate checking and maintenance of the parts in immediate contact [with the
personnel], and the defective tune-ups of parts. Although they carry spare parts, rel-
atively few troubles have occurred involving those parts. They need to get a thorough
training in how to handle and service sonars.
The points to be considered when servicing [sonars] (Omitted by the author)
2) The sonar personnel
The sonar personnel do not have much knowledge of or experience with oscillating
currents and this kind of equipment, and their ability of locating troubles or making
inferences about the condition [of the equipment] is poor. Therefore, it is necessary
to give them a training as realistic as possible by training them at any available op-
portunity and having them do acoustic training at least one hour every day. 
Concerning [the skills to] detect and locate [the enemy], their [skills to] shift from
a search and detect mission to a continuous detection mission, as well as their skills
to avoid false detections are still very poor. [Therefore], attaching [more] importance
to such [skills] rather than to searching skills, they need to conduct exercises in sound-
recognition as much as possible.
(End [of quotation])
3. Comments on the ‘Findings on the maintenance of the underwater detection equipment’
Concerning the findings [quoted] in the previous item, Cdr. Tsukuda Sadao, member of the
Navy Technical Department at the time of the opening of hostilities, had after the war the fol-
lowing recollections: 
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(1) Comments on the poor quality of the underwater detection equipment
{1} Unlike other weapons, such as big guns and torpedoes, where it is common knowledge
that after handling them for years or even decades, defects have been eliminated, the
underwater detection equipment had clearly not yet moved beyond the stage of being a
prototype weapon. The point that should absolutely be brought up as a fundamental
problem is that the performance of the underwater detection equipment was affected by
so many various and complicated conditions that it was impossible to show the true ca-
pability of the equipment itself without stating the environment in which it was used.
For example, if we look at the hydrophones, the transducers were theoretically to be
placed on a flat surface, in reality however they were arranged three-dimensionally on
the outside of a complexly curved surface, which differed according to the class of the
vessel [on which they were placed]. One cannot ignore the possible effects of the three-
dimensional arrangement, nor the effects of the shape of the hull of the ships on the
sound waves.
As for where to install the equipment [on the vessels], it was almost impossible at
that time to install it on the most desirable place to make the most of its performance;
particularly in the early times, very little attention was paid to the equipment, and quite
often the installation conditions were obviously very unfavorable. 
On top of that, it was impossible to eliminate such external influences as the effects
of the waves, underwater noises, bathymetric features and the refraction of soundwaves
caused by anomalies in the underwater temperature distribution, let alone the effects of
the water current [which would change] according to the speed [of the vessel] and in-
terference by the vibration of the hull coming from the engines.
It needs no saying that [the detection results] are greatly and directly affected by the
features of the target, such as the strength, frequency, and rhythm of the sound of the
target in case of acoustic detection, and shape, structure and reflective power of the target
in case of sound pulse detection.
Taking such conditions into consideration, upgrading and improving the perform-
ance of the equipment would only make them mechanically [more] complicated, which
is an unavoidable problem with underwater detection equipment.
{2} It was in the early years of the Showa period [late 1920s] that underwater acoustics finally
attracted general attention, but just like the general attention paid to it, its history as a
weapon was quite shallow and low. Consequently, piles of even fundamental problems
were left unsolved.
A considerable long period is needed to improve a weapon and make it ready to such
a degree that after a crash course even unskilled soldiers can handle it, and [in that sense]
the [underwater detection] equipment was still quite far from the final stage [of devel-
opment]. 
{3} The number of troubles was astonishing; the admittedly major cause seems to me to have
been the poor quality and low reliability of the numerous electrical parts that constituted
the complex equipment. Compared to the present-day standards of the electronics in-
dustry, the standards at that time were quite low. Since even such words as quality con-
trol or reliable technology, which are common these days, did not exist, there must have
been problems in the manufacturing processes as well as with the test techniques.
As a result, besides [poor] parts of very dubious uniformity, we have to add the vari-
ations in performance caused by temperature and humidity, or the instability caused by
mechanical vibrations, etc., and that is why it was not only very difficult to tune up the
equipment but also why minor causes would get the equipment out of order, or in ex-
treme cases even the weather would affect its condition. 
(2) Comments on unskilled personnel
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{1} It was true that the quality of the personnel in charge of underwater detection was so
low that they did not even have a beginner’s knowledge of electrical [engineering] or
acoustics. However, prior to that, and taking into account the [equipment’s] essential na-
ture as a weapon, I think that we need to change our way of thinking that the weapon
depends on the individual personnel’s advanced training or their having a good ear for
distinguishing subtle differences in sound. 
However, it takes a long time for a weapon to reach a level where it can be handled
[without advanced training or special skills]. The situation was that it was quite impos-
sible to expect that the underwater detection equipment would actually reach a standard
worthy of being called a weapon in only a short period of two or three years.
{2} Simplification of weapons should be considered only after they have reached a satisfac-
tory level of performance. As for the underwater detection equipment, it was out of the
question because making it simple and handy would only worsen its already inadequate
performance. 
{3} It is a big mistake to think that one could compensate for the deficiencies and faults of
weapons with trainings and drills by the personnel in charge. 
A U.S. technical officer in charge of radar, whom I interrogated at Corregidor, was
originally a medical engineer, and electric [engineering] or wireless [technology] were
out of his field. 
He stated that he had been given a special training for [operating] radar for only three
months. [According to him,] although he did not understand the intricate system of radar
at all, he had mastered how to handle it. There was a list [for how to] deal with troubles;
several causes were stated according to the types of troubles, and the measures to fix
them were [also] shown in quite a simple way. It went like, “change this part,” “if it does
not work, then change that,” “if both do not work, replace the entire sliding block with
a spare;” there were no theories or textbook explanations at all. With that system, he
stated, he had never felt handicapped in servicing his weapon. 
This is what a real weapon is supposed to be. I keenly felt an immense difference
compared to the Japanese underwater detection equipment.
You cannot call it weapons [manufacturing] technology if it cannot produce a weapon
that a layman after a mere three months of training can fully handle. It is a stupid effort
to give lessons on the theories of electric [engineering] or acoustics, or to explain about
circuits to personnel with no basic knowledge of the subjects, and it is nonsense to expect
any results from that.
(3) Comments on the measures to prepare the equipment
{1} It is an ideal to eliminate all mechanical defects, and it is a condition for making it into a
weapon. However, at that time, it was almost impossible to achieve that at the [technol-
ogy] level of not only the Navy but also of the whole of Japan.
{2} Although there were problems with the installation itself, more basically, the [level of]
understanding and recognition of underwater detection equipment on the part of [naval]
tacticians and ship-building engineers was also problematic.
{3} It is true that the diagrams and manuals were incomplete and that they were not appro-
priately distributed. The system of those days of having engineers in charge throughout
[the whole process] from conducting fundamental research, experimenting, planning,
supervising manufacturing and writing manuals was quite primitive. Manuals to be read
by personnel should not be written by engineers.
{4} It is only proper that trainings should be focused on firsthand practice at the real system.
However, if the equipment is intricate and its reliability low, the trainings will produce
little effect despite the enormous burdens laid on the training program. The training
methods may have had problems, but I think the equipment bore a heavier onus.
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{5} Even naval arsenals had only a few skilled workers; the reality was that technicians were
dispatched from the Naval Technical Research Institute when any troubles occurred.
Since [the number of workers was] increased so rapidly, training could not keep up [with
the increase]. Although acceptance tests were conducted as a matter of course, I do not
think the installation work was perfectly carried out.
{6} Although I agree with the necessity to attach special duty officers and warrant officers
specifically in charge of underwater detection to the staff, I very much doubt their level
of competence, [in the sense whether] special duty officers and warrant officers, who are
transferred in the middle [of their careers] to take charge of underwater detection, can
really be called experts.
{7} Although the idea of placing a large number of professional workers on repair vessels
and assign workers to all units was preferable, [the Japanese forces] did not have enough
reserves to permanently assign such skilled workers. 
{8} It is true that sonar was mostly left to [the private manufacturing] companies. Although
it may seem that the personnel and financial costs to the Navy were smaller if from the
beginning one relied upon the private [sector] with no leadership taken by the Navy,
one cannot expect that private companies would take on business that was not commer-
cially profitable. And it is no wonder that [the Navy] ended up being pulled about by
the nose at the convenience of the private companies. In all ages, there is no easy way to
obtain results without making efforts and sacrifices yourself.
(4) General comments
{1} I wonder to what extent the [naval] tacticians understood and recognized the character-
istics of the underwater detection equipment, which was based on underwater acoustics,
[a technology] highly susceptible to unstable external conditions. Perhaps their lack of
understanding and recognition gave rise to excessive hope and expectations, which
[then] resulted in large miscalculations. 
{2} Even graduates of the advanced general and advanced professional courses, the so-called
marked-out set, were guys that fundamentally speaking had no close affinity with sci-
ence or technology, and from the point of view of advanced technology, they were just
amateurs. 
The equipment to be handled by such men should be very simple and sturdy; proto-
type-kind machinery that may get out of order anytime or take much effort to locate
problems, should be rejected right from the start.
(End [of quotation])
4. Findings on the drills for underwater detection(167) (according to ‘A study on the improvement
of the underwater detection skills of the fleet’)
The underwater detection drills conducted by the fleet did not seem to be thorough at all,
and records, rules and handling methods were also ill-prepared and incomplete. In order to en-
hance the effects of the drills, we need in view of the results of this fiscal year to study and im-
prove them.
It is considered necessary for the fleet to conduct and execute drills on the following items
and take the results into account.
(1) In order to improve underwater detection skills, it is necessary to attach importance to drills
at anchor, as previously told (omitted by the author). [In such drills,] relatively effective
drills may be conducted if for the divisions or fleets the anchorages at the point of operations
or the formations at the anchorages are given [careful] consideration.
(2) Mutual drills between submarine and destroyer squadrons need to be studied and con-
ducted. 
That is, destroyer squadrons have few training opportunities where submerged sub-
marines are set as their targets, while submarine squadrons do not get much training op-
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portunities for assaulting directly escorted targets. However, from the beginning of [this]
fiscal year, both have actually admitted the need for such basic drills in the first half of the
year. If [such drills] that would allow both squadrons to train together are studied and
worked out, it would immediately make [more] effective drills possible.
(3) It is necessary to increase the frequency of [depth charge] projector drills so that they will
be conducted twice, both in the first and the latter halves of the fiscal year. 
The frequency of [depth charge] projector drills at the fleet was [only] at a rate of once a
year. Even at present, when sonars are [already] installed and when the necessity of drills
using sonar is recognized, the drills have not changed for a long time. In the current circum-
stances where sonars are going to be increasingly used, there is no doubt that an improve-
ment of skills cannot be expected with a drill rate of only once [a year], and that, moreover,
in the latter half [of the fiscal year]. On top of that, inadequate study and review will lead to
the wrong handling of sonars and, along with unskilled instructions, give us no hope for
satisfactory results.
Currently the least improved, studied, trained and also the least developed subject in
the [operations of the] fleet must be the frequency [depth charge] projector drills. It is most
regrettable that in that respect the [attack] fleets are particularly inferior even to the defense
units.
It is said that the fleets have conducted drills as much as possible when under sail on
alert, [particularly when operating] as clearing units to detect [the enemy]. However, such
[underwater detection]  drills without projecting [depth charges] will not allow an adequate
review of the results, and moreover, they are not drills that include everybody from the com-
mander down.
(4) There is a need to study [and improve] the reviewing methods of underwater detection
drills. 
Although [underwater detection drills] have been conducted using explosives as a sound
source and smoke-emitting shells, respectively for [the drills of] destroyers and submarines,
there still seems to be a reluctance to use such [items in drills]. 
It is necessary to further increase the number of these [items for drills], adequately use
them in all drills and see to it that the results shall be reviewed without fail. It is no exagger-
ation to say that drills without reviews are worth little.
In the current circumstances, I think further progress can be achieved by using sonars
for mutual underwater communications between destroyers and submarines. 
If this research produces considerable results, some sonars should be modified so that
they can also be used as underwater telephones. By measuring the results through under-
water telephones, not only [the issues concerning] the reviews of the results but also security
issues can be solved, which, I believe, will have a major impact on the practice of drills.
(5) It is necessary that rules about underwater detection drills be established at the fleet in the
same way as communication rules, and that the drills be conducted under control.
(End [of quotation]) 
5. [Building] an imitation of a British antisubmarine weapon(168)
In the early period after the opening of hostilities, following the seizure of allied naval bases
such as Hong Kong, Singapore and Surabaya, investigations into [enemy] ordnance were made,
and a British antisubmarine acoustic equipment device called ‘ASDIC’ (AntiSubmarine Detec-
tion Indicating [Investigation] Committer [Committee]) was gotten hold of. [The Japanese Navy]
began research into the strong points of the equipment, the flow-straightening cover for the
transducer[s] to be installed at the bottom of a ship and the distance recording indicator, and
started working on a prototype. The former is expected to help to improve the detection per-
formance under sail, and the latter to facilitate the evaluation of situations in antisubmarine at-
tacks. However, it was not until 1944 that these devices were put into practical use.
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6. Antisubmarine depth charges
(1) On 10 December 1941, Minesweeper No. 10 of the Philippines invasion unit was strafed off
Vigan by enemy fighter planes. The strafe directly hit the antisubmarine depth charges (con-
taining Carlit explosive powder) loaded on the upper deck, inducing explosions and sinking
the minesweeper. In the next two months, the sensitive Carlit explosive powder was all
changed to Type1 explosive powder, which was safer. Due to this change, the explosive
power was reduced somewhat compared to those which contained the Carlit explosive pow-
der.(169)
(2) The antisubmarine depth charges in the early years had a slow descending speed (Type95:
1.9 meters [per second]). Since it was slower than the submerging speed of [enemy] sub-
marines, they exploded [far] above them and did not display their full power.(170)
(3) The number of antisubmarine depth charges that could be loaded on a vessel was small; the
charges would run out after several drops, which made it impossible to carry out adequate
antisubmarine attacks. An example of the numbers of antisubmarine depth charges carried
on a vessel at the time of the opening of hostilities is shown in the following table (Later the
numbers were gradually increased; by the end of 1942, the number of antisubmarine depth
charges carried by a coastal defense ship reached 120.) 
Remarks: Although antisubmarine depth charges were also loaded on destroyers, minesweepers
and other vessels right before the opening of hostilities, the number of charges [per vessel]
was [only] 18-20.(172)
7. Submarine attacking methods
Sublieutenant (Later Lt. Cdr.) Mizoguchi (originally Kuzuhara) Satoshi, then torpedo chief of
the destroyer Kawakaze recalled [the attacks on enemy submarines] as follows:
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When attacking [submarines], the center method and the half-circle method were generally
adopted. In the center method, we headed with increasing speed toward the point where [the
submarine] was spotted or detected and, by calculating the seconds [for us] to reach the spot
using charts and counting the time with a stopwatch, covered the point with antisubmarine
depth charges released in a zonate way. The half-circle method was used when the direction
and the speed of the target was deducible; we would describe a half-circle based on the direction
in which the target would advance and calculated on the basis of its speed the distance it would
advance and the time when we would encounter it, and cover the central part of the [half-]circle
with antisubmarine depth charges released in a zonate way. For this purpose, every vessel meas-
ured its inertia at the time of its increase in speed or course change and prepared its own chart,
which would enable you to instantly know the angle to turn your vessel and the seconds to
reach the point [of encounter] by using it with such data as the distance of the target [from your
vessel] when spotted or detected, your speed, the direction of the target from your vessel and
the direction in which the target was moving and its speed. The chart was placed on the bridge
along with a stopwatch so that the officers on duty could immediately conduct antisubmarine
depth charge attacks. Since in this method the distance [to the target], the direction, and the
speed of the target was measured only by eyesight, and evasive actions by the [target] submarine
after its submersion were not considered at all, it was only with great luck that one could catch
the enemy submarine in the zone where the charges were released. On top of that, since there
was a risk that the crystals used as oscillators in the transducers at that time might break by the
impact [of the blasts], it became practice to retract the transducers into the vessels when anti-
submarine depth charges were dropped, which made it impossible to continue the detection
up to a close distance. [The order to] “retract the transducer[s]” would be given at 1,000-1,500
meters [from the target] before the vessel gained speed and turned her bow [toward it]. Also,
no particular methods based on mathematics were provided concerning [how to] resume de-
tection after attacks. When oil circles came up after the first attack, attacks might be continued
with the help of them; otherwise, in most cases they were simply called off.(173)
Sublieutenant (later Lt.) Yoshimatsu Yoshihiko, then torpedo chief of the destroyer Ushio,
recalled [the antisubmarine attacks] as follows: 
[We] mainly located [enemy] submarines by visually spotting their periscopes or the wakes
of their torpedoes. When an [enemy] submarine was spotted, we rushed toward her at the order
of “full speed ahead,” and dropped antisubmarine depth charges at the point where she had
presumably submerged. There were four or five patterns in a zonate way to release the charges.
Although these thunderous attacks were an inspiring sight, their effect was doubtful. Unlike
today, few thought that by making use of underwater detection equipment enemy submarines
could be caught and destroyed for certain. Thorough neutralization of [enemy submarines] was
impossible also because of the shortage in escort vessels; it was customary to call off attacks at
some point to follow the convoy. Although we carried antisubmarine depth charges enough to
conduct a couple of [zonate] attacks, I don’t recall a time when we attacked the enemy persist-
ently until we used up the entire load of charges.
8. Comments on antisubmarine warfare in general
(1) Comments by Cdr. Tsukuda Sadao (member of the Navy Technical Department at the time
of the opening of the hostilities) 
On the morning of the day of the opening of hostilities on 8 December 1941, I was pri-
vately not at all ready or prepared for it. Though dismayed, I had no choice but to brace my-
self for the worst. In the previous years, the general use and development of underwater
detection equipment had progressed beyond my expectations and to all appearances it
looked as if it was ready. In reality, it was too unreliable as a weapon and it was not in a con-
dition to be used to its full extent. As the main person in charge, I knew very well that we
550 Chapter VII     /     The Implementation of the Java Invasion Operation
could not expect effective results from it, which made me all the more anxious and kept me
awake [at night].
For example, the hydrophones sometimes located a submarine [as far as] 6,000 meters
away, but at other times could not locate one [as close as] 2,000 meters away. Also, the sonars
sometimes detected one 3,000 meters away for certain, but at other times their performance
became unreliable even if [the target was] only 1,500 meters away.
The reasons for the unstable performance were very complex; the conditions of the vessel
greatly affected the performance, and so did the conditions of the target. The geographical
features, the depth and the wave conditions of the sea [area], the underwater noises and
even the distribution of the underwater temperatures had an impact, and in combination,
they created an immense variety [of conditions]. Each of these problems could not be solved
without spending a considerable amount of time conducting a series of fundamental studies
and experiments while gathering and sorting out data. The nature of these problems was
not such that you could master them with just skill or intuition. That the Acoustic Research
Department (established in 1940) had selected the waters [off] Numazu was also because it
hoped to proceed with its theoretical research in tandem with experiments. In terms of the
massiveness of the research subject, our research had only just begun.
(2) The recollections of Capt. Asahiro Hiroji ([became] member of the Navy Technical Depart-
ment in April 1942)
I [started] working at the Navy Technical Department in April 1942 as a member mainly
in charge of the underwater detection equipment. For half a year from February 1943 on-
wards, I was attached to the Combined Fleet headquarters, and with the Yamato as my base,
I conducted research on the practical use of the underwater detection equipment at the front,
while supporting and guiding the teaching and training [for the equipment].
My conclusion was that the underwater detection equipment, which had been installed
with great trouble, was not fully used due to the deficiencies in the equipment and the men-
tal attitude of the [naval] tacticians, and that it was too dangerous to be solely dependent on
the underwater detection equipment. 
I believe that the Naval Antisubmarine [Warfare] School had done its utmost [in training
personnel], but I realized that with a few special exceptions, crash-course-trained underwater
detection personnel would hardly be able to handle the equipment. On top of that, the cap-
tains of naval vessels seemed to lack an eagerness to actively use it, which, in not a few cases,
made the equipment a useless possession. Particularly, it seemed that destroyers, which usu-
ally sailed fast, had not had much opportunity to use it. (Detection was possible only at four-
teen knots or less.)
(3) The recollections of R. Adm. Aruga Takeo (then head of the 6th Department of the Navy
Technical Department) 
The reasons why the improvement of antisubmarine weapons had fallen behind may be
viewed as follows:
{1} Misunderstanding and misjudgment of the importance of antisubmarine weapons
From the start, the Japanese Navy had a great interest in gunnery and torpedoes, and
with thorough research and an abundance of talented people had reached a level that
compared generally favorably to that of Britain or the United States except for some fire-
control devices. It was natural since these were the main weapons in battle. However,
defensive aspects, along with damage control on vessels, were considered of lesser im-
portance, and being understaffed, research [in these fields] could not produce effective
results. Although recognition of these fields finally improved around the time right be-
fore the opening of hostilities and [the Navy] started to put some effort into these fields,
the reality was that everything was thrown into great confusion by the opening of hos-
tilities. 
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Because in the Japanese Navy, such fields as mines, minesweeping, or damage control
were essentially viewed as jobs for losers who were not marked out for navigation, gun-
nery, or torpedoes, those assigned [to antisubmarine warfare] seem to have had a sense
of inferiority, and even if they did not, they certainly did not have a sense of superiority. 
I believe that such a mindset had a great impact on the morale of the persons con-
cerned. When looking nowadays at European and U.S. antisubmarine weapons, I realize
that our point of view was childish and our research effort insufficient, but at the same
time I feel a kind of bitterness that the Navy’s treatment and leadership in this field at
that time caused a loss of opportunities.
Those in charge of administering military affairs or directing military forces in the
future must take good note of this point, follow the truth, and draw up careful and ap-
propriate plans, without being deluded by superficial opinions or dazzled by superficial
splendor. 
{2} The organizational improvement required for technological integration was too late. 
Although considerable attention was paid to the research of acoustic weapons, re-
searchers in the fields of navigation or mines [separately] conducted research from their
own standpoints without sharing technologies; [both fields] uselessly quarreled with
each other over [research] territories, adopting the wrong course for a successful coop-
eration in this serious matter. It was only after the new establishment of the 6th Depart-
ment of the Navy Technical Department three years before the opening of hostilities that
they finally came together in one coherent team.
{3} Lessons
1) Everyone focuses on showy subjects and neglects the dull ones. But it is the dull ones
that [often] contain matters of importance. 
2) The adoption of weapons or improvements of the system need to be approached in
a far-sighted, intelligent and cautious way and never miss the right time [to imple-
ment them]. It should be done calmly and appropriately and not be disturbed by the
actual situation.
3) Technological [research] should be brought together and concentrated, and not be
studied at different places [in a fragmentary way].
(4) The recollections of Cdr. Koyama Tadashi (staff of a destroyer squadron and [later] member
of Navy Technical Department) 
{1} It is said that a leading member of the U.S. Navy, who was stationed in Sasebo after the
war, commented on the defensive weapons of the Japanese Navy wondering that they
were no different from what they had been after WWI, and that he had thought that the
Japanese should have made more progress. Although his comments may have been
somewhat exaggerated, it seems impossible to say that his evaluation was far off the
mark in the case of mines, antisubmarine depth charges, or minesweeping devices, not
to mention the underwater detection equipment, which had just marked a step toward
practical use only a few years before the opening of hostilities. 
{2} No epoch-making development or innovation can be discovered in the Japanese Navy’s
ideas on the defensive employment of forces from the time of the stipulation of the Sea
Defense Order in 1904 until WWI. [But] this the Navy had in common with the navies
of all other countries. 
However, after the turning point of WWI, along with the progress in the development
of naval vessels, weapons, and aircraft in the navies of every country, also in defensive
warfare epoch-making changes had occurred in the field of antisubmarine warfare. How-
ever, in the Japanese Navy, which after the Russo-Japanese War had been focusing on
war preparations against the United States, strategic and tactical thinking was [still]
based on the concepts of interceptions and decisive battles between fleets. Especially
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after the conclusion of the Washington Naval Treaty [1922], when it came to upgrading
naval armaments in line with the defense restrictions included in the treaty as well as
with the [Imperial] Defense Policy of 1923 and the revision of the main points of the em-
ployment of forces, defensive fields such as defensive warfare were necessarily limited
to a bare minimum. These circumstances affected organization, personnel and budgets,
and presumably became the main cause of the lack of thorough policies concerning de-
fense.
{3} Since the Japanese Navy gave priority to decisive battles between fleets, it had kept for
years to a policy that matters of defense and the protection of shipping lanes should be
limited to the defense of the main ports of mainland Japan and specified advance bases,
as well as the protection of the commerce between the Asian continent and the mainland
on the waters to the north of the Taiwan Strait.
It is fair to recognize that the armaments required for such a [minimal] degree of de-
fense had been [properly] provided throughout the years. The painstaking efforts, with
which the naval authorities had striven for years to improve [naval] armaments on a
limited military budget, must have been huge.
However, in the Greater East Asia War, the face and scale [of the defense] had com-
pletely changed and become quite different from what the Japanese Navy had envisioned
for years. As a result of the expansion and elongation of the sea lines of communication,
and also in view of the [available] weapons for antisubmarine warfare, we may say that
all the peacetime research, development and preparations were totally insufficient com-
pared to the reality of this war.
(End [of quotation])
As [seen] in the above, the Japanese Navy’s actual capability to attack [enemy] submarines was
quite inadequate. However, it is impossible to deny that there also existed in the background
an atmosphere of thinking lightly of the military power of U.S. submarines. On top of that, for
good or for evil, due to the less aggressive operations of the enemy submarines at the beginning
of the hostilities, their poor attacking methods, the poor [quality of] their torpedoes (many were
duds and others passed under the bottoms of [Japanese] vessels), and their shortage of torpedoes
(233 torpedoes in store were lost in the [Japanese] bombing of the torpedo warehouses in the
naval port of Cavite,(113) while mass production of torpedoes was still lacking), the Japanese side
had only sustained light losses, which made the Japanese Navy further underestimate the ability
of the enemy submarines (see the Action Report of the 2d Destroyer Squadron [p. 504]), and it
got too late for fundamental countermeasures against enemy submarines.
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Chapter VIII The State of the Allied Forces Before the
Java Operation
1. The State of the Allied Forces Before the Outbreak of the Second European
War*
The United States
The New War Plan Orange
Since 1922, the U.S. Navy had kept the major part of the U.S. Fleet in the Pacific Ocean.(92)This was because the Japanese advance toward the Caroline, Marshall and Mariana Is-lands as well as the decline in Russian power after World War I had made the U.S. Army
and Navy very much concerned about the movements of Japan in the Pacific Ocean. 
The plan of operations against Japan was called War Plan Orange, and the gist of the plan
drawn up in 1928 was as follows:(174)
1. In case hostilities are opened between the United States and Japan, Japan’s first hostile act will
probably be an invasion of the Philippines. In such a case, the forces stationed in the Philippines
shall hold out against the Japanese attack as much as possible and try to secure Manila Bay. 
2. Leaving some forces such as submarines, small naval vessels and patrol aircraft behind in the
Philippines, the U.S. Asiatic Fleet shall withdraw its main force to the Indian Ocean to avoid
the brunt of the attack of the Japanese fleet. 
3. During the holding operations in the Far East, an expeditionary force shall be prepared as soon
as possible on the United States mainland to win the final victory.
However, the plan only indicated the strategic course to be followed against Japan; without
concrete arrangements to implement it, it was no better than a paper plan. 
From 1935 onwards, with the international situation becoming tense mainly due to the
actions of Japan, Germany and Italy, both the U.S. Army and Navy secretaries recognized
that the current Plan Orange was too obsolete and drew up a new Plan Orange. Compared
to the old plan, it was remarkably specific and practical, and it also included [items on] the co-
operation between the U.S. and British Navies. The cooperation was in outline as follows:(92, 174)
* The author refers only in a general way to his sources without giving chapter and verse. In a few cases, we
could trace his source and restore the original text; however, in most cases, this turned out to be a hopeless
task.
1. The basic policy is that in case of war against Japan in the Pacific Ocean, Britain shall dispatch
a battle fleet to Singapore and operate based on Singapore, while the U.S. Fleet shall concentrate
in Hawaii.
2. In a war against Japan, both the United States and Britain shall make their waters available for
each other’s vessels.
The Rainbow Plans
Subsequently, along with Germany’s expansion in Europe, Italy’s acting in concert, and
Japan’s employment of armed force in wider areas of mainland China, it was considered im-
possible to cope with this state of affairs with the present Plan Orange. In February 1939, the
Rainbow Plans were newly drawn up on the assumption that Britain and France would act
in concert with the United States. Their outline was as follows.(175)
1. Assumptions
Assuming that the United States will wage war against either Japan, Germany or Italy individ-
ually, or against their combined forces. In that case, we assume that Britain and France will sup-
port the United States or act in concert with her.
2. The plans
(1) [Rainbow] 1
A plan to defend the area to the north of 10º N* in the western hemisphere.
(2) [Rainbow] 2 
Along with the defense of the western hemisphere stated in Rainbow 1, the United States,
jointly with Britain and France, shall assume her share of the operations to protect the inter-
ests of the allied countries mainly in the Pacific. No forces will be sent to Europe. 
(3) [Rainbow] 3 
Along with the defense of the western hemisphere stated in Rainbow 1, [the United States]
will rapidly conduct an operation to secure control of the western Pacific. 
(4) [Rainbow] 4 
A plan to provide for the defense of the entire western hemisphere as well as the eastern Pa-
cific.
(5) [Rainbow] 5 
A plan where, in order to attain the aims of Rainbow 1 and Rainbow 4, and assuming that
combined operations with Britain and France will be conducted, the United States will dis-
patch military forces to Europe to deliver a decisive blow to Germany and Italy.
However, the deployment of the U.S. Army and Navy in the Far East around September 1939
at the time of the breakout of World War II was not so much different from that in 1931.(175)
The forces in 1931 were the following:(154)
The U.S. Asiatic Fleet
Southern China Patrol Unit: 19 Destroyers (based in Chefoo)
Yangtze [Patrol] Unit: 6 River-Gunboats (based in Shanghai) 
Others: 12 Submarines and some auxiliary vessels 
The U.S. garrison army on the Philippines
About 10,000 men ([with] officers mainly consisting of Americans, and noncommissioned
officers and men of Filipinos, half of the army were Philippine Scouts)
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* Actually 10º S. See Corps of Engineers: The War Against Japan (https://history.army.mil/html/books/010/10-
6/CMH_Pub_10-6.pdf), p. 10: north of 10 degrees south latitude.
As of 1939, only two cruisers were added to the [Asiatic] Fleet, while as for the Army, after
the Philippines Independence Act was passed in 1934, the Commonwealth Government of
the Philippines, with the support of its American Military Advisor MacArthur, was making
strenuous efforts to have a regular force of 10,000 men and a reserve force of 400,000 men by
1946 (the year of full independence).(177)
Britain 
After World War I, the U.S. and Japanese navies rapidly grew larger, replacing the German
Fleet, which had [practically] disappeared. Japanese naval power provided a potential threat
to the security of the sea communications between Great Britain, India, Australia and New
Zealand, and Britain considered it neither necessary nor possible to maintain fleets of ade-
quate strength in both the western and eastern hemispheres; it was accordingly decided that
the British Fleet should be held in a central position in European waters, from which it could
reinforce the Far East as and when required.(85)
In order to implement this strategy, a naval base with adequate strength and facilities at
a strategically advantageous position in the Far East came to be considered necessary. As a
result of discussions between the top leaders concerned of the Army and Navy, they came to
the conclusion that their only existing base in Hong Kong was not strategically worthy in
terms of its geographical location and facilities, and that it was necessary to construct a base
in Singapore since it was strategically the best situated for the control of sea communications
in the Indian Ocean and the southwestern Pacific. This was in 1921.(85)
Because of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Britain maintained cooperative relations with
Japan during the Russo-Japanese War and in World War I. However, having perceived
Japan’s expansionist designs since Japan’s Twenty-One Demands on China in 1915, Britain
changed course to contain Japan’s intentions. In 1921, Britain abrogated the Anglo-Japanese
Alliance and simultaneously drew up a strategy with Japan as a potential enemy, and pro-
ceeded to try to implement it.(85)
The plan to construct a naval base in Singapore was approved by cabinet and parliament
in 1923 and was supposed to be carried out, but due to the subsequent political situation in
Britain and conflicting opinions over the defense of the base between the Army, Navy and
Air Force, it was not easily realized. After various twists and turns, the construction of the
base was finally started from May 1932 onward, based on the following policies.(85)
1. The main deterrent against naval attacks on Singapore shall be guns.
2. As auxiliary forces, fighter planes for the defense and attack planes for attacks on enemy ships
shall be added.
3. The first stage of the construction of the base shall be the full installation of guns for coastal de-
fense and the preparation of the required air units and airfields, which shall be completed by
1936 or 1937 at the latest.
After Hitler took political control in Germany in January 1933, the country in quick succession
took steps to break up the [post] Versailles [political] order, withdrew from the League of
Nations in October that year, and proclaimed rearmament in March 1935, thereby becoming
a major threat to Britain. Furthermore, as Italy was also stirring, the situation had changed
in such a way that [Britain] could no longer afford to dispatch massive military forces to the
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Far East, while emptying Europe as specified in the current Far East strategy plan, and that
it should be anticipated that the strength of the fleet which could be sent to the Far East would
have to be governed by home requirements.(85)
In July 1935, the British Government authorized the start of part of the second stage of
the construction work on the Singapore base (the construction of additional heavy artillery
emplacements and two airfields). It was considered that the completion of this second stage
work would enable Singapore to hold out for about seventy days against the expected scale
of attacks before the arrival of a British fleet in the Far Eastern waters. However, improve-
ments in aircraft performance [made it possible] to use aircraft for offensive purposes, which
brought about a [new] phase where such a plan as to solely fortifying Singapore should fun-
damentally be reconsidered. After having reexamined the defense plans on site from a new
angle, Major General [W.G.S.] Dobbie, who had become the commander in [British] Malaya
in 1937, sent the following reports to the War Office from October to November that year.(85)
1. It is possible for the enemy to land on the east coast of Malaya during the northeastern monsoon
(from October to March), because poor visibility on the waters during that period will limit the
capability of our air reconnaissance.
2. It is very likely that when Japanese forces should come for an attack on Singapore, instead of a
direct attack from the sea front, as [we] have considered earlier, they will [first] seize Singora,
Pattani, or Kota Bharu, push forward their advanced airfields there, and carry out attacks from
the north. Therefore, the security of [the base in] Singapore would largely be dependent on the
defense of northern Malaya and Johore.
3. From the above point of view, the defense of Singapore should in fact be considered inclusive
of the defense of the whole of the Malay Peninsula.
The major general further warned in July of the next year (1938) that the jungle in Johore was
in most places not impassable for infantry. Despite such warnings, the construction work on
[the naval port of] Singapore was continued following the plan of 1932.(85) It was finally
around August 1940 when the proposals of Major General Dobbie were actually adopted,
but then it was too late.
In July 1937, the China Incident broke out in the Far East, which frequently caused con-
flicts between Japan’s military operations and Britain’s [attempts to] preserve its interests in
China, and added to the tensions between both countries. Also, from the latter half of 1938
onwards, the situation in Europe became more critical, and with Germany’s advance into
Sudetenland in October that year as the turning point, a [new] plan of operations which
would meet the new state of affairs needed to be drawn up. The plan sent by the Chiefs of
Staff to the Committee of Imperial Defence in February 1939 focused on naval strategies and
was in outline as follows:(178)
1. This plan is a strategic plan for Britain in case Britain and France should jointly go to war against
Germany and Italy. It also anticipates the case that Britain may fight Japan in the Far East, too.
2. The theaters regarded to be most important to Britain are the home country, the Mediterranean,
and the Far East, in that order.
3. The Home Fleet and the Mediterranean Fleet shall be deployed respectively on the waters near
Britain and in the Mediterranean mentioned in the previous item, and be assigned the task to
enforce naval blockades against Germany and Italy as well as to destroy [their] fleets. 
Chapter VIII     /     The State of the Allied Forces Before the Java 557
Operation 
4. In the operation in the Mediterranean, its western basin shall be a French responsibility and the
responsibility for its eastern basin falls on Britain.
5. The protection of shipping lanes spanning the rest of the world shall be the responsibility of the
area fleets abroad (in the East, the China [Station] Fleet and the East Indies Fleet) or the navies
of the dominions.
6. In order to respond to Japanese aggression in the Far East, the need to dispatch a fleet from Eu-
rope is recognized. But we are not strong enough to maintain a third fleet equivalent to the
Home Fleet or the Mediterranean Fleet. Since part of the forces in the European theater will
have to be spared for dispatching such a fleet, [the scale of] the dispatched forces shall depend
on the war situation in Europe.
While the Committee of Imperial Defence was examining the plan, the situation in Europe
rapidly changed; in March 1939, Germany invaded Czechoslovakia, which was followed by
the Italian invasion of Albania. Consequently, on 2 May of the same year, the committee drew
the following conclusions:(85)
1. The order of priority regarding our potential enemies shall be Germany, Italy and Japan, in that
order.
2. It is not possible to definitely state how soon a fleet can be dispatched to the Far East after Japan
has initiated an offensive there or how large a fleet can be sent.
Also, the Admiralty, while making clear its view that even if war broke out in the Far East, it
would be impossible to send more than two capital ships,(92) informed the United States in
the same month (May 1939) that owing to the necessity of watching the Mediterranean, it
would be impossible to send a battle force to Singapore and suggested that the U.S. Navy
defend the Malay Barrier (the British and Dutch colonies from Timor to Malaya). It was ob-
vious that the contents of this announcement fundamentally changed the basic principles of
the Anglo-American agreement for joint operations formed one and a half years before. By
that time, the United States had already begun to work on the Rainbow Plans on the assump-
tion that it could not count on the British Fleet in the Far East.(92)
In March 1939, an Anglo-French staff meeting on their joint operations was held in Lon-
don, where France accepted the following items.(178)
1. The French Navy shall assume control of the western basin of the Mediterranean. 
2. If Japan takes the offensive in the Far East, the need to dispatch one fleet to the Far East is rec-
ognized. However, the dispatch shall be dealt with in due consideration of the balance of peril
between Europe and the Far East.
Based on this meeting, a conference was held in June of that year in Singapore between the
commanders of the British and French forces on site. In this conference, the following con-
clusions were drawn and sent as recommendations to both governments:(85)
1. Since it seems impossible to station adequate naval forces in the Far East in peacetime, the only
practical solution seems to have considerably large air units on hand [there] instead.
2. The strength of the combined British and French air and ground units [stationed in the Far East]
is inadequate.
3. Reinforcements of two brigades should be sent to the Far East as soon as possible.
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4. In order to avert Thailand from plotting with Japan, diplomatic steps should be taken so that
British and French forces can freely pass Thai territory in time of war.
In July of the same year, in view of the uncertainty about dispatching a British fleet to the
Far East, the [British] Committee of Imperial Defence decided to increase the period for Sin-
gapore to hold out on its own from seventy to ninety days, and ordered an investigation into
the possibility of storing enough supplies to support civilians and the garrison for six months
in Malaya.(85)
In August, the committee decided to reinforce Singapore, and sent reinforcements of one
infantry brigade, one field [actually: mountain] artillery regiment and two bomber
squadrons, and was further planning to send in September two bomber squadrons from
mainland Britain, when World War II broke out. The British forces in the Far East at that time
were roughly the following:(178)
1. Navy
(1) China Station (Commander in Chief: Admiral [P.] Noble)
{1} Area covered: the whole western Pacific excluding the waters around Australia and New
Zealand
{2} Bases: Singapore and Hong Kong
{3} Forces: 4 cruisers, 1 aircraft carrier, 10 destroyers, 5 escort vessels, 15 submarines, 5 coastal
defense vessels, 20 river-gunboats, and 6 torpedo boats as the core 
(2) East Indies Station (commander in chief: Rear Admiral [R.] Leatham)
{1} Area covered: the entire Indian Ocean
{2} Base: Trincomalee (Ceylon)
{3} Forces: 3 cruisers, 7 escort vessels (of which 5 vessels belonged to the Indian Navy) 
(3) The Australian Navy
Forces: 5 cruisers, 3 destroyers and 2 escort vessels 
(4) The New Zealand Navy
Forces: 2 cruisers and 2 escort vessels 
2. Air Force (forces in Malaya)
24 Bombers (in 2 squadrons), 24 torpedo bombers (in 2 squadrons), 10 flying boats (in 2
squadrons), a total of 58 aircraft (in 6 squadrons) 
3. Army
(1) Malaya
{1} Singapore: 5 Infantry battalions, heavy artillery units and antiaircraft artillery units as
the core, [comprising] 23 guns for the stronghold, [a total of] about 12,000 men
{2} Penang: 1 Infantry battalion as the core, [consisting of] about 3,000 men
{3} Northern Malaya and Johore: Voluntary units of about 1,000 men as the core
{4} Reserve: 1 Infantry Brigade and 1 mountain artillery regiment [consisting of] about 7,000
men
23,000 men in total
(2) Hong Kong: 4 Infantry battalions and artillery units as the core, [consisting of] about 19,000
men
(3) Burma: About 20 infantry battalions as the core, [consisting of] about 20,000 men
The Netherlands
[Even] after [seeing] Japan’s growing tendency toward expansion in the Far East after the
Russo-Japanese War, the purpose of the Dutch Navy had remained the preservation of the
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sea lines of communication between the home country and its East Indies colony as well as
the shipping lanes between the islands within the colony, and it assumed that in anticipated
future conflicts with Japan, the British and U.S. navies would play the major role. Accord-
ingly, the Dutch Navy [had chosen] not to have capital ships; its forces consisted of cruisers
and destroyers as their core, which were suitable for the protection of shipping lanes.(179)
Therefore, it was not at all possible for the Netherlands to defend its colony in the Far
East solely with its own navy, and it had to depend on Britain with its large interests and
forces in the Far East. In the spring of 1936, the Dutch Government examined the defense
situation of Dutch East Indies, and came to the conclusion that its defensive capability was
very weak. Because it considered that the security of the Dutch East Indies was of interest
[also] to Britain, the Dutch Government proposed to the British Government informal talks
between both countries concerning defense policies in the Far East.(85)
The British Government agreed that cooperation between the British and Dutch units in
the Far East was desirable, but did not make a commitment that it would cooperate in the
defense of the Dutch East Indies. Asked about the matter, the Committee of Imperial Defence
also advised the Government in July that “the Dutch should be encouraged to improve their
defences but that it would be unwise to consent to any proposals for a joint Anglo-Dutch De-
fense Scheme.”(85) However, considering it desirable that the Dutch air forces in the Dutch
East Indies would be appropriately equipped to play their part in a combined air defense of
the Far East, the British Air Ministry held talks on technical matters with their Dutch coun-
terparts.(85)
The Netherlands had the following forces [in the East Indies] at the breakout of World
War II (September 1939):(34, 87)
1. Navy: 2 Cruisers, 5-6 destroyers, 12 submarines and some other vessels
2. Air Force: About 100 Army aircraft and about 50 Navy aircraft, a total of about 150 [aircraft]
3. Army: About 19,000 men on Java, and about 12,000 men on the islands other than Java, a total
of 31,000 men
2. The Situation of the Allied Forces Right Before the Opening of Hostilities
Although the allied forces had thereafter made efforts to reinforce their forces in the Far East,
the war situation in Europe did not allow them to send adequate reinforcements. The situa-
tion of the allied forces [in the Far East] right before the opening of hostilities was as follows:
Britain
1. Air Force
In late January 1941, the Chiefs of Staff gave approval only to [the deployment of]
army troops out of the request made by the local forces (in Malaya), which had been
582 aircraft of the Air Force and twenty-six battalions [of the Army]. As for [the de-
ployment of] the air force, [the Chiefs of Staff] insisted on setting the [total deployment
at only] 336 aircraft as they had estimated earlier, and decided to attain this goal as
much as possible by the end of 1941.(85) However, the war situation in Europe made it
impossible to fulfill this plan at all. The following forces were [stationed in the Far
East] at the time of the opening of hostilities:(85, 139)
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(1) Malaya: 158 Aircraft, [consisting of] 13 squadrons and 88 reserve aircraft, (about 60 of which
were operable)
(2) Burma: 16 (Buffalo) fighter planes 
21 (P–40) fighter planes 
2. Army
In the summer of 1940, when the Chiefs of Staff estimated the defense forces required
for the Far East at eighteen battalions (six brigades) as the core on condition that 336
aircraft [should be fully made available] by the Air Force, there was in Malaya [already]
a force of nine battalions, or about 30,000 men including volunteers.(85) By the end of
1940, this force was increased to seventeen battalions as the core, totaling about 40,000
men, with which the deployment of the targeted number of troops was more or less
attained. After that, the request [for an increase to] twenty-six battalions was almost
fulfilled by April of next year, which rapidly increased the total [size of the ground]
forces to close to twenty-six battalions, totaling 60,000 men. However, this was based
on the condition that an air force of 582 aircraft were made available. In view of very
slow progress in the reinforcement of the air force, the local garrison further made a
request for [an increase in] ground forces to forty-eight infantry battalions as the core,
with attached tank, artillery, antiaircraft [artillery] and engineer units.(85) Concerning
this request, reinforcements were made from the summer to the autumn of 1941, which
increased the infantry to thirty-one battalions as the core. However, the tank units
which the local garrison had most [strongly] requested were not reinforced.(85) The
army strength [in Malaya] at the time of the opening of hostilities was as follows:(85, 95)
Malaya area (including northern Borneo)
31 Infantry battalions (about 3-5 divisions)
8 Field and mountain artillery regiments (about 175 guns)
2 Antitank gun regiments and some smaller units (about 95 guns) 
8 Volunteer infantry battalions and 10 other units
A total of 88,600 men (consisting of 19,600 British, 15,200 Australians, 37,000 Indians, and
some 16,800 Malays)
3. Navy
Having her hands full with the war against Germany in Europe, Britain was too busy
to pay attention to the situation in the Far East. However, the outbreak of war between
Germany and the Soviet Union in June 1941 and the reinforcement of forces in the At-
lantic by the U.S. Fleet from June to August allowed the Navy some scope to organize
an Eastern Fleet to contain Japan’s southern advance, and dispatch it to the Far East
in December of that year. The strength of this fleet was as follows:(178)
Battleships: HMS Prince of Wales, HMS Repulse (to Malaya), and HMS Revenge (to Ceylon)
Aircraft Carriers: HMS Indomitable (who ran aground near Jamaica on 3 November; with no
alternatives, the dispatch [of carriers] was cancelled.)
4 Destroyers
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The United States
Around the spring of 1941, with their attention still taken up by the situation in the Atlantic,
the U.S. Chiefs of Staff were too busy to consider the situation in the Far East at all.(174) How-
ever, such factors as the possibility of a military buildup in the Far East after the outbreak of
war between Germany and the Soviet Union in June that year and the possibility of gaining
air supremacy at last by the completion of the state-of-the-art heavy bomber B–17 allowed
the country to send large reinforcements around November of that year with as goal a perfect
defense of the Philippines.(174) [As a result,] the strength available at the time of the opening
of hostilities became as follows:(177)
1. Army
(1) Ground forces:
U.S. Army: The Philippine Division and 7 regiments of [other] various forces, ground units
of air units, and harbor defense units, a total of 31,095 men
Philippine Army: 10 Divisions (though poorly equipped and trained), about 80,000 men
(2) Air forces: 1 Regiment each of bombers, fighter planes and combined forces, a total of 277
aircraft (of which about 150 aircraft were operable)
2. Navy(92)
1 Heavy cruiser, 2 light cruisers, 13 destroyers, 29 submarines, 4 seaplane tenders, 4 subma-
rine tenders, 5 minesweepers, 6 torpedo boats, 6 gunboats and 6 other types of vessels; 32
flying boats, about 20 reconnaissance seaplanes, 1 marine regiment (1,600 men) and ground
personnel of the 16th Naval District (20,000 men)
The Netherlands
The Dutch strength in the Far East around August and September of 1940 was by and large
as follows:(86)
Navy: 2 Cruisers, 6 destroyers and 16 submarines as its core
Air force: About 150 aircraft (most of them were outdated U.S. aircraft)
Army: About 30,000 men
The Dutch Navy had successively shifted its forces to the Dutch East Indies after the collapse
of its home country, and by December 1941, the following forces were added [to the forces
in the Dutch East Indies]:(179)
2 Cruisers, 1-2 destroyers, and 3 submarines 
3. The Situation of the Allied Forces at the Time of [Japan’s] Launch of the
Dutch East Indies Operation
The following is the deployment of the allied forces in the Dutch East Indies as of early Jan-
uary 1942, when the Japanese forces were about to launch the Dutch East Indies operation:
Surface Forces(87, 92, 178, 179)
Dutch East Indies Fleet 
Waters near Java
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2 Light cruisers: HNLMS De Ruyter and HNLMS Tromp [probably HNLMS Java is meant]
5 Destroyers: HNLMS Piet Hein, HNLMS Van Ghent, HNLMS Kortenaer, HNLMS Banckert,
and HNLMS Witte de With
3-4 Minelayers and minesweepers
1 Gunboat: HNLMS Sumatra [Actually a Java-class cruiser]
3 (Old-type) submarines: K-VII, K-VIII, K-IX
Sea to the north of Australia




2 Submarines: K-X and K-XVIII
Waters near Singapore
1 Light cruiser: HNLMS Tromp
2 Light cruisers: HNLMS Evertsen and HNLMS Van Nes [Actually destroyers]
6 Submarines: K-XI, K-XII, K-XIII, K-XIV, K-XVI, and O-XIX
U.S. Asiatic Fleet
Sea to the north of Australia
1 Heavy cruiser: USS Houston





3 Seaplane Tenders: USS Heron, USS Childs and USS [William B.] Preston
3 Submarines: USS Pickerel, USS Permit and USS Swordfish
Air forces(85, 86, 95, 139)




Dutch East Indies Australia United States
Army Navy Air Force Army ForcesFar East Asiatic Fleet






35 Bombers 10 Flying boats
Tarakan 2-3 Flying boats
Balikpapan 15 Bombers
Menado
Kendari 5-6 Flying boats 2-3 Flying boats
Ambon 5 Fighter planes15 Bombers 10 Flying boats 12 Bombers 5 Flying boats
Kupang 12 Bombers
Port Darwin 100 Fighter planes10 Bombers
Total 145 42-44 24 120 7-8
Ground units(85)
Remarks: Excluding Java and Sumatra










Ambon 2,600 1,000 Australian Army advanced in late December
Kupang 400 1,500 Australian Army advanced in mid-December
Dili 250 250? Occupied by both armies on 17 December
Total
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(See Attached Illustrations Nos. 1, 8, 9 and 10) [Omitted]
1. Outline of the Course of the Operation
The Circumstances Leading to the Capture of Burma and Neighboring
Strategic Areas
Burma
For the sake of prosecuting a drawn-out war, Burma was not only a vital strategic pointwhich Japan needed for securing the important southern resource areas, but also a vitalbase [for operations] to cut off the route of support for Chiang [Kai-shek] in China as
well as to encourage India to break away from Britain. However, for reasons of [available]
army forces before the opening of hostilities, the Burma operation was supposed to be im-
plemented in such a way that first of all air bases in southern Burma were to be captured,
and that then the invasion of the whole of Burma should be conducted if the circumstances
permitted it after the first stage of the operation was roughly completed.(34) On 11 December,
the order to seize the air bases in southern Burma was given by Southern Army Commander
in Chief General Terauchi Hisaichi to Fifteenth Army Commander Lt. Gen. Iida Shōjirō, who
had completed the invasion operation of Thailand.(34) On 31 January, the army seized the air
base in Moulmein.
Prior to this, on 21 December, Col. Hattori Takushirō, chief of the operations section of
the Army General Staff, had visited Southern Army headquarters in Saigon and disclosed a
plan to take advantage of the very smooth progress of the war since the opening of hostilities
by implementing at this juncture the Burma invasion operation with the Fifteenth Army at
a stroke.(180) Against this plan, the Southern Army headquarters had argued that the Army
would not be able to execute an invasion operation against the whole of Burma in terms of
strength, matériel, etc., and the headquarters and Section Chief Hattori had agreed that the
[invasion] operation should for the time being be limited to the capture of the Rangoon area.
On 22 January, IGHQ issued [the order to] capture key areas in Burma by means of IGHQ
Army Department Order No. 590,(145) and announced the main points of the Burma operation
and the Army-Navy Central Agreement on the Burma Operation by means of IGHQ Army
Department Instruction No. 1008.(146) The Navy, too, announced the Army-Navy Central
Agreement on the Burma Operation by means of a supplementary volume to IGHQ Navy
Department Instruction No. 45.(43)
The Army-Navy Central Agreement on the Burma Operation (22 January 1942)
I. Mission
1. The mission of the operation against Burma is to destroy the enemy in Burma, occupy and
secure key areas there, as well as to intensify the pressure on China.
II. Forces to be employed
2. The forces to be employed in the operation are as follows:
Army: The Fifteenth Army ([consisting of] two divisions as the core; depending on the sit-
uation, further reinforcements of about two divisions are expected).
Navy: Part of the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet
Part of the Combined Fleet
III. Outline of the operation
3. The Fifteenth Army shall advance to the line of the Salween River near Moulmein, prepare
for the operations [there], and then capture Rangoon with its main force from the sector
along the road connecting Moulmein and Pegu. In order to facilitate the above operation,
the army shall endeavor to have one element head for the area near Rangoon by sea from
the west coast of southern Burma.
4. After Rangoon and its surrounding areas have been captured, depending on the enemy
movements, the necessary forces (by and large two divisions as a norm) shall be diverted to
capture key areas near Mandalay and the oilfields near Yenangyaung.
On that occasion, at a time before or after the capture of the above areas, [the Army] shall
endeavor to destroy the enemy forces, the Chinese army in particular. 
(Directions for the execution of this operation shall be given separately.)
Circumstances permitting, the Army may, after the capture of Rangoon and vicinity, without
break conduct the operation against Mandalay and Yenangyaung with the currently em-
ployed forces.
5. While continuing their air campaign to destroy the enemy air power in Burma and [the op-
eration to] cut off enemy reinforcements, the Army air units shall closely support the
[ground] operations of the Army.
6. The Navy shall cover ([and] escort) the [Army’s] maritime deployment and transport oper-
ations mentioned in Items 3 and 4, while securing the Army units’ maritime lines of com-
munication with their rear.
For this mission, the Navy shall appropriately use the air bases in Thailand and Burma.
IV [Code] name of the operation, etc.
7. The Burma operation shall be called Operation U.
8. For items other than those stipulated in this agreement, one shall refer to the Army-Navy
Central Agreement for the Southern Operation.
In accordance with the Imperial Command of 22 January, Southern Army Commander in
Chief General Terauchi issued on 9 February the order to the Fifteenth Army to capture key
areas in Burma.(34)
Northern Sumatra
The [operation to] capture northern Sumatra was specified in the Army-Navy Central Agree-
ment on the Southern Operation concluded before the opening of hostilities in such a way
that when the Malacca Strait was about to be neutralized after the capture of Singapore, one
element of the Twenty-fifth Army should land near Medan from the west coast of the Malay
Peninsula at an appropriate moment, seize strategic areas in Aceh, and then taking an op-
portunity, seize Sabang Island. Also, in Combined Fleet Operation Order Classified No. 1 is-
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sued in conformity with this agreement, it was specified that strategic areas in northern
Sumatra should be captured after the capture of Singapore. Then, following the smooth
progress of the operations, in the Cam Ranh Agreement of 29 December, it was stipulated
that capture of northern Sumatra should be scheduled on Day X + 80 (26 February), that the
assembly point should be Penang, and that details should be discussed between First South-
ern Expeditionary Fleet Commander in Chief V. Adm. Ozawa Jisaburō and Twenty-fifth
Army Commander Lt. Gen. Yamashita Tomoyuki.
The Andaman Islands
The capture of the Andaman Islands was not included in the plans of IGHQ at the time of
the opening of hostilities. This speaks for itself because the Andaman Islands were also not
mentioned at all in the Imperial Japanese Navy Operations Policy decided on 5 November
1941, or the Army-Navy Central Agreement on the Southern Operation concluded on the
same day. However, in view of the fact that the Andaman Islands were included along with
Midway and others as ‘areas to be occupied or destroyed as swiftly as the operational situ-
ation permits’ in the ‘areas planned to be occupied or destroyed in stage-two operations’ in
Combined Fleet Operation Order Classified No. 1 (of 5 November 1941),(45) the Combined
Fleet seems to have recognized the necessity of their capture or destruction at an early stage
considering the strategic importance of the islands. Then, along with the progress in the
Malaya operation, the defense of Malaya had increased the necessity to advance operational
bases onto the line of the archipelagos connecting Sumatra, the Nicobar Islands, the Andaman
Islands, and the southwestern point of Burma. Then [the decision] to implement the Burma
operation also increased the necessity to secure this line of archipelagos prior to the operation
for the sake of the maritime transport operation of reinforcements. Consequently, IGHQ came
to consider an operation to capture the Andaman Islands. On 4 February, the head of the 1st
Bureau of the Navy General Staff informally informed Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, com-
mander in chief of the Combined Fleet, of the plan to capture the islands.(46) On 7 February,
[the order to] capture the Andaman Islands was issued by means of IGHQ Navy Department
Order No. 15.(42)
Christmas Island
At the time of the opening of hostilities, neither IGHQ nor the Combined Fleet headquarters
had plans to capture Christmas Island during the stage-one operations. Being a small island
about 220 nautical miles south of Java in the Indian Ocean, it was a British possession, known
for its production of rock phosphate. It was [just] a volcanic island of only twenty-three kilo-
meters at its longest part, but it was equipped with wireless communication facilities and lo-
cated at a key point on the shipping lanes between India and Australia. Since it was
disadvantageous to leave this island uncaptured not only in terms of the subsequent opera-
tions to be conducted in the Indian Ocean but also in terms of the defense of the already
seized island chain from Sumatra and Java to the Lesser Sunda Islands, the swift capture of
the island to set up a lookout base in the Indian Ocean was [considered] necessary. IGHQ
[Navy Department] decided to put in motion [an operation to] capture the island immedi-
ately after the conquest of Java, and on 14 March gave directions for capturing it to the com-
mander in chief of the Combined Fleet.(43) On 15 March, Admiral Yamamoto issued an order
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to Southern Task Force Commander V. Adm. Kondō Nobutake to capture the island,(182) who
then ordered Dutch East Indies Unit Commander V. Adm. Takahashi Ibō to execute it. On 18
March, the Dutch East Indies Unit commander announced the outline of the operation by
means of Dutch East Indies Order Classified No. 203.(62)
The Arrangements Between the Army and the Navy, etc.
With the capture of Singapore almost achieved, the staff of the Southern Army [started] from
14 February onwards (Singapore fell on 15 February) preliminary discussions with the staff
of the Second Fleet about the [means of] transportation for the northern Sumatra invasion
operation (Operation T), the operation to capture the Andaman Islands (Operation D) and
the Burma operation (Operation U).(30) On 21 February, Southern Army Commander in chief
General Terauchi and First Southern Expeditionary Fleet Commander in Chief Vice Admiral
Ozawa finally reached an agreement, the contents of which were roughly as follows:(34)
1. The standard date [to calculate] the implementation date of the operation
(1) The operation schedule shall be calculated from the day when the clearing of mines in the
Malacca Strait is roughly completed (Day W), which is expected to be by and large at the
end of February or the beginning of March.
(2) The standard landing date of each operation shall be set as in the following table:
2. The transportation [mission] in Operation U (Omitted by the author)
3. The detailed arrangements to be made between the Army and Navy units concerned (Omitted
by the author)
4. Security (Omitted by the author)
During this period, the [Army] 38th Division had carried out the Bangka and Palembang op-
erations with the support of naval units; it successfully landed on Bangka on the early morn-
ing of 15 February, and in Palembang from 15 to 16 February, and without a break went on
to the operation to capture strategic places in southern Sumatra, as previously told. On 17
February, after the Bangka and Palembang operations were for the most part completed,
Malaya Unit Commander Vice Admiral Ozawa ordered 9th Base Force Commander R. Adm.
Hiraoka Kumeichi to clear the waterways of Singapore and the Malacca Strait.(118) The wa-
terways-clearing unit started its operation from 21 February, and completed clearing the wa-
terways of Singapore on 24 February, and the Malacca Strait on 5 March.(68)
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Operation Operation Code Standard Landing Date Notes
Sumatra Operation Operation T About early March
Andaman Operation Operation D
Around Day W + 20
The availability of naval air
units after their advance to
Bangkok is a requirement.Burma Operation Operation U
Remarks The assembly points for Operation U shall be the ports of Singapore and Penang, andthe landing point shall be Rangoon.
The Course Leading to the Implementation of a Carrier Operation in the
Indian Ocean
The Surprise Attack Operation on Ceylon
On 14 February, after having studied a surprise attack operation on Ceylon and anticipating
that the British fleet would be operating in the said area against [Japan’s] operations to cap-
ture the Andaman Islands and Burma, the Navy Department of IGHQ and the Combined
Fleet headquarters decided to let the Carrier Task Force, which had been incorporated in the
Southern Task Force, operate in the Indian Ocean to the east of Ceylon and conduct a surprise
attack operation on the island at an appropriate moment (in late March).(46)
On 1 March, the Sixteenth Army landed on both eastern and western Java, and the oper-
ations made smooth progress. On 5 March, the chief of staff of the Combined Fleet disclosed
the outline of operations for the stage-one, phase-four operations ([to be conducted] from
the rough completion of the Java operation until early April), in which he announced the im-
plementation of a carrier operation in the Ceylon area by the Southern Task Force.(54) Then,
following the unconditional surrender of the Dutch East Indies on 9 March, Combined Fleet
Commander in Chief Admiral Yamamoto issued an order to Southern Task Force Com-
mander Vice Admiral Kondō to implement the surprise attack operation on Ceylon, the con-
tent of which was as follows:(53)
Combined Fleet Telegraphic Operation Order Classified No. 86
The Southern Task Force commander shall execute the carrier operation in the Ceylon area spec-
ified in the following:
1. Mission
To conduct a surprise attack on the enemy fleet in the Ceylon area and destroy it.
2. Date of the operation
From mid-March until early April
3. Participating forces
The force with the Carrier Task Force as the core
The stage-one, phase-four disposition of forces was put in motion as of 10 March.(141)
The Striking Operation in the Bay of Bengal
Since considerable time to spare was expected between the scheduled completion date of the
Andaman Islands capture and the rough date of completion of the capture of [other] southern
strategic areas including the Burma operation, Malaya Unit Commander Vice Admiral
Ozawa had been planning to seize this opportunity and conduct an operation that would be
the crowning operation of the surface unit of the Malaya Unit, by employing as his main
force the temporarily incorporated vessels (the Chōkai, the 7th Cruiser Division, the 3d De-
stroyer Squadron and the 4th Carrier Division, which were to be returned to their original
units after the rough completion of stage-one operations). Since early February, he had been
drawing up a full-scale plan to independently conduct a striking operation by the Malaya
Unit in the northern part of the Bay of Bengal, so as to check the British-Indian Army in the
Burma theater by threatening the allied supply route from the Indian Ocean to Calcutta
through the Bay of Bengal, and on the other hand to crush [any] enemy intentions to make
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counterattacks against the Andaman Islands after their capture.(38) On having formally been
informed of the implementation of the carrier operation in the Ceylon area by the Combined
Fleet Order of 9 March, Malaya Unit Commander Vice Admiral Ozawa made a proposal to
Southern Task Force Commander Vice Admiral Kondō that a striking operation in the north-
ern part of the Bay of Bengal, which his unit had already been studying, should be imple-
mented in concert with the operation of the Carrier Task Force of the Southern Task Force as
long as the situation should permit it.(181) Having obtained the approval of Combined Fleet
Commander in Chief Admiral Yamamoto for the proposal by the Malaya Unit commander,
the Southern Task Force commander announced, on the night of 14 March by means of tele-
graphic order No. 139, the outline [of actions to be taken] in concert by [the relevant] units.
It specified that while continuing its current tasks, the Malaya Unit should conduct a striking
operation in the Bay of Bengal to the north of the line connecting Madras (inclusive) [in India]
and Babi Island [off Sumatra]*, but that it should not advance to the waters to the west of
85ºE longitude until the first air raid by the Carrier Task Force.(181)
[The Operation to] Capture Burma and Key Areas Nearby Is Put in Motion
After the clearing of the waterways of Singapore on 24 February, the Malaya Unit commander
entered the naval port of Seletar in Singapore on the evening of 27 February, leading the
Chōkai and the Ayanami. Following that, the transport convoys that were to participate in the
Indian Ocean theater operations began to assemble in Singapore one after another.(68)
The units for the northern Sumatra invasion assembled in Singapore between 27 February
and 6 March, left the port of Singapore on 8 March, and mopped up [the enemy in] northern
Sumatra by 31 March.(68) Meanwhile, [the operation] to capture the Andaman Islands was
launched on 20 March and completed by the 30th.(118) During these operations, they hardly
met any major resistance from the enemy.
On 8 March, the Fifteenth Army seized Rangoon. On the previous day, the 7th, Southern
Army Commander in Chief General Terauchi had ordered Fifteenth Army Commander Lieu-
tenant General Iida to destroy the enemy in the Mandalay area, while at the same time issuing
an order to newly add to the Fifteenth Army the 56th Division (which was no longer needed
in the Malaya operation due to the smooth progress in the operation) as well as the 18th Di-
vision, which had completed its operations in Malaya.(145) The Navy was supposed to escort
the transport convoys of these units. On 19 March, the Burma transport operation was
launched with the first transport. [The Navy] escorted a total of 134 transport ships by 28
April and made a huge contribution to the Burma operation. The loss sustained by the Japan-
ese forces in this transport operation was only two (empty) Army transport ships, which
were sunk by enemy submarines while returning from Rangoon to Singapore.(68)
On 31 March, the Christmas Island invasion units captured the island as scheduled. In
this operation, there were no enemy counterattacks on the ground, but there was an incident
with the Naka, the flagship of the 4th Destroyer Squadron, which was torpedoed by an enemy
submarine while on guard in the surrounding waters of the island, but somehow she man-
aged to return to Bantam Bay.(56)
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* The text has Babié Island. Since the Action Report of the 5th Carrier Division and that of the Hiryū mention
Babi Island in one breath with Simeulue Island (off the northwest coast of Sumatra), we assume that Babié
Island refers to the small Babi Island between Simeulue and Nias.
The Carrier Operation in the Indian Ocean Is Put in Motion
The Carrier Task Force of the Southern Task Force was originally scheduled to leave Staring
Bay on 21 March and conduct attacks on Ceylon on 1 April.(100) However, since the return to
the Carrier Task Force of the 5th Carrier Division, which had been kept in mainland Japan to
be ready against air raids by an enemy striking force, was delayed due to the reports on the
air raid on Minami-Torishima [Marcus Island] by an enemy striking force on 4 March and
on the appearance of an enemy striking force [on the waters] to the north of Wake Island on
10 March, the schedule [of the carrier operation] was changed on 17 March in such a way
that [the Carrier Task Force] should [now] leave Staring Bay on 26 March and attack Ceylon
on 4 April. In the meantime, since the Kaga of the 1st Carrier Division had earlier touched an
uncharted rock at Palau and sustained minor damage to her hull, she was removed from the
Carrier Task Force as of 13 March and left Staring Bay on 15 March for Sasebo for repairs (as
previously told).(141) For about three weeks until their departure on 26 March, the carrier-
based aircraft of the 1st and the 2d Carrier Divisions had conducted hard drills at the Kendari
base, which had remarkably improved their skills.(75) On 24 March, the 5th Carrier Division
entered Staring Bay, which finished the assembly of the units for the Ceylon attack.(100)
On 26 March, the Carrier Task Force of the Southern Task Force left Staring Bay and raided
Colombo on 5 April; while delivering a heavy blow to the enemy air power and his ground
facilities, it also sank two British heavy cruisers HMS Cornwall and HMS Dorsetshire. Further
on 9 April, it dealt a massive blow to the enemy by an attack on Trincomalee and also sinking
the small British aircraft carrier HMS Hermes.(141)
In the meantime, on 1 April, the Malaya Unit Striking Force had left Mergui. On 6 April,
after splitting into three units, the force sank a number of [enemy] merchantmen by closing
in to the coast of India in the northern part of the Bay of Bengal.(119)
After achieving the major aims of the Southern Operation, the Combined Fleet shifted to
stage-two operations from 10 April onwards,(53) and the focus of the operations of the Navy
shifted from the previous areas southwest [of Japan, i.e. Southeast Asia] to the east of Honshū. 
On 13 April, the Minister of the Navy and the Chief of Naval General Staff sent the fol-
lowing congratulatory telegram to the commanders in chief of the Combined Fleet and the
Second Fleet:(141)
Office of the Navy Minister Telegram Classified No. 183
You have attained great military results in the recent operations in the Indian Ocean by destroy-
ing almost all enemy naval vessels, his air power and merchantmen and blowing up his military
facilities around the Bay of Bengal and on Ceylon, on which we offer you our congratulations.
2. Clearing the Waterways in the Malacca Strait 
(See Illustration No. 52)
Plan of Operations and Preparations 
The disposition of forces for this operation was in outline as follows.(68)
1. The operation to clear the waterways of Singapore (as shown in the following table)
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2. The operation to clear the waterways in the Malacca Strait
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5 [4?] cutters, 2 large-
sized motorized [landing]
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1. Clearing the waterways
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11th Subchaser Div, 2
motor launches and 1
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[landing] craft
1. Clearing the waterways
of Johor
2. Sweeping the anchor-
age for the naval port
for mines
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from the commercial
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1. The 3d Destroyer Squadron commander shall, when specifically ordered, support the
above [mission to] clear the waterways, leading the Sendai, the Amagiri, and the Asa-
giri.
2. One reconnaissance seaplane of the Chōkai (including 9 service personnel at the Men-
tok and the Anambas [bases]) shall engage in the clearing of the waterways of Singa-
pore.











Hatsutaka Support of theMinesweeping Unit
Minesweeping Unit 44th Minesweeper DivCdr
44th Minesweeper Div,
11th Subchaser Div, and 2
cutters
Clearing the waterways
in the Malacca Strait
and sweeping anchor-
ages for mines
Supply Unit 91st Guard Unit Cdr 91st Guard Unit, Eikō-maru and Nojima-maru
Providing supply and
guard
At 0800 on 18 February, 9th Base Force Commander Rear Admiral Hiraoka left Palembang
leading the Hatsutaka, sailed downstream and arrived at the mouth of the [Musi] river at
1500. After having been joined by the Eikō-maru and the Kōryū-maru off Mentok, he headed
for Mapur Island. The Otowa-maru, the Rumoi-maru, and six auxiliary cutters, too, called off
their minesweeping operations by the end of the 18th and headed for Mapur. Following
them, the 11th Subchaser Division, the 41st and the 44th Minesweeper Divisions, the Yūgiri
and the Nojima-maru also left Anambas or their own patrol areas on the 19th and headed for
Mapur; the main force for the operation to clear the waterways of Singapore assembled at
the anchorage to the south of Mapur by 0915 on 20 February.(68)
Clearing of the Waterways Completed
The operation to clear the waterways of Singapore took the following course.(68)
[February]
20th: At 2030, the minesweeping units left Mapur. 
21st: Having started sweeping at 1000, the units swept the central waterway, the main waterway
to Keppel [Harbour] and the Johor waterway for mines but snagged no mines. At 2030, the
minesweeping operation was suspended. In the minesweeping operation, other than making
use of the buoys set by the British, [the unit] conducted the operation with a British navy
commander (former commander of a minesweeping unit at Singapore) taken prisoner off
Mentok, on board of [one of] minesweepers. 
22d: At 0800, the minesweeping operation was resumed. The 1st Minesweeping Unit cleared
the main waterway to Keppel Harbour, while the 2d Minesweeping Unit the main waterway
to the naval port of Seletar. With no mines snagged, [the units] suspended the operation at
2030.
23d: At 0800, the minesweeping operation was resumed. The 41st Minesweeper Division swept
the anchorage of the naval port of Seletar for mines, while the 44th Minesweeper Division,
the Otowa-maru, the Rumoi-maru and others swept the anchorages of Keppel Harbour and
the commercial port. At 1300, the minesweeping operation at the anchorage of the Seletar
naval port was completed with no mines snagged. 
24th: At 0800, the minesweeping operation at the anchorages of Keppel Harbour and the com-
mercial port was completed. 
25th: Preparations for the minesweeping operation of the waterways in the Malacca Strait. On
that day, the 3d Destroyer Squadron swept the areas about sixty nautical miles 120º of the
east entrance of the central waterway of Singapore for mines.(118) However, no mines were
snagged. 
The operation to clear the waterways in the Malacca Strait took the following course.(68)
26th: At 0800, the Hatsutaka, the 44th Minesweeper Division, Submarine Chaser No. 7 and two
cutters left Singapore and at 2040 started the minesweeping of the waterways in the Malacca
Strait ([with] the effective width and depth of 1,000 meters and 15 meters respectively). [The
unit] disposed of one floating mine. 
27th: [The unit] resumed the minesweeping operation at 0730 and suspended it at 2100. At 2200,
a reconnaissance seaplane of the Chōkai, which had been supporting the minesweeping op-
eration, returned [to the vessel]. It was decided that the aircraft of the Sagara-maru should
support the minesweeping [operation, replacing the seaplane]. [On that day, the unit] dis-
posed of eight floating mines. 
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28th: [The unit] resumed the minesweeping operation at 0730 and suspended it at 2000, dispos-
ing of one floating mine. 
March
1st: The minesweeping operation of the waterways in the Malacca Strait was completed. 
2d: [The unit also] completed the minesweeping of the anchorage at the mouth of the Jugra
River and disposed of one floating mine. 
3d: [The unit] completed the minesweeping of the anchorage at Malacca. 
4th: [The unit] completed the minesweeping of the anchorage at Batu Pahat and disposed of
five floating mines. 
5th: At 1500 the minesweeping units returned to the naval port of Seletar.
Malaya Unit Commander Vice Admiral Ozawa, who had entered the port of Cap Saint
Jacques ([in] French Indochina) leading the Chōkai and the Ayanami on 19 February after the
completion of Operation L, stayed there and directed the overall operation from there. Since
the clearing of the waterways of Singapore was completed, he left Cap Saint Jacques at 0800
on 25 February, leading the Chōkai and the Ayanami, and entered the naval port at Seletar on
the evening of the 27th.(118) Thereafter, the surface units of the Malaya Unit began to advance
one after another to the naval port at Seletar, while the transport convoy [carrying units to]
participate in the coming operations in the Indian Ocean also began to assemble one after
another at Singapore from 2 March onwards.(68)
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Our Fleet Dominating the Naval Port of Singapore
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3. The Northern Sumatra Invasion Operation
(See illustration No. 53)
In accordance with the arrangements for Operations T, D and U concluded on 21 February
between the [Navy] First Southern Expeditionary fleet and the Southern Army at Saigon, the
Twenty-fifth Army commander, the [Army] Third Air Force commander and the commander
in chief of the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet made arrangements concerning the opera-
tion to capture strategic areas in northern Sumatra at Singapore on 28 February,(34) in which
they reached an agreement on the following: the mission (to capture key areas in northern
Sumatra and swiftly seize naval bases and airfields there, while securing important resource
areas), the operation schedule, the landing points and their reconnaissance, the disposition
of forces, the embarkation of forces [on the transport ships], the assembly, departure and
things to be done [before the departure] of the transport ships, the time and date of the start
of the landing and the landing schedule, the distribution of the transport ships and their es-
cort at sea, the air operations, feint operations and diversions, the landing battles, the cover
of the landings and support of the disembarkation, the defense facilities at the landing points
and landing bases, joint operations between the Army and the Navy after the landing, intel-
ligence, detailed arrangements to be made between the Army and Navy commanders con-
cerned, etc.(120) In this arrangement, Day W and the date of the landing were set respectively
on 2 March and on Day W + 10. Following the arrangement, in the beginning of March, the
arrangements for communications in Operation T between the commander in chief of the
First Southern Expeditionary Fleet, the Twenty-fifth Army commander and the army Third
Air Force commander as well as detailed arrangements between the 3d Destroyer Squadron
commander and the commander of the Imperial Guard Infantry Group were concluded.(120)
The Plan of Operations
The Malaya Unit
In accordance with the aforementioned agreement and arrangements between the Army and
the Navy, Malaya Unit Commander Vice Admiral Ozawa announced the Malaya Unit’s plan
of operations for Operations T, D, and U in Singapore on 5 March. Although the whole plan
is not extant, part of the plan was as follows.[119](125)
1. Mission 
In conjunction with the Army, [the unit shall] swiftly capture key places in northern Sumatra
and the Andaman Islands, while escorting the Army units for the Burma invasion [operation]
from Singapore to Rangoon and facilitate [the operation to] capture Burma.
2. Outline of the operation
(1) First of all, [the unit] shall capture key places in northern Sumatra to set up a naval air base
on Sabang Island. 
(2) Then, [the unit] shall capture key places on the Andaman Islands to set up a naval air base
and a base for naval vessels there. 
(3) Almost simultaneously with the operation to capture the Andaman Islands, [the unit] shall
escort army transport ships from Singapore (part of them from Penang) to Rangoon and fa-
cilitate the Burma invasion operation. 
3. The disposition of forces in Operation T (as shown in the following table)
Remarks: 
1. From 25 February, 1942 onwards, the 9th Base Force became the 9th Special Base Force. 
2. The 40th Air Group was formed in Tateyama on 1 February, 1942 and incorporated into the First
Southern Expeditionary Fleet as of that day. Its forces consisted of eight carrier-based attack
planes and eight carrier-based bombers; the former advanced to Singapore in mid-February and
the latter in early April.(183)
3. The Kamikawa-maru was removed from the Malaya Unit as of 10 March by means of Southern
Task Force Telegraphic Order No. 120; she headed for the areas to the southeast [of Japan, i.e.
the western Pacific], as previously told [pp. 499, 506]. 
The 1st Escort Unit 
The outline of operations of the 1st Escort Unit of the Malaya Unit in Operation T was as fol-
lows:(118)
1. Outline of the mission
[The unit] shall escort the transport ships carrying the [Army] Kobayashi Detachment of the
Imperial Guard Division ([consisting of] one infantry battalion as the core for [the capture of]
Sabang, and two infantry battalions and one field artillery battalion as the core for [the capture
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Chōkai, 7th Cruiser Div, 6 destroyers
of 3d Destroyer Sqdn, Mihoro Air
Group (Type-96 carrier-based fighter
plane unit attached), 40th Air Group,
4th Carrier Div (minus 2d Section),
Sagara-maru, Kamikawa-maru and 91st
Subchaser Div
1. To support the whole op-
eration






3d Destroyer Sqdn (minus 6 destroy-
ers), Kashii, 1st Minesweeper Div
(incl. Minesweeper No. 5), 2 subma-
rine chasers of 11th Subchaser Div,
(and Yura)
1. To escort the units land-
ing along Sabang Bay and
at Kutaraja
2. To sweep inside the port






Eikō-maru, 1 submarine chaser of 11th
Subchaser Div, 41st Minesweeper Div
2d Section and 44th Minesweeper
Div 1st Section
To escort the Labuhanruku





11th Submarine Base Unit, the
ground patrol and surface patrol sec-
tions of 9th Special Base Force and 4
large-sized motorized [landing] craft
1. To provide supplies
2. To defend and guard
Penang







About 1plt of the ground patrol sec-
tion of the 9th Special Base Force, 3
large-sized motorized [landing] craft,
2 auxiliary cutters
To defend and guard Sa-
bang
of] the Kutaraja area) as well as the navy unit for the Sabang base from the port of Singapore to
northern Sumatra, and disembark them on Sabang Island and in the vicinity of Kutaraja.
2. Disposition of forces
[The unit] shall be divided into the direct escort unit and the minesweeping unit; the former
shall be assigned to directly escort the transport ships and support the landing [of forces] under
the command of the 1st Escort Unit commander, while the latter shall be assigned to dispose of
floating mines in the Malacca Strait and sweep the sailing routes ahead of the transport ships
and their anchorages for mines under the command of the 1st Minesweeper Division com-
mander. 
3. Outline of actions of both units 
(1) On Day W + 6, the direct escort unit shall leave the west Keppel Harbour escorting the eight
transport ships carrying the Kobayashi Detachment of the Imperial Guard Division and
enter the anchorages of Kutaraja and Sabang around Day W + 10. When the disembarkation
is completed, the unit shall return to Penang.
(2) The minesweeping unit shall depart at an appropriate moment on the morning of Day W +
6. After disposing of floating mines in the Malacca Strait, it shall join the transport ships on
the evening of Day W + 7. When entering the anchorages, the unit shall [start] sweeping for
mines on the sailing routes ahead of the ships as well as in their anchorages from Point Y
without [specific] order. 
The 2d Escort Unit 
Outline of the mission 
[The unit] shall escort the main force of the Imperial Guard Division ([consisting of] five infantry
battalions, one tank squadron, two field batteries, two trench mortar batteries as the core with
two engineer companies and one air unit element) and the Yoshida Detachment ([consisting of]
one infantry battalion as the core) from the port of Singapore respectively to Labuhanruku and
Idi, and put them ashore.
Disposition of forces
[The unit] shall be divided into Escort Units A, B and the Penang Base Unit. Escort Unit A shall
escort the Labuhanruku landing unit under the command of the 9th Special Base Force com-
mander, and Escort Unit B shall escort the Idi landing unit under the command of the captain
of the Shimushu, while the Sabang Base Unit of the Penang Base Unit shall be assigned to the
defense and guarding of Sabang Island after it has been captured by the army unit.
Outline of the actions of the units 
1. On Day W + 8, Escort Unit A shall leave the west Keppel Harbour, escorting eight transport
ships carrying the main force of the Imperial Guard Division and enter the anchorage of
Labuhanruku around 0300 on Day W + 10. When disembarkation is completed, the unit shall
return to Penang. 
2. On Day W + 7, Escort Unit B shall leave the west Keppel Harbour, escorting two transport ships
carrying the [Army] Yoshida Detachment, and enter the anchorage of Idi around 0100 on Day
W + 10. When disembarkation is completed, the Shimushu shall return to Singapore, escorting
the empty ships by way of Labuhanruku, while the 2d Section of the 41st Minesweeper Division
shall return to Penang. 
3. The Sabang Base Unit shall embark on navy transport ships escorted by the 1st Escort Unit; after
the army Kobayashi Detachment has captured Sabang Island, it shall take charge of the defense
and guard of the island. 
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Preparation for the Operations 
The units for Operation T assembled in Singapore between 27 February and 6 March.(114, 150)
Meanwhile, since the Yura, which had operated in the western Java area, returned to Singa-
pore on the afternoon of the 6th, Malaya Unit Commander Vice Admiral Ozawa incorporated
her in the 1st Escort Unit. Also, since it was decided to additionally send a construction unit
to Sabang Island, he added another transport ship.(63)
In the meantime, the Mihoro Air Group and the Type–96 carrier-based fighter plane unit
(put under the commander of the Mihoro Air Group) were [still] based in Kuantan, and even
after the main force of the 1st Air Unit of the Malaya Unit (the 22d Air Flotilla headquarters,
the Genzan Air Group, the main body of the Kanoya Air Group and the Type–0 fighter plane
unit of the 22d Air Flotilla) was transferred to the Air Unit of the Southern Task Force to par-
ticipate in the Java operation, they were kept in the Malaya Unit, and mainly engaged in at-
tacking enemy vessels on the sea near Bangka Island as well as in the Gaspar Strait. On 19
February, the Mihoro Air Group commander was ordered by the Malaya Unit commander
to advance about four of its land-based attack planes to Sungai Petani, so as to reconnoiter
[enemy] seaplane bases, air bases on the ground as well as port facilities (and [take recon-
naissance] photos of key places) on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and of Sabang and
Kutaraja. He was also given a preparatory order that all aircraft units [under his command]
should be advanced to the west coast of Malaya (Sungai Petani or Ayer Tawar) after the
[Army’s] landing on Java.(135) Accordingly, four land-based attack planes were advanced to
Sungai Petani on the 20th and conducted reconnaissance over the Andaman Islands and
northern Sumatra on the 21st, the 22d, the 24th, the 26th and the 28th, but they spotted no
enemy.(71) On 5 March, the orders concerning Operations T, D and U were issued by means
of Malaya Unit Operation Order Classified No. 18 and the Mihoro Air Group was incorpo-
rated in the main unit of the Malaya Unit along with the Type–96 carrier-based fighter plane
unit. The units advanced to Penang by the 9th and completed preparations for Operation
T.(135) Meanwhile, the carrier-based attack plane unit of the 40th Air Group arrived in Singa-
pore on 16 February and completed its preparations for Operations T, D and U on 5 March(184)
(its carrier-based bomber unit arrived in Singapore in early April). Following them, the
Sagara-maru entered the port of Penang on 9 March and completed her preparations for Op-
eration T, having her aircraft advance to the seaplane base of Penang.(125) 
Landings Made Without Bloodshed 
The 1st Escort Unit, the main unit of the Malaya Unit and the 2d Escort Unit left the port of
Singapore respectively on 8, 9 and 10 March, and headed toward the landing points, sailing
northward in the Malacca Strait.(114, 118) In the meantime, the air campaign against northern
Sumatra was launched on the 9th with an air raid on Sabang Island by the Mihoro Air
Group.(68) From 10 March onwards, the Sagara-maru, too, provided the 1st Escort Unit and
the convoy with direct escort against [enemy] submarines as well as patrols on the sailing
routes ahead of them, employing the aircraft unit at the Penang seaplane base, while the 40th
Air Group provided the escort units and the main unit sailing in the southern part of the
Malacca Strait with patrols on the sailing routes ahead of them as well as patrols against
[enemy] submarines.(71) Before dawn on the 12th, the landing units landed without bloodshed
on Sabang Island, in Kutaraja, Labuhanruku and Idi. On the 14th, the 1st and the 2d Escort
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Illustration No. 53 — Rough Sketch of the Course of the Imperial Guard Division’s Invasion Operation in
Central and Northern Sumatra
Units departed respectively for Penang and Singapore, completed this operation and started
preparing for the coming Andaman Islands operation.(118) During this period, the Mihoro Air
Group conducted bombing attacks on Sabang Island and search missions in the Indian Ocean,
while the Sagara-maru and the 40th Air Group conducted patrols on the sailing routes ahead
of the convoys as well as patrols against [enemy] submarines and neutralized the landing
points but spotted no enemy. The surface units encountered no enemy either and [thus] no
loss was sustained by our forces.(71, 118, 125)
The army units operated as shown in Illustration No. 53; they mostly completed the clear-
ing of northern Sumatra by around the 21st.(185)
4. The Capture of the Andaman Islands
(See Illustration No. 54)
In accordance with the arrangement between the Southern Army commander in chief and
the commander in chief of the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet, Twenty-fifth Army Com-
mander Lt. Gen. Yamashita Tomoyuki and First Southern Expeditionary Fleet Commander
in Chief Vice Admiral Ozawa concluded in Singapore an arrangement for [the operation to]
capture the Andaman Islands. The main points of the arrangement were as follows:(34)
1. Mission 
[The units] shall capture key places in the Andaman Islands and swiftly secure naval bases and
airfields there. 
2. Forces to be employed 
(1) Army 
Commander: the 56th Infantry Regiment 2d Battalion commander 
The 56th Infantry Regiment 2d Battalion 
The regimental artillery battery (minus one half) of the 56th Infantry Regiment 
One half of the antitank guns of the 56th Infantry Regiment 
Other than the above, some medical units, signal units and engineer units
(2) Navy 
Detached Unit of the 12th Special Base Force 
3. Landing points 
The west coast of Ross Island, the sandy beach two kilometers west of Ross Island and others;
after that, Havelock, Stewart Sound, Port Cornwallis, etc. shall be seized in succession on request
of the Navy. 
4. Embarkation, assembly, departure and landing 
(1) Embarkation point: the port of Singapore 
(2) Assembly point and date of assembly 
Assembly point: Penang 
Date of assembly: Day W + 18, by when [each vessel] shall sail on their own [to the assembly
point]
5. Chain of command 
From the assembly at Penang until ordered [otherwise] by specific orders, the army landing
units shall come under the command of the navy landing unit commander concerning the op-
eration. 
6. Escort at sea 
(1) The bulk of the Malaya Unit 
(2) One element of the Eleventh Air Fleet ([consisting of] the 22d Air Flotilla as the core)
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In accordance with the above arrangement, the 3d Destroyer Squadron commander, the 12th
Special Base Force Detached Unit commander and the [army] 56th Infantry Regiment 2d Bat-
talion commander made detailed arrangements on 1 March.(118)
The Plan of Operations 
The Malaya Unit 
On 5 March, the Malaya Unit commander gave instructions for the plan of operations of the
Malaya Unit concerning Operations T, D and U in Singapore by means of Malaya Unit Op-
eration Order Classified No. 18, in which the disposition of forces of Operations D and U
was as shown in the following table:(68, 118, 119)
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Chōkai, 7th Cruiser Div, 1 de-
stroyer div of the 4th [3d?]
Destroyer Sqdn, 4th Carrier
Div (minus 2d Section), 40th
Air Group, Sagara-maru, and
San’yō-maru





3d Destroyer Sqdn (minus 4
[6?] destroyers), (Yura), 1st
Minesweeper Div (with
Minesweeper No. 5 in-
cluded), 11th Subchaser Div
To escort the units to capture the
Andaman Islands
2d Escort Unit 9th Special BaseForce Cdr
Kashii, Hatsutaka, Shimushu, 4
[1?] destroyers of the 3d De-
stroyer Sqdn, 5th Destroyer
Sqdn [Div?]
To escort the transport ships car-
rying the [army] 56th Div, 18th
Div, and the units under the di-
rect control of the army from






Bulk of 10th Special Base
Force, Asahi, Chōsa-maru,
Rumoi-maru, Otowa-maru,
44th Minesweeper Div, 2
large-sized motorized [land-
ing] craft, 6 fishing boats and
[some] captured ships
1. To continue the previous tasks
2. To escort the second landing
units of Imperial Guard Div
from Singapore to Belawan






Main body of 12th Special
Base Force (minus Detached
Unit), Kari, Nojima-maru,
Kōshō-maru, 41st
Minesweeper Div, 12th Gun-
boat Div, 4 large-sized mo-
torized [landing] craft, 12th
Subchaser Div [Signal
Unit?], and [some] captured
ships
To clear waterways from the
mouth of the Irrawaddy River to
Rangoon and guide and escort
the army transport ships
Remark: The San’yō-maru was removed from the Dutch East Indies Unit and transferred to the
Malaya Unit as of 10 March. 
The Air Unit of the Southern Task Force 
The disposition of forces of the Air Unit of the Southern Task Force in these areas from 5
March onwards was in outline as shown in the following table:(186)
With the surrender of the Dutch East Indies on 9 March, the Air Unit of the Southern Task
Force called off most operations in its initial plan of operations in the southwest [of Japan,
i.e. southeast Asia]. However, the subsequent operations of the unit still included the follow-
ing extensive and complex missions.(186)
1. To act in concert with the Burma and Andaman operations 
2. To support and act in concert with the third carrier operations (the Ceylon operation)
3. To support the operation to capture Christmas Island 
4. To support the western New Guinea invasion operation
5. To support the operations against Bataan and Corregidor







Detached Unit of the 12th
Special Base Force, one ele-
ment of the 9th Special Base
Force, about 1 bn of the
[army] 18th Div, led by Capt
Hayashi, Kinugasa-maru
(Navy), Hirokawa-maru
(Army), 4 large-sized motor-
ized [landing] craft and 2
auxiliary cutters
To seize key areas of the An-
daman Islands
To set up [an] air base. 
(Although being an army- navy
joint operation, the navy com-
mander shall [also] lead the
[army] Hayashi Detachment
along with the navy unit.)
























1. Dutch East Indies Operation (omitted by
the author)
2. Burma Operation
a) To search and patrol 

















1. Until the rough completion of the Java
operation (omitted by the author)
2. Operations against the Andaman Islands
and Burma
a) To patrol over the Bay of Bengal and
the waters southwest of Sumatra 
b) To destroy the enemy surface power 
c) Depending on the situation, to destroy
the enemy air power
The rest omitted by the author
Among them, the mission in Burma and the Andamans was as follows.(75)
1. [The Air Unit] shall conduct extensive search missions in the Bay of Bengal with the 3d Air Raid
Unit, to be prepared against maneuvers of the enemy surface forces. If they should come for an
attack, the unit shall destroy them in cooperation with friendly surface vessels. 
2. The army shall take the responsibility for [the air campaign to] destroy enemy air power in Burma;
our unit shall not conduct operations other than necessary for self-defense. 
3. The guarding of the convoy from the air shall be shared [between the units]. 
It was also announced that in order to direct Operations U and D, the Eleventh Air Fleet
headquarters would shift to Bangkok, and that operations in the Dutch East Indies area
should mainly be directed by 23d Air Flotilla Commander R. Adm. Takenaka Ryōzō (com-
mander of the 2d Air Raid Unit).(186) In the meantime, after the raid of a U.S. Striking Force
in the Marshall Islands at the end of January, the war situation in the central [south] Pacific
and the areas southeast [of Japan, i.e. the west Pacific] had gradually started showing signs
of intensification, due to which the 1st Air Group ([of] the 1st Air Raid Unit) under the com-
mand of the Air Unit of the Southern Task Force had already been transferred to the South
Seas Unit (it had left Ambon on 22 February). At the beginning of March, the land-based air
units were reorganized, and further extractions and transfers of forces were ordered one after
another.(186) Namely:
As of 5 March: The 21st Air Flotilla headquarters and the Kanoya Air Group were transferred
to the Northern Task Force and sent back to mainland [Japan]. 
As of 10 March: One half of the 3d Air Group ([of] the 23d Air Flotilla) was [also] transferred to
the Northern Task Force and sent back to mainland [Japan]. 
As of 15 March: The Mihoro Air Group and the Type–96 carrier-based fighter plane unit was re-
turned to the 22d Air Flotilla from the Malaya Unit.
On top [of the above], in [the plan of] the reorganization of the Navy air units scheduled to
be implemented as of 1 April in preparation for stage-two operations,(187) the fighter plane
unit formerly attached to the 22d Air Flotilla headquarters (two squadrons of Type–0 fighter
planes dispatched from the 23d Air Flotilla) were supposed to be incorporated into the
Kanoya Air Group. Since the Kanoya Air Group was to be transferred to the Northern Task
Force, [the incorporation meant that] no fighter plane units would remain deployed in the
Indian Ocean area [supposed to be covered] by the Air Unit of the Southern Task Force.
Against this decision, on 1 March, Air Unit Commander V. Adm. Tsukahara Nishizō re-
quested that the fighter plane units of the 22d Air Flotilla remain [in the theater], which was
narrowly approved, and he barely managed to keep a fighter plane unit (about twenty air-
craft in two squadrons) in the Indian Ocean area.(188)
The Shift of the Air Units 
R. Adm. Matsunaga Sadaichi, commander of the 3d Air Raid Unit (and the 22d Air Flotilla),
who had been directing operations in Kuching since 8 February, advanced to Bangkok on 13
March. On 17 March, Air Unit Commander Vice Admiral Tsukahara (commander in chief of
the Eleventh Air Fleet) shifted to Bangkok, too.(186) The shift of the air units [in preparation
for Operations D and U] was as follows:
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The Genzan Air Group 
The air group had carried out operations while shifting between the Kuching and Gelumbang
[airfields] during the Java invasion operation and [then] conducted search missions in the
eastern part of the Indian Ocean from Gelumbang from 3 March onwards. On 7 March, its
aircraft unit ([consisting of] twenty-seven Type–96 land-based attack planes) left Gelumbang
under the direct command of the commander [of the group] and, by way of Saigon, advanced
to Bangkok on the 13th. The remaining six aircraft also completed their advance in Bangkok
on the 17th, while [supporting] the shift of the Yamada Unit (a fighter plane unit).(21)
The Yamada Unit (fighter plane unit attached to the 22d Air Flotilla headquarters) 
On 24 February, the Yamada Unit, the Type–0 fighter plane unit, had advanced from Kuching
to the Mentok base, where it had participated in the western Java invasion operation and
chiefly conducted patrols in the air over the convoys with its main [force] while carrying out
with one element [air] reconnaissance over Batavia as well as patrols in the air over the an-
chorage at Patrol. On 15 March, the unit began its shift from the Mentok base and on the
16th, twenty Type–0 fighter planes including the commander’s [plane] and three land-based
reconnaissance planes completed their advance to Bangkok.(129)
The Mihoro Air Group and Type–96 carrier-based fighter plane unit 
Having been put in the main unit of the Malaya Unit, they had stayed on at the Penang base
after the northern Sumatra invasion operation and maintained their aircraft ready for use,
waiting for the runway extension work on their next advance base at the Sabang airfield to
be completed. As of 15 March, they were removed from the Malaya Unit and transferred to
the Air Unit, where they returned to [their original unit,] the 22d Air Flotilla, and prepared
for Operations D and U.(186)
The Tōkō Air Group Detachment 
During the Java invasion operation, the Tōkō Air Group had operated with Ambon as its
service base and Semau (an island five nautical miles west of Kupang) in Timor as its advance
base (to where twelve large flying boats had advanced on 25 February). On 10 March, when
the Java invasion operation was mostly completed, in accordance with the (aforementioned
[p. 604]) phase-four disposition of forces of the Air Unit of the Southern Task Force, seven
Type–97 large flying boats left the Semau base from the 10th onwards and advanced to
Penang by the 13th by way of Kendari and Singapore, led by Aviation Officer Cdr. Itō
Sukemitsu. After its arrival in Penang, the detachment prepared the base while servicing its
aircraft to be ready for the [coming] shift to its next base, Port Blair.(189)
The Enemy Garrison Unconditionally Surrenders
At 0800 on 10 March, the Andaman Islands Operation was launched with the departure of
the 1st Escort Unit and the 1st Minesweeping Unit from Penang.(118)
Prior to this, the 22d Air Flotilla (the 3d Air Raid Unit) and the Tōkō Air Group Detach-
ment, which were supposed to act in concert in this operation, had advanced their bases to
the bases in Thailand, Malaya and northern Sumatra. The Genzan Air Group and the Mihoro
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Air Group conducted search missions over the waters about 100 to 150 nautical miles west
of the Andaman Islands, [each] employing eight to ten land-based attack planes day after
day, the former from Bangkok from 17 March onwards, and the latter [first] from Penang
from 18 March onwards and then from Sabang from the 24th onwards. However, they spot-
ted no enemy.(71)
At 0400 on the 23d, the transport ships entered the planned anchorage without having
encountered the enemy during their sail. At 0630, the invasion unit under the command of
Capt. Kawasaki Harumi successfully made a surprise landing on Ross Island, the coast to
the south of Atalanta Point and the coast to the west of Snake Island. [The unit] seized the
whole area of the southern part of Port Blair on Ross Island as well as the airfield without








































Illustration No. 54 — The Operations of the 1st Escort Unit in Operation D 
(from 1845 on 20 March until 0300 on 23 March)
meeting resistance from the enemy. Twenty-three British officers and three hundred Indian
garrison troops surrendered unconditionally. On that day, based on the information obtained
from the inhabitants, a minesweeping operation was carried out in the northern and the
southern waterways, in which twenty-three mines were disposed of in the northern water-
way, while no mines were snagged in the southern waterway. At 1330, one large [enemy] air-
craft flew over Havelock Island, to which the Isonami responded and drove it off. At 1900,
the disembarkation of the Hirokawa-maru was completed.(118)
At 0100 on the 24th, the Hirokawa-maru who had completed disembarkation left for Sin-
gapore. On that day, the army units that were to seize strategic places embarked on three
large-sized motorized [landing] craft and headed for Havelock Island, escorted by the Yura
and the 1st Section of the 19th Destroyer Division. However, since there were no airfield or
houses, the invasion unit cancelled the landing, and after conducting a reconnaissance in the
areas near the eastern entrance of the Andaman Strait, returned to port at 2000. [Meanwhile,]
minesweeping was continued and forty-four mines were disposed of. Although one Lock-
heed aircraft came for a raid at 1420, the Sendai drove it off with her guns.(118) On that after-
noon, seven flying boats of the Tōkō Air Group advanced to Port Blair.(189)
From the 25th onwards, the invasion units of Army and Navy [conducted an operation
to] clear the Elphinstone and Stewart
Sound Islands, and the port of Cornwal-
lis and completed it by the 27th. Mean-
while, having completed disembarkation
by the 30th, the transport ships headed
back for Penang or Singapore, and com-
pleted their operation. In the meantime,
since the 3d Destroyer Squadron (minus
six destroyers) was assigned as the
Guard Unit in the disposition of forces
for the Malaya Unit striking operation in
the northern part of Bay of Bengal and
supposed to advance to the waters to the
west of the Andaman Islands, the unit
stayed on standby while continuously
guarding the area off Port Blair. 
During this period, the Sagara-maru
carried out search missions on the waters
in the Port Blair area while supporting
the ground operations; after having set
up a seaplane base in the port of Port
Blair on the 24th and letting the Tōkō Air
Group [Detachment] advance its seven
large flying boats there, she [also] stayed
in Port Blair until the 30th, when she left
for Penang in order to participate in Op-
eration U. The 4th Carrier Division car-
ried out search missions in the Port Blair
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The Glorious Ceremony of Raising the Naval Flag in Front
of the Government House on Ross Island
area and the Bay of Bengal, after which it left the waters of Andaman Islands on the 25th and
headed for Mergui to prepare for the Indian Ocean operation.(72)
After its advance to the [seaplane] base in Port Blair, the Tōkō Air Group Detachment
joined the search missions. From the 25th onwards, it carried out search missions day after
day on the sea about six hundred nautical miles to the west [of the Andaman Islands] (up to
[as far as] about 150 nautical miles from the east coast of India) with three large flying boats,
to be ready against counter attacks by enemy naval vessels coming from the west.(71) In order
to catch the Lockheed aircraft which had flown over Ross Island for reconnaissance day after
day from the landing of the invasion unit on the 23d until the 26th, the Type–0 fighter plane
unit attached to the 22d Air Flotilla headquarters, which had been advanced to Bangkok, fur-
ther advanced to Tavoy on the 29th and carried out patrols in the air over the Andaman Is-
lands for about four consecutive days with a total of ten aircraft, but no enemy raids were
spotted thereafter.(141)
5. The Burma Transport Operation (See Illustrations No. 55 and No. 56)
When the minesweeping in the Malacca Strait was for the most part completed, Malaya Unit
Commander Vice Admiral Ozawa had announced on 2 March the plan of operations of the
Malaya Unit for Operations T, D and U, as previously told [p. 576, 582; there the date is 5
March]. He specified that almost simultaneously with the capture of the Andaman Islands,
the mission was to escort the army transport ships from Singapore (one element of them from
Penang) to Rangoon and facilitate the Burma invasion operation. At 0000 on 15 March, the
disposition of forces for Operations D and U was put in motion, and on 19 March, the oper-
ation to transport [the units for the invasion of] Burma was launched with the first transport
(a convoy [consisting of] thirty-two transport ships carrying the [Army] 56th Division).(68)
The Position of the Units Right Before the Launch of the Operation
The position of the [relevant] units right before the launch of the operation was as follows:
Main Unit
The Chōkai, the Murakumo and the Ayanami: Had entered the port of Penang on 14 March after
[having participated in] Operation T.
The 7th Cruiser Division, the Hatsuyuki and the Fubuki: Had entered the port of Singapore on
15 March after [having participated in] Operation T.
The Shirayuki: Had entered the port of Singapore on 14 March, after having engaged in the escort
of the transport ships carrying the 56th Division from Cap Saint Jacques ([in] French In-
dochina) to Singapore [ordered] by means of Malaya Unit Telegraphic Operation Order No.
52.
The 4th Carrier Division: Had stayed in Singapore from 5 March onwards, servicing, replenish-
ing and conducting drills.
The 40th Air Group: Was in Singapore, servicing and conducting drills after the completion of
Operation T.
The Sagara-maru: Arrived in Penang on 15 March after the completion of Operation T; was
preparing for Operation D.
The San’yō-maru: Had been on standby in Penang since 19 March.
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Illustration No. 55 — The Deployment of the Air Forces for Operation U on 19 March 
The Air Unit of the Southern Task Force put in parentheses
Second Escort Unit
The Kashii: Entered the port of Singapore on 16 March after [having participated in] Operation
T and was on standby.
The Hatsutaka: Entered the port of Penang on 15 March after [having participated in] Operation
T and was on standby.
The Shimushu: Entered the port of Singapore on 15 March after [having participated in] Opera-
tion T and was on standby.
The 11th Subchaser Division: Entered the port of Penang on 15 March after [having participated
in] Operation T and was incorporated in the Penang Base Unit as of 17 March.
The 5th Destroyer Division: After operating in the Bantam Bay area, [its destroyers] entered the
port of Singapore one by one between 12 and 14 March, and were on standby.
The Shikinami: Entered the port of Singapore on 15 March, after having escorted the transport
convoy carrying the 56th Division from Cap Saint Jacques to Singapore, and was on standby.
The Singapore Base Unit (The 10th Special Base Force as the core)
The 10th Special Base Force was formed in Saigon as of 15 January 1942 (with R. Adm. Oku
Nobukazu as commander). Having been incorporated in the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet,
it advanced to the Seletar naval port on 14 February, and from the beginning of March onward,
was in charge of the defense and guarding of assigned sectors in the Singapore area, the protec-
tion of [sea] lines of communication, and reconstruction work in the sectors of Singapore as-
signed to the Navy.
The Rangoon Base Unit (The 12th Special Base Force as the core)
The 12th Special Base Force was formed in Sasebo as of 15 February 1942 (with R. Adm. Ishikawa
Shigeru as commander). Having been incorporated in the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet, it
advanced first to Singapore from 4 to 5 March, then to Penang on 17 March, and was preparing
for advance to Rangoon.
The Air Unit of the Southern Task Force (land-based air unit)
The Genzan Air Group and the Mihoro Air Group had started search missions over the waters
to the west of the Andaman Islands respectively from Bangkok from the 17th onwards and from
the Penang base from the 18th onwards.
The Transport of More Than Two [Army] Divisions
The Burma Transport Operation was started with the first transport, which was put in motion
on 19 March, and was continued until the fourth transport (which was completed on 28
April). During this period of about forty days, the Malaya Unit escorted as many as a total
of 134 ships, in which, in addition to the two divisions (the 56th and the 18th Divisions), [the
unit also] transported many [army] units under the direct command of the [Twenty-fifth]
Army. And by also transporting large quantities of ammunition and matériel as well as equip-
ment, [the Malaya Unit] very much contributed to the Burma operation. During this transport
operation, no particular loss was caused by enemy aircraft or submarines and the operation
did progress very smoothly.(68) The only regret was that two army transport ships, the
Yaeyama-maru [Yae-maru] and the Shunsei-maru (both empty), returning from Rangoon to Sin-
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Illustration No. 56 — The Seaplane Bases at the time of Operation U (Malaya Unit)
gapore, were sunk by an enemy submarine attack at about seventy nautical miles northwest
of Penang.(190)
During this period, the main unit of the Malaya Unit left Penang on 20 March and ad-
vanced to the waters to the south of Burma on the 24th to support Operations D and U, after
which it left the waters on the 25th for Mergui, where it arrived at 1500 on the 26th.(119) Then,
in concert with the Ceylon operation of the Carrier Task Force of the Southern Task Force,
the Malaya Unit formed a Striking Force of its own, advanced to the northern part of the Bay
of Bengal on 6 April and sank a number of enemy merchantmen.(119) When the Ceylon oper-
ation was completed on 10 April, the disposition of forces for stage-two, phase-one operations
was put into effect; the 2d Escort Unit was disbanded, and the Penang Base Unit (the 9th
Special Base Force as the core) was formed instead, which turned the escort of the transport
convoys [to Burma] into a relay-type of operation between the Singapore Base Unit and the
Penang Base Unit, and between the Penang Base Unit and the Rangoon Base Unit.(53) In the
meantime, the Air Unit of the Southern Task Force carried out search missions in the Bay of
Bengal and the Indian Ocean with the land-based attack planes of the Genzan and Mihoro
Air Groups as well as the large flying boats of the Tōkō Air Group, while conducting patrols
in the air over the Port Blair area (from 30 March until 2 April) with the fighter plane unit,
which had been advanced to Tavoy. Moreover, the aircraft of the 40th Air Group, the Sagara-
maru and the San’yō-maru, which had been incorporated into the main unit, were [also] en-
gaged in patrols against enemy submarines as well as on the sailing routes ahead of the
convoys, while providing direct escort against enemy submarines and conducting search
missions near their sailing routes, but spotted no enemy submarines or naval vessels. It so
happened that patrols by aircraft against enemy submarines were not provided in the area
about seventy nautical miles northwest of Penang, where at 2315 on 1 April and at 0015 on
2 April two army transport ships were sunk.
6. The Capture of Christmas Island (See Illustration No. 57)
As previously told [p. 568], on 18 March, Dutch East Indies Unit Commander Vice Admiral
Takahashi announced the outline of the operation to capture Christmas Island by means of
Dutch East Indies Unit Classified Telegram No. 203, which meant that the unit started on
preparing for the operation with a landing scheduled for 31 March. The contents of the out-
line were as follows:(62)
1. Our unit shall implement the Christmas Island operation in the following way:
(1) Mission: To capture Christmas Island and secure the rock phosphate resources
(2) Commander: the 16th Cruiser Division commander
(3) Forces: the 16th Cruiser Division (minus the Kinu and the Nagara –– note by the author: [con-
sisting] only of the Natori), the 4th Destroyer Squadron (minus the 2d, the 24th, the 4th De-
stroyer Divisions, and minus the 2d Section of the 9th Destroyer Division –– note by the
author: [consisting] only of the Naka and the 1st Section of the 9th Destroyer Division), the
detached unit of the 24th Special Base Force, one element of the 21st Special Base Force (in-
cluding four 12-cm guns, four 8-cm antiaircraft guns and their personnel), the Kimishima-
maru, the Kumagawa-maru, Patrol Boats No. 34 and No. 36 (the time of incorporation shall
be given by special order), the Akebono-maru and one element of the 102 Construction Unit
(about 200 men from Makassar)
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(4) Implementation schedule: [The participating units] shall assemble on the waters northwest
of the Bantam anchorage (Batavia) by 28 March and complete replenishment and prepara-
tions for the operation. The landing shall be conducted on 31 March.
(5) The course of action after the invasion: Leaving the ground defense unit and the construction
unit behind, the other units shall swiftly withdraw from the site after the disembarkation is
completed.
2. When [the operation to] capture Christmas Island is under way, the main unit shall in general
advance to the north of the island and support [the capture operation].
3. [All] other units shall continue their current tasks.
On that day and [again] on the 19th, Dutch East Indies Unit Commander Vice Admiral Taka-
hashi took steps to remove the Nagara from the Dutch New Guinea invasion unit and incor-
porate the Kinu into that unit instead, while incorporating the Nagara into the unit to capture
Christmas Island.(62) This was done because he had been informally notified that with the re-
vision of the Imperial Navy Wartime Formation as of 10 April, the Nagara was to be put into
the 10th Destroyer Squadron (the unit [formed to] guard the aircraft carriers). By avoiding her
inclusion in the Dutch New Guinea invasion unit, [an operation] that was expected to take a
considerably long period from now on, he could include her in the unit to capture Christmas
Island, an operation that was to be more or less completed in a short period. He also incorpo-
rated the 22d Destroyer Division into the main unit and ordered it to join the main unit as soon
as it completed its task of [escorting] the second transport of the Sixteenth Army to Java.(182)
The Plan of Operations
On 25 March at Makassar, Christmas Island Invasion Unit Commander (R. Adm. Hara Ken-
zaburō, [who had become] 16th Cruiser Division commander since 10 March from being
commander of the 5th Destroyer Squadron) announced the plan of operations to capture
Christmas Island by means of Dutch East Indies Unit Christmas Island Invasion Unit Order
Classified No. 1, the outline of which was as follows:(62)
1. The Christmas Island invasion unit shall capture Christmas Island, secure the resources of rock
phosphate there and as much as possible conduct surveys as to where to set up a ground air
base (to be used by fighter planes) as well as to arrange for a quick construction of it.
2. The disposition of forces (as shown in the following table)
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16th Cruiser Div (minus Kinu) To direct the operation andsupport the guarding
Guard Unit 4th DestroyerSqdn Cdr
Naka, 9th Destroyer Div 1st Section, Pa-
trol Boats Nos. 34 and 36, Kumagawa-
maru and Kimishima-maru
To escort the transport







24th Specal Base Force Detached Unit (a
landing force of about 450 men), one ele-
ment of 21st Special Base Force (about
200 artillery personnel, 4 x 12-cm guns
and 4 x 8-cm antiaircraft guns) and one
element of 102d Construction Unit
(about 200 personnel)
Ground combat of the opera-
tion to capture Christmas Is-
land; to set up defense; to
conduct a survey of ground
air bases and quickly prepare
for [their construction]
3. Time of Departure: At 1900 on 29 March
4. Landing points:
First landing point: Flying Fish Cove Pier No. 3 and the coast nearby (mainly to its southwest)
5. Time of entering [into the anchorage]: At 0700 on 31 March
The Naka Torpedoed 
At 1700 on 29 March, the 1st Section of the 9th Destroyer Division left Bantam Bay ahead [of
the other units] in order to clear enemy submarines off the outer area of Bantam Bay and
along the planned sailing route of the invasion unit. Then, at 1900 as scheduled, the main
unit ([consisting of] the Natori and the Nagara), the Guard Unit ([consisting of] the Naka, the
Kumagawa-maru and Patrol Boat No. 34) left the anchorage of Bantam Bay in that order. With-
out encountering any enemy at all during the sail, the invasion unit reached a point about
fifteen nautical miles north of the anchorage [at Flying Fish Cove on Christmas Island] at
0700 on 31 March, and changed its formation to enter into the anchorage.(122)
At 0708, the Naka of the Guard Unit spotted a surfaced enemy submarine at about 12,000
meters 48º on port hand. While immediately ordering the 1st Section of the 9th Destroyer Di-
vision to attack her, [the Naka] herself closed in, firing [at the submarine] using searchlights,
but the enemy rapidly submerged in about one minute. The Naka kept rushing towards the
enemy. After launching her aircraft at 0718 in order to support the attack on the enemy sub-
marine, reconnoiter the landing point as well as to attack the enemy battery, she carried out
an antisubmarine attack (with four depth charges) at 0726 around the point where the enemy
submarine had submerged. Meanwhile around 0720, the 16th Cruiser Division also launched
the aircraft of the Natori and the Nagara for the same purpose. While having the transport
ships temporarily evacuate to the west of the anchorage, Guard Unit Commander R. Adm.
Nishimura Shōji tried hard to detect and intercept the enemy submarine.(56)
The reconnaissance seaplanes, which had been launched from the Natori, the Nagara and
the Naka, made some intimidating flyovers over Christmas Island and conducted reconnais-
sance. At 0747, they first of all made a bombing attack near the houses at the eastern end of
Flying Fish Cove and then bombed the enemy battery at Smith Point. In the meantime, at
0754, the Naka had reached a point about 9,000 meters from the Smith Point battery, and
opened fire (three shells). Since the enemy put up white flags everywhere around 0800, the
shelling and bombing was suspended. The transport ships immediately moved on to enter
into the anchorage, and at 0910 they completed entering. At 0945, without meeting resistance
from the enemy, the landing force successfully made the first landing.(56)
At 0949, while supporting the landing of the landing force, the Naka came under attack
from an enemy submarine (three torpedoes) at a close range of 1,000 meters. She successfully
evaded the attack and immediately counterattacked (with six antisubmarine depth charges).
Having spotted bubbles and the welling-up of a large amount of oil, and detecting no echoing
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Chapter IX     /     The Neutralization of the Indian Ocean 595
Anchorage (Landing point No. 1)
2d vessel in charge of shelling
Note: Anchorage for Landing point No. 2 
         shall appropriately be set in front of Waterfall.




















































1st vessel in charge of shelling
Smith Point

















Illustration No. 57 — The Outline of the Capture of Christmas Island
sound, she believed that she had sunk the enemy submarine for certain. In the meantime, at
1425, the Landing Force Unit commander reported the results of the clearing of the town as
follows:
We have completed the clearing of the town at 1230 as scheduled. It is very calm on the island;
all hostile foreigners have been confined. The rest, twenty-seven Indians, have all surrendered.
The enemy battery is usable. Although 20,000 tons of rock phosphate is kept in the warehouse,
it is impossible to [carry it out of the warehouse] and ship it due to trouble with the generators.
Although other things are still under investigation, it seems that there is quite some damage.
The threat of enemy submarines around the anchorage was not gone. While keeping a strict
guard against them, Guard Unit Commander Rear Admiral Nishimura accelerated as much
as possible the disembarkation of the transport ships. At 2030 on the same day, the Amat-
sukaze, who had been dispatched from the main unit of the Dutch East Indies Unit, arrived
[at the site] and immediately engaged in clearing the area of enemy submarines. At 0650 on
1 April, the Natori of the main unit spotted a torpedo wake in an area twenty nautical miles
north of the anchorage, fired warning shots, but with unknown results. At 1804 on that day,
when conducting a patrol by sailing a zigzag course on the waters to the north of the anchor-
age with the 1st Section of the 9th Destroyer Division as her direct escort, the Naka was hit
by a torpedo launched by an enemy submarine about 700 meters 70º on her starboard (from
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Occupying the Enemy Battery on Christmas Island
the center between her and the destroyer escorting her on starboard). Although she had
quickly changed course, it was too late; the torpedo hit her amidships on starboard beam in
one of her boiler rooms. Her position at that time was 6.3 nautical miles 28º off Smith Point.
After quickly projecting one antisubmarine depth charge, the Naka tried to come closer to
Christmas Island while stemming the flooding and making emergency repairs to the engine.
However, she temporarily became unable to operate or communicate. While immediately
striving to neutralize the enemy submarine, catch, and destroy her, the 1st Section of the 9th
Destroyer Division called the Amatsukaze and Patrol Boat No. 34 to the site to provide the
Naka with an all-around guard.(56)
While drifting and trying to control the damage, the Naka spotted a surfaced submarine
at 1920 about 6,000 meters on starboard quarter and immediately fired her guns to warn the
vessels nearby. Although the [enemy] submarine quickly submerged, all vessels tried hard
to detect her, and at 2030, Patrol Boat No. 36 detected her as close as five hundred meters
and dropped antisubmarine depth charges. Having spotted the welling-up of a large amount
of oil, the patrol boat believed that she had sunk the submarine for certain. In view of the
rampant presence of enemy submarines,* 4th Destroyer Squadron Commander Rear Admiral
Nishimura decided to leave these dangerous waters by being towed away, and at 2031 he
requested the Natori (the flagship of the 16th Cruiser Division) patrolling in a neighboring
area to tow her. At 2230, escorted by the 1st Section of the 9th Destroyer Division and the
Amatsukaze, the Natori started towing the Naka and headed for Bantam Bay. Earlier at 1945,
Invasion Unit Commander Rear Admiral Hara had notified the Landing Force Unit com-
mander that in view of the rampant presence of enemy submarines, the unloading should
be terminated and that the transport ships should leave [the anchorage] as soon as they were
ready. At 2230, without completely unloading part of the matériel, Patrol Boats No. 34 and
No. 36 left the anchorage for Bantam Bay, respectively escorting the Kimishima-maru and the
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The Cruiser Naka
* Actually, it was only one submarine, the USS Seawolf.
Kumagawa-maru. Forty-two tons of rock phosphate packed in bags had been loaded onto the
Kimishima-maru.(56)
On receiving the report that the Naka had been torpedoed, Dutch East Indies Unit Com-
mander Vice Admiral Takahashi ordered on 2 April the rescue ship Seiha-maru, who hap-
pened to be in Bantam Bay, to make ready to be dispatched, while giving an order to the 2d
Section of the 22d Destroyer Division to hurry to the site to escort the Naka. In the meantime,
since the Naka became able to sail on her own at slow speed [6 knots] or half speed [9 knots],
[the dispatch of] the Seiha-maru to accompany her was called off; the Naka managed to arrive
in Bantam Bay at 1245 on 3 April.(56) With her return, all units for the capture of Christmas Is-
land returned to Bantam Bay, except for the [ground] Guard Unit that was left on site, and
the capture operation was completed.
For reference: The operational state of the Naka after having been torpedoed
I. Condition of the engines when the torpedo hit
1. State of the engines: The engines were on standby so that speed could be increased to 21
knots in an instant, to 26 knots in ten minutes, and to full speed in one hour. 
2. Speed: 12 knots
3. Situation of the engines
(1) The four main [propeller] shafts were in operation
(2) The boilers in use
Boilers Nos. 7, 10, and 11: Type A Boilers
Boiler No. 6: Type B Boiler (a low combustion boiler with a fixed rate of evaporation) 
Boilers Nos. 5, 8, 9, and 12: Supplementary boilers
Boilers Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 (small boilers): All ready for a quick start (Boiler Rooms Nos.
1 and 2)
(3) Auxiliary equipment
Evaporators Nos. 1 and 2: (At that time, we were in the course of supplying boiler water
to the reserve water tanks in Boiler Rooms Nos. 2 and 4 as well as to the main water sup-
ply tanks.)
Generator No. 2
Refrigerators Nos. 1 and 2: (In the course of cooling the powder magazine[s] at the fore)
Icemaker[s]
(4) State of the piping
Steam pipes and exhaust pipes: [Set to] battle-ready mode
However, the intermediate valve between Auxiliary Steam [Pipes] Nos. 1 and 2 (in Boiler
Room No. 2) was open. The interconnection valves between the main steam [pipes which
ran] on both sides of the ship were slightly open.
(5) Electric Circuit: Power distribution on alert
II. Situation when the damage was sustained and outline of the course of the damage control
1. After a massive violent shock, the lights in the vessel went out (shut down by the automatic
circuit breaker), but the lights were turned on again in about two minutes. 
2. After the violent shock, the steam pressure in the main and auxiliary steam pipes rapidly
dropped respectively to 16.5 tons (the pressure in [normal] operation: 18 tons) and 13.5 [tons],
and the rotation speed [of the shafts] temporarily decreased to the rotation speed for half
speed [9 knots].
3. Instantly after the violent shock, the vacuum in the condensers of the front and rear turbines
rapidly dropped to about 60-cm [Hg]. Even though both vacuum pumps on [each of] the
front and the rear [turbine condensers] were started and the rotation of the circulating pumps
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was increased to almost the maximum, the vacuum in the condenser[s] on starboard did not
recover. Since the temperature of the condensate and the temperature of the seawater at the
outlet [of the condenser[s]] showed a tendency to rise all the time, we judged that [one of]
the condensers on starboard was out of order; we stopped the outer [propeller] shaft on star-
board ([operated by] the front turbine), while letting the other three shafts remain in opera-
tion. (A later examination revealed that the cause of the vacuum decrease was because heavy
oil, which had flowed out by large amounts due to the damage caused on the heavy oil tanks
on starboard side, was sucked in [together with the seawater].)  
4. When we checked the salinity of the condensate and the main water supply tanks in the en-
gine room[s]about seven minutes after the hit, the increase in salinity was so acute that we
cut out the main water supply tanks in the front engine rooms, stopped the [remaining] front
turbine, and operated only the two [inner] propeller shafts on the rear turbines.
5. At that time, the main valves of the feedwater pipes in Boiler Rooms Nos. 1 and 2 were open.
Although we immediately closed the main valve of the feedwater pipe in Boiler Room No.
2 when we were hit, we were late in closing the valve in Boiler Room No. 1. Moreover, we
were supplying distilled water to the main water supply tanks as well as the reserve water
tanks in Boiler Rooms Nos. 2 and 4, and due to the water pressure of [the reserve water tank
in] Boiler Room No. 2, which had become full, only the reserve water tank in Boiler Room
No. 4 [was left to store the distilled water.] However, due to [the design of] the piping, it
was impossible to directly supply water from the reserve water tank in Boiler Room No. 4
to the main water supply tank[s] in the rear engine rooms. [Therefore], we decided to directly
conduct the collected distilled water to the main water supply tank[s] in the rear engine
rooms. However, by that time, the quantity of the water to be collected had markedly de-
creased because the evaporators had already drawn in a large amount of heavy oil, which
was flowing past the bottom of the ship.
6. Since [the Naka] needed to escape from the waters as soon as possible partly because of the
risk that enemy submarines might come [back] for a raid again, we tried hard to keep on
operating [the engines] as much as possible, leaving the steam gushing out of Boiler Room
No. 1 (due to leaking valves, it was impossible to control the damage unless the main engines
were stopped and the boilers were turned off). However, because of the large consumption
of boiler water and the marked decrease in the amount of the distilled water collected, the
quantity of the water in the main water supply tank[s] in the rear engine rooms decreased
minute by minute. At that rate, even if the damage had been [successfully] controlled, the
reserve quantity of boiler water necessary to make steam was expected to become insuffi-
cient. So, we stopped the engines, turned off all the boilers generating steam ([at] 1845), and
started to seal off the damaged auxiliary steam pipes at 1900.
7. At that time, since the flooding of Boiler Room No. 2 was so rapid and also because of the
steam gushing out [of the pipes], it was impossible to close the intermediate valve in Boiler
Room No. 2 between Auxiliary Steam [Pipes] Nos.1 and 2, which ran on both sides of the
ship. Therefore, we decided to install blind patches between the [piping] joints in Boiler
Room No. 3 to seal off both auxiliary steam pipes on both sides of the ship.
8. We made makeshift blind patches and tried to install them [between the joints] but the bolts
and nuts on the flanges of the auxiliary steam pipes were stuck because of the heat. More-
over, because [the joints] were situated in difficult places to work on, it took a considerably
long time [to install them]. We completed [that part of] the damage control work around
2220.
9. At 2220, as soon as we finished the work to seal off the auxiliary steam [pipes], we conducted
a test operation (at 50 [rpm]) with four boilers in Boiler Room No. 4, two rear turbines and
both inner propeller shafts. At 2230, [the Naka] began to be towed by the Natori. After that,
while being towed, we kept operating [the rear turbines] so that [the Naka] would still sail
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by herself at a slow speed [of 6 knots] on her own engines. However, the salinity of the boiler
water was so high (unmeasurably so) that it caused boiler priming, which [needed to be
blown down and] caused a considerable amount of drain every several minutes. On top of
that, since we were not able to get the evaporators working properly (though we had tried
to get rid of the heavy oil sucked into the evaporators, it was not easily removed), it became
difficult to collect [sufficient] water. Since the quantity of water to be collected [dropped to]
one ton per hour, [the water in] the main water supply tanks in the rear engine rooms de-
creased minute by minute, and at 0355 we could not afford to keep [the turbines] in operation
any longer.
10. After that, we decided to [also] install blind patches in the auxiliary [steam] exhaust pipes
of Boiler Room No. 1 passing through Boiler Room No. 3 so as to seal them off, and in order
to implement it, we turned off Boilers Nos. 10 and 12 at 0408. Earlier, when we tried to start
the draft fan in Boiler Room No. 3 to turn on Boilers Nos. 5 and 7, it was impossible to start
it up due to the huge [amount of] drain, due to which, for a while Boilers Nos. 9 and 11 be-
came the only operating boilers.
11. At 0440 the towing cable was cut and the work to seal off the auxiliary [steam] exhaust [pipes
of Boiler Room No. 1] was also finished. At 0530, the steam evaporation by all boilers in
Boiler Room No. 4 [was started]; the draft fan of Boiler Room No. 3 was successfully started
up as well; at 0645 Boilers Nos. 5, 7, and 8 were turned on, and by operating them all together
[the Naka finally] started sailing on her own at about half speed on both inner propeller
shafts (with an oil pressure of 6 tons in the burners of each boiler). 
12. Although a considerably large quantity of drain came out even after starting the above op-
eration, the salinity gradually decreased by rigorously blowing down [the boilers], while
the amount of collected water by the evaporators increased. From around 2000 on the 2d
onwards, the water level in the boilers became more or less stable, which enabled us to in-
crease the rotation of the shafts so that [the Naka] would be able to sail at a speed of about
eleven knots. At 1330 on the 3d, we were finally able to reach the Bantam anchorage.
At 0930 on 3 April, the Christmas Island invasion unit was disbanded when the Natori, who
had gone ahead, entered into the Bantam anchorage; the units, [which had participated in
the operation,] were thereafter [assigned] the following tasks and operations:
1. The 16th Cruiser Division (minus the Nagara and the Kinu) and the 22d Destroyer Division shall
form an escort unit and, staying in the Java area, take charge of guarding the sea as well as the
protecting of the [sea] lines of communication in the area along with the 21st Special Base Force.
2. Patrol Boats Nos. 34 and 36 shall be incorporated in the attached unit, and after respectively es-
corting the Kimishima-maru to Surabaya and the Akebono-maru to Makassar, [both shall] stay on
standby in Makassar.
3. The Kimishima-maru and the Kumagawa-maru shall act as specified by the commanders of the
21st Special Base Force and the 22d Special Base Force respectively, after which both shall return
to mainland [Japan] as soon as possible.
4. The Christmas Island landing unit shall be incorporated into the Java Guard Unit, and assigned
to guard the island and secure the resources. 
On the morning of 3 April, the Christmas Island Guard Unit completed its preparations for
antiaircraft engagements by completing [the set-up of] antiaircraft batteries. (The island was
unsuitable for setting up an air base.) Meanwhile on the 6th, the Naka left Bantam Bay for
Singapore, where she went into dock on 3 May, came out of dock on 2 June, and left Singapore
on the 3d to return to Yokosuka on the 12th by way of Magong.(56)
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7. The Carrier Operations in the Indian Ocean
Return of the 5th Carrier Division Delayed
As previously told [p. 212], the main force of the Carrier Task Force (minus the 5th Carrier
Division, the Arare and the Kagerō) was transferred to the Southern Task Force on 8 February
to implement the 1st and 2d carrier operations (respectively to Port Darwin and to the south
of Java). Meanwhile, to be prepared against a [possible] attack by an enemy striking force on
the Tokyo area, the 5th Carrier Division was kept on standby in Mikawa Bay as the Combined
Fleet’s Air Unit, while at the same time engaging in drills.(100)
On 3 March, following the decision (of 14 February, as previously told [p. 569]) to conduct
a carrier operation in the Indian Ocean, Combined Fleet Commander in Chief Admiral Ya-
mamoto decided to return the 5th Carrier Division to the Carrier Task Force as of the 5th,
and in order to be prepared against [possible] enemy air raids on Tokyo, he issued an order
to transfer the 21st Air Flotilla (minus the Tōkō and the 1st Air Groups) to the Northern Task
Force [instead].(100)
However, at 0425 on 4 March, about forty enemy carrier aircraft raided Minami-Torishima
[Marcus Island], which caused the Combined Fleet commander in chief to temporarily post-
pone the 5th Carrier Division’s return to the Carrier Task Force. On 5 March, he temporarily
put the division into the Guard Unit and ordered it to attack the enemy striking force. How-
ever, since there was no information on the enemy movements after that, the 5th Carrier Di-
vision’s temporary transfer to the Guard Unit and its attack on the enemy striking force was
called off; it was decided that the division should stay on standby while remaining at its pres-
ent station.(100)
The 5th Carrier Division was relieved from standby duty on 7 March; on 8 March, the di-
vision left mainland Japan for Staring Bay to return to the Carrier Task Force. However,
[again] at 1830 on 10 March, information came in that radio waves, which presumably be-
longed to an enemy striking force, had been detected in an area six hundred nautical miles
350º [N] of Ōtorishima (Wake Island), and the Combined Fleet commander in chief judged
that the enemy striking force was likely to conduct an air raid on Tokyo. Based on this judg-
ment, Operation Tactics 3 against the U.S. Fleet [p. 49] were put in motion on 11 March, which
meant that the 5th Carrier Division was again incorporated into the Guard Unit and assigned
to attack the enemy striking force.(100)
The 5th Carrier Division on a southward course toward Staring Bay quickly reversed
course and headed for an attack on this enemy. On the evening of the 11th, the division com-
mander R. Adm. Hara Chūichi reported his scheduled course of action as follows: “[the di-
vision] will advance to an area 120 nautical miles 190º [S] of Minami-Iwo-Jima [South Iwo
Jima] at 0600 on the 13th and 300 nautical miles 50º [NE] of Hahajima at 1200 on the 14th.”(100)
However, as no enemy movements were reported after that, the likelihood grew that the ra-
diolocation [of the enemy] had been faulty. On 12 March, the chief of staff of the Combined
Fleet notified the chief of staff of the First Air Fleet that the 5th Carrier Division should be
returned to the Carrier Task Force after completing the operation against the [supposed]
enemy striking force and that the Kaga was scheduled to be returned to mainland Japan for
repairs as soon as she was ready. In reply, the chief of staff of the First Air Fleet sent a telegram
to the chief of staff of the Combined Fleet on 13 March, saying that the Carrier Task Force
was scheduled to leave Staring Bay around 21 March to attack Ceylon around 1 April and
Chapter IX     /     The Neutralization of the Indian Ocean 601
that since it was difficult to anticipate when the 5th Carrier Division
could join the force, the Kaga should participate in the Ceylon operation,
although her present condition gave concerns about her readiness for
action, and if one aircraft carrier needed to be kept on standby in main-
land Japan, he wanted it to be one of the carriers of the 5th Carrier Divi-
sion.(100)
Since no enemy movements were reported thereafter, Combined Fleet
Commander in Chief Admiral Yamamoto issued an order on 15 March
that the 5th Carrier Division should return to the Carrier Task Force. At
1400 on that day, 5th Carrier Division Commander Rear Admiral Hara
reported to the chief of staff of the First Air Fleet that the division would
leave its area of operations on the 15th, arrive in Yokosuka on the 16th
for replenishment, leave there on the 17th and arrive in Staring Bay on the 24th.(100)
On 16 March, the chief of staff of the Combined Fleet informally suggested to the chiefs
of staff of the First Air Fleet and the Second Fleet that in connection with the delay in the op-
erations of the 5th Carrier Division, one element of the Carrier Task Force should now, if pos-
sible, attack and destroy the enemy naval vessels in Port Darwin. In reply, at 2300 on 17
March, the chief of staff of the Second Fleet opposed the suggestion for an attack on Port
Darwin on the following grounds: for an attack on Port Darwin one would need to arrange
for oil supply ships; since the bulk of the aircraft units of the Carrier Task Force were [cur-
rently] dispatched to Kendari for planned maintenance and were [also] earnestly conducting
drills according to the [new] directions for attack units that met the revised engagement tac-
tics based on the [latest] lessons of war, it would be difficult to make a sortie before 21 March;
if the force were to conduct an attack on Port Darwin, the sortie of the Carrier Task Force
from Staring Bay for the 3d carrier operation should be [delayed until] the 28th or later and
the attack on Ceylon until 7 April or later; in view of the current condition of the enemy
strength, an attack by the 2d Air Raid Unit [on Port Darwin] would be sufficient.(141)
Meanwhile at 1840 on the 17th, Southern Task Force Commander Vice Admiral Kondō
had issued the following orders by means of the Southern Task Force Telegraphic Order No.
145:(141)
1. The 3d carrier operation of the Southern Task Force shall be called Operation C, the scheduled
date of attack shall be called Day C, and Day C shall be scheduled for 5 April.
2. The above name shall be abandoned simultaneously with the completion of the attack.
Combined Fleet Commander in Chief Admiral Yamamoto approved the order, and the attack
on Ceylon was set to be carried out on 5 April. According to The Second World War by W.
Churchill, the allies had information (by breaking codes?) that the [Japanese] attack on Ceylon
would be conducted around 1 April. However, they had no chance to know that the attack
had been postponed until the 5th, and the British Fleet acted on the premise that the Japanese
Fleet would attack Ceylon on 1 April.(178)
Meanwhile the Kaga was removed from the Carrier Task Force as of 13 March, transferred
to the Guard Unit, and left Staring Bay on 15 March for Sasebo.(141)




The Enemy Movements in the Indian Ocean
I. The outline of the principal telegrams concerning the enemy movements(141)
IGHQ Navy Staff Classified Telegram No. 974
1. Air Strength
(1) Current numbers (10 March)
The Indian area (including Ceylon): 230 [aircraft]
Burma: 80 [aircraft] (of which 30-40% fighter planes)
(2) Reinforcements (expected to be completed in the beginning of April)
Reinforcements dispatched from North Africa and Middle and Near East: 150 [aircraft]
Reinforcements dispatched from mainland Britain: 100 [aircraft]
Reinforcement in preparation for departure from mainland Britain: 80 [aircraft]
2. Movements of naval vessels (as of early March)
(1) The naval vessels stationed in the Indian Ocean are operating with Colombo, Bombay,
Mombasa (South Africa), Durban (South Africa), etc., as their bases; the main vessels are:
Battleships: HMS Revenge (Britain), HMS Royal Sovereign (Britain), HMS Ramillies (Britain)
Aircraft carriers: HMS Hermes (Britain), HMS Indomitable (Britain)
Heavy cruisers: HMS Cornwall (Britain), HMS London (Britain), HMS Susan [Sussex?]
(Britain), HMAS Canberra (Australia)
(2) Major forces expected to be dispatched as reinforcements in the near future
Two battleships
Two aircraft carriers
Intelligence indicates that HMS King George V (British battleship) and HMS Warspite
(British battleship) have been brought to the Indian Ocean and the Australian waters
from late February onwards.
II. Prior reconnaissance results of the island of Ceylon(191)
1. When the reports of the covert reconnaissance by the Submarine Unit and the Air Unit of
the Southern Task Force were put together, it turned out that the patrols near the mouth of
the ports of Colombo and Trincomalee were very strict, which made it difficult for sub-
marines to approach these places. Moreover, it seems that [the enemy] conducts patrols
within a radius of two hundred nautical miles [from Ceylon] with destroyers and gunboats
and within a radius of five hundred nautical miles from Ceylon with aircraft.
2. The land-based air units have not yet spotted large enemy vessels in [the port of] Trincomalee
or the Bay of Bengal during their reconnaissance.
III. The state of the defense of Colombo
1. Defense
Four 24-cm guns, four or five 14-cm guns; an antisubmarine net has been put up at the mouth
of the port and a night-time dummy city has been set up in the northern part [of the town].
[The town] holds a garrison of about 3,000 troops.
2. Major military facilities
The airfield, barracks, batteries, rice storehouses, oil tanks, radio station, arsenals and pow-
der magazines.
IV. The enemy’s anticipation of the Japanese operations
1. Britain’s anticipation of our Indian invasion operation
(1) A surprise attack on Ceylon by the [Japanese] Navy is anticipated.
(2) Invasions of Colombo, Calcutta, Madras and Bombay may be started within six or seven
weeks (before the monsoon season).
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2. Foreign telegrams (on 3 April) reported that Ceylon was exposed to the danger of an attack
by Japanese forces, but there are no indications that [the enemy] has gotten wind of our
plans. 
For reference:
According to the “The Greater East Asia War’s Lessons of War ([section] Air Operations: The
Operations on Ceylon),” the domestic and foreign state of affairs relevant to the Ceylon opera-
tion was on page 36 viewed as follows:
India is a treasure house for Britain both in terms of matériel and human [resources], and its at-
titude affects the fate of Britain.
The Indian people, who have started to harbor doubts about the armed strength of Britain
because of our quick and bold southern operation, are showing signs of unrest about [Britain’s]
perennial oppression and exploitation. Britain has immediately dispatched [Sir Richard Stafford]
Cripps, who is leaving no stone unturned to placate people; at the moment, he is negotiating
with the Indian National Congress.
It is thought that a carrier operation against Ceylon at this juncture will, combined with the
operation in the Bay of Bengal, affect the Anglo-Indian relations in a subtle way and have quite
some impact, indeed.
On the other hand, it is expected that our attack on the Indian area will absorb the military
strength of the allied forces, and ought to facilitate the operations of the Axis countries on other
fronts very much; furthermore, it will facilitate the communication [between the Axis countries]
via India when Germany and Italy’s operations in the Near East or in North Africa make
progress.
The Plan of Operations
The Southern Task Force
On 14 March, Southern Task Force Commander in Chief Vice Admiral Kondō announced the
outline of the third carrier operation by means of Telegraphic Order No. 139, the contents of
which were as follows:(141)
The Southern Task Force shall conduct the third carrier operation in the following way: it shall
destroy the enemy power in the Ceylon area in a surprise attack, while striving to ensure a per-
fect escort at sea for [the forces of] the Burma operation.
1. The Carrier Task Force shall at an appropriate moment leave Staring Bay, and advance to Ceylon
by way of the waters to the south of Java and to the southwest of Sumatra. In the beginning of
April, it shall carry out surprise attacks on enemy vessels ([enemy] air power, naval bases, fa-
cilities and so forth) in the area and return to the South China Sea by way of the Malacca Strait.
2. Submarine Unit C shall be assigned to watch and patrol of the waters to the west of Ceylon (a
line connecting the Laccadive and Maldive Islands as well as the Chagos Archipelago) and the
Bombay area with its main force, while with one element conducting a covert reconnaissance
(two days prior to [the day of the] air raids as a standard) and weather reconnaissance (on the
day of the air raids) of Colombo, Trincomalee and other places.
3. While continuing its current tasks, the Air Unit shall act in concert with the actions of the Carrier
Task Force; it shall conduct reconnaissance over the Cocos and Christmas Islands as well as
search missions and neutralization attacks over the waters to the southwest of Sumatra and in
the Bay of Bengal.
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4. While continuing its current tasks, depending the movements of the enemy, the Malaya Unit
shall at an appropriate time start operating in the Bay of Bengal more or less to the north of the
line connecting Madras (inclusive) and Babi Island [p. 570, note] at both ends, and act in concert
with the Carrier Task Force. However, it shall not advance to the waters to the west of 85ºE lon-
gitude until the first air raid by the Carrier Task Force.
5. All units other than the above shall continue their current tasks.
6. The main unit ([consisting of] the Atago and the 4th Destroyer Division (minus the 2d Section)
shall operate appropriately in the Malacca Strait and [near] the Andaman Islands.
The Carrier Task Force of the Southern Task Force
On 19 March, Carrier Task Force Commander V. Adm. Nagumo Chūichi announced the plan
of the carrier operations in the Indian Ocean by means of Carrier Task Force Operation Order
Classified No. 31, the contents of which were as follows:(192)
1. Enemy movements
When various sources of information are combined, it seems that a British fleet consisting of
three battleships, two aircraft carriers, four Class-A cruisers and about eleven Class-B cruisers
as its core is operating in the Indian Ocean, and an air power of a total of about five hundred
aircraft is deployed in the India area (including Ceylon). It is judged likely that a considerable
part of the above [forces] is deployed in the Ceylon area and one part is operating in the Bay of
Bengal. Although it seems that an element of the British, Australian, Dutch, and U.S. forces re-
mains in the Australia area, the details are unknown.
2. The movements of our forces
As shown in Southern Task Force Telegraphic Order No. 139 in the separate sheet (Note by the
author: as already told)
3. In accordance with Southern Task Force Telegraphic Order No. 139, the Carrier Task Force shall
advance to the waters to the south of India, and try to catch and destroy the enemy fleet as well
as his air power 
4. The disposition of forces (as shown in the following table)
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1st Air Fleet (minus the Kaga and
destroyer division(s))
To destroy enemy fleets and
air power
Support Unit 3d Battleship DivCdr
3d Battleship Div and 8th Cruiser
Div
To cover the Air Raid Unit
To attack enemy fleets
Guard Unit 1st DestroyerSqdn Cdr
1st Destroyer Sqdn, 17th and 18th
Destroyer Divs, Akigumo and 4th
Destoyer Div 2d Section
To guard [the units]











2d Supply Unit Under directcommand
Nichirō-maru, Kyōei-maru No. 2 and
Hōkō-maru
5. The outline of the operations of the units
(1) The Air Raid Unit, the Support Unit, the Guard Unit and the Shinkoku-maru [B] shall leave
Staring Bay at 0800 on 26 March and operate as designated in Separate Illustration No. 1
(omitted by the author). At 1000 on 31 March, after having been joined by the Ken’yō-maru
and the Nippon-maru at Point A (9º0’S, 106º0’E), they shall complete the replenishment while
sailing up to Point B (1º0’N, 90º0’E). Thereafter, depending on the whereabouts of the enemy
fleet, they shall advance to either Points C (8º0’N, 84º0’E), D (6º20’N, 82º40’E) or E (4º40’N,
81º40’E), to resolutely carry out the attack on Ceylon. If no information about the enemy
movements is obtained [by the time they reach] Point B, they shall postpone the air raid for
one day and have the 8th Cruiser Division advance to conduct a covert reconnaissance of
Trincomalee and Colombo with the reconnaissance seaplanes of the division from outside a
radius of four hundred nautical miles from enemy territory.
Depending on the movements of the enemy, further air raids shall be repeatedly con-
ducted on the next day. When the attack on the Ceylon area is completed, they shall head
for Point F (10º0’N, 95º0’E), while searching for the enemy in the vicinity of the Bay of Bengal.
The time to reach Point F shall be set at 1800 on Day C + 3.
(2) After completing the replenishment around Point B, the 1st Supply Unit (minus the Tōei-
maru and the Kokuyō-maru) shall sail to the area near Point F, and stay [there] on standby. 
The Tōei-maru [A] shall join at Point F while the Kokuyō-maru shall sail to Singapore by
Day C + 6. 
(3) The 2d Supply Unit
The Nichirō-maru shall stay on standby at Palau. The Kyōei-maru No. 2 and the Hōkō-maru
shall stay on standby at Kure and Yokosuka after servicing the ship [including] the engines.
6. The Air Raid Plans 
(1) When the major part of the enemy fleet is in Trincomalee
{1} The formation of the air units for air combat
The first formation (with nine aircraft per carrier for the unit that is to take control of the
air)
{2} The [priority of] targets
1st Group: Enemy aircraft carriers, battleships and cruisers in that order.
2d Group: Enemy aircraft carriers, cruisers, battleships and small vessels in that order.
However, the 14th Attack Unit shall [attack] enemy hangar[s] on the airfield.
3d Group: Enemy aircraft in the air as well as on the ground; however, the 6th Air Control
Unit shall directly cover the 1st Group.
If the number of enemy target vessels is markedly less than expected, the groups shall
appropriately direct their attacks to transport ships or military facilities on the ground.
{3} The armament
1st Armament: Carrier-based attack planes: No. 80 Mark 5 bombs ([with] Fuse C)
Carrier-based bombers: Type99 No. 25 regular bombs ([with] Fuse C)
2d Armament: Carrier-based attack planes: No.80 regular bombs ([with] Fuse C)
Carrier-based bombers: Type99 No. 25 regular bombs ([with] Fuse C)
3d Armament: Carrier-based attack planes: No. 80 land bombs ([with] Fuse C)
Carrier-based bombers: No. 25 land bombs ([with] Fuse B)
In any case, the airfield attack unit shall carry No. 25 land bombs ([with] Fuse A). The
orders for the types of armament shall be given the day before the air raid.
For the period up to the day before the air raid and after it, carrier-based attack planes
and bombers shall be prepared respectively with torpedoes and No. 25 land bombs
([with] Fuse A).
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Note by the author:
1) Fuse A, B and C indicate the delay before detonation. 
Fuse A: 0.03 sec.; B: 0.01 sec.; C: 0.02 sec.
2) No. 80: 800kg bombs; No. 25: 250kg bombs
{4} Takeoff times
The first units, [i.e.] the carrier-based attack plane and fighter plane units, are scheduled
to take off at 0900, and the second unit, [i.e.] the carrier-based bomber unit, shall take off
thirty minutes after the takeoff of the first units.
Note by the author: the local time is four hours behind Japan time.
{5} The time of assembly and the assembly point after the attacks
The time of assembly: Forty-five minutes after the start of the attack.
The assembly point: Ten nautical miles 90º of Foul Point, at an altitude of 2,000 meters
[Radio] communications: the 1st Attack Unit
(2) When the bulk of the enemy fleet is in Colombo
The same as under (1) other than the following:
The assembly point after the attack: Ten nautical miles 270º of Galbokka Point
(3) When the enemy fleet is berthed both in Trincomalee and Colombo
{1} The formation of the air units for air combat
The Trincomalee attack unit: The second formation ([with] nine aircraft each of the 1st,
the 3d and the 4th Air Control Units)
The Colombo attack unit: The third formation ([with] twelve aircraft each of the 5th and
the 6th Air Control Units)
{2} The [priority of] targets and the armament
The same as under (1) and (2) other than the following:
Both in the second and the third formations, one element of the carrier-based bombers
shall attack enemy airfields there; no direct cover units shall be dispatched from the air
control units.
{3} Takeoff times
The second formation: 0900
The third formation: 0945
{4} The assembly shall be made in the same ways as under (1) and (2), other than the fol-
lowing:
[Radio] communications
The Trincomalee unit: 1st Attack Unit
The Colombo unit: 6th Attack Unit
7. The guard against aircraft as well as submarines of the enemy (note by the author: as shown in
the following table)
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(Note by the author) 
f sr: Reconnaissance seaplane
f sr/2: Two-seater reconnaissance seaplane
f sr/3: Three-seater reconnaissance seaplane
f o: Carrier-based attack plane
f b: Carrier based bomber
f c: Carrier-based fighter plane
(Remarks)
1. One duty vessel from among the Akagi, the Sōryū, the Hiryū, the Zuikaku and the Shōkaku, in
that order, shall be made the vessel in charge for the day, and the vessels will take turns re-
gardless of whether an aircraft guard is employed or not. 
2. The vacant spaces [in the line] caused by carriers’ change of location due to the takeoff and
recovery of their aircraft shall be left as they are.
3. In order to covertly conduct the operations, radio transmissions shall be refrained from.
8. The standby [positions] for guarding against unexpected encounters with the enemy (note by
the author: as shown in the following table)
Remarks
1. The starting time will be ordered later.
2. Solo attacks [without support] are allowed to be carried out only when the commander or the
captain of the vessel specifically recognizes their necessity.
3. Takeoff of three aircraft for each carrier (except for the one on guard duty for the day) may be
ordered when air control units become necessary. 
4. Attacks by the carrier-based attack planes [shall be conducted] as specified in Carrier Task Force
Signal Order No. 51.
5. If an urgent takeoff of aircraft units should be ordered, the units shall report [back] the time
they are able to take off; they shall [also] report it to the vessel carrying the senior commander
on board. (End) 
















and probing 3d Standby
Upon spotting enemy carrier-based
aircraft, [the aircraft shall] follow





















Type99 No. 25 regular
bombs ([with] Fuse C) 3d Standby
1. The carriers shall notify each other
of who will be the commander of
operations for the following day.
2. [Units shall] conduct attacks
under the unified command of the
senior commanders in the above,
unless otherwise specially or-
dered.
The Air Unit of the Southern Task Force (See Illustrations Nos. 58, 59, 60 and 61)
By means of Operation Order No. 50, Air Unit Commander Vice Admiral Tsukahara had is-
sued his plan of operations in the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal, which were to be con-
ducted mainly by the 3d Air Raid Unit during the Andaman Islands, Burma and Ceylon
operations. However, its main text is no longer extant and the details are unclear. Neverthe-
less, according to Separate Illustration No. 1 of the order, the search mission was planned as
follows(192) (See Illustrations Nos. 58 and 59). In view of the fact that the search areas [shown in
the separate illustration] were relevant to Operations D and U, the order seems to have been
issued around 17 March. Then on 21 March, the Air Unit commander issued the following
plan of operations for his unit when acting in concert with Operation C of the Carrier Task
Force.(141) (Southern Task Force Air Unit Classified Telegram No. 918.)
Telegraphic Operation Order No. 77
1. The Southern Task Force shall implement Operation C in accordance with Southern Task Force
Telegraphic Order No. 139.
2. The Dutch East Indies Unit shall capture Christmas Island on 31 March in accordance with
Dutch East Indies Unit Classified Telegram No. 203.
























Planned route of Carrier Task Force






























Illustration No. 58 — The Plan for the Search Missions of the Air Unit of the Southern Task Force 
in Operation C (Part 1)
3. The schedule of operations of the Carrier Task Force is as shown in First Air Fleet Classified
Telegram No. 118.
4. While continuing current tasks, all air raid units shall support the above operations in the fol-
lowing way:
(a) The 2d Air Raid Unit
(1) Shall conduct search missions on the routes ahead of the Carrier Task Force within a ra-
dius of six hundred nautical miles from Kupang before its departure.
(2) One element of the main body of the Tōkō Air Group shall be dispatched to Batavia (the
number of the aircraft [to be dispatched] shall be decided by the 2d Air Raid Unit com-
mander), so as to conduct search missions in the Christmas Island area on 29 and 30
March and in the Cocos Islands area on 31 March and 1 April.
(b) The 3d Air Raid Unit
(1) On 1 and 2 April, the search area of Sector A shall be [shifted] to an area within six hun-
dred nautical miles between 170º and 280º from Sabang. From 3 April onwards, the
search missions in the heretofore areas shall be resumed.
(2) Depending on the enemy movements until Day C – 1, the land-based attack plane unit
of the Genzan Air Group shall, by a special order, attack enemy naval vessels near Cal-
cutta from base[s] in Rangoon.
(c) The Tōkō Air Group Detachment 
(1) On 1 and 4 April, one element of [the detachment] shall extend [the search distance of]
Sector C up to seven hundred nautical miles and, with one element, reconnoiter Trinco-
malee and, if possible, Palk Bay and Strait.
(2) On 2 April, [the detachment] shall conduct a search mission in Sector D, with an [ex-
tended] distance of seven hundred nautical miles. ([However,] it shall not approach the
area within twenty nautical miles from the shore). 
(3) On 3 April, [the detachment] shall conduct a search mission in Sector E. However, it shall
not advance within twenty nautical miles from the shore.
The Malaya Unit
On having been officially informed that Day C should be set on 5 April by Southern Task
Force Telegraphic Order No. 145 on 17 March, Malaya Unit Commander Vice Admiral Ozawa
started to work on a detailed plan for his unit’s striking operation in the northern part of the
Bay of Bengal, which should be conducted in concert with Operation C. We may assume the
outline to have been as follows.(118) (Malaya Unit Operation Order Classified No. 20.)
1. Mission
While continuing its current tasks, the Malaya Unit shall act in concert with the Carrier Task
Force’s surprise attack in the Ceylon area (scheduled for 5 April), in accordance with Southern
Task Force Telegraphic Order No. 139, timely operate in the Bay of Bengal by and large to the
north of a line connecting Madras and the western point of Babi Island [p. 570, note], disrupt
enemy sea lines of communication in the Madras and Calcutta areas as well as search for enemy
naval vessels, and catch and destroy them.
2. The disposition of forces (as shown in the following table)
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3. The outline of the operation 
(1) The Chōkai, the 7th Cruiser Division, the 4th Carrier Division (minus the 2d Section and the
Shiokaze), the Yura and the 11th Destroyer Division shall leave Mergui on Day C – 3 under
the direct command of the Malaya Unit commander and advance into the Bay of Bengal,
passing to the north of the Andaman Islands (the 1st route). On the morning of Day C – 2,
the 11th Destroyer Division shall separate from the main unit to sail to Port Blair, where it
shall come under the command of the 3d Destroyer Squadron commander. The 20th De-
stroyer Division shall appropriately withdraw from its patrol area near the Andaman Islands
from Day C – 2 onwards, and join the main unit on the waters to the west of the islands on
the early morning of Day C – 1. The main unit shall reach Point C (16º0’N, 86º40’E) at 2100
on Day C – 1, from where the 1st Section of the 7th Cruiser Division and one destroyer of
the 20th Destroyer Division shall form the North Unit, and under the command of the 7th
Cruiser Division commander advance to the area of Point D (19º20’N, 87º30’E) around 0900
on Day C, to take charge of disrupting the enemy sea lines of communication as well as
catching and destroying enemy naval vessels mainly in the area to the south of Calcutta up
to Point E (18º20’N, 85º50’E). Meanwhile, the 2d Section and another destroyer of the 20th
Destroyer Division shall form the South Unit, and under the command of the captain of the
Mikuma, reach Point F (15º30’N, 83º20’N) around 0900 on Day C, to take charge of disrupting
the enemy sea lines of communication as well as catching and destroying enemy naval ves-
sels in the area to the north of Madras. The remaining main unit shall become the Center
Unit, and under the direct command of the Malaya Unit commander, sail westward almost
in the middle between the sailing routes of the North and the South Units, reach the waters
southeast of Visakhapatnam, after which it shall appropriately operate on the waters be-
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(minus 2d Section and
Shiokaze)
2 destroyers of 20th
Destroyer Div
1. To support the entire operation
2. To disrupt [enemy] sea lines of communi-
cation and attack enemy naval vessels
around the midpoint between Madras
and Calcutta
North Unit 7th Cruiser Divcdr
7th Cruiser Div 1st
Section (Kumano and
Suzuya) 
1 destroyer of 20th
Destroyer Div
To disrupt enemy sea lines of communica-
tion and attack enemy naval vessels on the
waters off Calcutta and southwards
South Unit Capt of Mikuma
7th Cruiser Div 2d
Section (Mikuma and
Mogami)
1 destroyer of 20th
Destroyer Div
To disrupt enemy sea lines of communica-
tion and attack enemy naval vessels on the
waters to the north of Madras
Supply Unit Cdr of De-stroyer Ayanami
Ayanami, Shiokaze and
Nichiei-maru
To provide guard for supply ships and con-
duct replenishment
Guard Unit 3d DestroyerSqdn Cdr
3d Destroyer Sqdn
(minus 6 destroyers) To be on standby near the Andaman Islands
tween [there] and near Point E to disrupt the enemy sea lines of communication and attack
enemy naval vessels.
At 1000 on Day C + 1, the Center, North and South Units shall assemble near Point G
(16º30’N, 85º40’E), and return to Penang and Singapore, passing to the south of the Andaman
Islands.
(2) The Guard Unit shall stay on standby near the Andaman Islands. On day C + 2 or later when
the 11th Destroyer Division joins the unit, it shall appropriately leave the area and advance
to the waters to the west of the Andaman Islands on Day C, to take charge of guarding the
rear of the main unit. The operations thereafter shall be ordered by special orders.
(3) The Supply Unit shall stay on standby on the waters near Port Blair.
(4) In case the attack of the Carrier Task Force of the Southern Task Force should be postponed
to Day C + 1, the Striking Force of the Malaya Unit shall appropriately operate on the waters
to the west of the Andaman Islands, and postpone the operations specified in the previous
items by one day.
Then, on the 21st, the 20th Destroyer Division commander assigned the following destroyers to
be incorporated into the Center, North and South units:
The Center Unit: Yūgiri and Asagiri
The North Unit: Shirakumo
The South Unit: Amagiri





















































































Illustration No. 59 — The Plan for the Search Missions of the Air Unit of the Southern Task Force 
in Operation C (Part 2)
The Submarine Unit
On 20 March, in accordance with the Southern Task Force Telegraphic Order No. 139, Sub-
marine Unit C Commander R. Adm. Ichioka Hisashi (commander of the 2d Submarine
Squadron) issued orders for Submarine Unit C. Although their contents are unclear, we may
assume the deployment of the submarines to have been as follows:(193)
1. Submarine I–7 shall conduct air reconnaissance [with her aircraft] over Colombo and Trinco-
malee two days prior to the air raids.
2. Submarines I–3 and I–2 shall respectively reconnoiter Colombo and Trincomalee and report on
the weather there. (The above concerns the 7th Submarine Division.) 
3. The 8th Submarine Division (Submarines I–4 and I–6) shall reconnoiter and watch the line [con-
necting] the Laccadive and the Maldive Islands and the Chagos Archipelago as well as the area
off Bombay, and after the success of the air raids, it shall shift to operations to disrupt the enemy
sea lines of communication.
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Illustration No. 60 — The Deployment of the Forces of the Air Unit of the Southern Task Force and the Shift
of the Bases of the Second Air Raid Unit ([as of] 26 March)
The Launch of the Operation
The Movements of the Air Unit of the Southern Task Force
On 26 March, when Operation C was launched with the Carrier Task Force’s departure from
Staring Bay, the Air Unit was positioned as follows:
1. Air Unit Commander Vice Admiral Tsukahara was in Bangkok from 17 March onwards, giving
directions to the Air Unit concerning the air operations connected to Operations D and U.
2. Rear Admiral Matsunaga, commander of the 3d Air Raid Unit was [also] in Bangkok from 13
March, directing the air operations of the Genzan and Mihoro Air Groups as well as the Type–
0 fighter plane unit attached [to the 22d Air Flotilla headquarters] in relation to Operations D
and U.
(1) The Genzan Air Group, which had been stationed in Bangkok conducting search missions
over the Burma Sea and the Andaman Islands with eight land-based attack planes, shifted
to search missions in the Bay of Bengal to the north of 270º [W] of Bangkok with four land-
based attack planes from 26 March onwards.
(2) The Mihoro Air Group, which had been stationed in Sabang conducting search missions
within a radius of about six hundred nautical miles from the northwest of Sabang toward
the southwestern waters, shifted to search missions over the waters to the west of [Sabang]
with five land-based attack planes from 26 March onwards.
3. The Tōkō Air Group Detachment had advanced to the Andaman Islands on the 25th under the
direct command of the Air Unit commander, where it carried out search missions over the waters
of Sector A up to six hundred nautical miles from Port Blair. 
4. The 2d Air Raid Unit (the 23d Air Flotilla and the main body of the Tōkō Air Group) had started
its shift from 8 March onwards, took new positions by 17 March and started on its missions.(71)
(1) The 23d Air Flotilla headquarters advanced to Kupang, and directed the air campaigns
mainly in the area to the north of Australia.
(2) The main body of the Takao Air Group advanced to Clark Base in mid-March, and engaged
in the air operations in the Bataan and Corregidor areas.
(3) The unit dispatched from the Takao Air Group ([of] eighteen land-based attack planes) ad-
vanced to Kupang on 14 March, and started its attack on the airfield[s] of Port Darwin on 16
March.
(4) The 3d Air Group advanced to Kupang from Kendari ([with] thirty-four fighter planes and
two land-based reconnaissance planes) on 8 March, whereupon it continued reconnaissance
of strategic places to the north of Australia with land-based reconnaissance planes and at-
tacks on these places with Type–0 fighter planes. From the 16th onwards, the group covered
the attacks on the area to the north of Australia conducted by the land-based attack planes
of the Takao Air Group.
(5) On 5 March, with [the start of] the fourth disposition of forces of the Air Unit of the Southern
Task Force, the Tōkō Air Group was put under the command of the 2d Air Raid Unit. The
group was still kept at the Semau Seaplane Base in Kupang after the completion of the Java
operation and conducted search missions and patrols over the Arafura Sea and the waters
to the south of Java. By the 25th, eight large flying boats [of the group] had advanced to Port
Blair on the Andaman Islands, while its main body advanced to Batavia by the 26th, to be
ready for the operations in the Bay of Bengal as well as the Christmas Island invasion oper-
ation and the carrier operation in the Indian Ocean. 
(6) The Tainan Air Group was kept at Denpasar on Bali after the completion of the Java opera-
tion, doing maintenance, conducting drills and taking some rest. In late March, nine of its
Type-0 fighter planes were transferred to the Philippines with as their main task providing
cover for the Takao Air Group’s attacks on Corregidor from the 22d onwards. However, with
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the reorganization of 1 April, the group was incorporated into the 25th Air Flotilla to operate
in the theater southeast [of Japan; i.e. southwestern Pacific] under the command of the South
Seas Unit commander (Commander in Chief of the Fourth Fleet V. Adm. Inoue Shigeyoshi),
due to which the unit was no longer involved in Operation C.
The Movements of Units Other Than the Carrier Task Force as of 31 March
Eleventh Air Fleet headquarters and the 22d Air Flotilla headquarters: 
Having completed their advance to Bangkok in mid-March, the Mihoro Air Group, the Genzan
Air Group and one element of the Tōkō Air Group were respectively deployed to Sabang,
Bangkok (part of the group to Rangoon and Tavoy) and Port Blair, and conducted search and
attack missions toward Ceylon and the northern part of the Bay of Bengal.
Submarine Unit (2d Submarine Squadron): 
Deployed Submarines I–2, I–3 and I–7 respectively off Trincomalee and off Colombo, and on
the waters to the southeast of Ceylon, while deploying Submarines I–4 and I–6 off the west coast
of India to watch and guard.
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Illustration No. 61 — The Deployment of the Forces of the Air Unit of the Southern Task Force as of 5 April
and the Shift of the Bases of the 3d Air Raid Unit
The Main Body of the Southern Task Force: 
Was at anchor in the port of Seletar [Singapore], due to depart from the port on the early morning
of 2 April.
The Striking Force of the Malaya Unit:
Was at anchor in Mergui (southern part of Burma), due to depart from the port on 1 April.
The Advance of the Carrier Task Force of the Southern Task Force
Under the [overall] cover provided by the Air Unit of the Southern Task Force, the Carrier
Task Force left Staring Bay at 0800 on 26 March and sailed toward Ceylon, heavily guarding
its sailing route ahead with carrier-based attack planes and guarding itself against enemy
submarines with carrier-based attack planes or bombers. 
In the meantime, the Christmas Island invasion unit had left Bantam Bay on the 29th and
occupied the island on the 31st, the same day that the Carrier Task Force passed the waters
one hundred nautical miles to the north of the Island.
On 1 April, an aircraft of the Eleventh Air Fleet reported:(119, 194) “1005; three enemy mer-
chantmen (10,000-ton class each), and one minesweeper are sailing northward [along] the
northwestern coast of Ceylon at eight knots.” “1030: In Palk Bay, no enemy naval vessels or
aircraft were spotted other than two [enemy] merchantmen (4,000-ton class) at anchor.” “No
enemy aircraft were spotted at the airfield or the seaplane base near Trincomalee, no pa-
trolling aircraft or antiaircraft fire, either.” [Later] at 2330 on the same day, the flagship of the
2d Submarine Squadron (Submarine I–7) reported that the enemy antisubmarine guard was
very strict in the Colombo area. On 2 April, Submarine I–7 again reported that the guard out-
side the port of Colombo was so strict that it was impossible to reconnoiter the inside of the
port; on the situation of incoming and outgoing vessels it reported (one ship on the 2d and
another on the 3d) etc. Then at 0000 on the 3d, Submarine I–7 reported that it had called off
the air reconnaissance [with her aircraft].(141)
On 3 April, after having completed its last refueling, the Carrier Task Force dropped the
Ken’yō-maru and the Nippon-maru from the line, and sailed closer toward Ceylon, while tight-
ening its guard. On that day, Carrier Task Force Commander Vice Admiral Nagumo issued
an order that the aircraft formation for the attack on Colombo should be the 1st [type] for-
mation (formation details unclear) and the armament the 2d [type] armament, while an-
nouncing that if enemy battleships should be spotted at anchor at the time of attack, the force
should carry out the second attack with 1st [type] armament on that afternoon or before
dawn of the next day. Meanwhile on that day, the commander of the Air Unit of the Southern
Task Force ordered the land-based attack planes of the Genzan Air Group as well as one el-
ement of the fighter plane unit detached from the Kanoya Air Group and its land-based re-
connaissance unit to conduct reconnaissance attacks in the Calcutta and the Akyab areas
(from 4 until 7 April).(141)
At 0840 on 4 April, the Carrier Task Force commander ordered by signal: “Keep a strict
guard. Keep the standby fighter planes on 1st standby, but the crews do not need to wait on
board their planes.” At 1205, a report from Submarine I–2 was received that the enemy’s
guard outside the bay of Trincomalee was very tight. At 1855, the Hiei spotted an enemy fly-
ing boat to her north and immediately opened fire, also to alert friendly units. Responding
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to the alert, Type–0 fighter planes on standby (three from each carrier, except for the Hiryū,
who launched six, totaling eighteen aircraft) took off from the carriers all at once, and at 1920,
they forced the enemy flying boat to make an emergency landing. However, during that time,
the enemy aircraft had been monitored sending out messages in the clear that [the Japanese
force consisted of] three battleships and one carrier on a 305° [NW] course. Since the enemy
aircraft had landed on the water at 1922 due to fire, the Isokaze of the Guard Unit immediately
approached and took the crew prisoner. The enemy aircraft had probed our fleet for twenty-
seven minutes, during which it radioed our movements, which wireless stations at Colombo,
Bombay and Aden relayed. At 1945, all Type–0 fighter planes returned. Although the enemy
patrol aircraft had been brought down, it became certain through intercepted messages that
it had [already] reported our movements.(158) Now that [the enemy] knew [our intentions]
because of our reconnaissance, considerably strong counterattacks might be expected, but it
was nevertheless decided that the air raid on Colombo should be carried out as scheduled.
The formation of the attack units was as shown in the following table:*(75, 191, 192)
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* The author bases his account of the attacks on Colombo and Trincomalee mainly on the “Greater East Asia
War’s Lessons of War,” and the “Action Reports” of the 5th Carrier Division and the carrier Hiryū. Since we
found a number of discrepancies and inconsistencies in the tables and the text that mainly concern the number
of planes and the names or ranks of officers involved, we consulted the action reports of the other carriers,
which may not have been available to the author at that time, and corrected the text and tables where neces-
sary.
To be ready against the appearance of enemy vessels, carrier-based attack planes and
bombers were kept on standby on the decks, of which the formation of the carrier-based
bombers was as shown in the next table. 
For reference: The regular number of the aircraft on each carrier of the 1st, 2d and 5th Carrier
Divisions were as shown in the following table (the first number before “/” is the regular num-
ber and the latter number is the number of spare aircraft.)(187)
The Air Raid on Colombo; the Sinking of Two [Enemy] Heavy Cruisers (75, 100, 141, 158, 191, 192)
The 5th of April; it was fair with a southwestern wind at a velocity of seven meters per sec-
ond; there was good visibility and sunrise was at 0931. At 0900, the 1st Section of the 3d Bat-
tleship Division, the 8th Cruiser Division and the Abukuma each launched one of their
reconnaissance seaplanes, which headed for search missions over the waters to the west of
the Carrier Task Force. Simultaneously, the first units for the attack on Colombo and the air-
craft of the direct air escort [of the carriers] began to take off. At 0945, an aircraft of the Hiryū
in the Attack Unit signaled: “0938: Enemy aircraft spotted. One [enemy] flying boat at forty-
three nautical miles 346º of the starting point, on a 180º course.” The enemy flying boat, which
had been probing the Carrier Task Force by skillfully making use of the dense clouds, was
brought down at 1046 by aircraft of the Hiryū’s direct air escort.
Fifty-three Type–97 carrier-based attack planes and thirty-eight Type–99 carrier-based
bombers of the units for the attack on Colombo entered the air over Colombo escorted by
































Carrier Div Mothership Fighter Planes Bombers Attack Planes Total Grand Total
1st Carrier Div Akagi 18/3 18/3 27/3 63/9
315/45
2d Carrier Div
Sōryū 18/3 18/3 18/3 54/9
Hiryū 18/3 18/3 18/3 54/9
5th Carrier Div
Shōkaku 18/3 27/3 27/3 72/9
Zuikaku 18/3 27/3 27/3 72/9
Total 90/15 108/15 117/15
thirty-six Type–0 fighter planes, and at 1045, Commander Fuchida, the general commander,
gave the “all go.” Since the enemy was waiting for them in the air with dozens of Spitfire
and Hurricane fighter planes, a fierce air battle broke out right away between [the enemy] and
the Japanese fighter planes. In a thirty minutes’ engagement, the Japanese Type–0 fighter planes
reported having brought down nineteen Spitfires, twenty-one Hurricanes, ten Swordfish (car-
rying torpedoes) and one Defiant, a total of fifty-one aircraft (of which nine were unconfirmed).
The loss sustained by the Japanese fighter planes was one plane that had crashed itself.
During this period, first of all the carrier-based bomber unit started bombing the Colombo
airfield, tankers, merchantmen and other targets. However, the weather at that time was very
bad, and it was rather difficult to carry out the bombing. After the attack, the unit came under
a sudden attack of more than a dozen enemy fighter planes; while it reported having brought
down six Hurricanes, five carrier-based bombers of the Zuikaku and one carrier-based bomber
of the Shōkaku crashed themselves. The military gains reported by this bombing attack were
four large merchantmen, one small cargo ship and one hangar, which were set ablaze, and
one tanker, two hangars and one repair shop, which were blown up. Next, the carrier-based
attack plane unit entered the air over Colombo and carried out bombing attacks on ships in
the port, piers, naval office[s], barracks and other targets between 1056 and 1113. [The unit]
sank or caused damage to several large merchantmen and one small merchantman, while
blowing up piers and railways. At 1128, the general commander’s aircraft reported: “1118:
Would like you to prepare the second sortie. Twenty transport ships spotted in the port. Also,
antiaircraft fire on the ground. [Spotted] some enemy aircraft. Dense clouds at an altitude of
1,000 [meters].” Having received this report, Carrier Task Force Commander Vice Admiral
Nagumo gave at 1152 the order: “[Ready] the 3d Formation [unit] ([and] six aircraft for each
carrier to control the air) with the 3d Armament. [Aircraft] shall be launched after recovering
the 2d Formation [unit].” Due to this order, the carrier-based attack plane unit, which had
been on standby armed with torpedoes, were made to hastily change them to bombs. After
assembling in the air over Point de Galle one after another, the units for the attack on
Colombo headed back to the force. At 1233, the Carrier Task Force commander ordered 5th
Carrier Division Commander Rear Admiral Hara to launch (an appropriate number of) car-
rier-based attack planes to form an east–west [guiding] line for returning aircraft at fifty nau-
tical miles to the north of the Carrier Task Force. In accordance with this order, the 5th Carrier
Division commander had both carriers launch three carrier-based attack planes each (a total
of six aircraft) at 1236, and had them form an east–west [guiding] line for the returning [air-
craft], positioning them at a distance of 10 kilometers from each other at fifty nautical miles
to the north of the main unit. The attack units returned one after another between 1248 and
1325 (six carrier-based bombers and one carrier-based fighter plane did not return), and the
aircraft which had formed the [guiding] line for the returning [aircraft] returned at 1550. In
the meantime, at 1300, a Type–94 reconnaissance seaplane of the Toné, which was searching
for the enemy over the waters to the west of the Carrier Task Force, had spotted vessels that
looked like enemy cruisers at 3º1’N, 77º58’E. “Two enemy cruiser-like vessels spotted at 150
nautical miles 268º of the starting point, on a 160º course at twenty knots.” On reception of
this report, Carrier Task Force Commander Vice Admiral Nagumo immediately had one
Type–0 reconnaissance seaplane each of the Toné and the Chikuma launched for probing and
issued the following preparatory order of attack at 1323: “The 3d Formation [unit] shall attack
the enemy cruisers. Carrier-based attack planes shall conduct the attack with torpedoes as
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far as possible.” Accordingly, the carrier-based attack planes, which had been in the middle
of changing their armament to bombs, were supposed to again replace them with torpedoes.
Following that, the commander [successively] issued orders: “1330: Report the available
launching time of the 3d Formation [unit] (minus the Air Control Unit);” then, “1350: The 2d
Formation [unit] (minus the Air Control Unit) shall stay on standby in the hangar after the
takeoff of the 3d Formation [unit] (minus the Air Control Unit). The carrier-based attack
planes shall conduct a torpedo attack. Adjust the running depth to three meters.” Replying
to the Carrier Task Force commander’s request to report the available launching time, 5th
Carrier Division Commander Rear Admiral Hara reported: (1357:) “Ready to launch at 1600.”
At 1350, the aircraft of the Abukuma reported: “Two [enemy] destroyers sailing at 200 nau-
tical miles 250º of the starting point.” At 1418, Carrier Task Force Commander Vice Admiral
Nagumo gave the following order for the sortie of the Attack Unit: “The 3d Formation [unit]
(minus the Air Control Unit) shall take off at 1500 and attack the enemy cruisers at 235º. They
are sailing on a 200º course at twenty-four knots. Any plane that cannot get ready in time
follows [when ready].” However, at that time, the aircraft of the Abukuma reported that no
enemy was spotted [other than the above], and doubt arose that the aircraft of the Toné had
mistook [enemy] destroyers for cruisers. The captain of the Abukuma ordered [his aircraft] to
continue the search mission near the enemy just to be sure. At 1427, the Carrier Task Force
commander [changed] his order: “The earlier [report of] ‘cruisers’ was a mistake for ‘destroy-
ers.’ Only the carrier-based bombers of the 3d Formation [unit] shall take off.” Accordingly,
seventeen carrier-based bombers of the Akagi took off at 1449, which was followed by eight-
een carrier-based bombers of the Hiryū and eighteen of the Sōryū respectively at 1459 and at
1503.
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At 1455, a Type–0 reconnaissance seaplane of the Toné, which had gone probing, spotted
the enemy and reported: “1455: Spotted two enemy cruisers at 158 nautical miles 235º of the
starting point. Sailing on a 200º course at twenty-six knots.” Receiving this, the captain of
the Toné wirelessed her aircraft: “Confirm the type of the enemy [vessels]. They can be de-
stroyers, can’t they?” At 1556, the reply of the aircraft of the Toné came in: “1545: Enemy cruis-
ers are HMS Kent-class. No other enemy [vessels] are spotted in their vicinity. Visibility 30
nautical miles.” Having received this telegram, Carrier Task Force Commander Vice Admiral
Nagumo ordered at 1610: “The enemy cruisers are of the HMS Kent-class. The 5th Carrier
Division shall attack them with about one half of its carrier-based attack planes and
bombers,” while ordering the aircraft of the Toné to guide them. At 1625, 5th Carrier Division
Commander Rear Admiral Hara ordered: “The Attack Unit shall take off at 1700. Target: the
Kent-class cruisers. Attack course 200º [SSW], distance to target 150 nautical miles.”
Earlier at 1554, the commander plane of the carrier-based bomber unit (Lt. Cdr. Egusa
Takashige) had wirelessed: “Enemy spotted.” Then at 1629, he ordered [his unit]: “Go! As-
sault Tactics No. 2. Bombing direction: 50º. Wind from 230º, velocity six meters [per second].”
The carrier-bomber unit skillfully approached the enemy from the direction of the sun, carried
out a surprise bombing on the enemy heavy cruisers from 1638 until 1655. Having scored hits
with most of the bombs, the unit sank them at 1658. It was a truly superbly executed attack.
Concerning these [attacks], the then British Prime Minister [Sir Winston] Churchill wrote
the following in his book The Second World War:*
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* W. S. Churchill, The Second World War, Volume IV, The Hinge of Fate, Book I, The Onslaught of Japan, Chapter X,
Ceylon and the Bay of Bengal, p. 160.
Japanese success and power in naval air warfare were formidable. In the Gulf of Siam two of
our first-class capital ships had been sunk in a few minutes by torpedo aircraft. Now two im-
portant cruisers had also perished by a totally different method of air attack — the dive-bomber.
Nothing like this had been seen in the Mediterranean in all our conflicts with the German and
Italian Air Forces.
Having received the report of the sinking of the large enemy cruisers, the second sortie unit,
which was supposed to take off at 1700, was made to stay on 1st standby at 1702. Then after
receiving the report from the aircraft of the Toné at 1705, “Advanced fifty nautical miles to
the southwest of the enemy cruisers, but no enemy spotted,” the sortie of the unit was called
off. All aircraft of the first sortie unit safely returned by 1745, and the attack on that day was
wrapped up. Then at 1909, a friendly surface vessel signaled that she had spotted enemy air-
craft, which the aircraft directly escorting the carriers in the air had not been able to spot. At
1929, six Type–0 fighter planes of the Hiryū took off, spotted two Swordfish, brought down
one of them but let the other slip away out of sight in the direction of the sun. No enemy was
spotted thereafter, and the engagements for that day were over. At 2158, the staff of the Car-
rier Task Force signaled the total military gains on the 4th and the 5th to the vessels of the
force as follows:
1. Brought down two probing PBYs and one Fairey Albacore 
2. At Colombo
(1) Brought down a total of 57 aircraft, of which 9 were not confirmed.
Aircraft 19 Spitfires
27 Hurricanes
10 Swordfish (carrying torpedoes)
1 Defiant
(2) Set one hangar ablaze and caused damage to two, also caused serious damage to one repair
shop.
(3) Inflicted serious damage on five large merchantmen, which caught fire, and blew up more
than a dozen small merchantmen.
(4) Blew up part of the governmental area and pier[s].
3. By the probing and under the guidance of the reconnaissance seaplanes, carrier-based bombers
instantly sank two HMS Cumberland-class large cruisers.
4. At Colombo
One carrier-based fighter plane of the Sōryū, five carrier-based bombers of the Zuikaku and one
carrier-based bomber of the Shōkaku met a heroic end by crashing themselves.
The following table illustrates the on-target rate and the situation of the hits in the attack on
[enemy] large cruisers on that day:






bombs on target On-target rate Notes
Akagi: 17 16 15 94
88
One of the carrier-based
bombers of the Akagi did
not release its bomb.
Sōryū:18 18 14 78
Hiryū: 18 18 17 94
The bewildering changes of armament for the carrier-based attack
unit, from the initially-planned bombs to torpedoes, and then to
bombs and back again to torpedoes, left behind a serious problem.
However, only in the 5th Carrier Division’s Action Report No. 5,
it was mentioned under item three, “The standby situation of the
carrier-based attack planes,” of the matters that had affected op-
erations. Hidden behind the successful attack on the [enemy]
heavy cruisers, it does not seem to have been dealt with as a big
problem at that time. However, the same situation occurred later
in the Battle of Midway, in which the changes of armament de-
layed the takeoff of the aircraft and the Japanese carrier group
was hit by a surprise attack of enemy dive-bomber units. The at-
tack induced successive explosions of torpedoes loaded on the
carrier-based attack planes on deck, leading to the tragedy of los-
ing at one stroke four aircraft carriers (the Akagi, the Kaga, the
Sōryū and the Hiryū), who had won consecutive victories. The ex-
cerpt of “The standby situation of the carrier-based attack planes”
in the Action Report of the 5th Carrier Division reads as follows:
In accordance with Carrier Task Force Signal Order No. 75 [sent] at
2303 on the 4th, the carrier-based attack plane units changed their ar-
mament from bombs to torpedoes (note by the author: since it had
been spotted by a patrolling enemy flying boat on the 4th, the task
force had changed its air raid plan), and [the units on] both vessels
completed their change of armament by 0630. To be prepared against
an enemy surface vessel attack, the [attack plane] unit was kept on standby in the hangar after
the takeoff of the carrier-based bomber unit.
1010: A report came from the Colombo Attack Unit: “A number of enemy merchantmen were
spotted in the port. A second sortie is required.”
1210: According to the order from the Carrier Task Force commander to “immediately change
the armament to bombs (No. 80 land bombs),” [the unit] started changing the armament.
1305: A report came that two large enemy cruisers were spotted. Then,
1323: [Another] order [was issued] “The 3d Formation [unit] shall attack the enemy cruisers.
The carrier-based attack plane unit shall change its armament to torpedoes as far as possi-
ble,” according to which the units in the midst of [fitting bombs] again started putting tor-
pedoes back on. This was followed by:
1415: “The 3d Formation [unit] (minus the Air Control Unit) shall take off at 1500 to attack the
enemy cruisers. Any plane that cannot get ready in time, follows [when ready].” 
1427: “The cruisers in the earlier [report] were a mistake for destroyers. Only the carrier-based
bomber unit of the 3d Formation [unit] shall take off.” 
1610: On receiving the order that “The enemy cruisers were HMS Kent-class. The 5th Carrier
Division shall attack them with about one half each of its carrier-based attack planes and
bombers.”
1625: The order was given: “The Attack Unit shall take off at 1700. The target: the HMS Kent-
class cruisers. Attack course 200º, distance to target 150 nautical miles.”
1656: On receiving the report that the two large cruisers had sunk:
1657: [We ordered,] “Hold the launch for a moment!” after which [we] issued the order to remain
on 1st standby.
626 Chapter IX     /     The Neutralization of the Indian Ocean
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Illustration No. 62 — The
Bombing of the [Enemy]
Cruisers by the Carrier-based
Bombers of the Hiryū
1720: According to the order of the Carrier Task Force commander, [we] kept the unit on standby
in the hangar.
The time required to switch the armament between torpedoes and bombs of the eighteen
Type–97 carrier-based attack planes studied by the Hiryū was as shown in the following
table:[(75)]
According to the Action Report of the 5th Carrier Division, the situation of the enemy in the
attack on the 5th was as follows.
1. The enemy anticipated our attack and deployed several dozens of fighter planes for the defense
in the air.
2. The antiaircraft fire from the ground was very fierce.
3. More than ten twin-engine large bombers and about twenty fighter planes were on the airfield.
4. About thirty large and small merchantmen as well as three destroyers were spotted in and out-
side the port of Colombo; the merchantmen were all armed.
5. At the time of our attack and pullback, [our unit] came under a considerably fierce attack by
more than ten enemy Hurricane fighter planes.
6. In order to attack the Carrier Task Force, the enemy had launched ten aircraft of their torpedo
attack [plane] unit (Swordfish).
7. Since two aircraft, which looked like enemy carrier-based biplanes, came to probe us on the
evening of the 5th, we suspected the presence of enemy carrier[s] near us.
Thus, the Carrier Task Force successfully completed the attacks on Colombo, pulled back in
a southeastern direction, and then sailed north on the waters outside a radius of 450 nautical
miles from Ceylon for an attack on Trincomalee. The [enemy] heavy cruisers it had sunk were
later identified as the HMS Dorsetshire and the HMS Cornwall.
The Air Strike on Trincomalee; the Sinking of One Small Aircraft Carrier(75, 100, 158, 191, 192, 194)
In view of the movements of the heavy enemy cruisers on 5 April, Carrier Task Force Com-
mander Vice Admiral Nagumo judged it very likely that enemy aircraft carrier[s] were de-
ployed in the area; he took a detour around the waters outside a radius of 450 nautical miles
from Ceylon and headed for Trincomalee, while particularly tightening his guard. However,
except for an enemy flying boat spotted on the 6th at seventy nautical miles 350º [N] of the
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No. Changes Time Required(Hour-Min.) Notes
1 Torpedo → 2 x No. 25 bombs 2:30
Bombs were [already]
brought to the hangar,
ready to be loaded
2 Torpedo → 1x No. 80 regular bomb 1:30
3 Torpedo → 1x No. 80 Mark 5 bomb 2:30
4 Bombs (2x No. 25) → Torpedo (or 1 x No. 80 regular bomb) 2:00
Torpedoes were brought
to the hangar, ready to be
loaded
5 Bomb (1 x No. 80 regular bomb) → Torpedo 2:00
6 Bomb (1 x No. 80 Mark 5 bomb) → Torpedo 1:30
Akagi by an aircraft of the Hiryū which was on a search mission, no enemy was spotted on
[the 6th and] also on the 7th. At 1820 on the 8th, the Abukuma spotted at 35,000 meters 260º
[W] of her a probing enemy flying boat and opened fire, but she lost sight of it at 1835, and
the fighter planes that headed to attack it also let it slip away due to a squall. At 2000 on that
day, through intelligence sent by the Takao Signal Unit, the Carrier Task Force learned that
the enemy [flying boat] had sent a telegram: “1900: Spotted three battleships and one aircraft
carrier on a 350º course at 260 nautical miles 90º [E of us].” 
Although the Carrier Task Force learned that it had been spotted by the enemy, it contin-
ued to sail toward Trincomalee to attack the place as scheduled. The formation of the units
for the Trincomalee attack was as follows:
1. Trincomalee Attack Unit (as shown in the following table)
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2. Unit for Attacking Enemy Vessels
At 0645 on 9 April, one Type–0 reconnaissance seaplane of the Toné was launched for a covert
weather reconnaissance over Trincomalee. Then at 0900, the first sortie unit (the 1st Formation
[unit], minus the 2d Party) for Trincomalee took off. The force consisted of ninety-one car-
rier-based attack planes and thirty-eight Type–0 fighter planes. The aircraft of each carrier
for the direct escort in the air as well as the search aircraft of the 3d Battleship Division, the
8th Cruiser Division and the 1st Destroyer Squadron also took off. At 1008, one enemy flying
boat probing at a distance of 30,000 meters 80º [E] of the Carrier Task Force was spotted; the
aircraft of the Hiryū providing direct escort in the air brought it down. At 1020, Commander
Fuchida, commander of the units for the Trincomalee attack ordered all units to charge. The
carrier-based attack plane units carried out the attacks as designated from 1030 until 1045
and returned at 1230, after inflicting enormous damage to the light cruisers and merchantmen
in the port, as well as land facilities, antiaircraft guns and other targets.
The loss sustained by the carrier-based attack plane units in this attack was one carrier-
based attack plane, which had crashed itself, two crew members killed on board, one heavily
injured and two with minor injuries. Meanwhile, the thirty-eight fighter planes in charge of
the direct escort of the units engaged with several dozens of enemy fighter planes; they re-
ported having brought down thirty-nine enemy fighter planes and one reconnaissance sea-
plane, while setting ablaze to two Hurricanes and one mid-sized plane and one small biplane.
In this engagement, the Japanese force lost three Type–0 fighter planes.





11th Attack Unit Lt Abe 17 Carrier-basedbombers of Akagi
In case of attacks on Trincomalee,
1. Surface naval vessels
2. Land targets are the exposed oil
tanks
13th Attack Unit Lt Cdr Egusa 18 Carrier-basedbombers of Sōryū
14th Attack Unit Lt Kobayashi 18 Carrier-basedbombers of Hiryū
16th Attack Unit Lt Sakamoto 14 Carrier-basedbombers of Zuikaku
15th Attack Unit Lt Cdr Takahashi 18 Carrier-basedbombers of Shōkaku























At 1055, right after the units of the Trincomalee attack finished their attack, the third air-
craft of the Haruna reported: “Spotted the enemy carrier Hermes and destroyers, [a total of]
three [vessels]. Our position is 155 nautical miles 250° [WSW] of the starting point.” At 1100,
the Carrier Task Force commander ordered: “Carrier-based bomber units and designated
carrier-based fighter planes, get ready for a sortie to attack the carrier.” At 1120, the third air-
craft of the Haruna continued its report: “The enemy, [consisting of] one cruiser and two de-
stroyers, are at 155 nautical miles 270° [W] of the starting point, sailing on a 180° [S] course
at twelve knots.” At 1143, the Naval Vessel Attack Unit of eighty-five carrier-based bombers
and nine Type–0 fighter planes took off. The attack unit (led by Lt. Cdr. Takahashi Kakuichi)
spotted an HMS Hermes-class carrier at 1330, carried out dive bombings from 1335 until 1350,
and sank her at 1355. Without a break, the attack unit went on to attack the destroyers, mer-
chantmen, patrol boats, etc. that were sailing nearby and reported having sunk one destroyer,
one patrol boat and two merchantmen. Further, between 1435 and 1447 on its return to the
carriers, the unit spotted four Blenheims (the aircraft which had bombed the Akagi and Toné)
and reported having brought down two of them. And again from 1515 and 1540, the unit en-
gaged with nine enemy fighter planes, and reported having brought down seven (two of
which unconfirmed) and returned around 1545. In the air engagements with the enemy
fighter planes, four carrier-based attack planes and one Type–0 fighter plane crashed them-
selves.
Almost at the same time with our carrier-based bomber units’ attack on the HMS Hermes,
nine enemy heavy bombers came to attack the Carrier Task Force, and dropped bombs near
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the Akagi and the Toné. Fortunately, no damage was sustained, but the truth was that the
Japanese force had not noticed the attack until water columns caused by the bombing shot
up, and the Akagi had not been able to fire even a single shot. After that, the fighter planes in
the air [over the Carrier Task Force] pursued the bombers and reported having brought down
five of them. Nevertheless, the unexpected attack of the enemy aircraft [despite the escort
aircraft on guard] posed a serious problem for the Carrier Task Force.
Although a total of eighty-five aircraft of the direct escort had guarded the air over the
Carrier Task Force, they had not spotted the enemy besides the above-mentioned heavy
bombers attacking the force. The loss sustained by the aircraft of the direct escort was one
Type–0 fighter plane, which had crashed itself in the air engagement with the enemy heavy
bombers.
On 10 April, the Carrier Task Force commander reported the military gains and losses in
the attack on Trincomalee as follows (Summary Report of the Actions of the Carrier Task
Force No. 9):
1. At 1800 on the 8th, an enemy flying boat was spotted probing us at 450 nautical miles 105° [E]
of Trincomalee. We pursued it but let it slip away due to a squall.
2. At 1030 on the 9th, the full force of the carrier-based attack planes and thirty-seven fighter planes
attacked Trincomalee, sank two large and one small merchantmen, caused serious damage to
one HMS Leander-class light cruiser (which probably sank), blew up, set ablaze and mostly de-
stroyed the naval arsenal and its facilities near the piers, antiaircraft batteries, the residence of
the commander in chief of Ceylon, three barracks and a group of oil tanks. They also blew up
and set ablaze two large hangars on the onshore airfield, which led to huge explosions of the
powder magazines, and totally destroyed the facilities of the airfield. In the air engagement,
[our force] brought down thirty-eight Hurricanes, two Blenheims, one Supermarine Walrus (the
end of three of which not confirmed), strafed one mid-sized and three small-sized aircraft on
the ground, which caught fire. The loss sustained was one carrier-based attack plane of the
Hiryū, which had crashed itself, two crew members killed on the aircraft, one heavily injured
and two carrier-based fighter planes of the Zuikaku and one of the Shōkaku that had crashed
themselves.
3. At 1055 on the 9th, a reconnaissance seaplane searching for the enemy on the waters to the east
of Ceylon spotted the enemy aircraft carrier HMS Hermes and a destroyer sailing southward at
a point seventy nautical miles 147º of Trincomalee (within ten nautical miles from the east coast
of Ceylon), and probed them. At 1400, the full force of the carrier-based bombers and nine fighter
planes attacked them, and sank both of them and [also] sank three large merchantmen sailing
on the waters nearby with the remaining forces. Apart from them, the reconnaissance seaplane
inflicted damage on another small merchantman. On their return, the carrier-based bomber
units engaged with nine Spitfires, and brought down seven of them (two of which unconfirmed).
The loss sustained were four carrier-based bombers of the Sōryū, which had crashed themselves
in the engagement with the Spitfires.
4. At 1016 on the 9th, [our force] brought down one probing enemy flying boat. At 1350, nine
enemy Blenheims came for a raid. We brought down seven of them (five of which by the aircraft
of the direct escort in the air and the other two by [the aircraft of] the unit, which were on their
return from the attack on the HMS Hermes). Although the Akagi and the Toné came under attack,
they sustained no damage. 
5. Comments
The enemy has been concentrating a considerable air strength for the defense of Ceylon. It is re-
quired to take countermeasures.
6. (Omitted by the author)
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The following table illustrates the on-target ratio and the hit scores in the attack on the HMS
Hermes and other targets on that day:
“The Greater East Asia War’s Lessons of War ([section] Air Operations: The Operations on
Ceylon)” analyzed the reasons for the almost miraculous gains as follows:
1. With fair weather, a slight breeze and a good air stream, the meteorological conditions were fa-
vorable for the bombing attack.
2. The commanders gave very appropriate directions and the actions at the time of approaching
and attacking the enemy were very skillful.
3. The crews were elite members of intact original units with a strong mental bond. Moreover,
their skills had been very much improved by the drills before the sortie (note by the author: the
drills conducted at Kendari).
4. The attack units’ raid was a sudden attack by rushing in all at once, which limited the enemy’s
evasive actions.
Furthermore, the “Lessons of War” mentioned the power of the No. 25 regular bombs:
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Target On-Target Rate Notes
Aircraft carrier
(HMS Hermes)
Akagi: 2 2 2 100
82
Hiryū: 11 11 9 82
Zuikaku: 14 14 13 93
Shōkaku: 18 18 13 72
Destroyer
Akagi: 12 12 12 100
81
Hiryū: 4 4 1 25
Patrol Boat Sōryū: 6 6 1 17
Large 
merchantmen
Akagi: 3 3 3 100
92Sōryū: 6 6 5 83
Hiryū: 3 3 3 100
Small 
merchantmen Sōryū: 6 6 5 83
After completing the attacks on Trincomalee on the 9th, the Carrier Task Force pulled back
to the east, conducted a refueling on the 10th and passed through the Malacca Strait on the
morning of the 13th. [Then,] having separated the 5th Carrier Division in the South China
Sea on the 14th, the force returned to its original port[s] for docking, servicing, and replen-
ishment. The 5th Carrier Division, after separating [from the Carrier Task Force], headed for
Magong to prepare for the subsequent Port Moresby operation. Although the Kaga was in-
tended to be employed for the Port Moresby operation, due to the delay in her repairs and
the strong demand for reinforcements from the South Seas Unit commander (Fourth Fleet
Commander in Chief Vice Admiral Inoue), it was decided to employ the 5th Carrier Division.
[The dispatch] seems partly to have been intended to further train the division, because the
5th Carrier Division was the least skilled among the Carrier Task Force. It was arranged that
the 5th Carrier Division would be supplemented with as many aircraft as possible from the
1st and the 2d Carrier Divisions.
The Lessons of War Drawn from the [Operations of the] Carrier Task Force in
Operation C
According to the Action Report of the Hiryū, the lessons of war drawn from the Ceylon op-
eration were as follows:
1. The power of the Type99 No. 25 regular bombs, which we had not been able to examine [after]
the air strikes at Hawaii, was fully displayed this time in the attacks on the large British cruisers
and HMS Hermes.
2. We found that Type98 No. 25 land bombs were effective in neutralizing antiaircraft guns and
machineguns on enemy vessels. In the attack on the large [enemy] cruisers and the carrier, the
first three aircraft of each squadron were equipped with land bombs. On impact, the bombs in-
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Target Number ofDirect Hits Effects Notes
HMS Dorsetshire (1st vessel) 31 Sank in 13 min. Number of aircraft in the at-
tack: 53
No. 25 Regular bombs: 37
No. 25 Land bombs: 16
[Employed] Fuses: C
HMS Cornwall (2d vessel) 15 Sank in 18 min.
HMS Hermes 37 Sank in several min.
Number of aircraft in the at-
tack: 85
No. 25 Regular bombs: 79
No. 25 Land bombs: 6
[Employed] Fuses: C
The destroyer 13 Sank
The patrol boat (of 300-ton class) 1 ditto
Large merchantman (of 7,000-ton class) 6 ditto
Large merchantman (of 2,000-ton class) 5 ditto
Small merchantman (of 1,500-ton class) 5 ditto
stantly silenced the enemy’s antiaircraft fire and facilitated the bombings
thereafter. Having the carrier-based bomber unit use the land bombs in si-
multaneous attacks with both torpedoes and bombs was found effective,
too.
3. Concerning the new installation of training rooms with radiosets to maintain
communication skills.
In the current situation where crucial operations are usually conducted after
having operated for a long period under combat-controlled [conditions for]
short wave [communications], it is quite difficult to maintain the communi-
cation skills [of the crews]. Therefore, it is very much necessary to newly in-
stall handset training rooms in the crew rooms (or a room for that purpose). 
4. The need for new aerial cameras
The currently used F–8 cameras are heavy and large, and are very inconven-
ient to handle within the narrow confines of the reconnaissance seat on small
aircraft. [Moreover,] when photos are taken under increased gravity (note
by the author: under the influence of centrifugal force) on carrier-based
bombers, their shutters are often damaged. Therefore, we want smaller cam-
eras of about f 2.0 ~ f 2.8 equipped with a telephoto lens. We feel that there
is an urgent need to use infrared photos in reconnaissance and for the con-
firmation of military results [particularly] when there is smoke and fog.
5. Although we did not really evaluate the effectiveness of the antiaircraft ar-
tillery this time because the firing was, among others, instantaneous and at
a great range, the following lessons of war were drawn:
(1) With the current Hiryū-type lookout facilities, it is quite difficult to spot
targets at an altitude of 5,000 meters or more. At that time, the Carrier
Task Force was sailing ahead in an antiaircraft guard formation, spread
out across a large area. Although all vessels were on alert, maintaining
1st patrol stations on each vessel, it turned out that they were not able
to spot the enemy bomber unit intruding into the middle of the sailing
formation from astern on a parallel course, before the water columns of the bombing against
the Akagi finally alerted [most of the vessels]. Moreover, the circumstances that the Akagi
did not start taking evasive actions until several bombs had been dropped and did not fire
a single shot, may be said to show that she was too late in spotting the targets and not ready
for a prompt artillery exchange. As countermeasures, we need to swiftly equip [the vessels]
with radar or sound detection equipment for the antiaircraft watch. 
(2) In antiaircraft artillery engagements, the vessel who spots the targets first shall open fire in
order to give warnings to all [friendly] vessels and air control units as well as to promptly
show the broad bearings of the target, and do so in the following way regardless of the firing
range: Even if [the enemy] is out of range, she shall open fire with one or two of her antiair-
craft guns. Depending on the circumstances, if she notices that friendly forces are in danger
of being bombed, she shall open fire with all antiaircraft guns and machineguns.
6. In the matter of abbreviated signals, more study and exercise is needed. 
Although signals using the abbreviations decided on by the Carrier Task Force were tested in
this operation, due to the lack of a proper structure of the abbreviated words as well as a lack
of training, they were not fully used. Since signals using abbreviations are quite essential in
view of a speedy transmission and a shortening of [the period of] exposing lights at night, it is
necessary to take the following measures:
(Measures)
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The Bombings of the
HMS Hermes and other
vessels by the carrier-
based bomber unit of the
Hiryū
(1) The number of abbreviated words for signals should be increased so that the words and
phrases used by the Carrier Task Force shall be covered as much as possible.
(2) The abbreviated words for signals should be further edited in a more simplified way so that
coding and decoding will be easier.
(3) The drills for signaling with abbreviated words shall be promoted so that officers as well as
the signal personnel shall be well acquainted with them.
7. In order to ensure a speedier reporting of spotted enemy aircraft, we think that it is quite effec-
tive to take the following [steps], in combination with the currently used [system of] signals to
report the spotting [of the enemy].
(1) When all units and vessels operate by spreading out across a wide area of ten to twenty kilo-
meters: gunfire to give warnings
(2) When all units and vessels operate by spreading out across an area of twenty kilometers or
more: sooty smoke screens (one [screen] for probing aircraft and two or more for aircraft
groups of more than several aircraft; these should be spread only by the vessel who spotted
the aircraft first) and gunfire to give warnings. 
8. The time zone must be added when times are mentioned in the communicated information. 
An actual example: “At 1045, the station at Ceylon broadcasted an air-raid warning,” raises
doubts whether the time is local time or [Japan] Standard Time. It will become much clearer if
this is communicated as “At 1045 ([Japan] Standard Time), the station at Ceylon …”. 
9. It is deemed a must to plan any astern refueling, when sailing on alert, on the leeward side of
the carriers. Since the carriers [need to] sail toward the wind at high speed for the takeoff or
landing of aircraft, the takeoff and landing operations of aircraft may be obstructed if there are
vessels that cannot freely move on the windward side of the carriers. 
10. An aircraft carrier needs to keep at least two or more spare sets of anemoscopes and anemome-
ters. Since troubles with electric circuits are expected to occur often when [a carrier] operates
for a long period in humid areas, spare sets of anemoscopes and anemometers, which are in-
dispensable for the takeoff and landing operations of aircraft, are required as a precaution
against troubles.
11. It is necessary that the facilities of all oilers for astern refueling are made to match, so that smooth
refueling can be conducted in whatever combination [of vessels] or with whatever methods.
For example, the “slip” [hook, or pelican hook] for the towing cable [jackstay] on the Nippon-
maru did not match the cable of our vessel; since the cable had to be fastened with strops, its re-
lease took time. Moreover, the Tōei-maru [A] did not have her onboard [dead] weight [to buffer
the tension in the jackstay] with her.
The Action Report of the 5th Carrier Division drew the following lessons of war [from this
series of operations].(191)
The recent attacks on the enemy carrier HMS Hermes and the attack on the British cruisers
on 5 April have shown that we need to attach greater importance to and conduct more joint
exercises between search aircraft and attack plane units. In particular, we need a better coor-
dination between different types of aircraft in cases where reconnaissance seaplanes are em-
ployed as search aircraft.
Since better and accurate navigation and reconnaissance by our search aircraft are key el-
ements that will decide the outcome of air operations at sea, we think that it is necessary to
conduct drills as often as possible.
The following excerpts from “The Greater East Asia War’s Lessons of War ([section] Air
Operations: The Operations on Ceylon)” are [also] relevant:
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1. In view of the fact that an attack on key enemy places with carriers is very likely to be carried
out by assault, we need to take all possible measures to guard the aircraft carriers, keeping in
mind their characteristics. 
As seen in the example of the present engagements, it is highly likely that attacks against
strategic enemy places with carriers, where [the enemy] widely conducts aerial patrols with its
land-based air power, come to be carried out by assault.
Therefore, when conducting these kinds of operations, you should obtain as much as possi-
ble information on the enemy movements before striving to carry out surprise and destroy at-
tacks, because air operations with carriers against [well-]prepared [enemy] bases are generally
disadvantageous unless you are absolutely sure of [being able to successfully conduct] a surprise
and destroy attack by hitting the enemy quite unexpectedly. Nevertheless, you need to expect
that such an attack may inevitably become an assault, and take all possible measures to guard
[the carriers] by concealing yourself by means of your mobility, moreover by limiting simulta-
neous damage by spreading out, as well as by carefully searching for the enemy. 
The present operation was an exceptional example of an operation where [after] a proper
evaluation of the movements of the enemy and us, an assault was conducted at a stroke, and
the enemy counterattack being blocked, enormous military gains were produced. Nevertheless,
when we examine the course of events, we think that more adequate search power needs to be
allocated for guarding. 
Although there were no critical problems that might have frustrated the operation in the
present course of events, we think that the search unit’s poor reconnaissance performance, which
will be mentioned under a later heading, reduced the enlargement of military gains. ([Subhead-
ing] General [Matters] on the Employment of Forces)
2. Since the quality of reconnaissance is a crucial element that decides the outcome of air engage-
ments at sea, more training is needed in view of the actual situation presented by this engage-
ment.
In the attack on the large cruisers on 5 April and the attack on the carrier on 9 April in this
operation, it occurred again and again that search aircraft, which had spotted the enemy and
probed him, wrongly identified the type of the vessels. As a result, it delayed the operations
and reduced the expansion of military gains, as mentioned separately in the account of the
course of events. (Note by the author: the separate account of the course of events is omitted —
[Subheading] Military Tasks)
3. Each flagship of [the units forming] the Carrier Task Force must at least carry about six to nine
high-performance reconnaissance aircraft (experimental 13–shi carrier-based bombers). 
It may be said that the tragic end of the British probing aircraft in the present carrier opera-
tion clearly showed that probing a fleet accompanied by aircraft carriers is most difficult unless
[conducted] by high-performance aircraft. That is, in order to ensure [a successful] probing of
the enemy and even conduct a forced reconnaissance if necessary to identify the type of vessels,
as well as in order to swiftly search designated areas so as to [enable] the conduct of quick and
brisk air operations, we deem it most urgent to equip the Carrier Task Force with high-perfor-
mance reconnaissance aircraft. ([Subheading] Reconnaissance)
4. The ability to look out for and spot [enemy] aircraft coming for a raid at high altitudes must rap-
idly be improved.
In the raid by the twin-engine heavy enemy bombers on 9 April, the actual situation was
that none of the vessels spotted the enemy until just before being bombed from right above their
own unit or until just after having been bombed.
We deem it necessary that as well as drills, the following measures are to be taken concerning
the [lookout] facilities: 
(1) Enhancing and improving the lookout capacity
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{1} It is necessary to increase the special duty lookout personnel; they should operate at least
in two shifts even during engagements.
{2} Concerning the improvement of the general capability to spot targets at a vertical angle
of more than 30º, wide-angle binoculars rather than those with a high magnification are
required for antiaircraft surveillance. (The currently used 20-power binoculars with a
view of 3 degrees should preferably be changed to 10 to 15-power binoculars with a view
of 15 degrees.) 
{3} It is necessary that the [information on] targets spotted by the lookouts shall be system-
atically communicated to the positions who need it.
{4} It is necessary to conduct lookout drills when large evasive actions are taken.
{5} It is necessary to improve the lookout commanders’ knowledge of air engagements in
general so that they can make tactical judgments.
(2) Radar
It is of immediate necessity to urgently equip every vessel of the Carrier Task Force and part
of the aircraft [with radar] and put it to use, even though it is [still] somewhat unsatisfactory
in precision.
(3) Deployment of aerial patrol aircraft
It is necessary to think about deploying aerial patrol aircraft at times of poor high altitude
visibility due to too many clouds, etc. ([Subheading] Air Defense)
5. The power of antiaircraft fire needs to be drastically improved. For this, I deem it necessary to
swiftly take measures concerning the following items.
(1) Armament
{1} Cruisers and larger vessels
It is necessary that they be equipped with four groups of machineguns (nine to twelve
guns per group) and two groups of antiaircraft guns (six to twelve guns per group) and
that two machinegun groups and one or more antiaircraft gun groups can cover [any
place] around the vessel.
{2} Destroyers
It is necessary that they be equipped with two or more groups of machineguns (six to
nine guns per group) and two groups of antiaircraft guns (four guns per group) and that
one or more groups of machineguns and antiaircraft guns can cover [any place] around
the vessel.
(2) Fire control
In view of the present situation in which the accuracy of our [antiaircraft] fire is poor, it is
deemed urgently necessary to train competent fire-control officers and improve the neces-
sary fire control instruments. However, for the time being we need to conduct studies and
drills on throwing up dense artillery barrages around the targets of [enemy] torpedoes or
bombs. 
(3) Facilities
{1} It is necessary to improve the [antiaircraft] artillery equipment so as to be able to follow
enemy [aircraft] speeds of 500 knots.
{2} It is necessary to increase the traverse and elevation speeds and also to increase the angles
of the antiaircraft fire control equipment as well as of the antiaircraft guns and machine-
guns.
{3} It is better to mix in smoke tracer or light tracer shells so as to show the whereabouts of
the enemy to friendly aircraft and facilitate the fire control.
(4) Antiaircraft formations
Since the present antiaircraft artillery armament of each vessel is poor, it is necessary to study
formations and evasive actions in order to put up effective antiaircraft walls of fire by con-
centrating the fire of the vessels of a formation. ([Subheading] Air Defense) 
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6. Establishing a new institution to research air defense
Since air combat and antiaircraft artillery,which are the core of air defense, are closely and in-
separably related, and it is impossible to conduct research and drills without aircraft, we deem
it necessary, in order to make rapid improvements, to newly establish an air defense research
institution that has a close connection with aviation and attach to it an air defense technical ar-
senal to start a new field in air defense research. ([Subheading] Air Defense)
The Cooperation of the Air Unit of the Southern Task Force (From 26 March to 8 April)
[See also the maps on pp. 612, 615, 616, and 618]
On 26 March, the Carrier Task Force left Staring Bay, and passing through the Ombai Strait
advanced to the Indian Ocean on the 27th. On both days, the Air Unit conducted search mis-
sions over the northern part of the Bay of Bengal with four land-based attack planes, over
Sector C with three large flying boats, and over Sector A with four to five land-based attack
planes, but no enemy was spotted.(71) On the 28th, the Carrier Task Force passed the waters
to the south of Sumba Island. On that day, the Air Unit conducted search missions over the
northern part of the Bay of Bengal with four land-based attack planes, over Sector A with
five [of them], and Sector E with three large flying boats. Two of the large flying boats spotted
two merchantmen in Sector E, carried out a bombing, and stopped one 3,000-ton-class cargo
ship with a near miss. Apart from them, one land-based attack plane carried out a search
mission on the sailing route ahead of the Carrier Task Force, but spotted no enemy.(71)
On the 29th, the Carrier Task Force sailed westward on the waters to the south of Bali.
The Air Unit carried out search missions over the northern part of the Bay of Bengal with
four land-based attack planes, over Sector A with five [of them], and over Sector C with three
large flying boats. One of the latter scored a hit on a cargo ship. On that day, one land-based
reconnaissance aircraft reconnoitered Calcutta and reported fifty merchantmen at anchor.(71)
On the 30th, the Carrier Task Force [continued to] sail westward on the waters to the south
of Java and passed the midpoint between Java and Christmas Island on the 31st. On both
days, the Air Unit carried out search missions over the northern part of the Bay of Bengal
with four land-based attack planes, over Sector A with five [of them] and over Sector C with
three large flying boats, but spotted no enemy. The [other] three large flying boats also carried
out search mission on the waters to the south of Java in concert with the Christmas Island
invasion operation. On top of that, in view of an enemy aircraft’s reconnaissance over Port
Blair, an air patrol by Type–0 fighter planes was also started from the 30th onwards [p. 588].(71)
On 1 April, the Carrier Task Force reached the waters to the north of the Cocos Islands,
while also the Malaya Unit Striking Force left Mergui. The Air Unit carried out search mis-
sions over Sector A with thirteen land-based attack planes and over Sector C with three large
flying boats (pressing on to a distance of seven hundred nautical miles). The large flying
boat[s] reported the enemy movements as follows:(119)
1. At 1030 a.m., no enemy vessels or aircraft were spotted other than two merchantmen of 4,000-
ton class at anchor in Palk Bay.
2. At 1005 a.m., three 10,000-ton-class merchantmen and one minesweeper escorting them [were
spotted] sailing northward off the northeastern end of Ceylon at eight knots.
3. No enemy aircraft was spotted on the airfield or at the seaplane base near Trincomalee. No
patrol aircraft was spotted, [either]. No antiaircraft fire. Eight destroyers or larger vessels [were
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spotted] inside the port and one destroyer was [spotted] escorting [a] large merchantman out-
side the bay. 
In continuation of the previous day, Type–0 fighter planes patrolled in the air above Port
Blair and three large flying boats searched for the enemy in the direction of Christmas Island,
but no enemy was spotted.
At noon on the 2d, the Carrier Task Force reached the 3º45’S 97º42’E point. The Air Unit
carried out search missions over Sector D (pressing on to a distance of seven hundred nautical
miles, but twenty nautical miles short of the shore of India) with three large flying boats,
spotted one 10,000t-class and one 8,000t-class merchantmen, and caused damage to both of
them with near misses. As on the previous days, the unit conducted search missions over
Sector A with thirteen land-based attack planes and a patrol in the air over Port Blair with
Type–0 fighter planes. At noon on the 3d, the Carrier Task Force reached the point of 1º17’S
93º34’E. The Air Unit carried out search missions over Sector E (twenty nautical miles short
of the shore) with three large flying boats, and reported having spotted thirteen merchantmen,
of which they sank one 20,000t-class cargo ship, scored two hits (with 250-kg bombs) on a
7,000t-class cargo ship and caused damage to one 8,000t-class cargo ship with near misses.(71)
Also on the same day, search missions over Sector A were conducted with nine land-based
attack planes but no enemy was spotted. The twenty Type–0 fighter planes, which had been
dispatched to Tavoy for the patrol over Port Blair, returned to Bangkok, and came under the
command of the Genzan Air Group commander. On the early morning on that day, there
was a small enemy raid over the Andaman Islands by three to four Boeings and one Lockheed
[bomber]. Although the raid inflicted minor damage on the Japanese side to the Yūgiri by
near misses, we brought down one large aircraft with concentrated fire (which will be men-
tioned later). On the 3d, Air Unit Commander Vice Admiral Tsukahara issued the following
order concerning the reconnaissance attack over the Calcuttta and[/or] the Akyab areas by
means of classified telegram No. 184.(141)
(Telegraphic Operation Order No. 84)
The 3d Air Raid Unit commander shall conduct reconnaissance attacks over the Calcutta and
Akyab areas as designated by him, on top of the following:
1. Forces: The land-based attack plane unit of the Genzan Air Group, one element of the fighter
plane unit and land-based reconnaissance aircraft unit dispatched from the Kanoya Air Group
2. Dates: During the period from 4 until 7 April
3. Bases to be used: Rangoon (depending on the situation, Bassein shall also be used)
4. Targets: Enemy naval vessels and aircraft (the Southern Army commander in chief, the Fifteenth
Army commander, and the [Army] 5th Air Force commander shall be informed)
At noon on 4 April, the Carrier Task Force reached the 0º13’N 86º16.5’E point. The Air Unit
carried out a covert reconnaissance over Trincomalee with one large flying boat, and reported
having spotted eight mid-sized or larger merchantmen (one of which was a hospital ship),
one large destroyer inside the port and patrol boat[s] outside. The unit also conducted search
missions over Sector C up to a distance of seven hundred nautical miles with three large fly-
ing boats, and over Sector A with nine land-based attack planes, but no enemy was spot-
ted.(194) In the meantime, twenty-eight land-based attack planes, eighteen Type–0 fighter
planes and one land-based reconnaissance aircraft advanced to the Mingaladon airfield of
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Rangoon under the command of the Genzan Air Group commander for the attack on Cal-
cutta.(71)
On 5 April, the Carrier Task Force attacked Colombo. The Air Unit carried out search mis-
sions over Sector C with two large flying boats, over Sector A with nine land-based attack
planes, and over the northern part of the Bay of Bengal with three land-based attack planes,
while patrolling in the air over Rangoon with Type–0 fighter planes, but no enemy was spot-
ted.(71) On that day, the Malaya Unit Striking Force advanced to the northern part of the Bay
of Bengal. On the 6th, the Carrier Task Force of the Southern Task Force pulled back to the
east of Ceylon to make preparations for the Trincomalee attack, while on the same day, the
Malaya Unit Striking Force cleared the northern part of the Bay of Bengal of enemy naval
vessels and merchantmen and attained large military gains. The Air Unit [also] carried out
search missions over Sector C with three large flying boats, Sector A with nine land-based
attack planes only to spot no enemy. In the meantime, the attack unit against Calcutta* carried
out bombing attacks on Calcutta* for about one hour from 1155, and reported the following
military gains:(71)
1. Bombed the Akyab airfield; all bombs hit the runway and the [airfield] facilities and blew up
one large and one small aircraft.
2. Bombed naval vessels in the port and sunk one 2,000t-class minelayer.
3. Strafing by the fighter plane unit set fire to one Hurricane and one DC–3.
In this attack, the enemy antiaircraft artillery was sparse and caused no damage to the Japan-
ese forces.
At noon on 7 April, the Carrier Task Force of the Southern Task Force reached the 0º25’N
88º1’E point, while the Malaya Unit had completed its operation and was heading back to
the Nicobar Islands. On that day, the land-based Air Unit did not conduct operations (the
reason is unknown; maybe just to avoid being mistaken by the Carrier Task Force for enemy
aircraft). The Genzan Air Group and the fighter plane unit of the Kanoya Air group returned
from Rangoon to Bangkok.(75) After reaching the point of 9º49’N 89º53’E at noon on the 8th,
the Carrier Task Force changed course to west-northwest and headed for Ceylon to attack
Trincomalee. The land-based air unit did not conduct operations on that day, either.
On 9 April, the Carrier Task Force of the Southern Task Force carried out the attack on
Trincomalee; it inflicted devastating damage on the naval port facilities and the airfield, and
sank HMS Hermes. Without conducting operations again on that day, the land-based air unit
resumed its search missions over the Indian Ocean from the 10th onwards. On that day, the
Combined Fleet shifted to stage-two operations, by which the main theater against the enemy
was meant to shift from the area southwest [of Japan] to that to the east [of Japan]. Accord-
ingly, the Eleventh Air Fleet headquarters also moved to Tinian in the Mariana Islands on 18
April.(75)
The Malaya Unit Striking Force Neutralizes the Bay of Bengal (From 1 to 11 April)
At 1400 on 1 April, the Striking Force of the Malaya Unit left Mergui and headed for the wa-
ters west of Tavoy. On that day thirteen land-based attack planes of the Mihoro Air Group
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* Probably Akyab is meant. Both the reports of the units involved and the following report on military gains
only mention Akyab.
carried out search missions in the areas between 170º and 280º of Sabang up to a distance of
six hundred nautical miles but spotted no enemy.(119)
On 2 April, in order to support Operation C, Southern Task Force Commander Vice Ad-
miral Kondō left the naval port of Seletar for the northern entrance of the Malacca Strait,
leading the main body of the Southern Task Force (the Atago and the 4th Destroyer Division
(minus the 2d Section)). In the evening, the Malaya Unit Striking Force changed course to
270º [W], and headed for the waters between the Andaman and the Nicobar Islands.(114) On
that day, thirteen land-based attack planes of the Mihoro Air Group again carried out search
missions as they had done on the previous day, but spotted no enemy.
On 3 April, the I-7, who on the two days prior to the air raid on Ceylon had been assigned
to covert air reconnaissance in the Colombo area with her onboard aircraft, reported that it
was impossible to conduct the air reconnaissance due to the strict guard of the enemy. From
the report, Malaya Unit Striking Force Commander Vice Admiral Ozawa judged it inevitable
that the attack by the Carrier Task Force of the Southern Task Force would be postponed for
one day, and changed the actions of his striking force in the following way:(181)
1. The date of attack to be carried out by the Malaya Unit Striking Force shall be postponed for
one day.
2. [The unit shall] reverse course at 0413, setting on a 90º [E] course, and then appropriately operate
on the waters east of the Nicobar Islands.
3. The search missions by the aircraft of the Ryūjō shall be postponed until tomorrow, the 4th.
4. The 11th Destroyer Division’s separation from the main unit to sail for Port Blair shall be post-
poned for one day until tomorrow, the 4th.
Meanwhile at 0645 on that day, three to four Boeings and one Lockheed aircraft came for a
raid over the anchorage of the Guard Unit at Port Blair, and bombed it making use of flares.
In this attack, due to near misses, the Yūgiri sustained minor damage, which, however, did
not impair her fighting or sailing [capability]. Fighting back, the Guard Unit brought down
by concentrated fire at 0720 one large enemy aircraft which landed in the back part of Man-
grove Bay.(118)
From 0900 onwards, the Malaya Unit Striking Force appropriately operated on the waters
to the north of the Nicobar Islands. At 1430, [one of] the flying boats of the Tōkō Air Group,
which had carried out search missions in the northern part of the Bay of Bengal on that day,
reported: “[Spotted] seven enemy transport ships 120 nautical miles 19º [NNE] of Calcutta,
sailing on a 180º [S] course at twelve knots.” At 1810 on the 4th, in view of enemy movements,
Southern Task Force Air Unit Commander Vice Admiral Tsukahara ordered reconnaissance
attacks against the Calcutta and Akyab areas between 4 and 7 April with the land-based at-
tack plane unit of the Genzan Air Group and one element of the fighter plane unit and the
land-based reconnaissance plane unit dispatched from the Kanoya Air Group (as previously
told).(141)
On 4 April, after reaching an area about sixty nautical miles southeast of Little Andaman
Island, the Malaya Unit Striking Force headed for the Ten Degree Channel, setting on a 270º
[W] course. At 0725, the Yura, who had sailed to Port Blair for refueling on the previous day,
joined the main unit, just passing at 0800 the 11th Destroyer Division which had been sepa-
rated from the main unit to sail for Port Blair, after incorporation in the Guard Unit. After
passing through the Ten Degree Channel, the Malaya Unit Striking Force took a 330º [NW]
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course at 0858 and headed for Point C, where the Central Unit, the South Unit and the North
Unit would split up [p. 614].(181)
At 1000, a flying boat of the Tōkō Air Group reported the results of its reconnaissance of
Trincomalee: “Eight mid-sized or larger merchantmen (including a hospital ship) and one
large destroyer inside the port.”(181) The Ryūjō conducted search missions with four of her
carrier-based attack planes in the morning and with three in the afternoon over the desig-
nated waters but spotted no enemy. At 2030, the Guard Unit commander left [the waters] off
Port Blair, leading the Sendai, the 11th Destroyer Division (which had arrived off Port Blair
at 1730 and immediately refueled), and the 1st Section of the 19th Destroyer Division, and
headed for the waters to the northwest of Port Blair to guard the rear of the main unit.(118)
At 0300 on 5 April, the main unit took a 320º [NW] course. At 0420, the 20th Destroyer
Division (which had left Port Blair on the 3d) joined the unit and started its direct escort. At
0855, three carrier-based attack planes of the Ryūjō took off and conducted search missions
in the area 120 nautical miles northwest [of the unit] but did not spot any enemy.(181) Around
that time, the Carrier Task Force of the Southern Task Force had reached a point 180 nautical
miles to the south of Colombo, where the first sortie unit against Colombo and the direct air
escort unit [of the carriers] were launched. At 1046, the [enemy] Ceylon station issued air-
raid warnings to all naval vessels.(141) Since the air raid on Colombo was carried out as sched-
uled, the Malaya Unit Striking Force Commander Vice Admiral Ozawa decided to launch
his attack operations also in the Bay of Bengal, and first of all at 1340, ordered the Ryūjō to
advance ahead of the main unit and conduct search and attack missions.(181) She launched
ten carrier-based attack planes between 1433 and 1510, which carried out search missions in
the area 260 to 280 nautical miles to her northwest. The enemy movements reported by the
aircraft of the Ryūjō were as shown in the following table:(119)
Judging from these reports on the movements of the enemy that the enemy lines of commu-
nication were by and large within thirty nautical miles from the shore, Malaya Unit Striking
Force Commander Vice Admiral Ozawa recognized the necessity to change the launching
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Spotted Time [Spotted] Point Types and Numbersof Vessels Course (Speed) Remarks
1640 18º50’N 86º20’E Special service vessel(9,000-ton class)
Bombed; 
1 x 60-kg bomb
scored a direct hit
1705 19º30’N 86º5’E 5 Large merchantmen 240 (8)
1725 17º50’N 84º14’E 1 Merchantman 220 (10)
1740 18º10’N 84º30’E 1 Merchantman 40 (8)
1742 16º52’N 82º45’E 2 Merchantmen 260 (16) Bombed; 1 caught fire
points for the attacks even closer to the shore; he changed Point E to 17º20’N 83º40’E, along
with which, the South Unit and the North Unit also shifted Point F and D closer to the shore.
The new Point F was 16º0’N 82º50’E and the new Point D 19º40’N 87º0’E.(181) At 2030 on that
day the Malaya Unit Striking Force reached the splitting-up point, from where [each unit]
respectively started to advance to Points D, E and F from the north. On that day, only one
enemy submarine was spotted at 140 nautical miles 255º [WSW] of Sabang in the search mis-
sions conducted by nine land-based attack planes of the Mihoro Air Group.(114)
On 6 April, each unit operated as follows:
The Center Unit reached around Point F at 0856; at 0900, the Ryūjō launched four of its
carrier-based attack planes to conduct search and attack missions over the area to the south
[off the coast of India] and near Visakhapatnam, while the Chōkai launched her search aircraft
at 0902. After that, the unit acted as shown in Attached Illustration No. 10 [omitted] and re-
ported the following military gains off Kakinada and Visakhapatnam.(190)
1. The Chōkai
0944 Sank one British merchantman ([of] 5,000 tons)
1119 Sank one U.S. oiler ([of] 9,000 tons)
1140 Sank one British oiler ([of] 3,000 tons) 
Her aircraft conducted bombing and inflicted
serious damage to one cargo ship ([of] 6,000 tons) and
serious damage to one armed marchantman ([of] 4,000 tons)
2. The Yura (including the Ryūjō and Yūgiri)
0955 Sank one Dutch merchantman ([of] 3,000 tons)
1045 Sank one British armed merchantman ([of] 6,000 tons)
1145 Sank one Dutch armed merchantman ([of] 3,000 tons)
3. The aircraft unit of the Ryūjō
Sank one large merchantman ([of] 8,000 tons)
Sank one mid-sized merchantman ([of] 5,000 tons)
Inflicted serious damage to
large merchantmen ([of] 10,000 tons) ⎫
([of] 9,000 tons) ⎪
⎬ setting them to fire or making them unable to sail
([of] 7,500 tons) ⎪
([of] 6,500 tons) ⎭
Inflicted serious damage to two small merchantmen ([of] 2,000 tons)
Blew up two oil tanks ([at] Coringa)
Blew up two warehouses ([at] Coringa and Visakhapatnam)
[In the meantime,] the South Unit ([consisting of] the 2d Section of the 7th Cruiser Division
and the Amagiri) neared Point F at 0900 and launched search aircraft. Having first of all spot-
ted two enemy transport ships at 1030, the unit reported the following military gains by that
afternoon.
Sank one passenger-cargo ship ([of] 7,000 tons)
Sank two passenger-cargo ships ([of] 6,000 tons)
Sank two passenger-cargo ships ([of] 5,000 tons)
The amount of ammunition used in the [South Unit’s] engagements was as follows:(114)
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Mikuma: 120 main gun shells, 22 antiaircraft gun shells, and 5 No. 6 regular bombs
Mogami: 137 main gun shells, 47 antiaircraft gun shells and 4 No. 6 regular bombs
Amagiri: 78 main gun shells and 3 torpedoes
Cap. Soné Akira, then captain of the Mogami recalled the engagements of that day as fol-
lows:(195)
1. No raid or reconnaissance by enemy aircraft was spotted whole day.
2. Even though warnings had been issued [by the enemy] since the previous day due to our suc-
cessive air raids, a number of merchantmen still operated.
3. Even when fired on at close range, merchantmen do not easily sink when armor-piercing am-
munition is used. [However,] once they catch fire, they meet their end fast.
4. Most of the merchantmen were empty and sailing southward.
5. The crew fled on boats one after another, raising sails and heading for the shore; they mostly
consisted of Indians, with a sprinkling of white men. 
6. In the actual situation, it was difficult to seize [such] ships; particularly the crews fled very fast.
7. In these circumstances, it was impossible to catch them unless we drew very much nearer to
the shore.
The North Unit (the 1st Section of the 7th Cruiser Division and the Shirakumo) reached the
19º33’N 87º8.5’E point at 0855 and launched [more than] two search aircraft. [They] first of
all spotted one transport ship at 0915 and were probing it, when they spotted six transport
ships at 0940. Between 0952 and 1150, the unit sank all of them. The amount of ammunition
used in these engagements was as follows:
Kumano: 333 main gun shells and 186 antiaircraft gun shells
Suzuya: 190 main gun shells and 64 antiaircraft gun shells
Shirakumo: 200 main gun shells
That is, the average amount of ammunition used to sink one merchantman was about sev-
enty-five 20-cm armor-piercing shells and about sixty-five 12.7-cm regular shells, with an av-
erage firing range of 5,000-6,000 meters. When probing the transport convoy during this
engagement, the 1st aircraft of the Kumano (Lt. Itō Motoé) facilitated our warships’ attack by
strafing the bridges [of the enemy vessels] from the west so as not to let them draw near to
the shore. When returning from the search mission, the aircraft came under a persistent attack
from three enemy Hurricanes, which were driven away around 1300 by a brave air fight of
the 2d aircraft of the Suzuya (a Type–95 reconnaissance seaplane) and the antiaircraft fire
from [friendly] vessels. At 1326, the North Unit recovered all its aircraft. Although having
sustained as many as nineteen hits, the crew of the 1st aircraft of the Kumano was unscathed.
Due to the attack by the three [enemy] fighter planes, the North Unit (led by R. Adm. Kurita
Takeo) hurriedly withdrew southeastwards, forced to temporarily suspend the operation to
destroy the [enemy] sea lines of communication. Since the unit had spotted sooty smoke to
its west after having recovered its aircraft, it headed there; sighting one 10,000-ton-class mer-
chantman drifting with fires at her stern, it sank her. With no information coming in on enemy
movements after that, the North Unit set a 180º [S] course from 1516 and headed for the ren-
dezvous point [scheduled] for the 7th.(119) Meanwhile, the Guard Unit had been operating on
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the waters about 250 nautical miles to the northwest of the Andaman Islands to guard the
rear of the Malaya Unit Striking Force, but spotted nothing unusual.(118)
On 7 April, all units first of all headed for the rendezvous point; at 0630 the South Unit
joined the Center Unit, which was followed by the North Unit, which joined the Center Unit
at 0830, and at 0900 the force took a 140º [SE] course at fifteen knots, heading straight for the
Nicobar Islands.(181) At 0905, the 20th Destroyer Division left the main unit for the Andaman
Islands for refueling. In the meantime, the Guard Unit was about two hundred nautical miles
northwest of Port Blair and on its way to join the main unit on the morning of the 8th.(190)
At 0800 on 8 April, the main unit reached a point about 150 nautical miles to the west of
Port Blair, and having been joined by the Guard Unit, it headed for the Ten Degree Chan-
nel.(181) The unit searched the channel with four carrier-based attack planes of the Ryūjō, but
no enemy was spotted. The unit reached the western entrance of the channel at 1600, un-
eventfully passed through the channel, and at 2115 took a course toward the north entrance
of the Malacca Strait at a point about thirty nautical miles north of Car Nicobar Island. Mean-
while, the Yura left the main unit at 2300 to head for Penang for refueling.(181)
At 1200 on 9 April, the Malaya Unit Striking Force reached a point about one hundred
nautical miles to the north of Sabang. Joined by the 20th Destroyer Division at 1440, which
had completed refueling at Port Blair, the force entered the Malacca Strait in the evening and
reached the port of Singapore between 1030 and 1100 on 11 April without problems. Mean-
while at 0915 on the 10th, the Yura had entered the port of Penang without problems.(114) Dur-
ing this period, the disposition of forces for the stage-two, phase-one operations of the
Combined Fleet was put in motion as of 10 April. Accordingly, the Chōkai and the 7th Cruiser
Division were transferred to the Forward Unit, while the Ryūjō and the 3d Destroyer
Squadron were put into the main unit. Prior to this, on 7 April, Southern Task Force Com-
mander Vice Admiral Kondō had issued by means of telegraphic order No. 159 the following
orders concerning the operations of the units ([and] vessels) of the Southern Task Force at
the time of shifting to the new disposition of forces (as of 10 April):(53)
1. The 7th Cruiser Division, the 3d Destroyer Squadron, the 4th Carrier Division (minus the 2d
Section) and the Chōkai shall be removed from the Malaya Unit. As soon as having completed
their [current] tasks, the above-mentioned units ([and] vessels) shall return to their home ports
for maintenance work.
Concerning the sail to mainland Japan, the 7th Cruiser Division commander shall group and
control the above-mentioned units ([and] vessels), giving consideration to the guarding and
sweeping [operations] against enemy submarines.
2. Having completed their mission in the Carrier Task Force, the 3d Battleship Division (minus
the 2d Section) and the 2d Section of the 4th Destroyer Division shall sail to their naval [home]
ports for maintenance work. As to the sail to mainland Japan, they shall obey the directions of
the Carrier Task Force commander.
3. The Yura shall be removed from the Malaya Unit and returned to the 5th Submarine Squadron.
4. The 2d and the 5th Submarine Squadrons shall be removed from the Southern Task Force. Each
squadron shall operate as designated by its own commander.
5. The 16th, the 18th and the 2d Destroyer Divisions, the 24th Destroyer Division (minus the
Suzukaze) and the 11th Seaplane Tender Division (minus the Mizuho) shall remain in their current
positions until specified otherwise by special orders. 
6. The remaining units ([and] vessels) shall be mobilized in accordance with the disposition of
forces for the stage-two, phase-one operations.
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The Chōkai, the 7th Cruiser Division, the 4th Carrier Division (minus the 2d Section), the 3d
Destroyer Squadron and the Yura, which were removed from the Malaya Unit by these or-
ders, operated as follows:
The Chōkai: After the flag of the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet had been transferred to the
Kashii on the 12th, the Chōkai left the port of Singapore together with the 4th Carrier division
(minus the 2d Section) on the 13th, and entered the port of Yokosuka on the 22d by way of
Cam Ranh Bay. 
The 4th Carrier Division (minus the 2d Section): On the 13th, the division left Singapore along
with the Chōkai [for Japan] by way of Cam Ranh Bay. On its way, it separated from the Chōkai,
arrived at Hashirajima on the 22d, and entered the port of Kure on the 23d.
The Sendai: She left the port of Singapore on the 13th; arriving at Sanya on the 17th and leaving
the port on the same day, she entered the port of Sasebo on the 22d. 
The 7th Cruiser Division: The division left Singapore on the 13th; arriving in Cam Ranh Bay on
the 16th and leaving the port on the same day, it entered the port of Kure on the 22d.
The Yura: She left Penang on the 11th and arrived in the temporary anchorage at Malacca on
the 12th; she left there on the 13th and entered the port of Sasebo on the 20th.
The aggregate military gains reported by the Malaya Unit in the striking operation in the
northern part of the Bay of Bengal were as shown in the following table.(181)
On the other hand, the damage sustained by the Japanese forces was very slight, [namely]
the 1st aircraft of the Kumano, which was marked by nineteen bullets, ([but] repairable on
the ship), and some damage to the 3d aircraft of the Kumano, which was caused by the gun
blast of its own vessel.(119)
The Reconnaissance of Key [Enemy] Places by the Submarines Proved Difficult
At that time [at the start of the carrier operation in the Indian Ocean], out of Submarine Unit
C (consisting of seven submarines of the 2d Submarine Squadron), Submarine I–1 was re-
turning to Yokosuka, having left Staring Bay on 15 March due to trouble with her starboard
engine, which required repair at a naval arsenal, while Submarine I–5, who had run aground
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[Enemy] Naval Vessels
[Enemy] Facilities Notes
Sank Inflicted Serious Damage









North Unit 8 Approx. 66,000 tons
South Unit 5 Approx. 29,000 tons
Total 21 Approx. 137,000 tons 8 Approx. 47,000 tons Blew up 2 oil tanksBlew up 2 warehouses
at the entrance to Kendari on 28 February, was in the middle of an operation to refloat her.
Consequently, [the number of] the submarines, which participated in the third carrier oper-
ation in the Indian Ocean was five in the beginning, namely, I–7, I–2, I–3, I–4 and I–6; after
having been joined by the I–5, who had completed repairs after being refloated, they totaled
six submarines. The operations of each of them were as follows:(60)
Submarine I–7 (with the Submarine Unit C commander on board)
I–7 was supposed to conduct air reconnaissance [with her onboard aircraft] over Colombo and
Trincomalee two days before the air raids. At 2330 on the 1st, she sent the following telegram to
the 2d Submarine Squadron:(191) At 0817 on the 1st, I–7 came under a bombing attack by an
enemy seaplane at a point 180 nautical miles 147º [SE] of Ceylon. Although nearly missed, no
damage was caused, because it was dud. Four hours after the bombing, an [enemy] patrol air-
craft came to our position. When the communication [signals] from the [enemy] aircraft at night
and the reports from the 5th Submarine Squadron are taken into consideration together, we pre-
sume that the enemy is trying to clear the sea of submarines at night with his aircraft, taking
advantage of current [bright] moonlight. It is necessary to keep a strict watch.”
Then at 0000 on 3 April by means of Submarine Unit C Classified Telegram No. 96, she re-
ported the cancellation of the air reconnaissance over Colombo: “The guard within a radius of
seventy to eighty nautical miles from the shore southwest of Ceylon is very strict around the
clock. Since there will be almost no chance for a launch of the flight operations, I–7 shall cancel
the air reconnaissance over Colombo and take up her designated position.” Later at 0740, I–7
attacked a cargo ship (the British ship Glenshiel, 9,415 tons)(100) at 1º0’S 78º11’E, and sank her with
two torpedoes and twenty shells.
On 7 April, Submarine Unit C Commander Rear Admiral Ichioka ordered Submarines I–3
and I–2 to conduct a weather reconnaissance around their stations in the Trincomalee area. On
the 9th, after the completion of the attack on Trincomalee by the Carrier Task Force, the com-
mander issued an order to the unit to withdraw from their stations and return to Singapore by
means of Submarine Unit C Telegraphic Operation Order No. 6, and he returned to Singapore
at 1600 on the 15th.
Submarine I–3 (with 7th Submarine Division commander on board)
Submarine I–3 had left Penang on 28 March and took up her position to reconnoiter and watch
Colombo. She made the following reports on enemy movements and the weather:(194)
Sent at 2200 on 3 April: “A number of enemy patrol vessels were outside the port of
Colombo. Since his guard was very strict, we were not yet able to reconnoiter the inside of the
port. [Enemy] ships considered to have departed [from Colombo] were one merchantman, who
was sailing south alone at a point seventy nautical miles 220º [SW] of Colombo at 0725 on the
2d, and another, who was sailing westward alone at a point seventy nautical miles 235º [SW] of
Colombo at 0130 on the 3d. However, other than them, we have not encountered any naval ves-
sels entering or leaving the port. As for [enemy] aircraft, although one land-based aircraft was
spotted at a point 195 nautical miles 135º [SE] of Colombo at 1600 on the 31st, the situation of
the [enemy] air patrols is unclear because we remained submerged during the day since then.”
Then at 0200 on 5 April, the following was sent: “The weather is fine around [here]; the cloud
cover is five and its height 1,000 [meters]. A southern wind with a velocity of five meters [per
second]. Visibility is good. More clouds are seen near the horizon and lightening is seen some-
times. Almost no changes in the weather in the past two days other than some increase in wind
velocity. Our position is fifty nautical miles 240º [WSW] of Colombo.” Then at 0400 on 5 April:
“Weather and atmospheric conditions were as sent in our Classified Telegram No. 30 (note by
the author: the previous telegram). The sea is calm. Our position is thirty-six nautical miles 240º
[WSW] of Colombo.”
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Later at 0540 on the 7th, I–3 spotted five cargo ships sailing east, one cargo ship sailing west-
ward and one oiler on the waters 100 to 150 nautical miles to the west of Colombo. Although
she attacked three of them, she was not able to produce any results, other than scoring fourteen
hits on one of them (the British ship Elmdale, 4,872 tons) (Consumed ammunition: four torpedoes
and thirty-nine shells). Then at 0450 on the 8th, she attacked a cargo ship sailing westward (the
British ship Fultala, 5,051 tons)(160) about 180 nautical miles west of Colombo and sank her with
one torpedo. Having reported the results of her weather reconnaissance at a point one hundred
nautical miles west-southwest of Colombo at 0200 and 0400 on the 9th, she withdrew from her
patrol area by the order of the Submarine Unit C commander of the 10th, and returned to Sin-
gapore on 15 April.
Submarine I–2
In order to take up her position to watch [the waters] off Trincomalee, Submarine I–2 had left
Penang at 1200 on 28 March for Trincomalee. At 2130 on 3 April, she sent the following report:(141)
“Reconnaissance report of Trincomalee: 1. Although we reached a point ten nautical miles out-
side the port of Trincomalee at 1100 on 3 April, we were not able to approach [the port], being
blocked by patrolling enemy vessels. No enemy was spotted around the mouth of the port other
than the patrolling vessels. 2. During the period we have watched this area from 31 March on-
wards, we have spotted no enemy aircraft around sunrise [or sunset] or at night (we remained
submerged during daytime). 3. General weather conditions in this area: fair until 1 April; over-
cast with thin clouds on 2 and 3 April and there was a light rain on the evening of the 3d. How-
ever, the weather is generally fine in the morning, and the sea is very calm every day.” [Then]
at 0400 on 5 April, she [also] sent: “Overcast in the vicinity with a cloud cover of 8 and a height
of 1500 [meters]. Southeast wind with a velocity of seven meters [per second]; visibility is good.
Generally, in these days, the amount of clouds is small in the morning; it increases in the evening
and causes light rains at times. The wind velocity tends to increase a little. Our position is fifty
nautical miles 40º [NE] of Trincomalee.” [Later,] she reported having sunk a mid-sized cargo
ship with two torpedoes at 1020 on the 7th at 6º48’N 82º18’E. Then sending a weather recon-
naissance report at 0400 on the 9th at a point sixty nautical miles 100º [E] of Trincomalee, she
[also] reported on the enemy movements [at the time of] the air raid on Trincomalee at 2200 [on
that day] as follows:(193) “The enemy movements we witnessed during submerged operations
around a point eighty nautical miles (seventeen nautical miles off the shore) 143º [SE] of Trin-
comalee on the 9th were as follows: 1. The two steamers sailing southward around 1430 were
both sunk by the bombing of [our] aircraft. 2. At 1515 to our west, a huge explosion was caused
by the bombing of [our] aircraft; a flame shot up to the sky, but disappeared in an instant, which
made us presume that the naval vessel had instantly sunk. After withdrawing from her station
on 10 April, Submarine I–2 returned to Singapore on the 15th.
Submarine I-4 (with the 8th Submarine Division commander on board)
Submarine I–4 had left Penang at 1200 on 28 March and headed toward her designated position
([in] the vicinity of Eight Degree Channel?). At 1900 on the 6th, she sank a cargo ship (the U.S.
ship Washingtonian, 6,617 tons) with two torpedoes at the western entrance of the channel. She
then reported having inflicted serious damage on a motorized sailing boat (200-ton class) off
Colombo at 0400 on the 10th by shelling (fourteen shells); she returned to Singapore at 1800 on
the 16th.
Submarine I–6
Submarine I–6 had left Penang at 1600 on 26 March for the Bombay area. At 1835 on the 31st,
she reported having sunk one mid-sized cargo ship with two torpedoes to the east of Eight De-
gree Channel. [Then] at 1714 on 2 April, she sank a cargo ship (the British ship Clan Ross, 5,897
tons) off Bombay with three torpedoes, while at 2200 on the 7th, she sank another mid-sized
cargo ship (the British ship Bahadur, 5,424 tons)(160) with seven torpedoes and eight shells in the
same area. Next, in the same area at 1115 on the 10th, she also shelled two 150t-class motorized
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sailing boats ([with] sixteen shells). After reporting having sunk them, she withdrew and re-
turned to Singapore at 1600 on 17 April. 
Submarine I–5
Having been refloated on 20 March and undergone emergency repairs at Kendari, she hurried
to the Ceylon area, leaving there on 25 March. On 8 April, she was ordered to advance to the
south of Cape of Comorin [Kanyakumari]. After having carried out patrols in the area, she re-
turned to Singapore at 1800 on 16 April.
The military gains Submarine Unit C had reported between 3 and 10 April were six cargo ships
and four motorized sailing boats, who had been sunk, and one cargo ship, on whom serious
damage had been inflicted, while no damage was sustained on the Japanese side. In accordance
with the stage-two, phase-one disposition of forces, which was put in motion on 10 April, the
2d Submarine Squadron was removed from the Southern Task Force and returned to the Ad-
vance Unit; [accordingly,] it left Singapore at 1000 on 21 April for mainland Japan, and entered
the port of Yokosuka on 1 May.
Concerning the use of submarines, “The Greater East Asia War’s Lessons of War ([section]
Air Operations: The Operations on Ceylon)” says the following: 
In reconnoitering enemy movements, one must employ submarines within the limits of their
capabilities, without overestimating them.
When launching new operations, the use of submarines is a very effective means in case you
decide to try every means available to thoroughly spy on the movements of the enemy. There-
fore, as stated in the previous item, it is necessary to deploy submarines at key enemy points
(note by the author: Aden, Durban, Cape Town, Bombay and Ceylon), have them directly watch
these places along with conducting a timely reconnaissance inside these ports with their aircraft,
conduct a sweep of the waters where engagements are anticipated so as to have them try as
much as possible to spy on the enemy forces at their locations and in their movements. However,
viewed in the light of their performance in this operation, the dispersal of the six submarines of
the 2d Submarine Squadron to the various areas of Trincomalee, Colombo, Bombay, the Chagos
Archipelago and the Maldive Islands, etc., meant that not only almost nothing was achieved in
their reconnaissance let alone their attacks, but that [ironically] their stationing actually deprived
[the task force] of the reconnaissance that was supposed to be done and on which it so much
depended. In such a situation where no reinforcements of submarines are expected as in this
operation, we think that it would have been better if they had rather all been concentrated off
Colombo. 
Thus, conceptually and fundamentally we cannot expect too much from the current practice
of reconnaissance with aircraft carried by submarines. Therefore, we deem it necessary to study
as a new concept a method of how to carry along land-based reconnaissance planes or carrier-
based reconnaissance aircraft, which are fast and able to return to considerably remote bases or
carriers, whose main purpose is to be employed for a single forced photo reconnaissance in on-
going operations. 
The Distress of Britain (See Illustration No. 64)
The situation of Britain, as described by [Captain S.W.] Roskill in his book The War at Sea
1939-1945, may be summarized as follows:* 
Chapter IX     /     The Neutralization of the Indian Ocean 649
* Vol. II, Chapter I “The Pacific and Indian Oceans,” pp. 22-32. 
On 8 March, the First Sea Lord Admiral Pound reported to the prime minister that Ceylon was threat-
ened and that a situation similar to what had happened to Malaya might occur. According to his view,
the loss of Ceylon would result in undermining the whole strategic position [of Britain] in the Middle
and the Far East. Upon this, the British government newly appointed Admiral [Sir James] Somerville
to commander-in-chief of the Eastern Fleet and ordered him to protect Ceylon, employing HMS Ramil-
lies, HMS Royal Sovereign and as many other naval vessels as possible. Somerville retorted to the First
Sea Lord that [the deployment of] only two R-class battleships with fighter planes to directly escort
them in the air would just repeat [the tragedy of] the HMS Prince of Wales and the HMS Repulse.
On his way to his new assignment, the new commander-in-chief [Admiral] Somerville sent a letter
to the First Sea Lord in which he described his prospects. “Ceylon is obviously exposed to the danger
of being lost. If the Japanese are intending to invade the island with their entire fleet, he could do little
against them. If, on the other hand, an attack were made on a smaller scale, the best counter would be
to preserve the military strength of the Eastern Fleet.” 
On 26 March, Admiral Somerville arrived in Colombo, where he assumed command of the Eastern
Fleet, replacing former commander-in-chief Admiral [Sir Geoffrey] Layton. His fleet consisted of two
large aircraft carriers (HMS Indomitable and HMS Formidable), one small aircraft carrier (HMS Hermes),
five battleships (HMS Warspite, HMS Resolution, HMS Ramillies, HMS Royal Sovereign, and HMS Re-
venge), two heavy cruisers, five light cruisers (including the Dutch HNLMS Jacob van Heemskerck), sixteen
destroyers and seven submarines, which on paper were superior forces.* However, the number of attack
planes carried by the three carriers was only fifty-seven, and the number of fighter planes was merely
thirty-six. Furthermore, there were insufficient shore-based long-range reconnaissance aircraft, and al-
most no land-based attack plane units. His fleet was outdated, and was not adequately trained. On top
of that, the defenses of his main bases, [i.e.] Colombo, Trincomalee and Addu Atoll (the latter of which
will be explained later) were very weak.
The former commander-in-chief of the Eastern Fleet Admiral Layton was a renowned admiral and
a person of action with a strong will, and one of the officers who had escaped from the successive de-
feats in Malaya and the Dutch East Indies. Having arrived in mid-January at Ceylon from Batavia, he
was newly appointed commander-in-chief of Ceylon with wide powers to command the three forces
on the island as well as the civil officers including the governor. Admiral Layton anticipated that Ceylon
would come under attack before long, which quickly became a fact.
In the middle of March, [Vice] Admiral Kondō (note: commander of the Southern Task Force) or-
dered two attacks against India. One was the attack on Ceylon carried out by the Carrier Task Force
(consisting of five aircraft carriers, four battleships, three cruisers and eight destroyers) led by Vice Ad-
miral Nagumo, while the other was a sweeping operation in the northern part of the Bay of Bengal
conducted by a fleet consisting of one light aircraft carrier, six cruisers and eight destroyers led by Vice
Admiral Ozawa (note: commander of the Malaya Unit). It was soon after his arrival at his new post
that Admiral Somerville got this information.
Both Admirals Somerville and Layton knew that under such circumstances, it was [too] dangerous
to use Colombo and Trincomalee as anchorages for the fleet. Therefore, it was decided to use a secret
base at Addu Atoll, the southern end of the Maldive Islands, six hundred nautical miles southwest of
Ceylon. Although the island was relatively safe against a surprise attack by an enemy fleet, it totally
lacked antiaircraft and antisubmarine defenses. But, fortunately, the Japanese forces did not learn of
the base on Addu Atoll.
Intelligence indicated that the attack against Colombo and Trincomalee was to be expected on or
around 1 April. [Admiral] Somerville judged that the Japanese attacks would be conducted from the
southeast at dawn; planning to destroy the Japanese forces by torpedo** attacks at night by carrier air-
craft, he concentrated [his fleet] to the south of Ceylon on the last day of March. However, he tried to
avoid being attacked by enemy carrier aircraft; he had been ordered to preserve his fleet. In accordance
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with his operational plan, six twin-engine reconnaissance seaplanes (Catalinas) of the 205th Squadron
of the Royal Air Force (which were all the [search] aircraft available on Ceylon) carried out search mis-
sions as far as 420 nautical miles to the south of Ceylon.
The intelligence which reached [him] on 31 March was that the enemy attack would soon be made.
On 1 April, the cruiser HMS Dorsetshire stopped her refit in Colombo and joined the fleet. On 1 and 2
April, the British fleet conducted search missions and patrolling while sailing eastward by night and
westward by day. However, no information on the enemy came in. Late at night on the 2d, Admiral
Somerville concluded that either the information of the attack on Ceylon was wrong, or the attack plan
had been postponed. Since part of the British fleet required replenishment of fuel and/or fresh water,
Admiral Somerville returned to Addu Atoll for replenishment, while dispatching HMS Dorsetshire to
Colombo [to resume] her refit and HMS Cornwall was sent to provide escort for the transport convoy
of Australian army troops due to arrive on the 8th. Furthermore, he also dispatched the aircraft carrier
HMS Hermes and one destroyer to Trincomalee to prepare for the invasion of Madagascar. 
On the afternoon of 4 April, the fleet entered the port of Addu Atoll. However, right after that, a re-
port came in from a search aircraft that a superior enemy force had been spotted 360 nautical miles
southeast of Ceylon. At that time, the fast division (HMS Indomitable, HMS Formidable, HMS Warspite,
HMS Cornwall,* HMS Emerald and HMS Enterprise) was in the middle of refueling, while the slow divi-
sion (the R-class battleships and the remaining cruisers) could not be ready until the next day. Admiral
Somerville decided to let the fast division sail as soon as possible and let the slow division follow in an
attempt to conduct a torpedo attack at night to block the enemy’s course of retreat.
Since it was impossible to expect support from Somerville’s fleet, Admiral Layton, commander-in-
chief of Ceylon, sent away the naval vessels at anchor, while strengthening his defenses on his own.
The main vessels who escaped were the heavy cruisers HMS Cornwall and HMS Dorsetshire in Colombo
and the carrier HMS Hermes in Trincomalee. The attack on Colombo was conducted from 0800 on 5
April (Sunday) with ninety-one bombers and thirty-six fighter planes. Two squadrons of Hurricanes
(another squadron was deployed in Trincomalee) as well as two squadrons of Navy Fulmar fighter
planes, totaling forty-two aircraft intercepted them, and after a fierce air engagement, brought down
many** [enemy] aircraft, although the British forces also lost nineteen fighter planes. Furthermore, six
Navy torpedo bombers (Swordfish) had been sent from Trincomalee to conduct torpedo attacks. How-
ever, they arrived at the scene in the middle of the air engagement and were all brought down. Fortunately,
the damage to the ships at anchor in the port as well as that to the port facilities was relatively slight.
The heavy cruisers HMS Dorsetshire and HMS Cornwall had left the port late on 4 April to join
Somerville’s fleet. However, both vessels were spotted by enemy search aircraft on the morning of the
5th, attacked by more than fifty [enemy] bombers on the late*** afternoon of that day and sank in a
few minutes. The deadly power of Japanese carrier aircraft was again demonstrated. On the late after-
noon of the next day, the 6th, 1,112 survivors of both vessels were rescued by vessels sent by Admiral
Somerville. However, 424 officers and men were lost.
Somerville’s fleet advanced halfway between Ceylon and Addu Atoll. However, with no informa-
tion on the enemy reported, he gave up the idea of attacking the enemy and entered the port of Addu
Atoll at 1100 on the 8th. Nagumo’s Unit also made efforts to spot Somerville’s fleet, only to fail. [It was
because] the Japanese fleet conducted search missions in the area southeast of Ceylon, whereas
Somerville’s Fleet was operating [on the waters] far to the west.
After [attacking Colombo], Nagumo’s fleet was heading for an attack on Trincomalee. On the af-
ternoon of the 8th, a British search aircraft spotted a large force at four hundred nautical miles to the
east of Ceylon. That night, the naval vessels at anchor in Trincomalee were made to evacuate the port.
Through this action the carrier HMS Hermes, the destroyer HMAS Vampire, some merchantmen and
naval vessels attached to the fleet retired to the south.
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* HMS Cornwall had already been sent away.
** The original text only says seven.
*** Roskill: early.
On the early morning of the 9th, the attack by enemy carrier aircraft took place. The [enemy]
strength was almost the same as that employed in the attack on Colombo. However, only twenty-two
fighter planes rose to meet them. The enemy attack did huge damage to shore facilities. Nine Blenheims
of the 11th Squadron (the entire forces available to fight back) headed for an attack on the enemy car-
riers, but five of them were lost before scoring any hits. 
Having heard that the attack was over, the vessels which had escaped from Trincomalee reversed
course at 0900 on the 9th to return to the port. Their position was about sixty-five nautical miles from
the base. Unfortunately, this unit was spotted by Japanese search aircraft, came under attack around
1030; the HMS Hermes sank [after] having been hit by forty bombs in ten minutes, and the destroyer
HMAS Vampire, the corvette HMS Hollyhock and two transport ships were also sunk. It was fortunate
that more than six hundred survivors were rescued by a nearby hospital ship.
Meanwhile, Ozawa’s striking force had been running riot in the northern part of the Bay of Bengal,
due to which twenty-three merchantmen of a total of 112,312 tons were sunk between 5* and 9 April.
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Illustration No. 64 — The Outline of the Actions of the British Eastern Fleet (from 5 till 8 April, 1942)
* Roskill: 4.
Japanese submarine units also operated in the waters off the west coast of India, and sank five mer-
chantmen of a total of 32,404 tons in the first ten days of April. The command of the sea as well as the
air over the Indian Ocean was completely taken over by the enemy.
On the morning of 7 April, the [British] Admiralty sent an instruction telegram to Admiral
Somerville that in such circumstances, the R-class battleships were a liability instead of an asset, and
that it would let the commander-in-chief use his own discretion to withdraw the battleships to Africa.
On the 8th, Admiral Somerville replied that he agreed to the instruction and had decided to send the
slow division to Kilindini in east Africa to have it engage in guarding the sailing routes of convoys in
the area, and that he had further decided to keep the fast division in the Indian Ocean to be ready
against rapid enemy forces, but would keep it far away from Ceylon. 
Fortunately, Japan had not planned to implement large-scale invasion operations in the Indian
Ocean. Without pressing home the advantage they had gained in the Indian Ocean, the Japanese forces
shifted their main strength to the east; two months later, they entered the decisive battle of Midway,
where Nagumo’s unit was totally destroyed. 
8. The Shift to Stage-Two Operations
As previously mentioned, the Combined Fleet, which had entered stage-one, phase-four op-
erations from 10 March onwards, the day after the fall of Java, decided to shift to stage-two,
phase-one operations from 10 April onwards, following the completion of the major part of
the Burma operation in early April.(141)
From the opening of hostilities, the Japanese forces had won victory after victory and
their power was reaching its peak, sweeping everything before them. With their morale soar-
ing to high heaven, they felt as if the United States and Britain did not amount to anything.
The following gives an outline of the concept of the stage-two operations.
The Grand Plan of Operations of IGHQ [Navy Department]
The Plan of Operations of the Imperial Japanese Navy for Stage-Two Operations(196) ([as of]
15 April 1942) by IGHQ [Navy Department] may be excerpted as follows:
I. General Policies (Omitted by the author)
II. Purpose of the Operations
4. The purpose of the operations of the Imperial [Japanese] Navy is to destroy the enemy fleets
and air power in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, secure the necessary strategic places so as
to strengthen and establish an undefeatable strategic position of the [Japanese] empire, by
which [the Navy] shall bring Britain to submission and crush the morale of the United States.
III. Missions
5. [The Navy shall] destroy the British fleet in the Indian Ocean, and in tandem with the
progress of the German and Italian operations in west Asia, capture Ceylon as far as the cir-
cumstances permit it in conjunction with the Army, so as to cut the communications between
Britain and India and secure the cooperation with Germany and Italy. 
6. [The Navy shall] intensify the operations against Australia, particularly those to cut off [the
communications between] the United States and Australia, to expedite their submission.
7. [The Navy shall] keep a strict watch against surprise attacks, particularly air strikes by
enemy task forces on mainland Japan, and catch and destroy them.
8. Against the United States, [the Navy shall] conduct surprise attacks on, destroy or capture
their operational bases in the Pacific Ocean as required, by which it shall try to diminish
U.S. surface and air power. After the operations in the Indian Ocean and against Australia
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are mostly completed, [the Navy shall] search for the U.S. main fleets (including those com-
bined with British forces), coercively draw them into decisive battles and destroy them.
9. At an appropriate moment, the operations against China shall be intensified, and along with
the results of the Burma operation, the submission of the Chiang regime shall be expedited.
10. Operational bases in the captured areas shall quickly be prepared and their defenses be
strengthened.
IV. Outline of the Operations
11. The disposition of forces in the initial period of stage-two operations shall be as follows:
(1) The occupied areas in [the area to] the south [of Japan]
The forces consisting of the First, Second, and Third Southern Expeditionary Fleets as
the core and one element of the Combined Fleet
(2) The [equatorial] Pacific Islands and the South Pacific Islands
The forces consisting of the Fourth Fleet and the Eleventh Air Fleet as the core and one
element of the Combined Fleet
(3) The Sea to the east of Japan
The forces consisting of the Fifth Fleet as the core
(4) The Pacific and the Indian Oceans
A force consisting of the Sixth Fleet as the core and one element of the Combined Fleet
(5) The Japanese waters 
The main force of the Combined Fleet
(6) The China area
The China Area Fleet
12. The Operations shall be carried out in outline as follows:
(1) [The forces shall] swiftly search for the British fleet in the Indian Ocean, destroy it and
in tandem with the progress of German and Italian operations in west Asia, capture Cey-
lon as far as the circumstances permit it, so as to cut the communications between Britain
and India and secure the cooperation with Germany and Italy.
(2) Against Australia, [the forces shall] intensify the operations to cut off [its communica-
tions] with the United States and Britain, while destroying enemy fleets in the Australian
[waters], to expedite its submission.
For that purpose, the following operations shall be conducted.
{1} The land-based air units and the Carrier Task Force shall smash the enemy power
and military facilities in strategic points on the eastern and northern coasts of Aus-
tralia to contain enemy counter offensives.
{2} The Carrier Task Force and the submarines shall destroy enemy fleets in the Aus-
tralian waters, while destroying enemy sea lines of communication. 
{3} In conjunction with the Army, [the forces] shall capture Fiji, Samoa and New Cale-
donia, prepare air and submarine bases at these points so as to cut off the sea lines of
communication as well as air traffic routes between Australia and the United States.
However, concerning Samoa, it is possible that the forces shall be withdrawn when
after its capture the base facilities have been completely destroyed.
After the China Incident has been settled or the relations with the Soviet [Union]
have become less tense, an invasion of Australia may be planned if circumstances
should permit it.
(3) Against the eastern front, the following operations shall be conducted:
{1} Midway Island shall be captured with as main intention to make it difficult [for the
enemy] to conduct surprise attacks.
{2} [To be ready] against enemy surprise attacks, necessary forces shall appropriately be
deployed, and patrols shall be conducted. Particularly, [the forces] shall maintain a
strict watch against air raids over mainland Japan, strive to find out the intentions of
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the enemy beforehand, and catch and destroy him by concentrating our strength at
appropriate moments. 
{3} By surprise attacks with submarines and air units [the forces shall] strive to degrade
the power of the enemy and destroy his operational bases in the Pacific Ocean, mainly
on Hawaii and other places. 
{4} Operational bases on the Aleutian Islands shall be destroyed or captured as soon as
possible to contain U.S. intentions of conducting operations from the north Pacific.
(4) After the operations in the Indian Ocean and the Australia area are roughly completed,
[the Navy shall] direct its whole strength toward the eastern front, coercively draw the
U.S. main fleets (including those combined with British forces) into decisive battles and
destroy them. 
For this purpose, when preparations have been completed, the following operations
shall be implemented.
{1} The bases on the periphery of Hawaii (Johnston and Palmyra Atolls, etc.) shall be
captured.
{2} At an opportune moment, large-scale surprise attacks shall be implemented against
Hawaii to destroy the enemy air power there.
{3} While carrying out the above two operations, the bulk of the Combined Fleet shall
catch and destroy the surface forces of the enemy to coercively draw the enemy main
force into decisive battles as much as possible.
{4} In connection with the operations in the above items, and if circumstances permit it,
[the forces may] capture Hawaii in conjunction with the Army with the intention to
destroy the enemy’s advance bases, disrupt his commerce, as well as to intensify sur-
prise attacks on strategic places on the west coast of the United States.
(5) Throughout this period of operations, [the Navy] shall conduct effective commerce dis-
ruption warfare in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, while securing the sea lines of com-
munication required for the [Japanese] empire.
(6) [The Navy] shall rapidly strengthen the defenses of the [equatorial] Pacific Islands as
well as the captured areas so as to be prepared against counterattack and recapture op-
erations of the enemy.
(7) As for China, by enforcing strict naval blockades in the India and Burma areas, conjointly
with the Army operations, the submission of the Chiang regime shall be expedited.
The Revision of the Wartime Formation
Since the opening of hostilities, several times partial revisions had been made of the Wartime
Formation of the Imperial Japanese Navy; on 1 April [1942], a change in the formation of the
Eleventh Air Fleet was implemented in order to enormously strengthen the land-based air
unit. Namely, the 24th Air Flotilla, made up by extracting [forces] from the Fourth Fleet, and
the newly-organized 25th and the 26th Air Flotillas were added to the [current] 21st, the 22d
and the 23d Air Flotillas, which increased [the number of air flotillas] to six. Following that,
along with the Combined Fleet’s shift to stage-two operations on 10 April, the Wartime For-
mation was substantially revised. The major changes were the following:(187)
1. The (newly-built) Yamato was incorporated into the 1st Battleship Division.
2. The First Air Fleet, which until now was made up of four carrier divisions, ([i.e.] the 1st, the 2d,
the 4th, and the 5th Carrier Divisions) with destroyer divisions or destroyers attached to each
of them, was changed in such a way that each carrier division only contained carriers and that
the newly-formed 10th [Destroyer] Squadron (consisting of one light cruiser and three destroyer
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divisions) was incorporated into the fleet instead to take unified [control over the] destroyer di-
visions (or destroyers) assigned to guard and escort the carriers. 
3. The 8th Destroyer Division was removed from the 2d Destroyer Squadron and incorporated
into the 4th Destroyer Squadron, while the 24th Destroyer Division was removed from the 4th
Destroyer Squadron and incorporated into the 1st Destroyer Squadron. The 17th Destroyer Di-
vision was removed from the 1st Destroyer Squadron and incorporated into the 10th [Destroyer]
Squadron.
4. The Southwest Area Fleet was newly formed to take command of the current First, Second, and
Third Southern Expeditionary Fleets. The commander of the Southwest Area Fleet was concur-
rently assigned to be the commander in chief of the Second Southern Expeditionary Fleet. 
5. In order to strengthen the protection of the sea lines of communication, the 1st and the 2d Surface
Escort Units were newly formed, and respectively incorporated into the Southwest Area Fleet
and the Fourth Fleet.
6. The 6th Submarine Squadron, which had been attached to the Combined Fleet, was disbanded.
The Main Points of the Outline of the Stage-Two Operations of 
the Combined Fleet
Based on the plan for stage-two operations of IGHQ, the main points of the operational plan
of the Combined Fleet for stage-two was to go ahead with the preparations for the invasions
of Port Moresby and Tulagi with one element, and continue to make preparations for the
Midway and Aleutians operations with the main force, while keeping an eye on the eastern
[front]. The outline of phase-one operations (to be conducted from 10 April till late May) was
by and large as follows:(157)
1. The main force unit shall primarily stay at anchor on alert in the western part of the Inland Sea,
conducting drills and doing maintenance work, while keeping a strict watch on the east front
to be prepared against attacks by U.S. striking forces.
2. The Forward Unit and the Carrier Task Force shall stay at anchor on alert in the western part of
the Inland Sea (in the southern part of Kyūshū for the carrier aircraft), engaging in drills and
maintenance work.
3. The Advance Unit shall operate in the areas near Hawaii, the west coast of the United States,
the Aleutians, New Zealand, Australia, South Africa as well as in the Indian Ocean from its main
base in the Marshall Islands; watching [enemy] strategic points, it shall conduct attacks on
enemy naval vessels, carry out Operation K (note: an operation to reconnoiter (and attack)
Hawaii with Type–2 flying boat[s]) and disrupt enemy sea lines of communication, while pa-
trolling the waters to the east of the Honshū with one element. [The unit shall also] support
with the major part of the 8th Submarine Squadron the Moresby invasion operation to be con-
ducted by the South Seas Unit.
4. In order to conduct air operations at the east and southeast fronts, the land-based air unit shall
deploy by and large four air flotillas (the 21st, the 24th, the 25th and the 26th Air Flotillas) to
Honshū, Saipan, Wake Island, the Bismarck Archipelago, the Marshall, Gilbert, and Solomon
Islands, and New Guinea, while at the same time engage in Operation K with one element in
cooperation with the Advance Unit. 
5. The South Seas Unit shall, in conjunction with the Army, capture Port Moresby in early May.
After that, the unit shall continue stage-one, phase-four operations, while patrolling and de-
fending the assigned areas and protecting the [friendly sea] lines of communication, in addition
to the clearing of the enemy from British New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. 
656 Chapter IX     /     The Neutralization of the Indian Ocean
6. The Northern Task Force shall continue stage-one, phase-four operations, while patrolling and
defending assigned areas as well as keeping a watch on the Soviets.
7. The former Southern Task Force shall be divided into the East Indies Unit, Malaya Unit, the
Philippines Unit and the Surface Escort Unit. They shall continue stage-one, phase-four opera-
tions, while strengthening the defense of the occupied strategic areas, clearing enemy remnants,
protecting the [friendly sea] lines of communication in their assigned areas as well as conducting
air campaigns over the Indian Ocean and against Australia (with the 22d and the 23d Air Flotil-
las).
The disposition of forces of the Combined Fleet in the stage-two, phase-one operations was
in outline as follows:(157)
1. The Main Force Unit
(1) The Main Unit: the 1st Battleship Division, the 3d Destroyer Squadron (minus one destroyer
division) and the 4th Carrier Division (minus the Shōō)
(2) The Guard Unit: the First Fleet (minus the 3d Battleship Division, the 6th Cruiser Division,
the 27th Destroyer Division, and minus the 3d Destroyer Squadron (minus one destroyer
division)), the 4th Cruiser Division 2d Section, one element of the First Air Fleet
2. The Forward Unit
The Second Fleet (minus the 4th Cruiser Division 2d Section, the 5th Cruiser Division, the 8th
Cruiser Division, and one destroyer division of the 4th Destroyer Squadron), the 3d Battleship
Division (minus the 2d Section), the 11th Seaplane Tender Division (minus the Mizuho)
3. The Carrier Task Force 
The First Air Fleet (minus one element), the 3d Battleship Division 2d Section, the 8th Cruiser
Division, one destroyer division of the 4th Destroyer Squadron
4. The Advance Unit
The Sixth Fleet, the 5th Submarine Squadron, the Chiyoda and the Nisshin
5. The Land-based Air Unit
The Eleventh Air Fleet (minus the 22d Air Flotilla (minus one element) and minus the 23d Air
Flotilla and the Tōkō Air Group) 
6. The South Sea Unit
The Fourth Fleet, the 6th Cruiser Division, the 5th Cruiser Division (minus the Nachi), the 18th
Cruiser Division, the Kaga, the Shōō, the Mizuho, the 7th Destroyer Division, the 27th Destroyer
Division, the 3d Kure Special Landing Force
7. The Northern Task Force
The Fifth Fleet and the Nachi
8. The Southern Task Force
The Southwest Area Fleet, the 22d Air Flotilla (minus the land-based attack plane unit of the
Genzan Air Group), the 23d Air Flotilla, the Tōkō Air Group, the 1st and the 3d Yokosuka Special
Landing Forces and some patrol boats 
That is to say, the Second Fleet Commander in Chief Vice Admiral Kondō, who had been in
command of overall operations in the area south [of Japan], was relieved of his command
and assigned to become commander of the Forward Unit in the stage-two phase-one dispo-
sition of forces. Replacing him, Vice Admiral Takahashi, commander in chief of the Southwest
Area Fleet assumed command of the operations in the area southwest [of Japan]. Thus, the
focus of the operations of the Japanese Navy shifted to the east of Honshū and the areas
southeast [of Japan] away from the southwestern areas as had been the case until then.
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On 10 April, Combined Fleet Commander in Chief Admiral Yamamoto issued the follow-
ing order to put in motion the stage-two, phase-one disposition of forces:(157)
Combined Fleet Classified Telegram No. 724
Combined Fleet Telegraphic Order No. 109
The stage-two, phase-one disposition of forces shall be put in motion.
The outline of the disposition is as sent by means of Combined Fleet Classified Telegram No.
694, except that the 5th Carrier Division and the Kaga shall switch stations and that the assign-
ment of the 16th Destroyer Division shall remain as it is until late April.
In accordance with this order, the 5th Carrier Division was made to participate in the Port
Moresby operation in place of the Kaga, as previously told.
The Combined Fleet scheduled stage-two, phase-two operations from late May until about
20 June, in which the capture of strategic places in the Midway and Aleutian Islands areas
were planned.
Plan for the Stage-Two, Phase-One Operations of the Southwest Area Fleet
The plan for stage-two, phase-one operations of the Southwest Are Fleet may be presumed
to have been as follows:(182, 190, 197)
1. While keeping a strict watch over the Indian Ocean with the 22d Air Flotilla (minus the land-
based attack plane unit of the Genzan Air Group) and with the Tōkō Air group, the Malaya Unit
shall continue its operation to transport reinforcements for the Fifteenth Army to Burma, and
also take charge of guarding the waters around the seized strategic points, setting up defenses
at the main ports and bases, and protecting the sea lines of communication of the assigned areas.
2. While conducting operations to neutralize the [enemy] air power in the northern part of Aus-
tralia with the 23d Air Flotilla, the East Indies Unit shall continue its operation to clear western
New Guinea of the enemy, which was launched at the end of the last month. Along with the
above, the unit shall take charge of escorting the transport of rear units of the Sixteenth Army,
the defense of the captured strategic areas, as well as the protection of the sea lines of commu-
nication in its assigned area, etc. It shall also launch a clearing operation of the Lesser Sunda Is-
lands with one element of its forces at the beginning of May.
3. The Philippines Unit shall, in conjunction with the Army, swiftly seize the enemy stronghold at
the mouth of Manila Bay. For this purpose, it shall strive to catch and destroy escaping vessels
of the enemy by intensifying the blockade at the mouth of Manila Bay, and in conjunction with
the Army, clear the southern islands of the Philippines of the enemy as quickly as possible. The
unit shall also take charge of protecting the sea lines of communication in its assigned area, and
push forward the preparation of various facilities for the naval bases.
4. The Surface Escort Unit (minus the 22d Destroyer Division) shall, while maintaining close co-
operation and communication with other units, take charge of protecting the sea lines of com-
munication in the following sea areas: (Sea areas — omitted by the author).
The outline of the disposition of forces of stage-two, phase-one operations of the Southwest
Area Fleet was as follows:(182)
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1. The main unit
The Ashigara and the 16th Cruiser Division 2d Section
2. The Malaya Unit
The First Southern Expeditionary Fleet, the 22d Air Flotilla (minus one element), and the Tōkō
Air Group
3. The East Indies Unit
The Second Southern Expeditionary Fleet, the 23d Air Flotilla, the 11th Seaplane Tender Division
(minus the Mizuho), the 1st Patrol Boat Division (minus four patrol boats), the 22d Destroyer
Division, the 16th Destroyer Division 1st Section, the 1st and the 3d Yokosuka Special Landing
Forces 
4. The Philippines Unit
The Third Southern Expeditionary Fleet
5. The Surface Escort Unit
The 1st Surface Escort Unit
Of the above, the forces of the 1st Surface Escort Unit were quite meager, as shown in the
following:
The 13th Destroyer Division: three Wakatake-class (old 2d-class destroyers)
The 22d Destroyer Division: four Minazuki-class (1st-class destroyers)
The 32d Destroyer Division: three Asagao-class (old 2d-class destroyers)
The (torpedo boats) Sagi and Hayabusa
Six auxiliary gunboats (merchantmen with some guns fitted)
It was almost impossible to protect the sailing routes of more than 2,500 nautical miles be-
tween Moji and Singapore with such a small force. However, at that time, the losses caused
by enemy submarines were unexpectedly small, and since the power of the enemy sub-
marines was rated [also] very low, matters of escort at sea were taken too lightly. The majority
[in the Navy] did not recognize that this would become one of the major causes that would
prove fatal to Japan in the future.
At 0910 on 10 April, along with the launch of the stage-two, phase-one disposition of
forces, Southwest Area Fleet Commander in Chief Vice Admiral Takahashi gave the following
instructions to the units under his command by means of Southwest Area Fleet Classified
Telegram No. 660:(182)
At this juncture, when stage-one operations are mostly completed, the Southern Task Force has
been disbanded and the new Southwest Area Fleet has been formed, I have been assigned the
heavy responsibility of commander in chief of this fleet. It is my earnest hope to fulfill my grave
responsibility by implementing the right tactics and conducting the right fights at all constituent
fleets. In my view, invasion operations are easy whereas long-term holdout operations are dif-
ficult. Not to mention that all forces must cooperate and unite, further enhance their strong
fighting spirit and preemptively and perfectly block enemy counteroffensives, I hope [all shall]
aggressively strive to defeat the enemy by always catching every opportunity, and in view of
the characteristics of these operations, further closely cooperate with the Army, giving adequate
thought to the real significance of Army-Navy joint operations, and thus without reserve ac-
complish their missions. 
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Conclusion
Stage-one operations were concluded earlier than scheduled and with a huge success.In the southwestern theater, the Japanese Navy had advanced as far as Ceylon and de-feated British fleets, while in Burma the Japanese Army continued its advance after
having occupied Rangoon on 8 March. The air attacks on the Australian key point of Port
Darwin were [also] continued, and India seemed to show tendencies to gradually break away
from Britain.
In the southeastern theater, Rabaul on the island of New Britain had been occupied on 23
January, and land-based air units had immediately advanced there. Then, the capture of key
places in British New Guinea (Lae, Salamaua, and Port Moresby) and strategic places in the
Solomon Islands (Tulagi, etc.) had been ordered at the end of that month. The aim was to se-
cure defensive positions in the area to the north of eastern Australia by taking control of the
waters (the Coral Sea), while cutting off the area’s communications with mainland Australia.
Lae and Salamaua were captured on 8 March, and the preparations for the capture of Port
Moresby was in steady progress. 
Meanwhile, the enemy on the Bataan Peninsula in the Philippines surrendered on 9 April
after the attacks by the Fourteenth Army from 3 April onwards, while the days of the Cor-
regidor stronghold were numbered.
Through the stage-one operations, [Japan] acquired the resources areas of the South,
which, as to the oil it craved, allowed the country to expect that 1.7 million tons could be ac-
quired in the first year of the war, which was about six times as large as [the prewar estima-
tion of] 300,000 tons.
The shipping losses since the beginning of the hostilities were as shown in the following
table. Compared to an estimated loss of 800,000 to 1,000,000 tons for the first year of the war,
only about 260,000 tons were [actually] lost in these four months. Particularly, the loss caused
by enemy submarines, which had been the chief concern, was [only] about 150,000 tons, and
moreover, the loss sustained by regular transports, which was supposed to give a rough idea
of [the loss in] the transport of resources in the future, was just 30,000 tons.
For Reference: Shipping Losses Classified by Cause(198)
Caused by
Year/month










1941-Dec 6 31,673 3 16,901 0 0 2 6,585 11 55,159
1942-Jan 9 41,104 2 9,686 3 2,133 5 19,455 19 72,378
Shipping Losses Classified by Tasks(198) (excluding shipwrecks)
The attacks by enemy submarines, particularly U.S. submarines, lacked aggressiveness, and
the performance of their torpedoes was bad, too. On top of that, just during the phase-three
operations of the Dutch East Indies operation, twenty-nine enemy submarines were reported
to have been sunk. (The number [of enemy submarines] actually sunk was four.)
Thus, the prospect of acquiring the southern resources was bright and the consolidation
of a long-term absolutely unbeatable position seemed certain, which led the Government
and Imperial General Headquarters to even start mulling over steps to facilitate the conclu-
sion of the war.
It can be said that the major reason for this success was owed to the remarkable service
of the air units. That is to say, the Carrier Task Force completely destroyed the U.S. Fleet in
Hawaii, while the land-based air unit sank two significant battleships of Britain off Malaya,
and easily defeated the U.S. Far East Air Force in the Philippines, which had been considered
very strong. Also after that, the air units were busily engaged in all directions; between 4 Jan-
uary and 6 April, the Air Unit of the Southern Task Force reported having brought down 334
enemy aircraft with certainty, along with 135 aircraft unconfirmed, having sunk seven naval
vessels and warships, three submarines, eighteen merchantmen of 10,000 tons or more, as
well as having inflicted damage on seven naval vessels and battleships, nine destroyers, two
submarines and seventeen merchantmen of 10,000 tons or more. Japanese losses on the con-
















1941-Dec 9 48,574 0 0 9 48,574
The ships operated by the
Ship Management Association
and shipwrecks on the Japan-
ese sea were calculated as
[losses sustained] in regular
transport.
1942-Jan 10 36,064 4 16,859 14 52,923
1942-Feb 10 39,196 1 989 11 40,185
1942-Mar 15 70,909 3 11,955 18 82,864
Total 44 194,743 8 29,803 52 224,546
1942-Feb 6 29,000 4 4,619 1 6,566 2 8,085 13 48,270
1942-Mar 11 47,017 3 10,516 4 25,331 0 0 18 82,864
Total 32 148,794 12 41,722 8 34,030 9 34,125 61 258,671
The losses sustained in the Philippines and Malaya in the beginning of the hostilities were
also very small as shown in the following table. Although in the map exercise at the Naval
College, a loss of 160% of the Type–0 fighter planes and 40% of the land-based attack planes
had been anticipated before the advance to Java, this turned out to be just a groundless fear. 
The Losses Sustained in the Air Campaigns over the Philippines (From 8 December till 3 January)(75)
The Losses Sustained in the Air Campaigns over Malaya (From 8 December till 15 February)(75)
Furthermore, the power of the Carrier Task Force was tremendous; the on-target rates in the






Fighter Planes Flying Boats Total
Crashed
themselves 12 6 14 2 34
Hit by bombs or
marked by
bullets
2 0 2 0 4





Fighter Planes Flying Boats Total
Crashed
themselves 1 0 13 1 15
Hit by bombs or
marked by
bullets
0 0 2 0 2





Fighter Planes Flying Boats Total
Crashed
themselves 5 1 3 0 9
82%. An example of the comparison of its aircraft’s performance in air combats was as fol-
lows, which gave the impression as if they were matchless.
The Air Strikes on Colombo (as reported)(75)
While these results show how powerful the Japanese air forces were, they also suggested
that the war from then on would be fought over the command of the air. However, there
were many in the top echelons of the Japanese Navy who still stuck to the view that large
vessels and giant guns were also required, due to which, despite the recognition of aircraft
power, drastic measures to provide [adequate aircraft] were not carried out. [The Navy] fur-
ther failed to take adequate measures against [enemy] submarines, partly due to its overop-
timistic judgment on the enemy submarines. And along with quite a number of other
problems that were kept within [the Navy], such as the leakage of information concerning
operations (for example the Colombo operation) and the fact that the lessons of war were








Confirmed Unconfirmed Confirmed Unconfirmed Confirmed Unconfirmed
Spitfires 12 5 0 0 12 5
Hurricanes 18 3 6 0 24 3
Swordfishes 8 2 0 0 8 2
Defiants 1 0 0 0 1 0






One carrier-based fighter plane and six carrier-based bombers crashed themselves
Abb. Abb. Abb.Explanation Explanation Explanation
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1. Kihon Kokuryoku Dōtai Sōran, Kokumin Keizai Kenkyūkyōkai (『基本国力動態総覧』国民
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IGHQ]).
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昭和28年6月, 660ページ [A Re-examination of the Causes of the Pacific War, ed. by The [Provi-
sional] Study Group on Japanese Diplomacy], June 1953, p. 660]).
6. ‘Nakazawa Tasuku Chūsa Memo’ (「中沢佑中佐メモ」 [‘Notes of Cdr. Nakazawa Tasuku’]).
[Then] chief of operations of the Navy General Staff; later [promoted to] Vice Admiral. 
7. Kaigun Nenryō Enkaku (「海軍燃料沿革」 昭和10年9月30日 [A history of the fuel [used
by] the Navy, 30 Sept 1935]). A report presented to Ōsumi Kaigun Daijin (大角海軍大臣
[Navy Minister Ōsumi]) by Maki Shunkai(真木俊魁), commissioned by the Navy Ministry.
8. Jinzō Sekiyu Seisaku to Sono Jigyō [by] Enomoto Takaichirō published by Kaikei Bunseki
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9. Iino Rokujūnen no Ayumi, Iino Kaiun Kabushiki Gaisha Shashi Hensan-shitsu hen (『飯野
六〇年の歩み』飯野海運株式会社社史編纂室編昭和34年6月 [Sixty years of Iino, ed. by the
Company History Compiling Office, Iino Kaiun Kaisha Ltd., June 1959]).
10. Sekiyu Shiryō Geppō, Sekiyu Renmei hen (『石油資料月報』石油連盟編 [Monthly newsletter
of data [related to the] oil [industry], ed. by the Petroleum Association of Japan]).
11. Yamaki Akira Taisa Sengo no Kaisō (矢牧章大佐戦後の回想 [Postwar recollections of Capt.
Yamaki Akira]). [Then] senior staff of the Third Fleet; later [promoted to] rear admiral.
12. ‘Shibata Bunzō Chūsa Memo’ (「柴田文三中佐メモ」[‘Notes of Cdr. Shibata Bunzō’]).
[Then] senior staff of the 21st Air Flotilla.
13. ‘Matsumoto Makoto Shōsa Memo’ (「松本真実少佐メモ」[‘Notes of Lt. Cdr. Matsumoto
Makoto ’]). [Then] aviation officer of the [Navy] 1st Air Group.
14. Hitō Jijō by Hiratsuka Takeshi and Madarame Fumio (『比島事情』平塚武・斑目文雄著昭
和17年10月 非凡閣発行 [The Circumstances in the Philippines, by Hiratsuka Takeshi and
Madarame Fumio, published by Hibonkaku, Oct 1942]).
15. Indoshina by Muroga Nobuo (『印度支那』室賀信夫著昭和16年11月白楊社発行 [Indochina
by Muroga Nobuo, published by Hakuyōsha, Nov. 1941]).
16. Nampo-kyō’ei-ken no Zembō, Satō Hiroshi hen (『南方共栄圏の全貌』佐藤弘編 昭和17年12月
旺文社発行 [The whole picture of the co-prosperity sphere in the south, ed. by Satō Hiroshi, pub-
lished by Ōbunsha, Dec. 1942 ]).
17. Ranryō Indo Nōgyō Seisaku-shi, Taiheiyō Kyōkai Chōsa-bu hen (『蘭領印度農業政策史』太
平洋協会調査部編昭和16年9月中央公論社発行 [History of agricultural policies in the Dutch
East Indies, ed. by the Research Department of the Pacific Society, published by Chūō Kōron-
sha, Sept 1941]).
18. Ran’in Seikatsu Nijūnen by Wada Tamiji (『蘭印生活二十年』和田民治著昭和17年5月講談
社発行 [Twenty years in the Dutch East Indies, by Wada Tamiji, published by Kōdansha, May
1942 ]).
19. Nampō-ken no Kikō by Fukui Eiichirō (『南方圏の気候』福井英一郎著昭和17年9月東京堂
発行 [Climate in the Southern sphere, [by] Fukui Eiichirō, published by Tōkyōdō, Sept. 1942]).
20. Yasunobu Takeo Chūsa Sengo no Kaisō (安延多計夫中佐戦後の回想 [The Postwar recollec-
tions of Cdr. Yasunobu Takeo]). [Then] senior staff of the 23d Air Flotilla; later [promoted
to] captain.
21. ‘Maéda Kōsei Chūsa Nisshi’ (「前田孝成中佐日誌」[‘Journal kept by Cdr. Maeda Kōsei’]).
[Then] commander of the Genzan Air Group; later [promoted to] captain.
22. Hitō Suiroshi, Suiro-bu hakkō (『比島水路誌』水路部発行 [Sailing directions for the Philippines,
published by the Hydrographic Department]).
23. Minami-Shinakai Suiroshi, Suiro-bu hakkō (『南支那海水路誌』水路部発行 [Sailing directions
for the South China Sea, published by the Hydrographic Department]).
24. Malacca Kaikyō Suiroshi, Suiro-bu hakkō (『マラッカ海峡水路誌』水路部発行 [Sailing direc-
tions for the Malacca Strait, published by the Hydrographic Department]).
25. Sumatra Tōbu Suiroshi, Suiro-bu hakkō (『スマトラ東部水路誌』水路部発行 [Sailing direc-
tions for the [waters] east of Sumatra, published by the Hydrographic Department]).
26. Java-kai Suiroshi, Suiro-bu hakkō (『ジャバ海水路誌』水路部発行 [Sailing directions for the
Java Sea, published by the Hydrographic Department]).
27. Yonehara Tsunaki Shōsa Shiryō (米原綱明少佐資料 [Documents kept by Lt. Cdr. Yonehara
Tsunaki]). [Then] air unit commander of the Tōkō Air Group.
28. Tomioka Sadatoshi Taisa Sengo no Kaisō (富岡定俊大佐戦後の回想 [Postwar recollections
of Capt. Tomioka Sadatoshi]). Chief of the 1st Section of the Navy General Staff between
1941 and 1943 and then director of its 1st Department; later [promoted to] rear admiral.
29. ‘Nakahara Yoshimasa Shōshō Nisshi’ (「中原義正少将日誌」[‘Journal kept by R. Adm.
Nakahara Yoshimasa’]). [Then] chief of Personnel Bureau, the Navy Ministry; later [pro-
moted to] vice admiral.
30. ‘Arao Okikatsu Rikugun Chūsa Sakusen Nisshi’ (「荒尾興功陸軍中佐作戦日誌」[‘Opera-
tional Journal kept by Lt. Col. Arao Okikatsu’]). [Then] chief of staff of the Southern Army;
later [promoted to] colonel.
31. Watanabe Yasuji Chūsa Sengo no Kaisō (渡辺安次中佐戦後の回想 [Postwar recollections of
Cdr. Watanabe Yasuji]). [Then] staff of the Combined Fleet; later [promoted to] captain.
32. Takahashi Chihaya Taisa Sengo no Kaisō (高橋千隼大佐戦後の回想 [Postwar recollections
of Capt. Takahashi Chihaya]). [Then] staff of the Eleventh Air Fleet.
33. ‘Sanagi Sadamu Chūsa Memo’ (「佐薙毅中佐メモ」[‘Notes of Cdr. Sanagi Sadamu’]).
[Then] staff of Section 1 of the Navy General Staff; later [promoted to] captain.
34. Ishii Masayoshi Rikugun Taisa Hokan Shiryō nado (石井正美陸軍大佐保管資料等 [Docu-
ments etc. kept by Col. Ishii Masayoshi]). [Then] senior staff of Section 1 of the Southern
Army; later [promoted to] major general.
35. Miyo Tatsukichi Chūsa Sengo no Kaisō (三代辰吉中佐戦後の回想 [Postwar recollections of
Cdr. Miyo Tatsukichi]). [Then] staff of the operations section of the Navy General Staff in
charge of aviation; later [promoted to] captain. He changed his [first] name to Kazunari.
36. Fujita Masamichi Chūsa Sengo no Kaisō (藤田正路中佐戦後の回想 [Postwar recollections
of Cdr. Fujita Masamichi]). [Then] staff of the Second Fleet; later [promoted to] captain.
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37. Odagiri Masanori Chūsa Sengo no Kaisō (小田切政徳中佐戦後の回想 [Postwar recollections
of Cdr. Odagiri Masanori]). [Then] senior staff of the 4th Carrier Division; later [promoted
to] captain.
38. ‘Ozawa Jisaburō Chūjō Shuki’ oyobi Sengo no Kaisō (「小沢治三郎中将手記」及び戦後の
回想 [‘Memoirs of V. Adm. Ozawa Jisaburō’ and his postwar recollections]). [Then] com-
mander in chief of the Southern Expeditionary Fleet ([and] the commander of the Malaya
Unit).
39. Kuroshima Kameto Taisa Sengo no Kaisō (黒島亀人大佐戦後の回想 [Postwar recollections
of Capt. Kuroshima Kameto]). [Then] senior staff of the Combined Fleet; later [promoted to]
rear admiral.
40. ‘Imoto Kumao Rikugun Chūsa Gyōmu Nisshi’ (「井本熊男陸軍中佐業務日誌」[‘Operation
journal kept by Lt. Col. Imoto Kumao’]). [Then] staff of the Operations Section of the Army
General Staff.
41. ‘Sugiyama Gen Rikugun Taishō Memo’ (「杉山元陸軍大将メモ」 [‘Notes of General
Sugiyama Gen’]). The records were [compiled] by the Sensō Shidōhan (戦争指導班 (課) [War
Direction Group (Section)]) [by] sorting out the deliberations at the liaison meetings and
conferences and the notes taken by Chief of Army General Staff Sugiyama from January to
May 1942 and making them into a clean copy.
42. ‘Daikairei-tsuzuri’ (「大海令綴」[‘The files of IGHQ Navy Department Orders’]). Daikairei
was the reference code for the Imperial orders, which, among the Imperial orders of com-
mand, were received and passed down by the chief of the Navy General Staff. However,
they were usually recognized as Imperial Commands issued toward the Navy.
43. ‘Daikaishi-tsuzuri’ (「大海指綴」[‘The files of IGHQ Navy Department Instructions’]).
Daikaishi was the reference code for the instructions issued by the chief of the Navy General
Staff, which were issued in accordance with the clause in the Daikairei that ‘details shall be
instructed by the chief of the Navy General Staff.’ However, they were usually recognized
as instructions given by the chief of the Navy General Staff.
44. Sentō Joretsu (戦闘序列 [Order of battle]). An army term denoting the organization of an
operational army ordered by the Emperor on the occasion of hostilities or incidents. 
45. ‘Kimitsu Rengō Kantai Meirei Saku Dai-ichi-gō’ (「機密聯合艦隊命令作第一号」[‘Com-
bined Fleet Operational Order Classified No. 1’]). A copy seized by the U.S. forces from the
Nachi sunk in Manila Bay, which was returned to Japan after the war.
46. ‘Sen-sō-roku’ by Ugaki Matome Shōshō (「戦藻録」宇垣纏少将 [‘Sen-sō-roku,’ journal kept
by R. Adm. Ugaki Matome]). [Then] chief of staff of the Combined Fleet; later [promoted to]
vice admiral.
47. Matsudaira Nagayoshi Kikan Taii Shiryō (松平永芳機関大尉資料 [Documents kept by Lieu-
tenant of Engineering Matsudaira Nagayoshi]). [Then] chief engineer of the Destroyer Ina -
zuma; later [promoted to] lieutenant commander. 
48. ‘Nairei Teiyō’ [by] Kaigun Daijin Kambō (「内令提要」海軍大臣官房 [‘Classified rules and
regulations,’ [by] the Office of the Navy Minister]).
49. Yamamoto Chikao Taisa Sengo no Kaisō (山本親雄大佐戦後の回想 [Postwar recollections
of Capt. Yamamoto Chikao]). [Then] chief of Section 1, General Affairs Department, [Navy]
Aeronautical Department; later [promoted to] rear admiral.
50. ‘Kaigun Kōkū Hombuchō Mōshitsugisho’ (「海軍航空本部長申継書」昭和16年7月 [‘Com-
munication notes of the director of the Navy Aeronautical Department,’ July 1941]).
51. ‘Kaigun Kōkū Hombu Senji Nisshi’ (「海軍航空本部戦時日誌」[‘War journal kept by the
Navy Aeronautical Department’]).
52. ‘Nagaishi Masataka Chūsa Memo’ (「永石正孝中佐メモ」 [‘Notes of Cdr. Nagaishi Masa-
taka’]). Aviation officer of the Hiryū between 1939 and 1940; later [promoted to] captain.
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53. ‘Dai-ni Suirai Sentai Senji Nisshi’ (「第二水雷戦隊戦時日誌」[‘War journal kept by the 2d
Destroyer Squadron’]).
54. ‘Dai-ni Suirai Sentai Sentō Shōhō’ (「第二水雷戦隊戦闘詳報」[‘Action report of the 2d De-
stroyer Squadron’]).
55. ‘San’yō-maru Sentō Shōhō’ (「山陽丸戦闘詳報」[‘Action report of the San’yō-maru’]).
56. ‘Dai-yon Suirai Sentai Sentō Shōhō’ (「第四水雷戦隊戦闘詳報」[‘Action report of the 4th
Destroyer Squadron’]).
57. ‘Dai-go Sentai Senji Nisshi’ (「第五戦隊戦時日誌」[‘War journal kept by the 5th Cruiser Di-
vision’]).
58. ‘Daitōa-sensō Senkun’ [prepared by] Kaigun Senkun Chōsa Iinkai (「大東亜戦争戦訓」海
軍戦訓調査委員会 [‘Greater East Asia War’s Lessons of War,’ prepared by the Naval Inves-
tigation Committee on Engagements and Lessons of War]).
59. ‘Dai-ichi Konkyochi-tai Senji Nisshi’ (「第一根拠地隊戦時日誌」[‘War journal kept by the
1st Base Force’]).
60. Shibuya Tatsuwaka Taisa Shiryō (澁谷龍穉大佐資料 [Documents kept by Capt. Shibuya Tat-
suwaka]). A record of submarine operations, sorted out right after the war by the captain
mainly in charge of submarines. [In Attached Table No. 1, his rank is Cdr.]
61. ‘Nampō Butai Sentō Gaihō’ (「南方部隊戦闘概報」[‘Summary report of the actions of the
Southern Task Force’]).
62. ‘Dai-yon Suirai Sentai Senji Nisshi’ (「第四水雷戦隊戦時日誌」[‘War journal kept by the
4th Destroyer Squadron’]).
63. ‘Dai-go Suirai Sentai Senji Nisshi’ (「第五水雷戦隊戦時日誌」[‘War journal kept by the 5th
Destroyer Squadron’]).
64. Nomura Ryōsuke Shōsa Sengo no Kaisō (野村了介少佐戦後の回想 [Postwar recollections
of Lt. Cdr. Nomura Ryōsuke]). [Then] staff of the 23d Air Flotilla; later [promoted to] com-
mander.
65. ‘Nampō Butai Sentō Shōhō’ (「南方部隊戦闘詳報」[‘Action report of of the Southern Task
Force’]).
66. Okazaki Seizaburō Rikugun Shōshō Sengo no Kaisō (岡崎清三郎陸軍少将戦後の回想 [Post-
war recollections of Maj. Gen. Okazaki Seizaburō]). [Then] chief of staff of the Sixteenth
Army; later [promoted to] lieutenant general.
67. ‘Rikusentai Kōdō Chōsho’ [summarized at] Kaigun Kōseki Chōsa-bu (「陸戦隊行動調書」
海軍功績調査部 [‘Action records of the special landing forces,’ [summarized at] the Navy
Department of Investigation of Achievements]).
68. ‘Sakusen Kenkyū Shiryō’ (「作戦研究資料」[Operation reviews]), compiled by the the Navy
Department of Investigation of Achievements to examine the achievements [in each opera-
tion].
69. Suékuni Masao Chūsa Sengo no Kaisō (末国正雄中佐戦後の回想 [Postwar recollections of
Cdr. Suékuni Masao]). [Then] staff of the 5th Cruiser Division; later [promoted to] captain.
70. ‘Tōyama Yasumi Chūsa Nisshi’ (「遠山安巳中佐日誌」[‘Journal kept by Cdr. Tōyama Ya-
sumi’]). [Then] senior staff of the 2d Destroyer Squadron.
71. ‘Hikōki-tai Kōdō Chōsho’ [compiled by] Kaigun Kōseki Chōsa-bu (「飛行機隊行動調書」
海軍功績調査部作成 [Action records of the air units, compiled by the Navy Department of
Investigation of Achievements]).
72. ‘Kansen Kōdō Chōsho’ compiled by the Kaigun Kōseki Chōsa-bu (「艦船行動調書」海軍
功績調査部作成 [‘Operation records of vessels’ compiled by the Navy Department of Inves-
tigation of Achievements]).
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73. ‘Okazaki Seizaburō Rikugun Shōshō Nisshi’ (「岡崎清三郎陸軍少将日誌」[‘Journal kept
by Maj. Gen. Okazaki Seizaburō’]). [Then] chief of staff of the Sixteenth Army; later [pro-
moted to] lieutenant general.
74. Takashima Tatsuhiko Rikugun Taisa Sengo no Kaisō (高嶋辰彦陸軍大佐戦後の回想 [Postwar
recollections of Col. Takashima Tatsuhiko]). [Then] senior staff of Section 1, Staff Department
of the Sixteenth Army; later [promoted to] major general.
75. ‘Daitōa-sensō Senkun (Kōkū)’ [prepared by] Kaigun Senkun Chōsa Iinkai (「大東亜戦争戦
訓（航空）」海軍戦訓調査委員会 [‘The Greater East Asia War’s Lessons of War ([section]
Air Operations),’ prepared by the Naval Investigation Committee on Engagements and Les-
sons of War]).
76. ‘Sanuki-maru Sentō Shōhō’ (「讃岐丸戦闘詳報」 [Action report of the Sanuki-maru]).
77. Nihon Sekiyu-shi, Nihon Sekiyu Kabushiki Gaisha hen (『日本石油史』日本石油株式会社編
昭和33年5月 [The History of Nippon Oil Co. Ltd. ed. by the Nippon Oil Co. Ltd., May 1958]).
78. ‘Dai-go Sentai Sentō Shōhō’ (「第五戦隊戦闘詳報」[‘Action report of the 5th Cruiser Divi-
sion’]).
79. ‘Watanabe Tasuke Shōsa Nisshi’ (「渡部太助少佐日誌」[‘Journal kept by Lt. Cdr. Watanabe
Tasuke’]). [Then] staff of the 11th Seaplane Tender Division; later [promoted to] commander.
80. ‘Yokosuka Chinjufu Dai-ichi Tokubetsu Rikusentai Sentō Shōhō’ (「横須賀鎮守府第一特別
陸戦隊戦闘詳報」[‘Action report of the 1st Special Landing Force of the Yokosuka Naval
Station’]).
81. ‘Dai-ichi Kūshū Butai Sentō Gaihō Tsuzuri’ (「第一空襲部隊戦闘概報綴」[‘File of summary
reports of the actions of the [Navy] 1st Air Raid Unit’]).
82. Itō Atsuo Taii Sengo no Kaisō (伊藤敦夫大尉戦後の回想 [Postwar recollections of Lt. Itō
Atsuo]). [Then] group commander of the air unit of the Mizuho; later [promoted to] lieu-
tenant commander.
83. Takagi Hisamori Shōsa Sengo no Kaisō (高木長護少佐戦後の回想 [Postwar recollections of
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Sadamu’]). [Then] staff of Section 1 of the Navy General Staff; later [promoted to] captain.
109. Daihon’ei Happyō: Kaigun-hen [by] Tominaga Kengo (『大本営発表海軍篇』富永謙吾著
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111. Nagai Sumitaka Chūsa Sengo no Kaisō (長井純隆中佐戦後の回想 [Postwar recollections of
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115. ‘Imazato Yoshimitsu Chūsa Shuki’ (「今里義光中佐手記」[‘A personal account of Cdr.
Imazato Yoshimitsu’]). [Then] senior staff of the 2d Base Force; later [promoted to] captain.
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123. ‘Dai-yon Sensui Sentai Sentō Shōhō’ (「第四潜水戦隊戦闘詳報」[‘Action report of the 4th
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124. Tsunoda Hitoshi Shōsa Sengo no Kaisō (角田求士少佐戦後の回想 [Postwar recollections of
Lt. Cdr. Tsunoda Hitoshi]). [Then] instructor of the Yokosuka Air Group, temporarily at-
tached to the Eleventh Air Fleet headquarters; later [promoted to] commander.
125. ‘Sagara-maru Sentō Shōhō’ (「相良丸戦闘詳報」[‘Action report of the Sagara-maru’]).
126. ‘Dai-nana Sentai Senji Nisshi’ (「第七戦隊戦時日誌」[‘War journal kept by the 7th Cruiser
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129. ‘Yamada Yutaka Chūsa Nisshi’ (「山田豊中佐日誌」[‘Journal kept by Cdr. Yamada Yu-
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130. ‘Unagi Tsuyoshi Taii Nisshi’ (「宇那木勁大尉日誌」[‘Journal kept by Lt. Unagi Tsuyoshi’]).
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131. Yamaguchi Shirō Shōsa Sengo no Kaisō (山口史郎少佐戦後の回想 [Postwar recollections of
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of Maj. Kanemura Matabē]). [Then] commander of the 3d Battalion of the 1st Taiwan Infantry
Regiment.
141. ‘Dai-ichi Suirai Sentai Senji Nisshi’ (「第一水雷戦隊戦時日誌」[‘War journal kept by the
1st Destroyer Squadron’]).
142. Sasabe Risaburō Chūsa Sengo no Kaisō (雀部利三郎中佐戦後の回想 [Postwar recollections
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roshi]). [Then] adjutant of 3d Yokosuka Special Landing Force; later [promoted to] lieutenant
commander.
148. ‘Shōji Shitai Meirei Tsuzuri’ (「東海林支隊命令綴」[‘The file of the orders of the Shōji De-
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149. Imazato Yoshimitsu Chūsa Sengo no Kaisō (今里義光中佐戦後の回想 [Postwar recollections
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672 Notes
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161. ‘Ran’in Sakusen Kiroku’ (「蘭印作戦記録」[‘Records of the Dutch East Indies operations’]),
compiled by Lt. Col. Oda Akimitsu (於田秋光), [then] chief of operations staff of the Six-
teenth Army, based on the materials at that time.
162. ‘Gunkan Atago Sentō Shōhō’ (「軍艦愛宕戦闘詳報」[‘Action report of the warship Atago’]).
163. ‘Gunkan Kumano Setsuju Dempō Tsuzuri’ (「軍艦熊野接受電報綴」[‘The file of telegrams
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Cdr. Sukigara Kengo]). [Then] member of Navy Technical Department.
170. Tsukuda Sadao Chūsa Sengo no Kaisō (佃定雄中佐戦後の回想 [Postwar recollections of Cdr.
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180. Hattori Takushirō Rikugun Taisa Sengo no Kaisō (服部卓四郎陸軍大佐戦後の回想 [Postwar
recollections of Col. Hattori Takushirō]). [Then] chief of Operations Section of the Army Gen-
eral Staff.
181. ‘Marē Butai Sentō Shōhō’ (「馬來部隊戦闘詳報」[‘Action report of the Malaya Unit’]).
182. ‘Dai-jūroku Sentai Senji Nisshi’ (「第十六戦隊戦時日誌」[‘War journal kept by the 16th
Cruiser Division’]).
183. ‘Kōkūtai Hensei Suii Ichiran-hyō,’ Dai-ni Fukuin-kyoku Zammu-shori-bu chōsei (「航空隊
編制推移一覧表」第二復員局残務処理部調製昭和24年7月 [‘Table[s] of the organizational
changes of the air groups,’ prepared by the Backlog Clearing Department of the 2d Demo-
bilization Bureau, July 1949]).
184. Furuta Yoshio Chūsa Sengo no Kaisō (古田良夫中佐戦後の回想 [Postwar recollections of
Cdr. Furuta Yoshio]). [Then] commander of the 40th Air Group; later [promoted to] captain.
185. Compiled by the author from the Ishii documents and other Army documents.
186. ‘Dai-jūichi Kōkū Kantai Senji Nisshi’ (「第十一航空艦隊戦時日誌」[‘War journal kept by
the Eleventh Air Fleet’]).
187. ‘Kaigun Senji Hensei Tsuzuri’ (「海軍戦時編制綴」[‘The file of [the records of] the Navy
Wartime Formation’]).
188. Uchida Shigeshi Chūsa Shiryō (内田成志中佐資料 [Documents kept by Cdr. Uchida
Shigeshi]). [Then] member of the Navy General Staff; later [promoted to] captain.
189. Itō Sukemitsu Chūsa Sengo no Kaisō (伊東祐満中佐戦後の回想 [Postwar recollections of
Cdr. Itō Sukemitsu]). [Then] aviation officer of the Tōkō Air Group; later [promoted to] cap-
tain.
190. ‘Dai-ichi Nanken Kantai Senji Nisshi’ (「第一南遣艦隊戦時日誌」[‘War journal kept by the
First Southern Expeditionary Fleet’]).
191. ‘Dai-go Kōkū Sentai Sentō Shōhō’ (「第五航空戦隊戦闘詳報」[‘Action report of the 5th Car-
rier Division’]).
192. ‘Gunkan Hiryū Sentō Shōhō’ (「軍艦飛龍戦闘詳報」[‘Action report of the Warship Hiryū’]).
193. ‘Dai-nana Sensui-tai Senji Nisshi’ (「第七潜水隊戦時日誌」[‘War journal kept by the 7th
Submarine Division’]).
194. ‘Dai-ichi Suirai Sentai Sentō Shōhō’ (「第一水雷戦隊戦闘詳報」[‘Action report of the 1st
Destroyer Squadron’]).
195. ‘Soné Akira Taisa Nisshi’ (「曽爾章大佐日誌」 [‘Journal kept by Capt. Soné Akira’]). [Then]
captain of the cruiser Mogami; later [promoted to] rear admiral.
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15-cm Howitzer Battery jūgo-ryū chūtai 十五榴中隊
1st Bureau (Operations Bureau), Dai-ichi-bu (Sakusen-bu) 第一部 (作戦部)
[Army Department of IGHQ]
1st Disembarkation Group Dai-ichi Yōriku Dan 第一揚陸団
2d Bureau (Intelligence Bureau), Dai-ni-bu (Jōhō-bu) 第二部 (情報部)
[Army Department of IGHQ]
air division hikō dan 飛行団
[Numbered] Air Force Hikō Shūdan 飛行集団
air ground support unit kōkū chiku butai 航空地区部隊
air ground support headquarters kōkū chiku shirei-bu 航空地区司令部
[Army] air group hikō sentai 飛行戦隊
air signal regiment kōkū tsūshin rentai 航空通信聯隊
air signal unit kōkū tsūshin tai 航空通信隊
air transport company yusō hikō chūtai 輸送飛行中隊
airfield battalion/company hikō-jō daitai/chūtai 飛行場大隊/中隊
airfield duty unit hikō-jō kimmu butai 飛行場勤務部隊
anchorage headquarters teihaku-jō shirei-bu 碇泊場司令部
antiaircraft artillery regiment/battalion kōshahō rentai/daitai 高射砲聯隊/ 大隊
antiaircraft searchlight company shōkū chūtai 照空中隊
[Numbered] Army Gun 軍
Army Aviation Headquarters Rikugun Kōkū Hombu 陸軍航空本部
Army Department of IGHQ Daihon’ei Rikugun-bu 大本営陸軍部
Army Flying School, Hakujōshi/Hamamatsu 白城子/浜松
Baichengzi/Hamamatsu Rikugun Hikō-gakkō 陸軍飛行学校
army railway unit gun tetsudō butai (第16)軍鉄道部隊
battalion artillery section daitaihō shōtai 大隊砲小隊
bridge building material company kakyō zairyō chūtai 架橋材料中隊
cavalry regiment kihei rentai 騎兵聯隊
Central District Army Chūbu Gun 中部軍
Central Shipping Transport, Un’yu-bu 運輸部
[Ministry of War]
China Expeditionary Army Shina-haken Gun 支那派遣軍
construction duty company kenchiku kimmu chūtai 建築勤務中隊
detachment shitai 支隊
disembarkation working unit yōriku sagyō tai 揚陸作業隊
division shidan 師団
division headquarters shidan shirei-bu 師団司令部
divisional district shikan 師管
Eastern District Army Tōbu Gun 東部軍
Economic Mobilization Bureau, Seibi-kyoku 整備局
[Ministry of War]
engineer regiment kōhei rentai 工兵聯隊
equipment platoon kizai shōtai 器材小隊
field aircraft repair depot yasen kōkū shūri-shō 野戦航空修理廠
field airfield construction unit yasen hikō-jō settei tai 野戦飛行場設定隊
field antiaircraft defense unit headquarters yasen bōkū tai shirei-bu 野戦防空隊司令部
field artillery regiment yahōhei rentai 野砲兵聯隊
field duty unit headquarters yasen kimmu tai hombu 野戦勤務隊本部
field freight depot yasen kamotsu-shō 野戦貨物廠
field gas company yasen gasu chūtai 野戦瓦斯中隊
field heavy artillery regiment yasen jūhōhei rentai 野戦重砲兵聯隊
field hospital yasen byōin 野戦病院
(field) meteorological company (yasen) kishō chūtai (野戦)気象中隊
field military police unit yasen kempei tai 野戦憲兵隊
field motor transport depot yasen jidōsha-shō 野戦自動車廠
field ordnance depot yasen heiki-shō 野戦兵器廠
field postal unit yasen yūbin tai 野戦郵便隊
field road unit yasen dōro tai 野戦道路隊
field transport headquarters yasen yusō shirei-bu 野戦輸送司令部
field well-drilling company yasen sakusei chūtai 野戦作井中隊
fixed radio unit kotei musen tai 固定無線隊
ground duty company [Army aviation] rikujō kimmu chūtai 陸上勤務中隊
Imperial Guard Division Kono’e Shidan 近衛師団
Imperial Japanese Military Academy Rikugun Shikan-gakkō 陸軍士官学校
independent air unit dokuritsu hikō tai 独立飛行隊
independent antitank gun dokuritsu sokushahō 独立速射砲
battalion/company daitai/chūtai 大隊/中隊
independent engineer company dokuritsu kōhei chūtai 独立工兵中隊
(electricity)/([to facilitate] river-crossing (denki)/(jūtoga) (電気)/(重渡河)
of heavy equipment)
independent field antiaircraft artillery dokuritsu yasen kōshahō 独立野戦高射砲
battery (horse-carried) chūtai (daba) 中隊 (駄)
independent motor transport dokuritsu jidōsha 独立自動車
battalion/company daitai/chūtai 大隊/中隊
independent radio platoon dokuritsu musen shōtai 独立無線小隊
independent squadron dokuritsu hikō chūtai 独立飛行中隊
[of Army Air Forces]
infantry artillery unit hoheihō tai 歩兵砲隊
infantry group hohei dan 歩兵団
infantry regiment/battalion/ hohei rentai/daitai/ 歩兵聯隊/大隊/
company/platoon chūtai/shōtai 中隊/小隊
Information Department, Hōdō-bu 報道部
[Ministry of War]
Inspectorate General of [Army] Aviation Kōkū Sōkan-bu 航空総監部
Inspectorate General of Heitan Sōkan-bu 兵站総監部
Line of Communication
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Inspectorate General of Military Training Kyōiku Sōkan-bu 教育総監部
intendance department director keiri-buchō 経理部長
Kwantung Army Kantō Gun 関東軍
legal department director hōmu-buchō 法務部長
light-armored car unit kei-sōkōsha tai 軽装甲車隊
line-of-communication sick horse depot heitan byōba-shō 兵站病馬廠
line-of-communication area unit heitan chiku tai 兵站地区隊
line-of-communication heitan 兵站
hospital/medical unit byōin/eisei tai 病院/衛生隊
machine gun company kikanjū chūtai 機関銃中隊
Mark-3 radio squad San-gō-musen buntai 3号無線分隊
material depot zairyō-shō 材料廠
medical department director gun’i-buchō 軍医部長
medical unit eisei tai 衛生隊
meteorological observation detail sokkō han 測候班
military administration department gunsei-bu 軍政部
Military Affairs Bureau, Gummu-kyoku 軍務局
[Ministry of War]
Ministry of War Rikugun-shō 陸軍省
mixed brigade konsei ryodan 混成旅団
motor transport squad jidōsha han 自動車班
motorcycle unit jidō-nirinsha tai 自動二輪車隊
mountain artillery regiment sampōhei rentai 山砲兵聯隊
Northern China Area Army Kita-shina-hōmen Gun 北支那方面軍
Northern District Army Hokubu Gun 北部軍
Office of Army General Staff Sambō Hombu 参謀本部
on-board antiaircraft artillery regiment sempaku kōshahō rentai 船舶高射砲聯隊
ordnance department director heiki-buchō 兵器部長
ordnance service unit heiki kimmu tai 兵器勤務隊
patient transport unit HQ/ kan’ja yusō tai hombu/ 患者輸送隊本部/
platoon shōtai 小隊
press corps hōdō han 報道班
Propaganda Group Senden Han 宣伝班
radio telegraph platoon musen denshin shōtai 無線電信小隊
raiding air group, [paratroop] teishin hikō-rentai 挺進飛行戦隊
Raiding Group, [1st Paratroop] [Dai-ichi] Teishin Dan [第一]挺進団
raiding regiment, [paratroop] teishin rentai 挺進聯隊
railway depot headquarters teishajō shirei-bu 停車場司令部
railway regiment tetsudō rentai 鉄道聯隊
reconnaissance regiment sōsaku rentai 捜索聯隊
regimental artillery section rentaihō shōtai 聯隊砲小隊
Resource section, [Ministry of War] Shigen-ka 資源課
river-crossing material company toga zairyō chūtai 渡河材料中隊
sea duty company suijō kimmu chūtai 水上勤務中隊
sea transport supervisory unit kaijō yusō kanshi tai 海上輸送監視隊
Section 2 (Operations Section), Dai-ni-ka (Sakusen-ka) 第二課 (作戦課)
[Army Department of IGHQ]
Section 3 (Organization and  Dai-san-ka 第三課
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Mobilization Section), (Hensei, Dōin-ka) (編成・動員課)
[Army Department of IGHQ]
ship repair depot sempaku kōsaku-shō 船舶工作廠
shipping engineer sempaku kōhei 船舶工兵
shipping signal regiment sempaku tsūshin rentai 船舶通信聯隊
Shipping Transport Command Sempaku Yusō Shirei-bu 船舶輸送司令部
shore duty company rikujō kimmu chūtai 陸上勤務中隊
signal unit tsūshin tai 通信隊
sick horse depot byōba-shō 病馬廠
Soutern Army Nampō Gun 南方軍
Southern China Area Army Minami-shina-hōmen Gun 南支那方面軍
Southern Group, Nampō Han 南方班
[Army Department of IGHQ]
Special Broadcasting Detail Tokushu Hōsō Han 特殊放送班
squad buntai 分隊
squad for collecting cast-off articles ikibutsu shūshū han 遺棄物収集班
squadron, [Army air group] hikō chūtai 飛行中隊
supply platoon of the train [of regiment] rentai danretsu hokyū shōtai 聯隊段列補給小隊
Taiwan Army Taiwan Gun 台湾軍
tank regiment sensha rentai 戦車聯隊
telegraph regiment denshin rentai 電信聯隊
transport regiment shichō rentai 輜重聯隊
Transport section, [Ministry of War] Kōtsū-ka 交通課
unit tai/butai 隊/部隊
unit under direct control of (Jūroku-)gun-chokuzoku (第16)軍直属部隊
the [Sixteenth] Army butai
vessel launching unit hensui sagyō tai 泛水作業隊
veterinary department director jūi-buchō 獣医部長
veterinary quarantine depot gumba bōeki-shō 軍馬防疫廠
War College Rikugun Daigakkō 陸軍大学校
War Preparation Section, [Ministry of War] Sembi-ka 戦備課
water supply and purification department bōeki kyūsui-bu 防疫給水部
weather observation detail kansoku han 観測班
wire company yūsen chūtai 有線中隊
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Navy
1001 [paratroop] Unit                                            1001 Butai                                1001部隊
Acoustic Research Department                           Onkyō Kenkyū-bu                 音響研究部
Advance Unit                                                         Senken Butai                           先遣部隊
Air Fleet [Eleventh] [or Air Unit]                        Kōkū Kantai                           航空艦隊
                                                             [Dai-jū-ichi]                      [第11]
                                                                                 [or Kōkū Butai]                       [航空部隊]
Air Fleet [First]                                                       Kōkū Kantai [Dai-ichi]          第1航空艦隊
Air Flotilla [21st, 22d, 23d, 24th, 25th, 26th]      Kōkū Sentai                            航空戦隊 [第21, 22, 23, 24, 
                                                                                 [Dai-nijū-ichi,                                25, 26]
                                                                                 Dai-nijū-ni, Dai-nijū-san, 
                                                                                 Dai-nijū-yon, Dai-nijū-go, 
                                                                                 Dai-nijū-roku]                         
Air Group [1st, 3d, 4th, 18th, 33d, 35th,             Kōkū-tai [Dai-ichi, Dai-san,  航空隊 [第1, 3, 4, 18, 33,
      40th, Iwakuni, Kanoya, Kisarazu,                       Dai-yon, Dai-jū-hachi,           35, 40, 岩國, 鹿屋, 
      Genzan, Tainan, Takao, Chitose,                         Dai-sanjū-san,                         木更津, 元山, 臺南,
      Tōkō, Mihoro, Yokohama]                                    Dai-sanjū-go, Dai-yonjū,       高雄, 千歳、東港,
                                                                                        Iwakuni, Kanoya,                  美幌, 横濱]
                                                                                        Kisarazu, Genzan, 
                                                                                        Tainan, Takao, Chitose, 
                                                                                        Tōkō, Mihoro, 
                                                                                        Yokohama]                        
air group detachment                                           kōkū-tai shitai                         航空隊支隊
Air Raid Unit [1st, 2d, 3d; A, B, C, D]                 Kūshū Butai                            空襲部隊 [第1, 2, 3; 甲,乙,
                                                                                        [Dai-ichi, Dai-ni,                     丙, 丁]
                                                                                        Dai-san; Kō, 
                                                                                        Otsu, Hei, Tei]                   
air training units                                                    renshū kōkū-tai                      練習航空隊
air unit                                                                    kōkū butai                               航空部隊
Air Unit [1st, 2d, 3d] [of the Malaya Unit,         Kōkū Butai [Dai-ichi,            航空部隊 [第1, 2, 3]
      Dutch East Indies Unit, etc.]                                 Dai-ni, Dai-san] 
[airborne] raiding unit                                          Teishin Butai                            挺進部隊
antitank gun unit [of the SLF]                              sokushahō-tai [rikusen-tai]   速射砲隊 [陸戦隊]
artillery unit  [of the SLF]                                     hō-tai [rikusen-tai]                 砲隊 [陸戦隊]
attached unit  [of the SLF]                                    fuzoku-tai [rikusen-tai]         付属隊 [陸戦隊]
Auxiliary Cruiser Division [22d, 24th]               Sentai [Dai-nijū-ni,                戦隊 [第22, 24]
                                                                                        Dai-nijū-yon]
Auxiliary Minesweeper Division [32d]             Sōkai-tai [Dai-sanjū-ni]          掃海隊 [第32]
Auxiliary Subchaser Division [51st, 52d,           Kusen-tai [Dai-gojū-ichi,       駆潜隊 [第51, 52, 53, 54, 
      53d, 54th, 55th, 91st]                                              Dai-gojū-ni,                             55, 91]
                                                                                        Dai-gojū-san, 
                                                                                        Dai-gojū-yon, 
                                                                                        Dai-gojū-go,
                                                                                        Dai-kyūjū-ichi]                 
aviation officer                                                       hikō-chō                                   飛行長
Aviation System Study Committee                     Kōkū Seido Kenkyū Iinkai   航空制度研究委員会
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Base Force [1st, 2d, 3d, 5th, 9th]                           Konkyochi-tai [Dai-ichi,       根拠地隊 [第1, 2, 3, 5, 9]
                                                                                        Dai-ni, Dai-san, Dai-go, 
                                                                                        Dai-kyū]                            
Base Unit [1st, 2d, 9th, Penang, Singapore,       Konkyochi Butai                    根拠地部隊 [第1, 2, 9,
      Rangoon]                                                          [Dai-ichi, Dai-ni, Dai-kyū,          彼南, 昭南, 蘭貢]
                                                                                        Penang, Shōnan, 
                                                                                        Rangoon]                           
Base Unit [Anambas, Penang, Sabang,              Kichi Butai [Anambas,           基地部隊 [アナンバス、
      Singora]                                                                   Penang, Sabang,                     ペナン、サバン、
                                                                  Singora]                           シンゴラ]
battalion headquarters [of the SLF]                    daitai hombu [rikusen-tai]    大隊本部 [陸戦隊]
Battleship Division  [1st, 2d, 3d]                          Sentai [Dai-ichi, Dai-ni,         戦隊 [第1, 2, 3]
                                                                                        Dai-san]                             
captain (of a ship)                                                  kanchō                                      艦長
Carrier Division [1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th]                Kōkū Sentai [Dai-ichi,            航空戦隊 [第1, 2, 3, 4, 5]
                                                                                        Dai-ni, Dai-san, 
                                                                                        Dai-yon, Dai-go]               
Carrier Operation unit                                          Kidō-sakusen butai                機動作戦部隊
Carrier Task Force                                                  Kidō Butai                               機動部隊
carrier-based air unit                                             bokan kōkū butai                   母艦航空部隊
chief gunner                                                            hōjutsu-chō                              砲術長
China Area Fleet                                                    Shina Hōmen Kantai              支那方面艦隊
China Expeditionary Fleet [2d]                           Kenshi Kantai [Dai-ni]           遣支艦隊 [第2]
Combined Fleet [or Main Unit]                           Rengō Kantai                          聯合艦隊, [主力部隊]
                                                                                        [Shuryoku Butai]
Combined Signal Unit [1st]                                  Rengō Tsūshin-tai                  聯合通信隊 [第1]
                                                                                        [Dai-ichi]
commander/commanding officer                       shirei                                         司令
commander                                                             shirei-kan                                 司令官
commander in chief                                               shirei-chōkan                          司令長官
Commercial [Maritime] Transport                      Tsūshō hakai tai                      通商破壊隊
      Disruption Unit                                                      
communication officer                                          tsūshin-chō                              通信長
company [of the SLF]                                            chūtai [rikusen-tai]                 中隊 [陸戦隊]
Construction Squad  [1st, 2d, 3d,                        Setsuei-han [Dai-ichi,             設営班 [第1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,
      4th, 5th, 6th, 8th, 9th]                                             Dai-ni, Dai-san,                      8, 9] 
                                                                                        Dai-yon, Dai-go, 
                                                                                        Dai-roku, Dai-hachi,
                                                                                        Dai-kyū]                            
Construction Unit [102d]                                      Kensetsu-bu                            建設部 [第102]
                                                                                        [Dai hyaku-ni]
Cruiser Division [4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th,             Sentai [Dai-yon, Dai-go,        戦隊 [第4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 16,
      9th, 16th, 18th, 21st]                                               Dai-roku, Dai-nana,               18, 21]
                                                                                        Dai-hachi, Dai-kyū, 
                                                                                        Dai-jū-roku, Dai-jū-hachi, 
                                                                                        Dai-nijū-ichi]                     
Defense Detail [1st, 2d]                                         Bōei-han [Dai-ichi, Dai-ni]    防衛班 [第1, 2]
Defense Unit [1st, 2d]                                            Bōbi-tai [Dai-ichi, Dai-ni]      防備隊 [第1, 2]
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Destroyer Division [2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th,           Kuchikutai [Dai-ni,                駆逐隊 [第2, 3, 4, 5, 6,
      7th, 8th, 9th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 15th, 16th,            Dai-san, Dai-yon,                    7, 8,  9, 11, 12, 13, 15,
      17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 22d, 23d, 24th,         Dai-go, Dai-roku,                    16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21,
      27th, 29th, 30th, 32d, 34th]                                    Dai-nana, Dai-hachi,             22, 23, 24, 27, 29, 30,
                                                                                        Dai-kyū, Dai-jū-ichi,              32, 34]
                                                                                        Dai-jū-ni, Dai-jū-san, 
                                                                                        Dai-jū-go, Dai-jū-roku, 
                                                                                        Dai-jū-nana, Dai-jū-hachi, 
                                                                                        Dai-jū-ku, Dai-nijū, 
                                                                                        Dai-nijū-ichi, Dai-nijū-ni, 
                                                                                        Dai-nijū-san, Dai-nijū-yon, 
                                                                                        Dai-nijū-nana, Dai-nijū-ku, 
                                                                                        Dai-sanjū, Dai-sanjū-ni, 
                                                                                        Dai-sanjū-yon]                  
Destroyer Squadron [1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th,         Suirai Sentai [Dai-ichi,           水雷戦隊 [第1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6]
      6th]                                                                           Dai-ni, Dai-san, Dai-yon, 
                                                                                        Dai-go, Dai-roku]             
“Destroyer Squadron                                            Sentai [Dai-jū]                         戦隊 [第10]
      [10th [Destroyer] Squadron]”
detached unit [of a base force]                             bunken-tai                               分遣隊
detached unit [of an air flotilla]                           kōkū sentai haken-tai            航空戦隊派遣隊
Dutch East Indies Unit                                          Ran’in Butai                             蘭印部隊
East Indies Unit                                                      Tōin Butai                                東印部隊
East Philippines Unit                                             Hitō Higashi Butai                 比島東部隊
Eastern Attack Unit                                               Tōhō Kōryaku Butai               東方攻略部隊
Eastern Support Unit                                            Tōhō Shién-tai                         東方支援隊
engineer unit [of the SLF]                                     kōsaku-tai [rikusen-tai]         工作隊 [陸戦隊]
Escort Unit [1st, 2d, 3d]                                        Goéi-tai [Dai-ichi,                   護衛隊 [第1, 2, 3]
      [of Malaya Unit,                                                    Dai-ni, Dai-san]                      [馬來部隊、蘭印部隊
      Dutch East Indies Unit, etc.]                                 [Malaya Unit,                         ほか]
                                                                                        Dutch East Indies 
                                                                                        Unit, etc.]                           
fighter plane unit                                                   kōkū-tai haken sentōki-tai    航空隊派遣戦闘機隊
      dispatched from an air group                              
fire-control officer                                                  shageki-shiki-kan                   射撃指揮官
Fleet [First, Second, Third, Fourth,                     Kantai [Dai-ichi, Dai-ni,        艦隊 [第1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6]
      Fifth, Sixth]                                                             Dai-san, Dai-yon, 
                                                                                        Dai-go, Dai-roku]             
Forward Unit                                                          Zenshin Butai                          前進部隊
Fuel Depot [101st]                                                  Nenryō-shō                             燃料廠 [第101]
                                                                                        [Dai-hyaku-ichi]               
ground patrol section [of base force]                  rikukei-ka [of base force]       陸警科 (根拠地隊）
Greater East Asia War’s Lessons of War            Daitōa-sensō Senkun             大東亞戦争戦訓（航空）
      ([section] Air Operations)                                    (Kōkū)                                
Guard Unit [2d, 3d, 4th, 91st, Celebes,               Keibi-tai [Dai-ni,                     警備隊 [第2, 3, 4, 91,
      Ambon]                                                                   Dai-san, Dai-yon,                   セレベス, アンボン]
                                                                                        Dai-kyūjū-ichi, Celebes, 
                                                                                        Ambon]                             
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Gunboat Division [1st, 2d, 3d, 12th]                   Hōkan-tai [Dai-ichi, Dai-ni,  第1砲艦隊 [第1, 2, 3, 12]
                                                                                        Dai-san, Dai-jū-ni]            
gunnery staff                                                          hōjutsu sambō                         砲術参謀
headquarters                                                           shirei-bu                                   司令部
headquarters [of the SLF]                                     hombu [rikusen-tai]               本部 [陸戦隊]
homeland units                                                      naisen butai                             内戦部隊
Hydrographic Department                                  Suiro-bu                                   水路部
Kure [Naval Station] Special Landing Force     Kure [Chin’ju-fu]                    呉特別陸戦隊 [第1,2,3]
      [1st, 2d, 3d]                                                             Tokubetsu Rikusen-tai          [呉一特、呉二特、
                                                                                        [Dai-ichi, Dai-ni, Dai-san]     呉三特]
                                                                                        [or Kure-ittoku, 
                                                                                        Kure-nitoku,
                                                                                        Kure-santoku]                   
land-based air unit                                                 kichi kōkū butai                      基地航空部隊
lookout commander                                              mihari-chō                               見張長
main body [of task force, group, unit]                hontai                                       本隊
main force                                                               shuryoku                                 主力
main unit [of task force, group, unit]                  shutai                                        主隊
Malaya Unit                                                            Marē Butai                               マレー部隊, 馬來部隊
Malaya Unit Striking Force                                  Marē Butai Kidō Butai           馬來部隊機動部隊
medical unit [of the SLF]                                      imu-tai [rikusen-tai]               医務隊 [陸戦隊]
military supplies department                              gun’ju-bu                                 軍需部
Minelayer Division [17th, 19th]                           Sentai [Dai-jū-nana,               戦隊, [第17, 19]
                                                                                        Dai-jū-kyū]                        
Minesweeper Division [1st, 11th, 21st,               Sōkai-tai [Dai-ichi,                  掃海隊 [第1, 11, 21, 30, 41,
      30th, 41st, 44th]                                                      Dai-jū-ichi,                              44]
                                                                                        Dai-nijū-ichi, Dai-sanjū, 
                                                                                        Dai-yonjū-ichi, 
                                                                                        Dai-yonjū-yon]                 
Naval Affairs Bureau [of Navy Ministry]          Gummu-kyoku                       軍務局
Naval Antisubmarine [Warfare] School             Kaigun Taisen Gakkō             海軍対潜学校
Naval Arsenal [101st, Toyokawa, Yokosuka]     Kaigun Kōshō                         海軍工廠
                                                                                        [Dai-hyaku-ichi,                     [第101, 豐川, 横須賀]
                                                                                        Toyokawa, Yokosuka]     
Naval College                                                         Kaigun Daigakkō                   海軍大学校
Naval Investigation Committee on                    Kaigun Sentō Senkun            海軍戦闘戦訓調査委員会
      Engagements and Lessons of War                      Chōsa Iinkai                            （航空分科会）
      (Subcommittee on Air Operations)                     (Kōkū Bunka-kai)             
Naval Technical Research Institute                     Kaigun Gijutsu                       海軍技術研究所
                                                                                        Kenkyū-sho                       
navigation officer                                                   kōkai-chō                                 航海長
Navy Aeronautical Department                          Kōkū-Hombu                          航空本部
Navy Department of IGHQ                                 Daihon’ei-Kaigun-bu             大本営海軍部
Navy Facility Department                                    Shisetsu-bu                              施設部
Navy General Staff                                                Gunrei-bu                                軍令部
Navy Ministry                                                        Kaigun-shō                              海軍省
Navy Technical Department                                Kansei Hombu                        艦政本部
Northern Task Force                                              Hoppō Butai                            北方部隊
occupying units                                                      shinchū butai                          進駐部隊
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paratroop unit                                                        kūtei butai                               空挺部隊
Patrol Boat Division [1st]                                      Shōkai-tai or Shōkaitei-tai     哨戒隊, 哨戒艇隊 [第1]
                                                                                        [Dai-ichi]                            
patrol stations [1st~] [on board]                          Kannai shōkai                         艦内哨戒第一配備
                                                                                        dai-ichi haibi                     
paymaster  [of the SLF]                                         shukei-tai [rikusen-tai]          主計隊 [陸戦隊]
Philippines Unit                                                     Hitō Butai                                比島部隊, 菲島部隊
Port Administration Department [1st, 2d]         Kōmu-bu [Dai-ichi, Dai-ni]   港務部 [第1, 2]
Preparatory Fleet Mobilization Order               Suishi Jumbi                            出師準備
      [first/second stage of ~]                                 [Dai-itchaku sagyō,                     (第一着作業, 
                                                                                        Dai-ni-chaku sagyō]               第二着作業)
protective sailing formation                                 Keikai kōkō taikei                   警戒航行隊形
protective sailing order                                         Keikai kōkō joretsu                警戒航行序列
Raid Unit [1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th]                            Kyūshū-tai [Dai-ichi,             急襲隊 [第1, 2, 3, 4, 5]
                                                                                        Dai-ni, Dai-san, Dai-yon, 
                                                                                        Dai-go]                               
range-taking officer                                               sokuteki shiki-kan                  測的指揮官
rapid unit                                                                keikai butai                              軽快部隊
River-ascending unit for Palembang                  Palembang sokō-butai           パレンバン遡江部隊
Sasebo [Naval Station]                                         Sasebo [Chin’ju-fu] Rengō    佐世保[鎮守府]
      Combined Special Landing Force                       Tokubetsu rikusen-tai            第1,2 聯合特別陸戦隊
      [1st, 2d]                                                                    [Dai-ichi, Dai-ni]              
seaplane base                                                          Suijō kichi                                水上基地
Seaplane Tender Division [11th, 12th]                Kōkū Sentai [Dai-jū-ichi,      航空戦隊 [第11, 12]
                                                                                        Dai-jū-ni]                           
section [of the 1st Combined Signal Unit]         rentai [of 1st Comb. S. U.]     聯隊 [第1, 2] [聯合通信隊]
section [of a ship division]                                   shōtai                                        小隊
senior staff officer                                                  shuseki sambō                        首席参謀
Ship Management Association                            Sempaku Un’ei-kai                 船舶運営会
Signal Unit [1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th,                 Tsūshin-tai [Dai-ichi,              通信隊 [第1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 
      12th, 21st, 24th, 91st, Chichijima,                        Dai-ni, Dai-san,                       12, 21, 24, 91, 父島,
      Okinawa, Takao, Tokyo]                                       Dai-yon, Dai-go,                     沖縄, 高雄, 東京]
                                                                                        Dai-roku, Dai-jū-ni, 
                                                                                        Dai-nijū-ichi, Dai-nijū-yon, 
                                                                                        Dai-kyūjū-ichi, Chichijima, 
                                                                                        Okinawa, Takao, Tokyo] 
South Seas Unit                                                      Nan’yō Butai                           南洋部隊
Southern Expeditionary Fleet                             Nanken Kantai [Dai-ichi,      南遣艦隊 [第1, 2, 3]
      [First, Second, Third]                                             Dai-ni, Dai-san]                
Southern Task Force                                              Nampō Butai                           南方部隊
Southwest Area Fleet                                             Nansei Hōmen Kantai           南西方面艦隊
Special Base Force [9th, 10th, 11th, 12th,            Tokubetsu Konkyochi-tai      特別根拠地隊 [第9, 10, 11,
      21st, 22d, 23d, 24th, 31st, 32d]                             [Dai-kyū, Dai-jū,                    12, 21, 22, 23, 24, 31, 
                                                                                        Dai-jū-ichi, Dai-jū-ni,            32]
                                                                                        Dai-nijū-ichi, Dai-nijū-ni, 
                                                                                        Dai-nijū-san, Dai-nijū-yon, 
                                                                                        Dai-sanjū-ichi, Dai-sanjū-ni]
special landing force [SLF]                                   tokubetsu rikusen-tai             特別陸戦隊
special meteorological detail                                tokubetsu kishō-han              特別気象班
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special minesweeping service unit                     sōkai tokumu-tai                    掃海特務隊
squadron [of air units]                                          chūtai                                        中隊
Subchaser Division [1st, 2d, 5th, 11th,               Kusen-tai [Dai-ichi,                駆潜隊 [第1, 2, 5, 11, 12,
      12th, 21st, 31st]                                                       Dai-ni, Dai-go,                        21, 31]
                                                                                        Dai-jū-ichi, Dai-jū-ni, 
                                                                                        Dai-nijū-ichi, 
                                                                                        Dai-sanjū-ichi]                  
Submarine Base Unit [11th, 21st]                         Sensuikan Kichi-tai                潜水艦基地隊 [第11, 21]
                                                                                        [Dai-jū-ichi, Dai-nijū-ichi]     
Submarine Division [1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 7th,          Sensui-tai [Dai-ichi,                潜水隊 [第1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9,
      8th, 9th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 18th, 19th, 20th,          Dai-ni, Dai-san,                       11, 12, 13, 18, 19, 20, 
      21st, 26th, 27th, 28th, 29th, 30th, 33d]                 Dai-yon, Dai-nana,                21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30,
                                                                                        Dai-hachi, Dai-kyū,               33]
                                                                                        Dai-jū-ichi, Dai-jū-ni, 
                                                                                        Dai-jū-san, Dai-jū-hachi, 
                                                                                        Dai-jū-ku, Dai-nijū, 
                                                                                        Dai-nijū-ichi, Dai-nijū-roku, 
                                                                                        Dai-nijū-nana, Dai-nijū-hachi, 
                                                                                        Dai-nijū-ku, Dai-sanjū, 
                                                                                        Dai-sanjū-san]                   
Submarine Squadron [1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th,        Sensui Sentai [Dai-ichi,          潜水戦隊 [第1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,
      6th, 7th, 8th]                                                           Dai-ni, Dai-san, Dai-yon,      7, 8]
                                                                                        Dai-go, Dai-roku, Dai-nana, 
                                                                                        Dai-hachi]                          
Submarine Unit                                                      Sensui Butai                             潜水部隊
supply unit                                                              hokyū-tai                                 補給隊
support unit                                                            shién-tai                                   支援隊
Surface Escort Division [1st, 2d]                          Kaijō Goéi-tai [Dai-ichi,        海上護衛隊 [第1, 2]
                                                                                        Dai-ni]                                
surface patrol section [of base force]                   Suikei-ka [of base force]        水警科 [根拠地隊]
Survey Unit [1st, 2d]                                             Sokuryō-tai [Dai-ichi,            測量隊 [第1, 2]
                                                                                        Dai-ni]                                
Torpedo Boat Division [21st]                                Suirai-tai [Dai-nijū-ichi]        水雷隊 [第21]
torpedo chief                                                          suirai-chō                                 水雷長
torpedo launching commander                           hassha-shiki-kan                     発射指揮官
transport aircraft unit                                            yusōki-tai                                 輸送機隊
transport unit [of the SLF]                                    un’yu-tai [rikusen-tai]           運輸隊 [陸戦隊]
units engaged in operations outside [Japan]     gaisen butai                             外戦部隊
Wartime Formation                                               Senji Hensei                             戦時編制
West Philippines Unit                                           Hitō Nishi Butai                      比島西部隊
Western Attack Unit                                              Seihō Kōryaku Butai              西方攻略部隊
Yokosuka [Naval Station]                                    Yokosuka [Chin’ju-fu]           横須賀[鎮守府]第1,2,3
      Special Landing Force [1st, 2d, 3d]                     Tokubetsu rikusen-tai           特別陸戦隊
                                                                                        [Dai-ichi, Dai-ni, Dai-san]     （横一特）（横二特）
                                                                                        [or Yoko-ittoku, Yoko-nitoku, （横三特）
                                                                                        Yoko-santoku]                  
Yokosuka Gunnery School                                   Yokosuka Hōjutsu Gakkō     横須賀砲術学校
Yokosuka Naval Air Technical Arsenal              Kōkū-shō                                 航空廠
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Abe Heijirō (阿部平次郎), Lt, SōryūCarrier-based
Attack [Plane] Unit cdr, IJN, 338, 620, 628
Abe Hiroaki (阿部弘毅), R Adm, 8th Cruiser Div
cdr, IJN, 477
Abe Kōichi (安部孝一) Maj Gen, 48th Inf Gp cdr,
IJA, 391 
Abe Toshio (阿部俊雄) Capt, 8th Destroyer Div
cdr, IJN, 320 
Abe Zenji (阿部善次 ), Lt, Akagi Carrier-based
Bomber Unit [gp] cdr, IJN, 621, 629 
Adachi Jirō (足立次郎) Lt, Takao Air Gp Land-
based Attack Plane Unit cdr, IJN, 241, 459 
Aizawa Tatsuo (相沢達雄) Cdr, Tōkō Air Group
cdr, IJN, 115 
Aoki Shigemasa (青木重誠 ) Lt Gen, Southern
Army V Ch of staff, IJA, 64–65 
Aruga Takeo (有賀武夫) R Adm, Navy Technical
Dept 6th Dept director, IJN, 551 
Asahiro Hiroji (朝広裕二) Capt, Navy Technical
Dept member, IJN, 551 
Asai Masao (浅井正雄) Lt, Tainan Air Group sen-
ior unit cdr, IJN, 237 
Chiang Kai-shek, [Jiang Jieshi] (蒋介石), 4, 14, 16,
535–36, 565, 654–55 
Chihaya Takehiko (千早猛彦) Lt, Akagi Carrier-
based Bomber Unit cdr, IJN, 337 
Churchill, [Sir Winston] (チャーチル), 538, 602,
624 
Colijn, [Anton Hendrikus] (コーレン) Capt, BPM
manager, Tarakan garrison army adjutant,
KNIL, 179 
Cripps, [Sir Richard Stafford] (クリップス), 604
Daigo Tadashige (醍醐忠重) R Adm, 5th Subma-
rine Sqdn cdr, IJN, 67 
Dobbie [W. G. S.] (ドビー陸軍少将) Maj Gen, Gen
Ofcr Commanding, Malaya Command, 557 
Doorman [Karel W. F. M.] (ドルーマン) R Adm,
Royal Netherlands Navy cdr, 243, 305, 323,
328, 461
Egusa Takashige (江草隆繁) Lt Cdr, Sōryū Car-
rier-based Bomber Unit cdr, IJN, 338, 621, 624,
629 
Fuchida Mitsuo (淵田美津雄) Cdr, Akagi Carrier-
based Attack [Plane] Unit cdr, IJN, 336–37,
492, 620, 622, 628–29 
Fujimura Masasuke (藤村正亮 ) Cdr, 1st Kure
Special Landing Force cdr, IJN, 217 
Fujita Iyozō (藤田怡與蔵) Sublieutenant, Sōryū
Carrrier-based Fighter Plane Unit [gp] cdr,
IJN, 620 
Fujita Ruitarō (藤田類太郎 ) R Adm, 11th Sea-
plane Tender Div cdr, IJN, 161, 163, 218, 387,
392, 458, 506 
Fukushima Kyūsaku (福島久作) Col, 4th Inf Rgt
cdr, IJA, 384, 488, 490 
Glassford [William A. Jr.] (グラスフォード) R
Adm, U.S. naval forces cdr, 192 
Hamada Takeo (浜田武夫) Cdr, 1001 Unit cdr,
IJN, 153, 396 
Hamanaka Shūichi (浜中修一[脩一]) Cdr, Capt of
the Yamakaze, IJN, 143
Hara Chūichi (原忠一) R Adm, 5th Carrier Div
cdr, IJN, 601–02, 622–24 
Hara Kenzaburō (原顕三郎 ) R Adm, 5th De-
stroyer Sqdn cdr; [later] 16th Cruiser Div cdr,
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IJN, 364–66, 369–70, 384, 386, 412, 414–16, 418,
465–67, 469, 472, 498, 593, 597 
Hart, [Thomas C.] (ハート ) Adm, U.S. Asiatic
Fleet C in C, 174, 328 
Hashiguchi Takashi (橋口喬) Lt Cdr, Kaga Car-
rier-based Attack [Plane] Unit cdr, IJN, 337 
Hashimoto Shintarō (橋本信太郎) R Adm 3d De-
stroyer Sqdn cdr, IJN, 266–67, 284–85, 298 
Hashimoto Uroku (橋本卯六 ) Cdr, 2d Sasebo
Combined Special Landing Force cdr, IJN, 160 
Hasuo Ryūichi [Takaichi?] (蓮尾隆市) Lt, 3d Air
Gp unit cdr, IJN, 241
Hatakeyama Kōichirō (畠山耕一郎) R Adm, 24th
Special Base Force cdr, IJN, 217, 225–26, 232,
512 
Hatakeyama Kunito (畠山国登) Lt, 1st Kure Spe-
cial Landing Force senior ofcr, acting cdr, IJN,
217, 225–26 
Hattori Takushirō (服部卓四郎) Col, IGHQ Army
Dept Ch of opns; Army Gen Staff Ch of opns,
IJA, 90, 565 
Hayakawa Kikuo (早川菊夫) Maj, 228th Inf Rgt
1st Bn cdr, IJA, 228, 353
Hayashi Reizō [?] (林礪三) Capt, 18th Div 56th Inf
Rgt 2d Bn cdr, IJA, 583 
Hayashi Shōjirō (林鉦次郎) Cdr, 1st Kure Special
Landing Force cdr, IJN, 217 
Helfrich, [C. E. L.] (ヘルフリッツ) V Adm, Royal
Netherlands Navy cdr, 328
Hiraoka Kumeichi (平岡粂一) R Adm 9th Base
Force cdr, IJN, 270, 295–96, 568, 573 
Hirose Suéto (広瀬末人) R Adm, 2d Base Force
cdr; [later] 22d Special Base Force cdr, IJN,
130, 198, 252, 364–65, 367, 392, 505, 512 
Hitler [A.] (ヒトラー), 556 
Homma Masaharu (本間雅晴) Lt Gen, 14th Army
cdr, IJA, 64
Horiuchi Toyoaki (堀内豊秋) Cdr, 1st Yokosuka
Special Landing Force Paratroop Unit cdr,
IJN, 160
Ichihara Tatsuo (市原辰雄) Lt, Shōkaku Carrier-
based Attack [Plane] Unit cdr, IJN, 628 
Ichioka Hisashi (市岡寿) R Adm, 2d Submarine
Sqdn cdr, IJN, 486, 616, 647
Ieki Kōnosuke (家木幸之輔) Cdr, 1st Kure Special
Landing Force [staff?], IJN, 217, 225, 227
Iida Shōjirō (飯田祥二郎) Lt Gen, 15th Army cdr,
IJA, 65, 565, 570
Imai Kazufumi (今井一二三) Col, 1st Taiwan Inf
Rgt cdr, IJA, 391
Imamura Hitoshi (今村均 ) Lt Gen, 16th Army
cdr, IJA, 65, 116, 256, 258, 265, 343–44, 404,
415, 472, 489 
Imamura Osamu (今村脩) R Adm 12th Seaplane
Tender Div cdr, IJN, 131, 271, 498 
Inoue Shigeyoshi (井上成美) V Adm, 4th Fleet C
in C, IJN, 618, 633 
Irisa Toshiié (入佐俊家) Lt Cdr, Kanoya Air Gp
avn ofcr, IJN, 115, 153, 235, 238–39, 242–43 
Isayama Haruki (諌山春樹) Maj Gen, 15A Ch of
staff, IJA, 65 
Ishii Masayoshi [Masami ?] (石井正美 ) Col,
Southern Army Section 1 (opns section) sen-
ior staff, IJA, 277 
Ishikawa Shigeru (石川茂) R Adm, Rangoon Base
Unit cdr, IJN, 590
Itaya Shigeru (板谷茂 ) Lt Cdr, Akagi Carrier-
based Fighter Plane Unit cdr, IJN, 337, 620,
628 
Itō Motoé (伊藤素衛) Lt, Kumano avn ofcr, IJN,
290, 644 
Itō Sukemitsu (伊東祐満) Cdr, Tōkō Air Gp avn
ofcr, IJN, 585 
Itō Takeo (伊東武夫) Maj Gen, 38th Inf Gp cdr,
Eastern Det cdr, IJA, 111–12, 116, 171, 213–16,
226–28, 232, 265, 342–47, 349, 352–54, 373, 381,
397 
Itoda Isamu (井戸田勇) Lt Col, 16th Army, Sec-
tion 1 (Ch avn staff), IJA, 303
Iwabuchi [Iwafuchi ?] Tsuneo (岩淵經夫) Lt. Col.,
38th Engr Rgt cdf, IJA, 266, 303–04 
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Kakuta Kakuji (角田覚治) R Adm, 4th Carrier Div
cdr, IJN, 272–73, 290, 294–95 
Kanauji [Kaneuji ?] Ken’ichi (金氏堅一 ) Maj,
146th Inf Rgt 2d Bn cdr, IJA, 130 
Kaneko Tadashi (兼子正 ) Lt Shōkaku Type–0
Fighter Plane Unit [gp] cdr, IJN, 628 
Kanemura [Kanamura?] Matabē (金村亦兵衛 )
Maj, 1st Taiwan Inf Rgt 3d Bn cdr, IJA, 310,
312, 322 
Kanki Takekichi (神吉武吉), Col., 38th Mountain
Arty Rgt cdr, IJA, 303 
Kawaguchi Kiyotake (川口清健) Maj Gen, 18th
Div 35th Inf Bde cdr; Kawaguchi Det cdr, IJA,
65, 69–70, 75, 81, 91, 120, 209, 274–75
Kawano Chimaki (河野千万城) R Adm, 6th Sub-
marine Sqdn cdr, IJN, 481–82 
Kawasaki Harumi (川崎晴実) Capt, 91st Guard
Unit cdr, IJN, 583, 586
Kitayama [Yūzō] (北 山 [雄 三 ]) Col, Imperial
Guard Div Reconnaissance Rgt cdr, IJA, 580
Kikkawa Kiyoshi (吉川潔) Cdr, Capt of the Ōshio,
IJN, 320
Kimura Eijirō (木村栄次郎) Maj, 228th Inf Rgt 2d
Bn cdr, IJA, 228
Kimura Tadao [Nobuo, Yoshio?] (木村信雄 )
Flight Petty Ofcr 1st Class, IJN, Akagi fighter
plane unit [grp] cdr, 629
Kitamura Kurō (北村九郎) Lt Col, 48th Recon Rgt
cdr, IJA, 391 
Kobayashi Ichizō (小林一三) Japanese Minister of
Commerce and Industry; special envoy [to
the Dutch East Indies], 4
Kobayashi Michio (小林道雄) Lt, Hiryū Carrier-
based Bomber Unit cdr, IJN, 338, 621, 626, 629,
634
Kobayashi [Takashi] (小林隆)Maj Gen, Imperial
Guard Inf Gp cdr; Kobayashi Det cdr, IJA,
577–78, 580
Kobayashi Tetsuri (小 林 徹 理 ) R Adm, 17th
Minelayer Div cdr, IJN, 99 
Kōmura Takeo (甲村武雄) Maj, 2d [Paratroop]
Raiding Rgt cdr, IJN, 302 
Kondō Nobutake (近藤信竹) V Adm, 2d Fleet C
in C; Navy Southern Task Force cdr; [later]
Forward Unit cdr, IJN, 62, 66–67, 70, 87, 94,
101–02, 125, 205, 210, 212, 276, 330–32, 343,
362–63, 365, 372, 403–05, 407, 409–10, 417,
423–24, 475, 481–82, 486, 493, 499, 568–70, 602,
604, 641, 645, 650, 657 
Konoé Fumimaro (近衛文麿) Prime Minister of
Japan, 13
Koseki [Akira] (小関晟) Cdr, 3d Fleet staff, IJN,
344
Koyama Tadashi (小山貞) Capt, staff of destroyer
sqdn [then] Naval Technical Dept member,
IJN, 552
Kōzai Fusaichi (香西房市) Lt Cdr, Sanuki-maru
avn ofcr, IJN, 310 
Kubo Kyūji (久保九次 ) R Adm, 1st Base Force
cdr; [later] 21st Special Base Force cdr, IJN,
159, 171–72, 200, 202, 246, 248, 251, 253–54,
311–12, 317, 319, 323–24, 427, 442, 512 
Kuboki Hideo (久保木英雄 ) Cdr, Capt of the
Arashio, IJN, 320
Kume Seiichi (久米精一 ) Col, 1st [Paratroop]
Raiding Gp cdr, IJA, 302–03 
Kunishi [Kentarō] (国司[憲太郎]) Col, Imperial
Guard Div 4th Inf Rgt cdr, IJA, 580
Kurita Takeo (栗田健男）R Adm, 7th Cruiser Div
cdr, IJN, 369, 387, 410, 412, 414–17, 644 
Kurusu Saburō (來栖三郎) Ambassador [sent to
the U.S.-Japanese negotiations], 14 
Kusuhata Yoshinobu (楠畑義信) Lt, Takao Land-
based Attack Plane Unit sqdn cdr, IJN, 460 
Kusumi Masashi (楠美正) Lt. Cdr., Hiryū Carrier-
based Attack [Plane] Unit cdr, IJN, 219, 338,
620, 628 
Layton [Sir Geoffrey] (レイトン) Adm Former C
in C of the Eastern Fleet; C in C of Ceylon,
650–51 
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Leatham [Sir Ralph, KCB] (レーサム ) R Adm,
East Indies Station C in C, 559 
Maéda Kōsei (前田孝成) Cdr, Genzan Air Gp cdr,
IJN, 518 
Maéda Masami (前田正実) Lt Gen, 14th Army Ch
of staff, IJA, 64 
Makino Masatoshi (牧野正敏) Lt, Zuikaku Type–0
Fighter Plane Unit [gp] cdr, IJN, 620, 628 
Makiuchi Tadao (牧内忠雄) Cdr, 2d Kure Special
Landing Force cdr, IJN, 135 
Matsumoto Makoto (松本真実) Lt Cdr, 1st Air Gp
avn ofcr, IJN, 22 
Matsunaga Sadaichi (松永貞市) R Adm, 22d Air
Flotilla cdr, IJN, 270, 279, 288, 292, 370, 498,
584, 617 
Matsuyama Tsugio (松山次男) Ch Flight Warrant
Ofcr, Hiryū Type–0 Fighter Plane Unit [gp]
cdr, IJN, 629 
Mikawa Gun’ichi (三川軍一) V Adm, 3d Battle-
ship Div cdr, IJN, 477–78 
Miyazawa Shigezō [Jūzō ?] (宮沢重蔵) Maj, 229th
Inf Rgt 2d Bn cdr, IJA, 266, 303–04 
Mizoguchi (Kuzuhara) Tomoji (溝口（葛原）智
司) Sublieutenant (later Lt Cdr) Torpedo Ch
of the Kawakaze, IJN, 549
Mori Kunizō (森国造) Capt, Sasebo Combined
Special Landing Force cdr; [later] 23d Special
Base Force cdr, IJN, 160, 201, 512
Morisawa (森澤) 1st Lt, 2d [Paratroop] Raiding
Rgt 3d Co cdr, IJA, 302 
Morita Rinji (森田林次 ) Lt, Kanoya Air Gp 2d
Sqdn cdr, IJN, 239, 243
Murase Jishichirō (村瀬治七郎 ) Capt, 3d Ma-
chinegun Bat cdr, IJA, 353 
Nagai Sumitaka (長井純隆 ) Cdr, Capt of the
Natsu shio, IJN, 253
Nagano Osami (永野修身) Adm, Ch of Navy Gen
Staff, IJN, 26, 34, 342–43
Nagasawa Kō (長沢浩) Cdr, 5th Cruiser Div sen-
ior staff, IJN, 441 
Nagumo Chūichi (南雲忠一) V Adm, 1st Air Fleet
C in C; Carrier Task Force cdr, IJN, 336–37,
339, 477–78, 491–92, 605, 619, 622–24, 627, 650 
Nakamura Toshihisa (中村俊久) R Adm, 3d Fleet
Ch of staff, IJN, 66
Namekata Shōichi (行方正一) Lt Col, 56th Field
Arty Rgt 1st Bn cdr, IJA, 136–38 
Nasu Yumio (那須弓雄) Maj Gen, 2d Inf Gp cdr,
IJA, 384, 488, 490 
Nikaidō Yasushi (二階堂易 ) Lt, Kaga Carrier-
based Fighter Plane Unit cdr, IJN, 338
Nishimura Shōji (西村祥治 ) R Adm, 4th De-
stroyer Sqdn cdr, IJN, 126–27, 136–37, 146,
148–49, 177, 184, 188, 190, 192, 194, 198, 248,
364, 367, 370, 372, 391–93, 427, 432–33, 436,
438–39, 443, 501–07, 594, 596–97 
Noble [Sir Percy] (ノーブル) Adm, China Station
C in C, 559
Nomura Kichisaburō (野村吉三郎) Japanese Am-
bassador to the United States, 6 
Nomura Ryōsuke (野村了介 ) Lt Cdr, 23d Air
Flotilla staff, IJN, 460 
Nonaka Tarō (野中太郎) Lt Cdr, Takao Air Gp
[unit] cdr, IJN, 235 
Nōno Sumio (能野澄夫) Lt, Hiryū Carrier-based
Fighter Plane Unit cdr, IJN, 338, 620 
Ogawa Shōichi [Seiichi? Masakazu?] (小川正一)
Lt, Kaga Carrier-based Bomber Unit cdr, IJN,
338 
Ogura Masami (小倉正身 ) Cdr, Capt of the
Michishio, IJN, 320
Oinuma Kichirō? [Yoshirō? Yoshio?] (生沼[吉郎])
Col, Imperial Guard Div 4th Inf Rgt cdr, IJA,
580 
Okazaki Seizaburō (岡崎清三郎) Maj Gen, 16th
Army , Ch of staff, IJA, 65 
Oku Nobukazu (奥信一) R Adm, Singapore Base
Unit cdr, IJN, 590
Ōmori Sentarō (大森仙太郎 ) R Adm, 1st De-
stroyer Sqdn cdr, IJN, 477 
Ōmura (大村)（技師） Engr, IJN, 8
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Ōnishi Takijirō (大西瀧治郎 ) R Adm, 11th Air
Fleet Ch of staff, IJN, 67 
Orita Masaru (折田優) Cap, 229th Inf Rgt 1st Bn
cdr, IJA, 266, 303–04 
Ōta Jusō (太田寿双) Lt, Tōkō Air Gp Torpedo At-
tack Unit cdr, IJN, 115 
Ōyagi Shizuo (大八木静雄) R Adm of Engr, IJN,
454 
Ozaki Takeo (尾碕武夫) Lt Cdr, 1st Air Gp unit
cdr, IJN, 235, 238, 242 
Ozawa Jisaburō (小沢治三郎) V Adm, Southern
Expeditionary Fleet/1st Southern Expedi-
tionary Fleet C in C; Malaya Unit cdr, IJN, 67,
124–25, 258, 261, 265, 270, 275–77, 279, 282–83,
287–90, 295, 298, 366, 369–70, 372, 423, 567–70,
575–76, 579, 581, 588, 613, 641–42, 650 
Pesman, [Jacob J.] (ベスマン) Maj Gen, Bandung
area garrison [army] cdr, KNIL, 489–90
Pibulsonggram, [Luang] (ピブン) Prime Minister
of Thailand, 80 
Poorten, [Hein] ter (テルポーテン) Lt Gen, Dutch
East Indies Army cdr and Ch of the Dutch
East Indies Army Dept, KNIL, 489
Pound, [Sir Alfred Dudley Pickman Rogers, GCB,
OM, GCVO] (バウンド卿 ) Adm, First Sea
Lord, 650 
Reinderhoff [Gerard Leonard] (レンデルボ) Capt,
Tarakan garrison staff, KNIL, 179 
Roosevelt [Franklin D.] (ルーズベルト) President
of the United States, 4, 6, 538 
Sakaguchi Shizuo (坂口静夫 ) Maj Gen, 56th
Mixed Inf Gp cdr; Sakaguchi Det cdr, IJA, 37,
70, 87, 92, 97, 103, 111–12, 117, 123, 127–29,
131, 135–38, 145, 149, 177–79, 181, 190, 194–96,
199, 210, 246, 256, 307, 355, 370–72, 380,
393–94, 397–99, 426, 488–90, 502, 533, 591
Sakaguchi Yoshitarō (阪口芳太郎) Lt Gen, South-
ern Army V Ch of staff, IJA, 64–65 
Sakamoto Akira (坂本明 ) Lt, Zuikaku Carrier-
based Bomber Unit cdr, IJN, 620, 629 
Sakiyama Shakao (崎山釈夫) Capt, Capt of the
Mikuma, IJN, 470
Sanagi Sadamu (佐薙毅 ) Cdr, Navy Gen Staff
Section 1 staff, IJN, 291 
Sano Tadayoshi (佐野忠義) Lt Gen, 38th Div cdr,
IJA, 266, 303 
Satō Hanshichi (佐藤半七) Col, 29th Inf Rgt cdr,
IJA, 384, 488, 490 
Sawada Torao (沢田虎夫) R Adm, 1st Southern
Expeditionary Fleet and Malay Unit Ch of
staff, IJN, 67, 277 
Shigematsu Yasuhiro (重松康弘) Sublieutenant,
Hiryū Type–0 Fighter Plane Unit [gp] cdr, IJN,
628
Shimazaki Shigekazu (嶋崎重和) Lt Cdr, Zuikaku
Carrier-based Attack Plane Unit cdr, IJN, 628 
Shingō Hideki (新郷英城) Lt, Tainan Air Gp air
unit cdr and [gp] cdr, IJN, 237, 241 
Shinoda Tarohachi (篠田太郎八) Capt, Capt of
the Kamikawa-maru, IJN, 271, 387, 498
Shiraishi Kazutaka (白石万隆) R Adm, 2d Fleet
Ch of staff, IJN, 66–67 
Shōji Toshishige (東海林俊成) Col, 230th Inf Rgt
cdr; Shōji Det cdr, IJA, 265, 361–62, 364, 374,
376, 378, 384, 398, 488–90, 500–01, 533
Somerville,[ Sir James Fownes, GCB, GBE, DSO,
DL] (ソマービル) Adm, Eastern Fleet C in C,
650–53 
Soné [Soji?] Akira (曽爾章 ) Capt, Capt of the
Mogami, IJN, 644
Suékuni Masao (末国正雄) Cdr, 5th Cruiser Div
gunnery staff, IJN, 441
Suganami Masaji [Seiji?] (菅波政治 ) Lt, Sōryū
Type–0 Fighter Plane Unit cdr, IJN, 628 
Sugawara Michiō (菅原道大) Lt Gen, 3d Air Force
cdr, IJA, 65, 258, 273, 500 
Sugiyama (杉山) Flight Petty Ofcr 1st Class,
Sōryū Type–0 Fighter Plane Unit [gp] cdr, IJN,
629 
Sugiyama Gen (杉山元) Gen, Ch of Army Gen
Staff, IJA, 26 
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Suzuki Sōsaku (鈴木宗作) Lt Gen, 25th Army Ch
of staff, IJA, 65 
Tada Takeo (多田武雄) R Adm, 21st Air Flotilla
cdr, IJN, 168–69, 183, 218–20, 240, 346, 349 
Takagi Takeo (高木武雄) R Adm, 5th Cruiser Div
cdr, IJN, 106, 110, 150, 172, 200, 218, 247, 307,
333, 344–46, 427, 431–33, 435–36, 438, 440–42 
Takahashi Chihaya (高橋千隼 ) Capt, 11th Air
Fleet senior staff, IJN, 205, 207 
Takahashi Ibō (高橋伊望) V Adm, 3d Fleet C in
C, The Philippines ([and later] the Dutch East
Indies) Unit cdr; [then] Southwestern Area
Fleet C in C, IJN, 66, 87, 94, 105–07, 118, 131,
174, 177, 201, 217, 246–47, 307–08, 311–12, 319,
322, 343–46, 354, 362, 364–67, 372, 379, 400–01,
403–05, 409–10, 424, 426, 438, 442–43, 445, 475,
501, 504, 507, 568, 592–93, 598, 657, 659 
Takahashi Kakuichi (高橋赫一) Lt Cdr, Shōkaku
Carrier-based Bomber Unit cdr, IJN, 620,
629–30 
Takama Tamotsu (高間完 ) Capt, Capt of the
Haruna, IJN, 66
Takedai Takashi (竹大孝志) Cdr, Navy Technical
Dept member, IJN, 453 
Takenaka Ryōzō(竹中龍造 ) R Adm, 23d Air
flotilla cdr, IJN, 130–31, 196, 234, 310, 427, 584 
Talbot [Paul H.] (タルボット) Cdr, Destroyer Div
cdr, 192 
Tanaka Hisakazu (田中久一) Lt Gen, 21st Div cdr,
IJA, 65 
Tanaka Kikumatsu (田中菊松) Capt, Capt of the
Kumano, IJN, 290
Tanaka Raizō (田中頼三) R Adm, 2d Destroyer
Sqdn cdr, IJN, 106, 150, 171–72, 200, 213–15,
218, 223–24, 227, 232, 344–45, 347–48, 355, 433,
435, 438, 443, 501, 503, 505–07 
Tanaka Ryōsaburō [Ryōzaburō?] (田中良三郎)
Col, 229th Inf Rgt cdr, IJA, 266, 303–04 
Tanaka Takekatsu (田中武克) Lt, Kanoya Air Gp
3d Sqdn cdr, IJN, 239, 243–44 
Tanaka Tōru (田中透) Col, 2d Taiwan Inf Rgt cdr,
IJA, 391
Terauchi Hisaichi (寺内寿一 ) Gen, Southern
Army C in C, IJA, 62, 64–65, 75, 87, 116, 120,
210, 265, 565–66, 568, 570 
Tjarda [van Starkenborgh Stachouwer], Jonkheer
Alidius Warmoldus Lambertus] (スタルケン
ボルグ) Governor-Gen, Dutch East Indies, 489 
Tōjō Hideki (東條英機, 東条英機), War Minister
and Prime Minister of Japan, 13, 342–43
Tomari Mitsuyoshi (泊満義) Capt, 1st Southern
Expeditionary Fleet/Malaya Unit senior staff,
IJN, 277
Tsuchihashi [Tsuchibashi?] Yūitsu [Yūichi?] (土
橋勇逸) Lt Gen, 48th Div cdr, IJA, 370 
Tsukada Osamu (塚田攻) Lt Gen, Southern Army
Ch of staff, IJA, 64–65 
Tsukahara Nishizō (塚原二四三) V Adm, 11th Air
Fleet C in C; Air Unit cdr, IJN, 67, 100–01, 113,
126, 130, 233, 237, 310, 330, 335–36, 369, 409,
423, 584, 612, 617, 639, 641
Tsukuda Sadao (佃定雄 ) Cdr, Navy Technical
Dept member, IJN, 544, 550
Ugaki Matome (宇垣纏) R Adm, Combined Fleet
Ch of staff, IJN, 330 
Wakabayashi Tōichi (若林東一) 1st Lt, 228th Inf
Rgt 10th Co cdr, IJA, 214, 217, 224–26, 228 
Wakatsuki Ryōzō (若槻龍三) Cdr, 3d Fleet gun-
nery staff attached to the 16th Army, IJN, 276 
Yamada Shigeru (山田茂) Flight Petty Ofcr 1st
class, crew of the Mizuho, IJN, 458
Yamada Takeo (山田猛夫 ) Ch Flight Warrant
Ofcr, IJN, 291
Yamada [Yutaka] (山田豊 ) Cdr, Yamada Unit
(fighter plane unit attached to the 22d Air
Flotilla HQ) cdr, IJN, 83, 270–71, 276, 280–81,
291–92, 299, 412, 421–23, 585 
Yamaguchi Sadao (山口定夫) Sublieutenant, 3d
Air Gp unit cdr, IJN, 241
Yamaguchi Tamon (山口多聞) R Adm, 2d Carrier
Div cdr, IJN, 212, 330, 339 
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Yamaki Akira (矢牧章) Capt, 3d Fleet senior staff,
IJN, 205
Yamakuma Wakito (山 隈 和 喜 人 ) Cdr, 11th
Minesweeper Div cdr, IJN, 142 
Yamamoto Isoroku (山本五十六 ) Adm, Com-
bined Fleet C in C, IJN, 13, 32, 34, 62, 77, 83,
118, 122, 204, 212, 485, 567, 569–70, 601–02, 658 
Yamamoto Kyōhei (山本恭平) Col, 146th Inf Rgt
cdr, IJA, 129, 137, 256–57, 426 
Yamashita Tomoyuki (山下奉文 ) Lt Gen, 25th
Army cdr, IJA, 65, 567, 581 
Yanagisawa Kuranosuke (柳沢蔵之助) Capt, 2d
Fleet senior staff, IJN, 209
Yano Tsuneo (矢野常雄) Lt Col, 56th Inf Gp/Sa -
kaguchi Det staff, IJA, 149
Yasunobu Takeo (安延多計夫 ) Cdr, 23d Air
Flotilla senior staff, IJN, 460 
Yokomizo Kōshirō (横溝幸四郎) Lt, Takao Air
Gp [unit] cdr, IJN, 238, 242 
Yokoyama Tamotsu (横山保) Lt, 3d Air Gp avn
ofcr and [unit] cdr, IJN, 235 
Yonehara Tsunaki? [Tsunaaki?] (米原綱明 ) Lt
Cdr, Tōkō Air Gp avn ofcr, IJN, 22 
Yoshii Gorō (吉井五郎) Cdr, Capt of the Asashio,
IJN, 320 
Yoshimatsu Yoshihiko [?] (吉松吉彦 ) Sublieu-
tenant, Destroyer Ushio torpedo Ch, IJN, 320 
Yoshitomi Setsuzō (吉富説三) R Adm, 4th Sub-
marine Sqdn cdr, IJN, 272–74, 300, 481–83
Yoshitomi Shigema (吉富茂馬) Lt Cdr, 4th Car-
rier Div avn staff, IJN, 295
Yoshizawa Kenkichi (芳沢謙吉) Ambassador and
special envoy, 5
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Abukuma (阿武隈), 59, 334, 371, 376, 492, 621, 623,
628
Aden-maru (亞丁丸, 亜丁丸), 376
Africa-maru (あふりか丸), 215
Aikoku-maru (愛國丸, 愛国丸), 61
Akagi (赤城 ), 32, 61, 334, 336–37, 339, 476, 479,
608–11, 620–21, 623, 625–26, 628–32, 634
Akashi (明石), 52, 54, 57, 105, 250, 530, 542
Akatsuki (曉, 暁), 367, 509
Akebono (曙), 322, 333, 346–47, 354, 382, 407, 410,
426, 442–43
Akebono-maru (あけぼの丸), 592, 594, 600
Akigumo (秋雲), 49, 54, 61, 371, 476, 605
Akikaze (秋風), 396
Alaska-maru (あらすか丸), 269
Alden (アンデン, アルデン), 174, 305, 461, 463
Amagiri (天霧), 283, 572, 615, 643–44
Amagisan-maru (天城山丸), 151, 159, 166, 396, 516
Amatsukaze (天津風), 150, 205–06, 215, 221, 223,
228, 434, 502, 526, 594, 596–97
An’yō-maru (安洋丸), 269
Aoba (青葉), 59
Aotaka (蒼鷹), 153, 159, 172, 249, 254, 308–09, 383,
426, 512
Arare (霰), 330, 601
Arashi (嵐), 475–76, 494, 496
Arashio (荒 潮 ), 221, 309, 311–12, 318–20, 323,
327–28, 444, 506, 526, 528, 543
Asagiri (朝霧), 267–68, 282–86, 289, 297, 572, 615
Asagumo (朝雲), 126, 128, 180, 194, 434, 437, 439,
443, 461, 505–06, 529–30
Asahi (朝日), 52, 55, 58, 263, 582
Asahi-maru (朝日丸), 52, 54, 189
Asahisan-maru (朝日山丸), 179, 189, 191, 193, 199
Asaka-maru (淺香丸, 浅香丸), 60
Asakaze (朝風), 366, 465–68, 510
Asama-maru (淺間丸, 浅間丸), 158, 177, 183, 396
Asashio (朝潮), 221–22, 224, 228, 311, 314–20, 323,
325–28, 444, 526, 528
Asheville (アンビル, アッシュビル), 494, 496
Ashigara (足柄), 60, 105, 110, 158, 174, 312, 322,
360, 367, 371–73, 382, 406–07, 410, 425, 440,
442–46, 448, 504, 512, 659
Atago (愛宕), 59, 90, 372, 475, 493–96, 605, 641
Awata-maru (粟田丸), 60




Banckert (バンゲルト), 243, 305, 563
Ban Ho Guan (バン・ホ・グァン), 487
Barker (バーカー, パーカー), 174, 243, 305
Boise (ボイス), 174, 192, 204, 563
Bulmer (ブルマ), 174, 243, 305
Canberra (キャンベラ), 341, 535, 603
Canopus (カノパス), 115
Chester (チェスター), 349
Chidori (千鳥), 366, 371, 413, 512
Chikuma (筑摩), 59, 334, 476, 478–79, 491–92, 496,
622
Childs (チャイルズ), 201, 563
Chilka (チルカ), 487
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Chitose (千歳), 60–61, 80, 84–85, 109, 161, 165, 201,
204, 218, 229–31, 247, 249–50, 256, 345, 365,
367, 371–73, 383, 395, 406, 427–29, 458, 499
Chiyoda (千代田), 657
Chōgei (長鯨), 60, 86, 485
Chōkai (鳥海, 鳥海), 59, 66–67, 72–73, 83, 260–62,
282–83, 287–88, 292, 294, 361, 371, 410, 493,
569–70, 572–73, 575, 577, 582, 588, 591, 614,
643, 645–46
Chōkō-maru (長江丸), 263
Chōsa-maru (長沙丸), 263, 380, 577, 582
Chōwa-maru (長和丸), 151, 166
Clan Ross (クランロス), 648
Cumberland (カンバーランド), 625
Cornwall (コンウォール), 535, 571, 603, 623, 627,
633, 651, 652
Daitō-maru (臺東丸, 台東丸), 322
Danae (ダナエ), 289, 415
De Ruyter (デロイテル), 238, 240, 242–44, 305, 320,
322–25, 328, 405, 450, 461–62, 464, 563
Dorsetshire (ドーセッツシャー), 571, 624, 627, 633,
651–52
Ebisu-maru (蛭子丸), 395, 424
Ebisu-maru (蛭丸; probably the same as the above)
Edsall (エドソール), 174, 305, 477, 480, 491, 496
Edwards → John D. Edwards
Ehime-maru (愛媛丸), 127, 179, 191, 370, 393, 426
Eifuku-maru (永福丸, 永福丸), 263
Eikō-maru (永興丸), 262, 265, 285, 297, 572–73, 577
Electra (エレクトラ), 461, 463
Elmdale (エルムデール), 648
Emerald (エメラルド), 289, 651
Encounter (エンカウンター), 445, 461–63
Enggano (エンガノ), 491
Enterprise (エンタープライズ), 651
Erimo (襟裳), 264, 499, 509
Evertsen (エベルツェン), 315, 508, 563
Exeter (エクゼター), 294, 305, 441, 444–46, 449–50,
461–62, 500
Ford → John D. Ford
Formidable (フォーミダブル), 650–51
Fubuki (吹雪), 282–87, 297, 411, 418, 465–67, 508,
588
Fujikawa-maru (富士川丸), 396
Fukuei-maru No. 15 (第十五福榮丸, 第十五福栄丸),
528
Fultala (フルタラ), 648




Ghent → Van Ghent
Gin’yō-maru (銀洋丸), 296
Glasgow (グラスゴー), 415, 418, 470
Glenshiel (グレンシール), 647
Haguro (羽黑, 羽黒), 59, 109, 253, 333, 382, 426,
434, 436–41, 443, 445–47, 461
Hakaze (羽風), 396
Hakusan-maru (白山丸), 109, 308–09
Hankow-maru (漢口丸, 漢口丸), 127, 179–80
Harukaze (春風), 366, 411, 418, 434, 465–68, 474,
508, 510, 527, 531
Haruna (榛名), 59, 66, 72, 83, 476, 630
Harusame (春雨), 126, 128, 196, 367, 393, 434, 444,
526
Hatakaze (旗風), 366, 465, 466–68, 508–10, 527
Hatsuharu (初春), 202, 204, 248, 250, 309, 322–23,
381, 383, 504, 530
Hatsukari (初雁), 366, 512–13
Hatsukaze (初風), 150, 205–06, 228, 434, 502, 506,
526, 543
Hatsushimo (初霜), 202, 251, 319
Hatsutaka (初鷹), 262, 284–85, 295, 572–73, 577,
582, 590
Hatsuyuki (初 雪 ), 283–86, 297, 465, 468, 474,
508–09, 527, 588
Havana-maru (はばな丸), 128, 179, 180, 370, 393
Hawkins (ホーキンス), 289
Hayabusa (隼), 659
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Hayashio (早潮), 109, 150–51, 166, 203, 205–06, 221,
254, 256, 475, 493–94
Hayatomo (早鞆), 424, 513
Heemskerck → Jacob van Heemskerck
Hein → Piet Hein
Hermes (ハーメス , ハーミーズ ), 535, 571, 603,
630–35, 640, 650–52
Heron (ヘロン), 115, 563
Hibiki (響), 367, 509
Hiei (比叡), 59, 476, 478–79, 481, 619
Hino-maru No. 3 (第三日の丸), 309, 322
Hino-maru No. 5 (第五日の丸), 215, 223, 396, 516
Hirokawa-maru (宏川丸), 583, 587
Hiryū (飛龍), 32, 61, 95, 101, 116, 201, 219, 334, 336,




Hiteru-maru (日照丸), 127, 179, 191
Hobart (ホバート), 305
Hōkoku-maru (報國丸, 報国丸), 61
Hōkō-maru (豐光丸, 豊光丸), 605–06
Hokuriku-maru (北陸丸), 151–52, 166, 248, 513
Hollyhock (ホーリー), 652
Hōrai-maru (蓬來丸, 蓬来丸), 472
Hōshō (鳳翔), 59
Houston (ヒューストン), 122, 174, 204, 219, 239,
243–44, 323, 350, 435, 438, 450, 461–64, 470, 563
Hyūga (日向), 59
I-1 (伊号第一潜水艦), 484, 486, 646
I-2 (伊号第二潜水艦), 484, 486–87, 616, 618–19,
647–48
I-3 (伊号第三潜水艦 ), 484, 486–87, 616, 618,
647–48
I-4 (伊号第四潜水艦 ), 484, 486–87, 616, 618,
647–48
I-5 (伊号第五潜水艦), 484, 486–87, 533, 646–47,
649
I-6 (伊号第六潜水艦), 211, 484, 486–87, 616, 618,
647–48
I-7 (伊号第七潜水艦), 60, 484, 486–87, 616–19, 641,
647
I-8 (伊号第八潜水艦), 60, 211
I-9 (伊号第九潜水艦), 60
I-10 (伊号第十潜水艦), 60
I-53 (伊号第五十三潜水艦), 300–01, 483–84
I-54 (伊号第五十四潜水艦), 483–84
I-55 (伊号第五十五潜水艦 ), 273, 299, 300–01,
483–84







I-123 (伊号第百二十三潜水艦), 484–85, 506
I-124 (伊号第百二十四潜水艦), 122
Ikazuchi (雷), 150, 223, 322, 333, 346–47, 354, 382,
407, 410, 426, 442–43, 446, 525
Ikushima-maru (いくしま丸), 254, 308–09, 383, 512
Imizu-maru (射水丸), 181, 512
Inazuma (電), 150




Isonami (磯波), 282, 298, 369, 410, 415, 587
Itsukushima (嚴島, 厳島), 60, 96, 98–99, 109, 111,
126, 159, 171, 181, 371, 380, 383, 393–94, 507,
513
Jacob van Heemskerck (ヒームスカーク), 650
Java (ジャバ, ジャワ), 238, 240, 242, 305, 314–17,
320, 322–25, 328, 405, 450, 461–62, 563
Jingei (迅鯨), 60
Jintsū (神通, 神通), 60, 84, 106, 109, 150, 152, 159,
171–73, 215, 221–23, 232, 346, 353, 355, 382,
426, 431, 434–41, 443, 451–52, 501–03
John D. Edwards (エドワーズ), 243, 305, 326–28,
461, 463
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John D. Ford (ジョン・D・フォード), 192–93, 315,
324–26, 328, 461, 463
Johor-maru (浄宝縷丸), 444
Jones → Paul Jones
Jupiter (ジュピター), 461–63
Kaga (加賀 ), 32, 61, 334–38, 341, 476, 492, 571,
601–02, 605, 626, 633, 657–58
Kagerō (陽炎), 330, 543, 601
Kagu-maru (香久丸), 128
Kako (加古), 59
Kamikawa-maru (神川丸, 神川丸), 60, 260, 262, 271,
274, 298, 345, 369, 374, 380, 383, 387–88, 390,
410–11, 413, 417, 420, 474, 498–99, 506, 508–10,
577
Kamikaze-maru (神風丸, 神風丸), 105
Kamitsu-maru (神津丸, 神津丸), 513
Kamogawa-maru (加茂川丸), 199, 200, 396, 515
Kamome (鷗, 鴎), 365, 513
Kanayamasan-maru (金耶摩山丸), 191
Kankō-maru (感興丸 [actually:咸興丸]), 525
Kano-maru (鹿野丸), 127
Kari (雁), 582




Kasuga-maru No. 2 (第二春日丸), 264
Katsuragi-maru (葛城丸), 151, 155, 166, 215, 229,
396
Kawakaze (江風 ), 126, 128, 184–85, 188, 354–55,
370, 372–73, 382, 392–93, 405, 410, 425–26, 431,
434–35, 437–38, 443, 446–47, 549
Keiyō-maru (慶洋丸), 398
Ken’yō-maru (健洋丸), 476–77, 605–06, 619
Kenryū-maru (乾隆丸), 513
Kent (ケント), 624, 626
Kiku-maru (菊丸), 96
Kimikawa-maru (君川丸), 60
Kimishima-maru (君島丸), 153, 159, 308–09, 383,
593, 595, 597–98, 600
Kinai-maru (畿内丸), 151, 166, 248
King George V (キングジョージ5世), 603





Kirishima (霧島), 59, 476, 478–79
Kirishima-maru (霧島丸), 115, 215
Kiso (木曾, 木曽), 60
Kisogawa-maru (木曾川丸, 木曽川丸), 264, 572
Kitakami (北上), 59
Kiyosumi-maru (淸澄丸, 清澄丸), 61
Kokuyō-maru (國洋丸, 国洋丸), 605–06
Komaki-maru (小牧丸), 396, 516
Kongō (金剛), 59, 66, 72, 83, 476
Kortenaer (コルテノール), 305, 461–63, 563
Kōryū-maru (廣隆丸 , 広隆丸 ), 264, 285, 297,
572–73
Kōshin-maru (興新丸), 151, 166
Kōshō-maru (江祥丸, 江祥丸), 582
Kōyō-maru (香洋丸), 376
Kōyō-maru No. 6 (第六高洋丸), 386
Kuma (球磨), 60, 96, 99, 367
Kumagawa-maru (球磨川丸), 128, 131, 140, 179–81,
189, 191, 193, 199, 592, 594–95, 598, 600
Kumano (熊野), 59, 260, 282, 288–90, 411–12, 414,
417–20, 422–23, 614, 644, 646
Kunikawa-maru (國川丸, 国川丸), 127, 396
Kunitsu-maru (國津丸, 国津丸), 128
Kureha-maru No.3 (第三呉羽丸), 96, 126
Kuretake-maru (呉竹丸), 128, 179, 189, 191, 193, 199







K-XIII (潜水艦K-13), 530, 563
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K-XIV (潜水艦K-14), 192, 563
K-XVI (潜水艦K-16), 563
K-XVIII (潜水艦K-18), 192, 563
K-XIX (潜水艦K-19), 563
Kyōdō-maru No. 36 (第三十六共同丸), 99
Kyōei-maru No. 2 (第二共栄丸), 605–06
Kyokutō-maru (旭東丸), 476, 605
Langley (ラングレー), 459–60, 477, 534
Leander (レアンダー), 295, 631
Le Maire (レ・マイヤー), 487
Lexington (レキシントン), 211
Liverpool-maru (りばぷーる丸), 127, 179, 191, 426
London (ロンドン), 535, 603
Lyons-maru (りおん丸), 215, 516
Manazuru (眞鶴, 真鶴), 512
Marblehead (マーブルヘッド ), 174, 192, 238,
240–44, 479, 481, 493–96, 563
Matsué-maru (松江丸), 249
Matsukaze (松風), 366, 418, 510, 527
Matsumoto-maru (松本丸), 518
Maya (摩耶 ), 59, 66, 72, 83, 214, 361, 371, 475,
493–94
Michishio (滿潮 , 満潮 ), 228, 251, 311, 318–20,
322–23, 327–28, 504, 528, 530
Miike-maru (三池丸), 215, 224
Mikazuki (三日月), 59
Mikuma (三隈), 59, 260, 282, 289, 414–16, 418–19,
465–66, 468–70, 474, 614, 644
Minazuki (水無月), 366, 465, 510, 659
Minegumo (峯雲), 126, 128, 252, 434, 437–39, 443,
461, 502, 526, 529
Minesweeper No. 1 (第一号掃海艇), 297, 549
Minesweeper No. 2 (第二号掃海艇), 472, 531
Minesweeper No. 3 (第三号掃海艇), 297–98, 527
Minesweeper No. 4 (第四号掃海艇), 297, 527
Minesweeper No. 5 (第五号掃海艇), 295, 297, 418,
509, 577, 582
Minesweeper No. 7 (第七号掃海艇), 227, 346, 355
Minesweeper No. 8 (第八号掃海艇), 227, 346, 355,
512
Minesweeper No. 9 (第九号掃海艇), 215–16, 223,
227, 247, 365, 512, 531
Minesweeper No. 10 (第十号掃海艇), 549
Minesweeper No. 11 (第十一号掃海艇), 215–16,
223, 227–28, 232, 249, 354, 365, 504, 510, 512,
531
Minesweeper No. 12 (第十二号掃海艇), 227–28,
232, 247, 354, 365, 504, 510, 512, 531
Minesweeper No. 13 (第十三号掃海艇), 140–42,
525
Minesweeper No. 14 (第十四号掃海艇), 141, 525
Minesweeper No. 15 (第十五号掃海艇), 141, 189,
190, 512
Minesweeper No. 16 (第十六号掃海艇), 141, 189,
512
Minesweeper No. 17 (第十七号掃海艇), 188
Minesweeper No. 18 (第十八号掃海艇), 188
Minesweeper No. 20 (第二十号掃海艇), 126, 371,
383, 392–94, 424, 505, 507, 529
Mizuho (瑞穂), 61, 84–85, 109, 161, 163, 165, 201,
204, 218, 229–31, 247, 249, 250–51, 256, 345–46,
348, 351–52, 354, 365, 373, 383, 395, 426,
428–29, 458, 499, 500, 513, 645, 657, 659
Modjokerto (モッドヨカード), 477, 491, 496
Mogami (最上 ), 59, 260, 282, 289, 293, 299, 412,
414–18, 418–19, 465–66, 469, 471, 614, 644
Montevideo-maru (もんてびでお丸), 249
Murakumo (叢雲), 274, 282, 465, 467, 469, 508, 588
Murasame (村雨), 126, 128–29, 158, 367, 434, 501
Muroto (室戸), 52, 55, 58, 264
Mutsu (陸奥), 59
Myōken-maru (妙見丸), 525
Myōkō (妙高), 59, 109–10, 118, 150, 346, 347, 355,
360, 380, 405, 410, 425–26, 434, 436, 438, 440,
442, 444, 445–46, 448
Myōkō-maru (妙高丸), 247, 371, 383, 385, 392, 443,
508, 513
Nachi (那智), 59, 109–10, 253, 333, 382, 426, 432–34,
436–43, 445–47, 657
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Nagara (長 良 ), 60, 96, 109, 150, 153, 158–59,
171–72, 201–04, 248–51, 254, 308–09, 313, 317,
319, 322–24, 380–81, 383, 504, 510, 518, 530,
592–94, 600
Nagato (長門), 31–32, 59
Nagatsuki (長月), 366, 465, 509–10
Naka (那珂 ), 60, 84, 106, 109, 126, 128–29, 137,
140–42, 146, 180–81, 188–92, 194, 248, 367, 371,
376, 383, 392–93, 424, 427, 432–34, 437–38, 440,
443, 502–03, 505, 507, 570, 592, 594, 596–99, 600
Nagisan-maru (那岐山丸), 396, 515–16
Nan’a-maru (南阿丸), 128, 179, 187–88, 194, 198,
200, 515, 525
Nankai-maru (南海丸, 南海丸), 109, 151–52, 166,
248
Nanshin-maru No. 48 (第四十八南進丸), 386
Natori (名 取 ), 60, 366, 371, 376, 383–86, 411,
413–17, 465–70, 474, 508–10, 513, 527, 592, 594,
596–97, 599, 600
Natsugumo (夏雲 ), 126, 128–29, 135, 139, 180,
501–02, 526
Natsushio (夏潮 ), 150, 203, 205–06, 251–54, 256,
346, 530, 541
Nenohi (子ノ日), 202, 250, 313, 319
Nes → Van Nes
Nichiai-maru (日愛丸), 128
Nichiei-maru (日榮丸, 日栄丸), 264, 614
Nichirō-maru (日朗丸), 605–06
Nichiyū-maru (日祐丸), 506
Nippon-maru (日本丸), 476, 605–06, 619
Nisshin (日進), 657
Nisshun-maru (日春丸), 396, 516
Nittei-maru (日帝丸), 179, 191
Nojima-maru (野島丸), 572–73, 582
Nowaki (野分), 475, 494, 496
O-XIX (潜水艦O-19), 563
Oboro (朧), 51, 54, 61, 330
Oha-maru (おは丸), 151, 159
Ōi (大井), 59
Okinoshima (沖島), 60
Okitsu-maru (興津丸), 199, 322, 515–16
Ōshio (大潮), 311–14, 316–20, 322–23, 325–28, 504,
530, 543
Otowa-maru (音羽丸), 285, 295, 572–73, 582
Oyashio (親潮), 150–51, 166, 205–06, 252–53, 496
Parigi (パリギ), 487
Parrott (バラット, パロット), 174, 192–93, 326–28
Patrol Boat No. 1 (第一哨戒艇), 96, 150–51, 249,
346, 354–55, 513, 526, 549
Patrol Boat No. 2 (第二哨戒艇), 96, 150–51, 249,
346, 354–55, 513, 526
Patrol Boat No. 3 (第三哨戒艇), 298
Patrol Boat No. 15 (第十五哨戒艇), 190
Patrol Boat No. 20 (第二十哨戒艇), 443
Patrol Boat No. 34 (第三十四哨戒艇), 96, 150, 218,
229, 231, 250, 256, 367, 380, 383, 395, 427–28,
592–94, 597, 600
Patrol Boat No. 35 (第三十五哨戒艇), 96, 132, 367,
371, 380, 382–83, 387, 420–21
Patrol Boat No. 36 (第三十六哨戒艇 ), 96, 126,
128–29, 180, 188–89, 190, 252, 310, 346, 365,
371–72, 380, 383, 592–93, 597, 600
Patrol Boat No. 37 (第三十七哨戒艇), 96, 126, 128,
180, 189–91, 380, 383, 394, 525, 549
Patrol Boat No. 38 (第三十八哨戒艇 ), 96, 126,
128–29, 143, 180, 189–90, 231, 250, 256, 367,
371, 380, 383, 395, 427–28, 513
Patrol Boat No. 39 (第三十九哨戒艇), 96, 126, 150,
218, 229, 231, 250–51, 256, 346, 351, 373, 380,
383, 395, 513
Paul Jones (ポール・ジョーンズ ), 192–93, 243,
461, 463
Pecos (ペコス), 243, 477, 491, 496
Perch (バーチ, パーチ), 503, 530
Permit (バーミット, パーミット), 174, 563
Perth (パース), 450, 461–62, 464, 470–71, 530
Peterel (バトレル), 79
Pickerel (ピックレル), 563
Piet Hein (ピート・ハイン), 243, 315, 324–26, 328,
563
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Pike (バイク, パイク), 174
Pillsbury (ピルスベリー), 243, 326–27, 493
Pope (ポープ ), 174, 192–93, 324–26, 328, 445,
461–63
Preston →William B. Preston
Prince of Wales (プリンス・オブ・ウェルズ), 81,
561, 650
Prins van Oranje (プリンス・ファン・オラーニ
ェ, プリンス・ファン・オランヂ), 138, 143,
145, 149
Rakutō-maru (洛東丸), 128, 322, 515–16
Ramillies (ラミリーズ), 535, 603, 650
Reiyō-maru (麗洋丸), 376
Renown (レナウン), 281
Repulse (レパルス), 81, 414, 561, 650
Resolution (レゾリューション), 650
Revenge (リベンジ), 535, 561, 603, 650
Ro-33 (呂号第三十三潜水艦), 300, 483–84
Ro-34 (呂号第三十四潜水艦), 273, 299, 300–01,
483–84
Rokkō-maru No. 12 (第十二鹿港丸), 386
Royal Sovereign (ロイアルソベリン, ロイヤルソ
ベレーン), 535, 603, 650
Rumoi-maru (留萠丸, 留萌丸), 262, 283, 285, 295,
572–73, 582
Ruyter → De Ruyter
Ryōyō-maru (良洋丸), 215–16
Ryūjō (龍驤), 61, 73, 125, 260, 262, 272, 282–83, 285,
292–93, 299, 370, 473, 641–43, 645
Ryūjō-maru (龍城丸), 472
S-37 (潜水艦S-37), 256
Sagami-maru (相模丸), 310–13, 317, 319, 371, 516
Sagara-maru (相良丸), 260, 262–63, 272, 573, 577,
579, 581–82, 587–89, 589, 591–92
Sagi (鷺), 659
Sakura-maru (佐倉丸), 376, 472
Samidare (五月雨), 126, 128, 184, 194, 367, 434
San Clemente-maru (さんくれめんて丸), 249, 251
Santos-maru (さんとす丸), 60, 486–87
Sanuki-maru (讃岐丸), 85, 96, 126, 131–33, 135, 144,
181, 195–97, 199, 247, 256, 310–11, 322, 345–46,
364–65. 371–72, 383, 394–95, 428–29, 499, 500,
506, 531
San’yō-maru (山陽丸), 60, 83–84, 96, 126, 131–33,
135, 144, 181, 195–96, 198, 345, 364, 371, 380,
382–83, 387–90, 420, 474, 498–99, 506, 508, 510.
582–83, 588–89, 591–92
Sasako-maru (笹 子 丸 ), 311–14, 355, 371, 394,
425–27, 502, 516
Satsuki (皐月), 366, 465, 508
Sazanami (漣), 229, 434, 443
Seian-maru (西安丸), 506, 512–13
Seiha-maru (靜波丸, 静波丸), 264, 598
Sendai (川内), 59, 260, 267–69, 282–86, 289, 297,
376, 572, 587, 642, 646




Shikinami (敷波 ), 272, 282, 293, 415, 417, 419,
465–69, 471–72, 474, 510, 531, 590
Shimushu (占守), 38, 61, 260, 262, 264, 267, 283,
296, 298, 303, 408, 549, 577–78, 582, 590
Shinkoku-maru [A] (新國丸, 新国丸), 396
Shinkoku-maru [B] (神國丸, 神国丸), 605–06
Shinkō-maru [A] (新興丸), 512
Shinkō-maru [B] (神功丸, 神功丸), 151
Shinsei-maru No. 18 (第十八眞盛丸, 第十八真盛丸),
396
Shiokaze (汐風), 73, 272, 293, 527, 614
Shirakumo (白雲), 282, 465, 467, 474, 508, 615, 644
Shiranui (不知火), 543
Shirataka (白鷹), 153, 159, 172, 364, 366, 371, 383,
385–86, 443, 468, 512
Shiratsuyu (白露), 190
Shirayuki (白雪), 268, 282–87, 297, 465, 468, 588
Shōkaku (翔 鶴 ), 32, 61, 609, 611, 620–22, 625,
628–29, 631–32
Shōka-maru (彰化丸), 151, 166
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Shōnan-maru No. 7 (第七昭南丸), 387
Shōnan-maru No.12 (第十二昭南丸), 387
Shōō (祥凰, 祥凰), 657
Shunsei-maru (春生丸 [actually: 春晴丸]), 590
Sianter (シアンター), 486
Sloet van de Beele (スロエト・ヴァン・ベレル),
299, 305
Soerabaja (スラバヤ), 563
Sōryū (蒼龍), 32, 61, 95, 101, 116, 201, 219, 334, 336,
338–39, 476, 478–79, 492, 496, 608–09, 611,
620–21, 623, 625–26, 628–29, 631–32
Stewart (スチュワート), 174, 243, 326–28
Stronghold (ストロングホールド), 493–94, 496
Submarine Chaser No. 1 (第一号駆潜艇 ), 221,
308, 323, 504, 512, 549
Submarine Chaser No. 2 (第二号駆潜艇 ), 216,
256, 512, 528
Submarine Chaser No. 3 (第三号駆潜艇 ), 249,
512, 528
Submarine Chaser No. 4 (第四号駆潜艇 ), 370,
393, 426, 512, 529
Submarine Chaser No. 5 (第五号駆潜艇), 512
Submarine Chaser No. 6 (第六号駆潜艇), 512
Submarine Chaser No. 7 (第七号駆潜艇 ), 285,
297, 573
Submarine Chaser No. 8 (第八号駆潜艇 ), 285,
297–98
Submarine Chaser No. 9 (第九号駆潜艇), 267–69,
283
Submarine Chaser No. 10 (第十号駆潜艇), 128,
139
Submarine Chaser No. 11 (第十一号駆潜艇), 128,
505
Submarine Chaser No. 12 (第十二号駆潜艇), 128,
139, 188, 190
Submarine Chaser No. 13 (第十三号駆潜艇), 512
Submarine Chaser No. 14 (第十四号駆潜艇), 249,
251, 512, 528
Submarine Chaser No. 15 (第十五号駆潜艇), 512
Submarine Chaser No. 16 (第十六号駆潜艇), 425,
512
Submarine Chaser No. 17 (第十七号駆潜艇), 512
Submarine Chaser No. 18 (第十八号駆潜艇), 512
Submarine Chaser No. 21 (第二十一号駆潜艇),
323
Submarine Chaser No. 51 (第五十一号駆潜艇),
549
Sumanoura-maru (須磨浦丸), 179, 181, 189–91, 193,
199, 525
Sumatra (スマトラ), 563
Sussex (スーザン), 535, 603
Suwa-maru (諏訪丸), 376
Suzukaze (涼風), 126, 128, 251, 371, 530, 645
Suzuya (鈴谷), 59, 260, 282, 285, 289, 419, 614, 644
Swordfish (スオードフィッシュ), 563, 622, 625,
627, 651
Tachikaze (太刀風), 396
Taiei-maru No. 2 (第二大榮丸, 第二大栄丸), 386
Taigei (大鯨), 60
Taikō-maru (大興丸), 513
Tajima-maru (但馬丸), 269, 297
Takao (高雄), 59, 371, 475, 493–94, 496
Tama (多摩), 60
Tatsugami-maru (辰神丸 , 辰神丸 ), 128, 187–89,
191, 193, 198–99, 200, 515, 525
Tatsuharu-maru (辰春丸), 512




Teiryū-maru (帝龍丸), 128, 179, 190–91
Teiyō-maru (帝洋丸), 376, 476
Tenjin-maru (天神丸, 天神丸), 386
Tenryū (天龍), 60
Ten’yō-maru (天洋丸), 60
Tenzan-maru (天山丸), 396, 516
Tōei-maru [A] (東榮丸, 東栄丸), 476, 493, 605–06,
635
Tōei-maru [B] (藤影丸), 179, 189, 191, 193
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Tokitsukaze (時津風), 150, 166, 205–06, 434, 502,
504, 506, 526
Tokiwa (常盤), 60
Tokushima-maru (徳島丸), 444, 505
Tomozuru (友鶴), 355, 371, 425–27, 502, 512–13
Tonegawa-maru (利根川丸), 376
Toné (利根), 59, 334, 337, 339, 476, 478–79, 481,
622–25, 629–31
Toyosaka-maru (とよさか丸), 309, 322
Tromp (トロンプ), 239–40, 243, 305, 317–18, 320,
326–28, 563
Tsubame (燕), 365, 513
Tsugaru (津輕, 津軽), 60
Tsukushi (筑紫), 249, 254, 308–09, 323, 383, 462,
504, 510, 513
Tsuruga-maru (敦賀丸), 127, 179, 188, 191–93
Tsurumi (鶴見), 264, 298, 369, 387, 410, 413, 508,
510
Umikaze (海風, 海風), 126, 128, 186, 194, 392
Urakaze (浦風), 491, 496
Uranami (浦波), 282, 410, 415
Ushio (潮), 356, 434, 443, 525, 550
Vampire (バンパイヤー), 651–52
Van Ghent (ファンゲント), 243, 305, 563
Van Nes (ヴァンネス), 299, 305, 563
Wakaba (若葉), 202, 250, 319, 526
Wakataka (若鷹), 131, 181, 371, 380, 383, 392–93,
424, 432, 443, 512
Wake (ウェーク), 79
Warspite (ウォースパイト), 535–36, 603, 650–51
Washingtonian (ワシントニア), 648
Whipple (ホィップル, ホイップル), 174, 243, 305
William B. Preston (プレストン), 80, 563
Witte de With (ヴィテ・デ・ウィット), 461–63, 563
Yae-maru (八重丸), 590
Yaeyama (八重山), 60, 99
Yaeyama-maru [actually: Yae-maru] (八重山丸[八
重丸]), 590
Yamafuku-maru (山福丸, 山福丸), 215
Yamagiri-maru (山霧丸), 
Yamagumo (山雲), 126, 128–29, 180, 252–53, 360,
371, 380, 383, 392–93, 443, 505–06
Yamakaze (山風), 126, 128, 136, 138, 142–43, 145,
312, 354–55, 367, 371–73, 405, 410, 425–26, 431,
434–35, 437–38, 443, 446–48, 526
Yamashimo-maru (山霜丸), 249
Yamashiro (山城), 59
Yamato (大和), 551, 655
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Aeng Batoe Batoe (アエンバトバト), 249, 252
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Akyab (アキャブ), 535, 615, 618–19, 639, 640–41,
652
Alang, Cape, ~Battery (アロング岬, ~砲台), 217,
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136–38, 146
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Ambelau Island (アンベラウ島), 222
Ambon, ~Island, ~Bay (アンボン, ~島, ~湾), 19,
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Angaur (アンガウル), 340
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ス), 425
Apar Besar (アバルベサル湾), 257
Aparri (アパリ), 25, 29, 39, 52, 63, 82
Api Channel (アピ水道), 413
Apo [Reef] Channel (アポ水道), 392
Arafura Sea (アラフラ海 ), 16, 20, 71, 234, 331,
340–41, 368, 406, 484, 485, 617
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), 419
Aru Bank, (waterway of ~) (アルーバンク), 187,
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514–15, 534–36, 537, 556, 559, 563, 567, 603,
605, 612, 617, 653, 654–58, 660
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397–99, 401, 403, 406, 413, 419, 424, 488–90,
497–98, 501
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Bobos Point (ボボス角), 510
Bohoi (ボホイ岬), 166
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620, 648–49
Bone, Gulf of (ボニ, ポニ湾), 254, 428, 484
Boompjes Island [Pulau Biawak] (ブームゼス島,
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Bula (ブル, ブラ), 219
Bulujowo (ブルージャク), 391
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olines) (中部太平洋), 584
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355–57, 366, 372, 406, 425–26, 428, 484, 564
Dobo (ドボ), 335
Dondo Bay (ドンドン湾), 373, 395, 427–28
Donggang (東港), 84–86, 102
Dunkirk (ダンケルク), 3, 5
Durban (ダーバン), 536, 603, 649
Dutch Borneo [Kalimantan] (蘭領ボルネオ), 16,
35, 44, 74, 370, 511
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印度諸島, 東印度), 1–17, 19–21, 23–25, 27–31,
33, 35, 37–42, 44, 47–48, 52, 54–55, 66–71, 75,
79, 82, 87–91, 94–96, 100–06, 109–16, 118,
122–23, 137, 143, 158, 177, 179, 195, 199, 200,
204–05, 207–08, 212–14, 220, 232, 242–43, 248,
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Dutch Timor (蘭領チモール), 17, 123
Duyoh (ルジョン), 275
Eight Degree Channel (八度水道), 648
Elphinstone (エルヒンストン), 587
Ema (エマ), 228
Endau (エンダウ , エンドウ), 120–21, 124, 204,
272, 361
[Equatorial] Pacific Islands (南洋群島, 南洋, 南洋
諸島), 34–36, 38, 43, 47, 373, 654–55
Eretan (エレタン), 488
Eri (エリ), 227–28
Europe (欧州), 2–4, 536, 555, 557–58, 560–61
Fak Fak (ファクファク), 335
Far East (極東), 1–3, 31, 70, 554–63, 650, 661
Fatucama (パトエカマ岬), 356
Fiji (フィジー, フィージー), 45, 50, 654
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Flagstaff Point (フラッグスタフ岬), 
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Fourcroy, Cape (ワークロイ岬), 339, 340–41
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67–68, 79, 80, 112, 117, 121, 301, 361, 400, 409,
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Jugra River (ジュクラ河, ジュグラ河), 574–75
Juwata (ジュワタ), 130, 136, 138, 145, 148
Kabaena Island (カバエナ), 230
Kabanjahe (カバンチャイ), 580
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Index of Place Names 711
Kakas (カカス), 19, 152, 154, 160–61, 165–66, 173,
175–76, 222
Kakinada (コカナダ), 618, 643, 652
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461, 500, 503, 505–07, 510, 520, 524
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Ledo (レド), 91, 101, 112, 120, 122, 124, 208–09,
259, 270, 273–78, 280, 282–83, 292, 301, 377,
406, 413
Leeuwin, Cape (リーウィン岬), 486
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ルダイブ諸島), 615, 652
Mali, Cape (マリー岬), 348, 351, 353
Mamua, Cape (アモア岬), 228
Manchu(ria) (満州, 満), 2, 6, 11–12
Mandalay (マンダレー), 535, 566, 570
Mandar, Cape, ~Bay (マンダル岬, ~湾), 254, 313,
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Manggar River (マンガル河), 195
Mangkalihat (マンカリハット岬), 184, 187, 428
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Mangrove Bay (マングローブ湾), 641
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222, 230, 332
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Maospati (マオスバチ, マオスパチ), 429
Mapur (マポール島), 573, 574
Mariana Islands (マリアナ諸島), 554, 640
Mariso (マリソ灯台), 255
Maromaho Island (マロマホ), 347
Maros (マロス飛行場), 249, 252–53
Marshall Islands (マーシャル諸島), 80, 123, 212,
534, 554, 584, 656
Martapura (Borneo) (マルタプラ), 187, 254, 257,
428
Martapura (Sumatra) (マルタプラ), 266, 303–04
Masalembu Islands (マサレンボ島), 313, 425
Masalembu Besar (マサレンボベサル), 240
Masalembu Kecil (マサレンボケチル), 240
Matasiri Island (マタリシ島), 425
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Menado [Manado] (メナド), 19, 21, 30–31, 36, 39,
45, 55, 63, 71, 82, 88–89, 91–99, 101, 107–112,
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Merak (メラク), 361, 374, 378, 381, 384, 398, 413,
419, 465, 488, 498, 500, 508, 527
Meratus Mountains (メラトス山脈), 257





Middle East (中東), 535, 603
Midway Island (ミッドウェー), 45, 49, 567, 626,
653–54, 656, 658
Mikawa Bay (三河湾), 601
Minahasa (ミナハサ州),175 
Minami Iwo Jima ((South) Iwo Jima) (南硫黄島),
601
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601
Mindanao (ミンダナオ), 15, 18–19, 94, 144, 161,
222, 340, 406
Mingaladon (ミンガラドン), 640
Miri (ミリ), 16, 19, 20, 22, 25, 30–31, 39, 63, 70–71,
75, 81, 100, 112, 114, 133, 301
Mojokerto (モジョケルト), 489
Molucca Channel (モルッカ水道), 222
Molucca Sea (モルッカ海), 16, 21, 112, 172–73,
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Naibonak (ゲイボナ, ゲイボ), 353–54
Nakhon (ナコン), 29, 63, 80
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Namlea (ナンレア), 220, 229–31
Nangka [Besar] Island (ナンカ島), 297
Natuna Islands (ナッツ[島嶼]), 20, 283, 410, 413
Near and Middle East (中近東), 535, 603
Near East (近東), 23, 535, 603–04
Netherlands (オランダ, 蘭, 和蘭), 3–6, 9, 13–14,
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Nomonhan (ノモンハン), 2
Nona, Gunung (ノナ山, ノマ山), 227–28
North Africa (北阿), 603–04
North Channel (ノースチャンネル), 487
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419, 421
Norway (ノルウェー), 3
Nunggul, Cape (ヌンヨル岬), 286
Nunrima (ヌンレウ), 353
Nusanive, Cape (ヌサンバ岬), 221
Obi (Mayor) Island (オビメイヤー島), 221–22,
230
Obi Strait, ~Islands (オビ海峡, ~諸島), 173, 222,
230
Oebelo (ロバウ), 353
Oecina, Cape (オイシナ岬), 353
Oekabiti (カピチ), 353
Oesapa Besar (ウサパベサル), 353
Oesau (デサウ), 352–54
Ogasawara Islands [Bonin Islands] (小笠原諸島,
~群島), 36
Oilalus (アルス), 348, 353
Olongapo (オロンガポ), 23
Ombai Strait (オンバイ海峡), 332, 356, 405, 475,
477–78, 486, 608–09, 638
Pacific Islands (太平洋諸島), 34–36, 38, 43, 47, 51,
53, 76, 373, 654–55
Pacific, Pacific Ocean (太平洋), 20, 27, 35–38, 79,
192, 199, 201, 222, 242–43, 324, 340, 406, 435,
453, 460–61, 484, 536, 539, 554–56, 559, 577,
584, 618, 649, 653–55
Padamarang Island (パダマラン島), 428
Padang (パダン), 20, 580
Padang Sidempuan(パダンシジンパン), 580
Pakiputan Strait (パキプタン水道), 161, 174
Palau (パラオ), 24, 52, 63–68, 72, 84–87, 91, 93–94,
102, 104–09, 117, 119, 123, 205–06, 212, 218,
331–33, 335, 340, 345, 360–61, 371–73, 401, 406,
486–87, 492, 518, 571, 606, 612
Palawan Island (パラワン島), 15
Palembang (パレンバン), 8, 16–17, 19, 21–22, 25,
39, 71, 90, 92–93, 101, 103, 112, 116–17, 125,
204, 208, 210, 213, 258–62, 264–66, 269–73, 281,
284–87, 293–96, 299, 300–05, 329, 331–33,
359–60, 362, 366, 368–69, 371, 373, 377–78,
400–01, 403–04, 406, 408, 413, 420–21, 424, 482,
484, 486, 500, 517, 568, 573, 615
Palk ~Bay, ~Strait (パルク海湾, ~湾, ~海峡), 613,
618–19, 638
Palmyra Atoll (パルミラ島), 655
Pamekasan (パメカサン), 240
Pamukan [Bay] (バムカン), 257





Panjang Island (パンジャン島), 466–67, 472, 508
Pantai Timur (パンタイチムール), 323
Pantar (バンタル), 230
Paracel Islands (西沙群島), 20
Parepare (パラパラ海岸), 256
Paris (パリ), 3
Pasirian (パリシアン, パリシァン), 430
Paso (near Ambon) (パソ), 217, 226–28
Paso (near Lake Tondano) (パソ), 165–66, 175–76
Pasuruan (パスルアン), 329
Pata anchorage (バタ泊地), 375, 395, 428
Patrol (パトロール), 361, 374, 381, 387–88, 390,
398, 412–14, 418–21, 298–99, 506, 508–09, 585
Pattani (パタニ), 39, 63, 79–80, 557
Pearl Harbor (真珠湾, 真珠港), 50, 79, 80
Pebelokan (ペベロカン島), 509
716 Index of Place Names
Pegu (ペグー), 566
Pejantan Island (ペジャンタン, ペシャンタン),
420–22
Pekanbaru (パカンバル), 19, 300
Peleliu (ペリリュー), 85, 102, 406–07
Peleng Island, ~Channel (ペレン島, ~水道), 230,
254
Pemangkat (パマンカット), 274–75
Penang (ペナン, 彼南), 18, 20, 23, 36, 45, 91–92, 94,
103–04, 121, 263, 265, 361, 401, 487, 498, 559,
567–68, 576–83, 585–92, 615, 645–48
Penfui (プトン, ブトン), 348, 353, 355
Penghu Islands [Pescadores] (澎湖島), 63
Petokol, Cape (ペトコーア岬), 503
Philippines (フィリピン, 比島, 菲律賓), 1, 15–16,
18–22, 24–31, 33, 35–42, 44, 46–49, 52, 54, 64,
66–71, 75, 79–80, 82–84, 87–88, 93, 95, 98–99,
100, 107, 110, 112–15, 117–18, 121, 143, 167,
205, 214, 217, 307, 358–59, 361, 514, 539,
554–56, 562, 617, 658, 660–62
Phnom Penh (プノンペン), 301
Phú Quốc Island (フコク島), 80
Phuket (プケト), 589, 591
Piapi Reef (ピアピリーフ), 109
Piru Bay (ピル湾), 222, 230–31, 250
Pitt Passage (ビット水道), 230
Pluti (プルチ), 353
Poland (ポーランド), 2, 3
Pontang, Cape (ポンタン角 , ボンタン角), 419,
421
Pontianak (ポンチャナック), 19, 120, 275–75, 413
Port Blair (ポートブレア , ボーバリア ), 583,
585–89, 591–92, 614–18, 638–39, 641–42, 645,
652
Port Cornwallis, Cornwallis (ポートコンウェル,
コンウォーリス), 581, 587
Port Darwin (ポートダーウィン, ポートダービ
ン ), 25, 48, 72, 90, 105, 122–23, 174, 212–13,
220, 244, 248, 310, 319, 330–37, 339–41, 347,
349, 351, 357, 361–62, 371–73, 401, 406, 425,
431, 478, 482, 484–85, 497, 531, 563, 601, 612,
617, 660
Port Moresby (ポートモレスビー), 633, 656–58,
660
Portugal (ポルトガル, 葡), 17, 123, 343
Portuguese Bay (ボルトギース湾, ポリトギュー
ス湾), 228–29
Portuguese Timor (葡領チモール, ポルトガル領
チモール), 18, 20, 123, 342–43, 347–48




Puisan, Cape (プイサン岬), 166
Puolo Condore (プロコンドル諸島 ), 120, 268,
283, 372–73
Purwokerto (プルオケルト), 489
Puting, Cape (プチン角), 425, 428, 458, 506
Rabaul (ラバウル, ラボール), 36, 45, 51, 91, 116,
211–12, 357, 373, 516, 534, 660
Rangoon (ラングーン�ラングン、蘭貢), 16, 48,
81, 336, 535, 539, 565–66, 568, 570, 576, 582,
588–92, 613, 615, 618, 639–40, 652, 660
Ratahan (フタハン), 166
Reo (レオ), 245
Riouw Strait [Selat Riau] (リオ海峡), 294
Roi (ルオット), 80
Romang Island (ロマン, ロマング島), 230, 347
Ross Island (ロス島), 581, 586–88
Roti Island, ~Strait (ロチ島, ~海峡), 353–54
Rumahtiga (ルーマチガ), 228
Rupat Island (ラパト島), 574
Rutung (ローテン), 214, 216–17, 223–24, 226–28
Sabang Island, ~Bay (サバン島, ~湾), 19–20, 40,
71, 566, 576–81, 585–86, 589, 591, 613, 615–18,
641, 643, 645
Sadau Island (サウド島), 138
Saigon (サイゴン, 西貢), 20, 69–70, 90, 94, 104,
112, 116, 263, 265, 274, 277–81, 301, 374, 397,
410, 498, 503, 505, 565, 585, 590, 615
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Saipan (サイパン島), 80, 656
Sakala Island (セカラ島), 313
Sakhalin (樺太), 8, 11
Salabangka, ~Channel (サラバンガ島 , ~水道),
218, 222, 230
Salamaua (サラモア), 660
Saleh River (サレ河), 261, 266–67, 269, 285–86, 303
Salween River (サルウィン河), 566
Samal Island (サマール島), 106–07
Samarinda (サマリンダ), 21, 103, 115, 187, 254,
373, 428
Sambas (サンパス), 274–75
Sambergelap Island (サンラゲラップ島), 425
Samboja (スンボジャ), 187, 195
Samoa (サモア), 45, 50–51, 654
Samosir Island (サモシリ島), 580
San Agustin, Cape (サンオーガスチン岬), 107
Sanga Sanga (サンガサンガ), 17, 22, 187, 540
Sanggau (サンゴウ), 274–75
Sangihe Islands (サンギ島, サンギヘ島), 173, 222
Sangkulirang (サンクリラン), 187
Sanur, ~anchorage (サヌール, ~泊地), 307, 309,
312–14, 316–17, 319, 322, 325–27
Sanya (三亜), 63–65, 67, 72, 74, 102, 112, 646
Sapanjang Island (セバジャン, セバヂャン, セバ
ンジャン島), 240, 313
Sape Strait (セープ海, ~海峡), 24, 313
Sapunang (サプヌン河), 426
Sarangani Bay, ~Islands (サランガニ湾, ~諸島),
107, 144
Sarawak, principality of~, (サラワク, ~王国), 16,
20
Sasebo (佐世保), 34, 85, 107, 110, 365, 410, 426,
438, 516, 552, 571, 590, 602, 646
Savu Island (サブ島), 245, 332–33
Sawu Sea (サウ海), 484, 612
Saya Island (サヤ島), 284–85
Seba (セバ), 245
Sebadu (セバドウ), 275
Sebuku Island (near Thwartway) (セグク島), 508
Sebuku Island (near Laut Island, Borneo) (セブ島),
254
Sedan (セダン), 391
Selatan, Cape (セラタン角, セランタン角), 240,
313, 354–55, 425, 427–29
Selayar, ~Island, ~Strait (サレーエル, サレエル,
~島, ~海峡), 231, 240, 249–51, 254, 428
Seletar (セレター), 18, 449, 570, 573, 575, 590, 619,
641
Semangka Bay (スマンカ湾), 266
Semarang (スマラン , セマラン), 301, 323, 329,
391, 406, 425, 430, 461, 489, 615
Semau, ~Island, ~Channel, ~Strait (セマウ, ~島,





Seria (セリヤ), 8, 75
Sermata Islands (セルマタ諸島), 230
Shan Plateau (シャン高原), 16
Shanghai (上海), 79–80, 555
Sharks Bay (シャークス湾), 486–87, 534
Siam, Gulf of, (Thailand, Gulf of) (シャム湾), 625
Sibbalds Bank (ジバルヅバンク), 425
Sibolga (シボルカ), 580





Singapore, ~Strait (シンガポール, ~島,新嘉坡, 昭
南, 昭南島, ～海峡), 4, 16, 18, 20, 23, 28–30,
35–36, 39, 40–41, 44–45, 47–48, 65, 67, 71, 79,
90–91, 93, 95, 112, 258, 264, 276, 279–80,
282–83, 285, 287, 290–91, 296, 301–02, 330–31,
362, 368, 371, 406, 413, 484, 499, 500, 505, 507,
509–10, 518, 520, 524, 548, 555–59, 563, 566–68,
570–79, 581–82, 585, 587–92, 600, 606, 615, 619,
645–49, 659
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Singaraja (シンガラジャ), 311, 313, 329
Singkawang (シンカワン), 274–75, 411, 413
Singkep Island (シンケップ島), 283, 293
Singora (Thailand) (シンゴラ ), 20, 29, 39, 63,
79–81, 94, 263, 265, 270, 557
Slim (スリム), 121
Smith Point (スミスポイント), 594–95, 597
Snake Island (スネーク島), 586
Solomon Islands (ソロモン, ~群島), 656–57, 660
Sorong (ソロン), 55, 88, 219, 340, 406, 484
South Africa (南阿, 南アフリカ), 331, 603, 656
South China Sea (南シナ海, 南支那海) 10, 16, 18,
20–21, 66, 88, 95, 103, 112, 301, 396, 518, 604,
615, 633
South Pacific (南太平洋), 38, 584, 654
Southwest Islands (南西諸島), 52, 64
Soviet Union, Russia (ソ, 蘇, ソ連, 露), 1, 2, 3, 6,
26, 48, 53, 536–39, 554, 561–62
Spratly Islands (新南群島), 20, 301
St. Nicholas Point [Tanjung Pujut] (ニコラス岬,
セントニコラス角), 418–19, 465–67, 469, 498,
508–09
Staring Bay [Teluk Wawosungu] (スターリング
湾 ), 222, 230, 248–51, 253–54, 300, 322–23,
331–33, 340–41, 345, 347, 351, 354, 365, 371–73,
401, 403, 410, 426, 428, 475–78, 482–87, 492,
494, 496, 571, 601–02, 604, 606, 608, 617, 619,
638, 646
Stewart Sound (ステワート・サウンド), 581, 587
Suakodo (ソワコード), 224–25, 228
Subang (スバン), 488
Sudetenland (ズデーテン), 557
Sudimara Island (セズマラ島), 286
Sula Islands (スラ島, スラ諸島), 169, 173, 221–22,
229–30, 249, 340, 428, 484
(Sula) Mangoli (スラマンゴリ島 , ~海峡 ), 222,
229–30
(Sula) Sanana (スラサナナ), 230
Sulamu, Cape (スラム岬), 353
Sulu Archipelago (スール諸島, ~列島), 15, 19
Sulu Sea (スール海), 112, 132, 144, 154, 158, 484,
612
Sumatra (スマトラ), 8, 16–17, 19–22, 24, 28, 30–31,
35–36, 38, 42, 44, 57, 64, 68, 71, 91–93, 103, 112,
120–25, 258–59, 261, 273, 278, 280, 286, 301–02,
304, 307, 323, 329–30, 332–33, 358–60, 363, 377,
379, 396–97, 402, 406, 408, 413, 423, 482,
484–85, 510–11, 517, 520, 534, 540, 563–64,
566–68, 570, 576, 578–81, 583, 585–86, 604, 612,
615
Sumba Island, ~Strait (スンバ島, ~海峡), 16, 240,
245, 406, 428, 475, 478, 484, 612, 638
Sumbawa (Island) (スンバワ島), 16, 240, 242, 254,
313, 329, 406, 428, 475, 478, 484, 496
Sumber River (サンバニ河), 195
Sunda Islands ([Lesser] Sunda Islands) (スンダ列
島, ~諸島), 16, 21–22, 308, 396, 482, 511, 534,
567, 658
[Greater] Sunda Islands (大スンダ諸島), 16, 18,
20
Sunda Sea (スンダ海), 234–35, 428
Sunda Strait (スンダ海峡), 48, 265, 272–73, 300,
329, 331, 370, 373, 406, 411–13, 419–20, 462,
482–83, 485, 498
Sungai Mahakam (マハカム河), 187
Sungai Petani (スンゲイパタニ), 18, 81, 259, 273,
280–81, 302, 498, 579
Sungai Pinyuh (スンゲイペニュ), 275
Sungguminasa (スングミナサ), 249, 255
Surabaya, (スラバヤ), 17, 19, 21, 36, 40, 45, 47–48,
71, 96, 100–01, 104, 111–12, 121, 174, 192, 220,
233–35, 238, 240–43, 245, 248, 301, 306, 308,
310–14, 319, 321–24, 329, 344, 346, 354–55, 359,
366, 368, 371–72, 374–75, 377, 379–80, 382, 394,
397–98, 401–06, 409–10, 425, 427–33, 440, 442,
446, 450, 453–54, 456, 458, 460–63, 470, 475,
483–84, 488–90, 497, 499, 500–07, 511–12, 515,
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Tainan (台南), 85, 114, 236, 361
Taiwan, ~ Strait (台湾, 臺灣, ~海峡), 11, 15, 20, 24,
28–30, 40–41, 52, 64–68, 80, 82, 106, 112–13,
310, 358, 364, 400, 517–18, 553
Taizhong (台中), 85, 102
Takatalu Rock (タカタル礁), 187
Takingeun (タキゴン), 580
Takisung (タキソン), 355
[Talang] Abab (アバブ), 266
Talaud Islands (タラウド島), 222, 340, 612
Taliabu (タリアブ), 230
Talisei Island (タリセイ島), 166
Talomo (タロモ), 117
Talu (タロル), 580
Tambelan Islands (タンブレン島, タンベラン諸
島), 283, 413
Tambu Bay (タムブ湾), 428
Tamperong Island (タムペロン島), 166
Tanahgrogot (タナゴロコッド, タナゴロコット),
254, 257
Tanahjampea Island (タナシャンビー島), 254
Tanahwangko (タナワンコ), 166
Tanakeke (タナケケ島), 252, 254, 311, 313
Tangerang (タンゲラン), 398
Tanimbar (タニンバル諸島), 340, 406, 484
Tanjung Priok (タンジョンプリオク), 21, 323, 509
Tanjungkarang (タンジュンカラン, タンヂュン
カラン), 266, 303, 304, 329, 373, 377, 406, 413,
424
Tantui (タンツイ), 228
Tapah, Cape (トイード岬), 286
Tarakan Island (タラカン), 11, 17, 19, 21–22, 30,
36, 39, 45, 48, 55, 63–65, 68–69, 71, 75, 81–82,
88–89, 91–97, 99, 101, 103, 107–08, 110–12,
114–15, 117–19, 126–27, 129–38, 140–41,
143–49, 164, 174, 177–87, 192, 198, 205, 207,
216, 236, 250, 306–07, 310, 342, 359–61, 367,





Tateyama (館山), 102, 577
Taunggyi (タウンギー), 535
Tavoy (タヴォイ, タボイ), 588–89, 591–92, 618,
639, 640
Tawiri (タウリ), 225–26
Tawi-Tawi (Island) (タウイタウイ), 19, 23, 131
Tebakubekun [Telukbetong ?] (テバクベクン),
323
Tebas (トバシ), 275
Telang River (テラ河, テラン河), 261, 266, 285–86,
303
Telo (テロ河), 255
Ten Degree Channel (十度海峡), 641, 645





Ternate (テルナテ), 88–89, 169, 173, 219, 230, 406
Thailand, Thai, Gulf of ~ (タイ, 泰, 泰国, タイラ
ンド, ~ 湾), 5–6, 15–16, 18, 20, 29, 31–32, 35–36,
39, 42, 44, 52, 63–65, 67, 70, 75, 80–81, 117, 121,
535, 559, 565–66, 585, 615
Thousand Islands [Pulau Seribu] (サウザンド諸
島, ダイゼント諸島), 420
Thủ Dầu Một (ツダウム), 79, 280–81, 292, 402,
409, 421, 498
Thwartway [Dwars-in-den-Weg, Pulau San-
giang] (ソワートウェイ島) 467, 508
Tianjin (天津), 2
Tifore Island (テイホ島), 73
Timor, ~Island, ~Sea (チモール, ~島, ~海), 16–20,
24–25, 35–36, 44, 112, 122–23, 192, 207, 213,
219–20, 234, 240, 244, 319, 331, 333, 335–36,
340–43, 345–49, 351, 354–55, 357, 362–63,
404–06, 410, 426, 428, 431, 475, 478, 481, 484,
487, 516, 526, 558, 585, 612
Tinian Island (テニアン), 640
720 Index of Place Names
Toba, Lake (トバ湖), 580
Toboali (トホブリ), 304, 413, 420–21, 498
Tokyo, ~Bay (東京, ~湾), 27, 61, 87, 103–04, 116,
342, 345, 498, 601
Tolo, Gulf of (トロ湾), 230
Tombatu (トンバル), 166
Tomini, Gulf of (トミニ湾, ドミニ湾), 154, 158,
164, 168, 201, 230, 395, 428, 484, 612
Tomohon (トモホン), 152, 160, 165–66, 175
Tompaso (トムパソ), 165–66, 175–76
Tondano, Lake ~ (トンダノ, ~湖), 152, 155, 157,
160, 165–66, 168, 176
Tonsawang, Lake (トンサワン湖), 166
Toppers Island [Pulau Tampurung] (トッパース
灯台), 508–09
Torres Strait (トーレス海峡, トレス海峡), 122,
204, 213, 332, 482, 485
Tountimomor (トウンテイモモル), 166
Trincomalee (ツリンコマリ ), 559, 571, 603–04,
606–07, 613, 615–16, 618–20, 627–31, 633,
638–40, 642, 647–52
Truk (Islands) (トラック), 212, 334
Tuguegarao (ツゲガラオ), 80
Tuing, Cape (ツイン角), 288
Tujuh Islands (セブン島), 286
Tulagi (ツラギ), 656, 660
Tumpak, Gunung (ツンパ山), 166
Tunang (ツナン), 275
Tutuila Island (ツツイラ), 50
Ujina (宇品), 116
Ujung Parapa (バラバ海岸), 310
Ular, Cape (ウラル角), 286–87, 297
Uloimi, Cape (ウロイム岬), 353
United States (米, A (アメリカ)), 1–6, 9–11, 13–14,
17, 23, 26–27, 32–34, 42–43, 45–46, 48, 76,105,
192, 201, 204, 211, 243, 323, 357, 530, 534–39,
551–52, 554–55, 558, 562–63, 653–56 
Upang River (ウパン河, ウバン河), 286, 296
Victoria Point (ビクトリアポイント), 81
Vigan (ビガン), 25, 29, 39, 52, 63, 82, 85, 549
Visakhapatnam (ビザカパタム, ビザガパタム),
614, 618, 643, 652
Visayan Islands (ビサヤ諸島), 15
Waiame (ワイアメ), 224, 228
Wain River (ワイン河), 178–79, 195
Waingapu (ワインガップ), 245
Wakal (フカル), 228
Wake, ~Island, Ōtorishima (ウエーク, ~島, ウェ
ーキ, 大鳥島), 51, 80, 116, 571, 601, 656
Wanci Island (Wangiwangi) (ホンジ島), 254
Wangiwangi (オンギオンギ島), 203
Waterfall (Christmas Island) (ウォーターフォー
ル), 595
Wetar (ウェタル), 230
Weti River (ウエチ河), 224–25
William, Cape [Tanjung Rangas] (ウィリャム岬,
ウイリアム岬), 252, 254, 313, 428
Wori (ウオリー), 166
Wota [Oti] anchorage (ヲタ泊地), 395
Wowoni Island (ウォウォニ島), 203, 222
Wyndham (ウィンダム), 497
Yamaguchi (pref.) (山口(県)), 69
Yangtze Kiang [Yangzi, Chang Jiang] (揚子江),
555
Yenangyaung (イエナンギャング), 22, 566
Yogyakarta (ジョクジャカルタ), 329, 425, 430,
489, 497
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734 Attached Table No. 2
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Type Fighter Plane Bomber
Attached Illustrations Nos. 5, 6, 7
The Sea Engagement off Surabaya [Battle of the Java Sea]
The Sea Engagement off Batavia [Battle of Sunda Strait]
The following illustrations were too large to be scaled down to the confines of the English
edition and have been omitted:
Attached Illustration No. 1: General Map of the Southwestern Area with Insets of Java,
Sumatra, etc. [Omitted]
Attached Illustration No. 2: An Outline of the Military Strength Deployed in the Southern
Countries [Omitted]
Attached Illustration No. 3: The Distances Between the Main Air Bases [Omitted]
Attached Illustration No. 4: The Movements of the Japanese and Enemy Fleets off Bangka
on 15 February [Omitted]
Attached Illustration No. 8: The Shift of Forces of the Air Unit of the Southern Task Force
[Omitted]
Attached Illustration No. 9: The Operations [of the Japanese Carrier Task Force] in the At-
tack on Ceylon [Omitted]
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